The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

College of the Liberal Arts

FIGHTING AND DYING FOR ONE’S COUNTRY: NATIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, AND GLOBALIZATION

A Dissertation in
Political Science

by

Gretchen Ursula Schrock-Jacobson

© 2010 Gretchen Ursula Schrock-Jacobson

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

December 2010
The dissertation of Gretchen Ursula Schrock-Jacobson was reviewed and approved* by the following:

Douglas Lemke  
Associate Professor of Political Science  
Dissertation Adviser  
Chair of Committee

D. Scott Bennett  
Professor of Political Science  
Head of the Department of Political Science

Burt Monroe  
Associate Professor of Political Science

Catherine Wanner  
Associate Professor of History, Anthropology, and Religious Studies

Lee Ann Banaszak  
Associate Professor of Political Science  
Director of Graduate Studies

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School.
Abstract

Scholars and laypeople alike often consider nationalism to be a primarily destructive phenomenon because it supposedly has the potential to promote extremely violent international conflict and other atrocities. By glorifying the history, myths, and attributes of a national group while marginalizing or dehumanizing excluded groups, nationalism creates unbridgeable differences, irresolvable animosities, and perceived existential threats conducive to the outbreak of violence.

Despite this argument’s widespread acceptance, the extant literature does not adequately theorize about or assess the relationship between nationalism and violent international conflict. Theorization has focused almost exclusively on the association between nationalism and the incidence of interstate violence, preventing the formulation of a comprehensive theory regarding nationalism’s impact on international conflict behavior. Furthermore, any insights derived from existing theories are dubious because they are supported mainly on the basis of a nonrandom sample of case studies.

My dissertation addresses these problems in the literature. I first develop a comprehensive theory of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior, specifically in terms of war initiation, severity, and duration. I argue that, in order to obtain mass cooperation, political elites embed their goals and the related policies in nationalist rhetoric and images. However, these “nationalist persuasion campaigns” can result in several mechanisms that promote long and deadly international conflict. Nationalism can provoke “national enemies” and their foreign allies, generate biased strategic assumptions, create domestic interest groups that favor war, permit the suppression of opposition groups, and promote “nationalist bidding wars” that bring about unexpectedly more aggressive military
policies. It is possible that these mechanisms affect international conflict behavior to varying degrees depending on the form of nationalism present in a particular state. Therefore, I construct a series of hypotheses regarding the effect of four types of nationalism on three facets of international conflict behavior.

In order to assess the accuracy of my argument and move beyond the qualitative techniques that have limited generalizability, I use original data on the existence and type of state-level nationalism from 1816 to 1991 and quantitative analysis (namely, summary statistics, cross-tabulations, and specialized regression models). I find that nationalism contributes to the initiation of more deadly conflicts, but not necessarily to longer wars. Nationalism significantly increases both the probability that a state will initiate an interstate war and the number of battle deaths the war will cause. There is greater uncertainty surrounding the effect of nationalism on interstate war duration. Nationalism in the initiator significantly decreases the length of war, while nationalism in the target significantly increases it, though only during the twentieth century. None of nationalism’s subtypes has an unambiguous effect on international conflict behavior that is consistent with the expected pattern of violent conflict.

Given that nationalism encouraged the initiation of more lethal conflicts from 1816 to 1991, one may suspect that the international community might not have to concern itself as much in the future with the violent ramifications of nationalism due to increasing globalization. Yet, the empirical evidence described in the last part of my dissertation shows that this is not the case; national attachment and pride are still ubiquitous among individuals in more developed countries, due to perceived unsatisfactory economic conditions. Political leaders and the global community in general must then be cognizant of nationalism’s potentially violent consequences and support efforts to combat its divisiveness and prevent the accession of extreme-right parties.
Otherwise, the possibility of extremely violent nationalist conflict and the ensuing human suffering remains.
# Table of Contents

List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... viii  
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... x  
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ xi  

Chapter 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1  

Chapter 2. The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the Initiation of Interstate War .................................................................................................................. 20  
  The State of the Literature .................................................................................................. 22  
  A Theory of Nationalist Conflict ....................................................................................... 24  
  The Varieties of Nationalism and Their Effect on Conflict ............................................. 29  
  Data and Methods .......................................................................................................... 37  
    Dependent Variable ...................................................................................................... 37  
    Independent Variables ................................................................................................. 38  
      General Nationalism Variables .................................................................................. 38  
      Specific Nationalism Variables ................................................................................ 39  
    Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 43  
    Statistical Models ........................................................................................................ 45  
  Results ............................................................................................................................. 46  
  Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 53  

Chapter 3. Dying for the Nation: Nationalism and Interstate War Severity ..................... 56  
  A Theory of the Severity of Nationalist Wars ................................................................... 59  
  The Types of Nationalism and Their Effect on War Severity ......................................... 67  
  Data and Methods .......................................................................................................... 76  
    Dependent Variable ...................................................................................................... 76  
    Independent Variables ................................................................................................. 77  
      General Nationalism Variables .................................................................................. 77  
      Specific Nationalism Variables ................................................................................ 79  
    Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 84  
    Statistical Models ........................................................................................................ 86  
  Results ............................................................................................................................. 87  
  Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 93  

Chapter 4. Fighting for National Glory: Nationalism and Interstate War Duration ........ 96  
  A Theory of the Duration of Nationalist Wars ................................................................ 99  
  The Forms of Nationalism and Their Effect on War Duration ....................................... 106  
  Data and Methods .......................................................................................................... 115  
    Dependent Variable ...................................................................................................... 115  
    Independent Variables ................................................................................................. 116  
      General Nationalism Variables .................................................................................. 116  
      Specific Nationalism Variables ................................................................................ 117
Control Variables ..........................................................118  
Statistical Models ..........................................................119  
Results ........................................................................120  
Conclusion .......................................................................131  

Chapter 5. The Lexus vs. the Olive Tree: Individual Choice between Nationalism and Globalism .................................................................134  
Defining Globalization and Nationalism ......................................137  
The Status of Nationalism Under Globalization ..............................139  
Understanding Globalism and Nationalism ....................................143  
Data and Methods ................................................................151  
Dependent Variable ................................................................153  
Independent Variables ............................................................155  
Statistical Model ..................................................................157  
Results ........................................................................159  
Conclusion .......................................................................163  

Chapter 6. Conclusion ..........................................................166  
Policy Implications ............................................................172  
Future Research ................................................................174  
Conclusion .......................................................................184  

Appendix A: An Example of the Coding Procedures for Nationalism Using the Country-Year Unit of Analysis ..................................................185  

Appendix B: Nationalism and Interstate Wars, 1816-1991 .......................188  

Appendix C: An Example of the Coding Procedures for Nationalism Using the Interstate War Unit of Analysis ..................................................194  

Appendix D: A Conditional Model of Individual-Level Enlightened Nationalism versus Traditional Nationalism ..................................................196  

References .......................................................................197
List of Tables

Table 1. The Relationship between the Different Types of Nationalism and International Conflict Behavior .................................................................16

Table 2. The Relationship of the Different Types of Nationalism to Interstate War Initiation …31

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Types of Nationalism ..............................................42

Table 4. A Cross-Tabulation of Interstate War Initiation and Nationalism .......................46

Table 5. The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate War Initiation, Model 1 .........................48

Table 6. The Change in the Probability of Interstate War Initiation Given Changes in the Explanatory Variables, Model 1 .........................................................49

Table 7. The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate War Initiation, Model 2 .........................50

Table 8. The Change in the Probability of Interstate War Initiation Given Changes in the Explanatory Variables, Model 2 .........................................................52

Table 9. The Relationship of the Different Types of Nationalism to Interstate War Severity ….69

Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of the Types of Nationalism among Initiators and Targets……83

Table 11. Battle Death Statistics with Nationalist and Non-Nationalist States .................88

Table 12. The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate War Severity .....................................89

Table 13. The Effect of Specific Nationalisms on War Severity ......................................92

Table 14. The Relationship of the Different Types of Nationalism to Interstate War Duration ........................................................................................................108

Table 15. War Duration Statistics with Nationalist and Non-Nationalist States ............121

Table 16. The Effect of Nationalism on War Duration ..................................................123

Table 17. The Interaction between Nationalism and Time and Its Effect on War Duration .....126

Table 18. The Effect of Specific Nationalisms on War Duration .....................................129

Table 19. A Cross-Tabulation of Nationalism and Globalism in 32 Countries in 2003 ........142

Table 20. A Conditional Model of Individual-Level Globalism versus Traditional Nationalism ........................................................................................................160
Table 21. A Summary of the Results Regarding the Relationship between the Types of Nationalism and International Conflict Behavior .................................................................171
List of Figures

Figure 1. A Model of Nationalist Conflict .................................................................13
Figure 2. A Model of Nationalist Conflict Initiation .......................................................29
Figure 3. A Model of the Severity of Nationalist Conflict ..............................................66
Figure 4. A Model of the Duration of Nationalist Conflict ...........................................105
Acknowledgements

First, I would like to extend my gratitude to the faculty of the political science department. They were instrumental in my professional training and were nothing but supportive as I undertook a sometimes daunting research agenda, while trying to maintain a healthy balance between work and family. I am especially indebted to the following individuals: Donna Bahry, Lee Ann Banaszak, Michael Bernhard, Scott Bennett, Gretchen Casper, Errol Henderson, Marie Hojnacki, Quan Li, Tamar London, Burt Monroe, Glenn Palmer, and Catherine Wanner. Most of all, I would like thank my advisor, Douglas Lemke, for reading and re-reading countless drafts, providing valuable constructive criticism, and encouraging me during the inevitable moments of frustration.

I would also like to thank my fellow graduate students. They challenged me with their theoretical and empirical insights, compelling me to make my arguments and statistical analyses more persuasive. Most importantly, they believed in the necessity of my research.

Of course, my success in graduate school would not have been possible without the love and unwavering support of my family and friends. I am grateful for the constant words of encouragement from Jennette DiFazio, Elizabeth Nelson Levy, Kimberly Paradise, Stacy Rodgers, and Hee Smith. I thank my parents, David and Jane Schrock, for instilling in me from a young age the thirst for knowledge and the confidence to obtain my dreams, no matter how unattainable they may seem at first. I thank my brother, Derek Schrock, for reminding me, in his own unique way, that we all need to get in touch with our “inner child” sometimes, if only to maintain our sanity. I am also grateful for my in-laws, John and Jenny Jacobson, for supporting me like their own daughter.
I know that I would have been unable to complete my Ph.D. without the support of my wonderful husband, Justin. He always reassured me whenever I was in the middle of a near mental breakdown. He was confident that I would finish my response papers on time, that I would pass my comprehensive exams with flying colors, that my dissertation proposal would get approved, and that the statistical models for my dissertation would “work.” But, most of all, I am grateful to have a best friend that makes me laugh every day and reminds me to enjoy the simple things in life.

