POLITICAL TRANSITIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
STRATEGIES FOR DEFENSE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL IN NEW
STATES, NEW DEMOCRACIES, AND NEW AUTOCRACIES

A Thesis in
Political Science
by
Jonah Victor

© 2006 Jonah Victor

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

December 2006
The thesis of Jonah Victor was reviewed and approved* by the following:

Errol A. Henderson  
Associate Professor of Political Science  
Thesis Advisor  
Chair of Committee

Gretchen G. Casper  
Associate Professor of Political Science

Douglas W. Lemke  
Associate Professor of Political Science

Mark S. Anner  
Assistant Professor of Labor Studies and Industrial Relations

Marie E. Hojnacki  
Associate Professor of Political Science  
Director of Graduate Studies

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School
ABSTRACT

Governments of new regimes in old states and governments of new states share the common challenge of establishing their political legitimacy and governing in a political environment of heightened uncertainty over whether the leadership and regime will survive or be overthrown by a political competitor, foreign or domestic. Together, I call this class of states that have recently experienced a major political transition – regime change or new statehood – “newly transitioned states” (NTSs). In this dissertation, I argue that the challenges of governing an NTS are likely to cause NTS leaders to adopt a decision making calculus on issues of national security that is different from that of other leaders, which makes NTSs both convergent as a group and distinctive from most other states that have served as the “model” for generalizations in international relations theory. In quantitative analyses of states worldwide from 1950 to 1998, I compare national security policies adopted by NTSs to those adopted by other states with respect to militarization, international conflict, alliances, and arms transfers. In addition, among NTSs, I compare national security policies among sub-types of NTSs, such as new democratic and new autocratic regimes and new and old states. Drawing on a synthesis of selectorate theory, bargaining theory and democratization theory, I generate several testable propositions of how NTS leaders will adopt national security policies that can allow them to pursue an effective strategy of political survival to maintain power within their new regime, consolidate the power of their regime, and defend their state from foreign rivals. The findings reveal that NTSs exhibit different policy
tendencies from other states across these dimensions of national security policy, which supports my contention that NTSs should be viewed as distinct political entities in international relations theory. In addition, the analysis of sub-types of NTSs reveals important points of convergence as well. Furthermore, certain national security policies are found to have different consequences for the political survival of NTS leaders than for leaders of more established governments.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... iii
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... viii
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... ix
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................. x

Chapter 1: Introduction................................................................................................. 1
   I. Domestic Political Change and International Security ........................................... 1
   II. The Challenge for Governments of Newly Transitioned States (NTSs) .......... 2
   III. The Effect of Regime Change and New Statehood on National Security Policy ......................................................................................................................... 5
       A. The State of the Literature ................................................................................. 5
       B. Toward a Strategic Logic of National Security Policy in NTSs .................. 8

Chapter 2: Strategies for Defense and Political Survival in New States, New
Democracies, and New Autocracies .......................................................................... 13
   I. Strategies for Political Survival in NTSs .............................................................. 19
       A. Political Survival in a New State ................................................................. 19
          1. Governance in New States ........................................................................ 21
          2. Horizontal Legitimacy in New States ..................................................... 22
       B. Political Survival in a New Democracy ....................................................... 26
       C. Political Survival in a New Autocracy ......................................................... 29
       D. A Typology of Newly Transitioned States ................................................... 31
   II. Political Survival and Policymaking in Newly Transitioned States .................. 32
       A. The Contribution of Selectorate Theory ....................................................... 33
       B. Selectorate Theory and New Regimes ......................................................... 37
       C. Selectorate Theory and New States ............................................................. 38
   II. National Security in NTSs ................................................................................. 42
       A. Militarization .................................................................................................. 44
       B. International Conflict and the Use of Military Force ................................. 47
       C. International Security Cooperation ............................................................ 53
          1. Formalization of Agreements .................................................................... 55
          2. Cooperation and the Number of Partners ............................................... 56
       D. Strategies for National Security ................................................................... 62
   IV. After the Cold War ............................................................................................... 62
   IV. Defining NTSs ..................................................................................................... 66
       A. New Democracies .......................................................................................... 67
       B. New Autocracies ........................................................................................... 70
       C. New States .................................................................................................... 74
   V. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 76

Chapter 3: Militarization and the Use of Military Force by NTSs ...................... 79
   I. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 79
   II. Militarization and Political Survival .................................................................. 81
       A. Militarization and Domestic Policy Trade-offs ............................................. 83
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 4: NTSs and International Security Cooperation</th>
<th>128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Two Instruments of International Security Cooperation: Alliances and Arms Transfers</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Arms Transfers</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Strategies for International Security Cooperation</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Choosing the Number of Security Partners</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Challenges of Cooperation</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Formalizing Security Relationships</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Analysis</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Multilateralism in Alliance Joining</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Research Design</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Findings</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Discussion</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Engaging in Alliances and Arms Transfers</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Research Design</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Findings</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Discussion</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The Formalization of Arms Transfer Relationships</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Research Design</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Findings</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Discussion</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Conclusion</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5: National Security Policy and the Prospects for Political Survival</th>
<th>187</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Demands of Political Survival</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Conditions for Regime Survival</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Strategies for Defense and Political Survival</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Militarization</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Engaging in Militarized International Conflict</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Types of NTSs and non-NTSs (circa 1998) .................................. 32
2.2 Regime Types (Dahl 1973) .................................................. 36
5.1 Political Survival of Leaders (Kaplan-Meier Estimates) ............. 193
5.2 Political Regime Survival (Kaplan-Meier Estimates) .................. 196
5.3 Hazard of Leaders Leaving Office ....................................... 207
5.4 Hazard of Regime Collapse ................................................ 212
# LIST OF TABLES

2.1 Cold War State-Years of each Case Type 1950-1988 ........................................ 78
2.2 Post-Cold War State-Years of each Case Type 1989-1998 ................................. 78
3.1 Average Military Spending as Percent of GDP ................................................. 92
3.2 Average Number of Troops as Percent of Population ....................................... 92
3.3 OLS Estimates of Military Spending/GDP ......................................................... 95
3.4 Substantive Effect of State Type on Military Spending/GDP ............................... 98
3.5 OLS Estimates of Military Size/Population ....................................................... 101
3.6 Substantive Effect of State Type on Military Size/Population ............................ 102
3.7 Number of Dyads in which Conflict was Initiated .......................................... 114
3.8 Logit Estimates of MID Initiation ................................................................. 115
3.9 Substantive Effect of State Type on MID Initiation ......................................... 118
3.10 Logit Estimates of MID Initiation, MID Involvement, and War Involv... 121
3.11 Substantive Effect of State Type on Conflict ................................................. 121
4.1 Number of Alliances Joined by New Regimes .................................................. 158
4.2 Logit Estimates of Multilateral Alliance Joining .............................................. 159
4.3 Substantive of State Type on Multilateral Alliance Joining ............................... 161
4.4 Poisson Estimates of Alliances Joined Per Year .............................................. 167
4.5 Substantive Effect of State Type on Alliances Joined Per Year ......................... 169
4.6 Poisson Estimates of Arms Suppliers Per Year ................................................ 172
4.7 Substantive Effect of State Type on Arms Suppliers Per Year ............................ 173
4.8 Number of Arms Suppliers Per Year to New Regimes ..................................... 178
4.9 Logit Estimates of Intra-Alliance Arms Transfers ............................................ 179
4.10 Substantive Effect of State Type on Intra-Alliance Arms Transfers ............... 180
5.1 Fit of Leadership Survival Models ............................................................... 208
5.2 Log-Normal Regression of Leadership Survival ............................................. 209
5.3 Fit of Regime Survival Models ....................................................................... 213
5.2 Exponential Regression of New Regime Survival ............................................ 215
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to my numerous mentors and fellow students – only a few of whom are mentioned here – who not only directly aided me in my doctoral studies, but enriched my graduate education. I am grateful to Errol Henderson for his skillful instruction over the past several years and for instilling in me strong scholarship values. Our three hour long meetings would often consist of a grueling dissection of each of my paragraphs, sentences, and word choices, but they often included quite a few laughs and I always walked away a better political scientist. Thanks to Gretchen Casper, Doug Lenke, and Mark Anner for their encouragement and assistance in this project. Exchanges with Navin Bapat, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Ashley Leeds early on were helpful in organizing my thoughts and ideas. I appreciate the assistance of Asa Blomstrom at SIPRI with arms transfer data.

While not directly involved in this project, I also would like to recognize Quan Li for his significant contribution to my graduate education. Thanks to graduate directors Scott Bennett and Marie Hojnacki for their patience, understanding, and support. The mentorship volunteered by Alex Braithwaite and Faten Ghosn and was invaluable. Things might have turned out a lot different if it was not for Faten’s wisdom, advice, and encouragement. Thanks to Elena Kircheva, Adrienne Lauzon, Andreea Mihalache, Robert Harkavy, and Regina Smyth for several years of unwavering moral support. I also thank my mentors at the Department of Defense including Theresa Whelan and Barry Pavel for their encouragement and for shedding some light on the paths to reaching my goals. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents for pushing me to achieve in all areas of life and setting such a lofty example.
Chapter 1
Introduction

I. Domestic Political Change and International Security

The struggle of new democratic regimes to establish legitimacy, authority, and security within their countries is one of the most pressing and salient concerns to those who value peace and stability in the international system. The young government of Iraq is being defended and supported by the United States while besieged by violent sectarian strife that is in part supported by Iran. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supported government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan is struggling to assert its governance over a vast and rugged country while threatened by the resurgence of the former Taliban regime. In West Africa, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is attempting to establish the first truly democratic government in Liberia, but faces the daunting challenge of governing a country broken by wars and bereft of modern infrastructure. In East Africa, the international community remains stymied in its attempts to re-establish a central locus of authority in Somalia – a country long wrecked and brutalized by anarchy and warlordism. In each of these countries the establishment of a stable government might reduce regions that are deeply impoverished, beyond the control of a central government, and constitute “ungoverned spaces.” It is widely held by policy makers that elimination of such ungoverned spaces can limit places where international terrorists can recruit, train, and seek refuge unfettered and
where insurgency and civil wars could emerge.\(^1\) While the international security threat of terrorism is clear, civil wars can also become internationalized and lead to international conflict. Unfortunately, countries with new regimes have only infrequently been studied as a separate class of actors in studies of international security, and thus the availability of scholarship to guide international efforts to aid these countries or to anticipate the consequences of regime change is limited.

**II. The Challenge for Governments of Newly Transitioned States (NTSs)**

For a new democratic regime to establish effective governance over a country, the democratic process must be established as the sole venue of legitimate political competition in the country. Security is not only a potential benefit of a stable new regime, but may also be a precondition to building a strong democracy. A new democratic regime must provide security to a country to demonstrate its ability to govern effectively and benefit its citizens. Broadly defined, personal security not only entails one’s safety from attack by criminals, insurgents, or foreign forces, but reliable access to essential goods such as food, shelter, and clean water. A new democratic regime must demonstrate that it can effectively provide public goods and services in order to convince residents of the country that they are better off under the new regime than any alternative form of government. When residents recognize the legitimacy of a new regime, they are more likely to cooperate with it and support it. A new autocratic regime can also garner legitimacy by convincing residents that it can provide security, stability,

\(^1\) For the United States Department of Defense perspective on the definition, causes, and security threat of “ungoverned spaces” see Whelan (2005).
and other goods and services better than any alternative form of government. However, it can also secure its rule by fielding a strong coercive apparatus and demonstrating that it will not permit any other political actors to compete with its authority over the country.

Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Lebanon are examples of states that are establishing new regimes and have long been (at least officially) recognized as independent and sovereign in the international system. However, the challenges that their governments face actually have much in common with the challenges of governments of newly independent states such as those that emerged in the 1990s from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The resulting proliferation of new states during that tumultuous decade also threatened international peace and stability with violent civil conflicts breaking out in newly emergent states such as Bosnia, Georgia, Russia, and Tajikistan, as well as international conflicts such as the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan after independence. Like old states experiencing regime change, most new states must also establish a new regime to govern the country or at least adapt an existing regime to govern territory and populations over which it did not previously have authority, such as in the reunited countries of Germany or Yemen. The governments of new states must establish the legitimacy of the newly established boundaries that demarcate a territory and population that is both independent from other countries and wholly governed under a single regime.

Governments of new regimes in old states and governments of new states not only share the common challenge of establishing their legitimacy, but of
governing in a political environment of heightened uncertainty over whether the leadership and regime will survive or be overthrown by a political competitor, foreign or domestic. This type of state that has recently experienced a major political transition – regime change or new statehood – is what I call a “newly transitioned state” (NTS). In this dissertation, I argue that the challenges of governing an NTS are likely to cause NTS leaders to adopt a different decision making calculus on issues of national security from that of leaders of non-NTSs. At once this makes NTSs divergent from non-NTSs, but it also suggests that they are convergent as a group and distinctive from most other states that have served as the “model” for generalizations in international relations theory. Studies of international relations have more often focused on the politics of strong states with established political systems and long diplomatic histories than weak states with new political systems and little if any diplomatic history. In this study, I find that NTSs do seem to diverge from other states in their national security policies across the dimensions of militarization, international conflict, and international security cooperation. In addition, I find points of convergence in policy tendencies among states of the same regime type – democratic or autocratic – and among new states and old states. Furthermore, I find that a state’s national security policy affects the likelihood that a new regime will consolidate power and survive which suggests that certain policies have different consequences for the political survival of NTS leaders than for leaders of more established governments.
III. The Effect of Regime Change and New Statehood on National Security Policy

A. The State of the Literature

It is not novel to propose that political change in a country will affect a state’s national security policy. Different explanations have been proposed for how regime change or new statehood might affect either international conflict involvement, militarization, or international cooperation. What is different about my argument, however, is that I propose a more unified common explanation of how this is so both across different types of major political change and across different aspects of a state’s national security policy.

Maoz (1989, 1996) offers a good empirical foundation for understanding the relationship between domestic political transitions and international relations, and has perhaps conducted the most comprehensive systematic study on the subject. In his 1996 book he shows that domestic political change can impact international relations and vice-versa. He finds that new states emerging through revolutionary processes and states experiencing revolutionary political change (a change between democracy and autocracy) are especially prone to international conflict. He argues that instances of revolutionary state formation and political change can generate uncertainty in a region, and that this uncertainty can lead to a regional rise in conflict and militarization. Maoz also studies the effect of a state’s international relations on its potential for experiencing a domestic political transition between democracy and autocracy. He finds that the favorable resolution of international crises and conflicts promotes the survival of existing
regimes. Maoz finds that in disputes short of war, the survival of autocracy is more dependent on a victorious outcome than the survival of democracy. While Maoz’s main focus in his study is conflict behavior, he also examines cooperative behavior in the form of a state’s alliance engagement. Among democracies, he argues that whether a state joins an alliance is dependent on that state’s individual military capability and the extent to which it can address its security needs alone – if a state can avoid joining an alliance and sacrificing policy autonomy, it will. He does not find a significant difference between the alliance commitments of old democracies and those that are new. Among autocracies, Maoz finds that new autocracies seem to have fewer alliance commitments than old autocracies. He is uncertain whether this is because new autocracies are less attractive as alliance partners or less inclined to join alliances. Maoz finds some evidence that more alliance commitments seem to promote the survival of democracy, but not necessarily promote the survival of autocracy.

While there has been little systematic research on the effect of political transitions on international cooperation, there is a significant research program that studies the effect of political regime type change on international conflict – a change from democracy to autocracy or autocracy to democracy. Mansfield and Snyder have been the leading proponents of the thesis that the process of democratization can increase a state’s propensity to engage in violent international conflict. They argue and find evidence that if a state experiences an “incomplete” democratic transition, conflict with other states is likely as leaders may use the nationalist appeal of an aggressive foreign policy to gain legitimacy
in the midst of intense competition among interest groups and weak institutions (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, p. 9). While this is a compelling argument, Ward and Gleditsch (1998), Gleditsch and Ward (2000), Thompson and Tucker (1997), Enterline (1996, 1998) all find evidence to the contrary of Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis. The critics of Mansfield and Snyder present studies that may be methodologically improved, but do not offer much theoretical innovation on the subject. Furthermore, it is unclear how many empirical lessons we can draw from this literature and apply to today’s world. Most of these studies (including Mansfield and Snyder 2005) do not analyze many cases in the Post-Cold War world which may evidence different patterns. In the Post-Cold War era the global power structure has changed and the extent of democratization worldwide has greatly increased. Both of these trends may transform the way in which domestic political change interacts with international politics.

While not extensively examined, the relationship between political change and a state’s level of militarization has also been of interest to scholars. Militarization – the extent to which a state invests its economic and human capital into its armed forces – can determine the level of resources available to a leader for civilian policy pursuits and can affect the balance of political power in a society between the military and the civilian population. When considering the level to set military spending and military expansion, a leader may weigh the security need for a stronger military against these potential political consequences. In a sample of sub-Saharan African states 1981-1990, Wang (1998) finds evidence that militarization increases the likelihood of a coup d’etat
— and thus regime change — while in a broader sample from 1960-1997 Henderson (1998) does not. Bowman (1996) finds that increased militarization has led to diminished levels of democracy in Latin American states. Conversely, Hunter (1995, 1997) observes that new democratic regimes in South America tend to decrease levels of militarization that were established by previous autocratic regimes. Mullins (1987) finds that among post-colonial states in Africa, many new states did not need to build a strong military as their newly independent neighbors lacked a strong military and did not pose an offensive military threat.

When states lack the resources to militarize at levels adequate for ensuring their national security they often seek to form alliances and alignments with other states to cooperate in the pursuit of greater mutual security. Less attention, however, has been paid to the effect of political change on a state’s cooperative security relationships. Siverson and Starr (1994) and Leeds (2003) find that regime change can result in significant changes to a state’s alliance portfolio. A few scholars have looked below the level of regime change to the effect of leadership change on international cooperation more broadly. McGillivray and Smith (2004) and Lutmar (2004) find that leadership change in autocracies seems to disrupt bilateral cooperation more than leadership changes in democracies.

**B. Toward a Strategic Logic of National Security Policy in NTSs**

While these works offer important insights into the connection between major domestic political change and a state’s national security policy, these different insights are not well connected and do not present a significant cumulation of knowledge on the subject. The effects of regime change and new
statehood are mostly examined independently and are discretely connected to outcomes such as militarization, conflict involvement, and alliance building. Even Maoz, whose work appears empirically comprehensive, is more focused on examining the effect of structural change in the international system on international stability than identifying a common strategic logic through which NTS leaders approach national security policy. I argue that not only is the effect of regime change similar to the effect of new statehood, but decisions made by NTSs on militarization, international conflict resolution, and international security cooperation are interrelated and are largely driven by the same strategic logic. In building my argument, I make three major assumptions. First, I assume that state leaders are the primary policy decision makers in each state and that it is their individual strategic calculus that is most important in determining policy outcomes. Second, I assume that a primary goal of each leader is political survival – that is, retaining political power – and that the policy decisions they make affect the likelihood of their political survival. Third, I assume that the resources available to leaders for executing policies are scarce to some extent, and that the more resources devoted toward one goal leaves less to be applied toward other goals. Fourth, I assume that different security policies are to some extent substitutable. Foreign policy substitutability is the idea that there are “alternative modes of response” available to a leader to deal with a given situation (Starr 2000:128). Each leader potentially has a variety of policy options through which they can defend their state and secure their political survival.
While NTS leaders are likely to face the common challenges of having questionable political legitimacy and governing in an environment of heightened uncertainty, I argue that the way in which these challenges will influence their national security decisions will depend on whether they govern a democracy or autocracy, and an old or new state. Leaders of new democracies – because they usually need the approval of a greater proportion of their citizens in order to retain office and garner political legitimacy for their new regime – must enact policies offering benefits that can be more widely enjoyed than leaders of autocracies. Leaders of new states not only must establish the political legitimacy of what is typically a new regime, but the legitimacy of the new state, its borders, and citizenship as well. Regime type and the newness of a state will in part determine the best strategy for an NTS leader to balance the needs of national defense with the needs of political survival. Across each dimension of national security policy I propose expectations about how this may be so primarily based on the insights of selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003), informed by scholarship on political legitimacy, democratization, and international bargaining. I test these propositions by conducting quantitative analyses across states worldwide between the years 1950 and 1998 of military spending, the size of armed forces, international conflict involvement and initiation, alliance engagement, and arms transfers. I also examine how decisions on each of these national security policy dimensions affects the likelihood of a leader’s political survival and the survival of their regime.
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 examines the theoretical rationale for my argument and the main propositions that I derive from them. First, I examine how the conditions for political survival may converge and differ between new democracies and new autocracies, and old and new states and how these conditions influence the political strategy of NTS leaders. Second, I examine how the political strategy of NTS leaders may influence their policy choices toward militarization, international conflict, and international security cooperation as well as how decisions on these policies could affect their political survival. Third, I propose an operationalization of new democracies, new autocracies, and new states which I use to empirically examine the behavior of NTSs in subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 proposes and tests expectations of the decisions NTS leaders are likely to make on issues of militarization and the use of military force. Chapter 4 proposes and tests expectations of the decisions NTS leaders are likely to make on issues of international security cooperation, and in particular, alliance engagement and arms transfers. I examine the challenges NTS leaders may face in finding cooperative partners, whether they are more likely to prefer multilateral or bilateral cooperation, and whether they are likely to formalize their security relationships in formal alliances. Chapter 5 examines Gourevitch’s (1978) “second image reversed”: the affect of international relations on domestic politics. I analyze how levels of militarization, involvement in international conflict, and engagement in alliances and arms trade affect the length of time leaders can expect to remain in office and the potential for new regimes to survive. Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings of this study and
how they can inform a better understanding of some of the most pressing threats to peace and stability today.
Chapter 2

Strategies for Defense and Political Survival in New States, New Democracies, and New Autocracies

Most national leaders face political rivals at home. Many leaders face rivals abroad. To stay in office, each leader must attempt to defend their state and at the same time maintain political power within their state. To negotiate these two levels of politics is a challenge, but especially daunting for the leader in power after their country experiences a major political transition. A major political transition – such as national independence, which creates a new state, or a regime change in an existing state – introduces a new political order into a society with a revised set of rules that determine who governs a state, how those individuals who govern are selected, and which people are governed by their decisions. The leader of a newly transitioned state (NTS) navigates a transformed political environment and confronts an uncertain new set of rivals at home and abroad who potentially threaten his or her political survival. This environment of heightened uncertainty over the survival of the new political order and their retention of power influences the choices a leader makes on issues of national security and these choices in turn have consequences for their political survival. The nature of those consequences will vary depending on whether the leader’s
state is new or not and whether the transitioning regime is a democracy or an autocracy.²

Most countries have experienced one or more major political transitions since the Second World War. Huntington (1991) observes two major “waves” of democratization that occurred in the post-war world – most apparent in Europe and Latin America – and also a major “reverse” in the 1960’s and 1970’s when many democratic regimes collapsed (c.f. Doreenspleet 2000). Even after the dramatic fall of communism and the emergence of new democracies in Eastern Europe after 1989, democracy continued to spread in Africa, Asia, and Latin America during the 1990s. Equally dramatic, during the past 50 years, has been the emergence of many newly independent states. During the Cold War, after European powers withdrew from their colonial empires in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Oceania, numerous new states emerged in the international system. Of these new states, many began as fragile democracies that were soon usurped by emergent autocrats. After the Cold War, another wave of new states emerged as the Soviet Union split into fifteen states, Yugoslavia dissolved into six states, East and West Germany and North and South Yemen united, and Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia divided into the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, respectively and Namibia won independence from South Africa. The governments of these emergent states were almost evenly split between stable democracies, stable autocracies, and mixed regimes. While a

² I use “autocracy” as a term of convenience for what others might prefer to call “dictatorship” or “authoritarian regime” – thus its meaning here is broader than simply “rule by a single person.”
literature exists on the security policy of democratizing states and a literature exists on the security policy of new states, little is understood about the implications of democratization or autocratization in a new state as compared to an existing state.

Leaders in any state – new or existing, democracy or autocracy – who are attempting to consolidate a new regime face the challenge of establishing the regime’s “vertical” legitimacy and the recognition of their right to rule the state (Holsti 1996, Englebert 2000). The leader must establish the legitimacy of their regime as an effective and legitimate source of authority in the midst of an uncertain new set of rivals - foreign and domestic - while retaining the support of a winning coalition of supporters whose loyalty is untested. The leader of a new state often faces a duel challenge. Not only might their regime lack vertical legitimacy, but the “horizontal” legitimacy of the new state may be questioned where uncertainty exists over the definition of state boundaries and the criteria for citizenship (ibid.). The new state leader must govern a country with redrawn borders and a redefined citizenry. This new state may have once been part of a larger state or empire, or it may emerge from the union of two or more independent states. In either event, the leader is challenged to establish him or herself as the new locus of authority in the country and legitimize their rule across a population of residents only newly recognized as being jointly subject to his or her rule. Residents of the country may reject the authority of the new state and foreigners may challenge its sovereignty.
In the environment of uncertainty that exists in the NTS, NTS leaders, like most leaders, can be assumed to prioritize securing their own political survival when making policy decisions. But they are uncertain not only as to whether they can maintain support within the regime, but whether the regime itself will survive challenges by residents and foreign leaders. This uncertainty exists not only within the NTS, but also abroad. Foreign leaders may be reluctant to cooperate with an NTS leader or may attack the NTS while it is weak. The uncertainty of both the leader of the NTS and foreign leaders influences how the leader balances the needs of national defense with their desire for political survival. This combination of questionable legitimacy and heightened uncertainty that often exists in NTSs would seem to make the security calculus of these states both convergent as a group and distinctive from that of most established states that have served as the “model” for generalizations in international relations theory.

In the short-term, leaders of new states and new regimes are concerned with establishing the authority of their regime and building political support at the domestic level. But these leaders can rarely avoid important security concerns at the international level. They must decide whether or not to develop a strong military force, whether to resolve diplomatic disputes with belligerence or conciliation, and whether to seek security cooperation with foreign leaders. Leaders can decide to take all of these actions or none of them. Different security policies offer different combinations of opportunities and constraints. Some security policies may help protect their state from foreign aggression or build
domestic support and national unity, while others may endanger the security of the state and regime or hinder a leader’s domestic policymaking abilities.\(^3\)

National leaders are granted power by a winning coalition of supporters within a political regime upon whom their political survival depends. This winning coalition could comprise voters in a democracy, party members in a communist system, or military officers in a junta. A winning coalition will form and survive if a critical mass of individuals approves the policies the leader promises or enacts. Members of the winning coalition are most immediately concerned with matters of domestic policy including social, economic, and patronage issues, but upon the emergence of a threat to their well-being, national security can become a salient concern. While all leaders must maintain the support of a winning coalition, the leader of an NTS not only faces the challenge of maintaining support within their regime, but the challenge of maintaining support for the regime itself. Choices the leader makes on domestic policy and security policy will influence whether the regime continues to support their leadership and whether support and security continues for the regime.

In this chapter I elaborate on this model of how an environment of heightened uncertainty influences the decisions leaders make on security policy in new democracies and new autocracies in new and old states. First, I discuss how uncertainty and strategies leaders adopt for political survival differ in new states,

\(^3\) While there are often domestic elements to national security, I use the term “domestic policy” to refer to patronage and regulatory, distributive, or redistributive policy that affects social and economic development.
new democracies, and new autocracies from more established states. Second, I apply selectorate theory to explain how the decision making calculus of leaders might differ in new regimes and states from established regimes and states and between democracies and autocracies. Third, I examine the decisions leaders must make on the security issues of militarization, the use of military force to resolve international conflict, and international security cooperation and the potential consequences of these decisions for political survival. Fourth, I explore how the dynamics of international security, democratization, and state building have changed after the Cold War, and why the findings of previous empirical work may not be applicable to the contemporary era. Fifth, I explain how cases of new statehood and regime change can be identified and compared. Sixth, I will summarize the main conclusions and outline a plan for analyzing the security policies of NTS which I conduct throughout the remaining chapters of this study.

There are several key areas where this study moves beyond previous work. First, while selectorate theory has been mostly used to understand differences in political strategy across established political systems, I apply it specifically to understanding the political strategy of NTS leaders. Second, while the security policies of new states, new democracies, and (less so) new autocracies have been explored to some degree, I proposed a more unified explanation of how political transitions influence security policy both across these different types of NTSs and across different dimensions of security policy. Third, while past studies have focused on NTS policy toward militarization and international conflict, I re-examine these and, in addition, examine NTS policy toward international security
cooperation. Fourth, while scholars have empirically examined the effect of a change from autocracy to democracy or democracy to autocracy on security policy, less attention has been paid to the effect of transitions between different autocratic regimes. Fifth, most of our current empirical knowledge on these issues dates from the Cold War and Pre-Cold War era and systematic studies of international relations have rarely examined cases of regime change and new statehood in the Post-Cold War era which I endeavor to do here.

I. Strategies for Political Survival in Newly Transitioned States

In this section, I discuss strategies for political survival leaders are likely to adopt across different types of NTSs. After new statehood and regime change, leaders of NTSs confront an uncertain new combination of rivals at home and abroad. However, the nature of the uncertainty and the consequences of policy choices can differ depending on whether the state is new or old and whether the regime type is democratic or autocratic.

A. Political Survival in a New State

Cohen et al (1981: 902) define “national state making” as “the creation of political order at a new spatial and institutional level. It involves the redistribution of political control of power resources away from sub-national collectivities and polities toward the central state apparatus.” Ayoob (1995: 22) defines traditional state making as a three-part process: “war” – the expansion and consolidation of a territorial and demographic domain under a political authority, “policing” – the maintenance of order in the territory, and “taxation” – the extraction of resources from the territory and population to support the first two
activities, and support the administrative apparatus of the state, the penetration of the state in society, and symbolic activities.

New states have emerged in waves since World War II. From the 19th century through the World Wars, new states emerged from the unification of many smaller states such as Italy, Germany, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Other states emerged from the fall of empires such as the Spanish Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary. After World War II and through the end of the Cold War, most new states emerged from the collapse of colonial empires in Africa, southern Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. After the Cold War, most new states emerged from sub-national units of larger states as witnessed by the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the divisions of Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia.

Much of the classic literature on the politics of new states was written during the Cold War and focused on the concerns of post-colonial developing countries. While this literature may have limited relevance for Post-Cold War new states, many of the challenges of political survival in new states have remained the same. For political survival a leader must establish him or herself as the center of authority in their country and legitimize their rule over a newly defined citizenry. To do this, the leader must surmount three main challenges. First, the leader must establish governance over the new state. Second, the leader must establish the horizontal legitimacy of the state and define who is a citizen.
Third, the leader will likely need to establish the vertical legitimacy of their regime – a topic which will be discussed in later sections.\(^4\)

1. Governance in New States

The leader of a new state will find establishing governance over their country challenging to some degree. Without effective governance, the leader’s ability to execute policies needed for political support will be hindered. The degree of difficulty in establishing effective governance will depend on the extent to which an administrative structure existed before independence. The degree to which an effective administrative structure exists in new states is related to the degree to which local administration had been decentralized from the central government of the former colonial power or formerly unified state (Cooley 2005). Ayoob (1995: 6) observes that new states often lack “adequate stateness” – where the government has coercive capacity, infrastructural power, and unconditional legitimacy. Gurr (1988) argues that the extent to which leaders of new states can recruit, extract, and organize human and material resources and then use them

\(^4\) In most instances, establishing a new state requires establishing a new regime. Possible exceptions include the establishment of an independent Taiwan after the Chinese Revolution in which Chang Kai-shek relocated his government to an island which was already under his governance, or the continuance of West German-style democracy in re-unified Germany. Still, in the later case the democratic regime was new to at least part of the country. There are other, less obvious exceptions such as in former republics of the Soviet Union where parts of the Soviet apparatus often served as transitional governments for a brief period after independence, and when Norway, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands emerged from the rule of Nazi Germany in 1945 with essentially the same democratic institutions that governed these countries before the war.
effectively in pursuit of state interests depends on their ability to complete three tasks. First, leaders of new states must reduce and manage internal divisions among communal and class cleavages. Second, leaders must establish their political legitimacy. Third, leaders must establish “decisional efficacy” – the capacity to reach prompt and relevant decisions under routine and crisis conditions (p. 46). Sometimes, new states that emerge through violent revolution and war will have greater levels of “stateness” than those that emerge peacefully. Maoz (1996) argues that a violent struggle for independence can develop nascent military institutions in a pre-independence country and confer greater legitimacy on revolutionary leaders who often go on to govern the new state.

2. Horizontal Legitimacy in New States

As important as it is for a new state leader to establish their ability to govern and execute policies, it is equally important for the leader to establish the state’s horizontal legitimacy and define the citizenship of the state. New state leaders must identify the territory and population over which they have political authority and must promote recognition of the legitimacy of that authority, both among residents and foreigners. Englebert (2000: 7) defines “horizontal legitimacy” as “the level of agreement on what constitutes the polity – the politically defined community that underlies the state.” A new state has as much horizontal legitimacy as there is agreement on who belongs to the state: where the borders are drawn, and which tribes, towns and provinces belong to which state. Post-colonial African states that exist within borders delineated by European powers are often characterized as lacking horizontal legitimacy. In many African
states, borders arbitrarily “dismember” ethnic groups across states or “suffocate” multiple ethnic groups into single states (Englebert et al 2000). In African states of low horizontal legitimacy, civil conflicts along ethnic lines have been known to spill over into neighboring states. But deficits of horizontal legitimacy are not just an African affliction. The horizontal legitimacy of new states in Europe and the former Soviet Union have been questioned as well. For example, the independence of Moldova was questioned when there was debate as to whether it should unite with ethnically similar Romania. The independence of Belarus is questioned whenever Belarus and Russia make moves toward unification as they have over the past decade. Some areas of Russia have questioned why they are not independent. Groups have called for secession in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Tatarstan. When Armenia and Azerbaijan questioned the legitimacy of their common border, a war broke out over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. All of these events are symptoms of new states lacking horizontal legitimacy.

Defining the citizenship of a new state is closely related to establishing its horizontal legitimacy. Citizenship rules determine over whom a leader has authority. Even in the absence of changes in a state’s borders, a change in citizenship rules can change who belongs to a particular state. Herbst (2000: 231) draws attention to the role that citizenship rules can play as “boundary mechanisms” in new states – “they determine who is and who is not a citizen and therefore attempt to give meaning at the level of the individual and the community to [territorial] boundary lines.” For weak states, he says that citizenship is “one of the few badges of status and privilege that sovereignty
allows them to allocate” (p. 234). Herbst highlights a key dilemma that leaders of new states face when defining citizenship. If leaders set a high barrier to citizenship they may be able to promote a greater national identity. But if they set a low barrier to citizenship, they can make the new state more inclusive and avoid the problem of having residents who are “legally but not geographically” excluded from the state (p. 236).

The competing desires for state unity and inclusiveness have caused political struggles over citizenship rules in the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia after independence. And, because of low horizontal legitimacy, these domestic disputes actually became international disputes. After declaring independence, all three Baltic states initially adopted restrictive citizenship rules as a means to assert their sovereignty and independence from the Soviet Union (and in particular, Russia). All three states had experienced large-scale immigration (forced or voluntary) of ethnic Russians during the Soviet era which created significant ethnic cleavages. At the time of independence, all three new states granted citizenship to those residents who held citizenship in 1940 and to the descendents of those residents. This left large numbers of ethnic Russians residing in the Baltics effectively stateless and reserved power mainly for ethnic Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians. However, as democratization progressed in all three states, the rules for citizenship were liberalized. Lithuania, where ethnic Russians comprised only 9 percent of the population, was the first to establish a procedure to naturalize non-Lithuanians. In Estonia and (especially) Latvia, where ethnic Russians comprised 29 percent and 33 percent of the population
respectively, the liberalization of citizenship rules was more gradual. Both of these states, for instance, required applicants for citizenship and government jobs to be fluent in the national language which proved quite discriminatory. At the same time, the governments of Estonia and Latvia were apparently concerned about having large numbers of stateless or disenfranchised people living in their countries. Braun (2000) argues that these two states hoped that through their discriminatory laws they could either assimilate the ethnic Russians or encourage them to leave the country. He observes that “in Latvia, in particular, there appears to be a dual-track approach to the Russian minority: assimilate a relatively small number while holding out hope that most, or at least many, will leave, thus shifting the demographic balance radically in favor of ethnic Latvians” (p. 120). Estonia and Latvia eventually liberalized citizenship, at least partly in response to protests and partly as a prerequisite to membership in international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) (Braun 2000, Pettai 2001). It is clear that even in the absence of border disputes among these states and Russia, there was significant uncertainty about who belonged to each Baltic state in the early years of independence and the governments had difficulty establishing the legitimacy of their citizenship laws. However, this uncertainty over citizenship was not limited to just the three Baltic states but extended to Russia as well. The government of Russia, and much of the Russian public, felt a certain amount of responsibility for ethnic Russians abroad, and pressured the Baltic states to grant them full rights.
In their quest for political survival, leaders of new states must overcome the constraints of uncertainty over whether they can effectively consolidate their authority over their country, and where and over whom their authority exists. A leader’s rivals at home and abroad also must confront the uncertainty of a new state. Rivals at home may view the uncertainty as an opportunity to challenge the leader’s authority. Rivals abroad may view the uncertainty as an opportunity to challenge the leader’s sovereignty. Under these circumstances, the best strategy for political survival will depend on whether the leader holds power in a democratic or autocratic regime.

