

The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

**POWER IN COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE:
CONTINGENCIES OF POWER SHARING, RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
POWER AND TRUST, AND APPROACHES TO ENHANCING POWER
SHARING**

A Dissertation in

Public Administration

by

Huiting Qi

© 2022 Huiting Qi

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

May 2022

The dissertation of Huiting Qi was reviewed and approved by the following:

Bing Ran

Associate Professor of Public Administration

Dissertation Advisor

Chair of Committee

Odd Stalebrink

Associate Professor of Public Administration

Professor -in-Charge of the Ph.D. Program in Public Administration

Triparna Vasavada

Associate Professor of Public Administration

John Haddad

Professor of American Studies

ABSTRACT

Despite collaborative advantages advocated by literature, there are still many challenges facing by both scholars and practitioners in collaborative governance. In order to further understand challenges, scholars increasingly study different factors contributing to these challenges and find that the paradoxical nature of collaborative governance is an important one. Based on a systematic review of literature on collaborative governance in a paradox lens, I developed a framework consisting of 12 paradoxes and found many paradoxes are linked to power issues in different ways. Power is believed as a significant research area in collaborative governance yet relevant studies are very limited. To fill the gap, this dissertation analyzes power issue in collaborative governance through three research projects, which provide three approaches to interpreting and handling power issues in collaborative governance, including contingency approach, dyadic approach, and multidimensional approach.

The first study on power in this dissertation is a conceptual study. The research question of this study is: What is the relationship between power sharing and effective collaborative governance? It proposes a contingency framework on power sharing in collaborative governance. This framework includes six contingency factors of power sharing from contextual, network, and node perspectives. The focus is about how each contingency factor influences the relationship between power sharing and the effectiveness of collaborative governance. The study suggests that, instead of focusing on the attempt to share power in collaboration, it will be more fruitful to design and implement collaborative arrangements based on dynamic contingencies.

Focusing on the individual role of power is insufficient to cope with challenges facing power sharing in collaborative governance, such as lack of trust, participants' reluctance, and inaction in sharing power. These unsolved challenges inspire me to study power from a dyadic

perspective by linking power with some other key factors in collaborative governance. The second study on power goes beyond power itself by linking power with trust as another important mechanism in collaborative governance. Trust is selected since power and trust are functionally equivalent alternative mechanisms in coordinating communication and interaction. Both power and trust have the function of control in social interaction (Reed, 2001), and investigating their relationship can provide new insights for the management of power relationship and trust relationship in collaborative governance. The research question of the second study is: What is the relationship between power and trust in collaborative governance? A conceptual analysis is conducted to study the dyadic relationship between power and trust in collaborative governance regarding the shared sources of power and trust, the effects of power asymmetry and power sharing on trust building, and the influence of trust building on the management of power relationship in collaborative governance. It helps improve the management of power relationship by taking advantage of the underlying relationships between different dimensions of power and trust.

The third study explores approaches to enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance, and the research question of this study is: What are the approaches to enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance? Power sharing is highly advocated in collaboration. However, how to enhance power sharing in collaborative governance is not well understood. Based on a case study on power sharing in a new collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China, this article explores how power sharing is enhanced with the engagement of a new collaborator in the governing process. The findings indicate four approaches to enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance, including diffusing the source of power, increasing the type of power, expanding the arena for power, and ameliorating the outcome of power. This study

offers a model for enhancing power sharing by considering multiple dimensions of power in collaborative governance.

This dissertation contributes to power research in collaborative governance, both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, it enriches the understanding of collaborative governance in a paradox lens, which helps interpret the paradoxical nature of collaborative governance. It also contributes to power research in collaborative governance by providing three approaches to interpreting, theorizing, and tackling power issues in collaborative governance, including contingency approach, dyadic approach, and multidimensional approach. Practically, it provides a set of managerial implications that are necessary to deal with power dynamics in collaborative governance. Firstly, it develops six contingency factors of power sharing in collaborative governance, which can help practitioners evaluate their own status in power relationship and understand dynamics of power sharing in collaboration. Second, practitioners engaged in collaborative governance can take advantage of the three underlying relationships between power and trust to improve the management of power relationships in collaboration. For example, practitioners can obtain and enhance common sources shared by power and trust (e.g., authority, resource control and discursive legitimacy) to build a better power relationship based on trust among participants. Thirdly, this dissertation explores four approaches to enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance, which provide useful strategies for practitioners to mitigate power asymmetry in collaborative practices.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| LIST OF FIGURES | ix |
| LIST OF TABLES | x |
| PREFACE | xi |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | xii |
| DEDICATION | xiv |
| Chapter 1 Introduction | 1 |
| 1.1 Purpose of the Dissertation | 4 |
| 1.2 General Research Questions..... | 4 |
| 1.3 Significance of the Dissertation..... | 5 |
| 1.4 An Overview of the Dissertation | 6 |
| Chapter 2 Reviewing Literature of Collaborative Governance: A Paradox Lens..... | 9 |
| 2.1 The Paradox Perspective..... | 11 |
| 2.2 Methodology | 16 |
| 2.2.1 Eligibility Criteria and Search Strategy..... | 16 |
| 2.3 Paradoxes in Collaborative Governance – A Framework..... | 20 |
| 2.3.1 Paradox between Normative Principles in Collaborative Governance..... | 23 |
| 2.3.2 Paradox between Normative Principles and Real-life Practice of Collaborative Governance | 27 |
| 2.3.3 Paradox in Real-life Practice of Collaborative Governance | 29 |
| 2.4 Research Agenda | 35 |
| 2.5 Conclusion | 40 |
| 2.6 Power as A Key Issue Behind Paradoxes in Collaborative Governance | 40 |
| Chapter 3 Contingencies of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance..... | 43 |
| 3.1 Introduction..... | 43 |
| 3.2 Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance | 46 |
| 3.3 Effectiveness of Collaborative Governance | 49 |
| 3.4 Appeal of Power Sharing in Effective Collaborative Governance | 51 |
| 3.5 Contingency Framework of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance | 54 |
| 3.5.1 Contingency 1: Institutional Environment and Power Sharing..... | 54 |
| 3.5.2 Contingency 2: Different Missions of Network and Power Sharing..... | 57 |
| 3.5.3 Contingency 3: Types of Network and Power Sharing | 59 |
| 3.5.4 Contingency 4: Previous Collaboration Experience and Power Sharing..... | 62 |
| 3.5.5 Contingency 5: Diffusion of Power Sources and Power Sharing | 64 |
| 3.5.6 Contingency 6: Cost-benefit Calculation and Power Sharing..... | 66 |
| 3.6 Discussion | 69 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 3.7 Conclusion | 74 |
| 3.8 From Contingency Approach to Dyadic Approach | 75 |
| Chapter 4 The Entangled Twins: Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance | 76 |
| 4.1 Introduction | 76 |
| 4.2 Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance..... | 80 |
| 4.2.1 Power in Collaborative Governance..... | 80 |
| 4.2.2 Trust in Collaborative Governance | 82 |
| 4.2.3 Relationship between Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance | 85 |
| 4.3 Three Relationships between Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance | 87 |
| 4.3.1 Relationship 1: Shared Sources of Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance | 87 |
| 4.3.2 Relationship 2: Influence of Power Relationship on Trust Building in Collaborative Governance | 91 |
| 4.3.3 Relationship 3: Influence of Trust Building on the Management of Power Relationship in Collaborative Governance | 95 |
| 4.4 Discussion | 99 |
| 4.4.1 Power and Trust as Entangled Twins | 100 |
| 4.4.2 Managerial Implications | 102 |
| 4.5 Conclusion | 106 |
| 4.6 From Dyadic Approach to Multidimensional Approach | 106 |
| Chapter 5 Enhancing Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance from A Multidimensional Perspective: Evidence from A Collaboration-based Governance Mechanism for Rural China..... | 108 |
| 5.1 Introduction | 108 |
| 5.2 Literature Review | 111 |
| 5.2.1 Power..... | 111 |
| 5.2.2 Power in Collaborative Governance..... | 113 |
| 5.2.3 Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance..... | 114 |
| 5.3 Research Context: A New Collaboration-based Governance Mechanism for Rural China | 117 |
| 5.3.1 Inclusion of Different Participants | 118 |
| 5.3.2 Pooling of Knowledge and Resources..... | 118 |
| 5.3.3 Adoption of A Deliberative and Consensus-oriented Decision Process..... | 119 |
| 5.4 Research Methods | 120 |
| 5.4.1 Data Collection | 120 |
| 5.4.2 Data Analysis | 122 |
| 5.4.3 Validity Strategies | 126 |
| 5.5 Findings | 127 |
| 5.5.1 Diffusing the Source of Power | 127 |
| 5.5.2 Increasing the Type of Power | 132 |
| 5.5.3 Expanding the Arena for Power | 135 |
| 5.5.4 Ameliorating the Outcome of Power..... | 141 |
| 5.5.5 A Model of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance | 143 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 5.6 Discussion | 144 |
| 5.6.1 Multidimensional Model: A Tool for Power Sharing | 145 |
| 5.6.2 Contribution to Collaboration: A Catalyst of Power Sharing | 146 |
| 5.6.3 Control from Hierarchical Structure: A Potential Challenge for Power Sharing..... | 147 |
| 5.7 Conclusion | 148 |
| Chapter 6 Conclusion..... | 150 |
| 6.1 Theoretical Contributions | 150 |
| 6.2 Practical Contributions | 153 |
| 6.3 Limitations of the Dissertation | 155 |
| 6.4 Directions for Future Research..... | 156 |
| Reference..... | 158 |
| Appendix A Approval Letters from Graduate School | 192 |
| Appendix B Copyright Permission | 195 |
| Appendix C IRB Exemption Determination | 196 |
| Appendix D Consent Form..... | 197 |
| Appendix E Semi-structured Interview Protocol..... | 199 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|---|-----|
| Figure 1-1: Approaches to Studying Power in Collaborative Governance..... | 3 |
| Figure 2-1: The Framework of Paradoxes in Collaborative Governance –Scheme 1..... | 119 |
| Figure 5-1. A model of power sharing in collaborative governance..... | 132 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|---|-----|
| Table 2-1: Top 47 Public Administration Journals as ranked by 2019 Incites Journal Citation Report and the Number of Articles with the Keywords (“collaborative governance”, “collaborative network”, “governance network”, “network governance”, “collaborative public management”, or “collaborative public administration”) in Titles..... | 16 |
| Table 2-2: The Framework of Paradoxes in Collaborative Governance – Scheme 2..... | 20 |
| Table 5-1: Details of interviews..... | 116 |
| Table 5-2: Key categories from data analysis..... | 123 |

PREFACE

Four chapters in this dissertation involve co-authored work. Chapter 2 (Reviewing Literature of Collaborative Governance: A Paradox Lens), Chapter 3 (Contingencies of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance), and Chapter 4 (The Entangled Twins: Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance) are co-authored with Dr. Bing Ran at Pennsylvania State University. Chapter 5 is co-authored with Dr. Bing Ran at Pennsylvania State University and Dr. Xiaokun Gu at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China. I am the first author of Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 and second author of Chapter 3 and 4. I received the approval letters from the Graduate School at Pennsylvania State University to include Chapter 3 and 4 in my dissertation (see Appendix A).

Chapter 2 is a systematic review of literature. In Chapter 2, I developed the research question with Dr. Bing Ran, searched the literature data used in this study, performed the research and analysis needed, developed the tables and graphs, wrote the full text, and worked with Dr. Bing Ran to revise the initial version of manuscript. Chapter 3 and 4 are two conceptual studies. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, my contributions include developing the research questions with Dr. Bing Ran, searching, reviewing, and synthesizing literature under the supervision of Dr. Bing Ran, discussing and developing the outlines of the articles with Dr. Bing Ran, developing the conceptual frameworks with Dr. Bing Ran, drafting the initial version of the manuscripts, and working with Dr. Bing Ran to revise and resubmit the articles after getting the feedback from reviewers. Chapter 5 is a qualitative study. In Chapter 5, I developed the research question, conducted literature review, participated in data collection, performed data analysis, developed the tables, and wrote the full text.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the enormous support of my committee and the School of Public Affairs community to which I am so proud to belong. My sincerest thanks go to Dr. Bing Ran, who acted not only as my advisor, but also as my mentor during my Ph.D. journey. I want to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Bing Ran for his continual support, guidance, and encouragement in my navigation of the academia.

I am also thankful to the rest of my committee, Dr. Odd Stalebrink, Dr. Triparna Vasavada, and Dr. John Haddad, who helped me get through this process. I would like to thank them for their insightful comments and continuous support. I am also especially grateful to Dr. Göktuğ Morçöl, for his invaluable mentorship and continued guidance in this long journey.

Thanks also to my cohort and to all friends I met at Penn State Harrisburg. I still remember the courses we took together. I still remember the conferences we attended together. I still remember the celebration parties we had together. These are all unforgettable moments in my life.

My family has continued to be a source of strength. Special thanks to my grandma. Although she has passed away for 15 years, her unconditional love and support made me who I am today. I would also like to thank my parents for their constant love.

Finally, and most importantly, I want to express my deepest gratitude to my little family. Deepest gratitude to my husband, Xin Li, whose unconditional love and constant support keep me motivated and confident. He is my most enthusiastic cheerleader; he is my strongest supporter; he is my real soulmate; and he is an amazing husband and father. Thank you for being my partner in life. Many thanks also go to my dearest son Terrence, who was born in 2018. Considering that he is a toddler, it's hard to imagine how he could contribute to my dissertation, but in fact, it is his

beautiful smile that brings so much joy and happiness into this long journey. My little boy is truly the light of my life. Mom loves you forever.

DEDICATION

To Xin and Terrence

for their unconditional support and love

Chapter 1

Introduction

The surge of collaborative governance consisting of governments, private actors, nonprofit actors, and citizens has become a notable phenomenon. Collaborative governance has been advocated by both practitioners and academics in recent years, which is viewed as a desirable approach to addressing difficult public problems because of its advantages (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). Scholars claim that successful collaborative governance has many advantages such as improving governance capacity (Rogers & Weber, 2010), better developing and transferring technology (Rogers & Weber, 2010), expanding democratic participation (Huxham et al., 2000), and co-producing public value (Bovaird, 2007; Verschuere, Brandsen, & Pestoff, 2012). In spite of advantages claimed, many challenges still exist in collaborative governance, including insufficient level of trust (Purdy, 2012), power asymmetry (Ansell & Gash, 2008; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011), high cost of time and resources (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011), and problems of conflicting accountabilities (Huxham et al., 2000). These challenges make collaborative governance risky and painful.

There has been a wealth of literature on collaborative governance. In the next chapter, I will conduct a systematic review of literature on collaborative governance in a paradox lens. A paradox lens is employed since scholars increasingly point to inherent paradoxes and associated tensions as important factors contributing to the challenges in collaborative governance (e.g., Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2015; Huxham & Beech, 2003; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Sedgwick, 2016; Vangen, 2017; Waardenburg, Groenleer, de Jong & Keijsers, 2020). Based on the findings in the review of literature, I found that many paradoxes found in literature review are linked to

power in collaborative governance. First, different elements in paradoxes (e.g., diversity, consensus, involvement, legitimacy) are linked to power in collaboration. Second, tensions formed between conflicting elements in paradoxes are rooted or caused by power relationships among participants (e.g., normative egalitarian versus pragmatic power imbalance). Third, possible solutions to deal with these paradoxes are related to the approaches to dealing with power issues in collaborative governance (e.g., sharing power to enhance egalitarian and build trust).

In this regard, I select power in collaborative governance as the theme of this dissertation and three studies on power in collaborative governance were conducted. Existing literature recognized that many challenges in collaborative governance are relevant to power dynamics in collaboration and how power affects such issues as limitation in engagement, low level of trust, lack of representation, limited deliberation, etc. (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; Purdy, 2012). Many scholars believed managing power relationship among partners appropriately is significant, and most of them proposed power sharing as a solution to problems associated with power asymmetry (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Berkes, 2010; Echeverria, 2001; Gray, 1989; Warner, 2006). However, promoting the management of power relationship and enhancing power sharing lead to difficulties in theorizing and implementation (Crona & Bodin, 2010; Dandy, Fiorini, & Davies, 2014; Grindle, 2004; Jentoft, van Son, & Bjørkan, 2007; Linder, 1999; Maner & Mead, 2010; Zérah, 2009), such as dynamics of power, time-consuming process, insufficient flexibility, and ineffectiveness (Huxham et al., 2000; Moynihan, 2009).

This dissertation does not aim to build a grand theory of power in collaborative governance. Instead, it will further the research on power in collaborative governance by

resolving three subthemes: relationship between power sharing and effective collaborative governance, relationship between power and trust in collaborative governance, and approaches to enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance. I believe this dissertation can provide important insights on handling challenges, conflicts, and tensions in collaborative governance from different perspectives.

I conducted three studies in this dissertation. First, I conducted a conceptual study in a contingency approach by exploring a set of contingencies affecting the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. Power sharing is not a panacea to address issues brought forth by power imbalance. Instead, a contingency approach is critical in enhancing power sharing as a solution to power imbalance since enlarging different stakeholders' share of power might not necessarily benefit the effectiveness of collaboration. Second, a set of challenges in power sharing (e.g., lack of trust, participants' reluctance, inaction in sharing power) is difficult to handle if only the individual role of power is considered. In collaborative governance, power and trust are two functionally equivalent alternative mechanisms in coordinating communication and interaction among participants, and both have the function of control in social interaction (Reed, 2001). In this regard, I conducted a conceptual study in a dyadic approach to analyze the relationship between power and trust in collaborative governance, which can improve the management of power relationship and solve challenges in power sharing beyond power itself.

In the last research, through a multidimensional approach to understanding power, I conducted a qualitative study exploring the approaches to enhancing power sharing among participants in a new type of collaboration-based governance mechanism for Chinese rural communities.

1.1 Purpose of the Dissertation


The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of power dynamics in collaborative governance. More specifically, this dissertation aims to investigate different approaches to interpreting, exercising, and managing power among participants to promote collaborative governance practices.

1.2 General Research Questions

In order to achieve the purpose of this dissertation, I try to answer the following three general research questions: (1) What is the relationship between power sharing and effective collaborative governance? (2) What is the relationship between power and trust in collaborative governance? (3) What are the approaches to enhancing power in collaborative governance? These three questions are raised through three approaches: contingency approach, dyadic approach, and multidimensional approach.

Figure 1-1 shows the approaches in which power is studied in this dissertation. It should be noted that different approaches to investigating power is not a one-time endeavor or one-way process. Instead, it is a complex and dynamic process. On the one hand, different approaches may be interrelated and should be considered holistically because the adoption and implementation of one approach may affect another. On the other hand, during the progress of collaborative governance, certain approaches may need some adjustment accordingly.

Figure 1-1: Approaches to Studying Power in Collaborative Governance.



1.3 Significance of the Dissertation

Despite a lot of literature recognized power as a big concern in collaborative governance, most of them only stopping at assessing how power is used in collaborative governance (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Purdy, 2012), analyzing why power imbalance can undermine collaborative

governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Huxham & Vangen, 2005), or investigating how to mitigate power imbalance in a specific phase in collaborative governance such as deliberative decision making process (e.g. Choi & Robertson, 2014). Although all these studies are merit, few of them has provided a satisfactory answer to deal with power concerns in collaborative governance. My main contribution to the literature will be in this under-researched area. I believe there is no simple or “one-size-fit-all” answer to how to deal with power concerns in collaborative governance, especially when we expect the answer can provide useful managerial implications to practitioners. The three studies on power in collaborative governance in this dissertation can contribute to the study on how to enhance power management and enhance power sharing in collaborative governance from different perspectives.

1.4 An Overview of the Dissertation

In Chapter 2, I conducted a systematic review of literature on collaborative governance and developed a framework consisting of 12 paradoxes categorized into three groups, including paradoxes between normative principles, paradoxes between normative principles and real-life practice, and paradoxes in real-life practice of collaborative governance. According to the findings in the review of literature, I found that many paradoxes are linked to power in collaborative governance in different ways because: 1) many elements and forces in these paradoxes are linked to power in collaborative governance; 2) the tensions formed between conflicting elements in paradoxes are caused by power issues in collaborative governance to certain extent; and 3) exploring solutions to handle paradoxes needs to consider how to deal with power concerns in collaborative governance..

Chapter 3 proposes a contingency framework on power dynamics in collaborative governance that includes six contingency factors of power sharing from contextual, network, and

node perspectives. The focus is about how each contingency factor influences the relationship between power sharing and the effectiveness of collaborative governance. The study suggests that, instead of focusing on the attempt to balance power and share power in collaboration, it will be more fruitful to design and implement collaborative arrangements based on the dynamic contingencies.

In order to deal with the paradox between normative egalitarian and pragmatic power imbalance, it is critical to go beyond the individual role of power to cope with challenges in collaborative governance, such as lack of trust, participants' reluctance, and inaction in sharing power. These unsolved challenges inspire me to study power from a dyadic perspective by linking power with some other key factors in collaborative governance. The second study on power goes beyond power itself by linking power with trust as another important mechanism in collaborative governance. Trust is selected since power and trust are functionally equivalent alternative mechanisms in coordinating communication and interaction. Both power and trust have the function of control in social interaction (Reed, 2001), and investigating their relationship can provide new insights for the management of power relationship and trust relationship in collaborative governance. Chapter 4 develops a critical conceptual analysis of the dyadic relationship between power and trust in the context of collaborative governance. Three dynamic relationships and seven corresponding propositions are proposed regarding the shared sources of power and trust, the effects of power asymmetry and power sharing on trust building, and the influence of trust building on the management of power relationship in collaborative governance. These dyadic relations help improve the management of power relationship by taking advantage of some underlying relationships between different dimensions of power and trust.

Enhancing sharing among participants is crucial for collaborative practices, yet the relevant research, especially empirical research, is very limited. The study in Chapter 5 tries to fill

this gap. Due to the complexity and dynamics of power and collaborative governance, power needs to be shared in a multidimensional approach. Based on a multidimensional conceptualization of power, a qualitative study was conducted to explore approaches to enhancing power among participants in a new type of collaboration-based governance mechanism for Chinese rural communities.

Chapter 6 summarizes the major theoretical and practical contributions of this dissertation and discusses the direction of future research about power in collaborative governance.

Chapter 2

Reviewing Literature of Collaborative Governance: A Paradox Lens

This Collaborative governance, broadly defined as a governing arrangement where multiple stakeholders work together based on deliberative consensus and collective decision making to achieve shared goals that could not be otherwise fulfilled individually, is representative of a host of terms on collaboration-based or networked governance such as collaborative public management, collaborative decision making, and network governance (Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Huxham & Vangen, 1996; Mandell & Keast, 2007; Morse & Stephens, 2012; O’Leary & Vij, 2012; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Collaborative governance is often viewed as a desirable approach to addressing difficult public problems (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). Scholars claim that successful collaborative governance has many advantages such as increasing government accountability (Johnston et al., 2011), improving governance capacity (Huxham et al., 2000; Rogers & Weber, 2010), better developing and transferring technology (Rogers & Weber, 2010), expanding democratic participation (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Huxham et al., 2000), co-producing public value (Bovaird, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006), and improving effectiveness of governance (Morse, 2014). In spite of advantages claimed, scholars also noticed many challenges in collaborative governance, such as insufficient level of trust prohibiting collaboration (Purdy, 2012), power asymmetry (Bryson et al., 2006; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011), high cost of time and resources (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011), and conflicting accountabilities (Huxham et al., 2000). These challenges make collaborative governance oftentimes risky and painful.

In order to further understand and handle challenges in collaborative governance, scholars increasingly delve into different factors contributing to these challenges and find that inherent paradoxes in collaborative governance are an important factor (Huxham & Beech, 2003; Vangen, 2017; Waardenburg et al., 2020). Though the paradoxical nature of collaborative

governance has captured more and more attention, there is still a lack of a comprehensive discussion on paradoxes in collaborative governance. This article thus takes on the task of sense-making the paradoxes in collaborative governance by systematically analyzing opposing or conflicting elements, logics and demands in collaborative governance. We conducted a comprehensive and systematic review on paradoxes in collaborative governance and developed a framework for categorizing different paradoxes, including paradoxes between normative principles, between normative principles and real-life practices, and in real-life practices of collaborative governance. All paradoxes discussed in this article provide insights on the essential nature of collaborative governance as a paradoxical phenomenon, which captures the complexity of collaboration and points to some potential research agendas. These paradoxes also contribute to a deeper and richer understanding of different challenges facing collaborative practice and shed light on solutions in tackling paradoxes. In this regard, paradoxes can be viewed as a meta-theory overarching different perspectives and assumptions about collaborative governance, which can inform the real-life collaboration more effectively by providing practical and contextual knowledge about collaborative governance.

In the following sections, we will first briefly introduce the paradox perspective and discuss the methodology of the systematic review. We then present our findings and the framework which includes 12 paradoxes categorized in three groups. The article concludes with a discussion of the insights and potential research agendas prompted by the paradox perspective and how such perspective could inform the managerial practice for public administrators, especially when they engage in service delivery design and public decision making that involve multiple stakeholders of a society.

2.1 The Paradox Perspective

Paradoxes are composed of “contradictory yet interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time.” (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 386). Two essential characteristics of a paradox are highlighted by scholars, including: (1) underlying tensions caused by “elements that seem logical individually but inconsistent and even absurd when juxtaposed”; and (2) “responses that embrace tensions simultaneously” (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 382). These two characteristics emphasize that underlying tensions are the source of paradox and the way of handling tensions in paradoxes is to embrace them simultaneously. Similar terms are also used in literature such as tension, dilemma, and contradiction to denote the enigmatic nature of collaborative governance. Though we recognize that to some extent, there exists a very thin line in the conceptual meaning of these words, their distinction is worth exploring further.

Tension is the basic component of a paradox and is the underlying source of a paradox. Tensions arise between two elements that seem logical individually but inconsistent when juxtaposed. Despite the importance of tension, it cannot capture the full meaning of a paradox. As we mentioned above, paradox has two components, and the second component of a paradox requires the response of embracing tensions simultaneously. In this sense, equating tensions with paradoxes only considers the first component of a paradox (the underlying source of a paradox) yet fails to reflect the second component of a paradox (the specific feature of responses to paradoxes).

Dilemma is also different from paradox since dilemma denotes “competing choices, each with advantages and disadvantages” (Smith & Lewis, 2011, p. 387). In a dilemma, it is an “either/or” situation between the two alternatives, requiring us to choose between two mutually exclusive options (Lewis, 2000; Michaud, 2014; Smith & Lewis, 2011), whereas a paradox adopts a “both/and” approach by acknowledging, accepting, and embracing both sides of

seemingly contradictory elements in a paradox. However, an overlap between paradox and dilemma cannot be ruled out, suggesting a close tie between these two concepts. For instance, Smith and Lewis (2011, p. 387) posit that “a dilemma may prove paradoxical when a longer time horizon shows how any choice between A and B is temporary.”

Compared with tension and dilemma, it is more difficult to differentiate contradiction with paradox since these two terms are so similar that they are often used interchangeably in many situations. Despite the high degree of similarity, it is still possible to distinguish them. Contradiction is spoken of in many ways. Grim (2004) teased out four approaches to defining contradiction, including “semantic” approach (i.e., contradictions are pairs of propositions or statements that cannot be true together or false together), “form” approach (i.e., contradictions are pairs of formulae as “A and not A”), “assertion and denial” approach (i.e., contradiction is the joint assertion of making and denying the same claim), and “ontological” approach (i.e., contradiction is a state of affairs in which something both had a particular property and also an incompatible property). Based on these different approaches to defining contradiction, it is clear that the fourth approach, “ontological” approach is most similar to paradox (that is, a particular element and a relevant incompatible element coexist in something). Thus, equating contradiction to paradox will lead to confusions when the former three approaches of defining contraction are adopted. In addition, the definitions of contradiction neglect an important characteristic of paradox: “the two sides of any contradiction exist in an active harmony, opposed but connected and mutually controlling” (Peng & Nisbett, 1999, p. 743). Therefore, a paradox overlaps with a contradiction but still different from a contradiction.

Paradox perspective is also similar to tradeoff perspective since both of them emphasize a need to make compromise and avoid going with one extreme. However, paradox perspective is much more powerful than tradeoff perspective since it can offer some different yet important

insights on understanding and examining conflicting demands, opposing assumptions, or seemingly incompatible principles.

First, paradox perspective requires the interdependence between conflicting elements, which means there are always some inextricable links or relationships between oppositional forces in a paradox, and this interdependence creates a sense of wholeness (Schad et al., 2016). In this sense, paradox perspective plays a critical role in exploring, understanding, and using the interplay between contradictory elements that ultimately form a Gestalt. Thus, a pair of paradox is more than or different from the combination of its parts. Differently, tradeoff perspective does not necessarily assume the interdependence between two entities. In a trade-off, a pair of elements each will lose some aspects in return for gains on other aspects, but these elements are not required to be interdependent, thus most often these elements are “forced” into a balance. For instance, when we handle “individual differences” and “collective cohesion” as two conflicting elements, from the paradox perspective (Smith & Berg, 1987), we focus on how these two elements are mutually inform, affect, and define each other to form a coherent wholeness; while from the trade-off perspective, we focus on how to balance them by increasing some aspects of an element and decreasing some aspects of the other element.

Second, persistence is a characteristic of paradox. From a paradox perspective, the contradictory yet interrelated elements will persist over time. The persistence of paradox emphasizes an ongoing process of “working through” conflicting forces rather than finding a temporary solution (Smith & Berg, 1987; Schad et al., 2016). The goal of coping with a paradox is pursuing long-term success or promoting long-term development. To achieve this goal, it is important to understand how each element in a paradox continually informs and defines the other. Comparatively, from tradeoff perspective, the two extremes that are needed to be balanced may only exist temporarily thus the decision on making tradeoff does not necessarily consider long-

term outcomes. In this regard, paradox perspective is more useful when dealing with contradictory demands or opposing forces that persist over time.

Third, paradox perspective depicts variation in the nature of paradoxical relationships, which means each pole in a paradox contains the seeds of its opposite and mutually define each other (Khazanchi, Lewis, & Boyer, 2007). The variation feature of paradoxical relationships emphasizes constant changes in conflicting elements. Thus, dealing with them requires a dynamic and flexible process rather than a static or one-time decision. For example, stability and change are paradoxical with each other in a system. The variation in their paradoxical relationship denotes the fact that stability only occurs when the system makes constant changes in response to changing situations (Schad et al., 2016). In other words, only constant changes are stable in a system. In this regard, stability contains the seeds of change and change contains the seeds of stability. Paradox perspective places an emphasis on flexibility and changes in mechanisms for handling complex and dynamic problems contingently rather than focusing on static solutions to make tradeoff between conflicting factors.

Last but not the least, generative is another critical characteristic of paradox perspective that makes it more powerful than tradeoff perspective for dealing with contradictory elements. The generative nature of paradoxes is based on its philosophical underpinning: dialectics. According to dialectics, contradictory elements in a paradox (thesis and antithesis) are resolved through synthesis and “every synthesis constitutes a new thesis that is eventually opposed by a new antithesis” (Schad et al., 2016, p. 45). As the dialectical process continues, there will always be a higher synthesis occurs and current synthesis becomes the starting point of a new synthetic process (Schad et al., 2016). In this sense, paradox perspective can generate synthesis (e.g., new ways of looking at the phenomenon) through a process of self-transcendence. Differently,

tradeoff perspective is unable to resolve contradictory elements through synthesis. Instead, it only stops at making “forced” compromises between two extremes based on pragmatic consideration.

Although scholars have recognized that paradoxes in collaborative governance are significant in contributing to the enigmatic nature of collaborative governance (e.g., Ospina & Saz-Carranza, 2010; Sedgwick, 2016; Waardenburg et al., 2020; Vangen, 2017), relevant research is still very limited. Only a few studies made a pioneering exploration on various specific paradoxes or tensions in collaboration. For example, Provan and Kenis (2008) analyzed some network-level tensions in governance that brought our attention to the very phenomenon of paradoxes in collaborative governance. However, their research is specific on the network level paradoxes while did not zoom in the tensions that might be experienced within individual organizations as a result of participating in governance. Instead of elaborating different kinds of paradoxes arising from collaborations, Vangen (2017) focused on how a paradox perspective can contribute to the development of practice-oriented theory of collaboration and help promote collaborations in practice. Waardenburg et al. (2020) made an insightful investigation on a set of paradoxes underlying the governance challenges in crime-fighting collaborations. However, the specific scenario of crime-fighting collaboration may limit the numbers and types of potential paradoxes occurred in other kinds of collaborations beyond their theorization, such as potential tensions and challenges in the institutional environment of collaborations.

Despite the significant contributions made by these studies, paradoxes in collaborative governance are still an under-researched area. We still have not seen systematic and comprehensive research that explores different paradoxes in collaborative governance and envisages paradox-based research agendas to move the field further. In the next section, we discuss a systematic review of collaborative governance literature leading to a framework that

comprehensively synthesizes major paradoxes in collaborative governance and points to some future research agendas.

2.2 Methodology

Systematic literature review is a replicable process to search relevant studies on a specific topic and synthesize these studies to build up knowledge (Cook, Mulrow, & Haynes, 1997; Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart, 2003), which can minimize bias and improve the quality of review through an audit trail of review decisions, procedures, and conclusions (Cook et al., 1997). We utilized the widely accepted Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) to report the systematic review (Liberati et al., 2009). The systematic review followed a search method, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and final sample size for review and extraction of findings.

2.2.1 Eligibility Criteria and Search Strategy

Eligibility criteria for searching literature is useful to limit the range of studies to a reasonable number, which is also a compromise between an ideally “sensitive” study and a realistically feasible “specific” study (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). Based on Liberati et al. (2009), the following eligibility criteria and search strategy were used:

- *Web of Science* was chosen to conduct the search for relevant studies. We did not set any time limits for the beginning period of our searches, because we want to search relevant publications as comprehensively as possible without the limitation of publishing time. We set the year 2020 as the end year for our search, because it was the last complete year when we conducted our search.

- We retrieved articles containing one of the following phrases: “collaborative governance”, “collaborative network”, “governance network”, “network governance”, “collaborative public management”, or “collaborative public administration” in the titles. As we discussed above, these are major phrases used in literature to describe the collaboration-based governance strategy, and we believe if an article’s title includes one of such phrases, it is devoted to studying collaboration-based governance strategy. This search generated 44,748 results.
- We filtered the results generated above to retain only peer-reviewed articles published in “public administration” discipline. We believe peer-reviewed articles, having been scrutinized by editors and reviewers in the field of public administration, provide better relevant perspectives and more generally acknowledged ideas compared to other types of studies such as books, reports, conference papers, etc. In *Web of Science*, we chose “articles” as the document type and “public administration” as the subject category and this filtering process reduced the number of articles to 775.
- We further filtered the results to retain only articles in English. This step reduced the number of articles to 763.
- We chose the top-ranked journals in public administration to filter the results. We refined our results in the top 47 public administration journals as ranked by the 2019 Incites Journal Citation Report of *Web of Science*. Following this screening process, 513 articles were generated and included in the systematic review (see Table 2-1).