I dedicate this dissertation to my children, Owen and Ava. Not only did they force me to reach the major deadlines for my dissertation, simply by virtue of their births, but they also inspire me to do my part, however small, in making the world a better and safer place for them and future generations.
Liberty Leading the People, Eugène Delacroix (1830)
After the destruction wrought by the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, political leaders, diplomats, scholars, and laypeople alike began to appreciate more greatly the powerful role of nationalism in the initiation and continuation of international and civil armed conflict. Researchers across many disciplines expended more effort trying to understand the mechanisms that connect nationalist ideas, rhetoric, symbols, and actions to warfare in particular cases, while political leaders and diplomats sought peaceful means of preventing and restraining nationalist conflict.

In the instance of Serbia following the collapse of communism, there appears to have been a strong relationship between the content of its nationalism and the dynamics of the ensuing conflicts with Croatia and Bosnia.1 Serbian nationalism was predicated upon the quest for a Greater Serbia, a state that would incorporate most, if not all, Serbs within its territorial boundaries and contain few, if any, minorities. In other words, Serbian nationalists desired an enlarged and nationally homogeneous state. It was their belief that the realization of this goal would assure Serbian control of the government, the economic system, and the military and in turn, would promote regional peace as the Serbs would no longer feel threatened.

Serbian nationalists perceived the Serbian people as continual victims at the hands of various evil “others,” and therefore emphasized Serbian historical oppression and martyrdom in

---

1 See Mueller (2000) for a different interpretation of the Yugoslav wars.
their discourse and imagery. They frequently referenced the Ustasha regime’s genocidal campaign of murder and terror against the Serbs during World War II, during which over 300,000 Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia were killed. In fact, one Croatian minister at the time declared, “There are no methods that we Ustasha will not use to make this land truly Croatian, and cleanse it of the Serbs” (as quoted in Kaufman 2001, 169). As a result of this tumultuous history, the Serbian nationalists’ conceptualization of their nation naturally contained a profound opposition to the Croats as “national enemies,” as well as a deep-seated fear of ethnic extinction. But, it was not just the Croats who supposedly threatened the Serbs with ethnic extinction. Serbian nationalists also accused the Kosovar Albanians of orchestrating a “genocide” against the Kosovar Serbs (Kaufman 2001, 180).

Due to the existential threats allegedly presented by the Kosovar Albanians, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, they were easily dehumanized by Serbian nationalists. They were no longer seen as human beings with legitimate concerns and emotions, but as animals (e.g. dogs) or as negative objects (e.g. dirt). Such dehumanization further assisted the Serbian nationalists in their construction of an “us” and “them” dichotomy, in which the “us” (i.e. the Serbs) was viewed as highly valued, morally superior, and innocent, while the “them” (e.g. the Croats) was depicted as inferior, weak, culpable, decadent, and natural “national enemies.” This belief in the Serbs’ uprightness and inherent sinlessness helped to erect another pillar of Serbian nationalism: the sense of Serbian historical mission in the Balkans. Because the Serbian nationalists viewed the Serbs as virtuous and good in comparison to “others,” they believed that the Serbs had the right to shape the political and economic environment of the region. Only through their “benevolent” guidance would the region become prosperous and free. A necessary corollary to this idea was the Serbian nationalist conviction that the Serbs had the right to rule over minorities.
When Serbian nationalism combined with Croatian and Slovenian nationalism in the context of the collapsing Yugoslav communist system, the results were threefold. First, negotiations about Yugoslavia’s future completely failed. In fact, negotiations threatened to be unsuccessful from the beginning primarily because of widespread distrust and uncertainty among the “national enemies,” which led to reneging on minor agreements, deception, a lack of faith in the process, etc. Second, as a result of this futile diplomacy, war in Croatia and Bosnia became inevitable. It was seen by the nationalists on all sides as the only way to save “ourselves and our culture” from the evil “enemy-others.” Third, ethnic cleansing turned out to be a logical conclusion given the nature of Serbian and other nationalisms, especially the former’s emphasis on the need for national homogeneity, the possibility of ethnic extinction, and the right to rule over minorities.

While the case of post-communist Serbia is often invoked when discussing the relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior, there are other, less obvious cases that support such a contention. The United States is an excellent example of a strongly nationalistic country that has been involved in many wars, both domestic and foreign, throughout its history. Is there a connection between the content and dynamics of American nationalism and the militancy of the American government? At least in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there appears to be such a relationship.

The 9/11 attacks were culturally represented in the United States as an assault on freedom and the American way of life (Pei 2003). President George W. Bush proclaimed shortly after the attacks, “They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (as quoted in Hixson 2008, 277). By explaining the attacks in this way, there was a constant equating of the United States with the
virtues of freedom, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, civil society, and free enterprise. Because the United States saw itself as the protector and champion of these virtues, it could be nothing other than innocent. Its role in generating Muslim grievances (e.g. military bases in Saudi Arabia and unconditional support for Israel) was practically ignored. To do otherwise would invite serious challenges to the hegemonic myth of American sinlessness and providential destiny.

Instead of provoking domestic introspection, the terrorist attacks significantly increased nationalist sentiment. Nearly three-quarters of the public described themselves as “strongly patriotic,” according to a *Washington Post*/ABC News poll (2001a) soon after the attacks. American flags and flag lapel pins became ubiquitous; in fact, a Gallup poll (2001) found that over 80 percent of Americans displayed or planned to display an American flag. In addition, Major League Baseball, the guarantor of America’s national pastime, instituted the singing of “God Bless America” during the seventh-inning stretch.

Since the terrorists sought to undermine the democratic foundations of the reinvigorated American national identity, they and their allies had to be destroyed. The American masses strongly agreed with the notion that a war against terrorism was necessary in order to protect the American way of life. A month after the attacks, 94 percent of Americans supported the U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan (*Washington Post*/ABC News poll 2001b). But, in the eyes of the Bush administration, this war against terrorism was not limited to the overthrow of the Taliban and the destruction of al-Qaeda. Any country and any political leader that did not support the United States in its military objectives were considered an ally of the terrorists and thus potentially subject to American military force. In an address to Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush declared, “*Every nation, in every region* now has a decision to make.
Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (as quoted in Hixson 2008, 289, emphasis added). American nationalism, awakened by the realization that the American homeland was vulnerable to the machinations of new “national enemies,” threatened to lead to multiple conflicts of unknown severity and duration. In other words, to protect American national identity, the U.S. government not only sought to promote the primary American ideals of democracy and free enterprise on a global scale, but also declared a war of unknown proportions. By March 2003, the war against terrorism had indeed spread beyond the porous borders of Afghanistan to Iraq, despite the lack of Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks and the absence of direct evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. Yet, it was widely believed that the Iraqi regime posed an explicit threat to the sanctity of the American nation and thus had to be toppled militarily and replaced by a friendlier one.

The above cases represent the conventional wisdom surrounding the relationship between nationalism and international conflict. Nationalism is traditionally seen as a “bad” or “negative” phenomenon because it has the potential to promote extremely violent international conflict and other atrocities (e.g. genocide and ethnic cleansing). By glorifying the history and attributes of the national group (i.e. “us”) and marginalizing or even dehumanizing excluded groups (i.e. “them”), nationalism creates unbridgeable differences and irresolvable animosities conducive to the outbreak of violence. One could point to the French revolution (which supposedly ushered in the era of nationalism), the German and Italian wars of unification, World War I and II, the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East as evidence for these assertions. As a result of this proposed connection between nationalism and war, governments that espouse intense nationalist sentiment are viewed by other states as threatening and as a
potential enemy. Therefore, it may be better from a national security standpoint to be seen as simply patriotic, not nationalistic, so as not to provoke unwarranted sanctions or attacks.

The extant literature does not adequately theorize about or assess these widely-accepted notions regarding nationalism and violent international conflict. There are some theories as to why nationalism might easily provoke interstate wars, but very little direct consideration of the relationship between nationalism and other aspects of international conflict behavior, such as war severity and duration. For the most part, there are only brief references to or implicit assumptions about these features of warfare. For example, Posen (1993, 81) argues that “nationalism increases the intensity of warfare, and specifically the ability of states to mobilize the creative energies and the spirit of self-sacrifice of millions of soldiers.” However, his study is primarily concerned with the mass army and its attendant nationalism as successful military practices often imitated by states for the sake of survival. Snyder (2000) suggests that certain forms of nationalism are associated with unlimited warfare, while others are more cost-conscious in nature. Nonetheless, he only considers the relationship between nationalism and conflict onset in his case studies. Due to the widespread scholarly disregard for nationalism’s potential impact on the severity and duration of war, a comprehensive theory addressing the effect of nationalism on international conflict behavior has not yet been formulated.

Instead, theorization has focused almost exclusively on the association between nationalism and the incidence of interstate violence. For Hixson (2008), violence against external enemy-others may be integral to the myths and ideologies of many nationalisms (especially that of the United States) and is instigated primarily when the nation is undergoing a period of psychic crisis due to major political, social, and/or economic change. International conflict provides the means by which the nation is reunified and national identity is reaffirmed.
Concentrating on the content of nationalism as well, Saideman and Ayres (2008) argue that the constitutive norms and degree of xenophobia inherent in particular nationalisms shape attitudes toward kin and other groups in neighboring countries and thus affect the elite’s inclination for and implementation of irredentist policies. Taking a more instrumentalist approach to the question, Gagnon (1994) contends that violent nationalist conflict is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity. This strategy is a response by the ruling elites to shifts in the structure of domestic political and economic power. By constructing individual interest in terms of the threat to the national group, endangered elites can fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilize the population against the status quo. However, Gagnon’s theory is limited in its applicability because he confines it to conflict along ethnic cleavages. “Enemy-others” can be constructed not only on the basis of cultural, linguistic, or religious differences, but also on the basis of ideological or institutional differences. Snyder (2000) recognizes this possibility when he maintains that under conditions of democratization, various forms of nationalism may cause violent conflict both at home and abroad because they provoke enemies, hinder the development of coherent strategic policies, encourage logrolling among nationalist veto groups, and contribute to elite attempts to gain nationalist prestige in the eyes of the domestic audience.