B. Political Survival in a New Democracy

Establishing a new democratic regime is difficult and the outcome of a democratic transition is often highly uncertain. Power and Gasiorowski (1997) find that one-third of new democracies in developing countries fail within 5 years of transition. Leaders of new democracies not only face electoral opponents who challenge their political survival but rivals at home and abroad who may challenge the legitimacy and authority of the entire democratic regime.

To some extent, the heightened uncertainty that exists after transition might help consolidate the new regime when it relates to uncertainty over electoral outcomes. Przeworski (1991) argues that for democratic consolidation to occur, the outcomes of elections must be uncertain. When a political system offers periodic elections with uncertain outcomes, competing groups in society can set long time horizons to accomplish their goals. A party may lose an election but can be encouraged that the next election may offer a chance of victory. When
the loser can count on an uncertain political future under a democratic system, they are more likely to continue to participate and compete within the democratic system rather than attempt to subvert the system. When an opposition party sees little or no chance of winning an election or attaining political power in the future, they have little incentive to support and participate in the system, and may revolt against it.

Maintaining free and fair elections with uncertain outcomes is important and can garner support for the regime. However, the uncertainty and instability of regime consolidation and the possibility of a revolt, insurgency, or coup d’état can make a leader’s job challenging and threaten the survival of a democratic system. The full consolidation of a liberal democracy may occur in gradual stages – from establishing a basic “electoral democracy” (eg. Indonesia or Venezuela) to establishing a system that guarantees basic civil liberties and human rights (eg. South Korea or Uruguay). But at the minimum, a consolidated democracy is one that is sufficiently institutionalized as to be secure against breakdown or regression toward autocracy (Schedler 1998). Power and Gasiorowski find that after about 12 years of consolidating, the likelihood that a new democratic regime will fail decreases substantially.

To discourage revolts, insurgency, or coups, a leader must establish what Holsti (1996) and Englebert (2000) call the “vertical legitimacy” of the democratic regime in the early years after transition. A regime is vertically legitimate to the extent that there is agreement on the relationship between a state’s political institutions and society. While horizontal legitimacy concerns
agreement on who belongs to the political community of the state, vertical legitimacy is similar to what Gurr (1988: 46) calls “political legitimacy”: “people’s acceptance of [the] rulers’ right to make binding decisions. Legitimacy determines the extent of voluntary compliance with state policies aimed at mobilizing and using resources.” At the World Economic Forum in January 2006, Ahmed Chalabi, the new Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, identified the top three priorities of his government that he considered critical to establishing and sustaining a democratic regime in Iraq (Chalabi 2006). These are (in order): ensuring internal and external security, deciding how to extract and allocate oil money, and providing public services. These priorities are not unique to the newly elected government of Iraq. All new democratic governments must prove their legitimacy through their ability to defend their citizens, ensure law and order, and protect individual rights and liberties. The leader and government must also prove their efficacy as a source of public goods and services, beyond security, including health care, education, financial institutions, and transportation and communications infrastructure in order to garner support and legitimacy. In order to provide these goods, the government must find ways to develop the economy, extract resources and allocate them effectively, and balance civilian and military needs. The leader’s ability to establish the legitimacy of the regime and consolidate democracy may depend greatly on the availability of economic resources (Przeworski et al 2000), the prevalence of a political culture conducive to democracy (Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam 1993, Inglehart and Welzel
2005), and the existence of effectively designed institutions (Huntington 1968, Linz and Valenzuela 1994, Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).

**C. Political Survival in a New Autocracy**

Autocrats must adopt a somewhat different strategy for political survival. Autocracies can take the form of personalist regimes, single-party rule, military government, theocracy, monarchy, or a hybrid of these. To some extent, the leaders of new autocratic regimes share the concerns of leaders of new democracies in ensuring security, extracting and allocating resources, and providing goods and services to residents. However, for autocrats a top (possibly the top) priority for political survival is coercing the residents of their country to obey the government and repressing any opposition to their rule. They must effectively demonstrate the hegemony of their regime over political authority and activity in the state. Significant resources may be diverted to funding paramilitaries, secret police, domestic intelligence services, and propaganda production toward these ends. Dahl (1973) asserts that for political survival autocrats must not only suppress all rival parties, but factions within the dominant party as well. In his words, “all opposition is potentially dangerous, no distinction can be made between acceptable and unacceptable opposition, between loyal and disloyal opposition…Yet if all oppositions are treated as dangerous and subject to repression, opposition that would be loyal if it were tolerated becomes disloyal because it is not tolerated” (p. 13).

To stay in power, autocrats typically need to secure the support of a minority of the population who they can buy off through the allocation of private
goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). An autocrat’s essential supporters (or “winning coalition” as Bueno de Mesquita et al call them) likely include such elites as members of the dominant party, business owners, military officers, and ethnic and religious leaders. Private goods they can distribute might include jobs, government contracts, natural resource concessions, and other special privileges and patronage. If autocrats can buy off their winning coalition and deter residents outside their winning coalition from rebelling, providing other public goods and services is much less important. Traditionally, economic development was thought to lead to mass demands for liberalization and democratization which could threaten the political survival of autocrats. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005) observe that in recent years autocrats have become more astute at adopting strategies of economic development that help sustain autocracy rather than threaten it. Some scholars have proposed that increasing the level of their state’s development and individual wealth is not as important for autocrats as maintaining economic growth and averting economic crisis (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Geddes 1999b, Przeworski et al 2000).

In summary, for political survival, leaders of both new democracies and new autocracies need to establish internal and external security and (perhaps) both need to promote economic development as well. However, leaders of democracies must devote more resources to providing public goods and services, and autocrats must devote more resources to buying off domestic supporters and repressing opposition to ensure their political survival. Until an autocrat has effectively established the hegemony of their regime over political authority and
activity in their state, there is likely to be a heightened degree of uncertainty over their regime’s survival.

D. A Typology of Newly Transitioned States

The period after a major political transition is a time of heightened political uncertainty in states. In new states, the sovereignty and composition of the state is in question, and in states experiencing democratization or autocratization the consolidation of the new regime is in question. In new states, there is uncertainty over the horizontal legitimacy of the state the leader rules and under a new regime there is uncertainty over the vertical legitimacy of the regime that selected the leader. In most new states, the leader must confront uncertainty along both of these dimensions at once. In relatively rare cases a new state may emerge that is governed by – what is arguably – an existing regime. Sometimes the governing apparatus of a prior regime is retained as an interim government in a new state until elections can be held such as occurred in some former Soviet republics. In the instance of reunited Germany in 1990, the West German institutions were retained and adopted by East Germans. Still, while the democratic regime of Germany was not new, it was at least new to some residents of the reunited country. In the case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, Chiang Kai-Shek lost control of all of China except Taiwan. While Taiwan clearly became a new independent state, its governing regime remained essentially the same. So while in most new states, a new regime must be established to govern the new political community, there are possible exceptions. To distinguish the
effects of new statehood, democratization, and autocratization I categorize newly transitioned states as follows:

**Figure 2.1**

**Types of NTSs and non-NTSs (circa 1998)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th></th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New State</strong></td>
<td>Czech Rep., Croatia, Armenia</td>
<td>Germany (1990)</td>
<td>Eritrea, Belarus, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Taiwan (1946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Existing State</strong></td>
<td>Mongolia, Poland, S. Africa</td>
<td>France, Botswana, India</td>
<td>Pakistan, DR Congo, Haiti</td>
<td>China, Saudi Arabia, Cuba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**II. Political Survival and Policymaking in Newly Transitioned States**

An NTS leader’s decision making calculus is influenced by the heightened uncertainty in the political environment. In particular, the uncertainty may influence how the leader balances the needs of national security with their desire for political survival. Selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003) offers the expectation that leaders’ policy decisions will differ depending on the rules of the political regime that selected them to power as the rules of the regime will establish the requirements for political survival. Selectorate theory makes the key insight that in the interest of political survival, leaders of democracies will favor policies that provide more public goods while leaders of autocracies will favor policies that provide more private goods. In this section I apply selectorate theory to explaining policy outcomes in newly transitioned states and argue that uncertainty over vertical and horizontal legitimacy may slightly alter the decision.
making model proposed by selectorate theory. I contend that the emphasis on providing public goods expected from democratic leaders will likely be more pronounced in new democracies and even more pronounced when a new democracy is established in a new state. Here, I present the basic logic of selectorate theory, explain how uncertainty over vertical and horizontal legitimacy might fit into this logic, and propose policy outcomes that we might expect in NTSs.

A. The Contribution of Selectorate Theory

Selectorate theory predicts that a leader’s policy decisions will depend on the rules through which the leader holds political power (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Selectorate theory assumes that all leaders seek political survival regardless of the level of political development or degree of regime consolidation in a state. That is, all leaders wish to maintain office or at least keep their party in power if they are term limited. Selectorate theory focuses on two generalizable characteristics of every political system: the “selectorate” and the “winning coalition.” The selectorate (S) is the set of people with a say in choosing leaders and with a prospect of gaining access to special privileges distributed by leaders. Bueno de Mesquita et al say S can often be roughly equated to the notion of “citizenship” (p. 43). Membership in S might be defined by personal origin (birthplace and lineage), special proficiency (skills, beliefs, or knowledge), wealth, gender and/or age (pp. 41-49). The winning coalition (W) is the subgroup of the selectorate whose support leaders require to remain in office and who
receive special privileges in return. In a presidential democracy with universal suffrage, S is about equal to the number of residents in the country (N), and W, the winning coalition, is the number of people sufficient to elect a president. In such a system, W is a majority of S. In a communist state where only Communist Party members have a say in government, S represents all Communist Party members – a number significantly less than N, and W – the number of members needed to support a party leader – is some subset of S, but not necessarily a majority of S. In a military government, the officer corps might constitute S, and W might be a faction of top officers needed to support a leader. In other instances W might be a super-majority or all of S. The size of W and S do not directly correspond with specific regime types such as “democracy” or “autocracy.” However, there is some general congruence between the relative sizes of S and W and conventional regime typologies. Full-fledged democracies are usually states with a large S (equal to the adult residents of the country) and a large W (where W might approach a majority of S). Autocracies usually have a very small S and W. Plebiscitary dictatorships or states where national elections are held but competition is severely constrained or are rigged generally have a large S, but with a W that is a minority of S.

---

5 Following the practice of Bueno de Mesquita et al, I use “S,” “W”, and “N” to refer both to the different groups of individuals and the (absolute) number of individuals in the group.

6 The precise institutions of the democracy (presidential or parliamentary government; plurality or proportional representation voting, etc) determine whether it is actually a national majority of voters needed to elect the leader. A president usually needs the support of a majority of voters, whereas a prime minister in a parliamentary system usually does not.
Selectorate theory assumes that members of W continually evaluate and revise their decision to remain supportive of the leader in response to key decisions made by the leader. Selectorate theory also assumes that the leader has sole control of policy; that is, decisions can be made without the approval of additional veto players. The most important of these is the decision on how to allocate state resources between public and private goods. Public goods that a state can provide include health care, education, a sound financial system, defense, law and order, transportation infrastructure, and communications infrastructure. Private goods that a state can provide might include money, jobs, favorable regulatory policy, natural resource concessions, or other special privileges.\(^7\)

Bueno de Mesquita et al find that states with a large W provide more public goods than those with a small W. One might extend this to proposing that democracies provide more public goods than autocracies. Bueno de Mesquita et al caution that “a large selectorate and a large coalition do not in themselves define democracy” (p. 72). However, to compare the politics of different regime types I am going to set reasonable definitions of different regimes in terms of selectorate theory. I will define full-fledged democracy by what Dahl (1973) calls

\(^7\) It is important to note that Bueno de Mesquita et al are not referring strictly to “pure” public or private goods. Some public goods can have private benefits and vice versa (e.g. military spending can both publicly increase national security and privately profit defense contractors). They are mainly concerned with whether the “mix” of goods created by policy is weighted toward private or public benefits (p. 31).
a “polyarchy.” A polyarchy is a regime with high “public contestation” and high “inclusiveness” or “participation.”

**Figure 2.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Types (Dahl 1973)</th>
<th>Less Inclusiveness</th>
<th>More Inclusiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Contestation</strong></td>
<td>“Competitive Oligarchy” (mixed regime)</td>
<td>“Polyarchy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Contestation</strong></td>
<td>“Hegemony”</td>
<td>(mixed regime)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Dahl does not give this regime type a name, but it seems similar to Bueno de Mesquita et al’s “rigged electoral system” (p. 93).

It seems reasonable that Dahl’s “inclusiveness” can be equated with S and “contestation” with W/S. Thus a democracy would comprise a large S and a large W. Let us assume for the moment that in a full-fledged majoritarian democracy, W – the support a leader needs to be elected or re-elected – is a majority of S; such that $W/S > 0.5$.

The proposition that democracies provide more public goods than autocracies reflects the fact that the leader often has an incentive to reward the loyalty of W through the allocation of private goods to its members. However, as the size of W grows, the amount of private goods that can be given to each member of W diminishes. To compensate, the leader must allocate more public goods in order to win sufficient supporters. With limited resources, the leader cannot grant each member of a large W satisfactory private goods, and so will invest more state resources in public goods from which multiple people can benefit.
While the size of W has important implications for policy outcomes, the relationship of W to S does as well. The fraction W/S signifies the degree to which W is loyal to the leader and is called the “loyalty norm.” Membership in W is subject to change over time even if the leader and the size of W remains the same. The smaller W is relative to S, the lower the chance that a given member of W will be included in a later W as there are a larger number of individuals in S who the leader can count on to form his or her winning coalition. The leader thus can afford to be less concerned about keeping the loyalty of any individual member of S. The larger W is relative to S, the more the leader needs to be concerned about keeping the loyalty of any individual member of S. Thus, the smaller W/S, the less effort and resources the leader requires to retain the loyalty of W. Leaders that require the support of a majority of S to hold office need to distribute more goods to W than if a minority was required. Leaders of states where W comprises a large proportion of society will need more of the goods to have public benefits.

**B. Selectorate Theory and New Regimes**

Bueno de Mesquita et al do not speak directly on how selectorate theory applies to the politics of new democracies and new autocracies. While they say that “transitional democracies” have smaller W/S than other democracies, they seem to be referring to semi-democracies or mixed regimes where political rights are constrained and elections are not free and fair rather than new full-fledged democracies (p. 247). Leaders of new democracies face a political environment of heightened uncertainty – they are not only uncertain about their political
survival within the democratic regime, but the survival of the regime itself. To increase chances of regime survival, the leader must establish the regime’s vertical legitimacy. A democratic leader can increase regime legitimacy by responding to public demands and demonstrating the regime’s efficacy as a provider of public goods and services. As Easton (1965) and Linz (1978) suggest, the public will often judge the efficacy of a new regime by their evaluation of the individual early leaders of the regime. If people approve of the leader, they are more likely to approve of the new regime. For a democratic system to survive it needs to become, as Przeworski (1991: 26) says, the “only game in town” for pursuing political interests. If a new regime lacks legitimacy, the leader’s rivals may garner support for an alternative regime and pursue change through revolution or coup d’etat. In pursuit of vertical legitimacy, leaders of new democracies may seek to appeal to a broader constituency beyond the members of W and place a greater emphasis on the provision of public goods than leaders of established democracies. Since a leader can benefit more people through the provision of public goods than private goods, they will win more support through the provision of public goods. Thus, new democracies are likely to provide more public goods than established democracies.

C. Selectorate Theory and New States

The leader of a new state must not only establish the vertical legitimacy of his or her regime, but horizontal legitimacy of their governance as well. Confronted with this duel challenge, leaders of democratic new states can be expected to attempt to provide even more public goods than leaders of new
regimes in old states. Statemaking involves the creation of political order at a
new spatial and institutional level, which creates uncertainty over both where the
leader’s authority extends and over whom the leader has authority. In selectorate
terms, there is some degree of uncertainty about the size and composition of S
(the selectorate) and N (the residents of the state). The political strategy of a
leader of a new state can best be understood by considering the type of political
regime in place and how N and S might change relative to W.

Recall that I defined a democracy as a state with a large W and S and
where \( W/S > 0.5 \). Let us set N to the adult residents of a country. In a well-
institutionalized democracy with universal adult suffrage, S should equal N.
Leaders of new democracies should want the largest S possible, because
revolutions or rebellions against a democratic regime are much more likely to
emerge from the disenfranchised \((N - S)\) than the enfranchised \(S\) populace.
Therefore, democracies should seek to establish and maintain a large S (and small
\(N - S\)) to limit the chance of revolution and the need for coercion.

In a new democracy if S does not yet equal N, we should expect \(N - S\) to
approach 0, that is, \(N - S \rightarrow 0\). To win election, a leader would need the support
of a majority of N, that is, \(W/N > 0.5\). If the institutions of a democracy \(W/S\)
remain constant, as S grows, W should grow as well. Thus, the size of W changes
with S \(W \propto S\). In a new democracy the leader can promote the survival of the
regime if s/he satisfies the population of S through public policy choices and
defends the state against opponents outside of S, whether it is opponents in \(N - S\)
or opponents outside the state’s territory. While democracies need only to fear
revolution from the population of N - S, Bueno de Mesquita et al argue that autocracies are “doubly vulnerable” – revolutions can emerge from within N - S or S (p. 370). This is similar to Dahl’s (1973: 11-13) point that autocrats cannot afford to distinguish between “loyal” and “disloyal” opposition.

In a full-fledged autocracy we should expect a small W and likely a small S. In the selectorate, while W will be small in absolute terms, there is no standard percentage of individuals needed to form the leader’s winning coalition. In an autocracy, W/S is more than 0 and can theoretically be as high as 1 if unanimous support of S is needed, such that, $0 < W/S \leq 1$. In an autocracy, S need not approach inclusion of all of N and is often a quite smaller group than the adult population of the country, that is, $N - S \geq 0$. One thing that is characteristic of all autocracies is that the leader needs the support of less than a majority of the population, and usually a small minority. Thus, we might expect the values of W/N and W to approach 0: $W/N < 0.5$ and $W/N \to 0$ and $W \to 0$. Unlike the leader of a new democracy, the leader of a new autocracy has less incentive to establish the largest S possible and thus to minimize N - S. It is the imperative of the autocrat to defend him or herself against all non-W and to exploit N for the benefit of him or herself and W.

As discussed above, in a new state there is likely to be uncertainty about the size of both N and S. The leader would ideally like to expand S to establish greater horizontal legitimacy. Even in a multi-ethnic autocracy like Kazakhstan, the government tried to be broadly inclusive of citizenship upon independence. If the new state is a democracy where $W \propto S$, as S increases with greater horizontal
legitimacy, W increases, and W/S should remain constant. As S increases, the economy of scale (or perhaps “polity of scale”) increases, and the state can (and should) provide more public goods to everyone.\footnote{Spolaore (2005) shows that benefits of scale come from sharing public goods among more taxpayers. The per capita cost of many public goods is lower in larger countries where more taxpayers pay for them. Spolaore notes that economies of scale can be expected for general policy coordination and administration, defense and foreign policy, the legal and judicial system, police and crime prevention, the monetary and financial system, communications infrastructure, and public health infrastructure. In the US, institutions like the CIA, FBI, NASA and the CDC provide non-rival and non-excludable public goods all can partake in, but few states in the world have the resources to establish such institutions. Empirically, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) find that smaller countries have larger governments relative to the size of the country. Thus, a larger country and larger effective tax base would be desirable to new regimes seeking to establish a new governance infrastructure. The democratic leader with a larger tax base can lower the tax rate. Selectorate theory says that a lower tax and greater provision of public goods can both increase a leader’s chance of political survival in a democracy.}

If the new state is an autocracy, W is small and need not change with S. Thus if S increases with greater horizontal legitimacy, and W remains constant, W/S should decrease. When W/S decreases, Bueno de Mesquita et al say that leaders need to invest less to secure the support of W and the amount of public goods provided inevitably decreases.

In sum, leaders of new democracies are likely to provide more public goods than leaders of new autocracies, and among new states this pattern should be more pronounced. In the course of establishing their horizontal legitimacy, leaders of new states that are democracies (“new state/democracies”) are likely to
provide more public goods than leaders of existing state/new democracies and leaders of new state/autocracies are likely to provide the same or fewer public goods than leaders of existing state/new autocracies. This is the strategic logic of the political survival of NTS leaders. The next section examines how this logic might impact a leader’s decisions on national security policy.

II. National Security in Newly Transitioned States

“National security” may be a misleading term when applied to newly transitioned states where leaders have uncertain levels of vertical and/or horizontal legitimacy. Buzan (1988) questions the term “national” and suggests that “state security” may be more appropriate when describing the security policies of weak states. For him, “national security” refers to the security of the “entire socio-political entity” including the social, cultural, political, and economic modes of organization of a self-governing people (p. 15). He proposes that “state security” more appropriately characterizes the defense goals of weak states as it emphasizes the defense of the governing regime more than individuals and groups within states. Ayoob (1995) questions the term “security” when applied to weak states. He argues that considerations of “security” traditionally assume that most threats to a state’s security are external and the threats to a state’s security are primarily military in nature and require a military response. Both of these observations are important, and yet do not preclude a study of the national security policy of newly transitioned states.

First, a newly transitioned state’s security policy may well be centered on the promotion of regime security. But this could be said for any state where the
leader’s chief goal is political survival. If the regime is a democracy, then there is much more incentive to make “national” goals consistent with regime goals, and if it is an autocracy, then there will be little incentive to promote the welfare of people beyond a small elite. Second, it is true that the governing regimes of newly transitioned states are especially threatened by internal opposition and these threats are often best dealt with through non-military means. Even new democratic regimes must deal with possible deficits of vertical and horizontal legitimacy and the integration of various opposition groups into the political system. Yet, it is still important for leaders to secure their country from foreign aggressors. Simon and Starr (2000: 391) describe the “two-level security management” that leaders of new democracies must engage in at both the domestic and international level, and argue that not all security threats can be dealt with by military means – potential domestic opposition may be bought off with investments in social and economic development.

Establishing political legitimacy, integrating national interests, and developing the policy capacity to make and execute decisions are argued to be critical to proper national security management (Azar and Moon 1988). The fact that newly transitioned states often lack these attributes makes the security calculus of these states both convergent as a group and distinctive from that of most other states. This can be demonstrated by comparing the decisions of leaders on some of the most important and consequential security issues. In the following sections, I will discuss some expectations of national security policy for newly transitioned states across the dimensions of militarization, international
conflict, and international security cooperation. Different security policies offer different combinations of opportunities and constraints for leaders. I suggest that to some extent policies are substitutable – there are multiple means toward the same end, and a leader potentially has more than one policy tool to solve a given problem. The choices to increase investment in militarization and engage in militarized international conflict divert resources to security (and specifically military) purposes that could otherwise be used for social and economic development. The choice to engage in cooperative security relationships with foreign leaders can allow a leader to free resources from security needs and redirect them to social and economic development without imperiling the security of the state and regime. Expectations across the militarization and international conflict dimensions have been fairly well developed in the literature while the international security cooperation dimension has not. While militarization and conflict involvement after regime change have been studied separately from the conduct of these activities after new statehood, the implications of democratization or autocratization occurring in new states as compared to existing states have rarely been examined. Thus, I will build off the existing literature on these first two dimensions and propose my own framework for understanding the third.

A. Militarization

By investing in a strong military the leader of an NTS can enhance their ability to deter and defend their regime against internal and external rivals, but at the same time they constrain their ability to enact domestic policy by diverting
resources to security purposes. One of the most immediate ways for a leader to promote his or her state’s external security is to build and develop its military forces: increasing military spending, expanding the number of troops, and acquiring better weapons, armaments, communications technology, and vehicles. A country can usually choose to increase its military power unilaterally, limited only by its available resources and political will. However, in newly transitioned states, increasing the size and budget of the military may not necessarily lead to greater internal security and, in particular, regime security. While the state and regime may be better protected, fewer resources will be available for a leader to invest in social and economic development and patronage. While autocrats usually need a strong military or paramilitary force and distribute adequate patronage to hold power in a country, democratic leaders need to appear to be effective in providing civilian goods and services for re-election.

It is critical for leaders of new regimes and new states to establish their vertical and horizontal legitimacy. In democracies, leaders can best establish the legitimacy of their regime and its ability to govern effectively through the provision of public goods and services. Many scholars speak of a “guns versus butter” trade-off that exists in most states: if a leader wants to invest more in the social and economic well-being of their country, they must decrease defense spending and/or increase government revenues (Antonakis 1999). While defense is a key public good provided by the state, it is unlikely to be the most critical public good to a leader’s survival unless the state is faced with a clear external threat. In fact, the 1999-2001 World Values Survey found that, on average, only
13 percent of respondents worldwide believed that their government should prioritize developing a strong national defense over developing the economy, allowing individuals more say on jobs and in their communities, or beautifying the cities and countryside (Inglehart et al 2004). As will be shown in Chapter 3, residents of NTSs prioritize national defense even less than the global average. Thus, for democratic leaders facing election, their political survival will likely rest on voters’ satisfaction with social and economic policy and their policy decisions will likely reflect this interest.

The political survival of autocrats may be more dependent on a strong security apparatus than social and economic development. Empirical analyses that show autocracies tend to invest more in the military than democracies seem to support this expectation (Lebovic 2001, Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003, and Fordham and Walker 2005). However, little systematic analysis has been conducted specific to newly transitioned states. Maoz (1996) finds some evidence that the less democratic leaders invest in the military, the more likely democracy will survive. Mullins (1987) finds that among post-colonial new states in Africa, many states did not need to build a strong military as their newly independent neighbors lacked a strong military and did not pose an offensive military threat. In addition he found that new states that invested less in the military experienced greater economic development. However, he does not distinguish between democracies and autocracies and it is unclear how these Cold War era findings apply to the contemporary era.
My framework for understanding policymaking in NTSs can help generate expectations of militarization in states following new statehood and regime change. First, Mullin’s finding that new states militarize less is unlikely to apply to the Post-Cold War era when new states emerged in the midst of states with better developed military capabilities. Militarization in new states after the Cold War will be determined by the presence of security threats and whether the governing regime is a democracy or autocracy. In existing states, because the political survival of democratic leaders depends more on voter approval of domestic policy and the political survival of autocrats depends more on a robust coercive regime security apparatus, democracies are likely to invest less in the military than autocracies. After regime change, in addition to garnering electoral support, democratic leaders must establish the vertical legitimacy of their regime and broad acceptance of the democratic system. Thus, we might expect new democracies to invest less in militarization than established democracies. When a new democracy is being established in a new state with uncertain horizontal legitimacy, we might expect leaders to invest even less in militarization as they must focus on establishing domestic identification with the new political community.

B. International Conflict and the Use of Military Force

When a leader chooses to take military action against another state, they divert resources that could otherwise be used for social and economic development to national security activities. They also risk the destruction of their country’s resources – material and human – if their action triggers violent
conflict. However, engaging in militarized conflict may help the leader protect or promote national interests and can promote national unity and support for the leader and regime. The diversionary theory of war posits that leaders can escalate international conflict to divert their public’s attention from their shortcomings in domestic policy. However, in the case of NTS leaders, they may also use foreign policy as an instrument to not only build support for themselves individually but for the political regime itself. Therefore, while militarized conflict can constrain resources available to a leader to enact domestic policy, it may offer an opportunity to garner political support and promote the likelihood of political survival.

Foreign rivals may challenge NTSs to test the ability and commitment of leaders of new regimes to defend their national interests and test the ability and commitment of leaders of new states to defend their sovereignty. To some extent, the study of conflict involvement is the study of how well states can resolve disputes diplomatically before they become militarized. A leader often can choose whether to respond to a dispute with conciliation or belligerence.

Some scholars have argued that certain types of new states are more prone to conflict involvement depending on whether independence was attained through violent revolution or not. Gurr (1988: 49) argues that states that win independence through violent revolution will be more conflict prone because “elites who have secured state power and maintained their positions by violent means are disposed to respond violently to future challenges.” Maoz (1996) finds evidence in analyses of involvement in militarized interstate disputes and
interstate wars 1816-1986 to support this claim that revolutionary new states are more conflict prone, but offers an alternative explanation. He argues that elites who assume power after winning a revolutionary struggle have high (vertical) legitimacy domestically, but the new state may have low legitimacy abroad and leaders of new states may be challenged by foreign rivals.

There is some evidence that conflict involvement might actually enhance the development and horizontal legitimacy of new states. Thies and Sobek (2005) find that while, over the short-run, involvement in militarized interstate conflict may decrease the political capacity of a state, over the long-run conflict involvement increases both a state’s political capacity and economic development. Organski and Kugler (1980) find evidence of a “phoenix factor” - that after defeat in war, states will experience accelerated rates of economic growth. Herbst (2000) suggests that if more interstate wars had been fought in sub-Saharan Africa, there might be fewer states today that lack the (horizontal) legitimacy and capacity to govern effectively and fewer states experiencing state failure and civil war. Over the long run, conflict involvement may enhance the stability of new states, but in the time immediately after transition, the desire for political survival is more likely to influence a leader’s decisions. Since most leaders of new states must also establish new political regimes, perhaps another useful way to understand the conflict behavior of new states is to take their regime type into consideration.

For political survival, democratic leaders rely more on providing public goods and services, and autocratic leaders rely more on coercion and buying off
domestic elites with private goods. In NTSs, enacting effective public policy can be difficult due to a lack of strong administrative and extractive capabilities. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) suggest that for political survival, leaders of new democracies can substitute appeals to nationalist sentiment for effective public policy. While this strategy may also be adopted by leaders of established democracies or autocracies, it is a particularly tempting strategy when a leader lacks the strong institutions needed to enact effective policy such as is often the case after a regime change. One way for leaders to appeal to nationalistic sentiment, they argue, is by conducting a belligerent foreign policy. Mansfield and Snyder argue that if states are experiencing democratic transitions, especially “incomplete” democratic transitions, conflict with other states is likely as leaders may use the nationalist appeal of an aggressive foreign policy to gain legitimacy in the midst of intense competition among interest groups and weak institutions. They assert that “nationalism helps elites to rally the support of the masses on the basis of sentiment, rather than seeking their loyalty by providing responsive institutions that protect their interests” (p. 10). These nationalist appeals may distort the nation’s perceptions of the chance of success in war or the “feasibility of reaching a compromise with an enemy,” thus leading to reckless and belligerent foreign policy decisions (p. 10). Mansfield and Snyder (1996, 2002a, 2005) find evidence that new democracies, especially in the early years after transition, engage in more wars than established democracies across the years 1816-1992. In addition, Mansfield and Snyder (2002b) find evidence that states experiencing “incomplete” democratization (and possibly “complete”
democratization as well) have a heightened likelihood of engaging in a militarized interstate dispute (MID) across the years 1950-1985.

Many scholars have expressed skepticism toward Mansfield and Snyder’s claims. In a case study of Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, Malcom and Pravda (1996: 538, 559) find that making nationalist appeals was “one of the few reliable routes to political success,” and that Boris Yeltsin sought to “capture nationalist ground” from the opposition. However, they observe that nationalism was actually “more pronounced in foreign policy rhetoric than in action” in the early years of Russian democracy, and that Yeltsin’s foreign policy was in fact relatively pragmatic and peaceful (p. 551). While in this example we see nationalist appeals being substituted for policy appeals, most of Yeltsin’s belligerence seemed to be targeted toward Chechen separatists challenging the new state’s horizontal legitimacy rather than toward rivals abroad. Systematic studies by Thompson and Tucker (1997) on MID involvement 1816-1976, Ward and Gleditsch (1998) on war involvement 1815-1992, Enterline (1998) on MID initiation and war initiation 1816-1992, and Gleditsch and Ward (2000) on war involvement 1875-1996 find little evidence that transitions to democracy increase the likelihood of conflict involvement. O’Neal, Russett, and Berbaum (2003) pose the possibility that because new democratic governments may be weak domestically they will try to avoid conflict by adopting conciliatory policies toward their neighbors. They analyze MID involvement from 1885 to 1992 and find that “democratization decreases the risk of conflict and does so quickly” (p. 384). Bennett and Stam (2005) analyze MIDs from 1816 to 1992 and find that
democratization decreases the odds of conflict initiation and escalation from a reciprocated use of force, but it increases the odds of lower level disputes occurring. Taken together, the evidence is mixed. This may partly be a product of differing empirical domains and dependent variables.

My framework for understanding policymaking in NTSs can be applied to understanding how a leader’s desire to establish horizontal and vertical legitimacy influences their international conflict behavior. Leaders of new democracies have a high incentive to win electoral support and establish the vertical legitimacy of the regime through the provision of public goods and services in the time of intense political competition which accompanies democratization. However, the state institutions may lack the capability to deliver on public policy promises and the leader may be tempted to substitute appeals to nationalist sentiment for the provision of public goods through adopting a belligerent foreign policy, resolving international disputes militarily, and initiating militarized conflict. The leader of a democratic new state has an even greater incentive to provide public goods because of the dual challenge of establishing the vertical and horizontal legitimacy of the regime. However, because the horizontal legitimacy of the new state, its boundaries, and its criteria for citizenship may be in question, appeals to nationalism are less likely to be effective. Mansfield and Snyder identify “shared experiences” over time such as war, military service, standardized education, and mass democracy as being critical to forging a strong nation-state identity (p. 11). For people of democratizing old states, these may be effective rallying points. But people of new states, which may have less history as a unified or independent
nation-state, will often lack these “shared experiences.” Thus, national identities may be weaker and more ephemeral and nationalistic appeals may be less effective in garnering support for a leader and regime. Thus, I expect that new democracies in new states will initiate fewer militarized conflicts than new democracies in existing states. It is possible that leaders of new autocratic regimes may also try to enhance regime legitimacy through appeals to nationalism. It should also be expected that these appeals will be less effective in new states than existing states.

C. International Security Cooperation

Unlike militarization and conflict involvement – both of which constrain the resources available to a leader for domestic policy, engaging in international security cooperation can free up resources that would otherwise be used for national security activities while still effectively defending their state. Leaders of NTSs can often choose from a variety of cooperative security arrangements. They can sign military alliances, arrange arms transfers, receive military training, host military bases, or participate in international peacekeeping among other activities. Security cooperation can relieve the burden for a leader of unilaterally developing a strong defense by relying at least partly on the security assistance and cooperation of other states.

NTS leaders who wish to engage in security cooperation are faced with some common challenges in finding partners among other states, especially state willing to join in a more formal alliance. However, an NTS leader’s preference for a particular type of security cooperation will likely depend on their regime
type and levels of vertical and horizontal legitimacy. NTSs – whether new states or states with new regimes – seem to share two characteristics that may influence their international behavior. First, NTSs often have weak governing institutions that suffer from deficits of domestic legitimacy and authority. Second, these states will have difficulty making credible commitments in attempts to negotiate security cooperation with another state. These characteristics will be considered by potential partners before they commit to cooperation with a newly transitioned state. Axelrod and Keohane (1985: 232) argue that cooperation in an anarchic international environment requires states to be concerned with the “shadow of the future.” They argue that establishing a shadow of the future – an expectation of reciprocation between two states – requires both (1) long time horizons and (2) reliable information about the other’s actions and reputation. An NTS is likely to be deficient with respect to these two elements. First, new states and new regimes are unlikely to have an established reputation for being reliable partners. The leaders likely have a different domestic base of support with different interests than the previous regime and may not feel compelled to respect the commitments of the previous regime. Their new regimes may be unproven in their administrative ability to execute agreed upon policies. Also, new leaders are unlikely to have an established bargaining reputation. Second, neither the NTS leader nor the potential foreign collaborator can be sure of the duration of the new regime’s tenure and the time horizon of their relationship. A new regime may be overthrown within one year or last decades. New states may not exist in their present geographic or political form for very long. Consider the example of how
the states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar united into Tanzania within a couple years of independence or how Serbia and Montenegro have evolved from a united federal state to more of a confederation over the past decade. The sovereignty of the new state may be challenged externally by other states, or internally by secessionists. Without a long time horizon in such contexts, states may be reluctant to make a large investment in a cooperative relationship with a new state or new regime, and thus newly transitioned states will have difficulty establishing cooperative security arrangements.