Table 2-1: Top 47 Public Administration Journals as ranked by 2019 Incites Journal Citation Report and the Number of Articles with the Keywords (“collaborative governance”, “collaborative network”, “governance network”, “network governance”, “collaborative public management”, or “collaborative public administration”) in Titles.

| Rank | Journal | 2019 Journal Impact Factor | No. of Articles with the Relevant Keywords in Titles |
|-------------|---|-----------------------------------|---|
| 1 | Climate Policy | 4.797 | 0 |
| 2 | Public Administration Review | 4.659 | 46 |
| 3 | Policy Studies Journal | 3.917 | 22 |
| 4 | Journal of Policy Analysis and Management | 3.828 | 3 |
| 5 | Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions | 3.643 | 4 |
| 6 | Journal of European Public Policy | 3.457 | 4 |
| 7 | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory | 3.407 | 39 |
| 8 | Public Management Review | 3.162 | 46 |
| 9 | Review of Public Personnel Administration | 2.825 | 0 |
| 10 | Regulation & Governance | 2.792 | 4 |
| 11 | Policy Sciences | 2.619 | 8 |
| 12 | American Review of Public Administration | 2.602 | 35 |
| 13 | Public Administration | 2.600 | 38 |
| 14 | Environment and Planning C-Politics and Space | 2.382 | 4 |
| 15 | Journal of Social Policy | 2.296 | 4 |
| 16 | Journal of Accounting and Public Policy | 2.269 | 0 |
| 17 | International Review of Administrative Sciences | 2.174 | 13 |
| 18 | Journal of European Social Policy | 2.119 | 0 |
| 19 | Policy and Politics | 2.028 | 15 |
| 20 | Policy and Society | 1.983 | 4 |
| 21 | Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis | 1.963 | 2 |
| 22 | Nonprofit Management & Leadership | 1.917 | 7 |

| Rank | Journal | 2019 Journal Impact Factor | No. of Articles with the Relevant Keywords in Titles |
|--------------|--|-----------------------------------|---|
| 23 | International Public Management Journal | 1.915 | 14 |
| 24 | Review of Policy Research | 1.864 | 11 |
| 25 | Local Government Studies | 1.825 | 21 |
| 26 | Public Policy and Administration | 1.813 | 2 |
| 27 | Journal of Public Policy | 1.805 | 2 |
| 28 | Administration & Society | 1.698 | 25 |
| 29 | Public Performance & Management Review | 1.600 | 22 |
| 30 | Science and Public Policy | 1.575 | 41 |
| 31 | Australian Journal of Public Administration | 1.311 | 19 |
| 32 | Social Policy & Administration | 1.269 | 5 |
| 33 | Public Money & Management | 1.215 | 13 |
| 34 | Human Service Organizations Management Leadership & Governance | 1.044 | 10 |
| 35 | Public Administration and Development | 0.918 | 7 |
| 36 | Contemporary Economic Policy | 0.905 | 0 |
| 37 | Canadian Public Policy-Analyse De Politiques | 0.899 | 0 |
| 38 | Canadian Public Administration-Administration Publique Du Canada | 0.883 | 7 |
| 39 | Policy Studies | 0.859 | 4 |
| 40 | Public Personnel Management | 0.789 | 0 |
| 41 | Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management | 0.757 | 3 |
| 41 | Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences | 0.757 | 4 |
| 43 | Lex Localis-Journal of Local Self-Government | 0.728 | 5 |
| 44 | Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia | 0.277 | 0 |
| 45 | Gestion y Politica Publica | 0.162 | 0 |
| 46 | Amme Idaresi Dergisi | 0.114 | 0 |
| 47 | Civil Szemle | 0.000 | 0 |
| Total | | | 513 |

We thoroughly read all 513 articles and conducted both in-article and between-article reviews. We independently read the articles from an interpretive standpoint paying particular attention to any information related to conflicts, confusions, uncertainty, inconsistencies, disagreements, incompatibilities, tensions, and oppositions within and between these articles. In our readings, we also focused on the challenges, problems, or issues caused by assumptions, principles, mechanisms, and outcomes in collaborative governance as revealed either within an article or between articles. We then linked these contradicting assumptions, principles and mechanisms to form relevant paradoxes. At the end of this step, a combined total of 19 pairs of paradoxical circumstances were generated.

Next, we examined the 19 pairs that were first extracted to address areas of differences in the extraction process in order to streamline the pairs and resolve differences. At the end of the examination and streamlining sessions, we were able to further narrow the number down to 12 broad categorizations of paradoxes by either matching similar pairs that imply the same conceptualization or dropping some trivial ones.

Finally, we examined these 12 paradoxes, trying to find an internal structure of these paradoxes. We then arrived at a framework that composed of two different categorization schemes of these paradoxes. In the next section, we present our findings and the framework we constructed.


2.3 Paradoxes in Collaborative Governance – A Framework

Our analysis generated 12 paradoxes in collaborative governance. In order to enhance the interpretation of these paradoxes, we constructed a framework using two categorization schemes.

The first categorization scheme reflects that collaborative governance consists of different phases of initiation, process, and outcome. Paradoxes arise within or across these

different phases of collaborative governance or between collaboration and its external environment (Figure 2-1).

Figure 2-1: The Framework of Paradoxes in Collaborative Governance –Scheme1.



The second categorization scheme reflects that collaborative governance follows some intrinsic normative principles, such as diversity, mutually benefit, inclusiveness, deliberation, egalitarian and consensus, but these normative principles sometimes conflict with collaborative practices. Paradoxes can be found between different normative principles in collaborative

governance, between some normative principles and collaborative practices, and within dynamics of collaborative practices (Table 2-2). We will discuss each paradox using this scheme.

Table 2-2: The Framework of Paradoxes in Collaborative Governance – Scheme 2.

| | |
|---|--|
| Paradox between Normative Principles in Collaborative Governance | Paradox 1: Diversity vs. Consensus |
| | Paradox 2: Inclusiveness vs. Efficiency |
| | Paradox 3: Deliberative Process vs. Instrumental Outcome |
| | Paradox 4: Internal Legitimacy vs. External Legitimacy |
| Paradox between Normative Principles and Real-life Practice of Collaborative Governance | Paradox 5: Mutuality vs. Competition |
| | Paradox 6: Normative Egalitarian vs. Pragmatic Power Imbalance |
| Paradox in Real-life Practice of Collaborative Governance | Paradox 7: Autonomy vs. Authority |
| | Paradox 8: Problem before Solution vs. Solution before Problem |
| | Paradox 9: Old Approaches before Collaboration vs. New Approaches in Collaboration |
| | Paradox 10: Trust First vs. Collaborative Action First |
| | Paradox 11: Accountability to Organization vs. Accountability to Collaboration |
| | Paradox 12: Artificial Systems vs. Natural Systems |

2.3.1 Paradox between Normative Principles in Collaborative Governance

2.3.1.1 Paradox 1: Diversity vs. Consensus

Diversity and consensus are two normative principles for collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash 2008; Huxham et al., 2000; Reilly, 2001). Diversity is important because a great variety of participants across organizations, sectors, and jurisdictions will bring diverse resources, perspectives, information, and knowledge into collaboration to solve complex problems (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015). Simultaneously, collaborative governance is also viewed as a consensus-oriented process in which most actions and decisions are discussed, decided and accomplished by consensus among participants (Agranoff, 2006; Robertson & Choi, 2012). In theory, consensus-oriented decision making will ensure a larger number of participants support the decisions and feel satisfied with the outcome of decisions (Robertson & Choi, 2012).

What we noticed is that the principle of diversity makes adaption and compromise difficult, and further deters consensus among participants. Firstly, diverse participants in collaborative governance bring in differences or even competition in goals and perspectives, which will lead to challenges in achieving consensus among participant (Vangen & Huxham, 2012). Secondly, diversity brings in difficulties in communications across participants who are embedded in different professional languages and organizational cultures that hinder the negotiation for consensus process (Huxham, 2003; Huxham et al., 2000). Thirdly, embedded in different organizational cultures are the different ways organizations do things, which may make consensus-oriented decision making tedious and difficult (Huxham et al., 2000). Fourthly, diverse participants may bring in conflicts in the daily operation of collaboration, such as conflicts over the time, location or frequency of meetings in collaboration (Agranoff, 2006). Consensus is hard to achieve due to these challenges associated with diversity. In a nutshell, there are many

conflicts and disagreements hidden in the diversity of a collaboration, leading to a paradoxical relationship between demands of diversity and consensus. It could be postulated that the more diverse a collaboration is, the more difficult the consensus can be achieved.

2.3.1.2 Paradox 2: Inclusiveness vs. Efficiency

Inclusiveness is regarded as a significant principle for collaborative governance, both ethically and pragmatically. Ethically, broadly including as many stakeholders as possible is viewed as an ethical demand for collaborations that secures the democratic nature of collaborative governance (Johnston et al., 2011). Pragmatically, broad inclusiveness produces more feasible outcomes (Huxham et al., 2000), helps taking account of all relevant viewpoints and information in problem solving (Gray, 1985), and promotes the subsequent implementation of decisions made (Gray, 1985; Johnston et al., 2011). Efficiency is also a necessary requirement in evaluating the performance of collaborative governance (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Stakeholders care about the efficient use of resources in collaboration (Wood & Gray, 1991), and they often ask whether they can receive benefits from collaborations in the form of efficiency created by collaborative actions (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

However, there is always a paradoxical relationship between the needs for broad inclusiveness and high efficiency in collaborative governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008). This paradox firstly occurs during the process of identifying diverse stakeholders where a large amount of time, resources and efforts needs to be invested. The broad inclusion of stakeholders also leads to more conflicts in attitudes, interests and values across different participants. In order to deal with these conflicts, collaborators need to spend more time and efforts, thus decreasing the efficiency. Additionally, inclusion is about “principled engagement” (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh 2012, 10), which requires fair discourse, open and inclusive communication, and the

representation and balance of relevant interests (Emerson et al., 2012; Innes & Booher 1999). This “principled engagement” occurs over time and takes place in different settings that require participants devote more time and energy into many activities, such as face-to-face dialogues, open forums, virtual meetings, and private or public meetings (Weiner & Alexander, 1998), which demands considerable time and efforts that will reduce efficiency. It could be postulated that the broader inclusion a collaboration has, the lower efficiency it can achieve because more time, energy, and resources have to be invested in collaborative processes.

2.3.1.3 Paradox 3: Deliberative Process vs. Instrumental Purpose

Collaborative governance is viewed as a deliberative decision-making process in which candid and reasoned dialogues take place (Ansell & Gash 2008; Emerson et al., 2012; Robertson & Choi, 2012). Deliberation requires participants to clarify multiple interests and perspectives (Healey, 1996; Roberts, 2004), share available knowledge and information freely (Robertson & Choi, 2012), examine issues thoughtfully (Roberts, 2004), and develop a mutual understanding (Robertson & Choi, 2012). At the same time, “collaborations are generally initiated with an instrumental purpose in mind” (Huxham et al. 2000, p. 340) since participants in collaborations need to get something done and produce desired outputs/outcomes (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Huxham, 2003). It has been noted that collaborations are goal-oriented and continuous-production driven because participants collaborate intensively towards their goals to produce desired outputs/outcomes (Provan & Lemaire, 2012; Saz-Carranza, Salvador Iborra, & Albareda, 2016).

The requirement of deliberation in collaborative governance will lead to extensive processes that will hinder effective decision making and successful production of outputs/outcomes (Huxham, 2003; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011). In deliberative processes,

participants will discover and encounter complexity, dynamics and conflicts that inevitably hinder or slow down the accomplishment of the collective goals targeted by the collaboration. In this sense, deliberative process is paradoxical with instrumental purposes of collaborative governance, as evidenced by many studies (Bryer & Cooper, 2006a; Bryer & Cooper, 2006b).

It could be postulated that the more deliberative processes and the more comprehensive and in-depth debates among various interests, aims, and values are implemented in collaborative governance, the less likely a collaboration will achieve its instrumental purposes due to decision stalemates and shortage of desired achievements.

2.3.1.4 Paradox 4: Internal Legitimacy vs. External Legitimacy

Legitimacy of a collaboration refers to a “generalized perception that the actions of a collaborating entity are desirable, proper, or within some system of norms, beliefs, and definitions” (O’Leary & Vij, 2012, p. 8). Legitimacy of collaborative networks needs to be addressed both internally and externally for the collaboration to continue functioning (Human & Provan, 2000; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Internal legitimacy refers to the participants’ perception either on whether governance mechanisms in collaboration are a legitimate way of conducting business that can help them receive social or economic benefits (Provan & Kenis, 2008) or on whether internal participants are trustworthy and credible with compatible and interdependent interests (Emerson et al., 2012). With the increase of internal participants’ real commitment to interaction mechanisms, activities, and collaboration-level goals, internal legitimacy of collaboration can be enhanced (Provan & Kenis, 2008). In contrast, external legitimacy refers to the perception of actors outside a collaboration that the collaboration is legitimate and responsive to external expectations (Provan & Kenis, 2008). External legitimacy of collaboration is closely linked to certain institutional conditions and relevant outsiders’ expectations (Provan & Kenis,

2008), and it is critical for a collaboration to build its legitimacy to outsiders by conforming and adapting to its environment and responding to expectations of key external actors (Bryson et al., 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Sharfman, Gray, & Yan, 1991).

Some governance efforts of a collaboration viewed as legitimate by internal participants may be at odds with institutional conditions or outsiders' expectations, and vice versa. A paradox will thus arise when internal participants' legitimacy requirements contradict with external demands or expectations (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The essence of this paradox exists in the conflict between "individualistic versus collectivistic legitimacy concerns" (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 244). Some governance mechanisms and activities of a collaboration are viewed as legitimate by insiders since they are beneficial for insiders' individual demands, however, these activities might be in conflict with broader external requirements or expectations. Governance mechanisms and activities that benefit internal participants in collaboration yet contribute less to outsiders' expectations will be viewed as less legitimate or even illegitimate by stakeholders outside the collaboration resulting in ineffectiveness of the collaboration. It could be postulated that the more inconsistency existed between internal legitimacy and external legitimacy, the more likely the collaboration will fail.

2.3.2 Paradox between Normative Principles and Real-life Practice of Collaborative Governance

2.3.2.1 Paradox 5: Mutuality vs. Competition

Mutuality is regarded as an important principle for collaborative governance that is deeply rooted in interdependence and mutual benefits among affected stakeholders (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009). It takes place when stakeholders exchange unique

resources (e.g., skills, expertise, or money) and experience mutually beneficial interdependencies (Thomson et al., 2009; Wood & Gray, 1991). Based on the mutuality principle, the achievement of a stakeholder's goals and interests depends on other stakeholders' mutually beneficial actions (Robertson & Choi, 2012; Thomson & Perry, 2006).

Although collaborative governance is guided by the norm of mutuality (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Wood & Gray, 1991), it is often “counterpoised with conflict or competition” (Huxham et al., 2000, 340; Gray, 1989). The reality of competition still exists, leading to an adversarial relationship among participants (Agranoff, 2006; Bryson et al., 2006). Competition in a collaboration usually emerges from conflicts in goals and interests (Vangen & Huxham, 2012), tensions between loyalty to individual organizations and accountability to the whole collaborative network (Bryson et al., 2006; Huxham et al., 2000), and differences in strategies and tactics of addressing problems (Bryson et al., 2006). Participants often compete with each other in obtaining more resources in collaboration or having more influences on decision making, breeding a paradox with the asserted norm of mutuality in collaborative governance. It could be postulated that the more competition existed between participants, the less likely the collaboration will be mutually beneficial.

2.3.2.2 Paradox 6: Normative Egalitarian vs. Pragmatic Power Imbalance

Collaborative governance is built upon collective decision-making, in which egalitarian principle is significant to ensure that every participant can possess equal opportunity to discuss their preferences, especially minority preferences, in decision making processes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Robertson & Choi, 2012; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Egalitarian in collective decision making is grounded in power balance that helps different participants have relatively equal influences in collective decision making (Johnston et al., 2011). However, power imbalance

among participants is realistically unavoidable in collaborative arrangements (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray, 1989; Huxham et al., 2000), even after the efforts to balance power and empower weaker or underrepresented participants by power sharing (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Purdy, 2012).

In the real life of collaborative practices, there are many difficulties in power sharing, such as time consuming, stalemate, inaction, and unwillingness to collaborate or even withdrawal from collaborations (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray, 1985; Ran & Qi, 2018). Power tensions and stakeholders' unwillingness to share power, either behind the scenes of collaborations or more open and explicit, were found in many cases (Margerum, 2001; Ran & Qi, 2019). It is clear that participants of a collaboration exist with each other in a power-dependence relationship and are often occupying different power positions, playing different roles, and carrying different weights (Agranoff, 2006). Normative egalitarian and pragmatic power imbalance appear to present a paradox in collaborative practices. It could be postulated that the more differentiated participants are in their relative power position in a collaboration, the less likely a participants will have egalitarian opportunity in collaborative decision making.

2.3.3 Paradox in Real-life Practice of Collaborative Governance

2.3.3.1 Paradox 7: Autonomy vs. Authority

Participants in a collaboration are legally autonomous or semi-autonomous actors (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009). Autonomy is important for participants who often worry about the actual or potential threats to their autonomy when they participate in a collaboration (Bardach, 2001). At the same time, authority of a collaboration is also important for effective collaborative governance since collaborations have an administration dimension to get things down and achieve particular goals (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et

al., 2009). Therefore, certain administrative structure with authority is necessary for collaborations to effectively act, coordinate, communicate, organize, and keep participants alert to jointly determined rules (Thomson et al., 2009).

In many situations, participants have to compromise their autonomy to some degree and adapt to other partners or to the whole collaboration, but they are often reluctant to do this. For example, Thomas (1997) observed that executives in an interagency cooperation tend to protect their autonomy rather than sacrificing their autonomy for the common mission and purpose of the collaboration. The paradox between participants' autonomy and collaboration's authority occurs when the obedience to authority of a collaboration reduces participants' independent power associated with their autonomy. The paradox between autonomy and authority will affect incentives and stakeholders' decisions on whether participating in a collaboration or refraining from it. It could be postulated that the more the authority of a collaboration is in conflict with participant's autonomy, the more likely participants will withdraw from collaborative arrangement.

2.3.3.2 Paradox 8: Problem before Solution vs. Solution before Problem

Before starting collaboration, potential individual participants will need to identify and analyze the problems facing them, reach a mutual acknowledgement of the issues, and make decision that collaborative efforts are needed to address these issues (Gray, 1985). Stakeholders can make a better decision on whether collaborative governance is an appropriate solution according to their problem analysis. However, problems that need collaborative effort to solve are often "wicked" – they cut cross policy domains, organizational boundaries, political and administrative jurisdictions, group interests with institutional complexity and scientific uncertainty, and are always connected and interacted with other problems, generating "a system

of problems” (Head & Alford, 2015; Weber & Khademian, 2008). In order to identify and define a “wicked problem”, it requires interactive actions of stakeholders and collaborative efforts to acquire data, knowledge, and understanding about the problem and its causal mechanisms (Waardenburg et al., 2020).

A paradox emerges when practitioners have to firstly analyze the problems facing them to evaluate the necessity of forming a collaboration, but at the same time, the very process of analyzing the problems depends upon relevant stakeholders’ collaborative efforts. This reflects the dynamics of collaborative arrangement as a solution to a problem but at the same time serving as the prerequisite for the analysis of a “wicked” problem before the collaboration is decided to be initiated. This paradoxical tension is evident in the study by Waardenburg et al. (2020) where they showed that collaborative action is needed to gather data regarding the problem and to analyze root causes of the problem, yet collaborative action had not yet taken place firstly since the data needed for problem analysis that can support the development of such collaborative approach is insufficient. It could be postulated that the more collaborative efforts are needed to analyze a problem in order to decide whether collaborative arrangement is an appropriate solution, the more likely it will take longer time for stakeholders to find a balance in the dynamics of collaborative problem solving.

2.3.3.3 Paradox 9: Old Approaches before Collaboration vs. New Approaches in Collaboration

Collaborative governance takes advantage of participating actors’ strengths to deal with complex problems that cannot be solved by any single actor independently (Vangen, 2017). A participant’s contribution to collaboration is largely based on their strengths ingrained in their strategic roles before collaboration, such as their control of knowledge, information, and resources. However, their new roles after they participate in a collaboration often require them to

think and behave beyond their old approaches since collaborative governance is an arrangement employing a set of innovative approaches to building collaborative capacity, and then achieve collaborative outcomes over time (Gray, 2000; Rogers & Weber, 2010). Collaborators think and behave in a new way and develop new capacities that can be “defined very broadly to include hardware, software, processes, and organizational (or institutional) change” (Klein, Klinger, & Seely 2003, p. 5), including employment of new technologies, shift in mutual relationships, changes in members protocols, and reforms in decision making approaches (Gray, 2000; Rogers & Weber, 2010).

In collaborative practices, the new roles of participants and new approaches of thinking and behaving in a collaboration are sometimes in conflict with the participants’ prior roles and prior approaches before participating in the collaboration. However, many participants often resort to their previous ideas, protocols, and methods to tackle problems because they are familiar with their old approaches (Waardenburg et al., 2020). Participants always struggle to reconcile a paradox between the dependency on their old roles and approaches before collaboration and the incentive of adopting a new role and new approaches to work collaboratively. It could be postulated that the more a collaborator is indulged in their old roles and old approaches, the less likely a collaboration will be successful in innovatively solving the problems targeted by the collaboration.

2.3.3.4 Paradox 10: Trust First vs. Collaborative Action First

The primary role of trust in collaborative governance has been emphasized by many scholars (Oh & Bush, 2016; Ran & Qi, 2019; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Trust can reduce collaborative members’ concerns about uncertainties at the formative stage of collaboration (Oh & Bush, 2016) and contribute to the success and effectiveness of

collaborative governance by developing positive attitudes and encouraging collective actions (Huxham et al., 2000; Oh & Bush, 2016). Although trust is an essential precondition for starting collaborative actions and ensuring collaborative relationships afterwards, it does not always preexist before collaboration but oftentimes is cultivated during collaboration through interactions such as face-to-face communication, sharing information, knowledge and resources, and promoting values of reciprocity (Knack & Keefer, 1997; McGuire, 2006). In order to build trust, stakeholders need to “engage in collaboration and see evidence that their collaboration could produce desirable results” (Waardenburg et al., 2020, p. 12).

A paradox may arise when trust building only happens during collaborative actions yet collaborative actions are on the premise of sufficient level of trust. Waardenburg et al. (2020) noted that trust-building among crime-fighting collaborators requires them to engage in collaboration and see evidence of desirable results produced by their collaboration, however, their interactions in collaboration, such as sharing sensitive crime data, requires a certain level of trust first. This paradox was recorded as: “trust comes from successful collaboration, but collaboration is about building trust” (Waardenburg et al., 2020, p. 12). It could be postulated that the more trust-building efforts are needed before a collaboration starts, the less likely a collaboration will be formed successfully due to insufficient level of trust.

2.3.3.5 Paradox 11: Accountability to Organization vs. Accountability to Collaboration

Accountability is particularly complex in collaborative governance due to participants’ different thoughts on being accountable to whom and for what (Bryson et al., 2006; Koliba, Mills & Zia, 2011). Representatives of participating organizations are sometimes subject to conflicting accountabilities to their own organizations that employ them (O’Leary & Vrij, 2012) and to the collaboration in which they are involved (Bryson et al., 2006; Huxham et al., 2000).

Representatives participating in a collaboration have an obligation to their own organizations by promoting, supporting, and acting in favor of their organizations, but simultaneously, as members of a collaboration, they also need abide by some jointly determined rules and structures, including collaboration's accountability system.

A paradox might arise when participating organization's accountability system is inconsistent or even conflict with collaboration's accountability system (Bryson et al., 2006; Koliba et al., 2011). The conundrum often exists in collaborative governance: participants achieving their own organizations' accountabilities yet failing to be accountable for the whole collaboration, or vice versa (Page, 2004). It is challenging to coordinate and balance the trade-offs between different accountability systems in collaborative governance (Huxham et al., 2000). It could be postulated that the larger the difference between participating organization's accountability and the collaboration's accountability, the more likely the collaboration will fail.

2.3.3.6 Paradox 12: Artificial Systems vs. Natural Systems

When designing and implementing collaborative governance, artificially-designed or naturally-developed systems often impose significant challenges. Artificial systems are designed by people with its artificial spatial and temporal boundaries, while natural systems are developed naturally without artificial spatial or temporal boundaries. When these two systems mismatch, collaborative governance will face significant difficulties (Qian, 2020). For example, a political election system is designed artificially with its relatively short temporal cycles (e.g., four years), while environmental system is a natural system with long temporal processes. When the mission of a collaborative arrangement is to deal with an environmental problem but is inevitably affected by a short-term political-election cycle, the effectiveness of the collaborative arrangement will face the danger of failure (Kallis, Kiparsky, & Norgaard, 2009). Similarly, spatial mismatch

between artificial and natural systems could also generate a paradoxical situation. For example, when artificially-designed administrative regions (cities, counties, and states) collaborate to address problems across artificially-designed spatial boundaries (such as economic development, labor market, poverty alleviation, environmental protection), participants have to think and act beyond artificial administrative borders (van der Laan & Schalke, 2001), because these artificial boundaries restrict collaborative activities significantly, such as challenges resulted from different fiscal situations, conflicting regulations, or competition for benefits among administrative regions (Qian, 2020).

A paradox will emerge when the mission of a collaboration is to deal with a problem that has to follow a long-term natural cycle or has to span across administrative regions but is inevitably affected by a short-term political cycle or the artificially designed administrative boundaries. This mismatch between artificially-designed and naturally-developed systems often lead to a paradoxical situation in which collaboration is difficult to be functional and effective. It could be postulated that the more differences existed between artificially-designed and naturally-developed systems, the more likely the collaboration will fail.

2.4 Research Agenda

We envisage a few research opportunities for scholars facing these grant challenges that leverage the paradox perspective and the 12 paradoxes that we identified in our review. Future research could focus on 1) investigating each particular paradox and their dynamics in a specific collaborative governance setting; 2) conducting more longitudinal, dialectic, and social network research about the nature and mechanisms of paradoxes in collaborative governance; 3) studying how to design and implement mechanisms to handle dynamics and challenges in collaborative

practice from the paradox perspective; 4) meta-theorizing governance theory from the paradox perspective.

We first call for more research on each paradox that we identified, especially on how the dynamics of the contradictory or dilemmatic pairs of opposing forces unfold from managing and governing different collaborations in specific settings. Future research can study factors leading to certain types of paradoxes in a collaboration, how the tensions were dynamically interwoven to form a paradox, how the existence of such paradoxes affects the effectiveness of collaborative governance, and strategies that are used to handle these paradoxes in different settings. For instance, researchers can study the conditions under which the paradox between internal and external legitimacy will emerge, to which extent this paradox will affect the achievement of participants' individual goals and the collaboration's common goal, and how to balance the need for both kinds of legitimacy in a collaboration.

Methodologically, to better understand the paradoxical nature of collaborative governance, we especially envisage more longitudinal, dialectic, and social network research about paradoxes in collaborative governance. On the one hand, paradoxical thinking highlights the embedded and constitutive nature of paradoxes (Papachroni, Heracleous, & Paroutis, 2015), which emphasizes a longitudinal and dialectic perspective to explore the dynamic relationship between the contradictory elements of a paradox, the evolution of a paradox in collaboration over time, and the long-term approach to managing a paradox (Bloodgood & Chae, 2010; Papachroni et al., 2015). On the other hand, participants experiencing particular paradoxes in collaborative practices are unavoidably engaged in different relationships and interactions. In this regard, enquiry into interactional ties among participants who experience specific types of paradoxes in collaborative governance is especially important. For example, future research can

study what network properties influence participants' perception and interactions when experiencing a certain paradox and the extent to what network characteristics might support or undermine the balance between the contradictory elements of a paradox.

We envisage more studies on how to design and implement mechanisms to handle dynamics and challenges in collaborative practice from the paradox perspective. When academic research on paradoxes intersects with the managerial practice for public administration practitioners, especially when public administrators engage in service delivery design and public decision making that involve multiple stakeholders of a society, it is fundamentally important to develop a paradoxical thinking as a general mindset and capacity in designing, implementing, and handling dynamics and challenges in collaborative practice. Paradoxical thinking is defined as the ability "to effectively embrace, rather than avoid contradictions" (Smith & Tushman, 2005, p. 533). We call for research that explores the role of paradoxical thinking in collaborative governance and the cultivation of paradoxical thinking in public administrators. Researchers can examine how collaborators' paradoxical thinking influences the formation, process, and outcome of collaborative governance, exploring topics such as to what extent participants' paradoxical thinking enable or hinder the formation of collaboration; how paradoxical thinking affects participants' decision making in collaborative process; whether the use of paradoxical thinking can improve the quality of collaborators' decision-making process; and whether paradoxical thinking can help participants achieve the collective goal and their individual goals, or both?

Future research can also explore individual, organizational, and institutional factors that promote or hinder public administrators' paradoxical thinking. For example, researchers could examine the influences of individual factors (e.g., demographic characteristics, previous collaboration experience, and individual perceptions on the impact of collaboration),

organizational factors (e.g., organizational mission, organizational culture, and organizational structure), and institutional factors (e.g., political regime, economic system, and laws or regulations in a specific field) on participants' willingness or capability to think paradoxically in collaboration. Of the critical importance is the research on how to handle paradoxes effectively in collaborative practices, and we envisage more research that focuses on strategic management, policy innovation, political leadership, collective decision-making, and institutional reforms as possible approaches or tools for handling paradoxes in collaborative governance.

We further envisage a distinct opportunity to meta-theorize governance from the paradox perspective. The paradox perspective, viewed as a meta-theory (Lewis & Smith, 2014), represents “an overarching theoretical perspective” (Ritzer 1990, p. 3), which “draws on divergent paradigms and theories and situates them in dialogue with one another through acknowledging and respecting differences and holding them in tension with one another” (Fairhurst et al., 2016, p. 177; Schad et al., 2016). Governance research still lacks a coherent overarching theory and suffers from theoretical fragmentation (McGuire, 2006; Nesbit et al., 2011; O’leary & Vij, 2012), but the paradox perspective could help us reconcile the limitation of various theories used to explain governance (such as transaction cost theory, game theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, corporatism and liberalism), produce a perspective overarching different theories, and contribute to the development of a potential new theory on governance. For example, governance reflects our recognition that public service delivery will never be possible and effective without involvement and interactions of all social actors, being public, private, or civil, and that it is a process of integrating different and diverse participants to achieve collaborative advantages (Gray, 1989; Torfing, 2019; Vangen, 2017). However, integration of differences itself is paradoxical since it not only needs to maintain the uniqueness of individual parts, but also requires a sufficient level of consensus to achieve collective goals. Thus,

governance by essence is always paradoxical between the uniqueness of members and integration of a collective, which is reflected by the conflicting assumptions and central concepts underlying different frames of theories when we juxtapose them to explain and study governance (Vangen, 2017). The paradox perspective reveals the enigmatic nature of juxtaposing different assumptions and concepts, and reframes conflicting and competing demands, principles, and situations in a new perspective regarding the nature, characteristics, and mechanisms of governance.

Meta-theorizing governance from the paradox perspective is also important for the managerial and administrative practices. Practically, based on the paradox perspective, contradictions between competing elements are extremely difficult or impossible to resolve, because of two contrasting orientations regarding the nature of collaborative governance: “idealistic” versus “pragmatic”. Idealistic orientation presupposes a set of goodwill and desired behaviors reflecting the normative aspects of a collaboration, such as diversity, involvement, mutuality, power balance and trust building. In contrast, the pragmatic orientation views collaborative practices in terms of instrumentality, emphasizing the complex challenges that negatively affect the success of a collaboration, including inefficiency, competition for self-interest, insufficient trust, power asymmetry, and incompatible accountabilities, etc. These two contrasting orientations about collaborative governance largely confused practitioners when normative rationality conflicts with pragmatic instrumentality. We thus call for public administrators to adopt a paradox perspective to try to achieve a dynamic equilibrium among multiple competing forces by considering and tackling them holistically rather than pursuing a normative stasis where the dynamics of paradoxes and the persistence of tensions are somehow neglected. The paradox perspective reminds us that when facing complexity in collaborative governance, it is important for scholars and practitioners to reflect from which perspectives they are framing the nature of collaboration, how and why.

2.5 Conclusion

The attempt of distilling major paradoxes from a vast literature is ambitious, so we are not claiming the comprehensiveness of this review, nor are the insights generated from this review significant to move the field of collaborative governance in a decisive way. It should also be noted that any single paradox discussed in this article may not just contain two contradictory elements. Instead, multiple contradictory elements (more than two) can exist in one paradox. Moreover, different categories of paradoxes are not mutually exclusive since the boundary between categories is not absolutely clear cut but fussy (Wittgenstein, 1958), which leads to the “fussy membership” of a paradox. However, we believe adopting a paradox perspective is significant, and based on a systematic review of literature, 12 paradoxes in collaborative governance we explored are of both theoretical and managerial significance. Our analytic framework on paradoxes can deepen the understanding of collaborative governance and provide insights on how practitioners can better operate and manage their collaborations when facing these paradoxes.

2.6 Power as A Key Issue Behind Paradoxes in Collaborative Governance

Reviewing the literature in a paradox lens helps examine how multiple contradictory forces coexist and form a set of tensions in collaborative governance. Interpreting the paradoxes and managing the tensions require us to analyze some common issues relevant to them. I believe power is one of the key issues closely related to these paradoxes in collaborative governance.

First, many elements and forces in these paradoxes are linked to power in collaborative governance. Taking Paradox 1 as an example, both diversity and consensus in Paradox 1 are linked to power. The diverse resources, information, knowledge, and expertise brought by

multiple participants can become different types of power sources, which are important bases for these participants to exercise their power in collaboration. Consensus achieved by multiple participants can also be viewed as an outcome of struggle and compromise among different power holders in collaboration. In addition, inclusiveness in Paradox 2 and deliberative process in Paradox 3 are also closely related to power since more powerful actors can exclude weaker stakeholders or dominant the deliberative process by using their power. The key element in Paradox 4, legitimacy, is also an important base of power that will enhance the power of certain participants who are believed by other actors as legitimate. Some other elements in different paradoxes, such as egalitarian, power imbalance, autonomy, and authority, are all closely linked to power, theoretically and practically.

Second, the tensions formed between conflicting elements in paradoxes are caused by power issues in collaborative governance to certain extent. The most obvious one is the tension between normative egalitarian and pragmatic power imbalance in Paradox 6, which is rooted in the inherent power disparity among participants. Additionally, the tension between diversity and consensus in Paradox 1 is influenced by power relationships because when participants become more diverse, the power relationships among them will become more complex and dynamic because of the multiple power sources associated with diverse participants, which will then increase the challenges for achieving consensus. Power is also a critical dimension of autonomy and authority in Paradox 7, and the tension between autonomy and authority can also be caused by the conflict between the power of independent participants and the whole collaboration. Moreover, in Paradox 12 (artificial system versus natural system), it is the limitation of power held by independent administrative regions that bring in difficulties in promoting collaboration in functional regions across multiple administrative boundaries.

Third, exploring solutions to handle paradoxes needs to consider how to deal with power concerns in collaborative governance. For example, a lot of literature suggests power sharing as a solution to promote egalitarian and reduce power imbalance among participants, which is a commonly recognized approach to dealing with Paradox 6. In Paradox 1, in order to promote consensus-oriented decision-making process, it is critical to balance the power of diverse participants. In Paradox 5, dealing with the paradox between competition and mutuality is also a process of moving from “power over” (own gain) to “power to” (mutual gain). Relieving the tension between autonomy and authority in Paradox 7 requires collaborators to find a balance between autonomous/semi-autonomous participants’ independent power and the whole collaboration’s authority power. In Paradox 9 (old roles before collaborating versus new roles in collaboration), the amount of power held by participants can influence their roles before and after collaborating and affect their ability of balancing their old and new roles. Even in Paradox 10 (trust first versus collaboration action first) where trust is a key element, power still plays a crucial role in tackling this paradox because enhancing power sharing before and during the collaboration is an important way of cultivating trust between participants.

More and more scholars have recognized that many factors affecting collaboration, such as representation, incentives to participate, involvement, voice, and transparency, can be partially explained by power issues (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2007; Lukes, 2005; Gaventa, 2006; Haugaard & Clegg 2009; Purdy, 2012). Theories of power can provide a useful way to link together seemingly disparate factors influencing the effectiveness of collaborative processes (Brisbois & de Loë, 2016). The following three chapters include three studies on power in collaborative governance, which investigate power as an important theme in collaborative governance by focusing on contingencies of power sharing, relationships between power and trust, and approaches of power sharing.

Chapter 3

Contingencies of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance¹

3.1 Introduction

Collaborative governance has received increasing attention by scholars and practitioners in recent decades. There is a host of similar phrases used interchangeably in literature, including collaborative governance, collaborative public management, collaborative decision making, network governance and so forth (Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Huxham & Vangen, 1996; Mandell & Keast, 2007; O’Leary & Vaj, 2012; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Especially, collaborative governance is often used interchangeably with collaborative management. Both of them emphasize engaging participants across the boundaries of organizations or sectors in a formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative process of decision making (Ansell & Gash, 2008), but the term “governance” is “broader and encompasses various aspects of the governing process, including planning, policy making, and management” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 548). Another important synonym is network governance. Network governance involves a set of autonomous individual organizations working together to address complex problems and adapt to contextual contingencies based on implicit and open-ended (social-building) contracts rather than hierarchical and market means (Jones, Hesterly & Borgatti, 1997; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Apparently, all of these similar terms capture a common emerging phenomenon: the collaboration of different organizations from public, private and civic sectors working together as stakeholders based on deliberative consensus and collective decision-

¹ A version of this chapter was published in *The American Review of Public Administration* [Ran, B., & Qi, H. Contingencies of power sharing in collaborative governance. 48(8), pp. 836-851. Copyright ©2018 (SAGE). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074017745355>]. Please also see the approval letter from the Graduate School in Appendix A and copyright permission in Appendix B)

making to achieve shared goals that could not be otherwise fulfilled individually (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Booher, 2004; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012).

Collaborative governance contributes to solving public problems by extending and integrating resources (Rogers & Weber, 2010), promoting information and knowledge sharing (O’Leary & Vij, 2012), motivating innovation (Rogers & Weber, 2010), producing more effective, efficient and flexible policies and sophisticated forms of solutions to problems (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Purdy, 2012; Sousa & Klyza, 2007), and generating solutions that can capture the interests and requirements of different stakeholders (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005). However, dynamics in collaborative governance bring in many challenges, such as the problems of transparency, commitment, accountability, and efficiency (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Bingham, 2009; Huxham, Vangen, Huxham & Eden, 2000; Huxham & Vangen, 2000; O’Toole, 1997; Purdy, 2012). Most of these challenges can be linked to power asymmetry in collaboration (Huxham et al., 2000; Purdy, 2012; Provan & Milward, 2001). Although collaboration assumes a power sharing arrangement by default, that is, collaborative governance always involves some degree of sharing responsibility for decision making and actions among stakeholders, there are always an imbalance in the stakeholders’ power relationship and different levels of dependencies of the stakeholders among each other (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Lawler & Yoon, 1996; Mahapatra, Narasimhan, & Barbieri, 2010), captured by the term power asymmetry or power imbalance. Because of the power asymmetry, the more powerful stakeholders may manipulate the collaborative process, leading to many challenges in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008) that might threaten the effectiveness of the collaboration (Choi & Robertson, 2013).