Unfortunately, any insights gleaned regarding the mechanisms leading from nationalism to interstate war are questionable due to inadequate hypothesis testing. The existing literature supports its conclusions primarily on the basis of a non-random sample of case studies, making it difficult to determine whether nationalism in general raises the probability of interstate war and increases its brutality and duration. Instead, our empirical understanding of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior is limited to particular countries or
regions in specific historical periods. For example, Gagnon (1994) focuses on the destructive consequences of ethnic nationalism in post-World War II Serbia, while Pavković (2000) examines the role of competing nationalisms in the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. Fousek (2000), Hixson (2008), and Lieven (2004) all describe how nationalism increased the propensity of the United States to engage in international military conflict throughout its history. Limiting their purview to only one type of interstate conflict, Saideman and Ayres (2008) explore the effect of nationalism on the construction and implementation of irredentist policies in Croatia, Serbia, Armenia, Hungary, Romania, and Russia. Snyder (2000) carries out a more comprehensive assessment than the previous scholars by briefly studying the relationship between nationalism and domestic and international conflict in 12 democratizing states. He concludes that violent conflict is often a by-product of the popular nationalism that arises during the earliest stages of democratization. Woodwell (2007) augments his three case studies with a quantitative analysis of nationalism’s violent tendencies, though he only considers nationalism among transborder nationalities. As this literature review makes clear, in order to accurately describe the general relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior, the large-N quantitative analyses that have not yet been undertaken are required.

But, before operationalization, quantification, and statistical model estimation can begin, precise definitions of the key concepts (i.e. nation and nationalism) must be delineated. Just as national groups identify themselves in opposition to whom and what they are not, useful descriptions of the nation and nationalism can be obtained by first clarifying what the nation and nationalism are not. The nation is not a state, a country, or an ethnic group. A “state” is the principal political unit with a territory, a permanent population, a set of autonomous ruling institutions, and the legitimate monopoly of force, while the term “country” denotes only the
territorial component of the state. Nations are distinct from ethnic groups, even though nations may evolve from ethnic groups, because the former must have a political project (i.e. national autonomy or sovereignty) while the latter need not (Barrington 2006, 4-5).

Now that we know what the nation is not, it is necessary to determine what it is. Unfortunately, this endeavor is quite contentious. For Barrington (2006) and Smith (2001), there are two primary ways of defining the “nation.” First, one could emphasize the ideas, attitudes, sentiments, and perceptions of the relevant group, thereby focusing on the subjective aspect of nationhood. According to this means of definition, if a people are convinced that their group is unique in its origins, evolution, and destiny, and thus constitute a nation, then they can be classified as a nation. In other words, what is important is whether a group of people believes that they are a nation. An example of a more subjective definition of the nation is Anderson’s (1991, 6) description of the nation as “an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” But, the problems with subjective definitions are twofold. They are too inclusive and make it difficult to “separate out nations from other kinds of collectivity such as regions, tribes, city-states and empires, which attract similar subjective attachments” (Smith 2001, 11). They also tend to ignore the kind of things (i.e. shared cultural features) that make people feel that they are nations (Barrington 2006, 6).

Therefore, some nationalism scholars prefer “objective” definitions of the nation. The focus is not on sentiment, imagination, and perception, but instead on observable, concrete characteristics, such as a common language, religion, and territory, that should be present in order for a group to be categorized as a nation. Objective definitions tend to provide a list of criteria that must be met for nationhood to attain. For example, Joseph Stalin defined the nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common
language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (as quoted in Smith 2001, 11). However, unlike subjective definitions, objective definitions are likely to exclude some widely accepted cases of nations (e.g. the United States).

In order to have the best possible definition of the nation, both subjective and objective elements should be incorporated, though how much each element should be emphasized remains controversial. Regardless of their particular mixture of subjective and objective components, most definitions recognize that the belief in the right to territorial self-determination must be central so as to differentiate nations from other social groups. My definition of the nation, which derives from Snyder (2000), meets the above requirements; it appreciates the role of sentiment and perception in the achievement of nationhood, while also delineating a set of observable, concrete characteristics and goals that must be present for nationhood to be realized. I view the nation as:

a group of people who see themselves as distinct in their origins, culture, history, institutions, or principles and who aspire to territorial autonomy or independence.

This vital process of differentiation necessarily entails the construction of “others,” which in turn produces the potential for violent conflict.

As for nationalism, it must not be confused with patriotism, ethnic politics, or ethnic conflict. While often seen as a diminished and more benign form of nationalism, patriotism describes pride in or loyalty to an existing state and therefore has little to do with the nation as a group of people. Ethnic politics can provide a starting point for something that may become nationalism, but it is not nationalism by itself, especially when the ethnic group in question does not claim the right to self-government within a given geographical area. Instead, ethnic politics is the political mobilization of people on the basis of ethnicity, for example for elections,
affirmative action programs, and the protection of language and customs. Furthermore, equating nationalism with ethnic politics makes the assumption that all nationalisms are ethnic in nature, leaving no room for other forms of national imagining. Nationalism also cannot be defined as ethnic conflict since the latter can arise over many issues (e.g. language laws and access to political power), while nationalist conflict must involve the issue of territorial self-determination (Barrington 2006, 8-9).

Therefore, one must search elsewhere for an acceptable definition of nationalism. Unfortunately, over the course of the last century, the term “nationalism” has acquired a range of meanings, rendering it more difficult to explain the exact nature of the nationalist phenomenon. The most important usages are: (1) a process of national formation; (2) a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation; (3) a language and symbolism of the nation; (4) a social and political movement on behalf of the nation; and (5) a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation (Smith 2001, 5-6). However, an adequate description of nationalism must include an explicit reference to the quest for territorial autonomy or independence. Combining this necessary definitional component with elements of the above definitions (specifically those regarding sentiment and ideology), I characterize nationalism, following Snyder (2000, 23), as:

the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their origins, culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.

Other benefits of this definitional choice, besides being fairly comprehensive, are that it allows the nation to be organized around characteristics other than ethnicity and culture and it does not confine the goal of nationalism to political independence (unlike Gellner 1983).

In addition to conceptualizing nationalism broadly, my dissertation makes three major contributions to the literature on nationalism and international conflict. First, I provide a
comprehensive theory of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior, specifically in terms of war initiation, severity, and duration. Second, I use original data on the existence and type of nationalism at the state level from 1816 to 1991. Third, I move beyond the nonrandom sample of case studies that has characterized most hypothesis testing in regards to nationalism and international conflict behavior by employing various quantitative statistical techniques to test my hypotheses.

I start with the assumption that political elites have a military and/or economic goal for which they require mass cooperation (or, at the very least, complacency). By embedding this goal and its attendant policies in nationalist rhetoric and images, they are more likely to generate a sufficient level of public support. The reasoning is that nationalism creates a common desire among the domestic population to protect its state through whatever means are necessary because the state, in theory, expresses and ensures the nation’s unique cultural, historical, institutional, and/or ideological characteristics. In addition to affecting mass aspirations, nationalism provides the citizenry with a sense of shared beliefs, preferences, and attitudes in regards to the dynamics and outcomes of international relations. This potential conformity of ideas and interests can be manipulated in such a way as to be amenable to elite objectives and increase public approval of government policies.

However, these “nationalist persuasion campaigns” can not only mobilize popular energies for the state’s military and economic projects, but can also result in several mechanisms that promote long and deadly international conflict. First, by constructing a set of “enemy-others” and demanding their disempowerment, marginalization, and/or extermination, nationalist states may generate intense, long-lasting hostilities between themselves and their “national enemies” and the latter’s foreign allies. Second, nationalism may lead to the creation and
dissemination of biased strategic assumptions in which other groups are deemed more menacing, more stubborn, and more sinful, yet more easily defeated than they really are. Third, nationalism may produce interests inside and outside the government that favor sustained belligerent nationalist rhetoric and its accompanying foreign policies for their own economic and political benefit. Fourth, nationalism may give elites ample political space in which to marginalize any opposition to their foreign policies by depicting the relevant groups as threats to the “nation” and its interests. Lastly, nationalism may trigger “nationalist bidding wars” among elites and/or between elites and the masses, resulting in more aggressive military policies than initially desired by any elite group. The relationship between nationalism, the mechanisms just described, and three major components of international conflict behavior are illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. A Model of Nationalist Conflict
However, all nationalisms are not created equal. Different nationalisms emphasize different features of the national community (e.g. ancestry vs. political institutions) and produce different conceptualizations of what nationhood is. As a result, the objectives of each type of nationalism vary (e.g. the incorporation of all ethnic kin into one homogeneous nation-state vs. the protection of democracy), as well as the construction of “national enemies” (e.g. an ethnic minority vs. communist infiltrators). These differences in substance can diversely affect domestic political dynamics, for example by favoring particular political parties while marginalizing others. It follows that the various forms of nationalism have different implications for the elite’s ability to mobilize popular energies to the tasks of war, provoke “national enemies,” propagate biased strategic assumptions, satisfy nationalist interest groups, repress dissent, control “nationalist bidding wars,” and initiate long and deadly international conflict.

I consider the four types of nationalism which comprise Snyder’s (2000) classification scheme (i.e. civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, and counterrevolutionary nationalism), in addition to the complete absence of nationalism (which occurs when political elites fail to disseminate a sense of nationhood and/or an explicit doctrine of nationalism among the masses and instead rely on other identities, ideologies, and political structures to generate the necessary support for their policies). I focus on these categories of nationalism because Snyder hypothesizes, either explicitly or implicitly, about the relationship between different types of nationalism and international conflict behavior; his theory and hypotheses inform my own conceptualization of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict; and he includes civic and ethnic nationalism, the most prominently used categories of nationalism in qualitative explanations of violent conflict. Using the goals of each type of nationalism and its relative degree of cost-consciousness in foreign policy as inputs, I
develop a series of hypotheses regarding the effect of each nationalism on various aspects of international conflict behavior, specifically war initiation, severity, and duration. These expectations are summarized in Table 1, along with the main characteristics of each form of nationalism.
Table 1. The Relationship between the Different Types of Nationalism and International Conflict Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Nationalism</th>
<th>Main Characteristics</th>
<th>Consequences for Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effect on the Probability of Interstate War Initiation</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effect on Interstate War Severity</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effect on Interstate War Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Emphasis on loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective. Inclusion in the group depends on birth or long-term residence within nation’s territory.</td>
<td>Cost-conscious foreign policy</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Emphasis on common culture, language, religion, shared historical experience, and/or shared kinship. Inclusion in the national group depends on these criteria.</td>
<td>High conflict until domination of the ethnic homeland is achieved</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Emphasis on defense of a political revolution that brings to power a regime that governs for the nation. Inclusion in the group depends on support for the political revolution.</td>
<td>Open-ended external conflict</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Emphasis on resistance to internal factions that seek to undermine the nation’s traditional institutions. Social classes, religions, cultural groups, or political ideological opponents that are deemed “enemies of the nation” are excluded from the national group.</td>
<td>Open-ended external conflict</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The descriptions of the variants of nationalism and the proposed consequences for violent conflict are obtained from Snyder (2000).
The contributions of my dissertation to the field of nationalism and conflict studies are not limited to the delineation of a comprehensive theory linking nationalism and international conflict behavior. The second contribution arises because, in order to assess the accuracy of my argument, I collected original data on the existence and type of nationalism at the state level from 1816 to 1991. More specifically, to test the significance of the proposed positive relationship between nationalism and the initiation of interstate war, I gathered data on nationalism for all war initiators in the previously mentioned time period, plus a random retrospective sample of non-initiators, for a total of 249 observations. In contrast, for the analyses of the hypothesized positive relationships between nationalism and interstate war severity and duration, I collected data on nationalism for the initiator and target of each interstate war from 1816 to 1991, for a total of 104 observations.