While all types of NTSs may have difficulty engaging in security cooperation, different types of NTSs will likely experience different levels of ease making agreements and have different preferences for the form of security cooperation they seek. Whether security is sought through defense pacts, arms transfers, or peacekeeping, each form of cooperation has theoretically relevant characteristics on two key dimensions: the number of states cooperating and the degree of formalism. Cooperative arrangements may be bilateral or multilateral. They may be, like a formal alliance, established in a public written treaty or established through a less formalized verbal agreement or diplomatic understanding:

1. Formalization of Agreements

A cooperative security relationship does not need to be established in a formal alliance to be effective. However, a written alliance may be highly desirable to an NTS leader as it can signal to other states that a long term commitment between allies and can raise the cost of breaking that commitment,
thus giving the security relationship greater deterrence and defensive value (Morrow 2000). However, for the reasons cited in the previous section, NTS leaders may have difficulty finding partners to join a formal relationship. The degree of difficulty will differ depending on whether the NTS is democratic or autocratic. Gaubatz (1996: 110) reminds us that international commitments can range from formal defense treaties to “casual assurances between diplomats.” He argues that the stability of formal commitments is enhanced in democracies because of their ability to make smooth leadership transitions. McGillivray and Smith (2004) and Lutmar (2004) find that leadership changes in democracies affect bilateral cooperation less than leadership changes in autocracies. However, Gaubatz argues that informal commitments may not enjoy this stability: “it is plausible that the myriad small understandings that condition relations between states might be threatened by a new administration with its team of top foreign policy makers and ambassadors” (p. 116). We know that leadership turnover is far more frequent (and more often institutionalized) in democracies than autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Thus, we might expect that if a state is seeking an informal security arrangement with a new regime, the commitment of a new autocracy is more credible than the commitment of a new democracy.

2. Cooperation and the Number of Partners

NTS leader may have a distinct preference for the number of partners they join with in a security cooperation agreement. Bargaining theory suggests that bilateral agreements have a different negotiation dynamic than multilateral agreements. The number of partners a state negotiates with may affect their
policy autonomy and ability to pursue an effective strategy for political survival. The relative degree of policy autonomy NTS leaders need to pursue an effective strategy for political survival will influence their preferences on the type of agreement they are willing to accept.

Leaders seek the right balance between investments in security and domestic policy and the provision of public and private goods for their political survival and their international commitments may promote or constrain their ability to attain this balance. Both democratic and autocratic leaders may wish to engage in international security cooperation, but depending on their regime type, may differ in their preference for bilateral or multilateral cooperation. The insights of selectorate theory and bargaining theory give some clues to how the type of cooperation might constrain the effectiveness of a leader’s political survival strategy and how this could influence a leader’s security cooperation preferences. While selectorate theory suggests that democratic leaders need greater policy autonomy to secure political survival than autocratic leaders, bargaining theory suggests that agreements between two states may restrict policy autonomy more than agreements among multiple states. Thus, democratic leaders may be expected to have a stronger preference for multilateral cooperation than autocratic leaders. In some instances, multilateral agreements may also constrain the policy autonomy of autocrats if their partners are democratic and make demands for liberalization and democratization causing them to have a stronger preference for bilateral agreements. Because NTS leaders need to not only maintain their support within the regime, but establish the legitimacy of the
regime itself, the difference between democratic and autocratic preferences may be more pronounced among NTS leaders.

Leaders of new democracies require more autonomy in their decisions on policy and resource allocation than new autocracies in order to provide the goods and services necessary to establish legitimacy and garner the electoral support necessary for political survival. Leaders of new autocracies can likely endure a greater loss of policy autonomy and still provide the private goods needed to satisfy W – their critical supporters. Bueno de Mesquita et al show that the amount of policy goods that democratic leaders need to distribute for political survival is usually less than that needed by autocratic leaders. Thus, selectorate theory suggests that democratic leaders have a greater need to maintain policy autonomy when engaging in international agreements. Leeds (1999: 980) argues that autocracies are characterized by greater foreign policy making “flexibility” and lower levels of domestic constraints. Bargaining theory suggests that the dynamics of negotiation between two states may be quite different from negotiation among multiple states and may offer different levels of policy autonomy. Bilateral security cooperation is often characterized by “asymmetry” where a more powerful state is allied with a weaker state. The weaker state gains security from the more powerful state. In exchange, the more powerful state gains favorable policy concessions from the weaker state. This is known as the “security-autonomy tradeoff” (Altfeld 1984, Morrow 1991). The weaker state gains security, but loses some policy autonomy. Traditionally, policy autonomy referred to freedom of action in the international realm, but it has also come to
encompass freedom in domestic policy as well. In a bilateral security arrangement an NTS can probably expect to find itself on the weak end of an asymmetric relationship as they are constrained by uncertain domestic politics. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2004) analyze foreign aid flows and argue that donor states, whether democratic or autocratic, are more likely to aid autocracies because it is easier for an autocrat to make policy concessions to the donor while allowing the leader to maintain the support of W than it would be for a democratic leader. Thus, we might expect that leaders of new democracies will be more reluctant to enter into bilateral security arrangements than leaders of new autocracies.

Unlike bilateral agreements, multilateral agreements are less likely to restrict the policy autonomy of weak states. Multilateral security arrangements may thus appeal more to democracies than autocracies. Morrow (1991: 915) observes that minor powers have tried to gain security while avoiding a loss of policy autonomy by forming multilateral alliances with other minor powers. Krause and Singer (2001) add that in multilateral alliances, minor powers can form intra-alliance coalitions to avoid dependence on any one particular ally. In the economics literature, Conconi and Perroni (2002) argue that multilateral negotiations offer greater opportunities for issue linkage than bilateral negotiations, and countries may form selective arrangements with different partners over different issues. Leaders can use these bargaining opportunities to secure greater flexibility in policy adjustments without breaking the cooperative relationship. New democracies would likely find the greater flexibility of
multilateral security arrangements appealing in helping them to deliver the necessary public goods. This seems to agree with Seidelmann’s (2001: 126) observation that new democracies in Eastern Europe joined NATO in order to guarantee “formal and informal access to major actors like the USA, Germany and France, which would have been difficult to create and maintain without membership.”

Unlike leaders of new democracies, leaders of new autocracies may find that multilateral cooperation constrains important aspects of their policy autonomy. Autocrats need the autonomy to restrict political power to a small winning coalition (W) and exercise coercion upon those residents (N) not in W (N - W). While democratic regimes are only threatened by rebellion emerging from disenfranchised residents of the country (N - S), Bueno de Mesquita et al say that autocratic regimes are “doubly vulnerable” to rebellion by members of S or members of N - S (p. 370). These two groups comprise N - W. In an autocracy, N - W includes those residents who receive few public or private goods from the state. Autocrats may be wary of engaging in multilateral cooperation, especially if their potential partners include democracies. Democratic partners may pressure autocrats to liberalize their political system (enlarge W) and avoid human rights violations which may be necessary in the course of coercing N - W. Pevehouse (2005) finds that inter-governmental organizations that include democratic members can pressure autocracies into making democratic transitions. NATO and the European Union, for instance, set prerequisites of democratic governance needed for new members. It also seems like autocrats are less likely to face
pressures to liberalize when they have a bilateral relationship with a major power. Neumayer (2003) investigates whether foreign aid donors reward states that respect human rights. He finds that human rights records seem to play a consistent role in the decisions of multilateral aid donors, but not bilateral donors. Thus, we might expect leaders of democracies to prefer multilateral cooperation over bilateral cooperation, and autocrats to often prefer bilateral cooperation to multilateral cooperation.

Overall, NTS leaders have a more difficult time finding partners for security cooperation due to the uncertainty over the survival of their regime (and possibly state), lack of a bargaining reputation, and unproven capabilities for following through on policy commitments. Democratic NTS leaders are more likely to find partners willing to engage in more formal cooperation, while Autocratic NTS leaders are more likely to find partners willing to engage in less formal cooperation. If they have a choice, democratic NTS leaders would prefer the greater policy autonomy allowed by most multilateral cooperative arrangements over bilateral cooperative arrangements. Autocratic NTS leaders will have a less strong preference for avoiding the greater policy constraints of bilateral arrangement, but would likely avoid multilateral arrangements if potential partners include democracies. Thus, we would expect autocracies to engage in more bilateral cooperation than democracies. Following from my argument that new democracies established in new states have a greater incentive to provide public goods than new democracies in existing states, I would expect
this pattern of cooperation and the differences between democracies and autocracies to be more pronounced in new states.

**D. Strategies for National Security**

Depending on available resources and opportunities after transition, NTS leaders may have a variety of security strategies from which to choose. Some activities like militarization and militarized conflict involvement divert resources from domestic policy applications to security, while international security cooperation can free up resources from security applications to be used for enacting domestic policy. A leader’s strategy for political survival will determine the best use of state resources, and their strategy will differ by the type of political transition the NTS has experienced: whether a new regime is democratic or autocratic and whether the state is old or new. In the next section, after this general discussion of security policy in NTSs, I propose some reasons why patterns of NTS security policy may differ between the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras.

**IV. After the Cold War**

Most empirical analyses on newly transitioned states and security policy have been conducted on Cold War and Pre-Cold War cases, with few Post-Cold War cases. The extent to which the empirical lessons of previous studies can inform our understanding of the contemporary world is questionable. There are three characteristics of the international environment that have changed since the Cold War that may affect the relationship between political transitions and international relations: (1) the structural constraints of bipolarity have
disappeared, (2) some constraints on democratization have been alleviated, and (3) the dynamics of state creation have changed. For these reasons, analyses on Cold War cases may have different findings from Post-Cold War analyses.

First, the global power structure has changed from being strongly bipolar to what is argued to be either a unipolar or multipolar system. The bipolar power structure of the international system during the Cold War constrained the foreign policy choices of all states, but in particular the choices of states in the Third World where the majority of political regime transitions and state building were taking place after 1950. David (1991) observes that leaders of Third World states would seek to align with the superpower that could best support them against domestic opposition and help deny support to potential insurgents. Ayoob (1995) observes that the superpower rivalry fueled some internal conflicts by providing military aid, and restrained other conflicts by preventing them from becoming zero-sum in nature through mediating and providing incentives for conflict resolution. He believes that the end of the Cold War lifted some of these catalysts and constraints on conflict. In addition, Ayoob speculates that in the absence of superpower involvement, regional hegemons may increasingly attempt to assert more power and manage regional security problems. Thus, security threats to Cold War states were very much influenced by the superpower rivalry and the bipolar structure shaped the opportunities available for international conflict and security cooperation.

Second, the Soviet Union and the US sought to control the type of political transitions that could take place in most states. Huntington (1991) observed that
the end of the Cold War allowed democratization in parts of the world where that opportunity did not previously exist. In particular, Huntington was referring to the way in which the Soviet Union frequently stifled democratic movements in its client states. While the US encouraged and defended democracy in Europe during the Cold War, there are many instances where the US also opposed democratization and even supported dictatorships against democratic movements in Third World states such as in Guatemala, Iran, and Zaire. While the Cold War era seems to have biased superpower intervention toward opposing democracy, the Post-Cold War era has seen movements toward democracy more widely encouraged and supported by the US and intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank. Ayoob observes that many Third World autocrats can no longer count on major power aid in the Post-Cold War era for repressing domestic opposition. In his words, “democratization is no longer merely a laudable goal for states in the Third World; it has become a political precondition for establishing legitimate states structure and regimes that enjoy the acquiescence, if not the enthusiastic support, of their populations” (p. 197).

Third, the dynamics of state creation and the characteristics of new states in the Post-Cold War era are quite different than in the previous era. New states that emerged between World War II and 1975 were mostly products of decolonization and geographically clustered in particular regions. The influence of colonial legacy on both political development and international relations behavior is well documented (Rodney 1974, Herbst 2000, etc.). In addition, Mullins (1987) finds that very few new states between 1950 and 1975 emerged
with military capabilities of any significance. In contrast, few new states emerging after 1989 were products of decolonization (at least in the traditional sense of the word) and few were without significant military capability. Several new states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were in fact nuclear states at independence. In general, Post-Cold War new states often had a far more developed administrative and security infrastructure in place than states emerging from colonies.

On one hand, it is clear that the end of the Cold War has altered the forces of domestic political change and the security needs and opportunities of newly transitioned states. On the other hand it is difficult to identity a clear pattern in the way in which security policies of newly transitioned states have changed. First, the Cold War restrained some internal conflicts while fueling others. Second, new democracies may have been more likely to join multilateral alliances during the Cold War because democracies tended to be aligned with the West, or during the Post-Cold War because there are more democracies in the international system (c.f. Siverson and Emmons 1991, Simon and Gartzke 1996). Third, it is unclear whether more developed Post-Cold War new states will need to make a lower military investment to develop capabilities or a higher investment because they need to maintain military capabilities and support their troops than less developed post-colonial new states. In sum, the forces driving the security behavior of newly transitioned states should be quite different after the Cold War. Whether this should result in different observed behavior is uncertain. However, there is clearly a need for empirical analysis that compares the two eras.
IV. Defining Newly Transitioned States

In this section I propose a method for classifying different types of NTSs to empirically compare their security policies. Essentially I create variables that identify the first 10 years following the start of a major political transition – a regime change or new statehood – to capture the effects of newly transitioned states. For instance, if a state transitions to democracy, it will be coded as “1” for the first 10 years after elections as a “new democracy” and “0” thereafter. If the democracy transitions to an autocracy after the sixth year, it is coded for 6 years as a “new democracy” and then for up to 10 years as a “new autocracy”.

Likewise, a state will be coded as a “new state” for the first 10 years after independence or unification. To check the robustness of these variables I also conduct analyses where only the first 5 years after a political transition are coded “1.” Maoz (1996) codes new states as those states within 4 years of independence – a shorter interval than I propose. My coding is similar to Mansfield and Snyder’s (2005) operationalization of democratic, anocratic, and autocratic transitions where they code their variables for both 5 and 10 years after the transition. However, my method makes a significant improvement on their operationalization. Mansfield and Snyder observe a state for 5 and 10 years after transitions to democracy to see if these new democracies engage in conflict. Often they count conflicts that occur within five or ten years after the transition as an instance of democratization leading to conflict, even if the state had already reverted to autocracy by the time the conflict occurred. My method would count such conflicts as occurring in a new autocracy. I think examining 5 and 10 year
intervals is appropriate as the first decade after a political transition seems to be a time of great uncertainty for newly transitioned states. Power and Gasiorowski (1997), for instance, find that the likelihood of a new democratic regime surviving increases substantially after the first 12 years. It is this uncertainty that is an important component of my argument. Most often scholars analyze the duration of regime types rather than the duration of distinct political regimes. That is, compare period of continuous democracy and continuous autocracy. While a continuous period of democracy can be considered a continuous regime (as the rules for attaining leadership stay fairly consistent), that is not necessarily so for autocracy. Transitions can occur between distinctly different regimes that are both autocratic. For instance, a monarchy could be overthrown by a military coup and a new military government could be established. Even when a new autocracy follows an old autocracy, uncertainty over the consolidation of the new regime will still exist. In this study, I differentiate between different autocratic regimes. Below I briefly discuss how I identify new democratic regimes, new autocratic regimes, and new states.

A. New Democracies

Przeworski (1991: 14) describes democracy as a system in which parties lose elections – an act of subjecting all interests to competition and of “institutionalizing uncertainty.” A democracy emerges when power devolves from “a group of people to a set of rules” (p. 14). Thus, the democratic process is a political regime in itself. Citizens who accept a democratic regime and agree to work within the democratic system agree to an institutionalized transfer of power
between leaders through elections and agree to accept the outcomes of those elections.

Scholars studying the influence of domestic politics on international relations often utilize a continuous specification of regime type in their analyses through the use of Polity or Freedom House measurements (i.e. in the case of Polity, on a -10 to +10 scale from the most closed and autocratic system to the most open and democratic). Scholars such as Maoz and Mansfield and Snyder have translated these continuous measures into discrete regime types ("democracy," "anocracy," "autocracy") to analyze transitions between regime types, where -10 to -6 might equal autocracy and +6 to +10 might equal democracy. While continuous specifications of regime type can get at the "degree" of democracy or autocracy in a state, it is less useful for analyzing changes between political regimes or political regime types. The translation of a continuous index to a dichotomy or trichotomy can be rather arbitrary. Reich (2002: 3) questions whether "datasets that were not designed for the purpose of categorizing regimes should be used for that purpose." The Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2003) includes a "regime transition" variable which records a transition as occurring when there is a 3 point or greater change in either the 10 point democracy or autocracy index. However, as Reich argues, it is unclear how this 3 point change can denote a substantively meaningful change of regime.

In order to analyze transitions between regime types I utilize the Political Regime Change Dataset ("PRC Dataset"), introduced by Gasiorowski (1996) and updated by Reich (2002). What distinguishes the PRC Dataset from the annual
regime scores of Polity or Freedom House is that Reich tracks continuities in the political system of a state over time and identifies events that mark clear changes in the political system. He utilizes qualitative criteria to define regime types and notes distinct events such as elections or coups across a state’s history that mark transitions between regime types. Reich classifies each regime as one of 3 types: “democracy,” “semi-democracy,” or “authoritarian.” He finds that his classification of regime types correlates about 85 percent with Polity and Freedom House. Much of the discrepancy between the PRC Dataset, Polity, and Freedom House data results from differences in identifying the precise beginning and ending dates of regimes. Reich uses the following criteria to code each regime:

Democracy: A regime in which (i) meaningful and extensive competition exists among individuals and organized groups for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; (ii) a highly inclusive level of political participation exists in the selection of leaders and policies, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and (iii) a sufficient level of civil and political liberties exists to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.

Semi-democracy: A regime in which a substantial degree of political competition and freedom exist, but where the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political party competition is so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of
elections are so compromised that electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; and/or civil and political liberties are so limited that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and express themselves.

Authoritarian: A regime in which little or no meaningful political competition or freedom exists. (Reich 2002: 6-7)

In addition to these distinctions, Reich uses the following criteria to characterize the “meaningfulness” of political competition:

(a) whether the current government unilaterally changes political institutions or invokes legislation to stifle peaceful opposition; (b) whether the current government tolerates information critical of government policies and leaders; and (c) whether the current government ensures that the right of peaceful opposition is honored by military and/or security forces. (p. 7)

B. New Autocracies

The PRC Dataset is very useful for analyzing changes in regime type over time, but less so for analyzing transitions between distinct political regimes. As previously noted, a continuous period of democracy can be considered a single political regime, but continuous autocracy does not necessarily constitute a single regime. Under autocracy, there may or may not be institutionalized rules and procedures for leadership change and governance. Under a monarchy such as
Saudi Arabia there are usually clear rules of succession to the throne and within the state, the pool of supporters of the monarchy remains fairly stable even across leadership changes. Thus, as long as leadership succession ensues within the institution of the monarchy, a continuous autocracy exists. Under personalist regimes such as Saddam Hussein’s or Idi Amin’s, loyalty to a regime is centered much less on a set of institutions and more on an individual leader. When a personalist ruler leaves office, the political regime ends. Each new leader following a personalist regime must re-establish the legitimacy and authority of government. There are instances of long standing autocratic regimes (i.e. Egypt 1952-present, Gabon 1960-present, Syria 1963-present) where leadership is highly personalist, but clear rules for succession exist through the ruling party or the military, and leadership change has not meant regime change.

Few efforts have been made in recent years to define distinct autocracies across different states. A notable exception is the work of Geddes (1999a, 1999b) who analyzes the breakdown of autocracies. She created a cross-national list of different autocracies and their periods of rule. Geddes focuses on identifying changes in the government’s base of support to distinguish between regimes. I use her list to identify transitions between distinct political regimes.

Geddes (1999a: 18) defines a political regime as a set of “formal and informal rules and procedures for selecting national leaders and policies.” She says that an autocratic regime ends when “either the dictator and his supporters [are] ousted from office or a negotiated transition [results] in reasonably fair, competitive elections and a change in the party or individual occupying executive
office” (p. 21). Geddes focuses on identifying changes in the government’s base of support to distinguish between regimes. She distinguishes between three types of autocracies: military, single-party, and personalist. In an institutionalized military regime there is an “agreed formula for sharing or rotating power” among top officers (Geddes 1999b: 123). This arrangement exists today in Myanmar. In a single-party regime, the “party organization exercises some power over the leader at least part of the time, controls career paths of individuals, organizes the distribution of benefits to supporters, mobilizes citizens to vote and show support for party leaders in other ways” (p. 124). This arrangement exists today in China. Personalist rulers often come to power through revolution, but also through the military or the ruling party. Geddes (1999a: 8) defines a regime as personalist when the leader comes to power as a result of “struggles of power among rival leaders after the seizure of office” and when “one individual wins such a struggle, continuing to draw support from the organization that brought him to power but limiting his supporters’ influence on policy and personnel decisions.” The one category Geddes does not code is the existence of monarchies. I identify autocratic monarchies and code leadership change occurring within a monarchy as occurring within a single regime. As Geddes notes, there are often gray areas where a regime does not cleanly fit into one of these pure types. An example might be the regime of Fidel Castro who has been the leader of the Cuban Communist Party, but also the only leader during the party’s rule. Thus, it is unclear whether his regime is personalist or single-party.
For this study, the precise type of autocracy is not a concern as it is not a variable of interest. What is important to conducting empirical analysis in this study is identifying the beginnings of new autocratic regimes. Geddes’ data is helpful in identifying whether succession between autocrats was conducted within the same regime or not. She does not categorize regimes lasting less than 3 years. This is not a problem because, whether there is in fact one regime or 3 or more regimes during these intervals, it is still within the first 5 or 10 years of a regime change and I code it as a “new autocracy.” The following coding rules will be used to identify new democracies and new autocracies, fill possible gaps in the Geddes data, and reconcile any discrepancies between the Geddes and Reich data:

1. Use the PRC Dataset to identify the beginning of new democratic regimes. Code the first 10 years of democracy as a “new democracy” or for as many years as the democratic regime survives if less than 10 years. Code “new semi-democracies” likewise. A 5 year variable will also be coded and analyzed to check for robustness.

2. Use the PRC Dataset to identify periods of autocracy (Reich’s “authoritarianism”). Consult the Geddes data to determine whether these periods represent a single regime or multiple regimes. Code the first 5 and

---

9 One example of such a discrepancy is that Geddes codes some single-party systems as autocracy, whereas Reich codes these same regimes as “semi-democracies.” In these instances, I defer to Reich.
10 years of each regime as a “new autocracy” or for as many years as the regime survives if less than 5 and 10 years.

3. For any gaps in the data consult the Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) dataset on leadership change or country-specific references if necessary.

4. Regimes are coded on an annual basis. If two or more regimes exist in a single year, that year will be coded as the regime that existed for the most time within that year.

5. The Political Regime Change Dataset codes for “transitional” years (similar to the Polity IV’s “interregnum” periods) where there is no clear regime in power. These will not be counted as new regimes.

C. New States

To define the beginning of a “new state” I consider two definitions. From the political development literature, Cohen et al (1981: 902) define “national state making” as “the creation of political order at a new spatial and institutional level. It involves the redistribution of political control of power resources away from sub-national collectivities and polities toward the central state apparatus.” While Cohen et al define new states by the initiation of a new process of political development, it is also necessary to consider new states as new unitary and sovereign international actors. The State System Membership dataset of the Correlates of War (COW) project lists the entry and exit dates of states in the international system. According to the COW project, membership in the international system requires either that the state is a member of the United
Nations or has a population of at least 500,000 and diplomatic recognition by at least two major powers.

For this project, I want to identify states that are first, in the early stages of establishing governance and horizontal state legitimacy at, as Cohen et al say, a “new spatial and institutional level”; and second, are new sovereign international actors. The COW criteria excludes some important cases that would be included by the Cohen et al criteria. For instance, for 1976 the COW dataset notes the exit of South Vietnam from the international system, but not the emergence of a new united Vietnam. For 1991, COW notes the entry of 14 new post-Soviet states, but not the emergence of an independent Russia. For 1992 and 1993, COW notes the entry of 4 former-Yugoslav states, but not the independence of Serbia and Montenegro. Also for 1993, COW notes the entry of Eritrea but not the entry of a territorially and institutionally transformed Ethiopia. There is compelling evidence that a significant reorganization of political order at a new spatial and institutional level occurred in Vietnam, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Ethiopia which should qualify them as “new states.”

In order to identify “new

---

10 Ethiopia is not often thought of as a new state. When Eritrea became independent in 1994, Ethiopia not only experienced a significant spatial change (losing some of its most strategically and economically important territory), but also a significant institutional change in political order. This change was radical enough to be characterized by Mengistaeb (2001: 21) as “a new strategy of state building” as a political structure of “ethnic-based federalism” was established. Similarly, after East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan adopted a new constitution that significantly altered the design of the political institutions (e.g. a change from a unicameral presidential system to a bicameral parliamentary system) and established Islam as the official state
states” that are sovereign and recognized international actors, I propose the following coding rules:

1. All states should be coded as “new states” for the 10 years after their entry into the international system as noted by the COW dataset. A 5 year variable will also be coded and analyzed to check for robustness.
2. A sovereign state that is the product of two merging sovereign states should be coded as a new state.
3. When one or more new states emerge as sovereign states in non-colonial territory ceded from an older state, the remainder of the older state should be coded as a new state if significant institutional reorganization was required to re-establish political order.

V. Conclusion

Leaders of newly transitioned states face challenges to their political survival from both home and abroad which influence how they make national security policy decisions in the environment of heightened uncertainty that follows a major political transition. Their choice of national security policy can constrain or promote their ability to effectively enact a domestic policy that can promote their political survival within their regime and the ability of their regime to consolidate. NTS leaders have a variety of security policy tools to pursue the goals of national defense and political survival. Leaders can invest in militarization to increase both the security of the state and the security of the religion (Hayes 1984: 73-79). Both Ethiopia in 1993 and Pakistan in 1972 are coded as new states.
regime, but military investment can divert resources from the provision of other public and private goods and services essential to winning support and legitimacy for the new regime. Leaders may adopt a belligerent foreign policy in an attempt to substitute appeals to nationalist sentiment for effective public policy. However, militarized conflict can also be costly and destructive, and defeat in war can threaten a leader’s political survival and regime consolidation. Leaders can seek security assistance from other states in the form of cooperative agreements ranging from formal defense pacts to less formal arms transfers and military training agreements. However, in exchange for additional security from other states, leaders may give up some policy autonomy making which may constrain their ability to pursue an effective political survival strategy. At a theoretically level, there seem to be some commonalities in the challenges that NTS leaders face, but potential differences in the way in which NTS leaders will respond to those challenges depending on their regime type and whether their state is old or new. The following three chapters will empirically examine how political transitions affect the security policies of NTS states, and the extent to which the choice of security policies affects the ability of an NTS leader to ensure their political survival. Chapter 3 will propose and empirically test expectations for the policies NTS leaders adopt toward militarization and conflict involvement. Chapter 4 will empirically test expectations for how NTS leaders will engage in international security cooperation. Chapter 5 will examine the effect of security policy choices on the political survival of the leader and regime consolidation. Each chapter will examine cases from 1950 to 1998. Based on the coding
procedure presented in this chapter, the number of total cases of each type are summarized in the following tables:

### Table 2.1
**Cold War State-Years of each Case Type 1950-1988**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democracy:</th>
<th>Semi-Democracy:</th>
<th>Autocracy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Existing</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>399</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2.2
**Post-Cold War State-Years of each Case Type 1989-1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democracy:</th>
<th>Semi-Democracy:</th>
<th>Autocracy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Existing</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3  
Militarization and the Use of Military Force by Newly Transitioned States  

I. Introduction

Engaging in militarization and using military force have some common consequences for leaders of newly transitioned states (NTSs) – new states, new democracies, and new autocracies. After a major political transition that involves regime change or new statehood, leaders must often govern in an environment of heightened political uncertainty through weak institutions. NTS leaders may face rivals at home and abroad who seek to challenge their power and political survival. To defend against these rivals, leaders can decrease their military capabilities, increase their military capabilities, or maintain their capabilities. When a diplomatic dispute arises a leader can choose a more conciliatory and accommodating approach or a more belligerent and aggressive approach to resolving the dispute that involves the threat or use of force. Militarization and the use of force can both garner support for the regime and help secure a leader’s political survival, but they also limit the resources available to a leader for enacting domestic policy.

By investing in stronger military capabilities and increasing militarization – the extent to which national resources are invested in the military – a leader may be able to deter rivals at home and abroad and appease military elites. A strong domestic security apparatus that includes military forces in addition to police and intelligence services can defend a new regime against opposition groups and deter
potential rebellion. A strong military can also deter foreign aggressors from targeting an NTS made vulnerable by its fragile political system. In addition, strong and steady military funding can reassure the military class that their interests will be protected by the new regime.

By conducting a more belligerent foreign policy that includes a greater willingness to use military force to resolve conflicts of interest with other states, leaders can draw on nationalist sentiment to unite citizens behind themselves and their regime when confronting foreign rivals. People may be able to overlook internal divisions and disputes to join together in confronting a common external threat. But when a leader adopts policies of greater militarization and belligerence, they face the consequence of placing greater constraints on their domestic policy options. The choice to develop a stronger military or the choice to take a belligerent approach to resolving a dispute entail the utilization or potential destruction of scarce national resources, including natural resources, economic capital, and human capital. Subsequently, a leader will have fewer resources available for enacting those domestic policies that may be critical to his or her political survival and maintaining the support of his or her winning coalition of supporters. NTS leaders share the common challenge of overcoming the potentially low legitimacy of their regime and state, and heightened uncertainty over their ability to stay in power and the survival of their regime.

---

11 While there are often domestic elements to national security, I use the term “domestic policy” to refer to patronage and regulatory, distributive, or redistributive policy that affects social and economic development.
However, among NTS leaders, their response to these challenges may differ. The extent to which leaders weigh the costs and benefits of militarization and the use of force significantly depends on whether they govern a democracy or autocracy and whether their state is old or new. In this chapter I analyze the effect of regime type, regime change, and new statehood on military spending, military expansion, the initiation of militarized international disputes, and involvement in international conflict and war.

II. Militarization and Political Survival

Leaders can choose from a variety of ways to strengthen their military. The size of the military can be expanded through increased recruiting or conscription, or the quality of the military can be enhanced through more sophisticated training or technological improvements in equipment, weapons, vehicles, aircraft, etc. These contribute to the “militarization” of a state: the extent to which national resources are invested in the military. The choice to increase their state’s military power is one leaders can usually make unilaterally – without the consent of other states – and limited only by available resources and political will. But before an NTS leader chooses to develop a strong military, they are likely to consider the potential consequences for their political survival: consequences for maintaining power and support within the political regime and the consolidation of that regime – maintaining the set of rules that selected him or her as leader. If their regime falls – be it a junta, monarchy, or parliamentary democracy – a leader’s political survival is likely to cease. If the leader loses a
winning coalition of support within the regime, their political survival is also likely to end.

Militarization can promote the security of a leader and a new regime by defending the regime against rivals both inside and outside the country and in some situations discouraging a potential military coup d’etat. However, militarization can also constrain the leader’s domestic policy options. The more money and manpower a leader dedicates to the military, the less they can invest in social and economic development, all else equal – the “guns versus butter” choice. In the face of a present or potential security threat, most states would likely increase military spending and personnel to counter the threat. But because the conditions for a leader to retain power within a regime and ensure the survival of that regime differ by regime type, the consequences of militarization are likely to have different implications for democratic leaders and autocratic leaders.

According to selectorate theory, leaders of democracies need to satisfy a large constituency to stay in power – the winning coalition of voters that elected them to power. With limited resources they are likely to invest more in goods that offer public benefits which can be enjoyed by many, than in private goods that are for the benefit of specific individuals (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Leaders of autocracies have a smaller winning coalition of supporters and are often able to satisfy key elites through the provision of private goods and can de-emphasize the

---

12 I am not speaking strictly in terms of pure public and private goods. Policy goods more often fall on a continuum from those with predominant public benefits to those with predominantly private benefits.
provision of public goods in order to keep more resources for themselves. In order to provide the necessary public goods to satisfy their winning coalition, leaders of democracies will likely desire fewer constraints on domestic policy and civilian spending and thus be more reluctant to increase militarization. As Bueno de Mesquita et al show, the value of private goods that an autocrat needs to secure political survival is less than the value of public goods needed by a democratic leader. Thus, autocrats may have more flexibility in their spending decisions. Since autocrats are also more threatened by internal rivals of the regime and for they may be more encouraged to increase militarization than a democratic leader. The argument that leaders of autocracies favor militarization more than leaders of democracies rests on informing the insights of selectorate theory with the assumption that a “guns versus butter” trade-off occurs and suggesting that this trade-off has important implications for the political survival of democratically elected leaders. In the following sections I discuss this trade-off in more detail and potential differences in the role it plays in established democracies and new democracies.

A. Militarization and Domestic Policy Trade-offs

Much scholarship has been devoted to understanding the budgetary trade-off between military and civilian spending. The “guns versus butter” argument suggests that greater military spending leads to sacrifices in a state’s social and economic development programs. While it is possible that deficit spending can allow situations where there may not be a dollar for dollar trade-off in an annual budget between military and civilian spending, Berry and Lowery (1990: 672)
argue that “unless one is willing to assume that budgeting takes place in an
environment characterized by abundance rather than scarcity...trade-offs are
inevitable.” They describe budgeting as a three-stage hierarchical process. First,
leaders decide how much to increase or decrease spending from the previous year.
Second, leaders decide how to divide money between military and civilian
spending. Third, leaders decide how to allocate money among departments.
Thus, in their view, the choice to invest in the military comes before the choice of
how to invest remaining funds among domestic policy applications, and my logic
follows from this assumption.

Some have argued that militarization can complement rather than impede
social and economic development. One school of thought, “military
Keynesianism,” contends that military spending can stimulate economic
development by stimulating demand and increasing employment. In addition,
Benoit (1973) argues that militarization can help developing countries create
skilled workers, accelerate modernization, and develop infrastructure. Zoninsein
(1994: 149) does not agree that militarization can effectively spur development
and counters that military spending supports a product that has no benefits other
than security: “Whatever benefits military expenditure might generate, these must
be compared in terms of crowding out private and public investment.”

The empirical evidence suggests that the consequences of military
spending for social and economic development may depend on a state’s level of
development. Heo (1999) finds evidence that the economic benefits of defense
spending may be limited outside those industrialized countries with a major arms
manufacturing sector. Apostolakis (1992) found evidence of trade-offs between social and military spending in Latin America, and Mullins (1987) and Dunne and Mohammed (1995) find that higher military expenditure had a negative effect on economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. However, Dabelko and McCormick (1977) uncover evidence of trade-offs occurring between spending on the military and spending on health and education, regardless of a state’s level of development. Even in a country as wealthy as the United States, Henderson (1998a) finds that increases in military spending during peacetime are associated with increases in poverty. While I do not empirically examine the guns versus butter trade-off here, I make the fundamental assumption that considerations of this trade-off are very important in the decision making of democratic leaders.

B. Militarization in New Democracies

Because leaders of democracies have a higher incentive to provide public goods and services than autocrats, we might expect democracies to invest fewer resources in militarization than autocracies, all else equal. Defense is a key public good provided by the state. But unless the state is faced with a clear security threat it is unlikely to be the public good most critical to a leader’s political survival. Improving the economic and social well-being of voters is often more important for re-election. This is clear in the 1995-1998 wave of the World Values Survey which found that, on average, 89 percent of respondents worldwide believed that their government should prioritize either developing the economy, allowing individuals more say on jobs and in their communities, or beautifying the cities and countryside over a strong national defense (Inglehart et
Respondents in new democracies were found to prioritize these social and economic goals even more, at 93 percent.\textsuperscript{13} Economic growth was by far the most desired goal of the four globally, prioritized by 62 percent of respondents. In all, public support for the leader and regime in democracies seems to require an ample provision of public goods beyond national defense. Empirical analyses (Lebovic 2001, Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003, and Fordham and Walker 2005) have shown that, overall, democracies tend to invest less in the military than autocracies. Thus, I expect:

\textbf{Proposition 3.1: Democracies militarize less than autocracies.}

Little systematic global evidence exists of militarization patterns in new democracies. Some have argued that it is important for leaders of new democracies to maintain strong and steady investment in the military after transition. The confidence of the military in the new regime – democratic or not - will be bolstered if a steady stream of funding and support is evident. Military coups, such as those that occurred in Sao Tome in 2003 and Chad in 2004, frequently result from the simple failure of the government to meet the payrolls of the armed forces. Huntington (1991) recommends that new democracies maintain strong military funding in order to appease the military class. Often a military regime will voluntarily hand over power to a democratic regime if they can be assured of continued support and influence in government. Houngnikpo (2000:

---

\textsuperscript{13} Among countries surveyed, I count the following as new democracies: Bulgaria, Chile, Hungary, South Korea, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Macedonia.
210) argues that “no African country democratizes without the consent, either tacit or explicit, of ‘military society.’” He asserts that smooth and peaceful transitions to democracy have only occurred in countries where the military has supported democracy.