Literature has made significant efforts in tackling the problems associated with power asymmetry by explaining the causes and influences of power imbalance in collaborative

governance, and proposed power sharing as the solution (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Berkes, 2010; Echeverria, 2001; Gray, 1989; Warner, 2006). For example, research in effective practices within collaboration highlighted several techniques for balancing power among unequal partners, so that partners with fewer resources will have adequate voice (Winer & Ray, 1994; Purdy, 2012). However, the pursuit of power sharing as the solution to power imbalance leads to difficulties in theorizing and implementation (Crona & Bodin, 2010; Dandy, Fiorini, & Davies, 2014; Grindle, 2004; Jentoft, van Son, & Bjørkan, 2007; Linder, 1999; Maner & Mead, 2010; Zérah, 2009). Sharing power in collaboration requires conceptually an insightful reflection on the dynamics of power sharing, and practically a clear guideline to handle the challenges such as time-consuming negotiation, less flexibility, and ineffectiveness (Huxham et al, 2000; Moynihan, 2009). Few studies have tackled these problems in handling power asymmetry through power sharing in a systematic way in collaborative practices. To address this issue, this paper tries to answer the following research question: what is the relationship between power sharing and effective collaborative governance? As explained above, we consider power sharing as a process of sharing responsibility for decision making and actions among stakeholders in collaboration, which is a significant approach to promoting different participants' influences in collaboration. Power sharing is a "process" rather than a perfect outcome of sharing power equally in collaboration. We argue that power sharing and power asymmetry are best conceptualized as a continuum, rather than as binary categories. In collaborative governance, the degree of power sharing varies from collaboration to collaboration and is likely to vary over time within the same collaboration. Instead of struggling to investigate whether a collaboration is sharing power equally among stakeholders, it is more fruitful to study under what conditions certain power arrangements contribute most to effective collaborations. In this paper, we reflected whether power sharing is an effective approach to dealing with the challenges of power asymmetry in collaborative

governance, and explored possible contingency factors that would moderate the influence of power sharing in collaborative governance. We conclude that the answer to this research question is ideally situated within a contingency framework that incorporates key factors affecting the degree of power sharing among stakeholders in collaboration.

This paper is organized as follows: we will first examine the theorization of power and power sharing in effective collaborative governance, and then discuss six contingencies of power sharing from contextual, network, and node perspectives. Along with each contingency, we provide a corresponding proposition to explain how this contingency factor influences the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the significance and implications of our contingency framework.

3.2 Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance

Power is a complex and dynamic concept that has been studied from diverse perspectives. For example, in governance literature, power is characterized by blurred boundaries and mutual dependence between multiple levels of different sectors, such as public sector, private sector, and civil society (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Meehan, 2003; Stoker, 1998). In the context of collaborative governance, power is also characterized as dispersed, shared, and opaque rather than having formal power hierarchies (Huxham, 1991; Huxham et al., 2000). A clear conceptualization of power is needed as a starting point for analyzing the contingencies of power sharing in collaborative governance.

There is a massive body of literature discussing the concept of power. From the behavioral perspective, Dahl (1957) conceptualized power as that “A has power over B to the extent to which he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (p. 202-203). He distinguished four elements of power: the base of power (the source of power), the means of

power (the instruments used by A to influence B's behavior), the scope of power (the range of power or the areas over which A can affect B's behavior), and the amount of power (the extent or the probability of B's actual performance or action that are caused by A's power) (Dahl, 1957; Lister, 2000). This categorization of the four elements of power were echoed by Kaplan (1964) who described three dimensions of power: the weight of power (the degree to which A affects B), the domain of power (the number of Bs that can be influenced by A's power), and the scope of power (the range of B's behaviors that is determined by A) (Kaplan, 1964; Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971). Dahl and Kaplan's behavioral definition of power was extended by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) with the assumption that power does not only refer to getting somebody to do something that he or she does not want to do, but also refers to preventing somebody from doing what he or she wants to do. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) pointed out that power can be exercised not only in decision-making processes but also in non-decision-making processes. In the non-decision making process, the exercise of power may influence the context of decision making (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970) or control which issues can be allowed to become agenda items (Walsh, Hinings, Greenwood, & Ranson, 1981).

Complimentary to the behavioral perspective, Lukes (1974) presented another conceptualization of power from the social construction perspective that focused on "socially structured and culturally patterned behavior of groups" (p. 22). According to Lukes (1974), power can be beyond relationships among individuals, moreover, it can also be resulted from "socially structured and culturally patterned behavior of groups" (p. 22). Thus, even though B voluntarily desires to do what A wants, there still exists the exercise of power from A, because the desires of B might be the result of A's manipulation through some kinds of ingrained social structure and cultural patterns (Lukes, 1974; Dawson, 1996; Lister, 2000). Lukes's perspective extends the understanding of power as decision-making and agenda-setting by adding preference shaping in

the picture (Hay, 1997). Based on his conceptualization of power, there can be no observable conflict in the process of exercising power, and power goes far beyond the relationship between individuals' behaviors into the arena of the socially constructed contexts affected by A and upon which subsequent actions of B must take place (Hay, 1997).

In recent years, scholars have made good attempts in expanding the conceptualization of power beyond individual exercising power. For example, Crosby and Bryson (2005) used structuration theory specifically to understand power in settings where no one is in charge. Thus, the power is viewed as organizational controls of ideas, resources, rules, modes, media, and methods in interorganizational dynamics. Applying this understanding of power in collaborative governance, what literature recognized as ambiguous, complex and rapid changing nature of power in collaborative governance (Huxham et al., 2000; Purdy, 2012) could be elucidated by a framework that delineates the influencing factors in power relationship between members in a collaborative network. Earlier studies have made some efforts in this direction. For example, Hardy and Phillips (1998) presented a simplified framework, emphasizing that formal authority, control of critical resources, and discursive legitimacy are three important aspects of power, which are useful in making sense of power dynamics in interorganizational domains. In line with Hardy and Phillips, Purdy (2012) offered a more comprehensive framework on how participants of collaborative governance assess power, manage power imbalances, and use power strategically based on the different sources of power (authority, resource and discursive legitimacy) and in different arenas of power (participant selection, process design, and content framing). Purdy (2012) also pointed out that individual and single organizational perspectives on power are inadequate to form the framework for assessing power in collaboration. The social setting, or institutional context, is significant when addressing power relationship in collaboration (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; O'Toole & Meier, 2004). O'Toole and Meier (2004) also treated collaborative

network as an outcome enmeshing in a broader environment. Inequality and more powerful elements that are already present in social settings may affect the decision or response of network managers (O'Toole & Meier, 2004). Clearly, power should be analyzed from different factors and across different perspectives in order to help participants strategically manage and share power in a collaboration. However, the existing literature has not engaged reflections critical enough on promoting the practices of power sharing and on the influencing factors in power relationship on the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

3.3 Effectiveness of Collaborative Governance

Effectiveness of collaborative governance is a multidimensional and complex concept. Most literature tends to conceptualize it in terms of outcome-based measures and process-based measures (Gray, 2000; Head, 2008; Provan & Milward, 1995; Provan & Kenis, 2008). According to Head (2008), the criteria for effectiveness of collaborative networks “might include a mix of process issues (e.g. agency survival, network growth, membership interaction, service coordination) and outcome issues at several levels (e.g. range of services, cost effectiveness of services, impact on clients)” (p.741).

Outcome-based measures assume that collaborative network is goal-directed (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Provan & Milward, 1995), so they focus on the achievement of multi-organizational or network-level outcomes (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Both outcome goals and intermediate goals (“outputs” that are seen as steps in the direction of outcome goals) are taken into account when measuring network effectiveness, using measures including value-for-money in service delivery, degree of democracy for seeking public-interest outcomes, and social capital such as mutual respect and trust (Chen, 2008; Gray, 2000; Head, 2008). In addition to outcome, collaborative processes, which are largely measurable through the perceptions of participants,

should also be included in the assessment of collaborative network effectiveness (Head, 2008). Measurements for effective collaborative processes can include the process of aligning different perspectives (Huxham & Vangen 2005), building trust among partners (Leach & Sabatier, 2005), and enabling adjustment to proposed actions (Muro & Jeffrey, 2008).

Effectiveness also depends on the input leading to the accomplishment of goals (Morse & Wagner, 1978). One traditional perspective of evaluating effectiveness is based on system resource model, focusing on inputs of resources and emphasizing a congruence or “fit” between input and output (Cameron, 1986; Langford, 1979; Willcocks, 1992). In line with this model, the input side of effectiveness in collaborative governance is relevant to resources provided by individual organizations or endowed by the interorganizational network as a whole to accomplish network-level goals (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007), and is often measured by resource acquisition and maximization, especially some scarce and valued resources (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967; Friedlander & Pickle, 1968).

Stakeholder approach is another key perspective of assessing collaborative network effectiveness. In addition to the systematic logic of performance improvement, performance assessment needs to strengthen the entire performance improvement system by focusing on stakeholders’ expectations, stakeholder satisfaction and empowering stakeholders (Holzer & Yang, 2004; Freeman, 1984). The stakeholder approach of assessing the effectiveness of collaboration is complex because diverse stakeholders may hold differing, incompatible, and changing criteria (Cameron & Whetten 1983; Denison & Mishra, 1995; Lewin & Minton 1986; Provan & Milward, 2001). Consistent with a multiple-stakeholder perspective, the satisfaction of three stakeholder groups is important in collaborative networks, including principals as monitors and funders of the collaboration, agents as administrators and service-level professionals, and clients as receivers of the services delivered by the collaboration (Provan & Milward, 2001).

Satisfaction of these stakeholder groups provides a recognition of the multidimensional nature of effectiveness in collaborative governance.

To sum up, the effectiveness of collaborative governance can be assessed from multiple perspectives: the extent to which the collaboration can acquire and maximize needed resources as network input, the degree of the intended network-level outcomes achieved by collaborative efforts, the process building of collaborations towards achieving network-level outcomes, and satisfaction of stakeholders about their collaborations. It should be noted that different measuring perspectives can be used to assess the effectiveness of certain aspects of collaborative governance, rather than evaluating whether the collaboration as a whole is effective or ineffective.

3.4 Appeal of Power Sharing in Effective Collaborative Governance

Necessary for an effective collaboration, power sharing is believed to be a highly advocated power relationship since the role of formal hierarchies is declined in collaboration (Berkes, 2010; Huxham, 1991; Huxham et al., 2000). Many empirical studies support that power sharing is positive for collaboration. For example, power-sharing can produce an ethos of cooperation and trust in a public-private partnership as well as promote the sharing of responsibility, knowledge, and risk between partners (Linder, 1999). Adopting a governance model of sharing power and responsibility, agencies can establish firm partnership in local government (Carmichael & Knox, 1999), contribute to the effectiveness of partners in their collaboration (Carley, 2000), secure legitimacy and support for a governance system (Jentoft et al., 2007), reduce inherent fragmentation among stakeholders (Ehler, 2003), and ensure stability in heterogeneous societies (Grindle, 2004). These benefits brought by power sharing among

partners contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of collaboration, and then promote the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Accompanied with these benefits of power sharing in collaborative governance, a set of challenges are also unavoidable when implementing power sharing. These challenges include a time-consuming process for trust building and power sharing, stalemate and inaction caused by the poor implementation of power sharing, unwillingness to collaborate or even withdrawal from collaboration due to the reluctance of sharing power with others, etc. (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Coff, 1999; Gray, 1985). These challenges can undermine the performance of collaboration thus are negatively correlated with the effectiveness of collaboration. Unfortunately, these challenges and the factors causing these challenges are largely ignored by current literature, leading to the following limitations in our current understanding of power sharing.

Firstly, most empirical studies supporting power sharing in collaboration were based on specific areas, such as co-management in marine areas (Jentoft et al., 2007), governance in poverty reduction (Grindle, 2004), integrated coastal management (Ehler, 2003), or specific local government partnership (Carmichael & Knox, 1999). The principles of power sharing distilled from these empirical studies have some limitations when applied to other areas as power relationship varies based on a series of factors, many of which are contingent upon specific situations. Secondly, although a large number of studies have shown that power sharing can bring in benefits, how to deal with the challenges in the process of sharing power, such as time-consuming negotiation, less flexibility and ineffectiveness (Huxham et al, 2000; Moynihan, 2009), is largely neglected. The realization of these benefits relies on the appropriate implementation of power sharing, which is contingent upon a large number of dynamic factors. Current literature has not yet provided a systematic contingent framework within which the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaboration is situated. Thirdly, the

lack of a systematic framework also leads to difficulties for scholars and practitioners to have a clear guideline to design an effective power relationship between participants. Lastly, emphasizing power sharing in collaborative governance simplifies the complexity of the power relationship across different stages or across different collaborations. Power relationship depends on many factors in individual participants, the collaboration formed by participants, and the institutional environment within which the collaboration forms. It is important for researchers to further investigate what conditional factors contributing to certain power arrangement will impact the effectiveness of collaboration.

In line with the above analysis, this paper is aimed to explore possible contingency factors affecting the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. We believe that in order to analyze and deal with the challenges of power sharing, it is necessary to consider the power dynamics under a contingency framework rather than making any absolute assumption about power sharing and its benefits to collaboration. We attempt to achieve this goal by synthesizing six possible contingencies that moderate the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaboration. We explore these six contingencies from the contextual perspective that forms the institutional environment for collaborations, from the network perspective where coordinated actions of participants occurred, and from the node perspective where the characteristics of each individual participating organizations impact the collaboration.

In addition to providing a better understanding of factors influencing power sharing, our contingent framework will also help practitioners engaged in collaboration to evaluate their own roles and status in power relationship and better understand the dynamics of power sharing in collaboration. In practice, participants in collaboration tend to pursue power sharing and enlarge their share of power which might not necessarily benefit themselves or the whole collaboration.

We believe that the appeal of power sharing in collaboration requires careful empirical investigation before it is used as the panacea to address issues brought forth by power imbalance. With our contingency framework, participants can better reflect their strategies to develop the power relationship in their specific collaborative networks and harness the benefits of the collaboration.

3.5 Contingency Framework of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance

In this paper, we identify six contingency factors from three different perspectives: the contextual perspective (institutional environment as the contingency factor); the network perspective (different missions accomplished by collaborative network and the types of network as the contingency factors); and the node perspective (power-sharing experience of participating organizations, diffusion of power sources among participating organizations, and cost-benefit calculation of participating organizations as the contingency factors). In line with the general usage in collaborative governance literature, here “participant” refers to the participating organizations in a collaboration. In the following sections, we will analyze each contingency factor and propose specific propositions on how each contingency factor influences the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance.

3.5.1 Contingency 1: Institutional Environment and Power Sharing

System theorists assume that organizations must interact and adjust to the environment in which they operate (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2011). Institutional theory also emphasizes the influence of a social framework of norms, values and taken-for-granted assumptions on organizations’ behavior (Oliver, 1997a). Organizations are willing to conform or demonstrate

conformity to these social expectations in the environment that they operate because this conformity will improve their chances of survival and success (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1997a). When organizations collaborate, the environment of the interorganizational collaboration is a vital source of resources, rules, and legitimacy (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000) that have great influences on a collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Guo & Acar, 2005; Phillips et al., 2000; Wood & Gray, 1991). Institutional environment sets basic protocols and norms under which participants in collaboration will form common understanding and behavior patterns (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002), such as some widely accepted modes of organizing inter-organizational activities (Alter & Hage, 1993).

Among many elements in collaboration affected by institutional environment, trust, especially system trust, is an important factor that can affect the power relationship between participants. System trust refers to the trust that an individual organization places in the environment around them, reflecting a feeling of safety in the current location or present situation (Adams & Davis, 2005; Pennington, Wilcox, & Grover, 2003). System trust can reduce complexity, uncertainty and opportunistic behavior in social relationships (Bachmann, 2001). There are two ways of building system trust: structural assurances including system's regulations, laws, contracts, and guarantees; and situational normality referring to a previously experienced situation that appears normal and thus reduces uncertainty in the following interaction (Adams & Davis, 2005; Pennington et al., 2003). Both the structural assurances and situational normality are related to institutional arrangement, which is essential to produce system trust that can coordinate trans-organizational relationships (Bachmann, 2001). If the institutional order of a socio-economic arrangement is weak, the risk of trust among members will be very high and a potential trustor will favor power instead of trust in interacting with others (Bachmann, 2001). On the

contrary, strong institutional environment can produce more system trust since organizations incline to believe that the system's rules can protect them from unforeseen challenges in social relationship (Adams & Davis, 2005).

By comparing the different degrees of rigidity in regulations in business collaborative networks of Britain and Germany, Bachmann (2001) found that institutional regulations are stronger in Germany, which cultivated a higher level of system trust between companies with less tendency of relying on power to coordinate their interorganizational relationships. Under this environment, sharing power will be easier to realize, without too much risk in time-consuming negotiation or serious contradictions. Similarly, in a study on multi-level governance and collaborative federal institutions in Australia, Painter (2001) found that a change in institutional rules characterized by power sharing and interdependence limited certain participants' unilateral actions, such as the use of veto and hold-out power (Painter, 2001). Under this environment, a system trust in the institutional rules was formed by the partnering agencies who were then able to reach intergovernmental agreement on sharing power to make decisions jointly (Painter, 2001). In addition to those formal rules, some informal rules in the institutional environment encouraging collaborative governance are also important to reduce the challenges of power sharing and then benefit the effectiveness of collaborative process. In a successful collaborative governance case in the Blackfoot River watershed in Montana State of the United States, one informal rule contributing to its specific institutional environment is a shared idea of promoting effective governance by broadly pooling stakeholders' knowledge assets (Weber, 2009). This institutional factor helped to flatten power and promote knowledge-based power sharing in the collaboration since it can remove the knowledge monopoly enjoyed by some stakeholders, thereby giving a larger array of stakeholders enough influence within the collective decision process (Weber, 2009).

These examples reveal that an institutional environment strongly cultivating and promoting collaborative relationships provides a solid foundation for power sharing in terms of system trust and shared ideas, values, and norms. Trust building, joint decision making, and collaborative spirit can be enhanced within this kind of institutional environment, all of which can make power sharing confront fewer challenges and become more beneficial for an effective collaborative process. Therefore, we propose:

Proposition 1: The stronger the institutional environment is in cultivating collaboration, the more beneficial power-sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

3.5.2 Contingency 2: Different Missions of Network and Power Sharing

The missions accomplished by different collaborations are not identical but have different characteristics. Some missions, such as emergency management of a crisis or exigency, require urgent response and high efficiency. Other missions, such as urban management and natural resource management, need long-time planning and implementation. Although power sharing could benefit collaborative governance in general, the effects of power sharing on collaboration are contingent upon different missions intended by the collaborations. For the exigent missions that require urgent demands and are efficiency-oriented, a time-consuming process of negotiating power-sharing will inhibit efficient responses to an emergency; while the long-term missions that are engagement-oriented or effectiveness-oriented can afford power sharing negotiations to achieve the mission of the collaboration.

Current literature assumed that a collaborative network plays an essential role in emergency management (Kapucu, 2005; Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010; Waugh & Streib, 2006; Wybo & Lonka, 2002). However, the requirement of quick response and high efficiency to manage crisis or disaster cannot afford participants to spend too much time and efforts on

negotiating power structure in the collaboration. Literature has confirmed that in the emergency management collaborations, central authority is necessary to maintain sufficient power to impose orders, take accountabilities, and coordinate resources while taking advantage of the collaborative network to promote information sharing and communication (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Koliba, Mills, & Zia, 2011; Moynihan, 2005; Waugh & Streib, 2006). The effectiveness of collaborative governance in this situation focuses on reducing the input of time, promoting resource sharing, enhancing coordination and communication, as well as delivering necessary goods and services to the public. For example, Moynihan's analysis (2009) on network governance of the crisis response via Incident Command System (ICS) revealed that "a network governance perspective allows us to integrate two seemingly conflicting imperatives of emergency management—the need for interorganizational collaboration and the need for rapid coordinated response" (Moynihan, 2009, p. 912), which is achieved through a temporary hierarchical structure to coordinate multiple response organizations, forming "a highly centralized mode of network governance" (Moynihan, 2009, p. 895).

Different from exigent missions, some other missions of a collaborative network are not urgent but need long-time planning and implementation. For example, urban governance, as a set of institutionalized working arrangements under which the broad social, political and economic forces deal with urban-steering issues and mold the process of urban development, requires participants from multiple governmental and nongovernmental (private or voluntary) sectors for long-term planning and implementation (Brenner, 2004; Hendriks, 2014). Therefore, even though negotiating power structure in the collaboration will consume much time, it will not significantly impact the accomplishment of these missions. Moreover, besides efficiency as one of the important factors in such governance networks, other factors may be more crucial in urban governance. Literature indicated that advancement of participation, power sharing of citizens

(especially vulnerable groups), and promotion of multi-stakeholder arrangements are significant in urban governance to balance certain dominant social groups and reduce potential intensified conflicts among stakeholders (Andersen, 2001; Baud & Dhanalakshmi, 2007; Dekker & van Kempen, 2004; Parés, Bonet-Martí, & Martí-Costa, 2012; Zérah, 2009).

Urban governance in Mumbai, as studied by Zérah (2009), exemplified a power asymmetry that is in favor of certain classes in society. The middle and upper middle classes are powerful in decision-making processes, yet nongovernment organizations play a disappointing role in promoting poorer communities to participate, which brings in difficulties to optimize public services for all stakeholders. The effectiveness of urban governance focuses more on having an inclusive process of decision making and improving different stakeholders' satisfaction by respecting and considering their interests and perspectives. In order to improve the effectiveness of governance and motivate actual engagement of diverse stakeholders in a long term, power sharing is an appropriate approach in urban governance even though it is time-consuming. Therefore, we propose:

Proposition 2: The less exigent the mission accomplished by collaborative governance is, the more beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

3.5.3 Contingency 3: Types of Network and Power Sharing

Collaborative networks could be categorized in many different ways, among which mandated and voluntary networks are two most common types. Mandated network refers to the legal or policy-mandated collaborative relationship between participants (Brummel, Nelson, Souter, Jakes, & Williams, 2010; Rodríguez, Langley, Béland, & Denis, 2007) while voluntary network refers to the collaboration and partnerships formed on the basis of voluntary participation rather than hierarchical control (Alexander, Comfort, Weiner, & Bogue, 2001; Thomson & Perry,

2006). Though both types of collaborative governance networks involve various degree of power sharing arrangements (after all, even in mandated collaboration, participants are by definition compelled to share power), in practice, the influences of power sharing on the effectiveness of collaborative governance may vary across these two types of network.

For example, “voluntary networks are created bottom-up by the professionals and organizations that will participate in the network, whereas mandated networks are created by policy dictate, typically by a government agency” (Kenis & Provan, 2009, p. 449). Voluntary collaboration is characterized by consent, reciprocity and trust (Das & Teng, 2001; Greenwood & Van Buren, 2010; Snavely & Tracy, 2002), which implies that when collaboration is formed voluntarily, participants will have more consent, reciprocity and trust among each other, and the collaboration will be more effective when measured by measures of the process and stakeholder satisfaction. This consent will be positive for their willingness in negotiating power structure in collaboration since they have more common values and trust thus willing to compromise reciprocally when collaborating, leading to a better chance to collaborate effectively. Voluntary network may also be driven by reciprocity to obtain more benefits while motives of reciprocity, in turn, enhance cooperation, collaboration and coordination among partners (Oliver, 1990). Similarly, trust between voluntary partners is also an important driver for them to form a collaborative network. Because of trust, partners can predict the risk of sharing power with each other more confidently. Therefore, they are more willing to share power with each other, and fewer challenges will be encountered by participants when sharing power. Comparatively, mandated collaboration usually involves some degree of use of bureaucratic or hierarchical mechanisms (Rodríguez et al., 2007) in order to achieve more effective outcomes of the collaboration. In a mandated network, participants engage in interaction largely based on the mandate (Raelin, 1980), which might hinder the level of mutual consent, reciprocity and trust. In

this situation, internal legitimacy, which refers to the participants' positive assessment and mutual consent of network, is unlikely to be very high (Kenis & Provan, 2009). Since legitimacy depends on the "consent of the governed" (Green, 1989) and internal legitimacy is not likely to be high in a mandated network, participants tend to either involuntarily comply with a differentiated power structure dictated in the mandate or struggle to gain more power for themselves due to lower levels of trust and reciprocity, leading difficulties in an effective collaboration.

Additionally, the different planning approaches in these two types of network also suggest a difference in power sharing. Bryson et al. (2006) synthesized two different planning approaches in collaborative settings. One approach is more applicable for mandated collaboration, which emphasizes deliberate planning and careful articulation of missions, goals, roles, responsibilities, and action procedures, as key factors to the effectiveness of collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006). The other approach is more applicable for voluntary collaboration, which emphasizes the emergence of the missions, goals, roles, and action steps over time through conversations involving a broader network of affected partners (Bryson et al., 2006; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Even though both "deliberative planning" and "careful articulation of missions, goals" can be used in mandated and voluntary collaborations, the degree of using these two approaches in the two types of collaboration is not the same, which leads to different impacts on the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaboration. The first approach assumes deliberate planning from goals and careful articulation of missions and responsibilities dominated by a few powerful parties with less power-sharing, while the second approach assumes a more democratically effective conversations between a broader network of affected partners in forming missions and specifying responsibilities where power sharing between participants is a key factor to the effectiveness of collaboration.

It should be noted that categorizing governance network types into mandated and voluntary is a simplified picture of reality and cannot capture all the nuances in collaborative governance, however, this categorization is a typical example that helps to explain the influence of network types in the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. Therefore, we propose:

Proposition 3: The more voluntary the type of collaborative governance is, the more beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

3.5.4 Contingency 4: Previous Collaboration Experience and Power Sharing

As explained by path-dependency theory, existing institutions, structures and policies extended from historical traditions, norms, and practices will result in difficulties and constraints in reform (Bevir, Rhodes, & Weller, 2003; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Wilsford, 1994). In collaborative governance, previous collaboration experience of different participants will impact their power sharing in current collaboration by inheriting their past patterns of thinking and actions. The research of Walsh et al. (1981) confirmed this by indicating that the exercise of power is influenced by “the rule of the past over the present” (p. 146), and partners with few experience of working together are not accustomed to sharing power (Lasker, Weiss, & Miller, 2001). These previous collaboration experience can influence the current power sharing in three manners.

First, for participants with insufficient power-sharing experiences in collaboration, it is difficult to establish the legitimacy of power sharing. Legitimacy is “a social judgment of acceptance, appropriateness, and/or desirability” (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002, p. 416) that helps to reduce challenges and contradictions in social interactions. For participants with limited power sharing experiences, the embrace of power sharing as a legitimate mechanism in collaborative

governance challenges traditional institutions of authority characterized by hierarchical styles of arrangements that they are familiar with (Booher, 2004). In this situation, in order to establish enough legitimacy for power sharing as a new arrangement in collaborative governance, more efforts and time are needed to overcome potential challenges and contradictions.

Second, the lack of power-sharing experiences will increase the reluctance of traditional powerful participants to share power in collaboration. With limited experiences of collaboration or power sharing, powerful stakeholders are inclined to adhere to the accepted culture, previous policies, and pre-identified problems within their groups to protect their power positions and prevent potential risks caused by other participants' increasing possess and use of power. As the stakeholders who have already possessed sufficient power to obtain benefits in the interaction with others, powerful participants also have a strong willingness and enough capability and skills to keep the existing power relationship in order to prevent potential loss of benefits resulted from power sharing.

Third, participants in a weaker power position may have limited capacities to share power due to their insufficient previous power-sharing experiences. Sharing power always comes along with sharing accountability, and if the participants do not have enough capacity to take on more accountability, they may choose voluntarily to rely on more powerful partners thus give up some of their power in exchange for less accountability in the collaboration. In addition to accountability, power sharing also requires certain capacities in negotiation, strategy-building, visioning and professional knowledge for the effectiveness of a collaboration, most of which can be acquired through previous experiences.

For example, based on a study on the Deer Initiative, a collaborative partnership on natural resource management in England, Dandy et al. (2014) found that the previous policy and accepted culture in natural resource management emphasizing traditional institutions of authority

and hierarchical styles of arrangements were still considered as more legitimate, although collaboration and power sharing become an emerging arrangement in this natural resource management. Sharing power is severely limited due to the fact that substantial power has been previously wielded to certain powerful participants (e.g. government agencies in the traditional deer and forestry sector) in advance rather than being shared. These traditional powerful stakeholders who had limited power-sharing experiences have effectively resisted the further inclusion of more diverse stakeholders and impeded power sharing in collaboration by emphasizing their priorities and dominating agenda-setting process (Dandy et al., 2014). At the same time, less powerful stakeholders who had insufficient capacity to negotiate power with powerful partners were not encouraged to participate in agenda setting or decision making. In this case, sharing power amongst stakeholders is limited even though collaborative governance as a form of natural resource management has emerged and gained legitimacy (Dandy et al., 2014).

The effectiveness of collaborative processes, such as joint decision making and mutual trusting relationship, will be inhibited due to the challenges encountered by power sharing between partners with insufficient power sharing experience, which will further negatively impact the collaborative outcomes as well as participants' satisfaction with their collaboration.

Therefore, we propose:

Proposition 4: The less power sharing experience participants have, the less beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

3.5.5 Contingency 5: Diffusion of Power Sources and Power Sharing

The relationship between power sharing and the effectiveness of collaboration is also contingent upon diffusion of power sources in collaboration. Power sources, which mainly come from formal authority, resource control, and discursive legitimacy (Hardy & Phillips, 1998;

Purdy, 2012), are the foundation of exercising power. It is unrealistic to share power without the diffusion of power sources among participants.

The roles or functions of participants in collaboration are not identical but vary among members based on their power sources. Participants dominating power sources are usually the central actors in collaboration who can control different arenas of collaboration, including the participants (“who is involved in a collaborative process and who leads it”), the process design for collaboration (“where, when, and how of collaborative governance, influencing the nature of interaction and the mode that are used for communication and decision making”), and the content of the collaboration (“what issues are addressed and what outcomes are pursued”) (Purdy, 2012, p. 411). Participants in a weaker power position are usually marginalized in these arenas, which deprives many of their opportunities to negotiate power sharing. When power sources are highly concentrated in certain participants in a collaboration, many challenges need to be coped with in the process of power sharing.

Taking resource control as an example: in a collaborative network, partnering organizations that can provide resources or services vital to all or to a large number of their partners can gain more power due to the centrality of their functions (Benson, 1975). “For example, where network organizations are engaged in the delivery of multiple, differentiated services to clients, an organization at the center of referral flow, namely, one to which all or many clients must be referred, may gain power over those at the periphery. This occurs because centrality makes an organization crucial to the resource acquisition of other agencies.” (Benson, 1975, p. 233). The powerful position of the organization with the central function is based on its resource control that is crucial to other partners in the network. This imbalanced power relationship is difficult to challenge if the powerful organizations’ central position in the referral flow does not change.

Crona and Bodin (2010) also discussed concentrated power sources in the hands of certain actors in the fisheries management, which leads to a power asymmetry between participants in the collaborative governance in the fishery. Actors in fishing communities, who possess the fish equipment, natural environmental knowledge, and links to relevant officials and nongovernmental organizations, are defined as “opinion leaders” based on their capacity to amplify their influences on shaping others’ understanding about the fishery and the natural environment (Crona & Bodin, 2010). The legitimacy of the “opinion leaders” is not easy to be challenged because their power sources are difficult to transfer to other actors in a short term. Moreover, the “opinion leaders” who have invested “sunken costs” would potentially resist major changes in their possession of resource (Crona & Bodin, 2010), which also makes them reluctant to share power with other participants. Since the sources of power cannot be easily shared with others, power sharing will lose its foundation and be extremely challenging, leading to difficulties in aligning different perspectives and making decisions jointly, which are important measures in assessing the effectiveness of collaboration from the process perspective. The disappointing collaborative process will further undermine stakeholders’ satisfaction about their collaboration. Therefore, we propose:

Proposition 5: The more widely diffused power sources are, the more beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

3.5.6 Contingency 6: Cost-benefit Calculation and Power Sharing

Collaboration is always associated with potential costs, including a loss of decision-making or operating autonomy (Provan, 1984; Schermerhorn, 1975), unfavorable ramifications for organizational image or identity (Levine, White & Paul, 1963; Schermerhorn, 1975), and expenditures of time and communication activities (Booher, 2004; Johnston, Hicks, Nan & Auer,

2010; Schermerhorn, 1975). For participants in collaboration, cost-benefit calculation is important to ensure that the benefits are recognized as outweighing the costs (Huxham & MacDonald, 1992). In practice, there is an intrinsic tradeoff for participants in a collaboration when they have to choose either having autonomy with more power or getting more benefits at the cost of relinquishing some power (Maner & Mead, 2010). The choices may depend on their expectation and calculation of the cost and benefit in giving up some power in a collaborative arrangement. If participants expect that benefits in collaboration will outweigh the cost of giving up some power or leaving the collaboration, they are more likely to tolerate a certain degree of differences or even disparities in power sharing.

As we defined in the previous section, collaborative governance is a multiorganizational arrangement where diverse stakeholders from public, private and civic sectors work together based on deliberative consensus and collective decision-making to achieve shared goals that could not be otherwise fulfilled individually. The major purpose of collaboration is to achieve some shared goals, rather than pursuing power in collaboration. Power sharing is a means to obtain benefits brought in by collaboration, rather than an end by itself. Therefore, participants' willingness and behaviors of pursuing power sharing will be contingent upon their cost-benefit calculation in achieving their ultimate goals or putting more efforts to achieve power sharing.

On the one hand, since the power relationship among stakeholders is significantly related to the degree of perceived interdependency among them (Gray, 1985), participants in a weaker power position often depend more on their partners and have more desire and needs to stay in the collaboration. Even though their power is weaker, they may be more willing to keep important partners from leaving the collaboration thus more willing to yield to important partners in power sharing arrangement, since the replacement cost caused by the leave of these important stakeholders has to be considered (Coff, 1999). Based on the calculation of cost and benefit, they

are likely to keep the collaboration working rather than only focusing on sharing more power with key actors. In this situation, power sharing is not a necessary condition for an effective collaboration. On the other hand, since powerful participants are also dependent upon less powerful partners in collaboration, if powerful participants expect that sharing some power with others will not undermine their major interests, but instead can improve the legitimacy of collaboration and ultimately benefit the whole collaboration in a long run, it is possible for them to be more willing to share power with their partners.

Studies of some social psychologists, such as Murray, Holmes, and Griffin (1996), have also found that parties who have a heavy dependence relationship with each other are more likely to interpret ambiguities in their partners' behaviors in a positive rather than a negative light. This implies that partners in collaboration who depend heavily on the benefits produced by each other are more likely to positively interpret the ambiguities in each other's behaviors, including behaviors of using power in the collaboration. Without too many concerns about the negative outcomes of exerting power, power sharing is less attractive compared with their heavy dependence relationship and the benefits associate with it.

Huxham (2003) suggested that a willingness to accept the manipulative behavior in dealing with power relationship in a collaboration is sometimes appropriate. Based on the cost-benefit analysis, manipulative behaviors in power relationship, such as shifting certain powerful positions among partners in some periods of time or maintain the existing power asymmetry, will likely be accepted by partners if these behaviors can maximize the benefits of collaboration. On the other hand, if participants assume that sharing power with their partners will promote their benefits obtained through collaboration, they tend to promote power sharing. From the cost-benefit perspective, the effectiveness of collaboration can be promoted in terms of both outcomes

achieved by collaboration and the stakeholders' satisfaction with their collaboration. Therefore, we propose:

Proposition 6: The more acceptable the cost-benefit calculation is for participants, the more beneficial power sharing is for the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

3.6 Discussion

Power relationship is a key issue in researching and practicing collaborative governance. Literature has noted power asymmetry between participants as one of the major problems in collaborative governance and proposed power sharing as a solution to this problem. However, the challenges in the process of sharing power, such as a time-consuming process for trust building and power sharing, stalemate and inaction caused by the poor implementation of power sharing, and unwillingness to collaborate or even withdrawal from collaboration due to the reluctance of sharing power, need to be reflected in depth. In order to provide a guideline for addressing these challenges, we proposed a contingency framework for power sharing, considering the complexity of different perspectives in participants, collaborative network, and institutional environment influencing power in collaborative governance.