As implied by this brief discussion of my data collection efforts, I employ quantitative analysis to determine the direction, magnitude, and strength of the expected relationships. This is a significant improvement to the extant literature because the vast majority of studies use qualitative techniques (namely, nonrandom samples of case studies) to reach their conclusions, thereby limiting their generalizability. Instead, I use summary statistics, cross-tabulations, and specialized regression models, all of which allow for greater precision, use of control variables, and more general conclusions.

I find that nationalism contributes to the initiation of extremely deadly conflicts. Nationalism significantly increases both the probability that a state will initiate an interstate war and the number of fatalities on the battlefield. However, the effect of nationalism on the duration of interstate wars is more complex in that nationalism in the initiator state significantly decreases
the length of war, while nationalism in the target state significantly increases it, though only in the twentieth century.

As for the variants of nationalism, none has an unambiguous effect on international conflict behavior that is also consistent with the pattern of violent conflict outlined in Table 1, thus calling into question the usefulness of differentiating among the types of nationalism when studying the relationship between nationalism and war. For example, ethnic nationalism significantly increases the probability of interstate war initiation and the severity of interstate war if present in the initiator, but significantly decreases the duration of interstate war if possessed by the initiator. However, ethnic nationalism in the target does not affect the number of battle fatalities or the length of warfare. Adding to the surprising and complicated nature of these findings, some of the significant effects of ethnic nationalism appear to be of a larger magnitude than those of counterrevolutionary nationalism, despite the fact that the latter supposedly lacks inherent limits on its military ambitions and promotes open-ended external conflict (unlike ethnic nationalism).

Given the general conclusion that nationalism encourages the initiation of more lethal conflicts, the question arises of whether the international community needs to worry less about the violent consequences of nationalism in the current era of globalization. It is widely believed that globalization decreases the salience of national identity and instead promotes the emergence of supranational or universal identities, the construction of hybrid or plural identities, and even the reversion to local identities (Alonso 1995; Barber 1992; Blum 2007; Croucher 2004; Dogan 1994; Scholte 2005; Spencer and Wollman 2002; Spiro 2008). Yet, the last part of my dissertation provides evidence to the contrary; national attachment and pride are still ubiquitous among individuals in more developed countries. I find that the continued prevalence of
traditional nationalist attitudes, in comparison to more globalist ones, is a function of less than ideal personal and national economic conditions.

These results suggest that nationalism is not solely a phenomenon of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or a characteristic of the less developed world. It thrives even among the citizens of advanced democracies. Therefore, political leaders, diplomats, and the global community in general must remain cognizant of nationalism’s potentially violent consequences and devise methods of combating its divisive myths, symbols, rhetoric, and actions and preventing the accession of extreme-right parties and politicians (e.g. Le Front National in France). Otherwise, the possibility of extremely violent nationalist conflict and the resulting human tragedy remains.

My dissertation is organized as follows. The second chapter uses the general theory of nationalism and international conflict behavior outlined above to explain the mechanisms by which nationalism encourages the initiation of interstate war. It also tests the ensuing hypotheses using large-\(N\) quantitative analysis and discusses the findings and their implications. The third and fourth chapters have a similar format in that each extends the general theory to delineate the relationship between nationalism and a specific aspect of international conflict behavior (interstate war severity and duration, respectively) and derive hypotheses, which are assessed using various statistical techniques. The fifth chapter determines whether nationalist sentiment is still prominent among individuals in more developed countries and then presents and tests several economic explanations for its continued prevalence or lack thereof. Each of the preceding chapters is in an article format, though they present a coherent whole. Taken together, they investigate the role of nationalism in international conflict behavior and evaluate the potential for future nationalist conflicts. The last chapter concludes.
Chapter 2
The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the Initiation of Interstate War

The devastating wars following in the wake of Nazi Germany’s quest for *lebensraum*, the Vietnamese independence movement, and the collapse of communism in Yugoslavia suggest that nationalism plays a significant role in the instigation of international conflict. In fact, many scholars and laypeople alike believe that nationalism has the potential to promote aggression. Yet, there has been relatively little systematic exploration of the relationship between nationalism and the initiation of interstate war (Cederman 2002, Van Evera 1994). As a result, many questions are left unanswered. (1) Does nationalism generally increase the risk of war? (2) If so, which types of nationalism are most likely to trigger or prevent warfare? (3) How might they cause conflict? (4) Which domestic and international processes lead to belligerent nationalism? (5) Under what conditions is nationalism the most dangerous? (6) How can the war-causing attributes of nationalism be suppressed or neutralized? This study will consider the first three questions because answers to them will not only address the limitations of the international conflict literature in regards to nationalism, but may also suggest possible answers to the latter ones.

Expanding upon Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict under democratization, I argue that political elites use nationalism to obtain mass cooperation for the achievement of a military or economic goal. But, the construction and diffusion of nationalism is not without serious domestic and international consequences. Successful “nationalist persuasion campaigns”
can produce several mechanisms that encourage violent international conflict. Nationalism can provoke the wrath of “national enemies” and their foreign allies and lead to biased strategic assumptions, such as increased optimism that military victory will be attained. It may also create domestic interest groups that favor aggressive foreign policies, permit the suppression of domestic opposition groups, and provide the necessary conditions for “nationalist bidding wars.” When one or more of these processes exist, nationalism should increase the probability that a state will initiate an interstate war. But, different forms of nationalism may not affect the propensity for international conflict in the same manner. Different nationalisms may influence the onset of interstate war in different ways and to different degrees.

The purposes of this study are threefold. First, I seek to build upon the rich qualitative literature on nationalism and construct a theoretical framework that explains how nationalism increases the probability of international conflict. Second, I want to determine whether the popular belief that nationalism and warfare go hand in hand is accurate. Third, I propose to move beyond the nonrandom sample of case studies that has characterized hypothesis testing in regards to nationalism and war initiation and onset. I test my expectations using data I collected on the existence and type of nationalism at the state level from 1816 to 1991.

I find that nationalism in general significantly increases the probability that a state will initiate an interstate war. However, not all forms of nationalism are created equal in this regard. Ethnic nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism significantly increase the probability of war, while civic nationalism and revolutionary nationalism do not. Based upon these results, I conclude that, in line with conventional wisdom, nationalism breeds international conflict.

These findings are noteworthy for three reasons. First, they indicate the theoretical and empirical importance of nationalism in understanding interstate war initiation. Researchers,
therefore, must not ignore the role of nationalism when constructing their models of international conflict behavior. Second, these results suggest that scholars should think further about whether and how other cultural and ideational variables influence the dynamics of international conflict. Lastly, they imply that policymakers must recognize the power of nationalism in bringing about violent international conflict and find ways, at both the domestic and international level, to counteract its most pernicious attributes.

This chapter is organized as follows. The first section describes the state of the literature pertaining to nationalism and international conflict. The second section uses this knowledge to develop a more complete model of nationalist conflict. The third section disaggregates nationalism into its various permutations and explains why the probability of war depends on the specific form of nationalism articulated by the state. Overall, four hypotheses are presented. The fourth section describes the dataset, the operationalization of the variables, and the statistical models. The fifth section presents the results of the statistical analyses and discusses the findings.

THE STATE OF THE LITERATURE

The existing literature on nationalism and violent conflict concludes that nationalism generally leads to a greater incidence of interstate war. Unfortunately, this conclusion is based on a nonrandom sample of case studies. For example, Gagnon (1994) focuses solely on the destructive consequences of ethnic nationalism in post-World War II Serbia, while Pavković (2000) considers the role of competing nationalism in the brutal fragmentation of Yugoslavia. Fousek (2000), Hixson (2008), and Lieven (2004) outline how nationalism has increased the propensity of the United States to engage in violent international conflict throughout its history.
Considering only one form of interstate conflict, Saideman and Ayres (2008) look at the role of nationalism in the prevalence of irredentism in five formerly communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Snyder (2000) carries out a broader assessment than the previous scholars by briefly examining the relationship between nationalism and domestic and international conflict in 12 democratizing states. Woodwell (2007) provides a quantitative analysis of the violent consequences of nationalism, in addition to three case studies, but he only considers nationalism among transborder nationalities. Despite the valuable theoretical insights that can be gleaned from these studies, they beg the question of generalizability. Can the claim be made that nationalism generally increases the probability of interstate war? In order to answer this question, which is at the heart of much nationalism research, a large-N quantitative analysis of nationalism in its entirety is necessary.

Yet, the previous literature provides some theories as to why nationalism might easily provoke violent international conflict. For Hixson (2008), violence against external enemies may be integral to the myths and ideologies of many nationalisms, not just that of the United States. The content of nationalism is also important for Saideman and Ayres (2008), because it shapes attitudes toward kin in neighboring countries and thus influences the propensity of elites to engage in irredentist behavior. Taking an instrumentalist approach, Gagnon (1994) contends that ethnic nationalism is associated with international conflict because it provides a means through which endangered elites can fend off domestic challengers in a shifting political and economic structure. A major limitation of Gagnon’s argument is that he confines it to conflict along ethnic cleavages. “Enemy-others” can be juxtaposed to the members of the “national family” not just in terms of culture and language, but also in terms of political ideology or traditional institutions. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) and Snyder (2000) develop a more
generalizable theory than Gagnon (1994) in that they apply it to many forms of nationalist conflict (e.g. wars between a revolutionary nationalist state and its purported foreign enemies). However, they restrict their argument to democratizing states.