However, there are reasons to doubt that new democracies will militarize more than existing democracies. To begin with, militarization – especially when it involves increasing the sophistication of training and expanding the size and functions of the military – can increase the probability of a military coup through enhancing the power and prestige of the armed forces and their sense of institutional efficacy vis-à-vis the governing regime (Casper 1991). The empirical evidence is mixed on whether militarization leads to military coups. In a sample of sub-Saharan African states 1981-1990, Wang (1998) finds evidence that militarization increases the likelihood of a coup d’etat, while in a broader sample from 1960-1997, Henderson (1998) does not. This discrepancy in findings may be a function of Wang not controlling for level of democracy, while Henderson does. The structure of the democratic system itself may discourage leaders from militarizing for other reasons. As argued in Chapter 2, leaders of new democracies have a greater incentive to provide public goods than leaders of existing democracies as they not only must secure support within the democratic system for their political survival but also must establish the vertical legitimacy of the democratic regime itself. Hunter (1995, 1997) finds evidence in Latin America that after transitions from military rule, the institutions of democracy decrease the political power of the military. While negotiating democratic
transitions in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the militaries tried to entrench their interests in the new democratic institutions. After transition, the democratically elected leaders shifted resources away from the military and toward social and economic development through improvements in health care, education, social security, public housing, and labor policy. Politicians in these countries prioritized securing re-election through satisfying their constituents over appeasing the military. Similarly, in Eastern European states Seidelmann (2001: 121) observes that the military has become less “politically relevant” after transitions to democracy and no military coups have been attempted even though militarization has decreased. Thus, I posit:

**Proposition 3.2: New democracies militarize less than existing democracies.**

**C. Militarization in New States**

Leaders of new states – whether democratic or autocratic – may have different incentives to militarize than leaders of old states. Patterns of military spending among new states have been uncovered during the Cold War era, but expectations about military spending across new states are less clear in the Post-Cold War era. Cold War new states tended to be clustered geographically, most notably in Africa. Mullins (1987) finds that among post-colonial new states in Africa, many states did not need to build a strong military as their newly independent neighbors lacked strong militaries, and thus did not pose a threat that required defending against. He argues that an anarchic “law of the jungle” did not apply in Africa and the new states did not face the security dilemma of arming against their neighbors: “Virtually all were created before they had any military
capability for self-defense, but in every case (except Zanzibar) they survived as states through their own restraint and that of the major powers” (p. 11). Thus, we might expect:

**Proposition 3.3: Cold War new states militarized less than existing states.**

In contrast to Cold War new states, few new states emerging after 1989 were without significant military capability, and several new states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were nuclear states at independence. Most Post-Cold War new states emerged in the midst of states that did possess offensive military capability. Thus, they potentially faced a security dilemma and had greater incentive to arm. Few new states in this era were products of decolonization (at least in the traditional sense of the word), and thus generally had a more developed administrative apparatus and infrastructure in place than states that emerged from colonies during the Cold War. Leaders of new states may need to invest more to maintain the capabilities they have, support their existing troops, and deter potential aggression. Thus, I posit:

**Proposition 3.4 Post-Cold War new states invest more in militarization than existing states.**

As in existing states, we might expect levels of militarization among new states to differ by regime type. Like new regimes, leaders of new states usually must work to establish the vertical legitimacy of a new regime. In addition,

---

14 Though according to Cooley (2005), the effectiveness of the administrative structure of new states seems to depend on the degree to which the prior governing structure was centralized or decentralized.
leaders must establish the horizontal legitimacy of the new state and resolve uncertainty regarding the definition of the state’s borders and citizenship that determines where and over whom the leader has authority. To establish horizontal legitimacy, they must encourage widespread identification with the new state across the population which likely involves building broad support for the regime. As argued in Chapter 2, the dual challenge of establishing the vertical and horizontal legitimacy of governments of new states encourages leaders of New State/Democracies to provide even more public goods than leaders of Existing State/New Democracies. Thus, I argue:

**Proposition 3.5: Democracies in new states militarize less than new democracies in existing states.**

**D. Analysis**

**1. Dependent Variables**

I build on Fordham and Walker’s (2005) basic research design to conduct my analysis. They use two different indicators of militarization: military spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), \( \text{Milspend/GDP} \), and the percent of the population in the armed forces, \( \text{Milsize/pop} \). \( \text{Milspend/GDP} \) captures the proportion of a state’s economic capital allocated to militarization. \( \text{Milsize/pop} \) captures the proportion of a state’s human capital allocated to militarization. Economic and human capital are both important resources for economic and social development. Data on the size of armed forces, national population, and military spending are from the Correlates of War (COW)
project’s National Military Capabilities Dataset 3.0; data on GDP are from Gleditsch (2002).

2. Independent Variables

An active security threat – internal or external – is likely to be the greatest incentive for a state to militarize. Following Fordham and Walker, I control for the number of interstate battle deaths and intrastate battle deaths as proportions of the population to capture the degree to which a state is actively threatened in a particular year: \( \text{Intl. war battle deaths/pop.} \) and \( \text{Civil war battle deaths/pop.} \). To capture more passive threats, I control for the capabilities of a state’s rivals, \( \text{Total power of rivals} \), in a particular year by the sum of the rival’s CINC scores (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). To capture the capabilities of a state’s allies, \( \text{Total power of allies} \), I control for the sum of the CINC scores of its allies.\(^\text{15}\) In addition, I control for the size of the state’s economy when analyzing \( \text{Milspend/GDP} \) and the size of the state’s population when analyzing \( \text{Milsize/pop.} \). Instead of using the Polity index (like Fordham and Walker) to measure regime type, I substitute a trichotomous regime type specification that codes each state as a democracy, semi-democracy, or autocracy based on the Political Regime Change Dataset (Reich 2002). In each model I include the dummy variables \( \text{Democratic} \) and \( \text{Autocratic} \) and let \( \text{Semi-democratic} \) serve as the baseline category. The dummy variable \( \text{New regime} \) equals 1 if there has been a regime change within 10 years. I include the interactions \( \text{New regime} \times \text{Democratic} \) and

\(^{15}\) I use Fordham and Walker’s data on CINC scores of strategic rivals as identified by Thompson (2001) and defense pact allies as identified by Gibler and Sarkees (2002).
New regime*Autocratic to identify the effect of new democracies and new autocracies. The dummy variable New state equals 1 if a state is within 10 years of becoming a new state. I include the interactions New state*Democratic and New state*Autocratic to identify the effect of New State/Democracies and New State/Autocracies.

3. Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1</th>
<th>Average Military Spending as Percent of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cold War &amp; Post-Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracies &amp; Autocracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/Existing Regime</td>
<td>2.42 &amp; 1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Regime</td>
<td>1.50 &amp; 1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>1.20 &amp; 0.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.2</th>
<th>Average Number of Troops as Percent of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cold War &amp; Post-Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracies &amp; Autocracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/Existing Regime</td>
<td>0.72 &amp; 0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Regime</td>
<td>0.71 &amp; 0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>0.49 &amp; 0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The means of Milspend/GDP for each state type are presented in Table 3.1 and the means of Milsize/pop. are presented in Table 3.2. In a preliminary analysis of the comparative averages, similar conclusions can be drawn from both tables. Propositions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 are found to be largely supported. First, it can be seen that democracies generally militarize less than autocracies (Proposition 3.1). In Table 3.1, Existing State/Existing Democracies spend an average of 2.42 percent of their GDP on the military compared to the 4.35 percent spent by Existing State/Existing Autocracies during the Cold War, and 1.95
percent compared to 4.48 percent in the Post-Cold War Era. In Table 3.2, it can be seen that Existing State/Existing Democracies have an average of 0.72 percent of their population in the military compared to 1.03 percent in Existing State/Existing Autocracies during the Cold War, and 0.58 percent compared to 1.03 percent in the Post-Cold War Era. Second, it can be seen that new democracies militarize less than existing democracies (Proposition 3.2). In Table 3.1, Existing State/New Democracies spend 1.50 percent of their GDP on the military compared to 2.42 percent in Existing State/Existing Democracies during the Cold War, and during the Post-Cold War era they spend 1.03 percent compared to 1.95 percent. A similar pattern can be observed in Table 3.2 when comparing the percent of the population in the military: 0.71 percent compared to 0.72 during the Cold War and 0.55 compared to 0.58 percent after the Cold War. Third, it can be seen that democratic new states militarize less than new democracies in existing states (Proposition 3.5). In Table 3.1, New State/Democracies spend 1.20 percent of their GDP on the military compared to 1.50 percent in Existing State/New Democracies during the Cold War, and during the Post-Cold War era they spend 0.95 percent compared to 1.03 percent. A similar pattern can be observed in Table 3.2 when comparing the percent of the population in the military: 0.49 percent compared to 0.71 during the Cold War and 0.45 compared to 0.55 percent after the Cold War. Proposition 3.3 – that during the Cold War, new states militarize less than existing states – is supported only among democracies. Among autocracies, new states militarize more than new regimes in old states. Proposition 3.4 – that Post-Cold War era new states
militarize more than existing states – does not find support. New states militarize the least among democracies, and among autocracies new states militarize less than existing state/existing autocracies.

These propositions are tested more rigorously in the following multivariate regressions. For each measure of militarization, I first analyze all states from 1950-1998, then disaggregate the observations into samples for the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, and lastly, in addition to estimating models that analyze the first 10 years of new regimes and new states, I check the robustness of my new regime and new state variables by estimating models that analyze the first 5 years after a political transition. I estimate each model using Ordinary Least Squares regression with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors and panel-specific controls for AR1 autocorrelation (Beck and Katz 1995).
Table 3.3 presents the estimates of models of Milspend/GDP and Table 3.5 presents the estimates of models of Milsize/pop. Tables 3.4 and 3.6 each present the corresponding substantive effects of each state type. In all four tables, Models I through III are estimated on the complete set of cases from 1950-1998. Model IV is estimated on Cold War cases and Model V is estimated on Post-Cold War cases. Model I does not control for whether a state is old or new, while all other models do. Models I, II, IV, and V each use 10-year measurements of New regime and New state, and Model III uses 5-year measurements. The high significance of the Wald statistics in Table 3.3 suggests that the variables in each

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure of New Regime &amp; New State:</th>
<th>10-year</th>
<th>10-year</th>
<th>5-year</th>
<th>10-year</th>
<th>10-year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Spending/GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>—0.11</td>
<td>—0.24</td>
<td>—0.18</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic</td>
<td>0.71*</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>2.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regime</td>
<td>—0.24</td>
<td>—0.16</td>
<td>—0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>—0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regime*Democratic</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
<td>—0.01</td>
<td>—0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regime*Autocratic</td>
<td>—0.15</td>
<td>—0.21</td>
<td>—0.07</td>
<td>—0.18</td>
<td>—1.52**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>—0.51**</td>
<td>—0.25</td>
<td>—0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State*Democratic</td>
<td>—0.21</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>—0.93**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State*Autocratic</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>—0.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl. War Battle Deaths/Pop.</td>
<td>17.34***</td>
<td>17.30***</td>
<td>17.43***</td>
<td>12.62***</td>
<td>425.90***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War Battle Deaths/Pop.</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Power of Rivals</td>
<td>11.43***</td>
<td>11.11***</td>
<td>12.06***</td>
<td>14.89***</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Power of Allies</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>—0.27</td>
<td>1.92***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>—0.00</td>
<td>—0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>2.18***</td>
<td>2.39***</td>
<td>2.50***</td>
<td>2.08***</td>
<td>1.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi2</td>
<td>88.54***</td>
<td>93.80***</td>
<td>78.83***</td>
<td>96.32***</td>
<td>67.69***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6008</td>
<td>6008</td>
<td>6008</td>
<td>4527</td>
<td>1481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of States</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ave. Years per State</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < .01  ** p < .05 * p < .1 (two-tailed test)
Standard Errors are Panel Corrected, Controlled for Panel-Specific AR1 Autocorrelation
model are jointly significant. The $R^2$ statistics are fairly similar for Models I through IV - between 0.04 and 0.06, but the $R^2$ statistic for Model V is much higher at 0.27 suggesting that the model of Milspend/GDP has greater explanatory power for the post-Cold War era than the Cold War era.

In Table 3.3, the coefficients of the Democratic and Autocratic variables represent the effects of democratic and autocratic regimes on Milspend/GDP compared to the effect of semi-democratic regimes, while controlling for those regimes that are new and/or in new states. Thus, these coefficients specifically represent the effect of existing regimes in Model I, and existing regimes in existing states in Models II through V. In Model I the coefficient of Autocratic has a value of 0.71 and is statistically significant and the coefficient of Democratic has a value of -0.11 and is not statistically significant. This suggests that existing autocracies militarize more than existing semi-democracies, but existing democracies do not significantly militarize more than existing semi-democracies which would lend support to Propositions 1, that democracies militarize less than autocracies. A similar result is observed in the Post-Cold War Model V when New state is controlled for, while neither regime variable has significance in the other models. Testing the other propositions requires consideration of the estimates of the New regime and New state variables and their interactions with the Democratic and Autocratic variables. At first blush, the estimates of these variables and interactive terms do not seem to be particularly helpful in testing my propositions, particularly because of the non-significance of so many coefficients. New regime is not significant in any model. New state is
only significant in Model II where it has a coefficient of -0.51 suggesting that new states militarize less than existing states. The interaction New regime*Democratic is only significant in Model III, New regime*Autocratic and New state*Democratic are only significant in Model V, and New state*Autocratic is not significant in any model. However, my interest is in observing differences among the following state types to test my propositions: Existing State/Existing Democracy, Existing State/Existing Autocracy, Existing State/New Democracy, Existing State/New Autocracy, New State/Democracy, New State/Autocracy. Because I use multiple interaction terms to capture the effects of political transitions, the interpretation of model estimates for comparing militarization across these state types is not straightforward and the non-significance of the coefficients for the interactive terms are not necessarily informative. In a multiplicative interaction model, the significance or non-significance of model parameters themselves are not necessarily of great interest (Brambor et al 2006). Because the coefficients in multiplicative interaction models do not indicate the average effects of variables as they do in additive models, the findings of these analyses are most usefully interpreted in the tables of substantive effects that include recalculated levels of statistical significance. The substantive effects are the sum of the effects for each state type. For example, the effect for New State/Democracy is the sum of the coefficients for New state*Democratic, New state, and Democratic. The asterisks indicate the significance of the interaction effect from the recalculated standard error. The standard error (SE) is recalculated as follows: \( SE = \sqrt{var(\beta_1) + var(\beta_3) + 2*cov(\beta_1\beta_3)} \) which in this
example would be $SE = \sqrt{var(\beta_{\text{newstate}}) + var(\beta_{\text{newstate} \times \text{democracy}}) + 2 \cdot cov(\beta_{\text{newstate} \times \text{democracy}})}$. 

The substantive effects of each state type on $\text{Milspend/GDP}$ are presented in Table 3.4. I first proposed (Proposition 3.1) that democracies militarize less than autocracies. Across the different models of military spending there is fairly consistent support for this. In Model I the effects of Existing Autocracy and New Autocracy are both positive and significant while the effect of Existing Democracy is negative and non-significant and the effect of New Democracy is negative and significant. Even when controlling for New state in Models II through V, every type of democracy, whether new or existing or in a new or existing state, consistently invests less than any type of autocracy. This finding is only somewhat weaker when examining military spending during the Cold War, but is generally consistent with existing research on the relationship between regime type and militarization.

Next I proposed that new democracies militarize less than existing democracies (Proposition 3.2) and this is supported by the findings. In Model I, the substantive effect of New Democracy is greater in magnitude (-0.13) than the effect of Existing Democracy (-0.11) and is significant. Interestingly, when
controlling for *New state* in subsequent models, Existing State/New Democracies are found to spend less than Existing State/Existing Democracies in the Post-Cold War era (Model V), but not during the Cold War (Models II through IV) where they are found to spend more. Thus, new democracies that emerged in existing states during the Cold War seem to be an exception to this pattern.

Proposition 3.3 stated that new states militarized less than existing states during the Cold War. There is little evidence supporting this proposition. First it should be noted in Table 3.3 in Model IV, that the coefficient for *New state* (-0.22) is not significant. This coefficient represents the effect of New State/Semi-Democracy – the baseline category of regime type. Looking at the substantive effects for Model IV in Table 3.4, it can be seen that among democracies that the effect of New State/Democracy on military spending (-0.00) is not statistically significant. Among autocracies, the effect of New State/Autocracy (0.37) is not statistically significant either.

I proposed (Proposition 3.4) that new states in the Post-Cold War era militarize more than existing states. The findings, based on the substantive effects for Model V, are mixed and lend little support for the proposition. In the Post-Cold War era, military spending in new states compared to existing states seems to vary by regime type. Among democracies, I find strong evidence that new states spend less than existing states – an effect of -0.65 compared to -0.26 and 0.17. Among autocracies, similar findings are apparent. New states seem to spend less than existing states with existing regimes. New State/Autocracy has an effect of 1.68 which is not statistically significant while Existing State/Existing
Autocracy has a significant effect of 2.21. If we consider that without statistical significance, the effect of New State/Autocracy cannot be considered different from 0.00, it also appears to be less than the significant effect of Existing State/New Autocracy (0.66).

Lastly, in Proposition 3.5 I proposed that democracies in new states militarize less than new democracies in existing states. I find strong evidence in Model V that New State/Democracies (-0.65) spend less than Existing State/New Democracies (-0.26) in the Post-Cold War era. The substantive effect for New State/Democracy in Models II through IV are not significant offering little evidence for this proposition in the Cold War era.
Turning to Tables 3.5 and 3.6 I find similar results in the analyses of Milsize/pop. The Wald statistics for each model are highly significant suggesting that the variables in each model are jointly significant. As in the analyses of military spending, based on the $R^2$ statistic I find that the model has much greater explanatory power in the Post-Cold War era than during the Cold War. The $R^2$ for Model V is 0.51 compared to 0.13 to 0.19 for Models I through IV.
The coefficients of Autocratic are greater than the coefficients of Democratic and significant in each model, suggesting that Existing State/Existing Autocracies militarize more than Existing State/Existing Democracies. As in the analysis of Milspend/GDP I compare the substantive effects of each state type on Milsize/pop. and the recalcified statistical significance of each interactive effect to better test my propositions. First, in the analysis of military size (Milsize/pop.) I find similar results to the analysis of military spending (Milspend/GDP) for Proposition 3.1 – that democracies militarize less than autocracies. In each model, every type of democracy, whether new or existing or in a new or existing state, consistently militarize less than any type of autocracy. Unlike in the analysis of military spending where I found strong evidence, in the analysis of military size I find only weak evidence for Proposition 3.2 – that New Democracies militarize less than Existing Democracies. In Model I, I find that the substantive effect for New Democracy is equal to the substantive effect for Existing Democracy – both -0.06 – and neither is significant. Thus, there is no clear difference between the two.

Proposition 3.3 is that new states should militarize less than existing states during the Cold War. I find a bit stronger evidence for this in the analysis of
military size than I did in the analysis of military spending. Still, the relationship between new and old states only seems to apply within regime types and not across regime types. First, the coefficient for New state in Model IV (-0.12) is negative and highly significant. Since Semi-democratic is the baseline regime type, this represents the effect for New State/Semi-democracy suggesting that among semi-democracies, new states militarize less. However, the effect of New State/Democracy (-0.09) is not significant. The effect for New State/Autocracy (0.06) is positive and significant. While it is less than the effect of Existing State/Existing Autocracy, it is not less than the effect of Existing State/New Autocracy. It is also greater than the effect of any type of democracy. Thus, there is not clear evidence that new states, regardless of regime type, militarized less during the Cold War than existing states.

For Proposition 3.4, I again find little evidence in the Post-Cold War era that new states militarize more than existing states. As in the previous analyses, the effects seem to vary by regime type. First, the coefficient for New state in Model V is positive and highly significant. Since Semi-democratic is the baseline regime type, this represents the effect for New State/Semi-democracy and suggests that among semi-democracies, new states militarize more than existing states. Next, the substantive effect for New State/Democracy is less than the effects for Existing State/Existing Democracy and Existing State/New Democracy, suggesting that among democracies, new states militarize less than existing states. Lastly, among autocracies, New State/Autocracy has the greatest positive effect on military size. In the analysis of military spending, New
State/Autocracy had the second greatest effect with Existing State/Existing Autocracy having the most. It might be interesting to make a closer examination of this difference in future research. Altogether, there is no consistent pattern for militarization in new states after the Cold War – patterns only exist within regime types.

Lastly, in Proposition 3.5 I proposed that democracies in new states militarize less than new democracies in existing states. As in the analysis of military spending, I find strong evidence for this proposition in the Post-Cold War era. The effect for New State/Democracy (-0.29) is consistently significant and less than the effect for Existing State/New Democracy (-0.07) in Model V.

**E. Discussion**

Although I use Fordham and Walker’s basic research design to analyze militarization, I modify it in three major ways: I disaggregate the sample by era, control for recent regime change, and control for recent new statehood. These modifications have each proven rewarding in improving our empirical understanding of militarization and informing my argument about how NTS leaders seek political survival through balancing the needs of national security and domestic policy. I find strong evidence for Propositions 3.1 that democracies militarize less than autocracies. I find strong evidence for Proposition 3.4 in the Post-Cold War era that new democracies in existing states militarize more than democratic new states. I find strong evidence that new democracies spend less than existing democracies on their military – supporting Proposition 3.2, but weaker evidence that they have smaller militaries. I do not find evidence that new
states in general militarize less than existing states, regardless of the era. Instead, patterns are found to differ by regime type. Among democracies I find evidence after the Cold War that new states militarize less than existing states. Among autocracies during the Cold War, the patterns of militarization are ambiguous. After the Cold War, New State/Autocracies militarize more than Existing State/New Autocracies, but while they have larger militaries than Existing State/Existing Autocracies, they seem to spend less. A finding that is perhaps as unexpected as it is intriguing is that the model of militarization has much greater explanatory power during the Post-Cold War era than the Cold War era. If this was only found for the model of Milspend/GDP it might be explained as a function of an intervening economic variable that is adding “noise” to the older data. But the fact that this is found for the Milsize/pop. model suggests that there is something systematically different about militarization in the two eras. That is, Post-Cold War cases seem to better fit the model while Cold War cases may be more idiosyncratic or more affected by some unobserved variable. Most significant to this study, regime type and political transitions seem to have a greater impact on levels of militarization after the Cold War. Thus, these variables may be more significant to determining national security policy in the contemporary era. A possible explanation for the difference between eras might be gleaned from observing that Intl. war battle deaths/pop. and Total power of allies have stronger predictive power after the Cold War than during. This may suggest that that while militarization has dropped among most states after the Cold War, it is still high among those states engaged in international conflict and
their allies. Still, this merits closer attention in future studies. From examining
how NTSs invest in militarization, I now turn to examining how they utilize their
military in resolving international disputes.
III. The Use of Military Force by Newly Transitioned States

A. Democratization and International Conflict

When leaders chose to initiate militarized conflict against another state, they divert resources that could otherwise be used for social and economic development and other domestic policy to national security activities. They also risk the destruction of their country’s resources – material and human – if their action triggers violent conflict. Still, engaging in militarized conflict may help the leader protect or promote their foreign policy goals and can potentially catalyze national unity and support for the leader and regime. This is similar to the expectation of the diversionary theory of war that posits that leaders can escalate international conflict to divert their public’s attention from their shortcomings in domestic policy. However, in the case of NTS leaders, they may also use foreign policy as an instrument to not only build support for themselves individually but for the political regime itself. Therefore, while militarized conflict can limit the resources available to a leader to execute domestic policies, it may offer an opportunity to garner political support and promote his or her political survival.

Foreign rivals may challenge NTSs to test the ability and commitment of leaders of new regimes to defend their national interests and test the ability and commitment of leaders of new states to defend their sovereignty. To some extent, the study of conflict involvement is the study of how well states can resolve disputes diplomatically before they become militarized with a threat or use of force. A leader often can choose whether to respond to a dispute with conciliation or belligerence. The spread of democracy is widely believed to have a pacifying
influence on relations between states. The dyadic democratic peace proposition - that states are less likely to fight each other if they are democratic - has been so persuasive that it has influenced official United States foreign policy. There are 124 references to “democracy,” “democracies,” or “democratic” – not including 80 mentions of “freedom” – across the 49 pages of the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States. Specifically, it claims: “democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supported extremism; and extending peace and prosperity” (p. 3). Echoing this theme on the third anniversary of the Iraq War, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2006: B.07) declared that “the rationale for a free and democratic Iraq is as compelling today as it was three years ago. A free and stable Iraq will not attack its neighbors, will not conspire with terrorists, will not pay rewards to the families of suicide bombers and will not seek to kill Americans.” However, considering that Iraq is currently surrounded by autocracies on all except its northern borders, it would not be clear to most proponents of the dyadic democratic peace proposition that a democratized Iraq would be a less belligerent Iraq (among others, see Ray 1995 and Maoz 1997). In addition, some scholars have argued that democratizing states are especially belligerent.

Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 9) argue that if states are experiencing democratic transitions, especially “incomplete” democratic transitions, conflict with other states is likely as leaders may use the nationalist appeal of an aggressive foreign policy to gain legitimacy in the midst of intense competition
among interest groups and weak institutions. They assert that “nationalism helps elites to rally the support of the masses on the basis of sentiment, rather than seeking their loyalty by providing responsive institutions that protect their interests” (p. 10). These nationalist appeals may distort the nation’s perceptions of its chance of success in war or the “feasibility of reaching a compromise with an enemy,” thus leading to reckless and belligerent foreign policy decisions (p. 10). Mansfield and Snyder (1996, 2002a, 2005) find systematic evidence across the years 1816-1992 that new democracies, especially in the early years after transition, engage in more wars than established democracies. In addition, Mansfield and Snyder (2002b) find evidence across the years 1950-1985 that states experiencing “incomplete” democratization (and possibly “complete” democratization as well) have a heightened likelihood of engaging in a militarized interstate dispute (MID).

Bennett and Stam (2005) analyze MID 1816-1992 and find that democratization decreases the odds of conflict initiation and escalation from a reciprocated use of force, but it increases the odds of lower level disputes occurring. Taken together, the evidence is mixed. Part of this may be a product of differing empirical domains and dependent variables. However, there is reason to believe that even if Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis is correct, the connection between democratization and international belligerence may work differently in new and old states.

Leaders of new democracies have an incentive to win electoral support and to establish the vertical legitimacy of their regime through the effective provision of public goods and services in a time of intense political competition. However, the state institutions may lack the capability to deliver on public policy promises and, according to Mansfield and Snyder, the leader may be tempted to substitute appeals to nationalist sentiment for providing public goods by adopting a belligerent foreign policy and initiating militarized disputes. Thus, we would expect:

**Proposition 3.6: New Democracies are more belligerent in foreign relations than existing democracies.**

**B. State Building and Nationalistic Foreign Policy**

In a new state, a democratically elected leader has an even higher incentive to provide public goods than the leader of a new democracy in an existing state while potentially sharing as many if not more obstacles to delivering them. Thus, substituting nationalist appeals for effective policy may be even
more tempting. However, because the horizontal legitimacy of the new state and the membership of the nation may be in question, appeals to nationalism in new states are less likely to be effective. Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 2) note that the promulgation of nationalist ideology “can be used to convince newly empowered constituencies that the cleavage between the privileged and the masses is unimportant compared to the cleavages that divide nations, ethnic groups, or races.” In many instances nationalistic elites may attempt to rally their publics around the identity of a dominant ethnic or religious group and their perceived superiority to minority groups. But when elites attempt to ignite nationalism through a belligerent foreign policy, the identification of the citizen with the nation-state may be a more important in-group to emphasize in the face of a foreign threat. Elites will attempt to “clarify the lines between ‘the people’ and their external foes, who become scapegoats in a self-fulfilling strategy that rallies support for defense against external threats” (p. 10). Mansfield and Snyder point out that “shared experiences” over time such as war, military service, standardized education, and mass democracy are critical to forging a strong nation-state identity (p. 11). For people of democratizing existing states, these may be effective rallying points. But for people of new states, which may have less history as a unified or independent nation-state, these “shared experiences” may be lacking. Thus, national identities may be weaker and more ephemeral and nationalistic appeals may be less effective in garnering support for a leader and regime.
The World Values Survey provides data through which we can compare the level of national identity across different countries. The survey asks, “how proud are you to be [your nationality]?” Globally, in the 1999-2001 wave of the survey, 56 percent of respondents reported being “very proud” of their nationality. Out of the 81 countries surveyed, 9 were existing state/new democracies, and 8 were new state/democracies.16 Across existing state/new democracies, an average of 54 percent of respondents report being “very proud” of their nationality – comparable to the global average. However, across new state/democracies an average of only 31 percent report being “very proud” of their nationality. While this is by no means confirmatory evidence, these survey results suggest that nationalism is higher after democratization in existing states than in new states. Perhaps, as reality fails to meet expectations of a better life after political transition in new states, people not only question the efficacy and legitimacy of the regime, but the (horizontal) legitimacy of the state as well. This suggests that leaders of new state/democracies may have trouble appealing to nationalism for political support. This leads me to the following proposition:

**Proposition 3.8: Existing state/new democracies are more belligerent in foreign relations than new state/democracies.**
C. Analysis

I conduct a directed-dyadic analysis to test these propositions. A dyadic analysis can control for the opportunity available for a state to engage in conflict with another state in a given year and can examine how different variables affect the likelihood of conflict. I draw a sample of all politically-relevant directed dyads to examine those bilateral relationships most at risk of violent conflict (Lemke and Reed 2001) from 1950-1998 using the EUgene software and the specification of land-only direct contiguity (Bennett and Stam 2000). By using this research design, I can control for the two of the most powerful predictors of interstate conflict and war – contiguity and relative power between two states (Bennett and Stam 2004) – as well as controlling for whether two states are allies and have a history of conflict. I examine three outcome variables. First, I examine whether a state initiated a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) in a particular year (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). Second, I examine whether a state became involved in a MID in a particular year. Third, I examine whether a state became involved in an interstate war in a particular year (Small and Singer 1982).\(^\text{17}\) The outcome variable equals 1 only if it is the first year of initiation of or involvement in a particular conflict. I control for whether a state is a Major power, whether the two states in the dyad share an Alliance (Gibler and Sarkees 2002), and the number of Peace Years between the two states (Beck, Katz, and

---

\(^{17}\) A MID can include a threat of force, a show of force, a use of force, or a full-scale war. The Correlates of War project defines interstate war as a conflict with at least 1000 total battle deaths and at least 100 battle deaths per year.
I create a variable measuring the *Relative power* of each state (State A) to the other state (State B) in the dyad using each state’s CINC score (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) as follows: $\text{Relative power} = \frac{\text{CINC State A}}{\text{CINC State A} + \text{CINC State B}}$. In each model I include the dummy variables *Democratic* and *Autocratic* and let *Semi-democratic* serve as the baseline category, based on Reich (2002). The dummy variable *New regime* equals 1 if there has been a regime change of any sort within 10 years. I include the interactions *New regime*\,*Democratic* and *New regime*\,*Autocratic* to identify the effects of new democracies and new autocracies. The dummy variable *New state* equals 1 if a state is within 10 years of becoming a new state. I include the interactions *New state*\,*Democratic* and *New state*\,*Autocratic* to identify the effects of New State/Democracies and New State/Autocracies. I create a dummy variable to control for whether the two states in the dyad are *Jointly Democratic*.

### D. Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.7</th>
<th>Number of Dyads in which Conflict was Initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracies Autocracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/Existing Regime</td>
<td>247 (1.20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Regime</td>
<td>82 (2.68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>40 (2.36%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7 presents the number of dyads-years in which each state type initiated a MID and the percentage of total dyad-years of each state type that number.

---

18 The Correlates of War Project identifies major powers in this time period as United Kingdom (1816-present), United States (1899-present), Soviet Union/Russia (1922-present), France (1945-present), China (1950-present), Germany (1991-present), and Japan (1991-present).
comprises. Upon comparing the frequencies, it can be seen that autocracies initiated more conflicts than democracies, both in terms of absolute numbers of dyads and percentages of total dyads. A preliminary analysis of the percentages of dyad-years in which conflict was initiated lends support to both Proposition 3.6 and Proposition 3.7. In both the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, new democracies in existing states initiated conflicts in a higher percentage of dyad-years than existing democracies, but democratic new states initiated conflicts in a lower percentage of dyad-years than existing democracies.

The multivariate regressions offer a more rigorous test of the propositions. Table 3.8 presents estimates of models of MID initiation, while Table 3.9 presents the substantive effects of each state type and the predicted probabilities of MID
initiation for each state type. As in the analysis of militarization, the interpretation of these regression estimates is not straightforward. In a multiplicative interaction model, the significance or insignificance of model parameters are not necessarily of great interest (Brambor et al 2006). Because the coefficients in interaction models do not indicate the average effects of variables as they do in additive models, the findings of these analyses are most usefully understood in the tables of substantive effects with recalculated levels of statistical significance. The substantive effects are the sum of the effects for each state type. For example, the effect for New State/Democracy is the sum of the coefficients for New state*Democracy, New state, and Democratic. The asterisks indicate the significance of the interaction effect from the recalculated standard error. The standard error is recalculated as follows: \( SE = \sqrt{\text{var}(\beta_1) + \text{var}(\beta_3) + 2*\text{cov}(\beta_1, \beta_3)} \) which in this example would be \( SE = \sqrt{\text{var}(\beta_{\text{newstate}}) + \text{var}(\beta_{\text{newstate}*\text{democracy}}) + 2*\text{cov}(\beta_{\text{newstate}}, \beta_{\text{newstate}*\text{democracy}})} \). Each of the predicted probabilities are calculated as \( e^{(\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \ldots + \beta_k)} / (1 + e^{(\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \ldots + \beta_k)}) \). For example, the predicted probability of a new democracy initiating a MID, based on the estimates for Model I, would be: 
\[
e^{(-1.04 + -0.04 + 1.05 + -0.12 + .13 + .20 + -.35 + -3.15) / (1 + e^{(-1.04 + -0.04 + 1.05 + -0.12 + .13 + .20 + -.35 + -3.15)})} = 0.0349 \text{ or } 3.49\%.
\]

Turning first to Table 3.8, Model I controls for New regime, but not New state while Models II through V control for both. Models I through III are estimated on a sample of cases from 1950 to 1998, while Model IV is estimated on Cold War cases and Model V is estimated on Post-Cold War cases. Model III is the one model that controls for dyads that are Jointly Democratic. While
jointly democratic dyads are widely found to be more peaceful than other dyads, I am interested in analyzing the foreign relations of NTSs with other states regardless of regime type. I omit *Jointly democratic* from other models to simplify interpretation. When *Jointly democratic* is included it constrains models to estimating coefficients for dyads that do not include two democracies.

Upon examining the diagnostic statistics, it can be seen that according to the consistent significance of the Chi\(^2\) statistic, the variables in every model are jointly significant in explaining MID initiation. The R\(^2\) statistics are also fairly consistent across models – ranging from 0.17 to 0.19 – suggesting that the models have similar explanatory power. Unlike the models of military spending and military size, the model of MID initiation seems to have similar explanatory power in both the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras. The *Democratic* variable is only statistically significant for Model III where it has a value of 0.39. In Models I through IV *Autocratic* is consistently significant and greater than *Democratic*. Neither regime type variable is significant for the Post-Cold War Model V. Since these models control for *New regime* and/or *New state*, this suggests that, at least during the Cold War, Existing State/Existing Autocracies initiated more MIDs and thus were more belligerent than Existing State/Existing Democracies. *New regime* is positive and significant and *New state* is negative and significant in Models II through IV. Neither variable is significant in the Post-Cold War Model V.
As in the analyses of militarization, to test my propositions and sort out the effects of the various interactions, it is best to focus on the substantive effects and predicted probabilities of MID initiation by each state type in Table 3.9.

Proposition 3.7 is based on Mansfield and Snyder’s argument – that new democracies are more belligerent than existing democracies. Model I tests this argument. I find that not only is the effect of New Democracy (-0.02) not significant, it is less than the effect of Existing Democracy (0.13). Thus, there is no evidence to support this proposition. Interestingly, the effect of New Autocracy is significant and greater than the effect of Existing Autocracy, suggesting that new autocratic regimes are more belligerent than existing autocratic regimes, but this is beyond their argument. If there is no evidence for this proposition, from where are Mansfield and Snyder drawing their anecdotal and systematic evidence that democratizing states exhibit heightened belligerence? Models II through V offer some clues to this when controlling for
New state and Jointly democratic. When controlling for New state in Models II, the effects of Existing State/New Democracy and New State/Democracy are both non-significant. However, in Model III when Jointly democratic is controlled for, the effect of Existing State/New Democracy (0.71) on MID initiation is significant and larger than the effect of Existing State/Existing Democracy (0.39). When both controlling for New state and disaggregating by era, in the Cold War Model IV the substantive effect of Existing State/New Democracy is non-significant. But in the Post-Cold War Model V, the effect of Existing State/New Democracy (-0.64) is significant and less than that of Existing State/Existing Democracy (-0.01). At best, this suggests that Mansfield and Snyder’s argument about new democracies only applies to existing states in non-jointly democratic dyads during the Cold War – that is, in situations where new democracies have a dispute with a semi-democracy or autocracy. However, in the Post-Cold War era, it seems that democratizing states are clearly less belligerent than established democracies, whether they are in new states or not.