The development of the contingency framework starts with our interpretation of power, which includes three aspects: the behavioral perspective, the social construction perspective, and different influencing factors in power dynamics. The behavioral perspective (the power from A on B that gets B to do something that B does not want to do otherwise) suggests that the ability to exercise power on others plays a critical role in power relationship since the power is exercised by A against B's will. In our contingency framework, we identified factors influencing some participants' ability in exercising power. From the node perspective, we believe that participants' previous experiences of power sharing and structures of power sources contribute to their ability

to exercise power. Participants with rich previous power-sharing experiences have more capability, knowledge, and skills to promote power sharing in their ongoing collaboration. Additionally, diffused power sources will decentralize functions of participants thus prevent certain participants from dominating the process of collaboration, contributing to the effectiveness of collaborative governance network.

The social construction perspective (the power from A on B that makes B voluntarily want to do what A wants) implies that power is socially structured and culturally patterned that will lead to B's internalization of A's will and willingness to yield to A's power. In the context of collaborative governance, once established as being legitimate or necessary, either power sharing or power asymmetry could be accepted socially as reasonable and function well in collaboration. Contingencies, such as increased system trust produced by a strong institutional environment that can cultivate collaboration, less exigent missions that could afford democracy-oriented power sharing, more voluntary collaborative network, more previous power-sharing experience, as well as more acceptable cost-benefit calculation on power sharing, will promote power sharing through the process of social construction. The shared power that is socially constructed and culturally patterned is more beneficial for the effectiveness of collaboration.

The last aspect of power interpretation suggests that power could be further decomposed into different factors, such as power source, power means, power scope, and power arena, that all contribute to the effectiveness of power relationship. This conceptualization helps to reflect the extent of power asymmetry in collaboration. Significant difference in power can negatively affect the inter-organizational relationship between participants since it undermines the involvement and trust of participants. Yet pursuing power distribution as equal as possible is not necessary and may prove undesirable and unrealistic due to the stalemate and inaction provoked by it (Gray, 1985). How to find a balance between power sharing and power asymmetry is related to the

flexible strategies in dealing with different power factors. Our contingency framework provides a general guidance to manage these dynamic factors in power by proposing that the appropriateness of power sharing for the effectiveness of collaboration will be impacted by the diffusion or concentration of power sources, the more or less previous experiences in power means, the different power scopes denoted by more or less mandatory types of the collaboration network and more or less exigent missions of the network, and the corresponding power amount exercised or shared based on acceptable cost-benefit calculations.

Our contingency framework is situated in the institutional theory and resource dependence theory. Institutional theory claims that organizations conform to social framework of norms, values and taken-for-granted assumptions composed and existed in their institutional context (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1997a). We proposed three contingencies in our framework which are in line with the institutional theory: institutional environment from the contextual perspective, missions of network from the network perspective, and previous power-sharing experience from the node perspective. First, stronger institutional environment cultivating collaboration brings in more willingness for participants to share power based on their system trust in environment and confidence on predictable outcomes of sharing power. Second, to accomplish different missions of network, existing institutional context, either inclines to be more bureaucratic or democratic, will impact the necessity and feasibility of power sharing. For example, exigent missions cannot afford the time-consuming negotiation in power sharing, thus will work better when existing institutional arrangement emphasizes central control. Third, participants with less power-sharing experience within an institution characterized by hierarchical styles of arrangements may be less voluntary to share power in a new collaboration, because power sharing is discouraged by the existing institution and lost its legitimacy to certain extent, thus harming the effectiveness of collaborative governance.

Resource dependence theory argues that organizational survival relies on their ability to secure critical resources from the external environment, and the interorganizational dependencies are created by the needs of all organizations to acquire or share scarce resources (Provan, Beyer, & Kruytbosch, 1980; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). In a collaboration, an organization can be more powerful relative to its partners if it controls more resources needed by others or if it can reduce its dependency on others for resources (Provan et al., 1980). We proposed three contingencies in our framework which are in line with the resource dependency theory: types of network from the network perspective as well as power sources and cost-benefit analysis from the node perspective. From the network perspective, when a network is mandated to form, and the interdependencies between participants are largely externally imposed thus might not strong enough to motivate them to collaborate voluntarily, mandated participants might have reduced willingness to share power leading to reduced benefits of the collaboration. From the node perspective, if power sources are concentrated on a single organization, this organization can be more powerful due to its possession of more resources needed by other partners and fewer dependencies on others, leading to challenges and reluctance for powerful participants to share power, which will further undermine the collaboration. On the other hand, if the ultimate goal of an organization to participate collaboration is to acquire scarce resources, that organization is more willing to give up some power in order to stay in the collaboration after a cost-benefit calculation.

Essentially, the contingency framework emphasizes the importance of balance between power sharing and power asymmetry, which is the key issue of power dynamics in collaborative governance. As we discussed on the appeal of power sharing in collaborative governance, most literature treated power sharing and power asymmetry as two opposite types of power relationship in collaboration. The binary demarcation of these two concepts has been assumed in

research on power dynamics in collaborative governance, leading to claims on the assumed benefits of power sharing and claims on the apocalypse of power asymmetry. In reality, power asymmetry and power sharing are always interwoven and co-existed, leading to a mixture of both in any state of the collaborative network. Sharing power perfectly among participants is clearly an impossibility while power asymmetry is more likely to be the norm of collaboration due to the specific socio-economic-political contexts where the inter-organizational collaboration situated. Therefore, the attempts of sharing power as much as possible in collaboration should be called into question. When pursuing power sharing in collaboration, the efforts in analyzing and practicing power sharing on collaboration should focus on the factors impacting the dynamics of power relationship upon which collaborative governance could be effective.

Our contingency framework also provides some empirical guidance to practitioners when collaborating with other partners: (1) When participating a collaboration, it is necessary for participants to evaluate the institutional environment outside the collaboration, such as the rigidity of regulations and rules that can control the participants' behaviors; (2) Understanding both individual organizational goals and common missions of the collaboration is necessary when sharing power between partners; (3) Improving the internal consent or legitimacy of the mandated collaborative network is significant for power sharing; (4) Choosing the partners who have positive previous experiences in power sharing with others is beneficial for an effective collaboration; (5) Be cautious to participate in a collaboration in which the partners' power sources are extremely asymmetric if you are willing to share more power with your partners; (6) Promoting the "outcome justice" and improving the participants' satisfaction with their benefits gained in collaboration are significant for promoting power sharing. As Huxham (2003) indicated, practitioners need to apply any theoretical analysis contingently to guide their efforts in

collaboration since “particular approaches to resolving issues are not necessarily transferable to other situations” (p. 420).

Our theoretical framework is built upon the literature on power sharing as related to the effectiveness of collaborative governance. However, this literature is thin in providing rich examples and cases upon which we could situate our framework. It is also possible that some cases we used in this paper might be subject to alternative interpretations and explanations. However, this paper is a starting point to study power sharing in collaborative practices within a contingency framework, which could shed some light on future empirical studies that this field is in dire need.

Certainly, due to the complexity of collaborative governance, it is also difficult for this paper to exhaust all contingency factors that can influence the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. Moreover, the contingency factors identified in this paper are not mutually exclusive. These factors will most likely co-exist and function together in a collaborative arrangement. We expect future studies, both conceptual and empirical, can further investigate more contingencies or the interplay between contingency factors. We also call for studies to include more dynamics in collaborative governance to develop a comprehensive framework and more in-depth studies on the compounding effects of these contingency factors in influencing the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance.

3.7 Conclusion

In this paper, we attempted to explore certain contingencies affecting the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. We approached the key question - whether power sharing is beneficial for the effectiveness of collaborative governance –

from a contingency perspective (“It all depends”), and developed a contingency framework that identifies six contingencies, including institutional environment (from the environmental perspective); different missions accomplished by collaborative network and types of network (from the network perspective); power-sharing experience of participants, diffusion of power sources among participants, and cost-benefit calculation of participants (from the node perspective). We argue that these contingency factors will affect the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance. This contingency framework will help both scholars and practitioners to develop a conceptual understanding of power relationship in collaboration and provide insight on how the power dynamics in collaboration can be managed.

3.8 From Contingency Approach to Dyadic Approach

In this chapter, a contingency approach is adopted to study how the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance will be affected by a set of contingencies. This contingent framework indicates that power in collaborative governance is extremely dynamic. Yet any absolute assumptions about power sharing as a highly advocated power relationship in collaboration cannot capture the complexity of managing power relationship in real-life practice. To further explore approaches to dealing with power issues in collaborative governance, in the next chapter, a dyadic approach is employed to link power with trust as another significant factor influencing interorganizational relationships in collaboration to analyze how their relationship can enlighten us in enhancing power management in collaborative governance.

Chapter 4

The Entangled Twins: Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance²

4.1 Introduction

Collaborative governance has been studied extensively by both scholars and practitioners in recent decades. Similar terms, including partnership, alliance, network, and joint working, all capture this emerging phenomenon (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Huxham, Vangen, Huxham, & Eden, 2000). In this article, we define collaborative governance as a multi-organizational arrangement where a number of identified participants work together based on deliberative consensus and collective decision-making to pursue shared purposes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012; Huxham et al., 2000; Ran & Qi, 2017).

Prior literature analyzed numerous factors impacting collaborative governance, among which power and trust are two important ones (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Huxham & Vangen, 2000). Most of the literature on power and trust in collaborative governance focused on their independent roles rather than their dynamic interplays (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Saz-Carranza, Salvador Iborra, & Albareda, 2016; Purdy, 2012; Vangen & Huxham, 1998; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Studies on power in collaborative governance often consider power as a challenge to the success of collaboration due to potential negative effects resulted from unavoidable power asymmetry (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Provan & Milward, 2001; Purdy, 2012; Ran & Qi, 2016). Power asymmetry is commonly noted as a problem since power is almost always distributed

² A version of this Chapter was published in *Administration & Society* [Ran, B., & Qi, H. The entangled twins: Power and trust in collaborative governance. 51(4), pp. 607-636. Copyright © 2019 (SAGE). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399718801000>]. Please also see the approval letter from the Graduate School in Appendix A and copyright permission in Appendix B.

asymmetrically across participants, which may lead to the manipulation by stronger actors in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Some literature further analyzed different sources and arenas of power in collaboration (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Purdy, 2012), providing a framework to make sense of power dynamics in interorganizational domains. Scholars tend to view power sharing as a solution to power asymmetry but a series of challenges in sharing power are still difficult to overcome (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray, 1989).

Comparatively, trust is often considered in terms of its positive influence on collaboration (Emerson et al., 2012; Huxham et al., 2000; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). The benefits of trust include developing positive attitudes and confidence between partners (Huxham et al., 2000; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), cultivating mutual understandings (Emerson et al., 2012), lowering transaction cost (Berardo, Heikkila, & Gerlak, 2014; Gulati, 1995), boosting openness of expression (Van Oortmerssen, van Woerkum, & Aarts, 2014), promoting conflict resolution (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), and improving performance of activities (Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerwood, 2004; Oh & Bush, 2016). Some researchers focused on trust building, providing a series of approaches to enhancing trust in collaboration, such as communication and adaptation (Das & Teng, 1998), competence to perform in collaboration (Blomqvist & Ståhle, 2000), and collective problem-solving activities (Booher, 2004).

It is important to note that a set of challenges in power sharing and trust building in collaborative governance are still unsolved effectively by the current literature, which largely focused on the individual roles of power and trust in collaboration, such as how to budget and justify the necessary time and cost in power sharing and trust building in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008), how to effectively manage various conflicts and reduce mistrust among stakeholders resulted from power issues (Gray, 1996; Huxham & Vangen, 2005), and how to cope with

participants' reluctance, possible stalemate and inaction in sharing power (Gray, 1985). These unsolved challenges inspire me to study the relationship between power and trust from a dyadic perspective rather than focusing on their independent and individual roles in collaborative governance. In fact, both power and trust are social forces (Ireland & Webb, 2007), entangled and intertwined with each other to coordinate interactions between individuals or groups (Luhmann, 1979). The dyadic perspective often studies the common bases or sources of two concepts and their mutual influence on each other. Accordingly, we discuss three dyadic relationships between power and trust in collaborative governance: the shared sources of power and trust, the influence of power relationship on trust building, and the influence of trust building on power relationship. We argue that the three dyadic relationships will effectively address the challenges in power sharing and trust building in collaborative governance. Promoting shared sources of power and trust can help participants save time and cost of collaboration by managing power relationship and building trust simultaneously. The influence of power relationship on trust building is important for understanding and managing various conflicts and reduce distrust among partners caused by power issues. The influence of trust building on the management of power relationship is significant for promoting conflict resolution, improving performance of activities, and reducing possible stalemate and inaction in pursuing power sharing. We believe the analysis of these three relationships can advance our understanding of power and trust both conceptually and practically.

From the conceptual perspective, most prior research on power and trust in collaborative governance stops at their individual roles, impacts and mechanisms in collaboration (e.g., Bryson et al., 2006; Huxham, 2003; Purdy, 2012; Saz-Carranza et al., 2016; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). This limits our interpretation of power and trust since it fails to uncover some similarities and interactions between these two elusive concepts. Through a dyadic perspective that bridges this

two concepts together, we identify certain important similarities and interactions between different dimensions of power and trust, such as their sources, types, and effects, all of which are helpful to further our understanding of these two critical concepts in collaborative governance.

From the practical perspective, since collaborative governance is full of paradoxes (Huxham et al., 2000), carrying the dynamics of dependency, cooperation, competition and conflict, neither power nor trust alone can make the collaboration work effectively in practice. Focusing on the independent role of power or trust leads to difficulties in dealing with certain challenges in collaboration, such as time and cost consuming resulted from trust building (Ansell & Gash, 2008), questions on authority, transparency and accountability caused by power disparities among participants (Purdy, 2012), and threats to the performance of collaboration due to stalemate and inaction provoked by pursuing inappropriate equality in power relationship (Gray, 1985). The dyadic analysis of power and trust used in this paper provides a different way of thinking and solving these issues. Taking advantage of some underlying relationships between different dimensions of power and trust provides important managerial implications in collaborative governance, which can help participants consider their power and trusting relationships with each other simultaneously and explore some useful strategies in coordinating their interactions more effectively.

This paper is organized as follows: we will first provide a critical review on power and trust in collaborative governance, and then propose three relationships and seven propositions between power and trust in the context of collaborative governance. We conclude this paper with a discussion of conceptual similarities between power and trust, trust-based power and power-based trust, as well as a set of managerial implications for participants to manage power and trust in collaboration.

4.2 Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance

In this section, we will first review some general conceptualization of power and trust that is primary in literature to provide a basic introduction of these two complex concepts, such as their definitions and widely used typologies. Because this paper discusses power and trust in the context of collaborative governance at organizational (meso and macro) levels rather than at interpersonal (micro) level, we will focus on some dimensions of power and trust that have been discussed frequently in collaborative governance literature, such as power asymmetry, power sharing, and trust building in interorganizational interactions.

4.2.1 Power in Collaborative Governance

Essentially, power is a property of a relationship (Emerson, 1962), referring to a potential ability of controlling or influencing others (individuals, groups, or organizations). The control or influence can be conceptualized in terms of evoking an influence or change in others' behaviors (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957; Hunt & Nevin, 1974) or manipulating others' desires, attitudes and behaviors through social structure and cultural patterns (Dawson, 1996; Lukes, 1974; Lister, 2000). Scholars categorize power in many different ways, such as a widely used typology proposed by French and Raven (1959) where power was categorized into reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power. A binary categorization is also frequently used: coercive or non-coercive (Ireland & Webb, 2007). Coercive power refers to actors' ability to control negative or undesired outcomes through punishment or threatened sanctions (French & Raven, 1959; Molm, 1997). Non-coercive power is the ability to promote positive or desired outcomes by providing or withholding rewards (Molm, 1997).

In recent years, scholars have made good attempts in expanding the conceptualization of power beyond individual or group exercising power, which is helpful in studying power in the context of interorganizational collaboration. For example, Crosby and Bryson (2005) used structuration theory specifically to understand power in settings where no one is in charge. Power is viewed as organizational controls of ideas, resources, rules, modes, media, and methods in interorganizational dynamics. Applying this understanding of power in collaborative governance, what literature recognized as ambiguous, complex and rapid changing nature of power in collaboration (Huxham et al., 2000; Purdy, 2012) could be elucidated by a framework that delineates the influencing factors in power relationship in a collaborative network (Ran & Qi, 2017).

In order to understand power in collaborative governance, Huxham and Vangen (2005) proposed two levels of power in interorganizational relations: the macro level and micro level. The macro-level power is about various sources of power and the power shift from one partner to another with the transfer of power sources between partnering organizations. The power sources are “macro” since they are related to groups, organizations or networks rather than to individuals in collaborations (Huxham & Beech, 2008). The micro-level perspective on power focuses on the way in which power is enacted by individuals (who are often the representatives of partnering organizations) or the partnering organization (as a collective entity) during the daily interaction in collaboration, such as managing membership and setting agenda (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). For instance, reward or coercive power exists when some representatives (at micro level) perceive that other partners can use resources (at macro level) to control or influence them by rewarding for compliance or by punishing for noncompliance (Purdy, 2012).

In collaborative governance, power-related issues have been analyzed extensively, such as major sources of power (Hardy & Phillips, 1998), different arenas of power (Purdy, 2012), and

factors affecting power relationship (Hardy & Phillips, 1998), among which power asymmetry has been regarded as the most critical issue (Huxham et al., 2000; Provan & Milward, 2001; Purdy, 2012). To address the problems caused by power asymmetry, researchers advocated power sharing as a solution (Berkes, 2010; Huxham et al., 2000). Power sharing can produce ethos of cooperation and trust (Linder, 1999), promote sharing of responsibility, knowledge and risk (Linder, 1999), establish firm partnerships (Carmichael & Knox, 1999), secure legitimacy of governance (Jentoft, van Son, & Bjørkan, 2007), and reduce fragmentation (Ehler, 2003). Difficulties in power sharing have also been recognized, such as the time-consuming process of fostering trust to share power, stalemate and inaction caused by poor implementation of power sharing, and failed collaboration due to unwillingness to share power (Coff, 1999; Gray, 1985).

All of these conceptualizations of power constitute the major power mechanisms, which affect actors' behaviors in face of different possibilities (Luhmann, 1979) and coordinate social interactions between actors (Bachmann, 2001). They provide a sound base for scholars to further investigate power issues in collaborative governance.

4.2.2 Trust in Collaborative Governance

Similar to power, trust has also been studied in different disciplines, all characterizing trust in terms of "confident expectations" and "willingness to be vulnerable" (Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015; Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Trust implies confident expectations of outcomes of an uncertain event, with one party willing to give up the control over outcomes and to be vulnerable to risks from another party (Hosmer, 1995; Zand, 1972). A trustor's confident expectations come from a trustee's certain characteristics perceived by the trustor. Three characteristics of a trustee are prominently discussed in literature (Mayer & Gavin, 2005; Mayer et al., 1995): ability (about

skills and competencies), benevolence (about good motivation), and integrity (about adherence to moral and ethical principles). A trustor can be betrayed or undermined if the trustee is proved to lack such characteristics to realize the trustor's confident expectations. The risks of trust include partners' opportunistic action and inability to perform (Currall, 1992; Inkpen & Currall, 1998; Inkpen & Currall, 2004). The risks of trust may even result in considerable losses for the trustor and damages for a relationship when trust is misplaced (Bachmann, 2001).

In order to cultivate trusting relationship in collaborative governance, both interpersonal and interorganizational levels of trust should be taken into account, because individuals as points of contact between organizations and partnering organizations represented by these individuals are important for trust building in collaborative governance. Interpersonal trust has two noteworthy types: affect- and cognition-based trust (Lewis & Wiegert, 1985; McAllister, 1995; Blomqvist, 1997). Affect-based trust consists of emotional bonds, in which genuine care and concern for the welfare of partners are invested. Cognition-based trust is based on the economic rationality to generate rational reasons for trust. Interpersonal notion of trust can be extended to the interorganizational level, referring to the extent to which members of one organization have a collective trust orientation toward another organization (Dyer & Chu, 2000; Jeffries & Reed, 2000; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). This collective trust orientation can be linked to the predictability of a partnering organization's behavior toward a vulnerable focal organization, reflecting the confidence of the focal organization in its partnership with another organization (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Yet the collectively-held trust orientation is not the simple aggregation of trust attitudes of all individuals in an organization because not all organizational members are equally involved in organizational interactions with another organization due to the unequal power distribution within an organization (Blomqvist & Ståhle, 2000; Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009).

In collaborative governance, trust, both at the interpersonal level and interorganizational level, is produced and reproduced through interactions over time. Interorganizational trust is tied to interpersonal trust through institutionalization (Sydow, 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998), started when individuals as points of contact between organizations developed trust orientation on each other during the collaborative work. Trust can be further strengthened, recreated, patterned, and institutionalized throughout the collaborating organizations as the interaction continues (Zaheer et al., 1998). Through collaboration and interaction, interpersonal trust of the points-of-contact individuals will affect the trust orientation of other organizational members toward the partnering organization (Zaheer et al., 1998). As this trust orientation becomes institutionalized, an interorganizational trust is formed, which will further serve as a behavioral constraint on both organizations and individuals.

Trust has been identified as a key factor in collaborative governance (Emerson et al., 2012; Huxham & Vangen, 2005) because it can ensure adherence to agreed rules (Lyon, 2006), promote understanding of others' interests, needs and values (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Thomson & Perry, 2006), and improve performance (Child, 2001). Low level of trust will produce a series of problems in collaboration, such as insufficient commitment, strategies of manipulation, and dishonest communications (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Yet trust building is a time- and effort-consuming process (Henneman, Lee, & Cohen, 1995), in which repeated and quality interactions (Emerson et al., 2012), successful past actions and cooperation (Vangen & Huxham, 1998), and sufficient competence of partners (Blomqvist, 1997; Blomqvist & Ståhle, 2000) are needed.

4.2.3 Relationship between Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance

The relationship between power and trust is generally believed as two-sided, both complementary and opposing (Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015; Ireland & Webb, 2007). For example, Luhmann (1979) argued power and trust are functionally equivalent alternative mechanisms in coordinating communication and social interaction. While coercive power may have negative effects on trust building (Frost & Moussavi, 1992) and there is almost no simultaneous coexist of coercive power and trust in relationships (Ireland & Webb, 2007). Some other types of power, such as expert and referent power that can be exerted noncoercively, can exist simultaneously with trust (Fedor & Ramsay, 2007; Ireland & Webb, 2007). In collaborative governance, scholars believe that power asymmetry will undermine trust, and the excessive use of power will also do harm to trust (Gray, 1989). Built from these prior studies, we argue a contingent relationship between power and trust. We believe that the negative influences from power asymmetry and positive influences from power sharing on trust are not absolute but contingent upon many factors, such as different types of power exercised in collaboration. This contingent perspective (Ran & Qi, 2017) provides a holistic understanding of power asymmetry, power sharing, different types of power, and trust building in the dynamic context of collaboration.

The relationship between power and trust has also been revealed largely through the control function shared by power and trust. Power can be considered as an important mechanism of control when exerted (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Reed, 2001). Trust is also believed as a specific type of control mechanism in social interaction (Merchant, 1985), which is a substitute mechanism for hierarchical control (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Researchers found that displays of power becomes a substitute for trust when there is a failure or deficiency of trust between actors (Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015). Participants may also resort to power due to its easiness to exercise compared with spending time and effort to foster and maintain trust (Bachmann, 2001;

Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015). Extending this perspective, in this paper, we will explore major functions shared by power and trust in collaboration. By exploring the shared sources of power and trust in collaboration, we argue that both power and trust can contribute to the formation of collective goals, group consensus and shared values, the improvement of participants' compliance with other partners, and the enhancement of the legitimacy of collaboration. Complementary to the control function, all of these functions also play a significant role in promoting collaboration by reducing risks caused by opportunistic behaviors.

Moreover, as discussed previously, many scholars propose power sharing as a solution to power asymmetry in collaboration and encourage participants to pursue power sharing to enhance the effectiveness of collaboration (Berkes, 2010; Carmichael & Knox, 1999; Ehler, 2003; Huxham et al., 2000; Jentoft et al., 2007; Linder, 1999). In this paper, we propose trust building as a supplemental mechanism in tackling power asymmetry. When the existing power relationship is well established and promoted, or when power is difficult to share due to some historical or bureaucratic reasons, trust building will make participants more competent to ameliorate issues resulted from power asymmetry. Through trust building, participants' abilities, such as identifying appropriate members to collaborate with, making agreement on collaboration goals, managing risks associated with opportunistic behaviors and vulnerability, and dealing with dynamics coming from environmental context, can be improved (Vangen & Huxham, 2003), which will help participants to handle the problems brought forth by power asymmetry.

Indeed, scholars tend to argue that trust is a beneficial factor in coordinating partners' relationships because it can relieve some negative outcomes caused by the exercise of power. However, we argue that although trust building is critical in collaboration, attention should also be paid to potential drawbacks of the extreme case of trust, blind trust, in collaborative governance. Blind trust can lead to the loss of collaborative advantages due to limited innovation

and creativity (De Wever, Martens, & Vandembemt, 2005; Jeffries & Reed, 2000). Blind trust could also lead to potential loss of sufficient mutual trust in collaboration if the trustees behave opportunistically (Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997). As a result, participants' confidence in their relationship with others is weakened. This failure or deficiency of trust can increase the tendency of using power as a substitute for trust to handle collaborative dynamics (Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015), or some participants may even withdraw from the collaboration, which will result in more challenges in managing power relationships between partners.

In the following sections, we will detail three relationships and seven propositions between power and trust in collaborative governance, and then discuss the conceptual similarities between power and trust as a “twin” concept and the entangled dynamics in terms of trust-based power and power-based trust. We will end our discussion by exploring some managerial implications that are useful in developing strategies to manage power and trust in collaboration.

4.3 Three Relationships between Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance

In this section, we provide a dyadic analysis of power and trust to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of them in collaborative governance. Three relationships and seven corresponding propositions regarding power and trust in collaboration are identified.

4.3.1 Relationship 1: Shared Sources of Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance

The dynamic relationship between power and trust in collaborative governance starts from the bases or sources shared by them. Power and trust root in some shared sources, which are important for the management of power relationship and cultivation of trust in collaboration. As we mentioned in the previous section, sources of power and the shift of these power sources are at

the macro level in collaborative governance, which are relevant to participant organizations rather than individuals who represent their organizations. It is true that power sources can derive from individuals in general, but in the specific context of collaborative governance, individuals as representatives of participant organizations are the people who enact power rather than actual entities who have power sources. It is the partnering organizations that possess power sources and form the macro-power context. Therefore, when we consider the similar sources shared by power and trust in collaborative governance, we start with the primary sources of power at the organizational level, which have been widely discussed in collaborative governance literature, including authority, resource control, and discursive legitimacy (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Purdy, 2012). We argue that these power sources are also significant in generating trust among participants in collaboration.

4.3.1.1 Authority

Authority is a socially acknowledged and legitimate right to exercise judgement, make a decision or take actions (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; Purdy, 2012). Purdy (2012) argued that authority is different from power and contradicts with coercive force although it may be achieved coercively. People could exert power by virtue of their non-coercive, socially-acknowledged and legitimate right. In collaboration, power rooted in authority can rest with one particular participant or be dispersed among different participants (Hardy & Philip, 1998).

Authority as a socially acknowledged and legitimate right implies group consensus, shared values, and promotion of collective goals (Grimes, 1978), which will encourage reciprocity, increase the degree of adaption among partners, and reduce the possibility of opportunistic behaviors, all of which are important sources of trust in collaboration (Das & Teng, 1998; Heide & John, 1992; Larson, 1992; Ouchi, 1980). When partners' goals and interests are

bonded through consensus and the authority of partners who exert power is accepted, they are more willing to adjust their own needs and behavioral patterns in collaboration and do favors instead of hurting each other. Thus the collective goals, group consensus, and shared values associated with the power holders' authority will enhance trust in collaboration.

4.3.1.2 Resource Control

Resource control as a source of power has been emphasized in many studies (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; Cook, 1977). Resource refers to any valued activity, service or commodity (Cook, 1977), tangible or intangible. Controlling critical resources needed by others and the asymmetry in resource control can create dependency among actors, which will lead to power asymmetry (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Emerson, 1962).

As we discussed in the previous section, affect-and cognition-based trust are two notable types of trust. The building of cognition-based trust among partners is closely related to resource control in collaborative settings. Cognition-based trust is based on rational choice in the interaction of economic change (Rousseau et al., 1998), during which trust emerges when the trustor perceives the benefits performed by a trustee's action. According to resource dependence theory, a crucial precondition of collaboration is that participants can obtain some critical resources from other partners in collaboration that they otherwise cannot get access to (Wood & Gray, 1991). In this situation, those participants who can bring critical resources to their partners and benefit the collaboration are more likely to obtain their partners' cognition-based trust. This cognition-based trust relying on calculation and rational choice appears more often in the early formation process of collaboration (Child, 2001).

The resources controlled by participants also indicate participants' ability in benefiting partners in collaboration. Trust often stems from the belief that a given partner with sufficient

resources will have the ability to properly perform a given set of tasks in the partnership (Ireland & Webb, 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). From this analysis, resource control is a source for both power and trust in collaborative arrangements.

4.3.1.3 Discursive Legitimacy

Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). A variety of “strategies” or “tactics” to obtain or preserve legitimacy are discursive in nature (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Seidl, Sanderson, & Roberts, 2013), resting heavily on the interactive process of conveying ideas in a discourse through which we construct, interpret, discuss, and analyze problems (Suchman, 1995; Steffek, 2009; Seidl et al., 2013).

Power derived from discursive legitimacy is rooted in society (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), and it becomes stronger when the values, norms, and beliefs represented by power holders are widely shared and relatively uncontested (Purdy, 2012). In collaborative governance, when a participant can speak of a socially important or collectively desired issue, discursive legitimacy will afford them more power in some key arenas such as prioritization and framing of issues to be addressed (Purdy, 2012).

Discursive legitimacy is also a source of trust between partners. Through discursive process of sense giving and sense making (Weick, 1995), participants’ compliance with values, norms, and beliefs can be developed in collaboration. Based on this compliance, participants are more likely to perceive benevolence and integrity from each other and have positive response to the participants within their own groups and partnerships, viewing them as more trustworthy (Williams, 2001). Moreover, participants with more discursive legitimacy can exert more

influences on the prioritization and dominance of the important issues identified in collaboration (Purdy, 2012), upon which diverse goals of participants can be converged. These participants with discursive legitimacy can obtain more trust from others by framing or representing these convergent goals shared in collaboration.

In summary, authority, resource control, and discursive legitimacy serve as profound sources of power and trust, which makes power and trust become “twin” concepts that are rooted in these shared sources. The effective enhancement of these three shared sources will promote a participant’s access to power and gain of trust in collaboration. Based on these arguments, we suggest the following proposition:

Proposition 1: The increasing acquisition of shared sources through authority, resource control and discursive legitimacy positively contributes to both participant’s access to power and gain of trust in collaboration.

4.3.2 Relationship 2: Influence of Power Relationship on Trust Building in Collaborative Governance

Both collective identity formation and justice preservation are believed as critical factors for trust building (Child, 2001; Das & Teng, 1998; Kramer, 1993; Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998), but both of them will encounter some challenges due to a primary concern on the relative power of participants in collaboration, i.e., power asymmetry and power sharing (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Huxham, et al., 2000; Purdy, 2012; Saz-Carranza et al., 2016; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). When participating in a collaboration, participants’ individual identities are at stake if their autonomous goals differ from the collaboration’s goals, and participants tend to protect their own identities by having individual control over collaboration. In this case, it is unavoidable for participants to construct a new

collective identity for the collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Similarly, the challenges to justice preservation are also unavoidable in collaboration in that asymmetrically distributed power will always impact justice among participants.

4.3.2.1 Influence of Power Relationship on Collective Identity

An important reality in collaborative governance is that participants share a dual identity: distinct self-identity separated from (although simultaneously with) a collective identity (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Self-identity focuses on the distinct attributes, autonomy, and self-goals (Thomson & Perry, 2006), while collective identity “addresses the ‘we-ness’ of a group, stressing the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce” (Cerulo, 1997, p. 386). This dual identity leads to the intrinsic tension between self-interest and collaborative interest as well as dilemma between autonomy of individual organizations and accountability to other partners (Huxham, 1996; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Compared with self-identity, the reinforcement of collective identity can enhance an actor’s perception of trusting relationship with other partners (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1998).

Partners in collaboration protect their self-identities by maintaining individual control rather than sharing control with others (Thomson & Perry, 2006). When power is asymmetric, powerful participants can have more power to control others and emphasize their own identities, interests and goals, especially when their own interests and goals conflict with those of the collaboration. The emphasis on self-identity and ignoring collective identity can increase the uncertainty and vulnerability for less powerful participants, decreasing their trust in collaboration. Comparatively, if power is shared, participants will have stronger collective identity because of their stronger perception that the collaboration is based on equal inclusion, sufficient representativeness, as well as share accountability, congruent goal, and collective interests. This

strong collective identity can breed trust by reducing uncertainty and vulnerability yet enhancing mutual dependency in collaboration.

4.3.2.2 Influence of Power Relationship on Justice Preservation

Justice is an important element of integrity (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007). Justice preservation is critical for trust building in interorganizational cooperation (Das & Teng, 1998; Korsgaard et al., 1995). Procedure justice and distributive justice are two related components of overall equity or fairness in creating trust (Kumar, 1996). A fair procedure is essential for institutional legitimacy through which trust can be created (Cropanzana, Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007). Otherwise, participants who perceive the unfair procedure may resort to opportunistic behaviors in order to achieve their goals. Equity in outcome distribution is important for trust building as well (Greenberg, 1987; Kay & Hagan, 2003). Calculative trust tells us that trust can rest on calculation of relative costs and benefits of each alternative (Child, 2001), and the perceived failure in distributive justice can undermine participants' calculative trust due to their loss of benefits.

Power asymmetry may negatively affect justice in collaboration because participants with more power tend to focus on their own goals with less attention to others' needs (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Kipnis, 1976). This will make high-power participants less likely to treat others fairly and prevent them from caring about the norms to act fairly (Blader & Chen, 2012), which will undermine both cognition-based and affect-based trust. The possibility of opportunistic behaviors conducted by powerful ones may increase, which makes weaker participants feel unconfident and results in the decline of their trust.

Different from power asymmetry, power sharing can promote participants' perceptions of fairness in collaborative process by enhancing representativeness, inclusion and equal influence

(Gray, 1985; Purdy, 2012), especially for less powerful but more vulnerable ones. Additionally, a fair procedure of decision making in collaboration needs participants to share responsibilities and risks, which can be promoted by power sharing as well (Linder, 1999). Participants can also perceive more distribution justice when they share power with each other because the equity of outcome distribution relies on procedure justice to a great extent. The preservation of justice promoted by power sharing can cultivate trusting relationship among partners in collaboration.

4.3.2.3 Different Types of Power as Contingency Factors

We argue that the influences of power relationship, either power sharing or power asymmetry, on trust building are not absolute but contingent upon different types of power. Generally speaking, two commonly used types of power, coercive and noncoercive power, can moderate the influences of power relationship on trust building. French and Raven (1959) identified five types of power: expert power, referent power, legitimate power, reward power, and coercive power. The first four types of power are often exerted in a non-coercive manner (Molm, 1997), although some of them, such as legitimate power, can be exerted coercively. The different influences of power sharing and power asymmetry on trust building can be impacted when power holders have sufficient competencies (expert power), enjoy personal admire (reference power), influence others by internalized values and accepted obligations (legitimate power), and improve other participants' positive calculation of interests (reward power) (Nicholson, Compeau, & Sethi, 2001; Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010). These four kinds of non-coercive power could cultivate trusting relationship by providing more profound sources of trust (Butler & Cantrell, 1984), producing consensus among partners (Ireland & Webb, 2007), promoting innovation to address threats (Cox, 2001), and enhancing legitimacy and stability to the relationship (Ireland & Webb, 2007; Oliver, 1990). Differently, coercive power is based on exercise of force (French &

Raven, 1959), which can impede trust building as it may decrease rewards for participants and increase retaliation between partners (Ireland & Webb, 2007).

In summary, power sharing is beneficial for trust building while power asymmetry in collaboration brings difficulties in generating mutual trust between partners. Nevertheless, noncoercive and coercive power are important contingencies affecting trust building in collaboration. Based on these arguments, we suggest the following propositions:

Proposition 2a1: Power asymmetry negatively influences trust building, yet the more noncoercive the power exercised in collaboration is, the less negative the influence of power asymmetry is on trust building.

Proposition 2a2: Power asymmetry negatively influences trust building, and the more coercive the power exercised in collaboration is, the more negative the influence of power asymmetry is on trust building.

Proposition 2b1: Power sharing positively influences trust building, and the more noncoercive the power exercised in collaboration is, the more positive the influence of power sharing is on trust building.

Proposition 2b2: Power sharing positively influences trust building, yet the more coercive the power exercised in collaboration is, the less positive the influence of power sharing is on trust building.