A thorough reading of history, on the contrary, implies that all regime types have the potential for violent nationalist conflict, whether at home or abroad. Hixson (2008) demonstrates this point by showing how Americans have engaged in militant foreign policies from the founding of the colonies to the war on terrorism as a means of reaffirming and renewing their sense of national identity during periods of psychic crisis. The mechanisms through which nationalism causes war, as the above scholars delineate, could theoretically operate in most political systems, not just democratizing ones. Therefore, I extend Snyder’s (2000) theory of violent nationalist conflict and the hypotheses derived from it to explain how nationalism in general increases the probability of interstate war.

A THEORY OF NATIONALIST CONFLICT

Political elites are often in need of mass cooperation (or, at a minimum, mass indifference) in order to achieve their military or economic goals. For example, they may want to acquire a piece of neighboring territory, control the supply of a natural resource, or protect domestic companies from the exigencies of globalization. In order to obtain such support, they may embed this goal and its related policies in nationalist rhetoric and images. In other words, they portray this objective as essential to the continued existence and power of the “nation” and as consistent with the “national character.”

When political elites, such as party leaders, presidents, or dictators, successfully spread nationalism among the masses in this way, the domestic population will eventually acquire the
common desire to protect its state through whatever policies and actions are deemed necessary. This desire is predicated on the notion that, in theory, all nations have the right to territorial self-determination and as a result of this right, the state should express and ensure the nation’s unique cultural, historical, institutional, and/or ideological characteristics. If it does so, defending the nation means defending the state.

In addition to influencing mass aspirations, nationalism gives the populace a sense of shared beliefs and attitudes in regards to the processes and outcomes of international relations. The need to protect national sovereignty, for instance, may entail a realist view of global politics and skepticism of international cooperation.

This potential conformity of ideas and interests and the mobilization of popular energies to the state’s nationalist projects are attractive to political elites. If they can effectively construct and diffuse an amenable form of nationalism, they may be more likely to achieve their objectives. However, the creation and dissemination of nationalism is not without serious domestic and international consequences. Even though these “nationalist persuasion campaigns” can result in a greater sense of national unity and purpose (which may be a positive development), they can also bring about several mechanisms that promote violent international conflict (Snyder 2000, 66-69).

First, the propagation of nationalism can only succeed if there is a clear delineation of the “other,” that is, those who are excluded from membership in the nation. The identification of certain internal and external groups as “enemies of the nation” can easily lead to their discrimination, disarmament, powerlessness, and/or expulsion. If these “national enemies” and/or their foreign allies have the ability to resist the nationalist state’s demands, the likelihood of war should increase (Snyder 2000, 66-67). The Palestinians are considered a constant threat
to the integrity of the Israeli nation-state and thus are politically marginalized. Unfortunately for Israel, the Palestinians have some means of resistance (e.g. rocket attacks, suicide bombings), as well as relatively powerful regional allies, and thus the conflict continues.

Second, nationalism promotes the portrayal of other nations as more threatening, more obstinate, and more liable for historical transgressions, but more easily defeated than they really are (Snyder 2000, 67). Nationalist leaders tend to construct a dichotomy between the weak and evil “them” and the strong and inherently good “us.” The combination of distrust, insecurity, and increased optimism about victory inclines nationalist states to provoke conflict. Though one may contend that this argument about biased strategic assumptions can be generalized beyond the context of nationalist conflict, the myths and prejudices inherent in nationalism render its components more persuasive. Political elites can reinforce the image of the enemy as extremely threatening by claiming not only that it will undermine the state’s physical integrity and sovereignty, but also that it will destroy its unique national identity.

The role of American nationalism in the initiation of war is instructive in this regard. American national identity is predicated, in part, upon the myth of Americans’ manliness, innate innocence, and providential destiny in comparison to the weakness, culpability, and decadence of external “enemy-others” (e.g. the Native Americans and the communists). For Americans, these qualities necessarily imply their right to exert their power in the world, so as to spread the “universal values” of democracy and free-market capitalism. This conception of American national identity drives a continuous militant foreign policy, including the regular resort to war (Hixson 2008).

Third, nationalism creates interests inside and outside the government that wish to maintain the belligerent nationalist rhetoric and its attendant foreign policies for their own
economic and political benefit. The military-industrial complex is a notable example of such an interest. It, like many other nationalist groups, may wield so much political influence by itself that war and expansion become likely. If defense contractors convince the government that “national security” can be achieved through elaborate weapons systems, not only do they increase their revenue, but other states may feel threatened and adopt a more militaristic posture. If two or more nationalist groups join together in a political coalition and logrolling occurs, the combination of policies may render war and military expansion even more likely. The German coalition of “iron and rye” prior to World War I embroiled the state in conflict by giving a fleet-building program to the industrialists, high agricultural tariffs to the aristocratic landowners, and an offensive war plan to the army. The first policy alienated Britain, the second angered grain-exporting Russia, and the last threatened all of Germany’s neighbors (Snyder 2000, 67-68).

Fourth, nationalism allows elites to undermine any opposition to their foreign policies, whether from political parties or individuals, by depicting them as threats to the “nation” and its interests. Characterizing the opposition as outside the realm of the “nation” and thus untrustworthy renders it less attractive to the public as participants or leaders in the government. The opposition becomes a smaller menace to the integrity of the state’s nationalist projects and in turn, its military agenda as it can no longer credibly question the construction of the nation and the wisdom of particular policies. As a result, the state obtains a greater freedom of action in the international arena, especially given the appearance of overwhelming public support for any state aggressiveness. For example, Adolf Hitler was able to initiate and continue his belligerent military policies, in part, because he used nationalism to justify the silencing of liberals, Jews, and socialists, whom he portrayed as against the interests of the German volk (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 26).
Lastly, nationalism creates the conditions for “nationalist bidding wars” among elites and/or between elites and the masses (Snyder 2000, 68-69). Competing elites try to outbid each other to gain greater nationalist prestige, more popular support, and further political power, leading to more belligerent policies than either set of elites initially desired. The masses may internalize the nationalist rhetoric, believing that their national identity, reputation, and self-rule are endangered by foreign “others” and can only survive through significant military action. They then push their leaders to initiate or continue aggressive foreign policies so as to achieve the perceived “national objectives.” In this process of internalization and lobbying, the populace becomes desensitized to the costs of war, allowing leaders to pursue more risk-acceptant military strategies. After the collapse of Soviet authority, Armenian politicians engaged in nationalistic outbidding over the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh in response to mass nationalist sentiment, which ignored “the real and growing costs of escalating violence and war” (Saideman and Ayres 2008, 97).

Due to increased public support, the provocation of “national enemies” and their foreign allies, biased strategic assumptions, nationalist interest groups, marginalized political opponents, and “nationalist bidding wars,” nationalist states should be more likely to initiate interstate wars than non-nationalist states. Not only does nationalism convince the population that their state, as the guardian of the nation, must be defended militarily against external threats. It also generates several processes that further promote international conflict, as outlined in Figure 2. The presence of nationalism should then increase the probability of interstate war initiation. This expectation leads me to the following hypothesis.

_Hypothesis 1:_ Nationalism increases the probability that a state will initiate an interstate war.
THE VARIETIES OF NATIONALISM AND THEIR EFFECT ON CONFLICT

Nationalism is neither homogenous nor unchanging. It has assumed many forms since its birth as political elites in different national contexts have altered it to promote their particular military and economic interests. Different nationalisms have defined the “nation,” its goals, and its enemies differently, thereby producing different nationalist dynamics. Recognizing that various forms of nationalism exist and may diversely affect domestic political interactions, I expect them to have different implications for the elite’s ability to mobilize popular energies, identify “national enemies,” propagate biased strategic assumptions, satisfy nationalist interest groups, repress dissent, control “nationalist bidding wars,” and initiate international conflict.

---

2 Greenfeld (1992) argues that the idea of the “nation” and nationalism emerged in England during the sixteenth-century and then spread across the European continent, all the while transforming itself to meet the political and social exigencies of each country.
One methodological problem in examining the effect of different types of nationalism on interstate war initiation is the array of contrasting classification schemes (see Breuilly 1993; Gellner 1983; Smith 2001; Snyder 1976; Snyder 2000). A categorization must be chosen that will fairly test the proposed relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation. While each classification scheme has its merits and scholars will disagree about their comparative usefulness, I follow the categories of nationalism proposed by Snyder (2000, ch. 2) for two reasons. First, he explicitly hypothesizes about the relationship between the different types of nationalism and war initiation, though in the context of democratizing states. Since his theory and hypotheses inform my own conceptualization of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict and I want to be consistent with his expectations, I employ his classification scheme. Second, he includes civic and ethnic nationalism, which are often used in case studies to explain the incidence of violent conflict (in contrast to Breuilly 1993 and Snyder 1976, 1990).

Snyder (2000, 69) divides nationalism into four categories on the basis of its collective appeals and criteria for inclusion in the national group. The categories are civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, and counterrevolutionary nationalism, the main characteristics of which are listed in Table 2. According to Snyder (2000, 80), each type of nationalism influences warfare in a distinct manner by producing different types of violent conflict as well as different degrees and patterns of violence, which would affect when wars occur.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Nationalism</th>
<th>Main Characteristics</th>
<th>Consequences for Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effect on the Probability of Interstate War Initiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Emphasis on loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective. Inclusion in the group depends on birth or long-term residence within nation's territory.</td>
<td>Cost-conscious foreign policy</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Emphasis on common culture, language, religion, shared historical experience, and/or shared kinship. Inclusion in the national group depends on these criteria.</td>
<td>High conflict until domination of the ethnic homeland is achieved</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Emphasis on the defense of a political revolution that brings to power a regime that governs for the nation. Inclusion in the group depends on support for the political revolution.</td>
<td>Open-ended external conflict</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Emphasis on resistance to internal factions that seek to undermine the nation’s traditional institutions. Any social classes, religions, cultural groups, or political ideological opponents that are deemed “enemies of the nation” are excluded from the national group.</td>
<td>Open-ended external conflict</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The descriptions of the variants of nationalism and the proposed consequences for violent conflict are obtained from Snyder (2000).
According to Snyder (2000, 80), civic nationalism normally leads to more prudent policies abroad. States with this form of nationalism tend to be more sensitive to the potential costs of war. They should only initiate those interstate wars that they believe they can win quickly with a minimal loss of life and materiel. The reasoning is that most mature democracies either have civic nationalism (e.g. the United States) or have had their historic nationalism tempered by civic features (e.g. post-WWII Germany). Since mature democracies permit open criticism of government policies and politicians are concerned about re-election, costly wars are likely to be avoided. Mature democracies are often associated with civic nationalism in that it is inclusive within the state boundaries and “seeks to accommodate all citizens within a nondiscriminatory legal and institutional framework” (Snyder 2000, 80). These features inform the popular perception that civic nationalism is “rational,” “benign,” and “desirable” (Brown 1999). I expect that states with civic nationalism are less likely to initiate wars than those with other forms of nationalism. However, civic nationalism still provides elites with the opportunity to elicit public cooperation, identify “national enemies,” propagate biased strategic assumptions, satisfy nationalist interest groups, suppress the opposition, and engage in “nationalist bidding wars.” It would lead to a higher probability of international conflict than if there were no nationalism. The following hypothesis derives from these expectations.