In Proposition 3.8 I argue that democracies in new states are less belligerent than new democracies in existing states. I find strong support for this proposition in Models III and V. In Model III when Jointly democratic is controlled for, I find that the effect of New State/Democracy (-0.75) on MID initiation is significant and less than the effect of Existing State/New Democracy (0.71). So, even though new democracies in existing states are found in this model to be more belligerent than established democracies, new democracies in new states are less belligerent than either new or existing democracies in existing
states. According to the predicted probabilities for Model III, existing state/new democracies are more than 4 times as likely to initiate a MID against a non-democracy in a given dyad-year as new state/democracies (7.12% probability compared to 1.74%). Furthermore, when the Post-Cold War era is analyzed in Model V, the effect of New State/Democracy (-2.08) is less than the effect of Existing State/New Democracies and in fact all other state types. When the Cold War era is analyzed alone, I find no statistically significant differences among different types of democracies. It is worth noting that among autocracies, new states were also less likely to initiate MIDs than existing states. Over the entire sample, Existing State/New Autocracies appear to be the most belligerent of states, and New State/Democracies appear to be the least.

The control variable estimates are fairly consistent across models. *Major power* and *Years of peace* are consistently negative and significant. It should be noted that in politically relevant dyads, major powers are the only states that share dyads with every other state which at least partly may account for the negative coefficient. Not surprisingly, countries that have a history of peace are likely to remain at peace. *Relative power* is positive and significant across each model suggesting that states are more likely to initiate MIDs against weaker states than more powerful states. *Alliance* is only significant for Models II and IV where it has a negative coefficient. This is interesting as it seems that alliances have a conflict dampening effect during the Cold War, but little effect in the Post-Cold War era and the effect is more pronounced when controlling for *New state*. *Jointly democratic* is negative and significant in Model III, but notably it does not
increase the $R^2$ from Model II which is estimated on the same sample suggesting that it adds little predictive power.

Table 3.10
LOGIT ESTIMATES OF MID INITIATION, MID INVOLVEMENT, AND WAR INVOLVEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directed-Ody Years: First 10 years of New Regime and New State</th>
<th>First 5 years of New Regime and New State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MID Initiation</td>
<td>MID Involv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model I</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model II</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model III</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regime</td>
<td>0.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regime/Democratic</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regime/Autocratic</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>-0.81***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/Democratic</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/Autocratic</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Power</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Peace</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-2.86***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR Chi²</td>
<td>3273.72***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>86931</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1 (two-tailed test) |

Table 3.11
SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS OF STATE TYPE ON CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MID Initiation</th>
<th>MID Involv.</th>
<th>War Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/Existing Democracy</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Democracy</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/Democracy</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/Autocratic</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Autocratic</td>
<td>1.10***</td>
<td>1.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/Autocratic</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>-0.51***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF CONFLICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MID Initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/Existing Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/Autocratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Autocratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/Autocratic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While I think that MID initiation more directly captures a state’s belligerence in foreign relations, I also analyze the effect of political transitions on MID involvement and War involvement in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. In Table 3.10, Models I through III are specified the same as Models II, IV, and V in Table 3.8, but with different dependent variables. Model I is the same as Model II in Table 3.8 and estimates a model of MID initiation, Model II estimates a model of MID
involvement, and Model III estimates a model of War involvement. Models IV through VI differ from Models I through III in that I use 5-year instead of 10-year measurements of New regime and New state to check the robustness of my findings. Judging from the Chi² statistics, the variables in each model are jointly significant. The R² statistics range from 0.18 to 0.20 which suggest that the models all have similar explanatory power. The R² statistics for Models II and V are slightly higher than those for Models I and IV, suggesting that MID involvement is better explained than MID initiation. Still, the differences are small.

Upon examining the substantive effects for Models I through III it can be seen that while there are no significant differences among democracies with regard to MID initiation, Existing State/New Democracies are more likely become involved in MIDs than Existing State/Existing Democracies during the first 10 years after transition, but less likely to become involved in full-fledged wars. When examining the effect of democratization in existing states on War involvement in Model III it can be seen that Existing State/New Democracies are less likely to engage in war than Existing State/Existing Democracies. When examining only the first five years of new regimes and new states in Models IV, it can be seen that the effect of Existing State/Existing Democracy is not statistically significant while the effect of Existing State/New Democracy (0.06) is significant. This suggests that during the first few years after regime change, new democracies in existing states are more belligerent than established democracies. The state type effects found for Models V and VI are similar to those for Models
II and III respectively. So, while Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis (and Proposition 3.7) seems to find limited support in MID initiation and involvement by existing states, there is no evidence, even just among existing states, that new democracies are more prone to war involvement.

Across Models I through V there is additional support for Proposition 3.8 – that New State/Democracies are less belligerent than Existing State/New Democracies. In Models III and VI, however, New State/Democracy does not have a significantly different effect on war involvement from other democracies. Across all the state types, Existing State/New Autocracies seem to be the most conflict prone, while New State/Democracies and New State/Autocracies are the least.

E. Discussion

In this analysis, I find only weak evidence to support one of the most prominent arguments about political transitions and militarized interstate conflict – that new democracies are more belligerent in their foreign relations than existing democracies. The little evidence I do find does not seem to apply to new regimes in new states, new regimes beyond the first few years after transition, and to conflicts occurring after 1989. That is not to say that leaders of new democracies do not sometimes attempt to appeal to nationalism through a belligerent foreign policy. If this happens, I argue that it should be less likely in new states than existing states, and indeed I find evidence that New State/Democracies are less belligerent than Existing State/New Democracies both during and after the Cold War.
I observe several other interesting connections between political transitions and conflict. There are much clearer differences among democracies in the Post-Cold War era than during the Cold War. Among autocracies during the Cold War, new states were more belligerent than new regimes in existing states, but less so than established autocracies. In the Post-Cold War era, while no significant difference are found between existing states with existing or new regime, new states are found to be less belligerent than either.

IV. Conclusion

Militarization and belligerence in foreign relations can increase security and support for a leader and regime but it also can constrain a leader’s domestic policy choices. The analyses in this chapter show that the costs and benefits of investing in a strong military and initiating a militarized dispute against another state are weighed differently in democracies and autocracies; new and old regimes; and new and old states. I argue that leaders of democracies have a greater incentive to provide public goods than leaders of autocracies. This is supported my findings that democracies militarize less than autocracies. I also find moderately strong support for my argument that leaders of new democracies have a greater incentive to provide public goods than leaders of autocracies. Lastly, I find strong support for my argument that leaders of new democracies in new states have an even greater incentive to provide public goods than those in existing states.

My findings on militarization corroborate systematic analyses that have found that democracies invest less in militarization than non-democracies. There
is little support for case evidence that new democracies invest more than established democracies – I find that the opposite is more likely true. My argument concerning the relationship between national security policy and policy survival finds the most support in the Post-Cold War era. Interestingly, the models of militarization seem to have the greatest explanatory power in the Post-Cold War era.

In my analyses of international conflict, I find little evidence for Mansfield and Snyder’s (2005) argument that new democracies are more belligerent than existing democracies. There is some evidence that during the Cold War, among existing states, and during the first few years after transition, new democracies were more belligerent than existing democracies, but they were clearly less belligerent after the Cold War. Across both eras, new state/democracies are less belligerent than existing state/existing democracies and existing state/new democracies. This supports my arguments (especially after the Cold War) that leaders of new democracies and new state/democracies need to place greater emphasis on public goods and services than leaders of existing state/existing democracies, and that leaders of new state/democracies may have trouble substituting appeals to nationalism for effective public policy as new states tend to have low levels of nationalism. Thus, they may be less likely to attempt diversionary tactics to distract from their shortcomings domestically. It is interesting that I find little evidence that leaders of new democracies are adopting strategies to appease the military through increased militarization and to rally popular support through international conflict involvement. The potential
usefulness of these strategies may be revealed in my analysis of how these policies affect political survival in Chapter 5.

While my arguments focus more on democracies, I observe some interesting patterns among autocracies in these analyses. In the contemporary era, new autocracies in existing states invest less in militarization than existing autocracies. New state/autocracies militarize more than existing state/autocracies, but spend less than existing state/autocracies. In the contemporary era, there is little difference in belligerence among different types of autocratic existing states, but autocratic new states are less likely to initiate a militarized conflict than autocratic existing states. However, during the Cold War, new autocracies in existing states were much more belligerent and conflict prone than existing autocracies. But, autocracies in new states were much less belligerent than existing state/autocracies and little more belligerent than new state/democracies.

Secretary Rumsfeld (2006) argues that “a free and stable Iraq will not attack its neighbors.” This study of conflict behavior in politically-relevant dyads lends credibility to his claim. Democracies are less belligerent when resolving diplomatic disputes than autocracies, and new democracies are less belligerent than existing democracies. Although Iraq is an existing state, the instigators of the widespread sectarian strife seem to question not only the vertical legitimacy of the new regime but also the horizontal legitimacy of the state. With low horizontal legitimacy, Iraq’s leaders should have trouble attempting to substitute appeals to nationalism for effective public policy through a belligerent foreign
policy, thus further decreasing the likelihood of MID initiation. The Iraqi leadership would more likely become belligerent if the democratic regime should fall to a new autocrat. The larger problem is that the Iraqi leadership must devote so much time, energy, and resources to establishing internal security, that they are constrained in their ability to provide other public goods and services which are important to garnering legitimacy and support and ultimately securing their political survival. The next chapter will analyze strategies of international security cooperation that can allow leaders of newly transitioned states to gain foreign assistance in promoting their national security and greater freedom in executing domestic policy.
Chapter 4

Newly Transitioned States and International Security Cooperation

I. Introduction

The preceding chapter analyzed strategies of militarization and use of military force that newly transitioned state (NTS) leaders (ie. leaders of new states, new democracies, and new autocracies) can adopt in pursuit of foreign policy goals, but will potentially constrain a leader’s domestic policy options and ability to secure political survival. This chapter will analyze strategies of international security cooperation that NTS leaders can adopt that not only can promote foreign policy goals, but potentially free resources for securing political survival through effective domestic policy.

The proliferation of NTSs after the Cold War has been highlighted by the breakup of the Soviet Union between 1990 and 1991 and its devolution into 15 independent states. These successor states would over 10 years forge a tangled array of alignments and alliances. Some cooperative relationships would center on a common historical-cultural heritage or a shared interest in balancing the hegemonic influence of Russia, while others were less predictable. It is common worldwide to observe cooperation along cultural lines or influenced by balance of power considerations. What is distinctive about the security decisions of post-Soviet leaders is that they faced the common challenges of establishing both a new state and a new political regime and these challenges may have altered the typical decision making calculus leaders adopt for issues of national security. For
example, any observer who might expect new states to cooperate based on a shared geographic, religious, or cultural interest would be surprised by the alignment of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUUAM). All leaders of GUUAM states, however, faced the common domestic threat of secessionist groups (Dwan and Pavliuk 2000). Secessionist groups hinder the ability of new state leaders to establish the horizontal legitimacy of their state’s new boundaries and citizenship which together define the domain of the leader’s authority. The common interest of establishing horizontal legitimacy has served as a rallying point for new state leaders of Eurasia in the 1990’s as much as for the new states leaders of Africa in the 1950’s and 1960’s where many new states were also regionally clustered.

Nine months earlier and 5,000 miles to the south, Namibia won independence from apartheid South Africa and, unlike the post-Soviet states, found itself geographically isolated from other NTSs. Nonetheless, Namibia also aggressively pursued international cooperation at least partly to promote the greater security of the state and regime. Within a few months of independence Namibia joined the United Nations, the (British) Commonwealth, the Southern African Development Community, the Lomé Convention, and the South Africa Customs Union (Evans 1993). Over the next 5 years it sought assistance from the United States in training 76 of its top military officers and over the next 10 years it would join with many other states to launch two peacekeeping operations in Angola, and a third in Sierra Leone. Perhaps surprisingly, despite the security threats of a festering territorial dispute with South Africa and an unrelenting civil
war in neighboring Angola it would be 9 years before it signed its first formal treaty of military alliance.

Leaders of fragile regimes – which characterize most new states and new regimes – have often been observed seeking to build networks of external alliances to deter security threats from abroad and promote the prospects of regime survival (Azar and Moon 1988, Casper 1995). NTS leaders often have the opportunity to pursue a very different diplomatic strategy from their predecessors – those who previously governed their country. While leaders of new states typically begin with a relatively blank slate upon which to establish diplomatic relations, even the emergence of a new regime in an old state can result in the significant reorganization of the state’s alliance portfolio (Siverson and Starr 1994, Leeds 2003). Leaders of NTSs that experience new statehood or regime change often seek help from abroad in managing external security threats so that they may turn their attention to consolidating power and managing internal security threats at home. An environment of heightened uncertainty exists in the wake of a major political transition, and whether the state is old or new, democratic or autocratic, the NTS leader will often face rivals at home and – less so in the African case – abroad who seek to challenge their power. To ensure their political survival, an NTS leader must not only secure their position within the governing regime, but establish the legitimacy and secure the survival of the regime itself. If another state agrees to give defense assistance to an NTS, the leader may be able to invest resources that would otherwise be needed for defense towards these two tasks. A vast literature examines why states engage in
international security cooperation, but less attention has been paid to how states are most likely to cooperate.

States can engage in many forms of international security cooperation. Formal security relationships span a continuum from an alliance between sovereign states where each state legally remains at “arms length,” to more hierarchical protectorates or empires (Lake 1996). At the less hierarchical end, states can cooperate not only through formal alliances but also within less-formal “alignments” (Morrow 2000). Whether formalized or not, during times of peace states can cooperate in many ways including through guarantees of mutual defense, engaging in joint military exercises, exchanging military advisors, transferring major weapons systems and technology, joining multilateral peacekeeping operations, or granting basing rights. During times of war, states can form strategic coalitions to oppose rivals or promise neutrality. While international security cooperation is often thought to be more conflictual and unstable than economic cooperation (Lipson 1984), security and economic cooperation are often intertwined. Sometimes, as in many agreements among post-Soviet states, security may be the goal of a cooperative agreement, but economics is often the grounds on which states agree to cooperate (Dwan and Pavliuk 2000). In other instances, regional trade organizations like the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that were originally formed to coordinate economic activity later expand their purview into coordinating responses to security issues. So while it can be assumed that NTS leaders would like to engage in security cooperation, and while it can be observed that there are
many possible forms of cooperation, we know little about which types of cooperation they are most likely to engage in.

A larger problem is that we have little theoretical or empirical guidance regarding which types of security cooperation any state is most likely to choose at any given time. While much research has examined the level of cooperation a state is likely to engage in and whom a state is likely to cooperate with, little systematic work has examined why a state might substitute one form of security cooperation for another.\textsuperscript{19} Foreign policy substitutability is the idea that there are “alternative modes of response” available to a leader to deal with a given situation (Starr 2000:128). Throughout this dissertation I argue that while most leaders value political survival and strategically choose policies to that end, the political survival of NTS leaders is often especially precarious which causes them to adopt a different decision making calculus than leaders of more established states. NTS leaders need to maintain a winning coalition of supporters within their regime in the midst of being challenged by questions over the legitimacy of their regime and possibly even their state, and must govern through weak institutions in the environment of heightened uncertainty that follows major political transitions. By informing the logic of bargaining theory with the insights of selectorate theory, I propose and test a framework for understanding which types of security cooperation a state is most likely to engage in, based on the state’s regime type,

\textsuperscript{19} One exception is Palmer and Morgan (2006) who examine how the decision to give foreign aid is substituted for the decision to form alliances. However, foreign aid here is more general than, if not exclusive of, security aid.
whether the regime is old or new, and whether the state is old or new. To this end, selectorate theory offers expectations of how the regime type of a state—democratic or autocratic—will influence its leader’s policy preferences. Bargaining theory offers expectations of how a leader’s policy preferences and institutional constraints will influence the type of international agreements they are likely to make. While each NTS leader may have preferences for bilateral or multilateral cooperation, and formal or less formalized agreements, the newness of their regime and/or state may constrain their ability to satisfy their preferences.

One preference leaders may have is for multilateral over bilateral agreements if a greater number of cooperating partners allows them greater policymaking flexibility. Leaders of democracies in particular need greater flexibility than leaders of autocracies to secure their political survival. According to selectorate theory, leaders of democracies need to satisfy a large constituency to stay in power—the winning coalition of voters that elected them in the first place. With limited resources they are likely to invest in more goods that offer public benefits which can be enjoyed by many and benefit their winning coalition than private goods for the benefit of specific individuals (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Leaders of autocracies can often satisfy a smaller winning coalition of key elite supporters by providing them with desirable private goods and can de-emphasize the provision of public goods in order to keep more state resources for themselves. In order to provide the necessary public goods, leaders of democracies will likely desire fewer constraints on domestic policy and civilian spending, and would prefer to enter into international agreements that place
fewer constraints on their policymaking autonomy. A leader’s ability to bargain with more than one state over more issues should make it easier for him or her to maintain commitments to multilateral agreements than bilateral agreements. With multiple partners, leaders are not beholden to satisfying a single stronger security partner. Different bargains can be made with different partners over different issues. Thus, democratic leaders should prefer the flexibility of multilateral cooperation. Because NTS leaders not only need to maintain their standing within their regime, but also secure the survival of the regime itself, leaders of new democracies in old states and new democracies in new states should desire this flexibility even more than established democracies. A second preference for many NTS leaders is for their security relationships to be formalized in alliances. A formalized agreement can enhance the deterrence and defensive value of a relationship and the legitimacy of new states.

Regardless of their preference, leaders of NTSs may have difficulty finding partners to form formal alliances due to the uncertainty that surrounds the survival of their regime. NTS democracies, however, are more likely to formalize their security relationships than NTS autocracies as formal agreements should endure longer when made with democracies, and informal agreements should endure longer when made with autocracies due to the greater frequency and institutionalization of leadership change in democracies.

In this chapter, I will test these arguments by analyzing two common and important forms of international security cooperation: alliances and arms transfers. First, I analyze whether NTS states that pursue alliances are more likely
to engage in bilateral or multilateral alliances. Second, I analyze the likelihood of an NTS state pursuing alliances or arms transfers. Third, I analyze whether states are more likely to receive arms transfers from formal allies or through less formalized partnerships. This study will not only analyze how NTSs engage in security cooperation, but propose a broader framework that connects the characteristics of a state’s regime type to its pursuit of a particular type of cooperation. First, I will discuss why alliances and arms transfers are two particularly interesting instruments of security cooperation to examine. Second, I will discuss the particular predicament that NTS leaders face when seeking security cooperation and offer a series of propositions for the form that cooperation is likely to take. Third, I will conduct a series of quantitative analyses of alliances and arms transfers from 1950 to 1998 to test these propositions. Fourth, I will summarize the results of this study and their contribution to understanding the national security calculus of NTS leaders.

II. Two Instruments of International Security Cooperation: Alliances and Arms Transfers.

Similar to Martin (2005), I propose that the varieties of international security cooperation can be classified on two dimensions: the degree of formalism and the number of partners. While Martin focuses on agreements made by the US, I propose a broader framework for cross-national comparison. First, cooperation can vary in the formalism of the relationship between two or more states. Leaders can formalize a relationship in a written and (usually) public treaty of alliance, or they may pursue less formalized verbal agreements,
diplomatic understandings, or ad hoc agreements. Second, numerous states can cooperate on a security issue, but an important distinction exists between bilateral and multilateral cooperation. A negotiation between two states offers a bargaining dynamic different from a negotiation between three or more states.

In this chapter, I examine how NTS leaders might pursue two common forms of security cooperation: alliances and arms transfers. I focus on these two forms of cooperation because they occur frequently, have fairly generalizable characteristics and consequences, and can be analyzed with cross-national data that has been systematically collected and compiled. In addition, they are highly amenable to testing my propositions as alliances can be bilateral or multilateral and arms transfers can occur between states within formal alliances or outside of alliances. One major challenge I will find in analyzing engagement in alliances and arms transfers is that the superpower rivalry of the Cold War likely shaped and constrained the opportunities for cooperation much differently from those that exist in the Post-Cold War era. I find that patterns of cooperation are often quite different between the two eras.

A. Alliances

There is widespread agreement that a formal alliance is one that is formalized in writing, has a membership of independent states, and stipulates coordination of policy in the event of, or in preparation for, a military conflict.

---

20 While there have been some notable “secret” alliances throughout history, most modern alliances are intentionally public as transparency can benefit the agreement’s deterrence and defensive value.
(Gibler and Sarkees 2004, Leeds 2005). For the purposes of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project, Leeds classifies alliances as mutual defense pacts, offense pacts, defense/offense pacts, nonaggression pacts, neutrality pacts, or consultation pacts. Alliance treaties can vary in their obligations, enforcement, governance, and their potential for time extension, membership expansion, or termination. Thus, the actual extent of cooperation within an alliance can vary. While alliances can be either bilateral or multilateral, they are usually considered a more formal type of security cooperation.

Most scholars agree that states join alliances when it is to their net benefit. As Lake (1999: 51) states, “to justify cooperation, there must be some advantage to pooling resources and effort with others that cannot be obtained unilaterally; otherwise polities are better off relying upon their own resources.” Militarization and alliance joining are thus often seen as substitutable policies a leader can choose between – they share the goal of promoting national security, but may entail different costs and consequences. Leaders may have difficulty attaining security through militarization if they lack the resources to adequately arm against foreign rivals. They may be unable to attain security through alliances if they lack the willingness, opportunity, or ability to create alliances with adequately strong allies. Militarization and alliance joining can differ in how quickly and reliably they can offer a leader enhanced security. Morrow (1993: 208) explains that unilateral militarization “produces a more reliable improvement in security slowly at the political cost of diverting resources to the military” while alliance joining “produces additional security quickly but with less reliability and
at the political cost of moderating conflicting interests with the prospective ally.”

Still, if effective security relationships can be created outside of alliances, Morrow (2000: 64) asks, “why write them down?” In answering this question, he argues that compared to less formal alignments, formal alliances can function as more effective instruments of “signaling” and “commitment.” An alliance can signal to potential rivals that two states share a common interest and are committed to aiding each other if threatened militarily – thus having deterrent value. And, it can strengthen the commitment of members to each other by improving the ability of allies to fight together through military coordination and impose audience costs on members who fail to honor their commitment – thus increasing its defensive value. Leeds et al (2000) find that states ultimately meet their alliance commitments about 75 percent of the time.

When leaders enter an alliance they agree to some sort of constraint on their behavior – often in the form of an obligation to each other. This can include agreeing to consult in times of war, promising to defend the other state(s) if attacked, or committing to maintain a certain level of military capability. Despite agreeing to some constraint, Palmer and Morgan (2006) argue that joining an alliance should, on the whole, increase a state’s freedom of action by enabling it to obtain its desired foreign policy goals with fewer resources than it could otherwise. Thus, by joining an alliance, a leader frees resources for the pursuit of additional goals. While Palmer and Morgan focus on the pursuit of foreign policy goals, I argue that for an NTS leader these resources are most significantly freed
for the pursuit of domestic policy goals that can help consolidate the power of the
new regime and secure the leader’s political survival.

B. Arms Transfers

Arms transfers are often defined as shipments of “arms or related goods
and services by sale, loan or gift from one country to another; such shipments
may be made by one government to another, by a government to specific
individuals or forces (e.g., rebels) abroad, or by a manufacturer to either a foreign
government or forces” (Pearson 1994: 7). Arms transfers are almost always
bilateral and can be conducted between states that are allies or between states that
have a less formalized security relationship. While leaders usually import arms
toward the end of promoting national security goals, they also may desire arms to
promote the prestige of the regime, appease the military, or facilitate corruption
and patronage (Huntington 1991, Brzoska 2004). While many arms transfers are
straightforward business transactions for profit, many are not. Sometimes arms
are transferred from one state to another as a “gift” or “aid.” Such transfers can
increase the military capabilities of the recipient state without requiring it to
invest its own resources. Other transfers are given at discounts or on credit which
may be a subtler sort of aid. Still other transfers are bartered as a trade of arms
for different arms or other material goods. Some arms are manufactured new,
while others are second-hand.

Because of its national security implications, the arms trade tends to be
heavily regulated by the government of the supplier state. A leader’s governance
over arms exports is critical for control over their state’s foreign policy and the
decision to trade arms has important international security implications. The states that are selected by the supplier state as recipient states often reflect the supplier state’s security interests and arms trade relationships may be contingent on the continued satisfaction of the supplier state with the recipient state’s policies, both foreign and domestic. For instance, during the Cold War the US often armed anti-Marxist governments who were friendly toward American business investment and unfriendly toward the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, US law has linked the authorization of arms transfers to the promotion of human rights, civilian control of the military, and democratic governance in recipient states (US National Defense Authorization Act, 2006: Sec. 1206). Thus, an exchange of arms from one state for policy concessions from another state often occurs.

Brzoska (2004) finds that after the Cold War, the arms trade has become more “commercial” with more arms being transferred for profit and fewer given as aid. This global shift is partly explained by the fall of the Soviet Union – which had been the largest supplier of military aid – and the fact that Russia no longer gives arms to allies for free or on “easy credit” (p. 112). Currently, the US is not only the largest exporter of arms but also the largest supplier of military aid. However, as Broska notes, the US no longer sees military aid as a substitute for development aid as it did under its Cold War containment strategy and its perceived utility has declined somewhat.

When a pair of states engage in one form of security cooperation, they are likely to engage in other forms of cooperation as well, and arms trade partners and
alliance partners are no exceptions. Pairs of states may trade arms without forming an alliance, form an alliance without trading arms, or both trade arms and form an alliance. However, the decision to find arms transfer partners is not usually made independently from the decision to find alliance partners. Arms trade partners can strengthen the effectiveness and reliability of their security relationship through forging an alliance, and allies can strengthen their relationship through transfers of arms. Krause (2005), for instance, argues that arms transfers can increase the likelihood that allies rely on similar weapons, which can improve joint coordination between allies of military preparedness, which in turn can lead to an increase in the alliance’s deterrence value. In this way, arms transfers not only substitute for, but can supplement defense pacts. In the following sections I discuss and analyze how NTS leaders are likely to join alliances and seek arms transfers.

III. Strategies for International Security Cooperation

NTS leaders may have preferences for the mode of security cooperation they would like to engage in including the number of partners and the degree of formality, but face challenges in satisfying their preferences. I examine the engagement of NTSs in international security cooperation through the instruments of alliances and arms transfers in three parts. First, I examine the preference of states for multilateral or bilateral alliances. Second, I compare the extent to which NTSs and established states engage in alliances and arms transfers. Third, I examine the extent to which NTSs formalize their security relationships and arms transfer agreements through alliances.
A. Choosing the Number of Security Partners

While multilateral and bilateral agreements can each provide security to an NTS, they can also offer distinctly different bargaining dynamics which may influence a leader’s preference for one or the other. I argue that NTS leaders will select the type of agreement that best promotes their political survival based on the insights of selectorate theory that connect a regime’s political institutions to a leader’s policy preferences and the insights of bargaining theory that connect policy preferences to bargaining outcomes. In particular, leaders will select agreements that allow them the necessary policy autonomy to ensure their political survival, and this requisite policy autonomy will differ by regime type.

According to selectorate theory, leaders of democracies need to satisfy a large constituency to stay in power – the winning coalition of voters that elected them – with beneficial policies. With limited resources they are likely to invest in more public goods that offer benefits which can be enjoyed by many, than private goods for the benefit of privileged individuals (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Leaders of autocracies often can satisfy key elites through the provision of private goods and can de-emphasize the provision of public goods. In addition, autocrats are more threatened by internal rivals of the regime and require the autonomy to use more instruments of repression. As Bueno de Mesquita et al show, the value of private goods an autocrat needs to secure political survival is less than the value of public goods needed by a democratic leader. Because it allows them to provide the necessary public goods, leaders of democracies will likely demand greater policy autonomy than leaders of autocracies. This proposition is
supported by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s (2004) analysis of foreign aid flows and argument that donor states, whether democratic or autocratic, are more likely to aid autocracies because it is easier for an autocratic leader to make policy concessions to the donor in exchange for aid and still be able to secure political survival at home. Because leaders of new democracies not only need to secure political survival within the democratic regime but establish the legitimacy of the regime itself, they will likely demand even greater policy autonomy than leaders of established democracies. New regimes can increase their legitimacy by demonstrating their efficacy at governance, and people will judge the efficacy of a new regime based on their evaluation of the regime’s early leaders (Easton 1965, Linz 1978). Therefore, the decisions of NTS leaders will likely have a greater impact on regime survival than the actions of established regime leaders. In new democracies we might expect leaders to make a greater effort to satisfy people outside of their winning coalition than in established democracies, for if a regime falls, the support of the winning coalition alone will not save the leader from losing office. Thus, leaders of new democracies will seek to provide more public goods and will need greater policy autonomy to provide them than leaders of established democracies.

Bilateral and multilateral agreements do not inherently differ in the amount of security they can offer a state – some bilateral agreements are more consequential than multilateral agreements and vice-versa depending on who the partner states are and the terms of the agreement. However, by the logic of bargaining theory, multilateral agreements should allow a leader greater policy
autonomy than bilateral agreements and thus democratic leaders should have a stronger preference for them than autocratic leaders. Bilateral cooperation is often characterized by “asymmetry” where a more powerful state is partnered with a weaker state and each benefits differently from the relationship. The weaker state gains security from the more powerful state. The more powerful state gains favorable policy concessions from the weaker state. This exchange is known as the “security-autonomy trade-off” (Alfeld 1984, Morrow 1991). The weaker state gains security, but loses some policy autonomy. While “policy autonomy” traditionally referred to freedom of action in the international realm, it has also come to encompass freedom in domestic policy as well. Beyond the US’s aforementioned demands for human rights observance and democratic governance in exchange for arms transfers, the more powerful state might demand basing, harbor, or overflight access for their military or policy concessions to promote their domestic business interests such as favorable licensing, regulations, and taxation for firms of the more powerful partner operating in the country of the weaker partner. Because of their potentially precarious domestic position, not to mention that NTSs tend to be less economically developed, NTS leaders are likely to find themselves on the weak end of an asymmetric relationship. A state that can provide an NTS greater security is likely one with an established regime and a leader less concerned with domestic security. A state less concerned with regime survival and domestic security can focus greater attention and resources on international security. Therefore, the established state will likely expect policy concessions in exchange for security assistance as the NTS is less likely to be able
to contribute directly to the established state’s security. Because this power asymmetry will constrain an NTS leader’s policy making autonomy, we might expect leaders of new democracies to be more reluctant to enter into bilateral security agreements than leaders of new autocracies.

While both multilateral and bilateral agreements can be highly restrictive, because of the bargaining dynamics of having more than one partner, multilateral agreements are likely to allow leaders greater policy autonomy. Morrow (1991) observes that minor powers have tried to gain security while avoiding a loss of policy autonomy by forming multilateral alliances with other minor powers. Similarly, NTS states might ally together to offset their individual weakness. Krause and Singer (2001) additionally observe that in multilateral alliances, minor powers can form intra-alliance coalitions to avoid dependence on any one ally. These strategies can help weaker states overcome power asymmetries by allying with multiple minor powers. More significantly for medium to major powers, Conconi and Perroni (2002) argue that multilateral negotiations offer greater opportunities for issue linkage than bilateral negotiations allowing countries to form selective arrangements with different partners over different issues. Leaders can use these bargaining opportunities to secure greater flexibility in making policy adjustments without breaking the cooperative relationship. Thus, we might expect democracies to prefer the greater flexibility of multilateral agreements to bilateral agreements. This logic seems to be supported by Seidelmann’s (2001: 126) observation that new democracies in Eastern Europe joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to guarantee “formal and informal
access to major actors like the US, Germany and France, which would have been difficult to create and maintain without membership.” In this case, the difficulty of cooperation he cites largely concerns the policy concessions the NTSs would potentially have to make to each major power.

While by this bargaining logic, leaders of democracies should prefer multilateral agreements over bilateral agreements, there are also reasons why leaders of autocracies may not favor multilateralism. While autocrats may not need to provide as many policy goods as democratic leaders, they still need the autonomy to combat and coerce opposition within their country and prevent rebellion. Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003: 371) argue that while democratic leaders are primarily vulnerable to rebellions emerging from disenfranchised residents of their country, autocrats are vulnerable to rebellion emerging from any group outside their narrow winning coalition of supporters who are the primary recipients of private goods from the state. Thus, autocrats are more threatened by rebellion and are likely to be wary of committing to any agreements that restrict their ability to prevent and combat rebellion. There is a potential for facing such restrictions if autocrats make multilateral agreements with democracies. Democratic partners may pressure autocrats to liberalize their political system and end policies that are perceived as violating human rights. Such concessions may weaken the coercive power of the regime. Pevehouse (2005) finds that those international organizations that include democracies can pressure autocrats into making democratic transitions. NATO and the European Union, for instance, set the prerequisite of democratic governance for new members. These pressures do
not seem to be as salient when autocracies enter bilateral relationships with democracies. As previously mentioned, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith argue that democracies prefer to aid autocracies as it is easier to exact policy concessions from a leader who is accountable to fewer people. This is further supported by Neumayer’s (2003) analysis of whether foreign aid donors reward states that respect human rights. He finds that while multilateral donors are likely to favor states with better human rights records, this is not found to be true with bilateral donors.

Thus, not only might we expect democracies to prefer multilateral agreements to bilateral agreements, but in certain situations – when potential partners are democratic – autocracies may prefer bilateral agreements to multilateral agreements. While there have been some notable multilateral alliances among autocracies such as the Warsaw Pact and the Arab League, opportunities for joining multilateral alliances are fewer and democracies should be more likely to pursue joining one if it allows them to avoid a bilateral alliance. Furthermore, because their domestic position tends to be more precarious I would expect these preferences to be more pronounced among NTS leaders. While leaders of new regimes in existing states face the challenge of establishing the vertical legitimacy of the regime – the recognition of its authority over the state – leaders of new states not only may face the challenge of establishing the vertical legitimacy of the regime, but the horizontal legitimacy of the state as well: agreement on who constitutes the political community the leader governs. Thus, we might expect these preferences to be even more pronounced among leaders of
new states. In terms of alliances, these conclusions lead to the following propositions:

**Proposition 4.1**: Democracies are more likely to join multilateral alliances than autocracies.

**Proposition 4.2**: The greater preference of democracies for multilateral alliances should be more pronounced among new regimes in existing states.

**Proposition 4.3**: The greater preference of democracies for multilateral alliances should be more pronounced among new states than new regimes in existing states.

**B. The Challenges of Cooperation**

Regardless of what their preferences are for the form of cooperation, NTS leaders may have difficulty engaging in any cooperative security relationship, especially a more formal relationship. In the wake of a major political transition NTS leaders often govern in an environment of heightened uncertainty with weak institutions and questionable legitimacy. These conditions may discourage potential partners. Axelrod and Keohane (1985: 232) argue that for cooperation to occur in an anarchic environment, states must be concerned with “the shadow of the future” – an expectation of repeated interaction and potential reciprocation with another state. To establish a shadow of the future, they argue that a long time horizon for interaction must exist and reliable information about the other’s actions and reputation must be available. Potential partners may be especially unsure of both of these elements when considering an agreement with an NTS.
First, leaders of new regimes and new states are unlikely to have an established reputation for being a reliable partner. An NTS leader likely has a domestic base of support with different interests than the leader of the previous regime and may favor different foreign policy goals. They may not feel compelled to respect the commitments of the previous regime. Other states may view them as unpredictable if potential partners are unsure which commitments the NTS leader intends to keep. Siverson and Starr (1994) find that a regime change often results in a significant change to a state’s alliance portfolio. Leeds (2003) finds that even if leaders of new regimes do not officially nullify alliances made by previous regimes, they are less likely to fulfill their commitments to those alliances. She argues that there is less pressure to fulfill commitments made by previous regimes as there will be fewer consequences to their bargaining reputation for breaking those agreements than for breaking alliances they concluded themselves. Leeds (2005) observes that new states sometimes adopt the alliance commitments of the prior state(s), but often do not. For instance, Russia adopted all Soviet alliances, united Yemen adopted the alliances of both North and South Yemen, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia adopted the alliances of Czechoslovakia. However, when Germany unified, the alliances of West Germany were honored while those of East Germany were not. Thus, there may be significant unpredictability concerning the foreign policy of new states. 