4.3.3 Relationship 3: Influence of Trust Building on the Management of Power Relationship in Collaborative Governance

Researchers have emphasized the necessity of having a trusting relationship for successful collaborations (Das & Teng, 1998; Gray, 1985; Huxham et al., 2000; McGuire, 2006; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). The failure or deficiency of trust will make actors resort to pursuing

and exerting power as a substitute mechanism to coordinate their interactions with others (Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015). In collaborative governance where power is almost always distributed asymmetrically, sufficient levels of trust is a lubricant for collaborative transactions and a soft control mechanism to manage power relationships even if certain partners are dominant in the collaboration (Das & Teng, 1998; Oliver, 1997b; Ring, 1997; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). The positive influences of trust building on the management of power relationship are fundamentally based on the characteristics of trust and the small-wins strategy for trust building. However, trust building cannot always benefit the management of power relationships. The extreme case of trust, blind trust, will negatively affect the management of power relationships in collaboration.

4.3.3.1 Positive Influence based on the Characteristics of Trust

Two basic characteristics of trust, confident expectations and willingness to be vulnerable, can help participants manage their power relationships in collaboration. Confident expectations imply the faith in others' ethical, fair, and nonthreatening intentions and actions in a relationship (Cook & Wall, 1980; Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992). Willingness to be vulnerable means trustors are willing to place themselves in potential jeopardy or risks of others' future behaviors (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992; Hosmer, 1995). Confident expectations and willingness to be vulnerable provide foundations for Lukes's perspective of power, which argues that the power from A on B makes B voluntarily willing to do what A wants (1974). This "voluntary willingness" can be promoted by trust building between A and B because high levels of trust enhance B's confident expectations about the outcome of A's use of power as well as the willingness of taking the risks caused by A's use of power. Trust building, as a lubricant for the

interaction between A and B, is thus a soft mechanism that contributes to managing power relationships in collaboration.

4.3.3.2 Positive Influence based on Small-wins Strategy

Small-wins strategy is a useful approach to coordinating the interactions among partners in collaboration by providing positive-feedback loop into collaborative process (Bajwa, Kitchlew, Shahzad, & Rehman, 2017). When small-wins strategy is used in trust building, it is helpful for managing power relationships in collaboration. Based on small-wins strategy, participants build trust gradually by getting started on some actions with partners and achieving some small positive outcomes, without having to deal with all aspects of trust building (Bryson, 1988; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Through small-wins approach, participants can take limited risks and gradually achieve their goals rather than putting themselves into highly risky situations. With the increased achievement of small positive outcomes and decreased risks, participants tend to be more confident in their partners and more willing to accept the power relationship formed and stabilized in this process. Participants' abilities to manage power issues can also be improved when building trust through small-wins strategy (Vangen & Huxham, 2003), such as identifying appropriate collaborating members, making agreement on collaboration aims, managing risks associated with opportunistic behaviors and vulnerability, dealing with dynamics coming from environmental context, avoiding radical challenges in a stable power relationship, and maximizing power sharing among partners. Some small wins can also be produced in the process of managing power relationships in collaboration, and then provide the positive-feedback loop into collaboration for trust building among partners. This positive-feedback loop derived from small-wins strategy is critical for understanding the relationship between power and trust in collaborative governance.

4.3.3.3 Negative Influence of Blind Trust

An extreme case of trust building is blind trust, referring to trustors' largely unconditional perception and expectation that their trustees are trustworthy and could be given full discretion to behave (Brenkert, 1998; Williamson, 1993). Blind trust will lead to some unhealthy situations in interorganizational collaboration (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007), such as impediment of innovation and creativity as well as increased risks for the trusting party.

The first unhealthy situation has to do with the loss of collaborative advantages due to the impediment of innovation and creativity. Innovation and creativity are important collaborative advantages in solving complex issues (Rogers & Weber, 2010). However, blind trust in collaboration is likely to cause participants think alike (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007), accommodate excessively or please other partners (Bidault & Castello, 2010; Kern, 2000), have too much faith in partners' actions (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007), and even generate groupthink (Janis, 1972), all of which will hamper innovation and creativity (De Wever et al., 2005; Jeffries & Reed, 2000).

The second unhealthy situation caused by blind trust relates to potential risks taken by the trusting party. Trust can influence power positions between partners (Baier, 1986; Sydow, 1998), helping the trustee obtain more power than the trustor. When trust becomes blind, it will produce an extremely unbalanced power relationship between partners. The trustees become extremely powerful and can easily conduct opportunistic behaviors while the trustors will recognize the risky situations that go beyond their expectations sooner or later (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Once opportunistic behaviors are conducted by the trustee, trustors are more likely to feel unsatisfied with their partners. Their previous mutual trust will easily be damaged or even turned into distrust (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Nooteboom et al., 1997).

Since these two unhealthy situations can increase participants' dissatisfaction, diminish their trust, or even lead to distrust on the collaborative relationship, participants tend to have

strong perceptions of uncertainty and vulnerability. When participants perceive the uncertainty and vulnerability unacceptable, they will either enhance their own influences on the collaborative process, especially decision-making process, by acquiring and exerting more power, or withdraw from the collaboration, both of which will impose more difficulties in managing power relationships in collaboration.

To sum up, trust building can contribute to the management of power relationship between partners because of the characteristics of trust and small-wins strategy. Nevertheless, blind trust will bring in a set of problems that increase the difficulties for managing power dynamics in collaboration. Based on these arguments, we suggest the following propositions:

Proposition 3a: Through promoting confident expectations and willingness to be vulnerable as well as employing small-wins strategy, trust building will positively influence the management of power relationship.

Proposition 3b: Blind trust leads to the loss of some collaborative advantages and the excessive risks taken by trustors that will cause disappointment or even distrust, thereby negatively influences the management of power relationship.

4.4 Discussion

In this paper, power and trust in collaborative governance are treated as entangled twins rather than one causing the other. Different from the causality that can identify which concept comes first and which concept causes the other, power and trust always come together like a “twin”, share similar sources, and entangle with each other. That is, as twins, power and trust largely share same sources and enjoy significant conceptual similarities. However, as entangled

twins, power and trust co-existed in any social relation, generating a complex interplay between them.

4.4.1 Power and Trust as Entangled Twins

We argue that besides the same sources discussed earlier, the concepts of power and trust share some conceptual similarities as well, a critical aspect in analyzing their interplay.

Fundamentally, both power and trust are relational constructs, in which certain patterns of attitudes and behaviors exist among different actors. Power is a property of relationship based on the dependence between actors, either balanced or imbalanced (Emerson, 1962). Similarly, trust involves a relationship between the trustor and trustee, indicating that the trustor usually has positive expectations and willingness to be vulnerable in the trusting relationship with the trustee. Furthermore, both power and trust have perceptual basis, relevant to the perception of participants in a relationship. Power relates to power recipients' perceptions of others' ability to control or influence them, either in a coercive or non-coercive way. The perceptual aspect of trust are about a faith in others' will, ability, and behavior. Last but not the least, both power and trust are reciprocal concepts. One actor exerting power or acting to trust will be reciprocated for such behavior simultaneously or at a future point of time, though the degree of reciprocated power and trust between them are not necessarily the same. The actor exerting power will affect the desire and behaviors of power recipients who will also, in turn, influence the power holder's decision and action. Trust is reciprocal in terms of the goodwill of mutual benefits between actors (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992).

Power and trust, as twin concepts, are two crucial mechanisms entangled in managing interorganizational relationships in collaboration. On the one hand, trust can serve as a base of power, making this type of trust-based power as innocuous "façade of trust" that is less visible,

taken-for-granted, and stable (Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 1998; Kroeger, 2012). Through acquiring the shared sources, trustors can obtain more power and preserve this power by building trust to influence the trustees' perceptions, cognitions, and preferences. This trust-based power is consistent with Lukes' conception of power from social construction perspective (1974). Power relationships based on trust has the potential to be more effective and enduring since it is viewed as natural and beneficial by participants (Kroeger, 2012; Lukes, 1974). However, when a trusting relationship evolved into blind trust, the impediment of innovative solutions to complex problems and high risks of trustees' opportunistic behaviors may undermine the benefits of trustors and cause trustors' disappointment sooner or later, which will ultimately diminish trust or even lead to distrust, thus further damage the trust-based power.

On the other hand, power plays a significant role in building trust, especially in the production of institutionalized trust (Kroeger, 2012). Similar to trust-based power, the sources shared by power and trust also contribute to generating power-based trust when power holders obtain or control these shared sources effectively. During the interaction between actors, in order to foster shared meaning and compliant behaviors, power holders can use their power to determine formal institutional rules and templates regulating participants' behaviors as well as to affect informal routines and practices shaping participants' perceptions, cognitions, and preferences (Hardy et al., 1998; Kroeger, 2012). All of these formal and informal factors constitute a set of institutional patterns through which trust can be cultivated. When these institutional patterns are formed under the influence of power, trust is ingrained in the power relationships in which conflicts between actors are less observable. Nevertheless, if the power relationship is so asymmetrical that it leads to excessive actual and observable conflicts between partners, this type of power-based trust will be at risk due to the resistance and challenges from trustors whose benefits are undermined excessively by powerful ones.

4.4.2 Managerial Implications

In this paper, in order to interpret the complex dynamics of power and trust, we analyzed three important dyadic relationships between them, which are helpful for practitioners managing interorganizational relationships in collaborative governance.

Firstly, participants should manage power asymmetry and build trust by obtaining more similar sources (authority, resource control and discursive legitimacy) shared by power and trust. If participants can improve their ability to obtain and use these shared sources, they can exert their power based on sufficient trust from their partners. Trust based on these shared sources can also legitimize and strengthen power relationships in collaboration. Both power and trust coming from these shared sources can contribute to securing commitment from members, building legitimacy for the collaboration, and creating a favorable environment for productive interaction, which are significant factors in managing a collaborative network (Mandell, 2001). Therefore, it is important for different participants to recognize and enhance the particular authority they have, the useful resources they control, and the specific discursive legitimacy they can increase.

For example, different from nonprofit and private organizations, a government's authority is tied to its legitimate right of establishing and enforcing rules in governance (Purdy, 2012). If the government as a participant can enhance this authority by establishing and enforcing rules in collaborative governance appropriately, it can legitimize its exercise of power, promote reciprocity, increase adaption, and reduce opportunistic behaviors in collaboration, all of which can cultivate other partners' trust on it. Participants also need to evaluate what resources they control are needed by other partners in collaboration, such as human resource, financial resource and technology, and then benefit other partners and the collaboration by providing these resources effectively to have a solid foundation for obtaining power and generating trust from other partners. Additionally, based on various roles played by different types of participant

organizations in a society, it is critical for them to speak on behalf of certain important values of norms of a society. For instance, when environmental organizations collaborate with government and other private organizations, they can focus on speaking on behalf of the societally important ideal of ecological preservation to obtain more power and trust in collaboration (Purdy, 2012).

Secondly, participants should build trust under certain power arrangements by exerting power in a noncoercive way. In practice, noncoercive way of exerting power is operationalized as several types of assistance provided by the actors who exert this power, such as rewards, knowledge or expertise (Lusch & Brown, 1982). In contrast, the indicator of coercive way of exerting power is different in that it involves potential punishment or threat to the power recipients based on the exercise of force (French & Raven, 1959; Lusch & Brown, 1982; Molm, 1997). Participant organizations need to manage their collaboration in collaborative and nonhierarchical ways (Thomson & Perry, 2006). This managing approach requires participants prevent themselves from using potential punishment or threat to their partners, especially to those less powerful partners. Instead, participants who provide high-quality assistance in collaboration can legitimize their efforts to gain power and help to get the power recipients to yield power willingly (Lusch & Brown, 1982).

Coercive power may result in aversive consequences perceived by power recipients and lead to the decrease of satisfaction and increase of resistance, while non-coercive power can reflect the power holder's ability to provide potential assistance, which are evaluated as desirable by power recipients. Trust can be fostered in the process of non-coercive exercise of power since it increases the perceived legitimacy of power and authority (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010), improves voluntary compliance (Wahl et al., 2010), and promotes the integration (Yeung, Selen, Zhang, & Huo, 2009), all of which will help to relief potential resistance of exercising power. This managerial implication provides a perspective to answer the

key question asked by Huxham and Vangen (2005): “whether and how power imbalances can be deliberately shifted to sustain an adequate level of trust” (p. 171). We believe that trusting relationship can be promoted by focusing on non-coercive way of using power to mitigate power imbalance.

Thirdly, participants should prevent themselves from excessively relying on either power or trust in collaboration. Although exerting power non-coercively can contribute to trust building, excessive use of power, coercively or non-coercively, will intensify the problem of power asymmetry thus undermining trust building. Exerting power implies the power holder’s ability to withhold resources or assistance from a relationship, which will constrain other partners’ opportunities and prospects of long-term survival and development (Ireland & Webb, 2007). Trusting relationship is difficult to promote if some participants concern about their long-term survival and development in a collaboration. It is also necessary for participants to avoid trusting their partners “blindly”, which will undermine the reciprocity, trust and commitment of participants in a long term.

Given the complexity and uncertainty of collaboration, both dynamism and inertia can be created in collaborative practices (Thomson & Perry, 2006), which requires participants understand the variable nature of both power and trust when interacting with other partners. The adjustment of power relations and evolvement of trusting relations are contingent upon different factors relevant to collaboration. For instance, when participants consider to share power in collaboration, it is necessary for them to consider some important contingencies (Ran & Qi, 2017), such as institutional environment external to collaborations (e.g. static or not), different missions accomplished by collaborations (e.g. exigent or not), different types of collaborative networks (e.g. mandated or voluntary), previous power-sharing experience of participants (e.g.

rich power-sharing experience or not), diffusion of power sources among participants (e.g. widely diffused or not), and cost-benefit calculation in collaborations (e.g. acceptable or not).

Rational cost-benefit analysis is important for participants when developing trusting relationship in collaboration. Although participants in collaboration might not initially start with a cost-benefit analysis but start with a kind of idealism in which trust is a key element (Thomson & Perry, 2006), they will then start to realize that there is a cost they have to pay in collaboration (Thomson, 2001). If the cost of trust building is much more than the benefits gained in the collaboration or the risk of high-level trust is extremely large, participants need to reconsider the trusting relationship with partners or even resort to using power appropriately.

Certainly, due to the complexity of power and trust, it is unrealistic to sort out or exhaust all relevant elements, factors or dimensions involved in the dynamic interplay between them. For example, in the second relationship between power and trust, we cannot exhaust all contingency factors influencing the relationship between power sharing /power asymmetry and trust building in collaboration. We expect future studies, both conceptual and empirical, can further investigate more contingencies to develop a more comprehensive framework. Similarly, when we discuss how collective identity and justice preservation are affected by power asymmetry and power sharing, we realize that some other factors, such as individual participants' moral level and institutional rules, can also impact collective identity and justice preservation, which, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, we proposed seven propositions on power and trust in this paper but these propositions are conceptual formulations that need to be operationalized in the future. Researchers have been struggling to empirically test both power and trust, and many measurements of power and trust have been developed in terms of perceptual rather than objective dimensions. We hope the conceptual exploration about the interplay between power and

trust discussed in this paper could shed some light on future empirical studies that this field is in dire need.

4.5 Conclusion

Power and trust are the basic entangled building blocks of partners' interaction in collaborative governance. But the relationships between them in collaboration are far from clear in prior literature. In this paper, we analyzed the roles of power and trust through a dyadic approach and conceptualize their interdependence to disentangle these twin concepts. The three relationships and seven propositions between power and trust proposed in this paper provide a starting point for an empirical examination of power and trust. Our paper also sheds light on how to promote a successful collaboration by managing power and trust in practice. This paper calls on more dyadic or multi-level research investigating the complex relationships between power and trust empirically, which are significant for understanding complex dynamics in collaborative governance.

4.6 From Dyadic Approach to Multidimensional Approach

This chapter develops a conceptual framework about power in collaborative governance through a dyadic approach, which extends the scope of study on power by relating power to another important issue (i.e., trust) in collaborative governance, rather than stopping at the role of power itself, which can provide more potential solutions to power concerns in collaboration. In the next chapter, an empirical study is conducted to explore the approaches to enhancing power sharing among participants in collaborative

practices. In this study, power is interpreted in a multidimensional approach, which can better capture the complexity and dynamics of power and collaborative governance.

Chapter 5

Enhancing Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance from A Multidimensional Perspective: Evidence from A Collaboration-based Governance Mechanism for Rural China

5.1 Introduction

Collaborative governance as a new strategy of governing has flourished in public administration research and practice in recent decades (Ansell & Gash, 2008). The notion of collaborative governance generally refers to governance processes in which multiple stakeholders from different sectors work together to achieve shared goals or address complex problems that could not be otherwise fulfilled or tackled individually (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). Advocates of collaborative governance typically highlight the advantages of this strategy in resource sharing (Berardo, 2014), information integration (Dale & Armitage, 2011), interaction quality (Connick & Innes, 2003), acceptance of decisions (Emerson et al. 2009; Scott, 2011), etc. Despite collaborative governance's advantages claimed by scholars, successful collaborative governance is difficult to achieve due to a set of challenges, including low level of transparency, unclear accountability, and lack of multiple voices (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Huxham & Vangen, 2000; Huxham et al., 2000; Purdy, 2012), among which power imbalance is a critical one (Purdy, 2012).

A balanced power relationship is deemed to be favorable for interest representation, deliberation, and achieving cooperative participation in collaboration (Choi & Robertson, 2013; Hardy & Phillips, 1998). However, in collaborative practice, participants exist with one another in a power dependence relationship (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011), and power imbalance among

participants are unavoidable in collaborative reality (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray, 1989; Huxham et al., 2000). Scholars have made significant efforts in tackling problems associated with power imbalance, and proposed power sharing as a solution to enhance power balance in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Berkes, 2010; Choi & Robertson, 2014; Warner, 2006). Benefits of power sharing include producing an ethos of cooperation and trust (Linder, 1999), promoting the sharing of responsibility knowledge and risk (Linder, 1999), enhancing the effectiveness of collaboration (Carley, 2000), and reducing inherent fragmentation among stakeholders (Ehler, 2003).

In the context of collaborative governance, power sharing is viewed as a kind of power relationship in which the influences on different phases of collaboration are shared among participants. Despite the importance of power sharing in collaborative governance, research on enhancing power sharing is thin. A few scholars analyzed methods of enhancing power sharing, such as deliberation, empowerment, decision-making rules, and the rule of law (Choi & Robertson, 2014; Qi, 2019; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). In spite of the efforts made by the existing literature, power sharing as a solution to power imbalance is still difficult to theorize and implement due to a set of challenges such as time-consuming negotiation, lack of tools, and concerns about ineffectiveness (Crona & Bodin, 2010; Dandy, Fiorini, & Davies, 2014; Huxham et al., 2000; Moynihan, 2009).

This article attempts to contribute to the literature by exploring approaches to enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance. In this article, I present a case study on how power sharing is enhanced in collaboration after a new type of collaborator is engaged in Chinese rural governance. In a collaboration-based governance mechanism developed in recent years for rural China, a new council (Xiangxian Council) was engaged in the governing process as an important collaborator, and the council members are called Xiangxian in Chinese. More specifically, the research question explored through this study is: With the engagement of “Xiangxian Council” as

a new collaborator in a collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China, how power has been shared with this collaborator during the governance process? The development of this collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China represents an interesting and valuable case for studying power in collaborative governance because, firstly, it provides a typical case of collaboration-based governance mechanism that can be characterized by the inclusion of different participants, the pooling of knowledge and resources, and the adoption of a deliberative and consensus-oriented decision process. Secondly, during the development of this collaboration-based governance mechanism, a new collaborator (i.e., “Xiangxian Council”) was engaged in the governance process, which causes significant changes in power relationships among stakeholders from different perspectives. Therefore, it provides a rich context for studying power dynamics in this collaboration.

This research makes important contributions to power sharing in collaborative governance, both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, it helps highlight the roles of multiple dimensions of power in enhancing power sharing among participants. A multidimensional model of power sharing in collaborative governance is developed, which includes the foundation of power sharing, implementation of power sharing and outcome of power sharing. Practically, it offers meaningful approaches for practitioners to share power in collaborative practices. Emerged from the data are four mechanisms for enhancing power sharing through diffusing power sources, increasing power types, extending power arenas, and ameliorating power outcome. Through these mechanisms, “power sharing” as a general activity can be disentangled into two parts: 1) which dimensions of “power” need to be considered in power sharing, and 2) which specific procedures contribute to a greater “share” of power. In this case study, four dimensions of power (i.e., source of power, type of power, arena for power, and outcome of power) contribute to power sharing through four concrete procedures (diffusing,

increasing, expanding, and ameliorating). Overall, this study greatly deepens our understanding of power sharing in collaborative governance by revealing the multiple dimensions and complex procedures of power sharing in collaboration.

The article is structured as follows. In the next section, I will firstly review the literature on power and power sharing in collaborative governance. I will then introduce the research context and research method of the study. In the following section, I will present the findings regarding approaches to enhancing power sharing in the collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China. The article is concluded by discussing the significant insights provided by this research for collaborative governance.

5.2 Literature Review

5.2.1 Power

Power is a complex concept that has been studied from a variety of perspectives in a massive body of literature. The most common definition of power views it as the influence that one actor has to get others to do what this actor wants, involuntarily or voluntarily (Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 2005). When actor B involuntarily desires to do what actor A wants, “A has power over B to the extent to which he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957, pp. 202-203). When actor B voluntarily desires to do what actor A wants, there still exists the power from A over B because the desires of B might be manipulated or shaped by A through some kinds of ingrained social structure and cultural patterns (Dawson, 1996; Lister, 2000; Lukes, 2005). To further understand the complexity of power, Molm (1990) concluded three facets of power conceptualized by scholars, including “as a structural potential (Bierstedt, 1950; Wrong, 1968; Emerson, 1962), as a process of behavioral or tactical influence (Rubin & Brown,

1975; Michener & Suchner, 1972; Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1972), and as a successful outcome of influence (Dahl, 1957; Mayhew, Gray & Richardson, 1969; Simon, 1957)” (pp. 427). “Structural power is the potential power created by the relations of dependence among actors in exchange networks” (Molm, 1990, p. 429). It focuses on “bases” of power or “ability” of using power and suggesting that power lies in potential (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). Comparatively, a process of behavioral or tactical influence of power emphasizes the actual “use” of power through behavioral tactics (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993), stating that “to have a power advantage is to use it” (Emerson, 1972, p. 67). Both potential power and behavioral power produce outcomes or influences for actors or relationships, which contribute to the third facet of power: the successful outcome of influence (Molm, 1990).

In addition to the concept of power, different levels of analysis, including the micro, macro, and structural level, are often emphasized by scholars studying power dynamics. A micro-level view of power focuses on individuals as power owners/users while macro level of power lays emphasis on a larger organizational structure or interorganizational context (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Molm, 1997). Individual actors’ use of power or ability to use power is a micro-level approach to analyzing power. Comparatively, when power sources or power use are related to organizations or interorganizational collaborations, a macro-level view of power can be adopted to investigate power mechanisms beyond individuals’ influences (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Huxham & Beech, 2008). Moreover, in recent years, scholars have made good attempts in expanding the conceptualization of power to the structural level. For example, Crosby and Bryson (2005) used structuration theory specifically to understand power in settings where no one is in charge. O’Toole and Meier (2004) also emphasized that inequality and powerful elements that are already present in social settings may affect the decision or response of network managers. In this sense, power is viewed as structural controls of ideas, resources, rules, modes, and methods.

5.2.2 Power in Collaborative Governance

In the context of collaborative governance, power is often characterized as dispersed, shared, and opaque rather than having formal power hierarchies (Huxham, 1991; Huxham et al., 2000), which brings more challenges for investigating power dynamics in collaboration. Scholars have made some efforts to make sense of power dynamics in collaboration context. For example, Hardy and Phillips (1998) presented a framework highlighting three bases of power - formal authority, the control of critical resources, and discursive legitimacy- which are useful for examining different actors' influences in collaboration. Based on this framework, Purdy (2012) offered a more complex framework for assessing power in collaborative governance that “considers authority, resources, and discursive legitimacy as sources of power and considers the participants, the process design, and the content of collaborative governance processes as arenas for power use” (pp. 409). By integrating power theory with the institutional analysis and design framework, Brisbois et al. (2019) revealed hidden power dynamics in arenas of inaction and non-decisions, such as the restriction of collaborative agenda, the selective enforcement of rules, and a broader context that inherently favored certain behaviors. In addition, the relationship between power and other issues in collaborative governance is also an important approach to analyzing power dynamics. Ran and Qi (2019) developed a conceptual framework of the dyadic relationship between power and trust as the entangled twins in collaborative governance, in which the shared sources of power and trust, the impacts of power asymmetry and power sharing on trust building, and the influence of trust building on the management of power relationship have been analyzed.

Current literature emphasizes that a purely zero-sum, resource- or exchange-based view of power is inadequate since when power is used appropriately, it has the potential for producing mutual gain by advancing joint efforts of collaborators and resulting in altruistic gain by empowering other partners to participate in collaboration (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Purdy,

2012). In line with this assumption, three power orientations in collaborative governance have been distinguished by scholars, including “power over (own gain), power to (mutual gain), and power for (altruistic gain)” (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p.175). In “power over”, the concern is controlling the relationship and limiting others’ autonomy (Göhler, 2009; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). In “power to”, power is used for producing the mutual gain and creating autonomy for other partners in collaboration (Göhler, 2009; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). The orientation of “power for” focuses on using power to build the capacity of other actors and generate altruistic gain for others (Bryson & Einsweiler, 1991; Huxham & Vangen, 2005).

5.2.3 Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance

Power sharing is viewed as a highly advocated power relationship in collaborative governance (Berkes, 2010; Huxham, 1991; Huxham et al., 2000). The move from “power over” to “power to” and/or “power for” can diminish negative consequences of power and enhance power sharing in collaboration, yet how to get participants with different bases and levels of power realize and promote this move is a key question in collaborative governance (Choi & Robertson, 2014).

Scholars have made some efforts to answer this question from either conceptual or empirical perspective. From a conceptual perspective, Ran and Qi (2018) developed a conceptual framework including six contingency factors of power sharing from contextual, network, and node perspectives to analyze how each contingency factor can affect the relationship between power sharing and the effectiveness of collaborative governance. Qi (2019) analyzed how the enhancement of the rule of law can help control power imbalance in collaborative governance. From an empirical perspective, Hardy and Phillips (1998) proposed four strategies that

organizations can use in their engagement with other organizations to reduce their dependence on a certain organization: collaboration, compliance, contestation, and contention, which can adjust power relationship and enhance power sharing between certain organizations. Choi and Robertson (2014) investigated how the application of a decision rule and a process of deliberation can help enhance power sharing and mitigate power imbalance in collaboration by giving all participants opportunities to present their perspectives and have equal influence on decision making. Brisbois et al. (2019) examined how visible, hidden, and invisible power dynamics shape the practice of collaborative governance, which provided some insights on controlling power imbalance and enhancing power sharing between powerful resource industries and other partners.

To summarize, prior research suggests that power in collaborative governance is complex and enhancing power sharing is particularly challenging. However, the existing literature has not engaged reflections critical enough on promoting the practices of power sharing in collaborative governance. There are still some research gaps that need be filled.

First, studies on enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance, especially empirical studies, are very limited. Since power imbalance violates egalitarian as one essential feature of collaborative governance and will lead to other problems such as less representation, unclear accountability, and lack of transparency (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; Purdy, 2012), more research is needed to enhance power sharing in collaboration.

Second, research about power sharing in collaborative governance fails to place sufficient emphasis on multiple dimensions of power. Power scholars often emphasize that power is a multidimensional concept. For example, Lukes (2005) analyzes three dimensions of power, including the ability to prevail in decisions, the ability to set the agenda, and the influence of social forces. However, the literature about enhancing power sharing or power balance in

collaborative governance often focuses on a single aspect or dimension of power (e.g., voting power in Choi and Robertson, 2014), which fails to capture the dynamics of power. Despite a few studies analyzing different dimensions of power in collaborative governance (e.g., different sources of power and arenas for power in Purdy, 2012), they only stop at assessing power distribution itself or pointing out power imbalance as a problem in different procedures of collaborative governance (e.g., Brisbois, Morris & de Loë, 2019) rather than investigating how to share or balance power by taking advantage of the multiple dimensions of power.

Third, most scholars tend to view power as a tool for certain participants' own gain and argue that power sharing can benefit weaker actors who are marginalized in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Provan & Milward, 2001; Purdy, 2012). However, in collaborative practices, it is possible that certain power mechanisms and power sharing approaches can benefit both powerful and weaker participants in collaboration.

This study expands the existing scholarly knowledge about power and power sharing in collaborative governance from the following perspectives. First, it adds to the collaborative governance literature by empirically exploring approaches to power sharing in collaboration, which is a critical yet less-studied area. In addition, the results revealed multiple dimensions of power that can be used in enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance, including source of power, type of power, arena for power, and outcome of power. Adopting these dimensions of power can make power and power sharing more accessible to researchers and practitioners working in collaborative governance contexts. Last but not the least, the positive perspective of power is also emphasized in this study, which extends a purely zero-sum, resource- or exchange-based perspective of power to a "enabling" role of power that can benefit more stakeholders, both powerful or less powerful, in collaboration. Next, a case study will be presented to examine how power sharing is enhanced in a collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China.

5.3 Research Context: A New Collaboration-based Governance Mechanism for Rural China

In recent years, collaborative governance as a possible strategy has been adopted in some areas of China. This study focuses on a collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China that developed in recent years. This mechanism engaged Xiangxian Council as a new collaborator in Chinese rural governance. In 2018, Chinese central government launched a policy named *Opinions of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and the State Council on Implementing the Rural Revitalization Strategy*, which explicitly stated that Xiangxian should play an important role in rural governance. Xiangxian is Chinese pronunciation. In English, it means “sage”/ “virtuous”/ “good” person with talent, capacity, reputation, and willingness to contribute to the development of villages. Xiangxian are council members who voluntarily participate in rural governance. They are urban residents born in the village and have family ties to rural communities but later emigrated to urban areas. Most of them are retired civil servants, veterans, entrepreneurs, scientist, teachers, lawyers, and other professionals.

The development of Xiangxian Council promoted the transition from “government” to “collaborative governance” in rural China. Multiple stakeholders in rural China, including Village Committee (VC), villagers, and Xiangxian Council, work together through a consensus-oriented and deliberative process to carry out public purposes or deal with public problems. This new collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China is characterized by the inclusion of different participants, the pooling of knowledge and resources, and the adoption of a deliberative and consensus-oriented decision process.

5.3.1 Inclusion of Different Participants

According to *The Organic Law of Village Committees of the People's Republic of China*, VC is the traditional organization that manages village affairs in China (each consisted of 3 - 5 elected representatives), including managing farm affairs, delivering public service, ensuring village security, and operating some rural enterprises. Affected by the rapid urbanization since the reform and opening-up of China in 1978, VC's governance capacity faces many challenges, leading to intensified conflicts and a decline of villagers' trust in VCs. In order to improve the effectiveness of rural governance, collaborative governance is increasingly applied in such situations and more participants such as Xiangxian and villagers are included in the governing process.

The establishment of Xiangxian Council is voluntary, depending on the opinions of VCs and villagers and willingness of Xiangxian. In a village, VC or villagers can invite or recommend different Xiangxian to form a council to participate in rural governance. There are formal rules, regulations, and procedures about the establishment, operation, and management of Xiangxian Council. Xiangxian Council is an independent organization that is not affiliated to VC or higher-level governments. After Xiangxian council is established, it plays an active role in communicating with individual villagers and engaging them into the governing process. Under the influence of Xiangxian Council, more villagers as stakeholders from the civic sector were included in Chinese rural governance. The collaboration studied was formed with the inclusiveness of VC, villagers, and Xiangxian Council in Chinese rural governance.

5.3.2 Pooling of Knowledge and Resources

The collaboration is also utilized as a tool to solve complex public problems in villages by

seeking knowledge and resources from more participants, especially from Xiangxian Council. Xiangxian Council plays two major functions in rural governance: the first one is consultation (providing professional advice on important public issues, such as community planning and land resources development); and the second one is resource provider (finding and providing external resources to help govern the village). As noted above, most Xiangxian are successful or professional people such as entrepreneurs, scientists, lawyers, or other professionals, who can provide valuable knowledge and resources for rural governance. When VCs face the challenges such as lack of financial support, loss of human resources, and shortage of public services in rural areas, collaborating with Xiangxian Council is a useful way of pooling knowledge and resources in rural governance, which include not only material and financial, but also human resources, expertise, and technical skills.

5.3.3 Adoption of A Deliberative and Consensus-oriented Decision Process

A deliberative and consensus-oriented decision process is an important ingredient in this collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China, which means the major goal of decision making is to reach consensus through deliberation among participants. During the governance process, VC members and Xiangxian often share their knowledge, information, expertise, and opinions openly to clarify the broad range of interests, concerns, and perspectives relevant to the decision being made. Through sufficient dialogue and discussion, they try to develop mutual understanding and reach a collective conclusion, which make the decisions more acceptable to all participants. Additionally, compared with previous decision-making processes in which villagers' voices were often less heard, the engagement of Xiangxian Council facilitates the deliberative dialogue between VCs and villagers. Both VCs and villagers have a high trust on the impartiality and professional competency of Xiangxian Council, thus the Council serves as a vital

role of connecting VCs and villagers. In the collaborative process, Xiangxian Council supported more villagers to participate in deliberation and made VC members give more weight to villagers' perspectives during deliberation and decision making, especially when there were controversy issues.

Overall, with the engagement of Xiangxian Council, collaborative methods are increasingly used in Chinese rural governance, which changes the previous power arrangement in traditional governance mechanisms for rural China. I am thus given a fruitful site to observe power dynamics and explore some approaches to enhancing power sharing in this new collaboration-based governance mechanism.

5.4 Research Methods

Given the lack of research on how to enhance power sharing in collaborative governance, an inductive qualitative research approach is used in this study, which is appropriate when scholars try to explore new areas or understand complex phenomena or concepts with little theoretical understanding (Marshall & Rossman, 1995; Creswell, 2013).

5.4.1 Data Collection³

This study focuses on the collaboration-based governance mechanism in two villages of D county (A village and B village) in Zhejiang province, China. D county was selected as the location

³ The data collection for this research was supported by a larger project headed by Dr. Xiaokun Gu at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China. My responsibilities in data collection include participating in designing and revising interview protocols, participating in conducting interviews, and collecting additional archival data.

of study because Xiangxian Council has experienced a sustained growth there in recent years. There are 151 villages in D county, among which 107 villages have set up the Council from 2013 to 2018. Collaborating with Xiangxian Council in D county has become an effective governance mechanism advocated by the local government. A and B village in D county were selected because they established Xiangxian Council very early in D county, and the collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural governance was relatively mature there.

IRB submission of this research was completed, and the Office for Research Protections at Pennsylvania State University determined that this research does not require formal IRB review because the research met the criteria for exempt research (Appendix B). This study was undertaken from July 2019 to July 2021. Both interview data and archival data were used for this study. These two villages have 13 Village Committee members, 37 Xiangxian Council members, and 5065 villagers in total. 50 semi-structured interviews were conducted, and the interviewees included three types of key participants in this collaboration-based governance mechanism (i.e., VC members, Xiangxian, and villagers). Details are provided in Table 5-1. Snowball sampling was used for data collection. The interviews lasted on average 60 minutes each and were tape-recorded and transcribed. An interview protocol was developed prior to the interview, which covered the topics such as the initiation of Xiangxian Council, the functions and influences of the Council, trust relationship among VCs, Xiangxian and villagers, as well as main challenges and future direction of Xiangxian Council. The interview questions followed a longitudinal timeline, from past to present to future of this collaboration-based mechanism.

In addition to semi-structured interviews, I also obtained about 500 pages of archival data, which included internal documents covering the council's handbook, performance measurement documents, reports about program evaluations, program management systems, council members' code of conduct, mission statements, publicly available data from the

government’s website, and newspaper articles. These materials helped enhance the interpretation of the data collected from interviews.