Hypothesis 2: Civic nationalism increases the probability of interstate war initiation relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism should render a state more prone to war than civic nationalism because the ethnic nationalist state is less cost-conscious. The potential benefits of war are seen
to be greater than the potential costs. If the ethnic nationalist state is victorious, it may either preserve its independence and distinctive national identity or acquire control and possibly sovereignty over territories inhabited by ethnic kin (Snyder 2000, 82). In addition, the motivations of ethnic nationalist states for fighting often preclude the consideration of costs. Ethnic nationalism tends to entail issues of culture, language, and religion, which are frequently seen as zero-sum issues and less amenable to compromise. For example, it would be difficult for ethnic nationalists in a homeland state to agree to the assimilation of their ethnic kin to the dominant culture in a neighboring state. To do so would mean the gradual erosion of what they hold most dear: their unique identity and sense of belonging. Therefore, diplomacy and peaceful negotiation may be deemed unacceptable. The only option is warfare, regardless of its costs.

However, the expansionist ambitions of ethnic nationalist states have natural limits. An ethnic nationalist state should be less inclined to violent conflict once its goal of a homogenized state, a sustainable pattern of domination, or security from “others” is achieved (Snyder 2000, 82). It should have little desire to conquer and rule over a large number of “foreigners” since their very presence may threaten the interests of “the national family.” These assertions suggest the following hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 3:** Ethnic nationalism increases the probability of interstate war initiation relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.

In contrast to ethnic nationalism, the military expansionism of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalisms does not have natural limits and states with these types of
nationalism should have the highest probability of interstate war initiation. Revolutionary nationalism has two characteristics that differentiate it from other forms of nationalism and render the relevant states some of the most likely to initiate wars. First, it is oriented toward protecting the political revolution from its domestic and foreign enemies. Second, it is preoccupied with “the possibility of spreading the benefits of political transformation to potential revolutionists abroad” (Snyder 2000, 82).

In the eyes of revolutionary nationalists, the revolution is precarious. The popular energy that it unleashes creates a long-term threat to neighboring states. The latter may try to kill the revolution, especially in its infancy, through preventive aggression so as to shield themselves from domestic revolution. As a result of this potential military intervention, revolutionary nationalists believe that spreading the revolution to other countries, as in the military campaigns of Napoleonic France, will obtain the security necessary for a successful and enduring revolution. “The revolutionary state’s goals for conquest are not necessarily limited to a finite set of historic or cultural objectives but are spurred by a more open-ended competition for security” (Snyder 2000, 82). The tense relations between revolutionary nationalist states and their enemies supply the context in which the likelihood of international conflict increases.

In contrast to the politically transformative basis of revolutionary nationalism, counterrevolutionary nationalism arises when threatened elites attempt to fend off internal political, economic, and/or social change by unifying the nation against its external foes. In addition, these elites may try to preserve traditional institutions and their place in them through the exclusion of the putative class, ideological, religious, and cultural enemies of the nation (Snyder 2000, 83). In the 1870s, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck and his fellow ruling elites feared a working-class revolution and demands for a fully democratic political system.
Therefore, they appealed to the Protestant middle classes, while labeling the working class, the socialists, the Catholics, and the Poles as the enemies of the “true” German nation (Snyder 2000, 93-94).

This strategy may not only prevent or reverse any domestic change by silencing the voices of revolution, but also enhance the ability of the state to foster national unification. The marginalization of particularly menacing groups would decrease the amount of opposition to the elite conceptualization of the nation and the resulting domestic and international policies, providing the semblance of unanimity. In such a context, aggressive foreign policies are more likely to be formulated and implemented.

Furthermore, like revolutionary nationalism, counterrevolutionary nationalism perpetually needs external enemies to serve as internal unifiers. Since counterrevolutionary nationalism is defined by its opposition to any group that wants to undermine the nation’s traditional institutions, its impetus for internal unification comes from the desire to preserve tradition and the status quo. In contrast, revolutionary nationalist states seek internal unification through the preservation of the political revolution. Yet, the constant construction of threatening “others” in both forms of nationalism provides leaders with more opportunities to bring the people together through violent international conflict.

Due to the above dynamics, states with these types of nationalism lack inherent limits on the number and extent of the rivalries they provoke with other states. Both forms of nationalism are, therefore, likely to produce higher levels of open-ended conflict than other types of nationalism. These features of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism suggest the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: Revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism increases the probability of interstate war initiation relative to no nationalism and more so than civic and ethnic nationalism.

I have no *a priori* expectation of a substantial difference between the effects of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Both depend on the continuous identification of external enemies for the maintenance of internal cohesion, which precludes them from having inherent constraints on their military expansionism. The primary difference between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism is their bases for national unification. I perceive no theoretical reason why this distinction should cause either nationalism to have a greater impact on the probability of interstate war initiation than the other, especially in light of their similarities.

The theory of nationalist conflict outlined above suggests that nationalism should increase the probability of interstate war initiation through a series of mechanisms. However, some forms of nationalism should have a higher likelihood of causing international conflict than others. If my hypotheses receive empirical support, it will indicate the theoretical importance of nationalism in understanding the initiation of interstate war. Such corroborative evidence would hopefully compel policymakers to consider more seriously the role of nationalism in promoting violent international conflict and seek ways of avoiding or ameliorating its deadly consequences. It would also suggest the need to consider the potential influence of other cultural and ideological variables on international conflict.
DATA AND METHODS

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable **Initiation** is binary with 1 indicating the initiation of an interstate war for a country in year \( t \) and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the monad-year. I am analyzing rare events, in that there are much fewer ones (i.e. initiations) than zeros (i.e. non-initiations). Because rare events are often difficult to explain and predict, I follow the advice of King and Zeng (2001a and b) and Lemke and Reed (2001) and eschew commonly used, though grossly inefficient, data collection strategies in favor of retrospective sampling. By doing so, it is much easier to understand the relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation.

The primary benefit of retrospective sampling is that I avoid spending precious data collection resources by forgoing a very large number of observations and focus on the inclusion of more informative and meaningful variables of nationalism. If I had aimed to gather the thousands of observations commonly found in quantitative international conflict studies, I would have had to use possibly inaccurate proxy variables for nationalism. Instead, I collected data on the nationalism of all the initiators the year prior to their wars (i.e. all the 1’s) and a small random sample of non-initiators. This strategy does not result in a loss of consistency or even much efficiency relative to the full sample (King and Zeng 2001a, 694). In fact, many of the “zeros” may contain very little substantive information regarding conflict initiation. For example, states like Palau or Andorra most likely will not provide much insight into the relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation.

Based upon this logic, I collected data on nationalism and other variables for 164 non-initiator-years, in addition to all 85 initiator-years, for a total of 249 country-year observations. The non-initiator-years were randomly drawn from all country-years in which the country in
question had participated in at least one interstate war between 1816 and 1991, according to the Correlates of War (COW) Project, minus those country-years in which the country in question initiated an interstate war (Sarkees 2000). The data on war initiation were obtained from the COW Project, though with World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War disaggregated, following Slantchev (2004).

**Independent Variables**

*General Nationalism Variable*

As there is no pre-existing dataset on the incidence of nationalism in general or its many permutations, I constructed my own variables and collected my own data using national histories and reference works on nationalism, governments, and political parties. Following Snyder (2000, 23), I define nationalism as “the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.” This definition expands Gellner’s (1983) standard conceptualization of nationalism as the doctrine that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the nation) should be congruent. It allows nations to be organized around characteristics other than culture and recognizes that the aim of nationalism can be something other than a sovereign state.

Nationalism exists in a state in year $t - 1$ if there is evidence in the historical record that there was some form of nationalism at the governmental level in that year. Such evidence of nationalism is the presence of one or more of the following events. First, a politically relevant nationalist party is present. A party is politically relevant if it achieves either a victory in a presidential election, a majority of seats in the national legislature, control of the most prominent
cabinet positions, or the ability to affect coalition building. Second, the state implements laws limiting the rights, freedoms, and activities of groups not considered part of the “nation.” Such laws could be restrictions on citizenship rights, use of a native language, membership in specific cultural or religious organizations, and/or political participation. Third, there is significant internal or external violence justified by the state via nationalism. Fourth, the state takes other military actions that it contends will protect the “nation” (e.g. troop mobilization or increased weapons procurement). See Appendix A for an example of my coding procedures. Nationalism is coded as 1 if the state in question had some form of nationalism at $t - 1$ and 0 otherwise.

**Specific Nationalism Variables**

I disaggregate the general nationalism variable into separate variables representing civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Definitions for these nationalisms derive from Snyder (2000, 70) and are based on the criteria for national membership and the nature of collective appeals.

Civic nationalism emphasizes loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that promotes justice, tolerance, and the rule of law and includes in the nation anyone born or who has lived for a long time within the national territory (Snyder 2000, 70). Thus, it is the most inclusive nationalism as its requirements for national membership are fairly easy to fulfill. Civic nationalism often occurs in democracies and may be considered a proxy for democracy. I coded a state as civic nationalist if citizenship was based on birth or a process of naturalization, if the rule of law and fair political institutions played a prominent role in national life, and if there was a national desire to ensure liberty, tolerance, individual rights, and equal justice under the law.
**Civic** is coded as 1 if the state had civic nationalism at \( t - 1 \) and 0 otherwise. Post-revolutionary France is an example of a civic nationalist state.

Ethnic nationalism stresses the importance of common culture, language, religion, historical memory, and/or kinship in constructing and maintaining the nation. It excludes anyone who does not have the necessary cultural, linguistic, religious and/or ethnic attributes (Snyder 2000, 70). If the government favored one culture, language, religion, and/or ethnicity through laws, educational opportunities, business contracts, and/or patronage, that country may be ethnic nationalist. However, for the state to qualify, the historical record must also indicate that national membership depended on cultural, linguistic, religious and/or ethnic criteria and the political elite emphasized the intrinsic superiority and uniqueness of the associated group. The fulfillment of the above criteria may point to a state controlled by a dominant ethnic group. **Ethnic** is coded as 1 if the state was ethnic nationalist at \( t - 1 \) and 0 otherwise. Nazi Germany is a prominent example of an ethnic nationalist state.