An NTS leader might actually benefit from lacking an established bargaining reputation and avoiding the consequences of the diplomatic actions of previous regimes. For instance, lender states are often willing to forgive debts
incurred by previous regimes. On one hand, NTS leaders start with a clean slate which may remain untarnished even when dropping the commitments of previous regimes. On the other hand, they are less predictable than established leaders and especially so if they are highly selective in choosing which existing commitments they will observe or nullify. Furthermore, regardless of their bargaining history, potential partners may question the ability of NTS leaders to meet their commitments. NTS governments may be unproven in their administrative capacity to execute agreed upon policies and lack a record of successful policy implementation.

Second, potential partners may be uncertain of the time horizon of interaction. Neither an NTS leader nor their potential foreign collaborator can be sure of the new regime’s tenure or the new state’s survival. A new regime may be overthrown within one year or last decades. While not common, new states may further divide or merge with others. Tanganyika and Zanzibar united into Tanzania within a couple years of independence. Over the course of a decade, Serbia and Montenegro devolved from a united federal state to a confederation and most recently into two independent states. In less peaceful instances, the sovereignty of the new state may be challenged externally by other states, or internally by secessionists. Israel as a new state survived these challenges, South Vietnam did not. Without a long time horizon in such contexts, states may be reluctant to make a large investment in a cooperative relationship with a new regime or new state. Thus, even if NTS leaders desire to forge a mutual defense pact or import arms from a stronger state in exchange for policy concessions, they
may have difficulty establishing these cooperative security relationships. This suggests the following expectation:

Proposition 4.4: Newly Transitioned States will engage in fewer alliances and arms transfers.

C. Formalizing Security Relationships

The same institutional characteristics of an NTS leader’s political regime that might lead them to prefer a multilateral or bilateral alliance may hinder them in their pursuit of a formal alliance. Specifically, while all NTS leaders must overcome the aforementioned constraints of uncertainty in forging an alliance, new democracies may have an easier time formalizing their cooperative security relationships into alliances than new autocracies while autocracies can sustain less formal relationships longer than democracies. An NTS leader does not need to conclude a formal alliance treaty to benefit from a security relationship with a foreign leader. For instance, two states can agree to transfer arms which the recipient leader may find useful for bolstering the security of their state. However, the leader could benefit even more if the security relationship was established in an alliance treaty. An alliance can signal to other states that a long term commitment exists between two states that will likely last beyond each leader’s term in office. This public commitment can help deter foreign aggression toward the NTS. In addition, the public commitment can strengthen the defensive value of the security relationship through establishing the potential for audience costs if the alliance is broken. Foreign leaders can observe whether the two states honor their commitment and the leaders of the signatory states risk damaging their
bargaining reputation – and thus incurring audience costs – if they do not. The risk of incurring audience costs strengthens the dependability of the security relationship. Despite these potential benefits, leaders will weigh whether they can accept the potential costs of signing an alliance. By signing an alliance, leaders risk incurring audience costs not only abroad but also at home. Citizens of the signatory states and leaders of other states may punish the signatory leaders for their choice of partners or their failure to fulfill their commitment. Consequently, a leader risks their political survival if their citizens and regime supporters disapprove of the alliance, they risk the ability to form security relationships with other states that may disapprove of the alliance, and they may even risk aggression from other states. Therefore, while NTS leaders may find alliances desirable, both signatory leaders face potential costs that may not be incurred from their less formal security relationship. Potential partners, however, may weigh these costs differently depending on whether the NTS leader has been elected to office democratically or not.

Potential partners can expect formal agreements to be more stable if they are made with democratic leaders, and informal agreements to be more stable if they are made with autocratic leaders. In pursuing formal agreements, democratic leaders draw an advantage from the systematic manner in which leaders are selected in their state and the continuity of rule of law. Gaubatz (1996: 110) reminds us that international commitments can range from formal defense treaties to “casual assurances between diplomats.” He argues that the stability of formal commitments is enhanced in democracies because of their ability to make smooth
leadership transitions. Succeeding leaders are bound by the same set of laws and the same formal commitments as their predecessors. McGillivray and Smith (2004) and Lutmar (2004) find evidence to support the proposition that leadership change in democracies disrupts bilateral cooperation less than in autocracies. At the same time, democratic states are less reliable as security partners when the relationship is less formalized because, as Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) find, they usually have more frequent leadership change than autocracies. Leaders, whether democratic or autocratic, may have little incentive to renew the less formal commitments of their predecessors. As Gaubatz argues, “it is plausible that the myriad small understandings that condition relations between states might be threatened by a new administration with its team of top foreign policy makers and ambassadors” (p. 116). Thus, less formal agreements may be perceived to be more durable when made with autocratic leaders, and there is less incentive to formalize a security relationship established with an autocracy than with a democracy.

Arms transfers are a useful indicator of a security relationship existing between two states. Harkavy (1975: 1, 1989: 5) goes as far as to call arms transfers “[possibly] the weightiest and most important instrument of international power and diplomacy” and “[arguably] the single most telling indicator of the state of alignments between industrialized and Third World countries.” However, the extent and duration of a commitment between two states may be unclear in the absence of an alliance. An NTS leader would likely desire the additional benefits of a formalized alliance relationship, but the potential partner will weigh the
potential costs of agreeing to one. If the potential partner is an established state, they are more likely to benefit from the policy concessions offered by the NTS leader than additional security. The potential partner can expect less formal agreements to be more reliable with autocracies than democracies, and a formal agreement to be more reliable if made with a democracy. Thus there is less incentive to formalize a security relationship – including an arms transfer relationship – when established with an autocracy. Thus, democratic NTS leaders, by virtue of how they are selected into office, are more likely to formalize security relationships than autocratic leaders. When observing arms transfer relationships between pairs of states, we might expect democracies to receive a greater proportion of their arms from allies (“intra-alliance transfers”) than autocracies. This is perhaps even more pronounced among NTSs because there is greater uncertainty about the duration of a new NTS leader’s political regime, and potential partners may not want to risk concluding a formal alliance with a state that may soon thereafter experience a regime change and a major shift in the interests represented by a succeeding leader. This suggests the following two propositions:

**Proposition 4.5:** Democracies are more likely to receive intra-alliance arms transfers than autocracies.

**Proposition 4.6:** New Democracies are more likely to receive intra-alliance arms transfers than new autocracies.

For leaders of new states, formalizing security relationships may be a higher priority than for leaders of new regimes in existing states. Leaders of new
states can benefit from forging formal agreements by more firmly establishing their national sovereignty and the horizontal legitimacy of their state through the formal recognition of the specific territory and the citizens that are subject to the leader’s authority. Cooley (2000) finds that obtaining formal recognition of their territorial and property rights were especially important for post-Soviet new states in the 1990s and were the impetus for many formal agreements between Russia and other states. While Russia was the direct successor state to the Soviet Union, many Soviet military assets such as communication installations, harbor facilities, military bases, and cosmodromes remained in other post-Soviet states. Although Russia might have attempted to reclaim these assets through a “neo-imperial solution,” Cooley finds that this did not occur (p. 100). In exchange for use of these facilities Russia concluded formal agreements that explicitly recognized the other former Soviet republics as legal owners of the assets and offered annual rental payments for their use. Cooley argues that this was significant for not only international but also domestic political reasons: “by securing Russian recognition that residual assets on [Former Soviet Union (FSU)] territories are the formal legal property of the FSU states, exchange sovereignty agreements have insulated state-building elites from domestic criticism that they are soft on Russian neo-imperialism” (p. 102). In this way, leaders of new states were able to strengthen the recognition of their state’s horizontal legitimacy both at home and abroad through formal recognitions of territorial boundaries and property ownership. Cooley observes that similar agreements were made by the US with Panama, the Philippines, and Japan after occupation of those countries. As it is often a priority
of new state leaders to establish their state’s horizontal legitimacy in order to secure their political survival, we might expect them to more actively seek out formal alliances and potentially be willing to concede more to alliance partners than other NTS leaders in exchange for formal recognition. Thus, in terms of arms transfers, this leads to the following proposition:

**Proposition 4.7**: New States are more likely than new regimes in existing states to receive intra-alliance arms transfers.

IV. Analysis

A. Multilateralism in Alliance Joining

1. Research Design

This first analysis compares the likelihood of an NTS joining a multilateral alliance during a given year to joining a bilateral alliance. This analysis is conducted using the ATOP project’s “member level” dataset of alliances. The member level dataset includes a separate entry for each alliance member for each phase of each alliance. A new phase of an alliance is commenced if and when members renegotiate the terms of the alliance and amend, renew, or otherwise adjust the written details of the alliance treaty. The dependent variable – *Multilateral alliance* – is coded 1 if a member joins a multilateral alliance (or new phase of an alliance) and 0 if a member joins a bilateral alliance. As described in Chapter 2, I use a trichotomous regime type specification that codes each state as a democracy, semi-democracy, or autocracy based on the Political Regime Change Dataset (Reich 2002). In each model I include the dummy variables *Democratic* and *Autocratic* and let *Semi-democratic*
serve as the baseline category. The dummy variable *New regime* equals 1 if there has been a regime change within 10 years. I include the interactions *New regime*Democratic and *New regime*Autocratic to identify the effects of new democracies and new autocracies. The dummy variable *New state* equals 1 if a state is within 10 years of becoming a new state. I include the interactions *New state*Democratic and *New state*Autocratic to identify the effects of new state/democracies and new state/autocracies.

An active security threat – internal or external – is likely to be a state’s greatest impetus to engaging in alliances or arms transfers. Following Fordham and Walker (2005), I control for the number of interstate battle deaths and intrastate battle deaths as proportions of the population (Intl. war battle deaths/pop. and Civil war battle deaths/pop.) to capture the degree to which a state is actively threatened in a particular year. To capture more passive threats, I control for the capabilities of a state’s rivals in a particular year by the sum of the rivals’ CINC scores (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) using Fordham and Walker’s data on CINC scores of each state’s strategic rivals as identified by Thompson (2001). I control for whether a state is a Major power and the state’s Power capabilities using its CINC score (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). 21

I also control for the opportunity for a state to join a multilateral alliance. Usually to join a multilateral alliance, some sort of governance structure needs to

21 The Correlates of War Project identifies major powers in this time period as United Kingdom (1816-present), United States (1899-present), Soviet Union/Russia (1922-present), France (1945-present), China (1950-present), Germany (1991-present), and Japan (1991-present).
be established to coordinate negotiations and enforce cooperation among the
different states. Thus, instances when states have a choice to form a multilateral
alliance instead of a bilateral alliance are limited.\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Opportunity for multilateral
alliance} equals the number of states globally that join any multilateral alliance in
the same year that the observed member is joining an alliance.

2. Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Alliances Joined by New Regimes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 presents some simple frequencies of alliance joining by new
democracies and new autocracies. During the Cold War, the frequency
distribution seems to conform to the expectation that new democracies are more
likely to join multilateral alliances than new autocracies. Sixty-four percent of
alliances joined by new democracies were multilateral while only 52 percent were
of those joined by new autocracies. After the Cold War, however, only 7 percent
of alliances joined by new democracies were multilateral while 29 percent were of
those joined by new autocracies. I turn to the multivariate analyses to see if these
tendencies continue to appear when some important control variables are added to
the model.

\textsuperscript{22} I thank Ashley Leeds for highlighting this issue.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the logit estimates and substantive effects of state type for each model of *Multilateral alliance joining*. I first analyze all alliance joiners from 1950-1998, I then disaggregate the observations for the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, and lastly I check the robustness of my *New regime* and *New state* variables by estimating models that analyze the first 5 years after a political transition in addition to the first 10 years. Model I does not control for whether a state is old or new, while all other models do. Models I, II, IV, and V each use 10-year measurements of *New regime* and *New state*, while Model III uses 5-year measurements. Model IV is estimated on Cold War cases and Model V is estimated on Post-Cold War cases.
In Table 4.2, the high significance of the Chi² statistics suggests that the variables in each model are jointly significant. The R² values seem to vary significantly across models. Models I through III, which are estimated on the entire set of cases, have R² values between 0.11 and 0.12, Model V which is estimated on the Post-Cold War sample has an R² of 0.15, and Model IV which is estimated on the Cold War sample has a much higher R² of 0.23. This suggests that the model has greater explanatory power for the Cold War than Post-Cold War era.

The coefficients of the Democratic and Autocratic variables represent the effects of democratic and autocratic regimes on Milspend/GDP compared to the effect of semi-democratic regimes, while controlling for those regimes that are new and/or in new states. Thus, these coefficients specifically represent the effect of existing regimes in Model I, and existing regimes in existing states in Models II through V. Democratic is not statistically significant in any model. Autocratic is negative and significant in Models I, II, and IV (-1.08, -0.80, and -1.14) while positive and non-significant in the five-year Model III and the Post-Cold War Model V. This suggests that, at least during the Cold War, Existing State/Existing Democracies that joined alliances were more likely to join multilateral alliances. This finding lends supports to Proposition 4.1, that democracies are more likely to join multilateral alliances than autocracies.

Unfortunately, the interpretation of the model estimates for comparing across other state types is not straightforward since I use multiple interaction terms to capture the effects of political transitions. In a multiplicative interaction
model, the significance or non-significance of model parameters are not necessarily of great interest (Brambor et al 2006). Because the coefficients in interaction models do not indicate the average effects of variables as they do in additive models, the findings of these analyses are most usefully interpreted in the tables of substantive effects that include recalculated levels of statistical significance. The substantive effects are the sum of the effects for each state type. For example, the effect for new state/democracy is the sum of the coefficients for \( \text{new state} \times \text{democratic} \), \( \text{new state} \), and \( \text{democratic} \). The asterisks indicate the significance of the interaction effect from the recalculated standard error. The standard error (SE) is recalculated as follows: \( SE = \sqrt{\text{var}(\beta_1) + \text{var}(\beta_3) + 2 \cdot \text{cov}(\beta_1, \beta_3)} \) which in this example would be \( SE = \sqrt{\text{var}(\beta_{\text{new state}}) + \text{var}(\beta_{\text{new state} \times \text{democracy}}) + 2 \cdot \text{cov}(\beta_{\text{new state}}, \beta_{\text{new state} \times \text{democracy}})} \).

From 1950 to 1998, 32 percent of alliance joiners joined multilateral alliances and 68 percent joined bilateral alliances. I offered three propositions about the likelihood of states to prefer multilateral alliances. First, I proposed (Proposition 4.1) that democracies are more likely to join multilateral alliances than autocracies. The estimates of Model I support this proposition. Upon examining the substantive effects for Existing Democracy and New Democracy it

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.3</th>
<th>SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT OF STATE TYPE ON MULTILATERAL ALLIANCE JOINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meas. of New Regime &amp; New State:</td>
<td>10-year Model I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/Existing Democracy</td>
<td>—0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Democracy</td>
<td>—2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/Existing Autocracy</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Autocracy</td>
<td>—0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/New Autocracy</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Democracy</td>
<td>—1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democracy</td>
<td>—0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Autocracy</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Autocracy</td>
<td>—1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
can be seen that although they have values of -0.57 and -1.97 respectively, neither effect is statistically significant. Thus, democracies are not significantly likely to join more or fewer multilateral alliances than bilateral alliances compared to the reference category of semi-democracies. The substantive effects for Existing Autocracy and New Autocracy are -1.08 and -0.47 respectively, and these effects have high statistical significance. The fact that the effect of autocracy is negative and significant and the effect of democracy is positive and non-significant suggests that when joining alliances, autocracies (whether new or existing) are less likely to join multilateral alliances than democracies.

Second, I proposed (Proposition 4.2) that the greater preference of democracies for multilateral alliances should be more pronounced among new regimes. I do not find support for this proposition. In Model I, I do not find the effects for Existing Democracy (-0.57) or New Democracy (-1.97) to be significant suggesting that there is no significant difference between old and new democratic regimes in alliance joining. In comparing the difference between Existing Democracies and Autocracies with New Democracies and Autocracies it appears that the differences in preferences between democracies and autocracies are actually less pronounced among states with new regimes than among states with established regimes. This is evident upon observing that the effect of New Autocracy (-0.47) is of a lower magnitude than the effect of Existing Autocracy (-1.08), while the effects of Existing Democracy and New Democracy are not significantly different from zero. Interestingly, when New state is controlled for in subsequent models, a similar finding among new regimes in existing states is
only observed for the Cold War sample in Model IV. The state type effects in Models II and III for the entire sample and Model V for the Post-Cold War sample suggest that Existing State/New Autocracies are apparently more likely to join multilateral alliances than Existing State/New Democracies. Taken altogether, the proposition is unsupported.

Third, I proposed (Proposition 4.3) that the greater preference of democracies for multilateral alliances should be more pronounced among new states than existing states with new regimes. I find moderate support for this proposition. In Models II, III, and V I find that while effect of New State/Democracy is not significant, the effect of New State/Autocracy is negative and significant (-1.34, -0.47, and -0.63). Furthermore, the effect of New State/Autocracy has a stronger negative effect than other types of autocracy – that is, they are less likely than Existing State/Existing Autocracies and Existing State/New Autocracies to join multilateral alliances. Thus, the regime type preferences can be considered to be more pronounced in new states. However, when examining the results in Model IV, it can be seen that the effect of New State/Autocracy is not significant for the Cold War era alone.

Since this analysis is somewhat novel in its dependent variable and empirical domain, it is worth examining the estimates for the control variables in Table 4.2. First, the coefficient for Opportunity for multilateral alliances, not surprisingly, is significant and positive suggesting that when more states are joining multilateral alliances in a particular year, other states are more likely to join multilateral alliances. Civil war battle deaths/pop. is only significant for the
Cold War sample in Model IV, where it has a negative coefficient, suggesting that alliance joiners with internal conflict during that era were less likely to join multilateral alliances. *Intl battle deaths/Pop.* is only significant for Model I where it has a positive coefficient suggesting that states at war are more likely to join multilateral alliances. *Power capabilities* is only significant for Models III and V where it has a negative coefficient. This lends evidence in support of Morrow’s (1991) and Krause and Singer’s (2001) propositions that minor powers may prefer multilateral alliances to avoid the power asymmetries of bilateral alliances. *Major power* is significant and negative across Models I through III suggesting likewise that major powers form more bilateral alliances than medium and minor powers. Lastly, *Total power of rivals* is not significant in any model.

3. Discussion

In this analysis I examined instances of states joining alliances to determine what characteristics of those states predict a propensity to join multilateral alliances. I found that democracies are more likely to join multilateral alliances than autocracies and that this effect is less pronounced among new democracies and new autocracies. When examining new and existing regimes in existing states alone, I find that in the Post-Cold War era, Existing State/Existing Democracies are actually less likely to join a multilateral alliance than Existing State/Existing Autocracies. When examining new states, I find that the greater preference of democracies for multilateral alliances is more pronounced than among existing states.
The expectation that democracies are more likely to join multilateral alliances than autocracies reflects my argument and the insights of selectorate and bargaining theory that leaders of democracies face greater pressures to provide public goods, they will demand the policy autonomy to provide these goods, and that multilateral agreements should allow greater policy autonomy than bilateral agreements. Furthermore, I expected that because NTS leaders face the added challenge of consolidating a new regime, they should demand even more policy autonomy and this should be especially true for leaders of New States who often face the duel challenge of establishing their vertical and horizontal legitimacy. While I did find Existing Democracies to be more likely to choose multilateral alliances than Existing Autocracies, and find some evidence that this proclivity is more pronounced among New State/Democracies and New State/Autocracies, I did not find this to be the case among New Democracies and New Autocracies in Existing States. This suggests that while leaders of democratic new states may face a greater pressure to provide public goods than leaders of established democratic regimes, this pressure is not as evident among leaders of new democracies in existing states.

B. Engaging in Alliances and Arms Transfers

1. Research Design

In this second analysis I examine the likelihood of an NTS engaging in an alliance or arms transfer in a particular year. In doing this, I intend to compare the level of engagement in security cooperation among different states. The analysis is monadic with country-year as the unit of analysis. I estimate models
of alliance and arms transfer engagement across a global set of countries 1950-1998. The dependent variable *Alliances joined* is equal to the number of alliances a state joined in a particular year and the dependent variable *Arms suppliers* is equal to the number of countries a state received arms from in a particular year. I code these variables based on the ATOP project’s database of alliances and the Stockholm International for Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) record of major weapons transfers. Across this set of cases, *Alliances joined* ranges from 0 to 14 and *Arms suppliers* also ranges from 0 to 14 per country-year. As in the first analysis, I use interactions of the variables *Democratic*, *Autocratic*, *New regime*, and *New state* to compare the effect of different types of states and use *Semi-Democracy* as the reference category. Because the impetus to militarize for security is similar to the impetus to seek security cooperation, I use a similar set of control variables as in the analysis of militarization in Chapter 3.

As in the first analysis, I control for *Civil war battle deaths/pop.*, *Intl. war battle deaths/pop.*, *Total power of rivals*, *Power capabilities*, and *Major power status* of each state to capture active and passive security to the state in a particular year. Following Fordham and Walker (2005), I also control for capabilities of a state’s allies using Fordham and Walker’s data on CINC scores of defense pact allies as identified by Gibler and Sarkees (2002). I lag *Total power of allies* one year in the analysis of alliance joining to avoid potential endogeneity problems. Lastly, I control for each state’s level of *Militarization* by calculating the size of a state’s armed forces as a proportion of its population.
based on the Correlates of War (COW) project’s National Military Capabilities Dataset 3.0.

2. Findings

Because the outcome variables *Alliances joined* and *Arms suppliers* are counts of events per year, I use Poisson regression to estimate each model. Poisson regression is appropriate for this data as count data does not follow a normal distribution. Poisson regression models a more appropriate distribution and even provides consistent, asymptotically normal estimates whether or not the Poisson distribution applies to the data (Wooldridge 2003: 573). Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the Poisson estimates and substantive effects for models of *Alliances*

### Table 4.4: POISSON ESTIMATES OF ALLIANCES JOINED PER YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure of New Regime and New State:</th>
<th>10-year</th>
<th>10-year</th>
<th>5-year</th>
<th>10-year</th>
<th>10-year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>0.54 ***</td>
<td>0.96 ***</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>—0.16</td>
<td>1.85 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic</td>
<td>0.61 ***</td>
<td>1.00 ***</td>
<td>0.27 *</td>
<td>0.73 ***</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regime</td>
<td>1.58 ***</td>
<td>1.45 ***</td>
<td>0.96 ***</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.71 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regime*Democratic</td>
<td>—0.45 **</td>
<td>—0.37</td>
<td>0.41 *</td>
<td>—0.04</td>
<td>—0.93 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regime*Autocratic</td>
<td>—1.40 ***</td>
<td>—1.75 ***</td>
<td>—1.34 ***</td>
<td>—0.44</td>
<td>—1.98 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>1.30 *</td>
<td>1.29 ***</td>
<td>0.99 ***</td>
<td>1.72 ***</td>
<td>1.22 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State*Democratic</td>
<td>—1.22 ***</td>
<td>—1.10 ***</td>
<td>—0.06</td>
<td>—1.21 ***</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State*Autocratic</td>
<td>—0.13</td>
<td>0.47 **</td>
<td>—0.44 **</td>
<td>1.43 ***</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War Battle Deaths/Pop.</td>
<td>—0.26</td>
<td>—0.15</td>
<td>—0.22</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>—1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. War Battle Deaths/Pop.</td>
<td>—0.66 **</td>
<td>—0.79 **</td>
<td>—7.06 **</td>
<td>—7.07 **</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.84)</td>
<td>(3.74)</td>
<td>(3.43)</td>
<td>(4.01)</td>
<td>(13.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Capabilities (CINC)</td>
<td>4.57 ***</td>
<td>4.23 **</td>
<td>3.95 ***</td>
<td>5.51 ***</td>
<td>—0.13 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(1.88)</td>
<td>(3.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>2.00 ***</td>
<td>1.72 ***</td>
<td>1.69 ***</td>
<td>1.68 ***</td>
<td>1.26 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Power of Rivals</td>
<td>—4.03 ***</td>
<td>—2.72 ***</td>
<td>—2.55 ***</td>
<td>—2.23 **</td>
<td>—6.52 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(3.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Power of Allies (lagged)</td>
<td>—1.58 ***</td>
<td>—0.77 **</td>
<td>—0.50</td>
<td>1.03 ***</td>
<td>—0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarization (Milsize/Pop)</td>
<td>0.24 ***</td>
<td>0.18 ***</td>
<td>0.19 ***</td>
<td>0.10 **</td>
<td>0.43 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>—2.86 ***</td>
<td>—3.32 ***</td>
<td>—2.61 ***</td>
<td>—3.12 ***</td>
<td>—3.43 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| LR Chi² | 521.73 *** | 666.3 *** | 716.8 *** | 236.4 *** | 628.05 *** |
| Pseudo-R² | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.24 |
| N        | 6095 | 6095 | 6095 | 4566 | 1529 |

*** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1 (two-tailed test)
joined, and Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the Poisson estimates and substantive effects for models of Arms suppliers.

First, I will examine the results of the analysis of alliances joined per year in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. Models I through III are estimated on the complete set of cases from 1950-1998. Model IV is estimated on Cold War cases and Model V is estimated on Post-Cold War cases. Model I does not control for whether a state is old or new, while all other models do. Models I, II, IV, and V each use 10-year measurements of New regime and New state, while Model III uses 5-year measurements.

In Table 4.4, the Chi$^2$ statistics are significant for each model suggesting that the variables in each model are jointly significant. Some inconsistencies can be observed among the R$^2$ statistics, however. While the R$^2$ values for Models I through V range from 0.07 to 0.11, the R$^2$ of Model V which is estimated on Post-Cold War case alone is much higher at 0.24. This suggests that the model of Alliances joined has much greater explanatory power after the Cold War than during the Cold War. Democratic is positive and statistically significant in Models I, II, and V, and Autocratic is positive and significant in Models I through IV. In comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients of the two variables, it can be seen that the value of Autocratic is consistently higher than Democratic in each model. This suggests that Existing State/Existing Autocracies are more likely to join alliances than Existing State/Existing Democracies. New Regime is positive and significant in Models I, II, III, and V, and New State is positive and significant in Models II through V. To directly test my propositions by
comparing other state types, it is necessary to examine the substantive effects to understand the effect of the interaction variables.

I proposed (Proposition 4.4) that NTSs should engage in less international cooperation – and less alliance joining - than other states. Judging from the substantive effects of Model I in Table 4.5, this is generally not found to be true. The effect of New Democracy (1.67) is higher than the effect of Existing Democracy (0.54) and the effect of New Autocracy (0.80) is found to be higher than the effect of Existing Autocracy (0.61). While there appear to be differences among states by regime type, there is little evidence within regime types that NTSs join fewer alliances than established states. In Models II, III, and V, Existing State/Existing Democracies join more alliances than Existing State/Existing Autocracies. However, in Model IV – which estimates Cold War cases alone – Existing State/Existing Democracies join fewer alliances than Existing State/Existing Autocracies. Among democracies, the substantive effects of Models II, III, and V suggest that Existing States/New Democracies join more alliances than Existing State/Existing Democracies, and the substantive effects in the Cold War Model IV are not significant. This is the reverse of my expectations. Thus, among democracies, new states join more alliances than

| Table 4.5 | SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT OF STATE TYPE ON ALLIANCES JOINED PER YEAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meas. of New Regime & New State: | 10-year | 10-year | 5-year | 10-year | 10-year | Sum of Coefficients |
| | Model I | Model II | Model III | Model IV | Model V | |
| Existing State/Existing Democracy | 0.96 *** | 0.24 | —0.16 | 1.85 *** | Dem |
| Existing State/New Democracy | 2.04 ** | 1.61 *** | 0.05 | 2.63 *** | Dem+Nreg+Nreg*Dem |
| New State/Democracy | 1.04 *** | 0.43 *** | 0.76 | 2.36 *** | Dem+Nste+Nste*Dem |
| Existing State/Existing Autocracy | 1.00 *** | 0.27 * | 0.73 *** | 0.21 | Aut |
| Existing State/New Autocracy | 0.70 *** | —0.11 *** | 0.54 *** | —0.06 *** | Aut+Nreg+Nreg*Aut |
| New State/Autocracy | 2.17 | 2.02 ** | 1.27 * | 3.37 *** | Aut+Nste+Nste*Aut |
| Existing Democracy | 0.54 *** | | | | Dem |
| New Democracy | 1.67 *** | | | | Dem+Nreg+Nreg*Dem |
| Existing Autocracy | 0.61 *** | | | | Aut |
| New Autocracy | 0.80 *** | | | | Aut+Nreg+Nreg*Aut |
established democracies and new regimes join more alliances than either new states or old states with existing regimes.

Quite the reverse is found among autocracies. The substantive effects of Models II, III, and V suggest that Existing State/New Autocracies join fewer alliances than Existing State/Existing Autocracies. The substantive effects of Models III, IV, and V suggest that New State/Autocracies join more alliances than either Existing State/Existing Autocracies or Existing State/Existing Autocracies. Thus, among autocracies, new states join more alliances than established autocracies, but new regimes in old states join fewer. Considered together, these findings neither fully support the proposition that NTSs join fewer alliances than established states, nor the reverse.

Turning to the control variables, Civil war battle deaths/pop. is non-significant. Intl. war battle deaths/pop. is negative and significant in all but the Post-Cold War Model V, suggesting that at least during the Cold War, states at war were less likely to join new alliances. While Major power status is positive and significant across all models, some striking inconsistencies can be observed among estimates for Power capabilities. Power capabilities is positive and significant across all cases in Models I through IV, but negative and significant for the Post-Cold War cases in Model V. It is not significant in Model III when New regime and New state are counted for only the first 5 years. The estimates for these two variables taken together suggest that while major powers are more likely to join alliances, among non-major powers, more powerful states were more likely to join alliances during the Cold War and less powerful states were
more likely to join alliances after the Cold War. *Total power of rivals* is significant and negative across all models with an especially large effect in the Post-Cold War Model V, suggesting that the more powerful a state’s rivals, the less likely they are to join new alliances – a somewhat surprising finding. *Total power of allies (lagged)* is negative and significant across all models but Model III where it is non-significant and the Cold War Model IV where it is positive and significant. This suggests that during that Cold War, states that already had powerful allies were likely to join more alliances, but during the Post-Cold War era they were likely to join less alliances. This possibly reflects the practice of intra-bloc alliance forming during the Cold War where states within blocs had more alliances with major powers and other states than non-aligned states. After the Cold War, states that do not have powerful allies seem more likely to seek them and conclude alliances. Finally, *Militarization* is positive and significant in each model suggesting that states that are militarizing more are also joining more alliances.
I find results more favorable to the same proposition – that NTSs should engage in less international cooperation – in the analysis of arms transfers than in the analysis of alliance joining. This analysis estimates models of the number of different supplier states a state receives arms from each year. In essence, this represents the number of security cooperation partners each state has. Starting with the model estimates in Table 4.6, it can be seen that the Chi$^2$ tests are significant, suggesting that the variables in each model are jointly significant.

The $R^2$ statistics for Models I through IV are fairly consistent, ranging from 0.05 to 0.06. The $R^2$ value for the Post-Cold War Model V is somewhat higher at 0.15, suggesting that the model has greater explanatory power for the Post-Cold War
era than for the Cold War era. Democratic is positive and significant in each model and with consistently higher values than Autocratic suggesting that Existing State/Existing Democracies receive arms from more suppliers than Existing State/Existing Autocracies. New regime is consistently positive and significant, while New state is consistently negative and significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.7</th>
<th>SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT OF STATE TYPE ON ARMS SUPPLIERS PER YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meas. of New Regime &amp; New State:</td>
<td>10-year Model I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/Existing Democracy</td>
<td>0.70 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Democracy</td>
<td>0.63 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/Democracy</td>
<td>0.29 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Autocracy</td>
<td>0.43 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing State/New Autocracy</td>
<td>0.50 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State/Autocracy</td>
<td>-0.09 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Democracy</td>
<td>0.77 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democracy</td>
<td>0.61 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Autocracy</td>
<td>0.52 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Autocracy</td>
<td>0.48 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Proposition 4.4, I proposed that NTSs should engage in less security cooperation – and thus fewer arms transfer agreements – with other states. I do not find this to be strictly true across regime types, but within regime types I find some evidence in support of this proposition across all cases, and strong evidence for this proposition across Post-Cold War cases. First, I find that, judging from the substantive effects in Table 4.7, Existing State/Existing Democracies receive arms transfers from more states than Existing State/Existing Autocracies. This finding is consistently supported across all five models: 0.77, 0.70, 0.55, 0.78, and 0.49 compared to 0.52, 0.43, 0.32, 0.55, and (non-significant) 0.08. In Model I, I find that New Democracies receive arms from fewer states than Existing Democracies (0.61 compared to 0.77), and New Autocracies receive arms from fewer states than Existing Autocracies (0.48 compared to 0.52). In both Models II and III I find that, among democracies, new regimes in existing states receive
arms from fewer states than existing regimes (0.63 and 0.47 compared to 0.70 and 0.55), and new states receive arms from fewer states than either new or existing regimes in existing states (0.29 and 0.03). For autocracies the findings differ between Models II and III. In Model II I find that, among autocracies, new regimes in existing states receive arms from more states than existing regimes (0.50 compared to 0.43), and new states receive arms from fewer states than either new or existing regimes in existing states (-0.09). In Model III, when the first 5 years of new regimes and new states are examined instead of the first 10 years, I find similar results among autocracies that I find among democracies: new regimes in existing states receive arms from about the same number of states as existing regimes, but new states receive arms from fewer states than either new or existing regimes in existing states. When the sample is disaggregated into Cold War and Post-Cold War cases, I find contrasting results. Judging from the substantive effects for Model IV, I find that during the Cold War, among both democracies and autocracies, new regimes received arms from more states than existing regimes, and that new states did not significantly differ. However, in Model V I find that after the Cold War, among both democracies and autocracies, NTSs received arms from fewer states than established states. Among NTS democracies, new regimes in existing states received arms from fewer states than new states, and among NTS autocracies, new regimes in existing states received arms from more states than new states. In sum, although I do not find that NTS states receive arms from more states regardless of regime type, I find, especially
after the Cold War, that among states of the same regime type, NTSs receive arms from fewer states than established states.

Turning to the control variables, Civil war battle deaths/pop. is negative and significant in Models I, II, and III but not significant when the sample is disaggregated by era in Models IV and V. This suggests that states experiencing internal turmoil are likely to have arms transfer deals with fewer states. The estimates for Intl. war battle deaths/pop. are positive and significant in Models I through IV and non-significant in the Post-Cold War Model V. This suggests that – at least during the Cold War – states at war had agreements with more states to receive arms than states at peace. Major power status is negative and significant in each model and Power capabilities is positive and significant in each model. This suggests that major powers – likely because they were major arms suppliers themselves – receive arms from fewer states, but among other states, more powerful states receive arms from more states. While Total power of rivals is negative and significant in Models I through IV, it is positive and significant in the Post-Cold War Model V. This suggests that during the Cold War, states with more powerful rivals received arms from fewer states and after the Cold War they received arms from more states. The explanation for this finding may be obscure, but could be a function of the fact that the during the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union were rivals as the two most powerful states and were also the largest arms suppliers, thus needing to import relatively few arms for themselves. After the Cold War, this rivalry had ended and states with more powerful rivals perhaps perceived the need to import more arms. Total power of allies is positive and
significant in Models I and V, negative and significant in the Cold War Model IV, and non-significant in other models. This suggests that during the Cold War states with more powerful allies received arms from fewer states, but after the Cold War they received arms from more states. This could be related to the fact that during the Cold War, the two superpowers were the primarily suppliers of arms for their allies. After the Cold War, the same security impetus that encouraged states to seek powerful allies perhaps also encouraged them to seek more arms transfers, and when seeking arms transfers they were less constrained by Cold War bloc politics when selecting their supplier partners. Lastly, *Militarization* is positive and significant for each model, suggesting that states that are more militarized are receiving arms from more states.

3. Discussion

This set of analyses examined predictors of a state engaging in international security cooperation. I examined two forms of cooperation: alliance joining and arms transfer agreements. Alliances are a formal declaration of security cooperation between states. Arms transfers, whether for aid or profit, are a direct form of security assistance from one state to another. An arms transfer relationship can exist within or outside of a formal alliance. When states of unequal power form alliances or agree to arms transfers, the stronger state often provides security assistance in exchange for some concession of policy autonomy by the weaker state. Because NTS leaders may lack both a bargaining reputation and the administrative capability to fulfill commitments, and have highly uncertain prospects for political survival, I expected them to engage in fewer
international security relationships. In the analyses of the number of alliances 
joined per year and the number of supplier states a state received arms from per 
year I did not find this to be strictly true. Differences between democracies and 
autocracies were often more determinant of cooperation occurring than 
differences between old and new regimes and states. Democracies tend to join 
more alliances and receive arms from more states than autocracies. I did however 
find some evidence in the analysis of arms transfers that NTSs cooperate less 
among states of the same regime type. I found evidence that is especially strong 
for the Post-Cold War era that among democracies and among autocracies, NTSs 
receive arms from fewer states. When it comes to alliance joining however, only 
Existing State/New Autocracies join less than existing regimes. Overall, New 
State/Autocracies are the most likely type to join alliances and Existing 
State/Existing Democracies are likely to have the most arms suppliers.