Table 5-1. Details of interviews.

| Respondents | Number of respondents |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| Village Committee member | 8 (Total number: 13) |
| Xiangxian | 7 (Total number: 37) |
| Villager | 35 (Total number: 5065) |
| Total | 50 |

5.4.2 Data Analysis

I conducted an inductive qualitative data analysis and used the constant comparative method to facilitate data analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2011). The unit of analysis of the texts is a sentence or a paragraph that contains a central thematic idea (Yin, 2011). The data analysis followed a three-stage process (Creswell, 2009; Merriam, 2009; Rubin & Rubin, 2011). The data analysis process began with open coding. I read the interview transcripts and archival materials line by line to discover incidents that are “indicators of phenomena or experiences as observed or articulated in the data” (Holton & Walsh 2017, p. 77). I then created tentative labels for incidents to conceptualize what is happening in the incident and grouped them into categories to form the first-order codes. In the second stage, I engaged in axial coding to search for relationships between and among categories (i.e., first-order codes) that were developed in open coding. I worked through the first-order codes to theorize them into higher-order themes. I integrated the various categories with each other and to refine the themes. The

second-order themes were developed in this stage. In the third stage, I switched to selective coding by gathering similar themes into several overarching dimensions that make up the basis of the emergent model. Details about the first-order codes, the second-order themes and third-order dimensions are provided in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2: Key categories from data analysis.

| Third-order Dimensions | Second-order Themes | Selected First-order Codes |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| Diffusing the source of power | Authority | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian Council is an officially authorized organization • Xiangxian Council has the authority to participate in the governance of rural affairs • Xiangxian Council has the authority to elect the council leaders and members • Xiangxian Council has the authority to participate in drafting relevant regulations for rural governance |
| | Resource control | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian are successful people who can provide money for rural governance • Xiangxian have professional knowledge in some specific areas • Xiangxian have good relationships with some public officials in township or higher-level governments |
| | Discursive legitimacy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian often make useful comments on village affairs • Xiangxian often point out some important issues in rural governance • Xiangxian often provide some good suggestions that are beneficial for many villagers |
| | Individual reputation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian are very nice people who always respect every villager • Xiangxian are successful people who make some great achievements • Villagers and village committee members respect Xiangxian because they are capable and professional |
| | | |

| Third-order Dimensions | Second-order Themes | Selected Firs-order Codes |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| | Interpersonal relationship | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Villagers like Xiangxian because they grew up in the same village and know each other for a long time • Villagers often chat with Xiangxian because they are good friends • Some Xiangxian are the relatives of some villagers, and they have good relationships |
| Increasing the type of power | Using reward power | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian help us bring in a lot of investment • Xiangxian donate a lot of money to support the development of the village • Xiangxian use their valuable experience to contribute to the village |
| | Using expert power | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian use their knowledge to contribute to the cultural development in the village • Xiangxian use their expertise to help improve the environment of village • Xiangxian use their skills and knowledge to improve the land planning in the village |
| | Using referent power | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Villagers follow Xiangxian because they think Xiangxian are capable and successful people • Villagers support Xiangxian in rural governance because they are impartial • Village committee accept Xiangxian's suggestions because they trust Xiangxian's vision and choice |
| | | |

| Third-order Dimensions | Second-order Themes | Selected Firs-order Codes |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|---|
| | Using legitimate power | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian Council participate in rural governance because it is an officially authorized organization • Xiangxian Council select their own president, vice president, and secretary-general based on the established regulations • Xiangxian Council participate in formal meetings with the village committee to discuss rural affairs |
| Expanding the arena for power | Participants selection | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian recommend another qualified people to join the Council • Xiangxian Council select their president, vice president, and secretary-general |
| | Process design | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian often communicate with village committee through flexible methods • Xiangxian invite village committee members into different places to discuss rural affairs • Xiangxian contact village committee members or villagers when Xiangxian are available |
| | Content framing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Village committee accepts Xiangxian's suggestions on developing the village culture • Village committee supports Xiangxian's proposal about land planning in the village • Village committee encourages Xiangxian to make more suggestions on the issues related to rural governance in the village |
| | Decision making | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian Council is in charge of the implementation of cultural project and can make decisions about it • Xiangxian Council is invited by village committee to participate in collective decision making about how to improve the environment in the village • Xiangxian Council can make decision on the council's internal affairs |
| | | |

| Third-order Dimensions | Second-order Themes | Selected Firs-order Codes |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| | Monitoring | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian Council monitors the progress of the resettlement housing project in the village • Xiangxian Council oversees the water governance in the village • Xiangxian Council monitors the performance of village committee |
| | Relationship building | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian Council is a “bridge” linking villagers and village committee • Xiangxian Council helps address conflicts between villagers and village committee |
| Ameliorating the outcome of power | Realizing “mutual gain” and “altruistic gain” | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Xiangxian realize their self-esteem by participating in rural governance and contributing to the benefits of villagers • Xiangxian who are retired start a new career by participating in rural governance • Xiangxian have no payment, and they invest time, energy, and money to benefit villagers |

5.4.3 Validity Strategies

Subjectivity and personal biases impacting validity are a common concern in qualitative research, and qualitative researchers can utilize various validation strategies to make their studies credible and rigorous (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Validity for this study was achieved through member checking and peer debriefing. The data and interpretations were taken back to some participants in the study so that they checked for accuracy and resonance with their experiences (Birt et al., 2016; Creswell & Miller, 2000). In addition, I used peer debriefing to add credibility to the study (Creswell & Miller, 2000). I presented and discussed this research at different stages, including conferences, workshops, etc. The inputs from other people helped me reduce my bias and assess the study from a more objective perspective.

5.5 Findings

Emerged from the data are four approaches to sharing power with Xiangxian in Chinese rural governance: diffusing the source of power, increasing the type of power, expanding the arena for power, and ameliorating the outcome of power.

5.5.1 Diffusing the Source of Power

The first approach to enhancing power sharing is diffusing the source of power. It means when Xiangxian participated in the collaborative governance process for rural China, their power sources were also diffused in the collaboration, which provides Xiangxian with a foundation to use their power. The diffusion of power sources in the collaboration is also the foundation for enhancing power sharing since power sharing is difficult to implement if most power sources are concentrated on powerful participants. The data revealed that five types of Xiangxian's power sources were diffused in the collaboration, including authority, resource control, discursive legitimacy, individual reputation, and interpersonal relationship.

5.5.1.1 Authority

In this collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural governance, authority was dispersed rather than resting with VC alone. Xiangxian Council was granted by Civil Affairs Bureau as legal participants in rural governance, which provided it with a socially acknowledged and legitimate right to exert their power in the governance process. The authority of Xiangxian Council has been clearly recognized in a document issued by Chinese central government in 2018, Chinese central government issued a document titled *Opinions of the Communist Party of*

China (CPC) Central Committee and the State Council on Implementing the Rural Revitalization Strategy, which explicitly stated that Xiangxian should play an important role in rural governance. Within the collaboration-based governance mechanism, Xiangxian Council held multiple authorities in rural governance, including the authority to participate in the governance of rural affairs, the authority to elect the council leaders and members, the authority to draft and amend their own management regulations, and the authority to participate in drafting relevant regulations for rural governance. Therefore, Xiangxian Council has a socially acknowledged and legitimate right to exert their power. For example, the handbook of Xiangxian's council indicated:

The governance platform for Xiangxian should be established at the township, district, and village levels... Xiangxian Council is an important part of grassroots governance system... Xiangxian Council plays a critical role in rural affairs such as enhancing rural civilization, promoting economic development, providing advice on decision making, and understanding public opinion in villages.

The council members can develop and amend the regulation about the council management... the council members can select or impeach the council's president, vice president and secretary-general.

The document of Xiangxian's mission statement also indicated,

In the village, Xiangxian council can collaborate with the village committee to draft or amend "village rules and codes" as well as "water governance rules in village". These two regulations play a critical role in guiding villagers' behaviors.

The interview data also reflected that Xiangxian council's authority was diffused in the collaboration for rural governance. As a VC member stated:

Xiangxian Council has its formal organizational structure including president, vice president, secretary general, etc. It is also registered and approved by the Civil Affairs Bureau, so it has legitimacy in rural governance.

5.5.1.2 Resource Control

The respondents indicated that Xiangxian as council members brought in a lot of critical resources needed by rural governance, tangible or intangible, including money, expertise, interpersonal network, and professional service. During Xiangxian's participation process, the control of resource as a critical power source was diffused in the collaboration. A VC member said,

Xiangxian Council consists of different elites who have wisdom, capacity, and interpersonal network that can be taken advantage by village committees in rural governance.

Some villagers also indicated,

Members in Xiangxian Council can provide important funding for the development of our village... Some of them are successful businessmen. I know a Xiangxian who has a big company, and he is very rich. He is also willing to make contributions to the village.

In Xiangxian's meeting yesterday, a Xiangxian named Qiangen Cai, he is almost 60 years old and has been doing business in Laizhou city for about 30 years. He has earned a lot of money. He said he will come back to the village in the immediate future and plans to invest in a nursing home for elderly in the village. He has also built a good relationship with some public leaders in the local government, which is a good resource for us.

5.5.1.3 Discursive Legitimacy

During the interactive process for rural governance, different participants construct, interpret, discuss, and analyze problems. The sense of legitimacy can be created when the actions of a participant are perceived as desirable, proper, or appropriate by justificatory discourse. The findings indicated that Xiangxian's discursive legitimacy was diffused during the interactive process in collaboration. Many villagers believed that Xiangxian can speak of socially important or collectively desired issues regarding village affairs. Based on this belief, discursive legitimacy

can afford Xiangxian Council more power in some key arenas such as prioritization and framing of issues to be addressed. A Xiangxian commented,

The advantage of Xiangxian is... you know, we (Xiangxian) don't live in the village, and we are not affiliated to the village committee or the government. So, we can express our opinions about rural affairs freely and objectively. In addition, we are very rational, we can speak for the interests of the whole village. That's why we are engaged in the rural governance... We convey the problems in rural governance to Township government, and we also provide some suggestions.

A VC member said,

I think Xiangxian Council can provide useful suggestions on our village issues. Their purpose is not to gain individual interests for themselves. We don't pay them... They are volunteers, and they provide suggestions for us to contribute to the village and the villagers. I believe what they said is for the benefits of us.

A VC member also indicated,

I believe Xiangxian have strong public service motivation and speaks on behalf of the better development of our village and the better life of our villagers... They work for us without payment. Instead, they may sacrifice something.

5.5.1.4 Individual Reputation

Many VC members stated that Xiangxian had very good individual reputation in villages, which affected their collaborations positively. Xiangxian's individual reputation helped them exert influences in the collaborative process. VC trust Xiangxian and is willing to share power with them because Xiangxian have good reputation in the village. Villagers also recognized Xiangxian's good reputation and trust them very much. As two VC members commented:

They (Xiangxian) have a high level of individual reputation and our village committee members respect and trust them very much.

They (Xiangxian) have resources and prestige... Some villagers believed more in what they (Xiangxian) said than what we (VC members) said.

A villager also said,

We have a Xiangxian who is a doctor...He was born in our village, and he has prestige in our village because he is a very nice person, and he respects us, never look down on others...and he also has more vision than us, that's why I often ask him for advice or help when I need.

A Xiangxian also talked about his personal reputation in village,

Not everyone can become a Xiangxian... I mean Xiangxian are the people with personal reputation in the village, and that's why they are recommended and selected as Xiangxian. For example, many Xiangxian are very successful people, such experts, successful businessmen who make a lot of money, or public officials. Their personal reputation is based on their capability and achievement. Because Xiangxian have personal reputation, the villagers often trust us and are willing to hear our suggestions... They (villagers) also trust what we say.

5.5.1.5 Interpersonal Relationship

Xiangxian were born and grew up in the villages, so they have family ties and friend relationships with some people living in rural communities, which helped them build and maintain very good interpersonal relationships with local villagers and VC members there. These interpersonal relationships provided a critical foundation for villagers and VC members to share power with Xiangxian in the governing process. For example, as a Xiangxian said:

We (Xiangxian) have a very good interpersonal relationship with villagers in our village. They (villagers) are willing to let us exert influences in rural governance.

Another Xiangxian also commented,

Villagers trust us (Xiangxian) naturally. We (Xiangxian) were born and grew up here, in the village. We have the same growth background, which is a geographic and blood linkage. That's why we have a good interpersonal relationship with villagers here.

A villager also indicated:

Village members also trust Xiangxian, and they have a very good interpersonal relationship...The village members welcome and encourage Xiangxian's participation in villager affairs.

5.5.2 Increasing the Type of Power

The findings revealed that Xiangxian were enabled to use different types of power in rural governance, which is a critical approach to enhancing their power in collaboration. In this case, I find that more noncoercive types of power were shared with Xiangxian in collaboration. Specifically, Xiangxian were able to use reward power, expert power, referent power, and legitimate power. By using these multiple types of power, Xiangxian affected rural governance from different perspectives.

5.5.2.1 Using Reward Power

Xiangxian invested multiple resources, tangible or intangible, in rural governance, which were viewed by both VC members and villagers as favorable reward. In this case, both villagers and VC members believed that they could obtain special help from Xiangxian by sharing power with them. In this regard, using reward power helped Xiangxian enhance their influences on rural governance. A Xiangxian in the council said,

As Xiangxian, we often introduce the best investment, human resource, and projects from Shanghai to our hometown.

A VC member stated,

Some Xiangxian are successful entrepreneurs with economic resources and long-term vision. They helped promote the economic development of our village by engaging in some economic projects in the village. Therefore, we encourage and support them to participate in the rural governance to exert their influences.

Similarly, a villager commented,

The engagement of Xiangxian council helped us a lot in dealing with some issues in rural governance, including shortage of human resource, lack of insightful viewpoints, etc. That's why we need the council to participate in and influence our village affairs.

One document in our archival data, “The Story of D county”, recorded different stories about Xiangxian’s engagement and influences in rural governance. It also introduced how Xiangxian used their reward power in the collaborative governance process. For example, the document stated that,

In the summer of 2014, a Xiangxian noticed that the planting landscape was not good in the resettlement housing area of the village. Therefore, he collaborated with another Xiangxian to deal with this problem. They donated maple grove and Osmanthus plants to the village to improve the planting landscape.

5.5.2.2 Using Expert Power

Many Xiangxian were experts with professional knowledge or skills in specific fields, and their expertise was of great value to VC members and villagers. Xiangxian used their expert power by providing professional advice and guidance in village affairs. Drawing on their expertise, some Xiangxian oversaw some public projects. As one Xiangxian stated,

I am in charge of the cultural projects in our village because I am familiar with it... I used to work in a university and my major work is to organize the local documents about cultural figures who were famous in the local history, such as their names, families, working departments, etc. ... I am familiar with the history and culture not only in our village, but also in our town. Village committee and the officials in township government are not familiar with these. In 2013, they (village committee) invited me to build a local cultural museum to introduce the famous cultural figures in the history of our village. In order to promote this project, they ask for my comments and suggestions when they encountered difficulties, and after I provided my feedback, they often adjust and implement based on my suggestions very soon.

A VC member also said,

He (a Xiangxian) is a public officer who are very familiar with relevant policies about the land planning project. His expertise in this filed helped him communicate and cooperate well with relevant public agencies in township government, such as finance office, office of agriculture and rural affairs, as well as land and resource office. In this way, he (a Xiangxian) used his expertise, capacity, and knowledge to make the project of land planning be implemented in our village.

Another VC member also commented,

We have a lot of Xiangxian who have their own business, and some of them are very successful businessmen. During the process of doing business, they earned some knowledge, skills, and innovative ideas... They are sometime more professional than our VC members. They took advantage of their expertise and capabilities to promote the development of the village, such as helping us attract some investment to some projects in the village.

5.5.2.3 Using Referent Power

Both VC members and villagers had a high level of respect, admiration, and identification with Xiangxian Council because of Xiangxian's achievement, reputation, impartiality, and competency, which formed the basis for Xiangxian's referent power. Using their referent power, Xiangxian played an effective role in bridging VCs and villagers by promoting communication and tackling conflicts between them. The exercise of referent power increased Xiangxian's influence on building collaborative relationships in rural governance and creating an enabling environment at work, which were cherished by both VCs and villagers. Power sharing was enhanced by enabling Xiangxian to use their referent power in the governance process. For example, two villagers commented,

Xiangxian is respected by villagers. Villagers communicate with Xiangxian frequently to share their ideas and express their perspectives... Xiangxian also help convey [the villagers'] opinions to the village committee and they have a good relationship with village committee members.

In our village, we only have a few village committee members, but we have many villagers. When we (villagers) cannot achieve consensus with village committee, we will resort to Xiangxian for their comments and suggestions. We respect and admire Xiangxian's vision, capacity, and rich experience. They (Xiangxian) often participate in the process to deal with the problem.

Similarly, a VC member noted,

We (VC members) trust and respect Xiangxian because they are competent people who want to contribute to the village... They (Xiangxian) also have a good relationship with villagers, so they often promote the communication by explaining some issues in our policies and help coordinate some conflicts.

5.5.2.4 Using Legitimate Power

Xiangxian were encouraged to use their legitimate power to influence rural governance since Xiangxian Council was legitimized by different levels of governments, from the central government to the township government. There were a set of official documents and formal policies regarding Xiangxian Council's working procedures, responsibilities, and personnel management. In this regard, increasing Xiangxian Council' influence in rural governance was viewed as legitimate by different stakeholders in rural governance. The handbook of Xiangxian Council indicated,

Xiangxian Council has the legitimate right to participate in a variety of governance and service activities in villages...Every village has to establish the formal rules to ensure the effective engagement of Xiangxian Council in rural affairs...The legal status of Xiangxian Council should be respected and Xiangxian can use their legal right to express their viewpoints and suggestions about rural governance.

A Xiangxian also stated,

Xiangxian Council is an officially authorized organization valued by villagers and the village committee, and we have formal channels to work and communicate with them, which is very good.

5.5.3 Expanding the Arena for Power

The data revealed Xiangxian exerted their power over the following arenas in rural governance, including participant selection, process design, content framing, decision making, monitoring, and relationship building. Different power arenas provided more opportunities for sharing power with Xiangxian in rural governance.

5.5.3.1 Participant Selection

Participant selection is an important arena for power in collaborative governance since it impacts who can be included in collaboration. The arena of participant selection was shared with Xiangxian since Xiangxian often recommended other qualified people to become Xiangxian in the governing process. In addition, Xiangxian Council also recommend and select their own council president, vice president and secretary-general. As a VC member said,

Xiangxian recommended other qualified people to become a Xiangxian.

Xiangxian Council's handbook also indicated that,

The council members can select or impeach the council's president, vice president and secretary-general.

5.5.3.2 Process Design

The data indicated that VCs shared power with Xiangxian Council in process design for their collaboration. For example, the council could decide the form of communication as well as locations, dates, and frequencies of meeting with the village committee and/or villagers. all of which are relevant to process design of collaboration, as two Xiangxian said,

We are very free in selecting how to communicate with the village committee to discuss rural affairs. For example, I can attend the formal meeting held by the village committee to talk to rural committee members face-to-face. Sometimes I also contact them via cell phone, WeChat, etc. I can contact the village committee members whenever I want.

I think the current communication mode is good. I mean, I can decide whether we communicate with village committee through formal meeting or informal approaches, such as cell phone. I can also invite the committee members to my company, and we can chat and discuss some issues about the village in my office.

A VC member also said,

Xiangxian sometimes contacted us to schedule a meeting when they think it is necessary.

5.5.3.3 Content Framing

Xiangxian Council also used its power in content framing during the collaborative process by affecting what issues were to be considered, discussed, and addressed as well as what outcomes were pursued by the collaboration. During the process of content framing, VC members shared power with Xiangxian by supporting them to frame the content for rural governance. As a VC member said,

Xiangxian is invited to provide advice and proposals about the future development plan [for our village]. Sometimes, Xiangxian have more innovative thoughts and advice for the development of village. For instance, the project of “Small High-rise Building” in our village was proposed by Xiagnxian Council and village committee together. The implementation of this project helped villagers’ aggregation in the village because compared with living in their previous ranch houses spread out the village, more villagers can live in the higher building as a “cluster”.

Another VC member also indicated that,

Xiangxian plays a great role in making plans for the development of our village. They often help us thinking about which issues in the village should be considered and tackled first, and what issues are the most important ones that need to be addressed. For example, they (Xiangxian) emphasized that the project of “Small High-rise Buildings” as a critical project in our village. They (Xiangxian) also proposed the renting plan of some spaces in Zhong Cang Company, which is a company belonging to the village...They (Xiangxian) also added the issue of a house in Bohe Property Company --it is also a company belonging to the village-- to the agenda.

A Xiangxian commented,

In regard to the environment management in the village, I wrote a proposal and submitted it to the village committee and township government. The proposal was focused on how to improve the environment, and in the meanwhile, guarantee the villagers’ income and life. I provided some suggestions in the proposal. The key is industrial upgrading. We cannot just close all industries to protect the environment, otherwise the villagers would lose their jobs and income, which would lead to serious conflicts. The village committee and township government accepted my suggestions, and organized field research to investigate this issue. They (township government) made some policy adjustments based on their investigation.

5.5.3.4 Decision Making

Power was also shared with Xiangxian to a certain extent during the decision-making process in rural governance. For example, some Xiangxian with specific professional knowledge and skills participated in the decision-making process about some public projects in the village to decide the scope, budget, schedule, quality criteria, etc. There were also certain procedures for Xiangxian Council to influence the decision-making process in rural governance.

As a Xiangxian stated,

We (Xiangxian council) also participated in decision making process...When the village committee made decisions about village affairs, Xiangxian would participate in the process...We have our procedures to make decisions...We (Xiangxian Council) made many decisions in promoting our cultural projects in the village, such as decisions about the operation and development of our Art Museum in the village...you know, I am familiar with the culture and history of our village.

Similarly, two VC members also said,

We depend on Xiangxian Council when making decisions regarding some important issues in our village.

Our village committee respects the decisions made by Xiangxian Council. Some decisions about village issues are jointly made with the council through a vote process.

In the document of “The Story of D county”, it also introduces how Xiangxian Council used their power in decision making in some important public projects in villages. For example, the document stated that,

Since 2015, Xiangxian Council in A village participated in the decision-making processes for 23 public projects including the projects of natural gas station in central village and landfilling of abandoned mine in the village.

5.5.3.5 Monitoring

The data indicated that stakeholders in rural governance shared power with Xiangxian by supporting them to work as an independent monitor to check the performance of VC members in

some public projects and track the quality of projects. Xiangxian exerted their monitoring power based on their strong reputation for competence and independence as well as their legitimacy from obligations undertaken by governments. As two Xiangxian said,

Different voices from multiple stakeholders can be conveyed (by Xiangxian), and it is also a form of monitoring for the village committee.

We have a monitoring mechanism in the public projects in village. Some Xiangxian have expertise in engineering and technology, so they participated in some projects as a monitor, which I think, is also a way to promote justice in our village.

In the document of “The Story of D county”, it introduces how Xiangxian Council monitored some important public projects in villages. For example, the document stated that,

In 2011, the resettlement housing project in A village was launched. Xiangxian Council was engaged in it...To ensure the construction safety and quality of the project, a group of Xiangxian led by Mr. Jin (who is also a Xiangxian) monitored the process of construction carefully. They always worked on site to check every procedure and some details of the project.

The document also indicated that,

Nowadays, Xiangxian Council participated in all public projects in A village. Xiangxian monitor the whole process, from project planning to implementation. Since 2015, 23 public projects were monitored by Xiangxian Council, including the projects of natural gas station in central village and the project of landfilling abandoned mine in the village.

5.5.3.6 Relationship Building

Xiangxian worked as a bridging actor who exerted influences over the arena of relationship building by promoting interactions, resolving conflicts, developing shared goals and mutual understanding, and fostering trust relationship among multiple stakeholders. Before the engagement of Xiangxian Council in rural governance, it was difficult for existing stakeholders (e.g., VC members and villagers) to exert influences in the arena of relationship building since

both VC members and villagers were not interest-neutral actors but had their own interests, which led to the insufficient level of trust and less mutual understanding. Different from VC members and villagers, Xiangxian were relatively interest-neutral participants in the governing process. Sharing power with Xiangxian in the arena of relationship building was a critical way to enhance Xiangxian's influence in the collaboration. Villagers, VC members and Xiangxian themselves all stated that Xiangxian played a critical role in building the relationship among stakeholders in rural governance. As three Xiangxian said,

We were involved in building a better relationship between village committee and villagers by coordinating their conflicts. For example, there were some conflicts between villagers and village committee members in environment management. To improve the environment in the village, you know, to make the village more beautiful, the village committee needed to remove illegal buildings that were built by some villagers. Because...you know, in the village, there existed some shabby buildings that were built by some villagers illegally, which destroyed the environment in the village. Village committee planned to remove these illegal building. However, some villagers who own these buildings refused to remove them. So, you know, Xiangxian was invited to help deal with these conflicts and coordinate the relationship between village committee and villagers. (A Xiangxian)

I (a Xiangxian) visited his (a villager's) home to chat with him to coordinate the conflict between him and the village committee about land planning conducted by the village committee on his land... It is a long-term process rather than a one-time mission... There were some villagers who were difficult to coordinate...and I visited and communicated with them for many times. (A Xiangxian)

Sometimes I (a Xiangxian) can help villager committee to deal with some difficult problems in the village. I mean some difficulties that are hard for the village committee to address, for example, when the village committee implemented the project of land management and planning in the village, we (Xiangxian) addressed some conflicts between villagers and the village committee and helped achieve some consensus. I think we (Xiangxian) play the role of "bridge" linking the villagers and village committee.

A VC member also indicated,

At the very beginning, Xiangxian played an important role in coordinating and building the relationship between villagers and village committee. In 2011, we have a project about village land planning, which led to some conflicts between villagers and village committees. I mean, some villagers did not agree to conduct the land planning project on their land. Xiangxian supported and assisted

the village committee to communicate with villagers, and then conveyed the villagers' demands and suggestions to the village committees. They (Xiangxian) also helped explain the policy and details about land planning to the villagers. Their communication and coordination were very valuable.

Similarly, a villager claimed,

Xiangxian often chat with us. We talked about our family and life. They visited frequently to build a relationship with me... I also trust them (Xiangxian). Definitely... I also trust our village committee more because of the engagement of Xiangxian.

5.5.4 Ameliorating the Outcome of Power

The data revealed that the trend of sharing power with Xiangxian was enhanced by the positive outcomes produced by Xiangxian's power in the collaborative process. Xiangxian's power in Chinese rural governance reflected the positive outcomes since the outcomes of Xiangxian's power were not for Xiangxian's own gain, but for the mutual gain and altruistic gain of all stakeholders.

5.5.4.1 Realizing “mutual gain” and “altruistic gain”

Xiangxian were interest-neutral participants who did not aim to benefit themselves but to contribute to the development of village and the interests of all villagers. For example, many public projects managed by Xiangxian Council promoted the economic and cultural development of the village. The engagement of Xiangxian Council also helped enhance villagers' participation and VC members' governing capacity in rural governance. Multiple participants in rural governance noted the realization of mutual gain and altruistic gain as important outcomes of sharing power with Xiangxian. A Xiangxian said,

My goal is not to benefit myself. The success of the village committee and villagers is also an honor and a sense of achievement for me.

With Xiangxian's engagement in rural governance, the environment of village improved a lot in recent years... Villagers also witnessed and recognized this improvement. For example, the road repair and building, park building, and gazebo building... The village was very dark previously due to the lack of streetlight, but now we have more streetlights, and our villagers liked these changes very much. Xiangxian really exerted a positive influence on village committee and village.

A VC member also indicated,

Our village received 1,200,000 RMB donation to support the public projects in the village, among which 70% came from our Xiangxian.

Similarly, a villager stated,

Xiangxian are volunteers without payment. They have no interest transaction with the village... They purely contribute to the village by participating in rural governance.

Handbook of Xiangxian Council also recognized the benefits brought by Xiangxian to village development.

Xiangxian Council played an irreplaceable role in a set of public projects in rural governance and made great contributions. For example, Xiangxian in Liaoyuan village helped the village collaborate with 9 corporates. 22 collaboration projects were successfully developed in the village, which attracted 9.7 million CNY investment in total. The annual income of the whole village increased 47% last year.


The outcomes of Xiangxian Council's power helped establish a healthy power relationship that further enhanced power sharing in collaboration since these outcomes revealed that Xiangxian's power did not undermine other stakeholders' autonomy or interests. Instead, it was beneficial for other stakeholders and the whole collaboration. Xiangxian gained more power by ameliorating the outcomes of using their power (i.e., realizing the mutual gain and altruistic gain in rural governance). Other participants were more likely to share power with Xiangxian to produce more positive outcomes rather than weakening Xiangxian's power in the governing process. As a VC member said,

Xiangxian worked for the economic development of our village...[Xiangxian] made a significant contribution to us. That's why we need them to exert influences in rural governance.

5.5.5 A Model of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance

Linking the approaches discussed above form a model of power sharing in collaborative governance (see Figure 5-1). This model indicates that enhancing power sharing is not only related to the use of power (which can be interpreted as using certain types of power over certain arenas for power), but also pertinent to the source of power and the outcome of power. Diffusing the source of power in collaboration provides a foundation for power sharing among participants since if power sources are highly concentrated in certain participants, these participants are more likely to dominate the collaborative process and deprive the opportunities of weaker participants in negotiating power sharing. Based on the foundation of power sharing, participants can implement the process of power sharing by supporting different participants to use more types of power over multiple power arenas. Furthermore, the outcome of power sharing is also a critical element in the power sharing system, which can significantly affect the future direction of power relationships: enhancing or decreasing power sharing. If the outcome of power sharing benefits many stakeholders and the whole collaboration, stakeholders tend to share more power with others in the future.

Figure 5-1. A model of power sharing in collaborative governance



5.6 Discussion

This study provides a thorough understanding about power sharing in collaborative governance. It provides two insights: how a multidimensional model provides a tool for power sharing in collaborative governance and how the contributions made by power sharing to the collaboration can further cultivate willingness and behaviors of power sharing. Based on the specific context of this study, it should also be noted that vertical control from hierarchical structure in the institutional environment outside the collaboration can bring in potential challenges for power sharing among participants within collaboration.

5.6.1 Multidimensional Model: A Tool for Power Sharing

This study offers a multidimensional model for revealing the complexity of power dynamics, which is a useful tool for enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance. The model suggests that power sharing should be enhanced based on multiple dimensions of power, including source of power, arena for power, type of power, and outcome of power, which provide more possibilities for power sharing in collaboration by helping different participants overcome their self-serving biases or limitations in framing, using, and sharing power in collaborative governance. For example, governments often emphasize legal authority as an important source of power (Purdy, 2012), and they tend to use coercive power in some “tangible” arenas (e.g., decision making) that may impact the processes and outcomes more directly or obviously (Brisbois & de Loë, 2016). To protect their power authority and influences, it is not easy for governments to support other participants from private, nonprofit, or civic sectors to use authority power coercively within certain “tangible” arenas. In this situation, considering multiple dimensions of power provides more realistic approaches to enhancing power sharing between governments and their partners from other sectors. Possible approaches include engaging participants who have other kinds of power sources that are complementary to governments’ power sources, supporting other partners’ use of noncoercive power that is less used by governments, opening some “intangible” power arenas that are less directly related to final decisions, and helping ameliorate the outcomes of power to benefit the whole collaboration. Framing power across multiple dimensions improves the recognition of diverse participants’ abilities, methods, arenas, and outcomes of using power in collaborative governance. Based on this recognition, it will be easier for participants to share power with other partners.

The multidimensional model of power helped participants in Chinese rural governance frame, use and share power from different perspectives. Four relevant approaches to enhancing

power sharing were observed in this collaboration-based mechanism for rural China: 1) Xiangxian's power sources were diffused in the collaboration, which provided a foundation for sharing power with Xiangxian; 2) Xiangxian used different types of noncoercive power that were rarely used by existing stakeholders; 3) Xiangxian exerted their power in some arenas where existing stakeholders played a weaker role; 4) Xiangxian used their power to produce more "mutual gain" and "altruistic gain", which ameliorated the outcome of power sharing and motivated existing stakeholders to share more power with them.

5.6.2 Contribution to Collaboration: A Catalyst of Power Sharing

In this study, sharing power with Xiangxian Council through the four specific approaches discussed above made a lot of contributions to the whole collaboration, these benefits brought by power sharing encourage participants to share power in collaborative governance.

First, as it revealed in the data, Xiangxian as a new collaborator brought in different resources during the collaborative process, such as money, knowledge, and human resource, which formed an important base for their use of power in collaboration. Second, Xiangxian's use of noncoercive power (reward power, expert power, referent power, and legitimate power) contributed to the collaborative process. For example, stakeholders in rural governance, such as VC members and villagers, often had conflicting perspectives of how village projects would be organized and managed. To solve these conflicts, Xiangxian were shared with more power to affect the collaborative process by serving as a credible and trustworthy connector who exerted influences non-coercively in promoting more communications, coordinating different expectations, and aligning conflicting interests and goals, all of which enhanced trust and fostered a more cooperative relationship among participants. Third, the outcome of Xiangxian's use of power contributes to other villagers' benefits and the development of the whole village (e.g.,

promoting the economic and cultural development). Other stakeholders are more likely to share more power with Xiangxian when they perceived these contributions of power sharing.

5.6.3 Control from Hierarchical Structure: A Potential Challenge for Power Sharing

Although the collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China has developed in recent years, the whole governance system at the village level depends upon the state (represented by township governments) and Party organization (e.g., village Party branches and their secretaries) in terms of resource dependency, personnel overlap, and accountability systems (Alpermann, 2009; O'Brien & Han, 2009; Tan, 2010). This dependence makes the collaborative governance practice in Chinese rural governance face a tension between horizontal collaboration with stakeholders at the village level and vertical control from the whole hierarchical structure.

Engaging Xiangxian Council in Chinese rural governance to develop a new collaboration-based governance mechanism requires to build a balanced power relationship in a horizontal collaboration. However, this horizontal collaboration is unavoidably affected by the whole hierarchical structure in the Chinese political system, and there is always a control from higher-level governments that constrains the autonomy of rural governance, which will further influence the degree and stability of power sharing in collaborative governance at the village level. For example, some VC members and Xiangxian indicated that directions from higher-level governments such as the township government still widely existed in rural governance. In this situation, the degree and stability of power sharing are not only determined by the willingness and actions of participants within the collaboration in rural governance, but also affected by the policy and guidance from higher-level governments outside the collaboration. In order to develop a long-term mechanism for power sharing, more efforts are needed to handle the tension noted above in the future.

5.7 Conclusion

Through a case about a new collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China, I explored four approaches to enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance, including diffusing the source of power, increasing the type of power, expanding the arena for power, and ameliorating the outcome of power. This research provides a thorough understanding about power dynamics and develops a useful model for power sharing in collaborative governance.

Despite the specific context related to this research, the approaches to enhancing power sharing revealed from this study are generalizable to many other collaborative governance situations. The core features of the collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China studied in this article, including the inclusion of different participants, the pooling of knowledge and resources, and the adoption of deliberative and consensus-oriented decision process, are the major characteristics of all collaborative governance cases, which provide a similar collaborative context for power sharing. In addition, although the empirical findings are limited to the specific setting (i.e., Chinese rural governance), the model of power sharing in collaborative governance can be generalized to other contexts since the dimensions of power discussed in this study (i.e., source of power, type of power, arena for power, and outcome of power) are common in different power relationships and most power relationships are shaped by these power dimensions, which increase generalizability of this study. In this regard, even though the institutional environments such as legal and administrative systems vary among countries, the approaches of power sharing in collaborative governance discussed in this article are generalizable across different countries or geographic regions to a large extent.

The greatest contribution of this research is not about synthesizing the general dimensions of power that are common in different power settings, yet based on these multiple dimensions of power, a set of concrete mechanisms for enhancing power sharing were explored

through an empirical case, including how to diffuse different power sources (e.g. authority, control of resource, discursive legitimacy, personal reputation, interpersonal relationship), how to increase types of power used in collaboration (e.g., use of reward, expert, referent, legitimate power), how to expand arenas for power (e.g., participants selection, process design, content framing, decision making, monitoring, relationship building), and how to ameliorate outcome of power (e.g., the realization of mutual gain and altruistic gain). A multidimensional model of power sharing in collaborative governance is developed in this research, which advances the understanding and practice of power dynamics in collaborative governance.

Overall, this study illustrates how to enhance power sharing in collaborative governance through four approaches, which is particularly important given the common need to deal with the issue of power asymmetry in collaboration. To explore more factors that can contribute to power sharing in collaborative governance, such as factors in institutional and cultural contexts, future research conducted in different settings would also be worthwhile.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Power mechanism is paramount in collaborative governance since it provides a useful way to link together seemingly disparate or even contradictory elements influencing the effectiveness of collaborative processes (Brisbois & de Loë, 2016). Building on this imperative, this dissertation presented three essays focus on power as a critical yet understudied area in collaborative governance research. In order to fill the research gap, in this dissertation, I examined contingencies of power sharing, the relationship between power and trust, and approaches to enhancing power sharing in collaborative governance. These efforts represent major improvements over previous studies on power in collaborative governance, both theoretically and practically.

6.1 Theoretical Contributions

This dissertation not only enriches the understanding of power in collaborative governance, but also contributes to the collaborative governance literature in general.

First, it offers a paradox lens to examine the importance of power in collaborative governance. In the literature review chapter, I conduct a systematic review of literature about collaborative governance from a paradox lens and find that power is a key issue behind many paradoxes in collaborative governance because: 1) many elements and forces in these paradoxes are linked to power in collaborative governance; 2) the tensions formed between conflicting elements in paradoxes are caused by power issues in collaborative governance to certain extent;

and 3) exploring solutions to handle paradoxes needs to consider how to deal with power concerns in collaborative governance. In this regard, theories of power can provide a useful way to link together seemingly disparate factors influencing the operation, outcomes, and development of collaborative governance.

Second, this dissertation provides three approaches to interpreting, theorizing, and tackling power issues in collaborative governance, including contingency approach, dyadic approach, and multidimensional approach.