Revolutionary nationalism frames national defense and self-rule in terms of protecting a revolutionary political regime. It excludes anyone from national membership that threatens the revolutionary regime’s stability (Snyder 2000, 70). I coded a state as revolutionary nationalist if it denied national membership to any group it believed was trying to undermine the political revolution and if it implemented discriminatory laws or instigated violence against these groups in order to preserve the revolutionary regime. As these criteria imply, a state resulting from a revolutionary victory is more likely to be revolutionary nationalist than other states. **Revolutionary** equals 1 if the state was revolutionary nationalist at \( t - 1 \) and 0 otherwise. Ethiopia, prior to the Ogaden War, is an example of a revolutionary nationalist state.
Counterrevolutionary nationalism perceives the nation’s well-being as primarily served by resistance to internal factions and external foes seeking to weaken the nation’s traditional political, social, and/or economic institutions. It excludes from national membership any social classes, religions, cultural groups, and adherents to “alternative” political ideologies that might change the status quo (Snyder 2000, 70). I coded a state as counterrevolutionary nationalist if the political elite described the nation with reference to the past, traditional institutions, the status quo, and/or social convention. For a state to be considered counterrevolutionary nationalist, the elite had to employ nationalism in an attempt to maintain their dominant positions, forestall political or social change, and/or protect the nation from “revolutionary” ideologies. The exclusion from the nation of anyone who opposed the establishment also indicated counterrevolutionary nationalism. Counterrevolutionary equals 1 if the state was counterrevolutionary nationalist at $t-1$ and 0 otherwise. Benito Mussolini’s Italy is an example of a counterrevolutionary nationalist state.

A “no nationalism” variable is the base category in the empirical analysis. The four variables of nationalism and the categories of nationalism they represent are exhaustive. However, I must emphasize that the coding of the specific types of nationalism is not always unambiguous and in many cases, require a judgment call that could be challenged. Table 3 provides the frequency of each form of nationalism and the base category of “no nationalism” in the dataset, as well as the percentage of country-years with each form of nationalism. These

---

3 There were cases in which nationalism existed, but did not conform to the categories of nationalism in my typology. I coded them as having an “other” form of nationalism, instead of categorizing them as non-nationalist. Choosing the latter course would have resulted in inaccurate data in that these cases were clearly instances of nationalism (for example, pan-nationalism or anti-imperialist nationalism). I drop the states with “other nationalism” from the empirical analysis of the relationship between the specific types of nationalism and interstate war initiation because the nationalisms contained in this category are often dissimilar in terms of their content, making any conclusions regarding their effect on interstate war initiation compared to non-nationalism tenuous. This decision decreases the number of observations to 227.
descriptive statistics indicate that while the majority of country-years do not possess nationalist characteristics, ethnic nationalism is the most frequent type of nationalism and revolutionary nationalism is the least frequent one.

| Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Types of Nationalism |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Frequency | Percentage of Observations |
| Civic nationalism | 38 | 15.26 |
| Ethnic nationalism | 45 | 18.07 |
| Revolutionary nationalism | 12 | 4.82 |
| Counterrevolutionary nationalism | 18 | 7.23 |
| No nationalism | 136 | 54.62 |
| Total | 249 | 100.00 |

If the historical record indicated a state evinced multiple types of nationalism, I used the most prominent and influential one in coding that state’s nationalism. If more references were made to the characteristics of one type of nationalism than another, the country was coded as having the former nationalism.4

For example, after the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union possessed revolutionary nationalism as it eliminated from the “pays legal” all members of the propertied classes and the clergy. In the 1922 constitution, it disenfranchised propertied society, people who hired labor, kulaks, priests, and White army officers (Suny 1997, 146). The emphasis on the protection of the communist revolution from the capitalist powers continued throughout the first half of the twentieth century. However, Soviet leaders sometimes employed ethnic nationalist rhetoric and

4 I do not estimate the effect of the presence of multiple state-level nationalisms on interstate war initiation because of the relative scarcity of this phenomenon. Out of 249 country-year observations, only 11 country-years could be coded as having multiple forms of nationalism. Furthermore, there is little variation among the combinations of nationalism. Five country-years have both ethnic and revolutionary nationalism, five country-years have both ethnic and counterrevolutionary nationalism, and one country-year has civic and counterrevolutionary nationalism.
imagery to mobilize the citizens to the defense of the communist experiment. From 1936 to 1938, Josef Stalin purged the minority nationalities in a campaign of mass terror because he saw the Russian people as the true guardians of Marxism and would not accept “nationalist deviators,” “bourgeois nationalists,” or “counterrevolutionary-Trotskyite-diversionist-espionage” individuals or parties (Snyder 1976, 216). Because Soviet leaders used Russian ethnic nationalism as one means of securing communism and this policy was inconsistently implemented, I considered the Soviet Union as a revolutionary nationalist state rather than an ethnic nationalist one.

**Control Variables**

To estimate accurately the effect of nationalism and its variants on the initiation of interstate war, I include five control variables in the analyses, all measured at $t - 1$. **Democracy** uses POLITY IV’s “institutionalized democracy” score to classify democracies (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). It ranges from 0 to 10, but I employ a dummy variable version that equals 1 if the democracy score was greater than or equal to 6 and 0 otherwise. Democracies should be less likely than autocracies to initiate wars because democratic leaders are inclined to be more selective in their foreign aggression, especially towards other democracies. They tend to initiate wars that they think their armies can win quickly with minimal casualties (which are unlikely to occur when confronting other democracies) so as to avoid public backlash and ensure their political survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003; Reiter and Stam 2002). While some studies suggest that democracies are, on the whole, more pacific than autocracies (Benoit 1996; Ray 1995), the empirical record does not support the conclusion of a monadic democratic peace (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Weede 1984). Despite the evidence
against democracies having a lower likelihood of waging war generally, I still consider it to be prudent to include regime type as a control variable due to the plausibility of the above argument.

**Major Power** is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if, according to the COW Project’s State System Membership List, the state in question was a major power and 0 otherwise. Major powers should be more disposed toward international conflict than other states because they are not as constrained by distance. Their extensive land, sea, and/or air capabilities allow them more easily to project their military power globally.

**Neighbors** is the total number of direct contiguities (by land or sea) for each state. These data are obtained from the COW Project’s Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002). The more immediate neighbors a state has, the more likely that it has unresolved disagreements over the settlement of territorial issues. Because irredentism is often a component of elite nationalist discourse, it is important to control for potential territorial disputes.

**Conflict** is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the state was a participant in either an intrastate or extrastate war, according to the COW Project’s Intra-State War and Extra-State War datasets and 0 otherwise (Sarkees 2000). A state may be less inclined to instigate another conflict if it is already engaged in one. To do so would risk stretching possibly scarce military resources to their breaking point and losing public support as economic resources are diverted to the war effort and casualties mount.

**Rivalry** is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the state was a participant in an enduring rivalry and 0 otherwise. The data come from Diehl and Goertz’s (2000) list of enduring rivalries. A state with an enduring rival should be more prone to interstate conflict in
that some aspects of its previous crises and wars are probable causes of future crises and wars. In other words, the onset of a conflict at \( t \) may be dependent upon the origins, dynamics, and outcome of a conflict at \( t - 1 \). Furthermore, this state may have “learned” over time that military force is an acceptable course of action in the context of this competitive relationship.

**Statistical Models**

One would normally use a logit regression model when the dependent variable is dichotomous. However, I employ a rare events logit regression model to avoid biased coefficients and estimates of event probabilities that are too small, as often happens in finite samples of rare-events data (King and Zeng 2001a and b). Because my research design is choice-based, I use the method of prior correction to ensure that my estimates, especially that of \( \beta_0 \), are consistent and efficient. Without a good estimate of \( \beta_0 \), I would likely have biased estimates of event probabilities. This procedure corrects the logit coefficients based on external information about the fraction of events in the population, \( \tau \), and the observed fraction of events in the sample, \( \bar{y} \) (King and Zeng 2001a, 700). The population fraction in this case is easily derived. I divided the number of country-years in which a war was initiated from 1816 to 1991 (85) by the total number of country-years as calculated using the EUGene program, version 3.204 (13,596) (Bennett and Stam 2000). I obtained a population fraction of 0.006. The observed fraction is the number of country-years in which a war was initiated from 1816 to 1991 (85) divided by the total number of country-years in my sample (249), which equals 0.341. Then, instead of the intercept produced by the computer, I follow the advice of King and Zeng (2001a and b) and use the following formula:
\[
\hat{\beta}_0 - \ln \left( \frac{1 - \tau}{\tau} \right)^{\frac{\bar{y}}{1 - \bar{y}}} \]

First, I estimate a rare events logit regression model with the general nationalism variable, \textbf{Nationalism}. Second, to determine whether particular forms of nationalism increase the probability of interstate war initiation more than others, I estimate a model with the variables \textbf{Civic}, \textbf{Ethnic}, \textbf{Revolutionary}, and \textbf{Counterrevolutionary}.

\textbf{RESULTS}

The cross-tabulation in Table 4 provides a preliminary picture of the relationship between nationalism and the initiation of interstate war. It shows that there is a statistically significant association between nationalism and interstate war initiation \((p = 0.000)\). Approximately 48 percent of nationalist states in the sample initiated wars, compared with roughly 19 percent of non-nationalist states. This difference in percentages is quite substantial, suggesting that nationalist states are more likely to instigate international conflict. However, the results of the cross-tabulation do not tell us anything definitive about the positive or negative direction of the relationship.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\hline
\textbf{Nationalism} & \textbf{Initiation} & \textbf{No} & \textbf{Yes} & \textbf{Total} \\
\hline
\textbf{No} & 96 & 68 & 164 \\
 & (81.36\%) & (51.91\%) & (65.86\%) \\
\textbf{Yes} & 22 & 63 & 85 \\
 & (18.64\%) & (48.09\%) & (34.14\%) \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & 118 & 131 & 249 \\
 & (100\%) & (100\%) & (100\%) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{A Cross-Tabulation of Interstate War Initiation and Nationalism}
\end{table}

\textit{Pearson \(\chi^2\) with 1 \(df\) = 23.9435 \(p = 0.000\)}
The rare events logit regression model in Table 5 provides such information. It indicates that nationalist states have a higher probability of interstate war initiation than non-nationalist states, holding all other variables constant. This finding is statistically significant at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test and confirms Hypothesis 1. It is, therefore, plausible that the mechanisms leading from nationalism to international conflict as outlined in my theory are operative in the relevant cases. That is, nationalism galvanizes public support for the state’s policies, provokes “national enemies” and their foreign allies, fosters biased strategic assumptions, encourages nationalist interest groups, marginalizes political opponents, and promotes “nationalist bidding wars,” all of which support the initiation of interstate wars.