C. The Formalization of Arms Transfer Relationships

1. Research Design

This final analysis examines the formalization of cooperative security 
relationships. In particular I compare the likelihood of a state receiving an arms 
transfer from a formal ally (an intra-alliance arms transfer) to receiving an arms 
transfer from a non-ally (an extra-alliance arms transfer). I created a dyadic 
dataset of global arms transfers from supplier to recipient across the years 1950-
1998 based on SIPRI records of major weapons system transfers. The unit of 
analysis is the directed-dyad year, but the dataset is censored to only include years 
in which arms transfers occurred. In essence, the unit of analysis is “arms transfer
year.” The dependent variable – *Intra-alliance transfer* - is coded 1 if arms transfers in a dyad-year occurred between allies as identified by the ATOP database, and 0 if arms transfers occurred between non-allies.

As in the previous analysis I control for *Civil war battle deaths/pop., Intl. war battle deaths/pop.*, *Total power of rivals*, and *Total power of allies* of the recipient state. I also control for *GDP* to capture the size of the economy and thus the potential to have a domestic arms industry as well as *Militarization*, measured here as military spending as a proportion of GDP. Data on military spending are from the COW project’s National Military Capabilities Dataset 3.0; data on GDP are from Gleditsch (2002).

2. Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Arms Suppliers Per Year to New Regimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Alliance</td>
<td>327 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Alliance</td>
<td>363 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>690 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8 compares the frequencies of extra-alliance and intra-alliance arms suppliers per year for new democracies and new autocracies. The distribution of arms suppliers conforms to my expectation that new democracies would tend towards receiving arms from allies than non-allies more than new autocracies. During the Cold War a majority of arms suppliers to new democracies were allies (53 percent) whereas only 36 percent of arms suppliers to new autocracies were allies. Similarly after the Cold War, 38 percent of arms
supplies to new democracies were allies compared to 11 percent for new autocracies.

Tables 4.9 and 4.10 present the logit estimates and substantive effects of different state types for each model of Intra-alliance arms transfer. Between 1950 and 1998 there were 11,434 dyad years of major arms transfers. Thirty-two percent of these dyads shared an alliance. I first analyze all arms transfer dyad-years from 1950-1998, then I disaggregate the observations for the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, and then I check the robustness of my New regime and New state variables by estimating models that analyze the first 5 years after a political transition in addition to the previously estimated first 10 years.
As in the previous analyses, differences among Existing State/Existing Democracies, Existing State/Existing Autocracies, Existing State/New Democracies, Existing State/New Autocracies, New State/Democracies, and New State/Autocracies are best observed with the substantive effects in Table 4.10. Also as in the previous analysis, Models I through III are estimated on the complete set of cases from 1950-1998. Model IV is estimated on Cold War cases and Model V is estimated on Post-Cold War cases. Model I does not control for whether a state is old or new, while all other models do. Models I, II, IV, and V each use 10-year measurements of New regime and New state, while Model III uses 5-year measurements.

| Table 4.10 SUBSTANTIVE EFFECT OF STATE TYPE ON INTRA-ALLIANCE ARMS TRANSFERS |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Meas. of New Regime & New State: | 10-year          | 5-year          | 10-year          | 10-year          | Sum of Coefficients |
|                                 | Model I         | Model II        | Model III        | Model IV         |                  |
| Existing State/Existing Democracy | 0.76 ***        | 0.68 ***        | 0.92 ***         | 1.05 ***         | Dem              |
| Existing State/New Democracy    | 0.24 ***        | 0.12 ***        | 0.54 ***         | 0.05 ***         | Dem+Nreg+Dem    |
| New State/Existing Autocracy    | 1.22            | 2.71 ***        | —0.45 *          | 1.59 **          | Dem+State+State*Dem |
| Existing State/New Autocracy    | 0.27 **         | 0.22 **         | 0.68 ***         | —0.85 ***        | Aut              |
| New State/Democracy             | 0.41            | 0.30 **         | 0.71             | 0.18 **          | Aut+Nreg+Dem    |
| New Democracy                   | 0.24 ***        | 0.12 ***        | 0.76 ***         | 0.05 ***         | Aut+Nreg+Dem    |
| New Autocracy                   | —0.21 ***       |                 |                  |                  | Aut+Nreg+Dem    |

The transfer of arms between two states reflects the existence of a cooperative security relationship. When a recipient state chooses to forge an alliance with a supplier state, this reflects a desire by the two states to formalize the relationship. I posited three propositions concerning which states would be most likely to formalize their agreements. First I proposed (Proposition 4.5) that democracies are more likely to formalize their security relationships and receive intra-alliance arms transfers than autocracies. The evidence from the estimates and substantive effects of Model I supports this. The substantive effect of
Existing Democracy on intra-alliance arms transfers (0.76) is significant and larger than that of Existing Autocracy (0.24). Second, I proposed (Prop 4.6) that New Democracies are more likely to receive intra-alliance arms transfers than New Autocracies. Again, in Model I the substantive effect of New Democracy (0.24) on intra-alliance arms transfers is significant and larger than that of New Autocracy (-0.21). New Democracies and Autocracies are less likely to receive intra-alliance arms transfers than Existing Democracies and Autocracies, respectively. Third, I proposed (Proposition 4.7) that new states are more likely to receive intra-alliance arms transfers than existing states with new regimes. There is support for this proposition in the Post-Cold War era, but less so during the Cold War. In Model III, the substantive effect of New State/Democracy is 2.71 and statistically significant (though it is non-significant in Model II). This effect is larger than that for Existing State/New Democracy and indeed any type of democracy or autocracy. Correspondingly, the effect of New State/Autocracy is 0.30 and significant and larger than that of other types of autocracy. In the Post-Cold War Model V this finding is equally apparent. Based on the evidence from Models III and V, New State/Democracies are the most likely type of state to receive arms transfers from allies. When the Cold War era is examined alone, however, it can be seen that New States received fewer arms from allies than Existing States. Thus, this proposition finds more support in the current era than during the Cold War.

The high significance of the Chi² statistics suggests that the variables in each model are jointly significant. The R² statistics are fairly consistent across
models – from 0.24 to 0.29 - suggesting that they all have similar explanatory power. Turning to the control variables, Civil war battle death/pop. is not significant in any model. Intl. war battle deaths/pop. is negative and significant for all except the Post-Cold War model where it is non-significant suggesting that during the Cold War, states at war were more likely to receive arms from non-allies. Total power of rivals has a positive and significant effect in Models I through IV, but in Model V, which is estimated on Post-Cold War cases, this variable is negative and significant. Perhaps this reflects the tendency of aligned states to trade arms within their Cold War bloc and have rivals in the opposing bloc, whereas a different dynamic seems to exist after the Cold War. Total power of allies is consistently positive and significant across all five models. This suggests that states that have powerful allies are more likely to receive their arms from them. Considering that the values of the variable range from 0 to 0.62 and the coefficients for Models I through IV close to 10.0, this variable has a very powerful effect on the outcome variable. GDP is negative and significant for all except Model IV which was estimated on Cold War cases. Perhaps this reflects the fact that arms suppliers are likely to be economically powerful states, and more powerful states predominantly engage in asymmetric alliances. Thus, economically powerful states are more likely to be suppliers than recipients in alliances, and if they do receive arms transfers these are likely to come from outside the alliance. Militarization is positive and significant for all Models but the Post-Cold War Model V. This suggests that states that spend more on their military receive more intra-alliance arms transfers. Perhaps this reflects a
relationship between states that militarize more and states that seek more alliances.

3. Discussion

This analysis examined whether states that receive arms transfers are more likely to receive them from formal allies than non-allies. It was found that Democracies are more likely to receive intra-alliance arms transfers than Autocracies; New Democracies are more likely to receive intra-alliance arms transfers than New Autocracies while each are less likely than Existing Democracies and Autocracies, respectively; and New State/Democracies are the most likely of any state type to receive intra-alliance arms transfers in the Post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, Existing State/Existing Democracies were the most likely state type to receive intra-alliance arms transfers, and new states were not significantly different from existing states.

I choose to examine arms transfers as a way to identify cooperative security relationships where a choice often exists to formalize the relationship with an alliance, or keep the relationship less formal. While presumably some dyads of states only begin to transfer arms after they form an alliance, the expectation of an arms transfer may be an impetus to signing a formal agreement. I find evidence for my argument that among both established states and NTSs, democracies seem to formalize security relationships more than autocracies. This lends support to my argument that informal agreements may be more reliable when made with autocracies, and formal agreements may be more reliable when made with democracies. I find that in existing states, existing regimes tend to
formalize security cooperation more than new regimes, and additionally, among democracies, new states tend to formalize security relationships more than either new regimes or existing regimes in existing states. This lends support to the argument that formal agreements are important to leaders of new states for establishing horizontal legitimacy. It is not clear whether this is true for New State/Autocracies.

V. Conclusion

NTS leaders can be expected to seek various types of international security cooperation in order to ensure national security and promote foreign policy goals while allowing them to reserve resources needed for executing domestic policy to promote regime consolidation and ensure their political survival. This chapter examined the extent to which NTS leaders engage in security cooperation and the mode of cooperation they are most likely to adopt. I proposed a series of expectations based on the insights of selectorate theory and bargaining theory and recognition of the challenges that many NTS leaders face when confronted with the low vertical legitimacy of their new regime and/or the low horizontal legitimacy of their new state. I tested these expectations on analyses of alliance joining and arms transfers.

My principle findings are that democracies are more likely to cooperate multilaterally than autocracies with this preference being more pronounced among new states, but not new regimes; democracies tend to join more alliances and receive arms from more states than autocracies; NTSs join as many or more alliances per year as established states; NTSs receive arms from fewer states than
established states of the same regime type; democracies are more likely cooperate formally and receive their arms transfers from allies than autocracies; New Democracies and New Autocracies are less likely to cooperate formally than Existing Democracies and Autocracies; and New State/Democracies are less likely to cooperate formally than Existing State/New Democracies.

In sum, my expectations about the challenge for an NTS to engage in international security cooperation were only partially confirmed, my expectations about the desire and ability for NTSs to engage in formal cooperation were mostly confirmed, my expectations about the preference of democratic leaders for multilateral cooperation were confirmed, but my expectation that this preference would be more pronounced in NTSs was confirmed only for leaders of new states, but not for leaders of new regimes in existing states. It is particularly interesting that, as in the previous chapter, new states were found to conform more to expectations than new regimes in existing states. The desire for policy autonomy and the need for democratic leaders to provide public goods for political survival is perhaps not as acute in new regimes as expected, but is found to be more pronounced in new states than in established democracies. Another important finding is that patterns of cooperation across both alliances and arms transfers differ significantly between the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras. This should call attention to the need to carefully consider the role of Cold War bloc politics in many international relations studies that have primarily examined Cold War cases. Perhaps there are many theories and observations – especially regarding security cooperation – that should be re-evaluated with Post-Cold War cases.
I have argued that because NTS leaders govern in an environment of heightened uncertainty and not only need to worry about securing and maintaining support within their regime, but often about securing the survival of the regime itself they are likely to adopt a different decision making calculus on national security issues than other leaders. The findings of this chapter support this proposition. Chapters 3 and 4 examined the potential for NTS leaders to benefit from various strategies of militarization, international dispute resolution, and international security cooperation and examined their use of these strategies. Chapter 5 will examine the extent to which these strategies have actually worked to promote the political survival of NTS leaders.
Chapter 5
National Security Policy and the Prospects for Political Survival

I. Introduction

After a major political transition, the same decisions on national security policy may have quite different consequences for a newly transitioned state (NTS) leader than for a leader of a more stable state. In the wake of regime change or new statehood, leaders of NTSs (i.e. new states, new democracies, and new autocracies) must govern in a political environment of heightened uncertainty. This uncertainty can complicate a leader’s strategic political calculus. We often assume that a primary goal of national leaders is political survival – retaining power within their regime. But after a major political transition, not only must NTS leaders concern themselves with maintaining the support of a winning coalition within their regime – those people whose support is necessary to hold power – but in addition, focus on ensuring the survival of the political regime itself – the set of rules that select the leader of the state. Because new regimes have a heightened risk of collapse, an NTS leader’s political survival is more uncertain than in more stable states. In order to remain in office and govern effectively, leaders of new regimes must establish the vertical legitimacy of their regime. That is, they must establish agreement on the rules that determine the leader’s right to rule the state. Leaders of new regimes in new states not only need to be concerned with establishing the vertical legitimacy of their regime, but look to establishing the horizontal legitimacy of their state as well. That is,
establish agreement and recognition of the boundaries and population over which the leader and regime have authority. In this dissertation I have argued that not only do leaders’ domestic policy decisions affect their political survival, but their decisions on national security policy do as well. The uncertainty present in NTSs and the desire by NTS leaders for political legitimacy likely cause leaders of NTSs to adopt a different decision making calculus for national security issues than other leaders. While previous chapters examined how this might be so, this chapter examines how national policy might affect NTS leaders differently from other leaders.

NTS leaders have limited resources to divide between domestic policy – including the promotion of social and economic development and the distribution of patronage – and national security needs – defending the state against violent aggressors from within and abroad. A leader’s political survival depends on both satisfying a winning coalition of constituents through favorable domestic policy and defending the state and regime from attack. This “two-level game” is particularly difficult to play for NTS leaders who govern regimes with disputed authority over a state and/or govern states with disputed jurisdiction over a territory or population. In Chapters 3 and 4 I proposed a series of strategies NTS leaders are likely to adopt through militarization, resolving international disputes, and engaging in international security cooperation to both defend their state and promote their political survival. I argue that among NTS leaders, strategies will likely differ depending on whether they govern a democracy or an autocracy and an old or new state. In this chapter I examine whether these strategies actually
“work.” That is, I analyze the extent to which decisions on national security policy influence the likelihood of the leader’s political survival and the survival of their political regime.

Many studies have analyzed the conditions under which regimes are most likely to survive or fail. The fall of autocracy and the emergence and survival of democracy have been of particular interest to scholars of democratization. Some studies have focused on analyzing the political survival of individual leaders in office. This study will examine both aspects of political survival – leadership survival and regime survival – side by side across a variety of security policies. First, drawing on the insights of selectorate theory I discuss the conditions under which individual leaders are most likely to stay in office. Second, drawing on the insights of democratization theory I discuss the conditions under which different types of political regimes are most likely to survive. Third, I propose a series of expectations of how a leader’s choice of national security policy should affect their individual political survival and the survival of their regime. Fourth, I test these propositions by conducting a series of worldwide survival analyses 1950-1998 on the duration of leaders’ terms in office and the reign of different political regimes. Fifth, I conclude by summarizing how national security policy seems to affect political survival and how NTS might be affected differently from other states.

II. The Demands of Political Survival

The best political survival strategy a leader can adopt will differ by the form of the regime they govern. A political regime is the set of rules by which the
leader of a state is selected. These rules may be established formally such as in a written constitution or they may be established less formally such as in patrimonial customs. While leadership selection is sometimes thought to be less formalized in democracies than autocracies, some autocracies can have very formal rules for leader succession such as in the former Soviet Union, while the some democracies may select leaders largely based on custom such as in the United Kingdom. The specific rules of a regime and their level of formality, however, are not most important for determining a leader’s best strategy for political survival. Rather, it is the number of people in a state who have a say in the selection of the leader and the number of people whose support is required to be selected that make the most significant difference cross-nationally in determining the optimal strategy.

Selectorate theory identifies these two characteristics of a regime that select a leader as the “selectorate” and the “winning coalition” and explains why they can influence the policy decisions a leader is likely to make in pursuit of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). People in the selectorate are those with a say in choosing the leader and who have a prospect of gaining access to special privileges distributed by the leader. People in the winning coalition are the subgroup of the selectorate whose support is required by the leader to remain in office and who receive special privileges in exchange for their loyalty. Because the leader of a democracy requires the support of a larger proportion of their state’s population for a winning coalition than the leader of an autocracy, Bueno de Mesquita et al argue that they are likely to invest in policies with
greater public benefits (ie. provide more public goods) than an autocrat. Goods that government can provide that have largely public benefits include health care, education, a sound financial system, national security, law and order, transportation infrastructure, and communications infrastructure. While autocrats may also provide these goods to some extent, they can often satisfy their smaller winning coalition through private goods including money, jobs, favorable regulatory policy, natural resource concessions, and other special privileges that can create strong bonds of loyalty while being able to keep some state resources for their own private use. Thus, they have less incentive to provide public goods. However, because an autocrat may prefer to benefit a much smaller group of people, they face a greater threat of rebellion from people outside of their winning coalition than democratic leaders (Dahl 1973, Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Thus, the autocrats must be prepared to deter and defend against rebellion with a strong coercive apparatus. Leaders of democracies are less threatened by rebellion from people outside their winning coalition, because those non-winning coalition people who are enfranchised members of the selectorate have a higher chance of joining a future winning coalition than selectorate members outside the winning coalition members in autocracies. Non-winning coalition people can also enjoy the greater public benefits of democratic governance even if the benefits are not targeted at them.

Londregan and Poole (1996) and Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) find that leadership turnover is more frequent in democracies than autocracies – that is, the duration of a democratic leader’s time in office is shorter. Of course, the duration
that a leader is likely to be in power can differ within regime types. In
democracies, for instance, differences in term limits and electoral rules, and
whether a government is presidential or parliamentary can influence the time
length of time a leader can expect to lawfully remain in office. Across
autocracies, leaders are likely to have a shorter reign in military governments and
single party systems which sometimes institutionalize frequent leadership change
than in more personalist regimes that revolve around loyalty to a particular
individual (Geddes 1999b). Leaders of democracies and autocracies often face
different consequences for losing power. When democratic leaders leave office,
they can still expect to benefit from the public goods emphasis of the regime.
When autocratic leaders leave office they have a lower chance of being one of the
relative few who benefit from a regime focused on the distribution of private
goods. Worse yet, Goemans (2000) finds that autocratic leaders are more likely
to be harmed when they lose office. Thus, democratic leaders risk less of a
personal loss when leaving office and have a greater incentive to preserve and
observe the rules of succession. Bienen and van de Walle (1991) and Bueno de
Mesquita et al (2003) find that leaders face the greatest risk of losing power
during their first few years in office, and become more secure over time. The
mean political survival time for leaders is 4-5 years and one-third of leaders fail to
survive past their first year (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). These patterns are
apparent across my sample of states from 1950-1998 with Bueno de Mesquita et
al’s data on leadership tenures (which itself was an extension of Bienen and van
de Walle’s data) disaggregated by the Reich (2003) coding of democratic and autocratic regimes used in previous chapters.

Figure 5.1 displays Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the duration of democratic and autocratic leaders in office. Each curve shows the proportion of leaders remaining in office after each year has passed. Both the democratic and autocratic survival curves are especially steep up to the 10 year mark showing that most leaders leave office within a decade. In the first few years, the two curves are very similar suggesting that democratic and autocratic leaders have about equal chance of losing office during that time. Over the long-run, however, the

\footnote{The Kaplan-Meier method is a product-limit estimator of the number of individuals surviving past a particular point in time.}
autocratic curve remains higher than the democratic curve which indicates that autocrats survive longer in office. While in general leaders tend to survive longer in wealthier states, the longest tenured leaders tend to rule in Africa and Asia (Bienen and van de Walle 1992).

III. The Conditions for Regime Survival

This discussion of political survival has focused on how leaders avoid deposition within their regime. However, in an NTS, leaders not only need to secure support within their regime, but need to consolidate the power of their regime as well. NTS leaders face a heightened risk of their regime collapsing due to the environment of heightened uncertainty, intense political competition, and institutional weakness that often follows regime change or new statehood. Each decision an NTS leader makes not only can have consequences for maintaining support within the regime, but also for consolidating the regime’s power. A major task for an NTS leader towards the consolidation of power is to establish the vertical legitimacy of their regime: recognition of the regime’s authority over the state and monopoly over the organized use of force. A regime can establish its legitimacy by demonstrating its efficacy and effectiveness in providing such policy goods as public services, national security, and law and order. Easton (1965) and Linz (1978) argue that a public will often judge the efficacy of an entire new regime by their evaluation of its individual leader. Linz describes as a daunting challenge the struggle of leaders of new regimes to prove their efficacy, as the public of an NTS often has high expectations for positive change and the leader cannot point to many past successes of the regime to demonstrate its
effectiveness. However, he notes that the leader’s effectiveness in defending against opponents of the regime can often be of equal or greater importance to political survival than providing satisfactory policy goods.²⁴ As I have argued, a leader’s abilities to provide each of these are closely entwined.

Often, the ability of a leader to consolidate a new regime is impeded by a country’s structural challenges. The establishment of a new regime is more difficult in states with significant ethnic or religious cleavages or where resources are scarce for implementing government policies. A high level of wealth and development in a country is particularly important for the consolidation of new democracies. Lipset (1959) argues that social and economic development in the areas of education, wealth, urbanization, and industrialization are critical for creating the conditions for democracy to work. Londregan and Poole (1996) and Przeworski et al (2000) find that the level of a country’s wealth is perhaps the best predictor of whether a democratic regime will survive. In countries above a certain level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, it is highly unlikely for democracies to fail. Londregan and Poole (1990) find that a coup d’etat is 21 times as likely to occur in the poorest countries as in the wealthiest.

In autocracies, wealth does not seem to be as critical for regime survival as maintaining strong economic performance and averting economic crisis. This has

²⁴ Linz (1978: 21-22) proposes an interesting distinction between a regime’s “efficacy” and its “effectiveness.” “Efficacy” is “the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing any political system (and those that become salient in any historical moment) that are perceived as more satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens,” while “effectiveness” is “the capacity actually to implement the policies formulated, with the desired results.”
been found to be especially true for military and personalist regimes (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Geddes 1999b, Przeworski et al 2000, Sanhueza 1999). Geddes (1999b) finds that single party regimes survive longer than personalist regimes and personalist regimes survive longer than military regimes. The collapse of military regimes often results from destabilizing rivalries among the top officers and the collapse of personalist regimes usually occurs with the death of the leader. While in the long-run the survival of personalist regimes depends more on the political survival of leaders than any other type of regime – democratic or autocratic – in the short-run, in a new regime, the survival of the leader and regime are closely intertwined regardless of regime type. That is, when a regime collapses, the leader usually loses power.

**Figure 5.2**

![Political Regime Survival (Kaplan-Meier Estimates)](image)
Figure 5.2 presents Kaplan-Meier estimates for the survival rate of new regimes for each additional year after regime change. This sample includes all new regimes that emerged from 1941-1998 (and survived at least until 1950), disaggregated by regime type. The coding of each new regime is described in Chapter 2. Quite a different pattern can be seen in this graph of regime survival from the graph of leadership survival. Here, both curves drop steeply in the first few years, but whereas the survival rate of democratic regimes stabilize after about 10 years, the survival rate of autocracies continues to drop fairly continuously. Over the long-run, democracies have a much higher survival rate than autocracies.

IV. Strategies for Defense and Political Survival

For NTS leaders, satisfying domestic constituencies and defending against rebellion are critical to political survival, but so too is providing for the national defense. After regime change or new statehood, foreign rivals may challenge an NTS leader to test their ability and commitment to defending their national interests and sovereignty. If an NTS leader fails to defend against foreign aggression, their chances of political survival will likely decrease. Their domestic constituency may question the efficacy of their regime and the legitimacy of the state. Or, a foreign aggressor may depose the leader directly. Leaders can deter and defend against foreign aggression through building a strong military, resolving disputes with other states, and seeking security assistance from other states. However, to adopt these defense strategies, leaders must usually draw from the same pool of limited resources needed to enact domestic policies. Thus,
for the NTS leader a careful balance is required to consolidate the power of the
regime, maintain support within the regime, and defend against rivals abroad.
And if resources are lacking and social cleavages are especially acute, this
balance may be impossible to achieve. Because democratic and autocratic leaders
have different political strategies, we might expect the consequences of different
defense strategies to impact their political survival and the survival of their regime
differently. In proposing expectations about how this may be so, I assume that the
same policies that promote the political survival of leaders also promote the
survival of new regimes because the performance of a new regime’s leader is so
closely intertwined with the consolidation of the regime. However, I will find
that the same policies do not necessarily have the same effect on leadership
survival as on regime survival.

A. Militarization

Building a strong military is a decision a leader can usually make
unilaterally, limited only by willingness and resources. Militarization is the
degree to which a state invests its resources – both in terms of manpower and
money – toward military purposes. Higher militarization may adversely affect the
political survival of democratic leaders while promoting the political survival of
autocratic leaders. Bowman’s (1996) finding that increased militarization led to
diminished levels of democracy in Latin American states lends support to this
expectation. However, Maoz’s (1996) finding that higher militarization in a state
relative to other politically-relevant states increased the chance of survival for
democratic regimes and decreased the chance of survival for autocratic regimes
between 1816 and 1986 seems to belie this expectation. Still, for the purposes of understanding how a leader’s decision to militarize can affect their political survival, it seems less important to analyze how a state’s militarization compares to its neighbors than how state resources are allocated between military and civilian needs. In Chapter 3 I found that democracies militarize less than autocracies, and that new democracies and new autocracies tend to militarize less than established democracies and autocracies, respectively. This shows that leaders of democracies are likely reluctant to militarize. Perhaps it is because they are wary of the trade-off of “guns for butter.” Promoting social and economic development are more critical to their political survival than enhancing military strength in the absence of a clear military threat, and leaders may wish to reserve resources for these goals which are more likely to garner domestic support. In addition, increased militarization may increase the risk of both insurgency and military coups. Increased militarization can appear to privilege military over civilian needs which is likely to heighten civilian discontent and encourage insurgency (Henderson and Singer 2000). The military, in turn, may adopt a heightened perception of its efficacy vis-à-vis the governing regime and may seek to take control of the state itself through a coup d’etat (Casper 1991, Wang 1998). Autocrats are likely less reluctant to militarize as they do not need to provide as many public goods, and they require a strong coercive security apparatus to deter and defend against rebellion. Thus, we might expect:

**Proposition 5.1: Militarization will decrease political survival in democracies.**

**Proposition 5.2: Militarization will increase political survival in autocracies.**
B. Engaging in Militarized International Conflict

Using military force to resolve disputes and engaging in militarized international conflict can also be a costly policy which can diminish the resources available to a leader for enacting domestic policy. This would seem to constrain a leader’s policy options for building domestic support through favorable public policy. However, there are instances where international conflict involvement might improve a leader’s chances of political survival. Success in foreign policy can demonstrate to state residents the efficacy of a regime and the effectiveness of its leader. Additionally, uniting a state against a common enemy can in itself help a leader build domestic support. However, failure in foreign policy, as Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) argue, can reveal the shortcomings of a regime and empower its rivals both at home and abroad. Thus, while engaging in lower level militarized interstate disputes can perhaps increase the prospects of political survival and regime survival, engaging in costly conflict can decrease those prospects. In Chapter 3 I found that leaders of autocracies initiate more militarized conflicts than leaders of democracies, and leaders of new autocratic regimes initiate more conflicts than leaders of established autocracies.

Success in war has been found to increase the chances for a leader’s political survival and regime survival, while defeat in war has been found to hurt them (Bueno de Mesquita et al 1992, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995, Maoz 1996, Goemans 2000). Bueno de Mesquita et al find, interestingly, that the risk of regime change is greater for initiators of war who are defeated than for targets who are defeated. Beyond victory and defeat, the costs of violent conflict
can increase the chances of leadership change and regime change. Bueno de Mesquita et al (1992) find evidence of this in an analysis of regime survival between 1916 and 1975 while Maoz (1996) fails to find evidence in an analysis of regime survival between 1816 and 1986. It is noteworthy, however, that Bueno de Mesquita et al distinguish between the survival of different subsequent autocratic regimes as I do, while Maoz does not. By not distinguishing between subsequent autocratic regimes, one may overlook many cases of regime collapse. Because democracies have been argued to more carefully select the military conflicts they enter – ones they are likely to win – democratic leaders may benefit more from conflict involvement than autocratic leaders (Reiter and Stam 2002).

Thus, I propose:

**Proposition 5.3:** Militarized international conflict involvement will increase political survival in democracies and autocracies.

**Proposition 5.4:** Costly international and internal conflict will decrease political survival in democracies and autocracies

**C. Alliances**

While militarization and conflict involvement can divert scarce state resources toward national security, creating a network of alliances can enhance a state’s security while reserving state resources for other purposes. Although agreeing to an alliance requires a state to agree to certain constraints on its behavior and obligations to its ally, Palmer and Morgan (2006) argue that joining an alliance should, on the whole, increase a state’s freedom of action by enabling it to obtain its desired foreign policy goals with fewer resources than it could
otherwise. While Palmer and Morgan focus on the pursuit of foreign policy goals, for NTS leaders these resources are most significantly freed for the pursuit of domestic policy goals critical to political survival. Thus, leaders with more allies should have better chances of political survival and regime survival.

In an analysis of regime survival across the years 1816-1986, Maoz (1996) finds that democracies with a greater number of alliances relative to other politically relevant states are more likely to survive. However, he finds no evidence that this is true for autocracies. This may partially be explained by the fact that he overlooks transitions between subsequent autocratic regimes. There is no particular reason why we should expect a stronger alliance network to aid democratic leaders but not autocratic leaders. Thus, we might expect:

**Proposition 5.5: Joining more alliances will increase political survival in democracies and autocracies.**

**Proposition 5.6: Having stronger allies will increase political survival in democracies and autocracies.**

**D. Arms Transfers**

Arms transfers are another important form of international security cooperation. Their impact, however, may be similar to that of heightened militarization which can aid the survival of autocracies, but hurt the survival of democracies. Receiving arms transfers can improve the military capabilities of a recipient state and help a leader deter and defend against internal and external rivals of their regime. Sometimes, arms transfers are received for free, for a discount, or on easy credit terms that can help leaders reserve state resources for
other applications while enhancing their military capability. Arms transfers may be especially helpful to autocrats if they can enhance the ability of their coercive apparatus to deter and defend against rebellion. However, arms transfers have been found to have deleterious consequences for the survival of democracies. Maniruzzaman (1992) finds that greater arms transfers facilitate military coups and prolong military rule. He argues that the acquisition of better armaments strengthens the military and grants it greater power within a state relative to civilians. Not only do the arms themselves have coercive value, he argues, but possession of more advanced weaponry creates a need for the acquisition of more advanced supporting technology, which in turn creates a need for improved training and intensifies the loyalty of troops to the military institution. All of this further empowers the armed forces and threatens the civilian regime. In addition, Blanton (1999) finds that greater arms transfers are related to increased human rights violations by recipient regimes, and Craft and Smaldone (2002) find that increased arms transfers lead to a higher risk of involvement in both civil and international conflict. Both of these consequences of arms transfers can be destabilizing for a democratic regime. These arguments and evidence of the consequences of arms transfers lead to two expectations regarding political survival:

**Proposition 5.7:** Arms transfers will decrease political survival in democracies.

**Proposition 5.8:** Arms transfers will increase political survival in autocracies.
V. Analysis

A. Research Design

The best way to analyze how different policies affect the likelihood of political survival over time is through event history analysis, also known as survival analysis, duration analysis, or hazard analysis. There are a variety of methods to analyze longitudinal records of when events happen to a sample of individuals. In this case the “event” of interest is the end of a leader’s tenure or the collapse of a regime and the “individuals” are leaders and regimes. Through an event history analysis, I can analyze the effect that different security policies have on the risk or “hazard” of the event occurring. At each point in time – each additional year of political survival - there may be a different hazard of the event occurring. The distribution of the hazard can be visualized as a “hazard curve.” Here, I apply a parametric method to analyze political survival. Parametric methods specify the functional form of the hazard distribution a priori (e.g. specifying the hazard distribution as an exponential function or a weibull function). Parametric hazard analyses are popular for their simplicity, easy replicability, and efficiency. However, when conducting a parametric hazard analysis, there is always a risk of choosing an inappropriate functional form which can result in incorrect estimates. This is because a parametric analysis assumes that a constant hazard rate exists over time which is often not realistic for the event history process being studied. To avoid such an error, I estimate a series of models with different functional forms – the exponential, gompertz, weibull, log-logistic, and log-normal – and compare the fit of these models. In addition, I
estimate a semi-parametric model – the piecewise exponential – where I specify the shape of the hazard without the assumption of a constant hazard rate. I choose the models that best fit the leadership survival and regime survival processes to test my propositions. I first conduct a survival analysis of leaders and then of regimes. For each analysis, separate models are estimated for democracies and autocracies.

B. Variables

I use the same variables here to test my propositions as used in Chapters 3 and 4. To analyze the effect of militarization, I use two different indicators: military spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), “Milspend/GDP,” and the percent of the population in the armed forces, “Milsize/pop.” Milspend/GDP captures the proportion of a state’s economic capital allocated to militarization. Milsize/pop captures the proportion of a state’s human capital allocated to militarization. Economic and human capital are both important resources for economic and social development. Data on the size of armed forces, national population, and military spending are from the Correlates of War (COW) project’s National Military Capabilities Dataset 3.0; data on GDP are from Gleditsch (2002). I include MIDs – the number of militarized interstate disputes a state is involved in per year – to capture conflict involvement (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). To capture the cost of international conflict I include Intl. war battle deaths/pop. – the number of interstate battle deaths per year as a proportion of the state’s population (Fordham and Walker 2005). I include two measures of alliances. Number of alliances with is the total number
of alliances a state is a member of in a given year (Leeds 2005). *Total power of allies* is the sum of the CINC scores of a state’s defense pact allies (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). I include *Arms suppliers* which is the number of arms suppliers to a state in a year to capture the effect of arms transfers (SIPRI).

I also include several control variables. While *Intl. war battle deaths/pop.* captures the degree to which a state is actively threatened by external rivals, I include *Civil war battle deaths/pop.* to capture the active threat of internal strife (Fordham and Walker 2005). To capture more passive security threats, I control for *Total power of rivals* - the sum of a state’s rivals’ CINC scores (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). I control for three economic variables: size of the economy (*GDP*), level of development (*GDP per capita*), and the rate of economic growth (*GDP growth*). I also control for *State age* – the number of years since becoming a new state (as defined in Chapter 2).

**C. The Hazard of Losing Office**

To analyze the effect of security policy on the political survival of leaders, I use Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) worldwide data on leadership tenures. I analyze leadership tenures within my sample of states from 1950-1998. The first task of event history analysis is choosing the best method to model the hazard distribution of the event of interest. To do this, I first visually inspect the hazard distribution of leaders leaving office.

---

25 I use Fordham and Walker’s (2005) data on CINC scores of defense pact allies as identified by Gibler and Sarkees (2002).