The contingency approach implies a “if-then” mind-set that enables people to consider the needs of specific situations in decision making. Adopting contingency approach in studying power in collaborative governance is critical since power relationship depends on many factors in individual participants, the network formed by participants, and the institutional environment within which the collaboration forms (Ran & Qi, 2018). For instance, power sharing is believed to be a highly advocated power relationship that is positive for the effectiveness of collaboration. Few efforts have been made to further investigate the complex influence of power sharing on the effectiveness of collaboration. This dissertation adds to the literature by exploring possible contingency factors affecting the relationship between power sharing and collaboration effectiveness. Specifically, six contingency factors of power sharing from contextual, network, and node perspectives are identified, which help both scholars and practitioners to develop a more in-depth understanding of power relationship in collaboration and provide insight on how the power dynamics in collaboration can be managed effectively.

The dyadic approach aims to analyze the relationship between two factors rather than focusing on their independent or individual roles. Most prior research on power in collaborative governance stops at the individual roles, impacts and mechanisms of power rather than relating power to other critical issues in collaboration. This dissertation fills this gap by linking power

with trust as a functionally equivalent alternative mechanism in collaborative processes. Three dynamic relationships are proposed regarding the shared sources of power and trust, the effects of power asymmetry and power sharing on trust building, and the influence of trust building on the management of power relationship in collaborative governance. The dyadic approach is helpful for interpreting and managing power relationships by considering and using trust mechanism in collaboration.

The multidimensional approach reveals the complexity of power dynamics and provides a thorough understanding about power and power sharing in collaborative governance. Most literature that focuses on limited dimensions of power (e.g., mechanisms of balancing voting power in Choi and Robertson, 2014) fails to capture the dynamics of power. Differently, this dissertation employs a multi-dimensional approach to conceptualize power in collaborative governance, which makes power and power sharing more accessible to researchers and practitioners. Based on a case study on how power sharing is enhanced in collaborative governance, four approaches of power sharing are explored, which capture different dimensions of power in collaboration (i.e., source of power, type of power, arena for power, outcome of power).

Third, the three approaches discussed above pave the way for future studies on other issues in collaborative governance. In addition to power, collaborative governance is full of other issues and challenges that are complex, dynamic, and entangled. For example, trust building in collaborative governance is also a critical yet challenging issue in collaboration. Trust itself is a complex concept consisting of different meanings (e.g., affective trust, cognitive trust). It is also entangled with other issues in social interaction such as power. The influence of trust on collaboration is not absolute yet depends upon other contingency factors such as the actual capacity of trustees and the institutional culture. Therefore, the contingency approach, dyadic

approach, and multi-dimensional approach are also necessary for studies on trust in collaborative governance. I believe that extending the three approaches used in this dissertation to more studies on collaborative governance can help develop more comprehensive and useful theories about collaborative governance in general.

6.2 Practical Contributions

The conceptual discussions and empirical findings of this dissertation also have important implications for practitioners in collaborative governance. With the growing use of collaborative methods in governance, practitioners in different sectors face power issues in the collaborative process with other actors. This dissertation provides a set of managerial implications that are necessary to deal with power dynamics in collaborative governance.

First, contingency factors matter. Collaborative governance is full of complexity, dynamics, and paradoxes, and there is no panacea to deal with power concerns in collaboration. Practitioners need to evaluate different contingency factors from contextual, network, and node perspectives to manage their power relationships with other collaborators. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, in order to manage power relationships with other stakeholders effectively, practitioners need to evaluate the regulations and rules in the institutional environment, clarify the goals and missions of the collaboration, understand the types and features of the collaboration, investigate their previous collaborative experiences with different partners, analyze different stakeholders' power sources, and conduct cost-benefit analysis during collaborative process. All these endeavors will help practitioners make better decisions on sharing power with other partners and improve flexibility of managing power relationships in collaborative practices.

Second, trust matters. As noted in chapter 4, power is entangled with trust as a functionally equivalent alternative mechanism in collaborative processes. Linking power with trust provides practitioners with useful strategies for handling power issues in collaborative governance. For example, building trust can help enhance power sharing since confident expectations and willingness to be vulnerable are enhanced when trust relationship is strengthened among partners. In this situation, participants are more likely to share power with other partners who they trust. Additionally, obtaining and enhancing common sources shared by power and trust such as authority, resource control and discursive legitimacy contributes to the legitimacy of power relationships in collaboration. When participants obtained sufficient level of these shared sources, their power is built upon sufficient trust, which provides a solid foundation for the legitimacy for power relationships in collaboration. Although trust plays a critical role in the management of power relationships in collaborative governance, participants should be cautious about blind trust on other partners, which may lead to over-dependence on other actors and then causes an extremely imbalanced power relationship in collaborative processes.

Third, different dimensions of power matter. Chapter 5 offers four approaches to enhancing power sharing in collaborative practice by taking advantage of different dimensions of power (e.g., diffusing the source of power, increasing the type of power, expanding the arena for power, and ameliorating the outcome of power). As noted in chapter 5, power is a multifaceted concept that requires people to frame and manage it across its different dimensions such as power source, power type, power arena, and power outcome. Understanding and using different dimensions of power can create more possibilities for power sharing in collaboration, such as engaging more participants who have different power sources, supporting other partners to use different types of power, opening more power arenas for other participants to exert their power, and collaborate with partners to ameliorate the outcomes of using power. In this regard, it is

crucial for practitioners to fully consider different dimensions of power to manage the power relationships, especially enhancing power sharing among participants in collaborative governance.

6.3 Limitations of the Dissertation

In this dissertation, I studied power as a complex and dynamic mechanism in collaborative governance through two conceptual studies and a qualitative case study, which provides important conceptual exploration and exploratory inquiry into power in collaborative governance. Despite the significance and the many insights generated, this dissertation has several limitations that need to be acknowledged. Firstly, in the two studies in Chapter 3 and 4, due to the complexity of collaborative governance and the dynamics of power and trust, it is difficult to exhaust all contingency factors of power sharing and the relationships between power and trust in collaborative governance. Future research is needed to further investigate more contingencies and explore more possible relationships between power and trust in collaboration. Secondly, the propositions proposed in Chapter 3 and 4 are conceptual formulations that need to be operationalized and then tested by more empirical studies in the future. Thirdly, the propositions developed in Chapter 3 cannot reflect the relationship between power sharing and each dimension of “effectiveness” in collaborative governance. As noted in Chapter 3, “effectiveness” has multiple dimensions, and different measuring perspectives are used to assess the effectiveness of certain aspects of collaborative governance rather than evaluating whether the collaboration as a whole is effective or ineffective. Thus, when breaking “effectiveness” into each dimension, each proposition in chapter 3 can be re-written for each aspect of the effectiveness. Future research is needed to further analyze the relationship between power sharing and each dimension of “effectiveness” in collaborative governance. Fourth, the study in Chapter 5 is a

single case study focusing on power sharing in a collaboration-based governance mechanism for rural China, which limits other researchers in making generalizations. A comparative case study focusing on power and power sharing across different countries or geographic regions, but it was not feasible due to the demands it would have placed on my time and resources.

6.4 Directions for Future Research

To better understand the nature of power and explore strategies for managing power relationships in collaboration, I firstly envisage future studies can empirically test the propositions developed about the relationship between power sharing and effectiveness of collaborative governance in Chapter 3 and the relationship between power and trust in collaborative governance in Chapter 4. I also envisage more longitudinal research about power in collaborative governance. Paradoxical thinking highlights the embedded and constitutive nature of paradoxes (Papachroni, Heracleous, & Paroutis 2015), which emphasizes a longitudinal perspective to investigate the evolvement of paradoxes in collaboration over time. As a key issue behind many paradoxes in collaborative governance, power also needs to be studied in a long-term approach to explore how it affects the formation, operation, and development of collaboration over time. In addition, social network analysis is critical for power research in collaborative governance. Participants who have different power relationships with each other are unavoidably engaged in different relationships and interactions. Therefore, studies about social ties among participants such as different network properties can shed light on the understanding and management of certain power relationships in collaboration. Last but not the least, comparative studies on power in collaborative governance is very important since power is closely related to specific contexts varying across nations and geographic regions (e.g., political regime, economic policy, and cultural background). Comparative studies on power in

collaborative governance can help explore the relationships between contextual and situational factors and power arrangements in different collaborations.

Reference

- Adams, W. J., & Davis, N. J. (2005, June, 15-17). *Toward a decentralized trust-based access control system for dynamic collaboration*. Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE (pp. 317-324), Information Assurance Workshop, West Point, NY.
- Agranoff, R. (2006). Inside collaborative networks: Ten lessons for public managers. *Public Administration Review*, 66, 56-65.
- Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (1999). Managing in network settings. *Review of Policy Research*, 16(1), 18-41.
- Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big questions in public network management research. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 11(3), 295-326.
- Agranoff, R. & McGuire, M. (2003). *Collaborative public management: New strategies for local governments*. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press.
- Alexander, J. A., Comfort, M. E., Weiner, B. J., & Bogue, R. (2001). Leadership in collaborative community health partnerships. *Nonprofit Management and Leadership*, 12(2), 159-175.
- Alter, C. & Hage, J. (1993). *Organizations Working Together*. CA: Newbury Park.
- Alpermann, B. (2009). Institutionalizing village governance in China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 18(60), 397-409.
- Andersen, H. T. (2001). The new urban politics of Europe: the area-based approach to regeneration policy. In H. T. Andersen & R. V. Kempen (Eds), *Governing European Cities, Social fragmentation, Social Exclusion and Urban Governance* (pp. 233– 253). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(4), 543-571.

- Astley, W. G., & Sachdeva, P. S. (1984). Structural sources of intraorganizational power: A theoretical synthesis. *Academy of Management Review*, 9(1), 104-113.
- Bachmann, R. (2001). Trust, power and control in trans-organizational relations. *Organization Studies*, 22(2), 337-365.
- Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1962). Two faces of power. *The American Political Science Review*, 56(4), 947-952.
- Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1970). *Power and poverty: Theory and practice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Baier, A. (1986). Trust and antitrust. *Ethics*, 96(2), 231-260.
- Bajwa, S. U., Kitchlew, N., Shahzad, K., & Rehman, K. U. (2017). Public–Private Partnership (PPP) as an interdependent form (I-Form) organization. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 1-9.
- Bardach, E. (2001). Developmental dynamics: Interagency collaboration as an emergent phenomenon. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 11(2), 149-164.
- Baud, I. S. A., & Dhanalakshmi, R. (2007). Governance in urban environmental management: Comparing accountability and performance in multi-stakeholder arrangements in South India. *Cities*, 24(2), 133-147.
- Baum, J. A. C., & Oliver, C. (1991). Institutional linkages and organizational mortality. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36(2), 187-218.
- Benson, J. K. (1975). The interorganizational network as a political economy. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 20(2), 229-249.
- Berger, B. K. (2005). Power over, power with, and power to relations: Critical reflections on public relations, the dominant coalition, and activism. *Journal of Public Relations Research*, 17(1), 5-28.

- Berkes, F. (2010). Devolution of environment and resources governance: trends and future. *Environmental Conservation*, 37(04), 489-500.
- Berardo, R. (2014). Bridging and bonding capital in two-mode collaboration networks. *Policy Studies Journal*, 42(2), 197-225.
- Berardo, R., Heikkila, T., & Gerlak, A. K. (2014). Interorganizational engagement in collaborative environmental management: evidence from the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 24(3), 697-719.
- Bevir, M., Rhodes, R. A., & Weller, P. (2003). Traditions of governance: interpreting the changing role of the public sector in comparative and historical perspective. *Public Administration*, 81(1), 1-17.
- Bidault, F., & Castello, A. (2010). Why too much trust is death to innovation. *MIT Sloan Management Review*, 51(4), 33-38.
- Bierstedt, R. (1950). An analysis of social power. *American Sociological Review*, 15(6), 730-738.
- Bigley, G. A., & Roberts, K. H. (2001). The incident command system: High-reliability organizing for complex and volatile task environments. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44(6), 1281-1299.
- Bingham, L. B. (2009). Collaborative governance: Emerging practices and the incomplete legal framework for public and stakeholder voice. *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, 2009(2), 269-326.
- Bingham, L. B., Nabatchi, T., & O'Leary, R. (2005). The new governance: Practices and processes for stakeholder and citizen participation in the work of government. *Public Administration Review*, 65(5), 547-558.

- Brisbois, M. C., & de Loë, R. C. (2016). Power in collaborative approaches to governance for water: a systematic review. *Society & Natural Resources*, 29(7), 775-790.
- Brisbois, M. C., Morris, M., & de Loë, R. (2019). Augmenting the IAD framework to reveal power in collaborative governance—An illustrative application to resource industry dominated processes. *World Development*, 120, 159-168.
- Birt, L., Scott, S., Cavers, D., Campbell, C., & Walter, F. (2016). Member checking: a tool to enhance trustworthiness or merely a nod to validation?. *Qualitative health research*, 26(13), 1802-1811.
- Brass, D. J., & Burkhardt, M. E. (1993). Potential power and power use: An investigation of structure and behavior. *Academy of management journal*, 36(3), 441-470.
- Blader, S. L., & Chen, Y. R. (2012). Differentiating the effects of status and power: a justice perspective. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 102(5), 994-1014.
- Blomqvist, K. (1997). The many faces of trust. *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, 13(3), 271-286.
- Blomqvist, K., & Ståhle, P. (2000, September). *Building organizational trust*. Paper presented at the 16th Annual IMP Conference, Bath, UK.
- Bloodgood, J. M., & Chae, B. K. (2010). Organizational paradoxes: Dynamic shifting and integrative management. *Management Decision*, 48(1), 85-104.
- Booher, D. E. (2004). Collaborative governance practices and democracy. *National Civic Review*, 93(4), 32-46.
- Bovaird, T. (2007). Beyond engagement and participation: User and community coproduction of public services. *Public Administration Review*, 67(5), 846-860.

- Bozaykut, T., & Gurbuz, F. G. (2015). Power and trust in organizational relations: an empirical study in Turkish public hospitals. *The International Journal of Health Planning and Management*, 30(1), E1-E15.
- Brenkert, G. G. (1998). Trust, morality and international business. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 8(2), 293-317.
- Brenner, N. (2004). Urban governance and the production of new state spaces in Western Europe, 1960–2000. *Review of International Political Economy*, 11(3), 447-488.
- Brummel, R. F., Nelson, K. C., Souter, S. G., Jakes, P. J., & Williams, D. R. (2010). Social learning in a policy-mandated collaboration: community wildfire protection planning in the eastern United States. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 53(6), 681-699.
- Bryer, T. A., & Cooper, T. L. (2006). Exploring bureaucratic responsiveness across stages of collaboration: Networks, inertia, and the political environment. In *Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April*, vol. 20.
- Bryson, J. (1988). Strategic planning: Big wins and small wins. *Public Money & Management*, 8(3), 11-15.
- Bryson, J. M., & Einsweiler, R. C. (Eds.). (1991). *Shared power: What is it? How does it work? How can we make it work better?* (Vol. 4). German Literature, Art & Thought.
- Brisbois, M. C., & de Loë, R. C. (2016). Power in collaborative approaches to governance for water: a systematic review. *Society & Natural Resources*, 29(7), 775-790.
- Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The design and implementation of Cross-Sector collaborations: Propositions from the literature. *Public Administration Review*, 66, 44-55.

- Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2015). Designing and implementing cross-sector collaborations: Needed and challenging. *Public Administration Review*, 75(5), 647-663.
- Butler Jr, J. K., & Cantrell, R. S. (1984). A behavioral decision theory approach to modeling dyadic trust in superiors and subordinates. *Psychological Reports*, 55(1), 19-28.
- Cameron, K. S. (1986). Effectiveness as paradox: Consensus and conflict in conceptions of organizational effectiveness. *Management Science*, 32(5), 539-553.
- Cameron, K. S., & Whetten, D. A. (1983). *Organizational effectiveness: A comparison of multiple models*. New York: Academic Press.
- Carley, M. (2000). Urban partnerships, governance and the regeneration of Britain's cities. *International Planning Studies*, 5(3), 273-297.
- Carley, M. (2000). Urban partnerships, governance and the regeneration of Britain's cities. *International Planning Studies*, 5(3), 273-297.
- Carnevale, D. G., & Wechsler, B. (1992). Trust in the public sector: Individual and organizational determinants. *Administration & Society*, 23(4), 471-494.
- Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. J. (2005). Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and constraint absorption: A closer look at resource dependence theory. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 50(2), 167-199.
- Carmichael, P., & Knox, C. (1999). Towards 'a new era'? Some developments in governance of Northern Ireland. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 65(1), 103-116.
- Cerulo, K. A. (1997). Identity construction: New issues, new directions. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23(1), 385-409.
- Chen, B. (2008). Assessing interorganizational networks for public service delivery: A process-perceived effectiveness framework. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 31(3), 348-363.

- Child, J. (2001). Trust—the fundamental bond in global collaboration. *Organizational Dynamics*, 29(4), 274-288.
- Choi, T., & Robertson, P. J. (2013). Deliberation and decision in collaborative governance: A simulation of approaches to mitigate power imbalance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 24(2), 495-518.
- Coff, R. W. (1999). When competitive advantage doesn't lead to performance: The resource-based view and stakeholder bargaining power. *Organization Science*, 10(2), 119-133.
- Choi, T., & Robertson, P. J. (2014). Deliberation and decision in collaborative governance: A simulation of approaches to mitigate power imbalance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 24(2), 495-518.
- Crona, B., & Bodin, Ö. (2010). Power asymmetries in small-scale fisheries: a barrier to governance transformability?. *Ecology and Society*, 15(4), 32.
- Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., & LePine, J. A. (2007). Trust, trustworthiness, and trust propensity: a meta-analytic test of their unique relationships with risk taking and job performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92(4), 909-927.
- Cook, K. S. (1977). Exchange and power in networks of interorganizational relations. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 18(1), 62-82.
- Cook, D. J., Mulrow, C. D., & Haynes, R. B. (1997). Systematic reviews: synthesis of best evidence for clinical decisions. *Annals of Internal Medicine*, 126(5), 376-380.
- Cook, J., & Wall, T. (1980). New work attitude measures of trust, organizational commitment and personal need non-fulfilment. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 53(1), 39-52.
- Creswell, J. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

- Creswell, J. W., & Miller, D. L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. *Theory into practice, 39*(3), 124-130.
- Cropanzana, R., Bowen, D. E., & Gilliland, S. W. (2007). The management of organizational justice. *Academy of Management Perspectives, 21*(4), 34-48.
- Cox, A. (2001). Managing with power: strategies for improving value appropriation from supply relationships. *Journal of Supply Chain Management, 37*(1), 42-47.
- Crona, B., & Bodin, Ö. (2010). Power asymmetries in small-scale fisheries: a barrier to governance transformability. *Ecology and Society, 15*(4), 32.
- Crosby, B. C., & Bryson, J. M. (2005). *Leadership for the common good: Tackling public problems in a shared-power world* (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Currall, S. C. (1992). Group representatives in educational institutions: An empirical study of superintendents and teacher union presidents. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 28*(2), 296-317.
- Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. *Behavioral science, 2*(3), 201-215.
- Dale, A., & Armitage, D. (2011). Marine mammal co-management in Canada's Arctic: Knowledge co-production for learning and adaptive capacity. *Marine Policy, 35*(4), 440-449.
- Dandy, N., Fiorini, S., & Davies, A. L. (2014). Agenda-setting and power in collaborative natural resource management. *Environmental Conservation, 41*(04), 311-320.
- Das, T. K., & Teng, B. S. (1998). Between trust and control: Developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances. *Academy of Management Review, 23*(3), 491-512.
- Das, T. K., & Teng, B. S. (2001). Trust, control, and risk in strategic alliances: An integrated framework. *Organization Studies, 22*(2), 251-283.
- Dawson, S. (1996). *Analyzing organizations*. London: Macmillan Business.

- Dandy, N., Fiorini, S., & Davies, A. L. (2014). Agenda-setting and power in collaborative natural resource management. *Environmental conservation*, 41(4), 311-320.
- Dekker, K., & van Kempen, R. (2004). Urban governance within the Big Cities Policy: ideals and practice in Den Haag, the Netherlands. *Cities*, 21(2), 109-117.
- Denison, D. R., & Mishra, A. K. (1995). Toward a theory of organizational culture and effectiveness. *Organization Science*, 6(2), 204-223.
- De Cremer, D., & Van Vugt, M. (1998). Collective identity and cooperation in a public goods dilemma: A matter of trust or self-efficacy. *Current Research in Social Psychology*, 3(1), 1-11.
- De Wever, S., Martens, R., & Vandenbempt, K. (2005). The impact of trust on strategic resource acquisition through interorganizational networks: Towards a conceptual model. *Human Relations*, 58(12), 1523-1543.
- Dyer, J. H., & Chu, W. (2000). The determinants of trust in supplier-automaker relationships in the US, Japan and Korea. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 31(2), 259-285.
- Echeverria, J. D. (2001). No success like failure: The Platte river collaborative watershed planning process. *William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review*, 25(3), 559-604.
- Edelenbos, J., & Klijn, E. H. (2007). Trust in complex decision-making networks: A theoretical and empirical exploration. *Administration & Society*, 39(1), 25-50.
- Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. *American Sociological Review*, 27(1), 31-41.
- Emerson, K., & Nabatchi, T. (2015). Evaluating the productivity of collaborative governance regimes: A performance matrix. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 38(4), 717-747.

- Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012). An integrative framework for collaborative governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 22(1), 1-29.
- Emerson, R. M. (1972). Exchange theory, part II: Exchange relations and networks. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch, Jr., & B. Anderson (Eds.), *Sociological theories in progress*, vol. 2: 58-87. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Ehler, C. N. (2003). Indicators to measure governance performance in integrated coastal management. *Ocean & Coastal Management*, 46(3), 335-345.
- Fairhurst, G. T., Smith, W. K., Banghart, S. G., Lewis, M. W., Putnam, L. L., Raisch, S., & Schad, J. (2016). Diverging and converging: Integrative insights on a paradox meta-perspective. *Academy of Management Annals*, 10(1), 173-182.
- Fedor, D. B., & Ramsay, R. J. (2007). Effects of supervisor power on preparers' responses to audit review: A field study. *Behavioral Research in Accounting*, 19(1), 91-105.
- Freeman, R. E. (1984). *Strategic management: A stakeholder approach*. Boston, MA: Pitman Publishing.
- Friedlander, F., & Pickle, H. (1968). Components of effectiveness in small organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 13(2), 289-304.
- French, J. R., & Raven, B. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), *Studies in social power* (pp. 151-157). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Frost, T. F., & Moussavi, F. (1992). The relationship between leader power base and influence: The moderating role of trust. *Journal of Applied Business Research*, 8(4), 9-14.
- Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and perspectives not taken. *Psychological Science*, 17(12), 1068-1074.
- Geringer, J. M., & Hebert, L. (1989). Control and performance of international joint ventures. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 20(2), 235-254.

- Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). *The discovery of grounded theory; strategies for qualitative research*. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Göhler, G. (2009). "power to" and "power over". In S. R. Clegg, & M. Haugaard *The SAGE handbook of power* (pp. 27-39). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Gray, B. (1985). Conditions facilitating interorganizational collaboration. *Human Relations*, 38(10), 911-936.
- Gray, B. (1989). *Collaborating: Finding common ground for multiparty problems* (1st ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Gray, B. (1996). Cross-sectoral partners: Collaborative alliances among business, government and communities. In C. Huxham (Ed.), *Creating Collaborative Advantage* (pp. 57-79). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Gray, B. (2000). Assessing inter-organizational collaboration: Multiple conceptions and multiple methods. In D. Faulkner & M. de Rond (Eds.), *Cooperative strategy: Economic, business, and organizational issues* (pp. 243-260). England: Oxford University Press.
- Green, L. (1989). Law, legitimacy, and consent. *Southern California Law Review*, 62(3-4), 795-825.
- Greenberg, J. (1987). A taxonomy of organizational justice theories. *Academy of Management Review*, 12(1), 9-22.
- Greenwood, M., & Van Buren, H. J. (2010). Trust and stakeholder theory: Trustworthiness in the organisation-stakeholder relationship. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 95(3), 425-438.
- Grim, P. (2004). What is a contradiction. In G. Priest, JC Beall & B. Armour-Garb (Eds.), *The law of non-contradiction: New philosophical essays* (pp. 49-72). England: Oxford University Press.

- Grimes, A. J. (1978). Authority, power, influence and social control: A theoretical synthesis. *Academy of Management Review*, 3(4), 724-735.
- Grindle, M. S. (2004). Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in developing countries. *Governance*, 17(4), 525-548.
- Gulati, R. (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38(1), 85-112.
- Gulati, R., & Nickerson, J. A. (2008). Interorganizational trust, governance choice, and exchange performance. *Organization Science*, 19(5), 688-708.
- Guo, C., & Acar, M. (2005). Understanding collaboration among nonprofit organizations: Combining resource dependency, institutional, and network perspectives. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 34(3), 340-361.
- Hardy, C., & Phillips, N. (1998). Strategies of engagement: Lessons from the critical examination of collaboration and conflict in an interorganizational domain. *Organization Science*, 9(2), 217-230.
- Hardy, C., Phillips, N., & Lawrence, T. (1998). Distinguishing trust and power in interorganizational relations: Forms and façades of trust. In C. Lane & R. Bachmann (Eds.), *Trust within and between organizations: Conceptual issues and empirical applications* (pp. 64-87). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hay, C. (1997). State of the art: Divided by a common language: Political theory and the concept of power. *Politics*, 17(1), 45-52.
- Hayes, A. F., & Krippendorff, K. (2007). Answering the call for a standard reliability measure for coding data. *Communication Methods and Measures*, 1, 77-89.
- Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1992). Do norms matter in marketing relationships?. *The Journal of Marketing*, 56(2), 32-44.

- Head, B. W. (2008). Assessing network-based collaborations: effectiveness for whom?. *Public Management Review*, 10(6), 733-749.
- Head, B. W., & Alford, J. (2015). Wicked problems: Implications for public policy and management. *Administration & Society*, 47(6), 711-739.
- Healey, P. (1996). Consensus-building across difficult divisions: new approaches to collaborative strategy making. *Planning Practice & Research*, 11(2), 207-216.
- Hendriks, F. (2014). Understanding good urban governance: Essentials, shifts, and values. *Urban Affairs Review*, 50(4), 553-576.
- Henneman, E. A., Lee, J. L., & Cohen, J. I. (1995). Collaboration: a concept analysis. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 21(1), 103-109.
- Hickson, D. J., Hinings, C. R., Lee, C. A., Schneck, R. E., & Pennings, J. M. (1971). A strategic contingencies' theory of intraorganizational power. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 16(2), 216-229.
- Holton, J. A., & Walsh, I. (2017). *Classic grounded theory: Applications with qualitative and quantitative data*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Holzer, M., & Yang, K. (2004). Performance measurement and improvement: An assessment of the state of the art. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 70(1), 15-31.
- Hosmer, L. T. (1995). Trust: The connecting link between organizational theory and philosophical ethics. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(2), 379-403.
- Hough, M., Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Myhill, A., & Quinton, P. (2010). Procedural justice, trust, and institutional legitimacy. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, 4(3), 203-210.
- Hunt, S. D., & Nevin, J. R. (1974). Power in a channel of distribution: sources and consequences. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 11(2), 186-193.

- Huxham, C. (1991). Facilitating collaboration: Issues in multi-organizational group decision support in voluntary, informal collaborative settings. *Journal of the Operational Research Society*, 42(12), 1037-1045.
- Huxham, C. (1996). Collaboration and collaborative advantage. In C. Huxham (Ed.), *Creating collaborative advantage* (pp.1-18). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Huxham, C. (2003). Theorizing collaboration practice. *Public Management Review*, 5(3), 401-423.
- Huxham, C., & Beech, N. (2008). Inter-organizational power. In S. Cropper (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of inter-organizational relations* (pp. 555-79). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huxham, C., & Macdonald, D. (1992). Introducing collaborative advantage: Achieving inter-organizational effectiveness through meta-strategy. *Management Decision*, 30(3), 50-56.
- Human, S. E., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Legitimacy building in the evolution of small-firm multilateral networks: A comparative study of success and demise. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 45(2), 327-365.
- Huxham, C., & Vangen, S. (1996). Working together: Key themes in the management of relationships between public and non-profit organizations. *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 7(9), 5-17.
- Huxham, C., & Vangen, S. (2000). Leadership in the shaping and implementation of collaboration agendas: How things happen in a (not quite) joined-up world. *Academy of Management Journal*, 43(6), 1159-1175.
- Huxham, C. & Vangen, S. (2005). *Managing to Collaborate: The theory and practice of collaborative advantage*. London: Routledge.

- Huxham, C., Vangen, S., Huxham, C., & Eden, C. (2000). The challenge of collaborative governance. *Public Management an International Journal of Research and Theory*, 2(3), 337-358.
- Huxham, C., & Beech, N. (2003). Contrary prescriptions: Recognizing good practice tensions in management. *Organization Studies*, 24(1), 69-93.
- Inkpen, A. C., & Currall, S. C. (1998). The nature, antecedents, and consequences of joint venture trust. *Journal of International Management*, 4(1), 1-20.
- Inkpen, A. C., & Currall, S. C. (2004). The coevolution of trust, control, and learning in joint ventures. *Organization Science*, 15(5), 586-599.
- Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (1999). Consensus building and complex adaptive systems: A framework for evaluating collaborative planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 65(4), 412-423.
- Ireland, R. D., & Webb, J. W. (2007). A multi-theoretic perspective on trust and power in strategic supply chains. *Journal of Operations Management*, 25(2), 482-497.
- Janis, I.L. (1972). *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.
- Janowicz-Panjaitan, M., & Krishnan, R. (2009). Measures for dealing with competence and integrity violations of interorganizational trust at the corporate and operating levels of organizational hierarchy. *Journal of Management Studies*, 46(2), 245-268.
- Jazaieri, H., Logli Allison, M., Campos, B., Young, R. C., & Keltner, D. (2019). Content, structure, and dynamics of personal reputation: The role of trust and status potential within social networks. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 22, 964–983.
- Jeffries, F. L., & Reed, R. (2000). Trust and adaptation in relational contracting. *Academy of Management Review*, 25(4), 873-882.

- Jentoft, S., van Son, T. C., & Bjørkan, M. (2007). Marine protected areas: a governance system analysis. *Human Ecology*, 35(5), 611-622.
- Johnson, D. E., Erez, A., Kiker, D. S., & Motowidlo, S. J. (2002). Liking and attributions of motives as mediators of the relationships between individuals' reputations, helpful behaviors and raters' reward decisions. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87(4), 808–815.
- Johnston, E. W., Hicks, D., Nan, N., & Auer, J. C. (2011). Managing the inclusion process in collaborative governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 21(4), 699-721.
- Johnston, D. A., McCutcheon, D. M., Stuart, F. I., & Kerwood, H. (2004). Effects of supplier trust on performance of cooperative supplier relationships. *Journal of Operations Management*, 22(1), 23-38.
- Jones, C., Hesterly, W. S., & Borgatti, S. P. (1997). A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions and social mechanisms. *Academy of Management Review*, 22(4), 911-945.
- Kale, S.H., McIntyre, R.P. (1991). Distribution channel relationships in diverse cultures. *International Marketing Review*, 8 (3), 31–45.
- Kallis, G., Kiparsky, M., & Norgaard, R. (2009). Collaborative governance and adaptive management: Lessons from California's CALFED Water Program. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 12(6), 631-643.
- Kaplan, A. (1964). Power in perspective. In R. L. Kahn & E. Boulding (Eds.), *Power and conflict in organizations* (pp. 11-32). London: Tavistock.
- Kapucu, N. (2005). Interorganizational coordination in dynamic context: Networks in emergency response management. *Connections*, 26(2), 33-48.

- Kapucu, N., Arslan, T., & Collins, M. L. (2010). Examining intergovernmental and interorganizational response to catastrophic disasters: Toward a network-centered approach. *Administration & Society*, 42(2), 222-247.
- Kay, F. M., & Hagan, J. (2003). Building trust: Social capital, distributive justice, and loyalty to the firm. *Law & Social Inquiry*, 28(2), 483-519.
- Kern, H. (2000). Lack of trust, surfeit of trust: Some causes of the innovation crisis in German industry. In C. Lane & R. Bachman (Eds.), *Trust within and between organizations: Conceptual issues and empirical applications* (pp.31-63). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kipnis, D. (1976). *The Power Holders*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kenis, P., & Provan, K. G. (2009). Towards an exogenous theory of public network performance. *Public Administration*, 87(3), 440-456.
- Khazanchi, S., Lewis, M. W., & Boyer, K. K. (2007). *Innovation-supportive culture: The impact of organizational values on process innovation*. *Journal of Operations Management*, 25(4), 871-884.
- Klein, G., Klinger, D., & Seely, B. (2003). Editorial mission. *Comparative Technology Transfer and Society*, 1, 5-6.
- Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4), 1251-1288.
- Koliba, C. J., Mills, R. M., & Zia, A. (2011). Accountability in governance networks: An assessment of public, private, and nonprofit emergency management practices following Hurricane Katrina. *Public Administration Review*, 71(2), 210-220.

- Korsgaard, M. A., Schweiger, D. M., & Sapienza, H. J. (1995). Building commitment, attachment, and trust in strategic decision-making teams: The role of procedural justice. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38(1), 60-84.
- Kramer, R. (1990). *Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Kramer, R.M. (1993). Cooperation and organizational identification. In J.K. Murnighan (Ed.), *Social psychology in organizations: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 244–68). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Kroeger, F. (2012). Trusting organizations: the institutionalization of trust in interorganizational relationships. *Organization*, 19(6), 743-763.
- Kumar, N. (1996). The power of trust in manufacturer-retailer relationships. *Harvard Business Review*, 74(6), 92-106.
- Langford, V. (1979). Managerial Effectiveness—A Review of the Literature. In M. Brodie & R. Bennet (Eds.), *Perspectives of Managerial Effectiveness* (pp.66-79). Thorne: Thames Valley Reginal Managerial Centre.
- Larson, A. (1992). Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: A study of the governance of exchange relationships. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 37 (1), 76-104.
- Lasker, R. D., Weiss, E. S., & Miller, R. (2001). Partnership synergy: a practical framework for studying and strengthening the collaborative advantage. *Milbank Quarterly*, 79(2), 179-205.
- Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. (1996). Commitment in exchange relations: Test of a theory of relational cohesion. *American Sociological Review*, 61(1), 89-108.

- Lawrence, T. B., Hardy, C., & Phillips, N. (2002). Institutional effects of interorganizational collaboration: The emergence of proto-institutions. *Academy of Management Journal*, 45(1), 281-290.
- Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. (1985). Trust as a social reality. *Social Forces*, 63(4), 967-985.
- Lewin, A. Y., & Minton, J. W. (1986). Determining organizational effectiveness: Another look, and an agenda for research. *Management Science*, 32(5), 514-538.
- Leach, W. D. & Sabatier, P. A. (2005). Are trust and social capital the keys to success?. In P. A. Sabatier, W. Focht, M. Lubell, Z. Trachtenberg, A. Vedlitz & M. Matlock (Eds.), *Swimming upstream: Collaborative approaches to watershed management* (pp. 233-258). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lewis, M. W. (2000). Exploring paradox: Toward a more comprehensive guide. *Academy of Management Review*, 25(4), 760-776.
- Lewis, M. W., & Smith, W. K. (2014). Paradox as a metatheoretical perspective: Sharpening the focus and widening the scope. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 50(2), 127-149.
- Levine, S., White, P. E., & Paul, B. D. (1963). Community interorganizational problems in providing medical care and social services. *American Journal of Public Health and the Nations Health*, 53(8), 1183-1195.
- Liberati, A., Altman, D. G., Tetzlaff, J., Mulrow, C., Gøtzsche, P. C., Ioannidis, J. P., ... & Moher, D. (2009). The PRISMA statement for reporting systematic reviews and meta-analyses of studies that evaluate health care interventions: explanation and elaboration. *Journal of Clinical Epidemiology*, 62(10), e1-e34.
- Linder, S. H. (1999). Coming to terms with the public-private partnership a grammar of multiple meanings. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 43(1), 35-51.

- Lister, S. (2000). Power in partnership? an analysis of an NGO's relationships with its partners. *Journal of International Development*, 12(2), 227-239.
- Linder, S. H. (1999). Coming to terms with the public-private partnership: A grammar of multiple meanings. *American behavioral scientist*, 43(1), 35-51.
- Lister, S. (2000). Power in partnership? An analysis of an NGO's relationships with its partners. *Journal of international Development*, 12(2), 227-239.
- Liu, Y., Li, Y., & Zhang, L. (2010). Control mechanisms across a buyer–supplier relationship quality matrix. *Journal of Business Research*, 63(1), 3-12.
- Liu, Y. S., Liu, Y., & Chen, Y. F. (2011). Territorial multi-functionality evaluation and decision-making mechanism at county scale in China. *Acta Geographica Sinica*, 66(10), 1379-1389.
- Lukes, S. (2005). *Power: A radical view*. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Long, H. L., & Tu, S. S. (2017). Rural restructuring: Theory, approach and research prospect. *Acta Geographica Sinica*, 72(4), 563-576.
- Lukes, S. (1974). *Power: A radical view*. Hampshire: Macmillan.
- Luhmann, N. (1979). *Trust and Power: Two Works*. Chichester, New York: Wiley.
- Lusch, R. F., & Brown, J. R. (1982). A modified model of power in the marketing channel. *Journal of marketing research*, 312-323.
- Lyon, F. (2006). Managing co-operation: Trust and power in Ghanaian associations. *Organization Studies*, 27(1), 31-52.
- Mandell, M. P. (2001). Collaboration through network structures for community building efforts. *National Civic Review*, 90(3), 279-288.
- Mandell, M., & Keast, R. (2007). Evaluating network arrangements: Toward revised performance measures. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 30(4), 574-597.