26 I use Fordham and Walker’s (2005) data on CINC scores of strategic rivals as identified by Thompson (2001) and defense pact allies as identified by Gibler and Sarkees (2002).
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the hazard of a leader leaving office for each year of a leader’s first 30 years in office. Leaders are disaggregated by those in democratic regimes and those in autocratic regimes (semi-democratic regimes are omitted). The hazard value is the probability that a leader will leave office within a very short interval after a particular point in time, divided by the length of that interval, and is conditional on the survival of the leader up to that point in time. In other words, a higher hazard value at a particular point in time indicates a higher chance of leaving office for those leaders who have not already left office. It can be seen that the democratic hazard curve is higher at all points in time than the autocratic curve. This is indicative of the higher leadership turnover in democratic regimes. The hazard is highest after 8 to 12 years in office.
suggesting that this is the period in which leaders face the greatest likelihood of leaving office. The hazard for autocratic leaders also peaks after 8 to 10 years, but does not fluctuate quite as much as the hazard for democratic leaders. One observation that should be made is that both curves are non-monotonic – they neither monotonically rise or fall over time. This suggests that the hazard distribution for leadership survival may be best modeled using a non-monotonic functional form such as a log-logistic or log-normal distribution which would be a break from common practice in analyzing these data (c.f. Bienen and van de Walle 1992, Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Still, I estimate models of leadership survival on monotonic distributions – exponential, gompertz, and weibull – and non-monotonic distributions – log-logistic and log-normal – to find the best fit. In addition I estimate a piecewise exponential model where I include 9 dummy variables to capture each 5-year change in the hazard curve. For each distribution I estimate the model: leadership ends = f(Milspend/GDP, Milsize/pop, MIDs, Intl. war battle deaths/pop., Number of Allies, Total power of allies, Arms suppliers, Civil war battle deaths/pop., Total power of rivals, GDP, GDP growth, State age).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Log-Likelihood</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>AIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exponential</td>
<td>6796</td>
<td>-1599.661</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3225.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piecewise Exp.</td>
<td>6796</td>
<td>-1580.252</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3204.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gompertz</td>
<td>6796</td>
<td>-1597.036</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3222.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weibull</td>
<td>6796</td>
<td>-1591.352</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3210.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Logistic</td>
<td>6796</td>
<td>-1534.730</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3097.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Normal</td>
<td>6796</td>
<td>-1510.917</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3049.834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.1 compares the fit of different hazard distributions on the model of leadership survival across states of all regime types. From left to right the table presents the number of observations, the log-likelihood, the number of parameters, and the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC). While a comparison of log-likelihood values can usually assess the fit of different models with the same number of parameters, these different estimation methods require different numbers of parameters. The AIC values are useful for comparing model fit in this case because they penalize models that include extra parameters. It is calculated as \( \text{AIC} = -2(\ln L) + 2(k+c) \), where \( k \) = the number of explanatory variables and \( c \) = the number of distributional parameters. Comparing the AIC values across models, it can be seen that the log-normal model has the lowest AIC and thus can be judged to have the best fit. In the next section I estimate log-normal models to analyze the effects of the explanatory variables.
Table 5.2 presents the log-normal estimates of models of leadership survival. To test my propositions I disaggregate this sample by Reich’s (2003) coding of democratic and autocratic regimes. Models I and II are estimated on democratic states. Models III and IV are estimated on autocratic states. Models II and IV control for State age. To control for the unobserved heterogeneity across different states, I cluster standard errors by state. Coefficients are expressed as time ratios. A time ratio greater than 1.00 suggests that the
explanatory variable increases the time of leadership survival. A time ratio less than 1.00 suggest that the explanatory variable decreases the time of leadership survival. The sample of democracies includes 606 leaders, of which 508 leave office during the period of observation. There is a total of 2312 leader-years. In both Models I and II, I find only the same three explanatory variables to be statistically significant in the analyses of democratic leaders. *Intl. War Battle deaths/Pop.* has time ratio values of 1.31e-7 and 1.20e-8 – both less than 1.00 – and is significant. This lends support to Proposition 5.4, that costly international conflict will decrease the chances of political survival. *Number of allies* has time ratio values of 1.02 and 1.03 – both greater than 1.00 – and is significant. This lends support to Proposition 5.5 that having more allies will increase the chances of political survival. *Arms suppliers* is less than 1.00 and significant. This lends support to Proposition 5.7 that arms transfer will decrease the chances of political survival in democracies.

Somewhat different results were found for Models III and IV in the analyses of autocratic leadership tenures. In Model III, two variables are found to be statistically significant. *Total power of allies* is found to be significant and less than 1.00 suggesting that autocrats with more powerful allies have a lower chance of political survival. This contradicts the expectation of Proposition 5.6 that having stronger allies will increase the chances of political survival. *GDP growth* is significant and quite a bit greater than 1.00 suggesting that strong economic performance is very important for the political survival of autocrats. When *State age* is included in Model IV, *GDP growth* remains significant, but *Total power of
allies loses significance and Total power of rivals becomes statistically significant and has a very large time ratio value of 21.9. This suggests that autocrats with powerful foreign rivals are more likely to stay in power.

E. The Hazard of Regime Collapse

To test the effect of security policy on regime survival, I analyze the duration of new regimes that emerged after 1941 (and survived to at least 1950 – where my data begins) and before 1999. As before, I first begin with a visual inspection of the hazard distribution of regime collapse.

Figure 5.4

Figure 5.4 graphs the distribution of the hazard of a regime collapsing for the first 30 years of a regime’s existence. Regimes are disaggregated into democracies and autocracies (semi-democracies are not included). It can be observed that at all points in time, autocracies have a higher hazard of collapsing
than democracies. This partially can be explained by the fact that many autocratic regimes are highly personalistic and collapse upon the death or removal of the leader, whereas the death or removal of a leader is less likely to lead to the collapse of a democracy. This finding should be contrasted to the finding in the previous analysis that leaders have a higher hazard of leaving office in democracies than autocracies. For democracies the hazard of collapse appears to decline after about 10 years, and for autocracies the hazard of collapse begins to decline after about 12 years. Similar to the hazard distribution of leaders leaving office, the hazard curve of regime collapse appears to be non-monotonic, suggesting that it may be best modeled with a log-logistic or log-normal functional form. As before, however, I conduct a formal test to compare the model fit for estimates of five parametric distributions and one semi-parametric distribution across democratic and autocratic regimes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Log-Likelihood</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>AIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exponential</td>
<td>3068</td>
<td>-287.62</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>603.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piecewise Exp.</td>
<td>3068</td>
<td>-278.62</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>603.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gompertz</td>
<td>3068</td>
<td>-287.60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>605.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weibull</td>
<td>3068</td>
<td>-287.61</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>605.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Logistic</td>
<td>3068</td>
<td>-290.49</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>610.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Normal</td>
<td>3068</td>
<td>-287.11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>604.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 presents the number of observations, log-likelihood, the number of parameters, and the AIC value of 6 different models of regime collapse. The model, Regime Collapse = $f$(Milspend/GDP, Milsize/pop., MIDs, Intl. war battle deaths/pop., Alliances, Total power of allies, Arms suppliers, Civil war battle deaths/pop., Total power of rivals, GDP, GDP growth, State age) was estimated
on each distribution for democratic and autocratic cases together. The lowest log-likelihood is found for the semi-parametric piecewise exponential model at -278.62 suggesting it offers the best fit to the data. The parametric exponential, gompertz, weibull, and log-normal models are all found to have similar log-likelihoods of slightly more than -287. Upon comparing the AIC values, which penalize models that have extra parameters, it can be seen that the exponential and piecewise exponential models are tied for the lowest AIC value at 603.24. Of these two, I select the exponential model for use in testing my propositions, as it offers greater efficiency with 9 fewer distributional parameters than the piecewise exponential.
Table 5.4 presents estimates of exponential models of regime survival. To test my propositions I disaggregate this sample by Reich’s (2003) coding of democratic and autocratic regimes. Models I and II are estimated on democratic states. Models III and IV are estimated on autocratic states. Models II and IV control for State age. To control for unobserved heterogeneity across different states, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by state. As in the log-normal regressions, the coefficients here are expressed as time ratios. Time ratios greater

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic Regimes</th>
<th>Autocratic Regimes</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time Ratio</td>
<td>Time Ratio</td>
<td>Time Ratio</td>
<td>Time Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Std. Error)</td>
<td>(Std. Error)</td>
<td>(Std. Error)</td>
<td>(Std. Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MilSpend/GDP</td>
<td>1.03 (0.12)</td>
<td>1.20 *** (0.06)</td>
<td>1.19 *** (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milsize/Pop</td>
<td>0.36 * (0.15)</td>
<td>1.46 * (0.32)</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDs</td>
<td>1.04 (0.42)</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl. War Battle Deaths/Pop.</td>
<td>7.30E+300 (0.44)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Allies</td>
<td>0.98 (0.07)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Power of Allies</td>
<td>743.92 *** (1296.66)</td>
<td>0.15 * (15.64)</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Transfers</td>
<td>0.64 *** (0.08)</td>
<td>0.91 * (0.05)</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War Battle Deaths/Pop.</td>
<td>3.4E+303 (0.32)</td>
<td>4.2E+253 (2.41)</td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Power of Rivals</td>
<td>3.95E+11 *** (158.95)</td>
<td>41.11</td>
<td>106.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>1.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>1.00 *** (0.00)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Age</td>
<td>1.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.99 * (0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Regimes</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Regime Failures</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>142</td>
<td></td>
<td>142.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time at Risk (Regime-Years)</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>2141</td>
<td></td>
<td>2141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-34.82</td>
<td>-220.55</td>
<td>-218.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald</td>
<td>251.37 ***</td>
<td>157.95 ***</td>
<td>162.57 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4 presents estimates of exponential models of regime survival. To test my propositions I disaggregate this sample by Reich’s (2003) coding of democratic and autocratic regimes. Models I and II are estimated on democratic states. Models III and IV are estimated on autocratic states. Models II and IV control for State age. To control for unobserved heterogeneity across different states, standard errors are adjusted for clustering by state. As in the log-normal regressions, the coefficients here are expressed as time ratios. Time ratios greater
than 1.00 indicate an increased time until regime collapse. Time ratios less than 1.00 indicate a decreased time until regime collapse.

In models I and II, 76 new democratic regimes are analyzed, 23 of which collapse before 1999. There are a total of 928 regime-year observations. Substantively, the findings are the same for both models. *Milsize/pop.* is significant and less than 1.00 lending support to Proposition 5.1 that more militarized democracies are more prone to collapse. *Total power of allies* is significant and far greater than 1.00 – at 1835.50 – lending support to Proposition 5.6 that democracies with powerful allies are (much) more likely to survive. *Arms suppliers* is significant and less than 1.00 lending support to Proposition 5.7 that arms transfers decrease the chances of democracies surviving. Neither *Milspend/GDP, MIDs, Battle deaths/Pop,* or *Alliances* are significant causes of regime collapse. Among the control variables, *Total power of rivals* and *GDP per capita* are both significant and greater than 1.00. This suggests that democracies with powerful rivals and higher levels of development are less prone to collapse.

Turning to the analysis of autocratic regimes, somewhat different results are found in model IV from model III when *State age* is included. A total of 201 new autocratic regimes are analyzed, 142 of which collapse before 1999. The models are estimated on 2141 regime-year observations. In model I, *Milspend/GDP* and *Milsize/pop.* are both significant and greater than 1.00 lending support to Proposition 5.2 that greater militarization contributes to the political survival of autocratic regimes. *Total power of allies* is significant and less than 1.00 suggesting that autocracies with powerful allies are more prone to collapse.
This finding contradicts the expectation of Proposition 5.6 that stronger allies should promote political survival. Another surprising finding is that Arms suppliers is significant and less than 1.00 suggesting that more arms transfers increase the likelihood of regime collapse. This finding contradicts the expectation of Proposition 5.8 that arms transfers will increase prospects for the survival of autocracies. As in the models of democratic survival, neither MIDs, Intl. Battle Deaths/Pop, nor Alliances are statistically significant. Among the control variables, Civil war battle deaths/pop. is less than 1.00 and significant and GDP growth is greater than 1.00 and significant. This suggests that autocracies facing internal strife are prone to collapse and autocracies with strong economies are likely to survive. In Model IV when State age is included, only Milspend/GDP, Civil war battle deaths/pop. and GDP growth remain significant. State age itself is significant suggesting and less than 1.00, suggesting that autocracies are more likely to endure in new states than old states.

G. Discussion

As expected, security policies are mostly found to have different effects on political survival in democracies compared to autocracies. Less anticipated were the differing effects of security policies on the tenure of leaders and the survival of regimes. At this point, I will review the extent of evidence in support of each of the eight propositions across the two analyses.

Some support was found for Proposition 5.1 – that militarization will decrease the chances of political survival in democracies. However, evidence was only found at the level of regime survival and not at the level of leadership.
survival. At the level of regime survival, the size of the military appears to have a greater detrimental effect on democratic survival than the amount of military spending. This seems to lend more evidence in support of the argument that militarization harms democracy through the strengthening of the military class than to the argument that democracy is weakened because of a trade-off of “guns for butter.”

Support was found for Proposition 5.2 – that militarization will promote political survival in autocracies, but again this is found only at the level of regime survival. Higher military spending and a larger military were both found to promote the survival of autocratic regimes. This lends support to the argument that a strong coercive apparatus is critical to defending the regime from internal rivals.

A state’s involvement in international conflict involvement is found to have only limited effects on political survival. No evidence was found in support of Proposition 5.3 – that militarized conflict involvement will promote political survival in democracies and autocracies. This seems to call into question the assumption that leaders try to bolster their political support by diverting attention from their deficiencies at home to their confrontations with rivals abroad. If support for leaders is bolstered through conflict involvement, it must only be on a short-term basis. International conflict involvement was not found to have adverse effects on political survival either, except in terms of the costs of conflicts that escalate to war. In democracies, costly international conflict is found to increase the chances of a leader losing office – lending some support to
Proposition 5.4. However, in spite of the expectation of Proposition 5.4, no similarly adverse effect is found on the survival of autocratic leaders or on regime survival.

Very mixed evidence was found for the effect of a state engaging in alliances on political survival. I proposed that joining more alliances (Proposition 5.5) and having stronger allies (Proposition 5.6) should promote political survival in both democracies and autocracies. For democratic leaders, having more alliances seems to promote their chances of remaining in office, while the strength of their allies does not seem to matter much. For autocratic leaders, while the number of alliances has little effect, there is some evidence that the strength of their allies has a surprisingly adverse affect on their political survival. When not controlling for the age of a state, autocrats with stronger allies have a higher chance of losing office. When analyzing how alliance engagement affects the survival of democratic regimes, the number of alliances does not seem to matter, but the strength of allies does. Democratic regimes with strong allies are more likely to survive. The effect of alliance engagement on the survival of autocratic regimes is similar to its effect on the tenure of autocratic leaders. When not controlling for the age of a state, autocratic regimes with stronger allies have a higher chance of collapse. Taken together alliance engagement seems to promote the political survival of democratic leaders and the survival of democratic regimes. However, there is some evidence to suggest that having strong allies is detrimental to the political survival of autocratic leaders and autocratic regimes.
Evidence is found for Proposition 5.7 – that receiving arms transfers decreases the chances of political survival in democracies. However, no evidence is found in support of Proposition 5.8 – that receiving arms transfers promotes political survival in autocracies. Receiving a greater number of arms transfer per year seems to both decrease the chances of a democratic leader remaining in office and decrease the chances of a democratic regime surviving. Receiving arms transfers seems to have little effect on an autocrat’s tenure in office. However, it is surprising to find that – when not controlling for the age of a state - receiving arms transfers decreases the chances of an autocratic regime surviving.

IV. Conclusion

NTS leaders tend to face different threats to their political survival than other leaders. Not only must they secure and maintain support within their regime – whether a democracy or autocracy – but they must also be concerned with securing the survival of the regime itself. The best strategy for attaining these two goals will be different for a democratic leader than for an autocratic leader. The choices a leader makes on national security policy are an important part of a leader’s strategy for political survival and have important consequences for their ability to remain in power. In this chapter, I find that not only do the consequences of a leader’s national security policy differ by regime type, but that national security policy seems to have different consequences for leadership survival than it does for regime survival. The fact that NTS leaders need to worry about regime survival to a greater extent than most other leaders suggests that they will likely differ in their national security decision making calculus.
For example, the ability of democratic leaders to retain office is found to be adversely affected by engaging in costly international conflict, having few allies, and receiving more arms transfers. However, democratic regime survival is found to not only be threatened by receiving arms transfers, but also by high militarization and having weak allies. Thus it seems that NTS leaders are likely more threatened by high militarization than other democratic leaders. Interestingly, having strong international rivals seems to increase the chances of democratic regime survival.

In autocracies, the ability of leaders to retain office is only found to be adversely affected by having strong allies (particularly in new states) and strong rivals (particularly in established states). However, regime survival is found to be additionally threatened by insufficiently investing in militarization, sustaining high costs from waging violent internal conflict, and (possibly) receiving arms transfers. While democratic leaders seem to be more threatened by costly international conflict, autocratic leaders are more threatened by the costs of civil war. Interestingly, autocratic regimes are more likely to survive in new states than established states.

One lesson of this study for the democratization and political development literature is that a state’s international relations have important implications for the likelihood of a new regime consolidating. While I find – as expected – that among domestic factors high economic development is important for the survival of democratic regimes and strong economic performance is important for the survival of autocratic regimes, I also find that international relations –
international conflict, arms transfers, international rivalries, and alliance networks – are important as well. The findings of this chapter, overall, help demonstrate the validity of studying NTSs as a separate class of international actors.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

This dissertation has explored the connection between major domestic political transitions in a country and its government’s national security policy. In particular, I examined theoretically and empirically how the challenges of establishing a new political regime and/or a new state in a country might alter the typical strategic political calculus of a leader and the way in which they attempt to balance the needs of national defense with their desire to ensure their own political survival. I proposed and empirically tested a number of expectations of how leaders of newly transitioned states (NTSs) – states experiencing regime change or new statehood – might differ from leaders of more established regimes and states in choosing policies on militarization, resolving international conflicts, and engaging in international security cooperation. I also examined how an NTS leader’s national security policies affect the prospects of their political survival and the survival of their new regime. Across this study, I arrived at two general findings. First, I find that the national security policies of NTS leaders do seem to differ from those of other leaders and the nature of these differences often depend on whether the regime is democratic or autocratic and whether the state is new or old. Second, I find that while across all states there is a set of policies that most often tend to affect the prospects of a leader retaining office, there is a different set of policies that tend to affect the prospects of a new regime surviving. Because the political survival of NTS leaders depends both on retaining office
within a regime and ensuring the consolidation and survival of that regime, the consequences of national security policy decisions would seem to differ between NTS leaders and other leaders. For instance, while all democratic leaders might shun policies that threaten the re-election of themselves and their party, leaders of new democracies must also be cautious when considering policies that could threaten the survival of the democratic system. Together, these conclusions demonstrate the validity of studying NTSs as a separate class of international actors – something that is rarely done by international relations scholars. In addition, these conclusions highlight the role that international security plays in the processes of democratization, autocratization, and statebuilding. While scholars of political development including Tilly (1975, 1985) have highlighted the importance of the international security environment in statebuilding, the role of international security in democratization has less frequently been addressed. In this final chapter, I review and synthesize the major lessons of this study. First, I will summarize the empirical lessons of these analyses of national security policy in new democracies, new autocracies, and new states, and the differences I found between the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras. Second, I will discuss the implications of these findings for theory building and scholarship on international relations and democratization. Lastly, I will consider some implications of this study for policymakers seeking to address contemporary threats to international security.
I. Empirical Lessons

A. New Democracies and National Security

Democracies tend to militarize less than autocracies – both in terms of the level of military spending and the number of troops relative to the size of the state’s gross domestic product and population. Among democracies, I find differences between new democracies and established democracies. New democracies tend to militarize less than established democracies and new democracies in new states militarize even less than new democracies in old states. When leaders militarize at high levels, they may face serious political consequences. I find that the higher the level of militarization – especially in terms of the number of troops in the armed forces – the greater the chance of a democratic regime collapsing.

Democracies overall tend to be less belligerent than autocracies when resolving international conflicts. Among democracies, I find little evidence that new democracies are more belligerent than established democracies as Mansfield and Snyder (2005) have prominently argued. The little evidence that they might be more likely to initiate international militarized disputes is only found for cases of new democracies in old states during the Cold War. Democratic new states clearly initiate fewer conflicts. In the Post-Cold War era I find strong evidence that new democracies are less likely to initiate militarized disputes than autocracies, and new democracies in new states are even less likely to initiate a dispute. In fact, democratic new states are found to be the most peaceful of any state type during or after the Cold War. Interestingly, the very act of engaging in
militarized conflict or escalating conflicts to war is not as consequential to
democratic survival as might be expected. I find no evidence that engaging in
international conflict is detrimental to the chances of a new democratic regime
consolidating and surviving. Neither the number of conflicts a democracy
engages in nor the number of battle deaths a democracy sustains seems to affect
the chances of a democracy surviving. What I do find is that when a state
engages in costly conflict, the chances of a democratic leader losing office – in
either new or old regimes – increase. However, the actual act of engaging in
conflict – regardless of costs – neither seems to promote nor hurt their chances of
holding office.

In the Post-Cold War era, democracies seem to engage in more
cooperative security relationships – as observed through alliance joining and arms
transfers – than autocracies. However, during the Cold War, democracies were
less likely to engage in alliances than autocracies but still more likely to receive
arms transfers. I find that compared to established democracies, new democracies
– in both old and new states – engage in more alliances, but fewer arms transfers.
In examining the means through which cooperative security relationships are
established, I find some interesting patterns. New democracies in old states are
less likely to formalize their security relationships through a written alliance than
established democracies, while new democracies in new states are more likely to
than established democracies. When joining an alliance, new democracies are
less likely to engage in a multilateral alliance than established democracies.
Engaging in alliances and receiving arms transfers are both found to have
consequences for regime survival and the ability of democratic leaders to retain office. The more powerful a democracy’s allies, the more likely a new regime will survive. The more arms transfers a democracy receives (in terms of the number of different supplier states per year), the less likely the regime will survive. The more different allies a democracy has, the more likely the leader will retain office. The more arms transfers a democracy receives, the less likely the leader will retain office.

B. New Autocracies and National Security

Overall, autocracies tend to militarize at higher levels than democracies. Interestingly, new autocracies militarize less than established autocracies, while new autocracies in new states militarize more than established autocracies. As in democracies, the level of militarization has important consequences for regime survival. Unlike democracies, in autocracies a higher level of militarization increases the chance of regime survival both in terms of the level of military spending and the number of military personnel.

Autocracies are more likely to initiate and engage in international conflict than democracies. During the Cold War, new autocracies in old states were the most belligerent of state types – far more likely to initiate a conflict than an established autocracy. After the Cold War they were no more likely to initiate a conflict than established autocracies. Both during and after the Cold War new autocracies in new states were much less likely to initiate or become involved in conflicts than new and established autocracies in old states. Unlike in democracies, I do not find evidence that conflict involvement and incurring higher
numbers of battle deaths either promote or hurt the chances of autocratic regimes surviving or autocrats retaining office.

In the Post-Cold War era, in general, autocracies engage in fewer cooperative security relationships than democracies. New autocracies engage in fewer alliances and arms transfers than established autocracies, but with one exception. Autocratic new states are more likely to engage in alliances than any other type of autocracy and even any type of democracy. This may stem from the complimentary finding that autocratic new states are more likely to formalize their security relationships with a written alliance than other autocracies. New and old autocracies also seem to differ in their preferences for the number of partners with which they enter an agreement. When new autocracies in old states engage in alliances they are more likely to enter multilateral agreements than established autocracies, but new autocracies in new states are less likely to than established autocracies. I find that there are political consequences for autocrats who engage in international security cooperation. Unlike in democracies, leaders of autocracies with strong allies are less likely to retain office. However, there is some evidence that, as in democracies, receiving more arms transfers decreases the likelihood of regime survival in autocracies. This last finding is interesting when considering the findings on militarization. While militarization seems to strengthen new autocratic regimes’ hold on power, receiving arms transfers from a greater number of suppliers seems to weaken it. This is possibly because, while militarization improves a regime’s coercive power and, in the case of military governments, the ruling class’ power in society, a greater number of arms transfer
deals causes the regime to be beholden to more foreign governments. So while imported arms could contribute to the regime’s coercive power, the advantage of this may be offset by its foreign political obligations and the potential loss of policy autonomy. This conjecture is further bolstered by the finding that having powerful allies threatens regime survival. When a state is allied with stronger states, an asymmetric power relationship exists where the weaker state often trades policy autonomy for security assistance and guarantees from the stronger state. However, neither arms transfers nor the power of allies are found to significantly endanger regime survival when controlling for the age of the state.

C. New States and National Security

Studies of the politics of new democracies more often than not conflate the process of establishing a new democracy after regime change in an old state with establishing a new democratic regime in a new state. It is true that leaders of new regimes in old states face similar challenges to leaders of new regimes in new states. However, building on the findings of Maoz (1996), I find that the politics of new states – especially regarding the impact of political change on national security policy – may be quite distinctive, and when we conflate these two processes of political transition, we may be overlooking some important differences between the politics of new and old states. In some instances I find that the behavior of new regimes in old states and new regimes in new states diverge by a matter of degrees from the behavior of established states. For instance, while new democracies militarize less than established democracies, new democracies in new states militarize even less than those in established states.
states. Similarly, while I find that new democracies initiate fewer conflicts than established democracies, I find that new democracies in new states initiate even fewer conflicts than those in old states. However, in the few instances where I find evidence that new democracies in old states may be more belligerent than established democracies – particularly when Cold War cases are included – democratic new states are still less likely to initiate conflict than established democracies. In other instances I find that the behavior of democratic new states and autocratic new states jointly converge and is distinctive from that of old states. For example, democratic new states and autocratic new states are the least likely states to initiate conflict within their respective regime types. Both democratic and autocratic new states are among the most likely states to join an alliance and the most likely states within their respective regime types to formalize their security relationships by signing alliances. The only area where autocratic new states really seem to diverge from other states is in militarization – particularly in terms of the number of troops relative to population. In the Post-Cold War, autocratic new states are more likely to militarize at high levels than other states. Among the most intriguing findings on autocratic new states, is that autocratic regimes established in new states are slightly more likely to survive than those established in old states. Thus, it seems that it is easier to consolidate a new autocracy in a new state than an old state.

D. Empirical Change after the Cold War

I predicted that because of changes in the dynamics of democratization, state creation, and international relations since the Cold War, different
relationships between political transitions and a state’s national security policy may be uncovered in the Post-Cold War era. Indeed, I find significant differences between the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras. To begin with, my models often differed in their explanatory power for the two eras. While the model of conflict initiation had similar explanatory power across both Cold War and Post-Cold War cases, the models of militarization, alliance joining, and arms transfers had much greater explanatory power across Post-Cold War cases than Cold War cases.

I also found differences in results when testing my propositions concerning militarization, conflict initiation, and security cooperation. First, whereas the distinctions in militarization among new and old democracies are not statistically significant in the Cold War sample, there are clearly significant differences in the Post-Cold War sample. Also, I find that while Post-Cold War autocratic new states are likely militarize more than other state types, Cold War autocratic new states were not especially likely to militarize. Second, while in the Post-Cold War sample I found that new democracies in both new and old states are less likely to initiate a conflict than established democracies, during the Cold War there is some evidence that new democracies in old states might be more likely to initiate a conflict than established democracies. During the Cold War, new autocracies in old states were found to be much more likely to initiate a conflict than established autocracies, whereas this is not found after the Cold War. Third, I found that among both democracies and autocracies, new regimes in old states were less likely to receive arms transfers than established states in the Post Cold War era, whereas they were more likely to during the Cold War.
II. Lessons for Theory Building

Elsewhere, different explanations have been proposed for how regime change or new statehood might affect either international conflict involvement, militarization, or international security cooperation. What is different about the argument presented here is that I propose a more unified common explanation of how this is so both across different types of major political change and across different aspects of a state’s national security policy. In contrast with more systemic-level/structural approaches, I analyzed each national security decision from the strategic perspective of the national leader of each state, and how each leader is challenged to balance the needs of national defense with a desire for political survival. A leader’s strategy for political survival usually requires satisfying certain domestic demands for favorable policy including patronage and social and economic development. I approached the problem within a foreign policy substitutability paradigm where I assume that each leader has different policy tools available to achieve a particular goal and assumed that the ultimate goal for a leader is political survival. My expectations of how the decisions of leaders of new regimes and new states differ from leaders of established regimes and states, and how democratic leaders might differ from autocratic leaders are rooted in the insights of selectorate theory, informed by scholarship on political legitimacy, democratization, and international bargaining.

Selectorate theory has rarely been applied to understanding the politics of new regimes and new states, but I find that there is some merit to using it to understand policy outcomes in NTSs, especially new democracies. Selectorate
theory offers the key insight that democratic governments will adopt policies with greater public benefits while autocratic governments will adopt policies with greater private benefits and the amount of public goods a democratic leader must deliver to his or her supporters within their regime is greater than the amount of private goods an autocrat must deliver to his or her supporters. I extend these insights in two ways. First, I argue that leaders of new democracies not only need to maintain the support of a winning coalition within their regime – more or less a majority of voters – but build broad support across their country for the new democratic regime. To do this, leaders of new democracies may emphasize the provision of public goods even more, and try to benefit individuals beyond their winning coalition. If a new democracy is being established in a new state, a leader faces the dual challenge of not only establishing the legitimacy of the political regime, but the legitimacy of the state itself. In these cases, leaders may try to provide even more public goods in order to be more inclusive across society and build identification with the new state throughout the population. Second, I argue that because providing more public goods requires more resources, a leader needs greater policy autonomy to deliver those goods. Thus, a democratic leader needs greater policy autonomy than an autocratic leader, the leader of a new democracy in an old state needs greater autonomy than the leader of an old democracy, and the leader of a new democracy in a new state needs greater autonomy than the leader of a new democracy in an old state. From this basic argument I examine how different security policies of militarization, conflict involvement and the use of military force, and international security cooperation
might constrain the policy autonomy of a leader and their ability to pursue an
effective political survival strategy, and propose expectations of NTS leaders’
preferences toward these security policies. Perhaps the most direct relationship
between a leader’s defense strategy and their policy autonomy can be observed in
militarization. The more resources that are invested in the military, the fewer that
are available to deliver other public and private goods that, in the absence of a
clear security threat to their country, are more important to a leader for winning
political support. My findings on patterns of militarization among NTS states –
especially in the Post-Cold War era – support the expectations of my argument.

This extension of selectorate theory somewhat contrasts with Bueno de
Mesquita et al’s (2003) expectation of how selectorate theory might be applied to
new regimes. They argue that “transitional” democracies should act less
democratic than established democracies and provide fewer public goods. They
compare “transitional democracies” to those new regimes that Mansfield and
Snyder classify as experiencing “incomplete” democratization. I assume that new
democracies have the institutional attributes of full-fledged (albeit institutionally
weak) democracies, and arrive at a different expectation.

A. Lessons for International Relations

Putnam (1988) drew attention to the “two-level game” that national
leaders play in balancing the foreign policy needs of national security with
proposed, the findings in this study suggest that it is more difficult for leaders to
effectively navigate this game when governing a new regime with questionable
vertical legitimacy and/or a new state with questionable horizontal legitimacy. While democratic leaders risk losing office if they incur substantial international war costs, have few allies, or receive many arms transfers, leaders of new democracies additionally risk losing office through regime collapse if they engage in excessive militarization and fail to economically develop their country. Leaders of autocracies risk losing office if they engage in asymmetric alliances with more powerful allies and fail to maintain economic growth. In addition, autocrats risk regime collapse if they do not militarize sufficiently and receive too many arms transfers. So while NTS leaders share the concern with other leaders of enacting policies that can best help maintain support within their regime, they must additionally be concerned with enacting policies that promote the survival of the regime.

I find significant differences between the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods in patterns of militarization, international conflict, and international security cooperation. It is particularly interesting that models of militarization, alliance joining, and arms transfers have greater explanatory power after the Cold War, while models of multilateralism in alliance joining have greater explanatory power during the Cold War. This seems to highlight the extent to which bipolarity and the superpower rivalry shaped security threats and opportunities for international interaction during the Cold War, and the need to test older theories on newer cases. This change in power structure dynamics can best be observed in the difference in estimates for variables such as power of allies and power of
rivals across the two eras. Further analysis to better understand the impact of these dynamics would be valuable.

B. Lessons for Democratization and Political Development

If two main lessons can be drawn from this study for scholars of democratization, they are that international politics – and in particular international security – matter to a state’s prospects for democratic consolidation, and that democratization in new states may differ from democratization in old states. Quite a few scholars have argued that the international environment can encourage or discourage a state from democratizing. Most often, this is said to occur through democratic “diffusion.” Diffusion of democracy is said to occur through the spread of information about democracy and democratic ideas and norms cross-nationally (Starr 1991). In addition it has been argued that international regimes, established through formal intergovernmental organizations, have been effective in promoting global democratization (Pevehouse 2005). I find evidence, complementary to the findings of Maoz (1996), that a state’s international security environment and national security policy can affect the survival of new democracies. Similar to Maoz, I find that democracies with strong allies are more likely to survive. However, not all international security cooperation promotes democratic consolidation. I find that the more arms suppliers a new democracy has, the less likely it will consolidate and survive. This is perhaps related to the finding that the greater number of military personnel a state has relative to its population, the less likely democracy will survive. These findings lend evidence to those who argue that when the
military has greater resources and political power in a society, they are more likely to intervene in government. Interestingly, I find that new democracies with strong foreign rivals are more likely to survive. In fact, it appears that the strength of a new democracy’s rivals is more important to its consolidation than the strength of its allies. This would seem to corroborate Mansfield and Snyder’s argument that leaders of new democracies can bolster popular support for their regime through appeals to nationalism in the face of a threat from foreign rivals. Even so, I do not find that involvement in militarized international disputes bolsters democratic survival as they might expect. One thing I do not test is whether the outcome of international conflict in terms of victory or defeat matters to political survival. Elsewhere, however, it has been found that international conflict involvement that results in a successful outcome increases the prospects for democratic survival (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita et al 1992, Maoz 1996).

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that a perception of personal security among people in a society is an important precondition for a pro-democratic culture to emerge. It might be thought that the costs and destruction of war would be among the greatest threats to personal security in a country. However, I find no evidence that the severity of either international or civil war impacts the likelihood of democratic survival (though severe international war can threaten a democratic leader’s tenure in office). Instead, severe civil war appears more likely to threaten the survival of autocracies than democracies.

The second major lesson for democratization theory is that the politics of new democracies in new states may be different from those in old states. Most
work on democratization conflates the processes of establishing a new democracy in new states with democratization in old states. I find some evidence that this may be inappropriate. While I find no systematic evidence that the risks of regime collapse may be different in new states, I do observe different policy outcomes between new democracies in old states and democracies in new states. This lends evidence to my proposition that the potentially questionable horizontal legitimacy of new states – questions over the legitimacy of state boundaries and state citizenship – may complicate the process of establishing the legitimacy of a new democratic regime. The challenge of democratizing in an environment of low horizontal legitimacy merits further investigation.

**III. Lessons for Policymakers**

As I have highlighted throughout this dissertation, there are two explicit national security goals of the United States that are relevant to this dissertation. One goal is to eliminate “ungoverned spaces” where terrorists and insurgents may seek refuge unfettered by effective state governance. A second goal is to bring democracy to more countries across the world. It is thought that the spread of democracy is likely to promote more peaceful relations among states, promote economic and social development, protect human rights, and discourage extremism. While the first goal is a precondition for the second goal, the second goal is not necessarily a precondition for the first goal. That is, stable and strong governments can be established without democratization, but democracy is unlikely to be established successfully if the government is not strong and stable. The US government has pressed for global democratization as an explicit part of
its national security policy. Afghanistan, Lebanon, Liberia, and Iraq are among the most prominent countries the US supports in their struggle for democratization. However, the US also prominently supports the military government of Pakistan as a source of regional stability.

The findings here agree with those who argue that democratization is a means toward peace. Democracies are more peaceful than autocracies, and new democracies are more peaceful than old democracies. Even those scholars who have found that the risk of a state’s belligerence rises after a transition to democracy – which I find to be only an artifact of the Cold War – find that it only rises within the first few years after regime change. Afghanistan and Iraq are nearly to the end of that point and have not fought any international conflicts with their neighbors. A potential for danger does not lie in continued democratization, but in a reversion to autocracy. One proposal that has gained momentum is to divide Iraq into separate states or at least into autonomous regions. Nothing in this study suggests that this move would threaten international security as long as stable governments are established. What I find is that new states – especially democratic new states – have a lower likelihood of initiating militarized conflict with their neighbors than more established states. Thus, the division of Iraq may be productive if it lessens the risk of civil war.

In order to establish stable democracies it is important for the US and other major powers to assist in ensuring their security. I find that when new democracies increase their militarization, they are more prone to collapse. If allies can make security guarantees that are sufficient to alleviate the need for new
democracies to invest significant resources in their military, democratic consolidation may be more successful. I find that new democracies with strong allies are more likely to survive. However, merely providing a new democracy with free arms is likely not sufficient for bolstering its defense capabilities and may in fact be counterproductive. I find that new democracies receiving more arms transfers are more prone to collapse. Thus, effective extended deterrence is important. Even if deterrence fails and a new democracy is attacked by another state, I do not find that engagement in conflict and war necessarily increase the odds of democratic failure. Overall, the most important precondition for democratic success is probably not military security, but human security through social and economic development.
References


Seriously: Time-Series - Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent

Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.

Understanding Budgetary Trade-offs.” American Journal of Political
Science, 34: 671-705.


Bienen, Henry and Nicolas van de Walle. 1992. “A Proportional Hazard Model of

Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries.”
Journal of Peace Research, 36: 233-244.


Brambor. Thomas, William R. Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. “Understanding
Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis,
14: 63-82.

Diasporas: National Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe. Michael


Correlates of War Project. http://www.correlatesofwar.org


VITA

Jonah Adam Victor

1629 Columbia Road NW
Apt. 810
Washington, DC 20009
jonahv(at)gmail.com
(814) 404-7029

Born: Detroit, MI, December 10, 1979

Education:

Doctor of Philosophy  Pennsylvania State University.
2006  Political Science: International Relations,
       Comparative Politics, and Research
       Methodology.

Master of Arts  Pennsylvania State University.
2004  Political Science: International Relations
      and Comparative Politics.

Bachelor of Arts  University of Michigan.
2002  Political Science.

High School  Andover High School, Bloomfield Hills, MI
1998

Publications:

Armed Forces and Security Policies of the World, edited by Karl DeRouen

Recent Awards:

Penn State Univ. Pre-doctoral Teaching Fellowship, 2006

Penn State Univ. Graduate Scholar Award, 2002