- Mahapatra, S. K., Narasimhan, R., & Barbieri, P. (2010). Strategic interdependence, governance effectiveness and supplier performance: A dyadic case study investigation and theory development. *Journal of Operations Management*, 28(6), 537-552.
- Maner, J. K., & Mead, N. L. (2010). The essential tension between leadership and power: When leaders sacrifice group goals for the sake of self-interest. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 99(3), 482-497.
- Margerum, R. D. (2001). Organizational commitment to integrated and collaborative management: Matching strategies to constraints. *Environmental Management*, 28(4), 421-431.
- MacDonald, D., Crabtree, J. R., Wiesinger, G., Dax, T., Stamou, N., Fleury, P., ... & Gibon, A. (2000). Agricultural abandonment in mountain areas of Europe: Environmental consequences and policy response. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 59(1), 47-69.
- Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (1995). *Designing qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Mintzberg, H. (1983). *Power in and around organizations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(3), 709-734.
- Mayer, R. C., & Gavin, M. B. (2005). Trust in management and performance: Who minds the shop while the employees watch the boss?. *Academy of management journal*, 48(5), 874-888.
- Mayhew Jr, B. H., Gray, L. N., & Richardson, J. T. (1969). Behavioral measurement of operating power structures: Characterizations of asymmetrical interaction. *Sociometry*, 474-489.
- McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect-and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38(1), 24-59.

- McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: Assessing what we know and how we know it. *Public Administration Review*, 66, 33-43.
- McGuire, M., & Agranoff, R. (2011). The limitations of public management networks. *Public Administration*, 89(2), 265-284.
- Meehan, E. M. (2003). *From government to governance, civic participation and "new politics": The context of potential opportunities for the better representation of women*. Queen's University Belfast: Centre for Advancement of Women in Politics.
- Merchant, K.A. (1985). *Control in Business Organizations*. Boston: Pitman.
- Merriam, S. B. (2009). *Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation (3rd ed)*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2), 340-363.
- Michaud, V. (2014). Mediating the paradoxes of organizational governance through numbers. *Organization Studies*, 35(1), 75-101.
- Michener, H. A. and R. Suchner. (1972). "The Tactical Use of Social Power." Pp. 239-86, in *Social Influence Processes*, edited by J. T. Tedeschi. Hawthorne, N. Y.: Aldine.
- Molm, L. D. (1990). Structure, action, and outcomes: The dynamics of power in social exchange. *American Sociological Review*, 55(3), 427-447.
- Molm, L. D. (1997). Risk and power use: Constraints on the use of coercion in exchange. *American Sociological Review*, 62(1), 113-133.
- Morse, R. S. (2014). Developing public leaders in an age of collaborative governance. In Ricardo S. Morse & Terry F. Buss (Eds.), *Innovations in public leadership development* (pp. 91-112). UK: Routledge.

- Morse, R. S., & Stephens, J. B. (2012). Teaching collaborative governance: Phases, competencies, and case-based learning. *Journal of Public Affairs Education*, 18(3), 565-583.
- Moynihan, D. P. (2005). *Leveraging collaborative networks in infrequent emergency situations*. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government.
- Moynihan, D. P. (2009). The network governance of crisis response: Case studies of incident command systems. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(4), 895-915.
- Morse, J. J., & Wagner, F. R. (1978). Measuring the process of managerial effectiveness. *Academy of Management Journal*, 21(1), 23-35.
- Mustapha, N., & Zakaria, Z. C. (2013). Measuring job satisfaction from the perspective of interpersonal relationship and faculty workload among academic staff at public universities in Kelantan, Malaysia. In: *The 20th International Business Information Management Conference (IBIMA)*. International Business Information Management Association, 25-26 March 2013, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, pp. 589-594.
- Muro, M., & Jeffrey, P. (2008). A critical review of the theory and application of social learning in participatory natural resource management processes. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 51(3), 325-344.
- Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., & Griffin, D. W. (1996). The benefits of positive illusions: Idealization and the construction of satisfaction in close relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(1), 79-98.
- Nesbit, R., Moulton, S., Robinson, S., Smith, C., DeHart-Davis, L., Feeney, M. K., ... & Hou, Y. (2011). Wrestling with intellectual diversity in public administration: Avoiding

- disconnectedness and fragmentation while seeking rigor, depth, and relevance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 21(suppl_1), i13-i28.
- Nicholson, C. Y., Compeau, L. D., & Sethi, R. (2001). The role of interpersonal liking in building trust in long-term channel relationships. *Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science*, 29(1), 3-15.
- Nooteboom, B., Berger, H., & Noorderhaven, N. G. (1997). Effects of trust and governance on relational risk. *Academy of Management Journal*, 40(2), 308-338.
- O'Brien, K. J., & Han, R. (2009). Path to democracy? Assessing village elections in China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 18(60), 359-378.
- Oh, Y., & Bush, C. B. (2016). Exploring the role of dynamic social capital in collaborative governance. *Administration & Society*, 48(2), 216-236.
- O'leary, R., & Vij, N. (2012). Collaborative public management: Where have we been and where are we going?. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 42(5), 507-522.
- Oliver, C. (1990). Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration and future directions. *Academy of Management Review*, 15(2), 241-265.
- Oliver, C. (1997a). Sustainable competitive advantage: Combining institutional and resource-based views. *Strategic Management Journal*, 18(9), 697-713.
- Oliver, A. L. (1997b). On the nexus of organizations and professions: Networking through trust. *Sociological Inquiry*, 67(2), 227-245.
- Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 25(1), 129-141.
- Ospina, S. M., & Saz-Carranza, A. (2010). Paradox and collaboration in network management. *Administration & Society*, 42(4), 404-440.

- O'Toole, L. J. (1997). Treating networks seriously: Practical and research-based agendas in public administration. *Public Administration Review*, 57(1), 45-52.
- O'Toole, L. J., & Meier, K. J. (2004). Desperately seeking Selznick: Cooptation and the dark side of public management in networks. *Public Administration Review*, 64(6), 681-693.
- Page, S. (2004). Measuring accountability for results in interagency collaboratives. *Public Administration Review*, 64(5), 591-606.
- Painter, M. (2001). Multi-level governance and the emergence of collaborative federal institutions in Australia. *Policy & Politics*, 29(2), 137-150.
- Papachroni, A., Heracleous, L., & Paroutis, S. (2015). Organizational ambidexterity through the lens of paradox theory: Building a novel research agenda. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 51(1), 71-93.
- Parés, M., Bonet-Martí, J., & Martí-Costa, M. (2012). Does participation really matter in urban regeneration policies? exploring governance networks in catalonia (Spain). *Urban Affairs Review*, 48(2), 238-271.
- Partzsch, L. (2017). "Power with" and "power to" in environmental politics and the transition to sustainability. *Environmental Politics*, 26(2), 193-211.
- Pettigrew, A. (1990). Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and practice. *Organization Science*, 1, 267-292.
- Pfeffer, J. (1981). *Power in organizations*. Marshfield, MA: Pitman.
- Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (1999). Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction. *American Psychologist*, 54(9), 741.
- Pennington, R., Wilcox, H. D., & Grover, V. (2003). The role of system trust in business-to-consumer transactions. *Journal of Management Information Systems*, 20(3), 197-226.

- Petticrew, M., & Roberts, H. (2008). *Systematic reviews in the social sciences: A practical guide*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
- Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (1998). Governance without government? Rethinking public administration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 8(2), 223-243.
- Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., & Hardy, C. (2000). Inter-organizational collaboration and the dynamics of institutional fields. *Journal of Management Studies*, 37(1), 23-43.
- Phillips, N., Lawrence, T. B., & Hardy, C. (2004). Discourse and institutions. *Academy of Management Review*, 29(4), 635-652.
- Pollock, T. G., Lashley, K., Rindova, V. P., & Han, J.-H. (2019). Which of these things are not like the others? Comparing the rational, emotional and moral aspects of reputation, status, celebrity and stigma. *Academy of Management Annals*, 13(2), 444-478.
- Provan, K. G. (1984). Interorganizational cooperation and decision making autonomy in a consortium multihospital system. *Academy of Management Review*, 9(3), 494-504.
- Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(2), 229-252.
- Provan, K. G., & Lemaire, R. H. (2012). Core concepts and key ideas for understanding public sector organizational networks: Using research to inform scholarship and practice. *Public Administration Review*, 72(5), 638-648.
- Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (1995). A preliminary theory of interorganizational network effectiveness: A comparative study of four community mental health systems. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 40(1), 1-33.
- Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do networks really work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational networks. *Public Administration Review*, 61(4), 414-423.

- Provan, K. G., Beyer, J. M., & Kruytbosch, C. (1980). Environmental linkages and power in resource-dependence relations between organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 25(2), 200-225.
- Provan, K. G., Fish, A., & Sydow, J. (2007). Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks. *Journal of Management*, 33(3), 479-516.
- Purdy, J. M. (2012). A framework for assessing power in collaborative governance processes. *Public Administration Review*, 72(3), 409-417.
- Qi, H. (2019). Strengthening the rule of law in collaborative governance. *Journal of Chinese Governance*, 4(1), 52-70.
- Qian, H. (2020). Book Review: Incentives to Pander: How Politicians Use Corporate Welfare for Political Gain. *Economic Development Quarterly*, 34(1), 89-90.
- Raelin, J. A. (1980). A mandated basis of interorganizational relations: The legal-political network. *Human Relations*, 33(1), 57-68.
- Ran, B., & Qi, H. (2016). Issues and challenges of public service procurement in China: a collaborative governance perspective. *International Journal of Public Policy*, 12(3-6), 339-358.
- Ran, B., & Qi, H. (2018). Contingencies of power sharing in collaborative governance. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 48(8), 836-851.
- Ran, B., & Qi, H. (2019). The entangled twins: Power and trust in collaborative governance. *Administration & Society*, 51(4), 607-636.
- Reed, M. I. (2001). Organization, trust and control: a realist analysis. *Organization Studies*, 22(2), 201-228.

- Ring, P. S. (1997). Processes facilitating reliance on trust in inter-organizational networks. In M. Ebers (Ed.), *The formation of inter-organizational networks* (pp. 114-145). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1992). Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations. *Strategic Management Journal*, 13(7), 483-498.
- Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships. *Academy of Management Review*, 19(1), 90-118.
- Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. *Academy of Management Review*, 23(3), 393-404.
- Ritzer, G. (1990). Metatheorizing in sociology. *Sociological Forum*, 5(1), 3-15.
- Roberts, N. (2004). Public deliberation in an age of direct citizen participation. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 34(4), 315-353.
- Robertson, P. J., & Choi, T. (2012). Deliberation, consensus, and stakeholder satisfaction: A simulation of collaborative governance. *Public Management Review*, 14(1), 83-103.
- Rodríguez, C., Langley, A., Béland, F., & Denis, J. L. (2007). Governance, power, and mandated collaboration in an interorganizational network. *Administration & Society*, 39(2), 150-193.
- Rogers, E., & Weber, E. P. (2010). Thinking harder about outcomes for collaborative governance arrangements. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 40(5), 546-567.
- Rubin, J. Z., & Brown, B. R. (1975). *The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation*. New York: Academic Press.
- Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. (2011). *Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- Saich, T. (2010). *Governance and politics of China*. London: Macmillan International Higher Education.
- Saz-Carranza, A., Salvador Iborra, S., & Albareda, A. (2016). The power dynamics of mandated network administrative organizations. *Public Administration Review*, 76(3), 449-462.
- Schad, J., Lewis, M. W., Raisch, S., & Smith, W. K. (2016). Paradox research in management science: Looking back to move forward. *Academy of Management Annals*, 10(1), 5-64.
- Schermerhorn, J. R. (1975). Determinants of interorganizational cooperation. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 18(4), 846-856.
- Scott, C. (2011). A case study in collaborative governance: Health care law reform in Georgia. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 28(4), 441-463.
- Seidl, D., Sanderson, P., & Roberts, J. (2013). Applying the 'comply-or-explain' principle: discursive legitimacy tactics with regard to codes of corporate governance. *Journal of Management & Governance*, 17(3), 791-826.
- Seidl, D., Sanderson, P., & Roberts, J. (2013). Applying the 'comply-or-explain' principle: discursive legitimacy tactics with regard to codes of corporate governance. *Journal of Management & Governance*, 17(3), 791-826.
- Sedgwick, D. (2016). Managing collaborative paradox: Examining collaboration between head start and the Virginia preschool initiative. *Administration & Society*, 48(2), 190-215.
- Sharfman, M. P., Gray, B., & Yan, A. (1991). The context of interorganizational collaboration in the garment industry: An institutional perspective. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 27(2), 181-208.
- Shafritz, J. M., Ott, J. S., & Jang, Y. S. (2011). *Classics of organization theory* (7th ed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
- Simon, H. A. 1957. *Models of Man: Social and Rational*. New York: Wiley.

- Smith, K. K., & Berg, D. N. (1987). *Paradoxes of group life: Understanding conflict, paralysis, and movement in group dynamics*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass
- Smith, W. K., & Lewis, M. W. (2011). Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic equilibrium model of organizing. *Academy of Management Review*, 36(2), 381-403.
- Smith, W. K., & Tushman, M. L. (2005). Managing strategic contradictions: A top management model for managing innovation streams. *Organization Science*, 16(5), 522-536.
- Snaveley, K., & Tracy, M. B. (2002). Development of trust in rural nonprofit collaborations. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 31(1), 62-83.
- Solomon, B. C., & Vazire, S. (2016). Knowledge of identity and reputation: Do people have knowledge of others' perceptions? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 111(3), 341-366.
- Sousa, D. J., & Klyza, C. M. (2007). New directions in environmental policy making: An emerging collaborative regime or reinventing interest group liberalism? *Natural Resources Journal*, 47(2), 377-444.
- Steffek, J. (2009). Discursive legitimation in environmental governance. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 11(5), 313-318.
- Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as theory: five propositions. *International Social Science Journal*, 50(1), 17-28.
- Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, 20(3), 571-610.
- Sydow, J. (1998). Understanding the constitution of interorganizational trust. In C. Lane & R. Bachman (Eds.), *Trust within and between organizations: Conceptual issues and empirical applications* (pp. 31-63). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Tan, Q. (2010). Why village election has not much improved village governance. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 15(2), 153-167.
- Tedeschi, James T. and Thomas V. Bonoma. 1972. "Power and Influence: An Introduction." Pp. 1-49 in *Social Influence Processes*, edited by James T. Tedeschi. Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine.
- Tracey, P., & Phillips, N. (2016). Managing the consequences of organizational stigmatization: Identity work in a social enterprise. *Academy of Management Journal*, 59(3), 740-765.
- Thomas, C. W. (1997). Public Management as interagency cooperation: testing epistemic community theory at the domestic level. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 7(2), 221-246.
- Thomson, A. M. (2001). *Collaboration: Meaning and measurement* (Doctoral dissertation). Indiana University, Bloomington.
- Thomson, A. M., & Perry, J. L. (2006). Collaboration processes: Inside the black box. *Public Administration Review*, 66, 20-32.
- Thomson, A. M., Perry, J. L., & Miller, T. K. (2009). Conceptualizing and measuring collaboration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(1), 23-56.
- Torring, J. (2019). Collaborative innovation in the public sector: The argument. *Public Management Review*, 21(1), 1-11.
- Tranfield, D., Denyer, D., & Smart, P. (2003). Towards a methodology for developing evidence-informed management knowledge by means of systematic review. *British Journal of Management*, 14(3), 207-222.
- Van der Laan, L., & Schalke, R. (2001). Reality versus policy: the delineation and testing of local labour market and spatial policy areas. *European Planning Studies*, 9(2), 201-221.

- Vangen, S. (2017). Developing practice-oriented theory on collaboration: A paradox lens. *Public Administration Review*, 77(2), 263-272.
- Vangen, S., & Huxham, C. (2003). Nurturing collaborative relations: Building trust in interorganizational collaboration. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 39(1), 5-31.
- Vangen, S., & Huxham, C. (2012). The tangled web: Unraveling the principle of common goals in collaborations. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 22(4), 731-760.
- Vangen, S., & Huxham, C. (1998, July). *The role of trust in the achievement of collaborative advantage*. Paper presented at the 14th EGOS Colloquium, Maastricht, Netherlands.
- Van Oortmerssen, L. A., van Woerkum, C. M., & Aarts, N. (2014). The visibility of trust: exploring the connection between trust and interaction in a Dutch collaborative governance boardroom. *Public Management Review*, 16(5), 666-685.
- Waardenburg, M., Groenleer, M., de Jong, J., & Keijser, B. (2020). Paradoxes of collaborative governance: investigating the real-life dynamics of multi-agency collaborations using a quasi-experimental action-research approach. *Public Management Review*, 22(3), 386-407.
- Walsh, K., Hinings, B., Greenwood, R., & Ranson, S. (1981). Power and advantage in organizations. *Organization Studies*, 2(2), 131-152.
- Wahl, I., Kastlunger, B., & Kirchler, E. (2010). Trust in authorities and power to enforce tax compliance: An empirical analysis of the “Slippery Slope Framework”. *Law & Policy*, 32(4), 383-406.
- Warner, J. F. (2006). More sustainable participation? Multi-stakeholder platforms for integrated catchment management. *Water Resources Development*, 22(1), 15-35.

- Waugh, W. L., & Streib, G. (2006). Collaboration and leadership for effective emergency management. *Public Administration Review*, 66(s1), 131-140.
- Weber, E. P. (2009). Explaining institutional change in tough cases of collaboration: “ideas” in the Blackfoot watershed. *Public Administration Review*, 69(2), 314-327.
- Weber, E. P., & Khademian, A. M. (2008). Wicked problems, knowledge challenges, and collaborative capacity builders in network settings. *Public Administration Review*, 68(2), 334-349.
- Weick, K. (1995). *Sensemaking in Organisations*. London: Sage.
- Weiner, B. J., & Alexander, J. A. (1998). The challenges of governing public-private community health partnerships. *Health Care Management Review*, 23(2), 39-55.
- Willcocks, S. G. (1992). Managerial effectiveness and the public sector: A health service example. *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 5(5), 4-10.
- Williams, M. (2001). In whom we trust: Group membership as an affective context for trust development. *Academy of Management Review*, 26(3), 377-396.
- Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 36(1), 453-486.
- Wilsford, D. (1994). Path dependency, or why history makes it difficult but not impossible to reform health care systems in a big way. *Journal of Public Policy*, 14(3), 251-283.
- Winer, M., & Ray, K. (1994). *Collaboration handbook: Creating, sustaining, and enjoying the journey*. St. Paul, MN: Amherst H. Wilder Foundation.
- Wittgenstein, L. (2010). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wood, D. J., & Gray, B. (1991). Toward a comprehensive theory of collaboration. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 27(2), 139-162.

- Wrong, D. H. (1968). Some problems in defining social power. *American journal of sociology*, 73(6), 673-681.
- Wybo, J. L., & Lonka, H. (2002). Emergency management and the information society: how to improve the synergy?. *International Journal of Emergency Management*, 1(2), 183-190.
- Yeung, J. H. Y., Selen, W., Zhang, M., & Huo, B. (2009). The effects of trust and coercive power on supplier integration. *International Journal of Production Economics*, 120(1), 66-78.
- Yin, R. K. (2011). *Applications of case study research*. SAGE.
- Yuchtman, E., & Seashore, S. E. (1967). A system resource approach to organizational effectiveness. *American Sociological Review*, 32(6), 891-903.
- Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. *Organization Science*, 9(2), 141-159.
- Zand, D. E. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17(2), 229-239.
- Zérah, M. H. (2009). Participatory governance in urban management and the shifting geometry of power in Mumbai. *Development and Change*, 40(5), 853-877.
- Zhang, Y., Li, X., & Song, W. (2014). Determinants of cropland abandonment at the parcel, household, and village levels in mountain areas of China: A multi-level analysis. *Land Use Policy*, 41, 186-192.
- Zimmerman, M. A., & Zeitz, G. J. (2002). Beyond survival: Achieving new venture growth by building legitimacy. *Academy of Management Review*, 27(3), 414-431.

Appendix A

Approval Letters from Graduate School

- Approval Letter for *Contingencies of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance* (Chapter 3)

From: Muthler, Linda Kemmerer <lkm6@psu.edu>
 Sent: Monday, September 21, 2020 2:01 PM
 To: Ran, Bing <bur12@psu.edu>
 Subject: RE: some questions on doctoral dissertation

Bing,
 This has been approved.

Thank you for your email.

Best,
 Linda

Linda K. Muthler
 Coordinator
 Office of Theses and Dissertations
 115 Kern Building
 University Park, PA 16802
 Phone: 814-865-5448
 Fax: 814-863-4627

From: Ran, Bing <bur12@psu.edu>
 Sent: Monday, September 21, 2020 1:17 PM
 To: Muthler, Linda Kemmerer <lkm6@psu.edu>
 Subject: RE: some questions on doctoral dissertation

Hello Linda,

We would like to apply for the exception to the “first author rule” again for the following published journal article to be included in a dissertation:

Student Name, ID and email: Huiting Qi (ID: 971265627; HUQ104@PSU.EDU)

Article Information: Ran, B., & Qi, H. (2018). *Contingencies of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance*. *American Review of Public Administration*. Vol. 48(8) 836 – 851. DOI: 10.1177/0275074017745355 (attached).

Reasons for the exception to the “first author rule”: As the program head and the student’s dissertation advisor and committee chair, I confirm that the student made substantial and integral contributions to the work above, which includes the following contributions: developing the research questions with the first author; searching, reviewing and synthesizing literature under the supervision of the first author; discussing and developing the structure and outline of the paper with the first author; developing the conceptual framework with the first author; drafting the initial version of the manuscript; revising the article with the

first author before submitting; revising and resubmit the article with the first author after getting the feedback from reviewers. This article provides an important theoretical foundation for the student's dissertation which underpins the empirical research part of the dissertation and contributes to the theoretical significance of the dissertation.

Based on this, I would like to request Graduate Thesis Office to grant an exception to the "first author rule". Thank you for your consideration!

Best regards,
Bing

- Approval Letter for *The entangled twins: Power and trust in collaborative governance* (Chapter 4)

From: "Muthler, Linda Kemmerer" <lkm6@psu.edu>
Date: 7/28/20 16:42 (GMT-05:00)
To: "Ran, Bing" <bur12@psu.edu>
Subject: RE: some questions on doctoral dissertation

Bing Ran,

Your request has been approved. Be sure the student clearly and fully indicates her contributions to the multi-authored work in a preface to the thesis or dissertation.

Thank you.
Linda

Linda K. Muthler
Coordinator
Office of Theses and Dissertations
115 Kern Building
University Park, PA 16802
Phone: 814-865-5448
Fax: 814-863-4627

From: Ran, Bing <bur12@psu.edu>
Sent: Friday, July 24, 2020 11:54 PM
To: Muthler, Linda Kemmerer <lkm6@psu.edu>
Subject: RE: some questions on doctoral dissertation

Hello Linda,

Based on your guidance, here we apply for the exception to the "first author rule" to include the following published journal article to be included in a dissertation:

Student Name, ID and email: Huiting Qi (ID: 971265627; HUQ104@PSU.EDU)

Article Information: Ran, B., & Qi, H. (2019). The entangled twins: Power and trust in collaborative governance. *Administration & Society*, 51(4), 607-636. (attached).

Reasons for the exception to the "first author rule": As the program head and the student's dissertation advisor and committee chair, I confirm that the student made substantial and integral contributions to the work above, which includes the following contributions: developing the research questions with the first author; searching, reviewing and synthesizing literature under the supervision of the first author; discussing

and developing the structure and outline of the paper with the first author; developing the conceptual framework with the first author; drafting the initial version of the manuscript; revising the article with the first author before submitting; revising and resubmit the article with the first author after getting the feedback from reviewers. This article provides an important theoretical foundation for the student's dissertation which underpins the empirical research part of the dissertation and contributes to the theoretical significance of the dissertation.

Based on this, I would like to request Graduate Thesis Office to grant an exception to the "first author rule". Thank you for your consideration!

Best regards,
Bing

Bing Ran, PhD
Associate Professor of Public Administration
Professor-in-Charge, Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration
Professor-in-Charge, Master of Public Administration
Professor-in-Charge, Juris Doctor and Master of Public Administration
Professor-in-Charge, Certificate in Public Sector Human Resource Management
School of Public Affairs
Penn State Harrisburg
777 W. Harrisburg Pike
Middletown, PA 17057
Phone: 717 948 6057
Fax: 717 948 6320
Email: bur12@psu.edu

Appendix B

Copyright Permission

Mary Ann Price (she/her/hers) commented:

Dear Huiting Qi,

Thank you for your email. You may include the Final Published PDF (or Original Submission or Accepted Manuscript) in your dissertation or thesis, which may be posted in an Institutional Repository or database as specified in our [journal author reuse policy](#). In addition, you may post the dissertation or thesis to ProQuest if it is a requirement of your university.

Please accept this email as permission for your request. Permission is granted for the life of the edition on a non-exclusive basis, in the English language, throughout the world in all formats provided full citation is made to the original SAGE publication with a link to the appropriate DOI where possible. Permission does not include any third-party material found within the work.

Please contact us for any further use of the material and good luck on your dissertation!

Kind regards,

Mary Ann Price
(she/her/hers)
Rights Coordinator
SAGE Publishing
2600 Virginia Ave NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20037
USA
www.sagepublishing.com

Appendix C

IRB Exemption Determination



PennState

Office for Research Protections

Vice President for Research
The Pennsylvania State University
205 The 330 Building
University Park, PA 16802

814-865-1775

Fax: 814-865-8699

orp@psu.edu

research.psu.edu/orp

EXEMPTION DETERMINATION

Date: April 1, 2021

From: Samantha Adams,

To: Huiting Qi

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Type of Submission: | Initial Study |
| Title of Study: | Approaches to Balancing Power in Collaborative Governance: Evidence from A Collaboration-based Governance Mechanism for Rural China |
| Principal Investigator: | Huiting Qi |
| Study ID: | STUDY00016926 |
| Submission ID: | STUDY00016926 |
| Funding: | Not Applicable |
| Documents Approved: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HRP-591 - Protocol for Human Subject Research.pdf (0.03), Category: IRB Protocol • Semi-structured interview questions.docx (0.01), Category: Data Collection Instrument |

The Office for Research Protections determined that the proposed activity, as described in the above-referenced submission, does not require formal IRB review because the research met the criteria for exempt research according to the policies of this institution and the provisions of applicable federal regulations.

Continuing Progress Reports are **not** required for exempt research. Record of this research determined to be exempt will be maintained for five years from the date of this notification. If your research will continue beyond five years, please contact the Office for Research Protections closer to the determination end date.

Changes to exempt research only need to be submitted to the Office for Research Protections in limited circumstances described in the below-referenced Investigator Manual. If changes are being considered and there are questions about whether IRB review is needed, please contact the Office for Research Protections.

Penn State researchers are required to follow the requirements listed in the Investigator Manual ([HRP-103](#)), which can be found by navigating to the IRB Library within CATS IRB (<http://irb.psu.edu>).

This correspondence should be maintained with your records.

We would like to know how the IRB Program can better serve you. Please fill out our survey; it should take about a minute: <https://www.research.psu.edu/irb/feedback>.

Appendix D

Consent Form

Dear Participant:

You are being invited to participate in this research study because you are a participant or stakeholder in your village governance system, and I am interested in understanding your experience. This research study will investigate approaches to balancing power in collaborative governance, taking the collaboration-based governance mechanism in your villages as an example. You can decide not to participate. The following information is provided in order to help you make an informed decision on whether or not you would like to participate in this study. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to ask.

Project: Approaches to Balancing Power in Collaborative governance: A Collaborative-based Village Governance Mechanism in China

Procedures: The interview will last about 45-60 minutes. The interview will be audio-recorded or handwritten recorded, depending on your preference. During this interview, you will be asked a series of questions that allow you to share your experience and perspectives. The recordings and transcript of interview will be kept confidential. Your name or village names will not be used in the final report. Pseudonyms will be used.

If you have any questions at any time, please ask the researcher. You do not have to answer any questions that you do not want to answer. The data collected for this research will be used solely for research purposes; they will not be used for any business purpose.

Risks and/or Discomforts: There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research.

Benefits: The information gained from this study may help us better understand the power mechanism in collaborative governance for Chinese village communities.

Opportunity to Ask Questions: If you have questions or concerns, you can contact Huiting Qi at +86 15810980359 or +1 7172654540. You can also send an email to huq104@psu.edu. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject or concerns regarding your privacy, you may contact the Office for Research Protections at Penn State at 814-865-1775.

Freedom to Withdraw: Your participation is voluntary, and you may decide to stop at any time.

You are voluntarily making a decision on whether or not to participate in this research study. Your signature certifies that you have decided to participate having read and understood the information presented. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep.

Signature of Participant: _____

Date: _____

Appendix E

Semi-structured Interview Protocol

Introduction

1. Introduce yourself
2. Discuss the purpose of the study
3. Provide consent form and obtain signatures
4. Provide structure of the interview (audio recording and taking notes)
5. Ask if they have any question

Semi-Structured Interview Protocol - Villager Committee

Questions about the initiation of Xiangxian council

1. Are you aware of how the Xiangxian council was initiated?
 - If yes, can you describe the process?
2. Why was the Xiangxian council formed initially? What are the missions and goals?
3. How the idea of initiating the Xiangxian council was proposed at the beginning?

Questions about Xiangxian

1. How many members does the Xiangxian council in your village have per year?
2. Elaborate on the demographic information about Xiangxian
 - Are they primarily from urban areas?
 - How many are working? How many are retired?
 - Of those working, what are their occupations?
 - Other background information about Xiangxian
3. How these Xiangxian were contacted and identified? Can you give some examples?

4. What is the process like if someone wants to sign up to be a Xiangxian? Or if an existing Xiangxian wants to recruit a new one?

Questions about the functions and influences of the Xiangxian Council

1. What are the functions of the Xiangxian council? Can you give some examples?

2. In your opinion, to which extent can Xiangxian council influence the decision made by the village committee?

3. Can you give an example that Xiangxian council significantly influenced the decision making process?

4. Were there any disagreements between Xiangxian council and the village committee?

- If yes, did they achieve agreement finally?
- If yes, how was the agreement achieved? Can you give some examples?
- If not, why? Can you give some examples?

5. Do you think the village committee is different from what it used to be because of the Xiangxian council?

- If yes, what are the differences? Can you give some examples?
- If no, why?

Question about trust relationship

1. Why do you trust Xiangxian?

2. How does the Xiangxian council affect the villagers' trust on village committee, and why? Can you give some examples?

Questions about main challenges and future direction

1. What are the challenges you see that the Xiangxian council faces?

2. How to address these challenges and promote the Xiangxian council?

3. Where is the Xiangxian council going in the future?

Concluding Questions and Statements

1. Is there anything else you would like to add or share about your experience that you feel is important for me to know besides of what we talked about?

2. Concluding Statement

- Thank them for their participation
- Ask if they would like to see a copy of the results
- Record any observations, feelings, thoughts and/or reactions about the interview

Semi-Structured Interview Protocol – Xiangxian

Questions about Xiangxian's personal experience

1. Why do you want to become a Xiangxian?

2. How do you become a Xiangxian? Who contact and invite you to become a Xiangxian?

3. How long have you been a Xiangxian?

4. Could you please talk about your work in Xiangxian council, such as the meetings you participated in, the consultations provided, and the relevant issues in your work?

Questions about Xiangxian's self-assessment

1. Can you talk about your contribution as a Xiangxian to the development of village?

2. As a Xiangxian, what have you dedicated to your work and what have you gained from your work?

3. How would you describe and evaluate your role as a Xiangxian in the governance of rural community?

Questions about Xiangxian's role and influence

1. In your opinion, what role does Xiangxian play in village community governance? Can you give some examples?

2. Can you describe the relationship between Xiangxian council and village committee?

4. In your opinion, how can Xiangxian affect the village committee's influence on village affairs?

3. In your opinion, to which extent can Xiangxian council influence the decision made by village committee?

4. Were there any disagreements between Xiangxian and village committee?

- If yes, did they achieve agreement finally?
- If yes, how was the agreement achieved? Can you give some examples?
- If not, why? Can you give some examples?

Questions about trust relationship

1. In your opinion, is Xiangxian trusted by the village committee?

2. Is Xiangxian trusted by villagers?

3. Do you think villagers trust Xiangxian more or village committee? Can you give some examples?

4. How can Xiangxian council affect the villagers' trust on the village committee, and why? Can you give some examples?

Questions about main challenges and future direction

1. What are the challenges you see that the Xiangxian council faces?

2. How to address these challenges and promote the Xiangxian council?

3. Where is the Xiangxian council going in the future?

Concluding Questions and Statements

1. Is there anything else you would like to add or share about your experience that you feel is important for me to know besides of what we talked about?

2. Concluding Statement

- Thank them for their participation
- Ask if they would like to see a copy of the results
- Record any observations, feelings, thoughts and/or reactions about the interview

Semi-Structured Interview Protocol - Villager

Questions about villagers' understanding about Xiangxian

1. Do you know Xiangxian council in your village? If yes, when do you know about it?

Do you know the number of Xiangxian in your village?

2. Do you know whether Xiangxian have been involved in some village affairs?

- If yes, can you give some examples?

3. In your opinion, why these people are willing to become Xiangxian in the village?

Questions about villagers' connection with Xiangxian

1. Have you every recommended someone to be a Xiangxian?

- If yes, can you give some examples?

2. Have you or your family members ever connected with Xiangxian?

- If yes, can you give some examples?

3. Have you ever audited some meetings of Xiangxian council?

- If yes, can you share some experience with us? Can you give some examples?

Questions about trust relationship

1. Do you trust Xiangxian? Why?

2. Do you trust the Xiangxian's suggestions on village affairs? Can you give some examples?

3. Will you trust the decisions on village affairs more if Xiangxian participated in the process of decision making process?

4. Who do you trust more: village committee or Xiangxian? Why?

Questions about Xiangxian's function and influence

1. What is your perception about the relationship between village committee and Xiangxian?

2. In your opinion, what is the function of Xiangxian?

3. Do you think it is useful to convey your thoughts on some important village affairs to Xiangxian?

4. Do you think Xiangxian did have some influences on your life in village?

Questions about main challenges and future direction

1. What are the challenges you see that the Xiangxian council faces?

2. How to address these challenges and promote the Xiangxian council?

3. Where is the Xiangxian council going in the future?

Concluding Questions and Statements

1. Is there anything else you would like to add or share about your experience that you feel is important for me to know besides of what we talked about?

2. Concluding Statement

- Thank them for their participation
- Ask if they would like to see a copy of the results
- Record any observations, feelings, thoughts and/or reactions about the interview

VITA

Huiting Qi

EDUCATION

- May 2022 Ph.D., Public Administration Pennsylvania State University, USA
Dissertation: “*Three Essays on Power in Collaborative Governance: Contingencies of Power Sharing, Relationships between Power and Trust, and Approaches to Enhancing Power Sharing*”
- July 2010 M.A., Political Science Beijing Normal University, China
- July 2007 B.A., Political Science and Public Administration Wuhan University, China

PEER REVIEW ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

- Wang, H., **Qi, H.**, & Ran, B. (2022). Public–Private Collaboration Led by Private Organizations in Combating Crises: Evidence from China’s Fighting Against COVID-19. *Administration & Society*, 54(1), 3-28.
- Ran, B., & **Qi, H.** (2019). The Entangled Twins: Power and Trust in Collaborative Governance. *Administration & Society*, 51(4), 607-636.
- Qi, H.** (2019). Strengthening the Rule of Law in Collaborative Governance. *Journal of Chinese Governance*, 4(1), 52-70.
- Ran, B., & **Qi, H.** (2018). Contingencies of Power Sharing in Collaborative Governance. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 48(8), 836-851.
- Ran, B., & **Qi, H.** (2016). Issues and Challenges of Public Service Procurement in China: A Collaborative Governance Perspective. *International Journal of Public Policy*, 12(3-6), 339-358.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

2021-present Board of Trustees Member: Northeast Conference on Public Administration

SCHOLARSHIP AND AWARDS

| | | |
|------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 2022 | Founders’ Fellow | ASPA |
| 2020 | Outstanding Student Award | Keystone State Chapter of ASPA |
| 2020 | Best Student Paper Award | Keystone State Chapter of ASPA |