---

5 I ran a series of robustness checks to ensure that nationalism truly has a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of interstate war initiation. First, I estimated a logit regression model. Second, I included a measure of national military capabilities in the main model with and without the dummy variable Major Power. Third, I substituted the number of rivalries a state is engaged in for the dummy variable Rivalry. In all cases, the direction and level of significance of Nationalism remained the same.
Table 5. The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate War Initiation, Model 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0.903***</td>
<td>(0.344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.890***</td>
<td>(0.359)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0.527*</td>
<td>(0.359)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>(0.406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>0.803***</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.123***</td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-tailed tests. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Three of the control variables behave as expected. Democracies are significantly less inclined to initiate interstate wars than autocracies, probably as a result of their leaders’ preoccupation with public opinion and electoral survival. Major powers are more disposed toward the initiation of violent international conflict, compared to minor powers, suggesting that their capabilities allow them to overcome the tyranny of distance. But, this finding barely obtains significance. States embroiled in a rivalry are significantly more likely to initiate interstate wars than those that are not, lending support to the argument that the history of crises and wars and the acceptance of military response inherent in rivalries provide a favorable environment for future conflict. However, the number of immediate neighbors and current involvement in another conflict have no relationship to the initiation of interstate war.
The relative magnitude of the statistically significant variables’ effects on the predicted probability of interstate war initiation is shown in Table 6. The change from a non-nationalist state to a nationalist one increases the predicted probability of international conflict by 0.0034. While this increase is quite small, it is larger than the absolute changes in the predicted probability caused by changes in democracy, major power status, and rivalry. For example, the movement from an autocracy to a democracy decreases the estimated probability of interstate war initiation by only 0.0013. Therefore, it can be argued that nationalism has a greater impact on the instigation of violent international conflict than more traditional correlates of war, especially given the statistical insignificance of the number of immediate neighbors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Change in Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>-0.0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The baseline probability is 0.0023 when Nationalism, Democracy, Major Power, Conflict, and Rivalry are set at 0 and Neighbors is set at its mean.

Disaggregating nationalism into its variants indicates that some forms of nationalism increase the probability of interstate war initiation, while others do not, as evidenced in Table 7. Holding all other variables constant, both ethnic nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism increase the likelihood of interstate war. These variables are statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a one-tailed test. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 and a portion of Hypothesis 4 find some support in that ethnic nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism increase the probability of interstate war relative to no nationalism.
Table 7. The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate War Initiation, Model 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>0.422 (0.635)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>1.271*** (0.419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>0.530 (0.625)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>0.894* (0.601)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.696* (0.454)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors</td>
<td>0.001 (0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0.684** (0.414)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>0.424 (0.422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>0.820** (0.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.075*** (0.342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-tailed tests. *$p<0.10$, **$p<0.05$, ***$p<0.01$

Contrary to my expectations, neither civic nationalism nor revolutionary nationalism has a statistically significant relationship with the initiation of interstate war, though their coefficients have the predicted positive direction. Hypothesis 2 is not supported at all, while Hypothesis 4 is somewhat undermined because revolutionary nationalism is not associated with an increase in the likelihood of interstate war initiation relative to no nationalism. However, this latter finding may simply be due to the relatively few cases of revolutionary nationalism in the dataset, which may make it more difficult to estimate any statistically significant results. Nevertheless, it appears from the available data that revolutionary nationalism and
counterrevolutionary nationalism do not have similar international political dynamics and thus their effects on interstate conflict are quite different.

In this model, three of the control variables have the expected direction and are statistically significant. Democracies are again less likely to initiate international conflict than autocracies. In contrast, involvement in a rivalry and major power status both increase the probability of interstate war initiation. The model also indicates that the number of immediate neighbors and current participation in a conflict may not be especially informative when attempting to explain interstate war initiation due to their high degree of statistical insignificance.

The relative magnitude of the effects of the statistically significant variables in Model 2 on the predicted probability of interstate war initiation is shown in Table 8. The change from a non-nationalist state to an ethnic nationalist state increases the predicted probability of interstate war initiation by 0.0056. Interestingly, this value is almost twice the size of the change in the predicted probability when a state becomes counterrevolutionary nationalist. This result suggests that another component of Hypothesis 4 is inaccurate; that is, counterrevolutionary nationalism does not increase the probability of interstate war initiation more so than ethnic nationalism. In fact, ethnic nationalism most greatly affects the initiation of international conflict in this model. Democracy, major power status, and rivalry all have a smaller absolute impact on the predicted probability of interstate war initiation than ethnic nationalism.
Table 8. The Change in the Probability of Interstate War Initiation Given Changes in the Explanatory Variables, Model 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Change in Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>0.0033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>-0.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>0 to 1</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The baseline probability is 0.0023 when Civic, Ethnic, Revolutionary, Counterrevolutionary, Democracy, Major Power, Conflict, and Rivalry are set at 0 and Neighbors is set at its mean.

This finding raises the question of what it is about ethnic nationalism that makes it especially violent in comparison to other forms of nationalism. It may be that the seemingly non-negotiable character of culture, language, religion, and ancestral myths, and the foundational role these ideas play in individual and collective identities lend themselves to an exceptionally stark delineation between “us” and “them,” the hardening of bargaining positions, and in turn, the escalation of minor disputes to interstate war.

Several conclusions emanate from the results of the above models of interstate war initiation. First, nationalism in general unambiguously increases the probability of an interstate war being initiated. Second, all types of nationalism are not created equal. Ethnic nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism significantly increase the probability of interstate war initiation, while civic nationalism and revolutionary nationalism do not. Third, ethnic nationalism appears to be the “worst” form of nationalism in that it promotes international conflict to a greater extent than the other forms.
CONCLUSION

This study’s theoretical argument, which extends Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict under democratization, begins with the assumption that nationalism is useful for political elites. When “nationalist persuasion campaigns” are successful, elites can more readily obtain mass cooperation for the realization of a military or economic goal. However, the construction and dissemination of nationalism may have considerable domestic and international repercussions. Several mechanisms can arise that encourage the initiation of violent international conflict. First, nationalism entails the identification and vilification of “others,” which can provoke violent responses if these “national enemies” and their foreign allies have the ability to resist. Second, nationalism allows biased strategic assumptions. Third, certain domestic interest groups may benefit from belligerent nationalist foreign policies and thus lobby for their continuation and possible escalation. Fourth, in a nationalist environment, elites can more easily marginalize opposition groups by depicting them as threats to national unity and sovereignty. Lastly, nationalism provides a favorable setting for “nationalist bidding wars” among the elites and between the elites and masses. When these processes are operative, nationalism should increase the probability that a state will initiate an interstate war.

The results of the statistical analysis strongly support this hypothesis, demonstrating that the conventional wisdom about the violent consequences of nationalism is accurate. Nationalism in general significantly increases the probability of interstate war initiation. In fact, it has a slightly larger effect on the predicted probability of interstate war initiation than democracy, major power status, and rivalry. When nationalism is disaggregated into its variants, ethnic nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism significantly increase the probability of interstate war initiation. It is clear then that nationalism is theoretically and empirically
important to understanding interstate war initiation. Therefore, researchers should allow for the influence of nationalism when developing their models of international conflict behavior.

These findings also suggest that scholars should further consider whether and how other cultural and ideational variables affect the dynamics of international conflict, especially given the relative scarcity of such studies in international relations. If nationalism is central to a comprehensive understanding of the causes of interstate war, then it is quite possible that other cultural characteristics and political ideologies are important as well. They provide part of the social and political context in which other correlates of interstate war are embedded.

The conclusions I have drawn regarding the relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation have significant implications for policymaking. They indicate that political leaders must appreciate the powerful role of nationalism in convincing both elites and the masses as to the necessity of violent international conflict and creating the conditions in which aggressive behavior emerges and then thrives. As a result, policymakers must find ways, both domestically and internationally, to prevent the growth of belligerent and divisive nationalism and promote efforts at inclusion, especially in more unstable environments, such as democratizing states.

This study is the first that quantitatively measures nationalism and examines its statistical relationship to interstate war initiation. Future research may reveal a different connection since this analysis can be improved and refined. One such means of improvement would be to collect more data on the existence of nationalism across state-years to assess more accurately the relationship between nationalism and war initiation. It might also be useful to expand the purview of the analysis to include civil wars so as to ascertain whether nationalism’s impact on conflict initiation is limited to the international realm.
Investigating the effects of nationalism on the initiation of military conflict is a research agenda that merits further attention. Not only will the popular belief that nationalism is inherently aggressive and a major cause of war be scrutinized, but a better understanding of why wars occur in the first place will be obtained. The international community may then be able to develop more effective policies that avoid the destructiveness of war.
The death tolls of interstate wars are often staggering. The eight million killed in World War I, the 16 million in World War II, and the one million in both the Vietnam War and the Iran-Iraq War support this assertion (Sarkees 2000). But, what causes some conflicts to be deadlier than others? Several explanations have been proposed. Democracies are less likely to engage in costly wars because their governments fear eroding public support (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002). Wars in which mixed regimes are losing should have more fatalities because their leaders will likely suffer harsh penalties above and beyond the loss of power even if the death toll is moderate. They gamble for resurrection by prolonging the war, and thereby increase the probability of more battle deaths (Goemans 2000). A greater number of participants, flat or desert terrain, longer duration, and a higher total population are associated with more severe conflicts as well (Cioffi-Revilla 1991; Lacina 2006).

However, the role of nationalism in increasing the severity of warfare has yet to be considered, even though it is commonly believed to “sustain the most intense combat imaginable with the energies and the blood of millions of young men” (Posen 1993, 80). Furthermore, it has been shown to be important in interstate conflict initiation and onset (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Snyder 2000; Woodwell 2007). If nationalism increases the
propensity for states to participate in and initiate interstate wars, it should also influence how violently they fight these wars.

I argue that nationalism conditions soldiers to want to give their lives for their nation, and consequently increases battlefield brutality. Individuals are ready to sacrifice for their nation because leaders are able to elicit identification with the nation and link it to emotions and norms associated with membership in primary groups (Stern 1995). Since individuals are predisposed to die for their family’s well-being, constructing the nation as a “family” has favorable effects on troop commitment, motivation, solidarity, willingness to sacrifice, and in turn, the ability of elites to achieve their military objectives.

However, this nation-building exercise is not without serious domestic and international consequences. Building upon Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict under democratization, I argue that successful “nationalist persuasion campaigns” can result in several mechanisms that increase interstate war severity. Not only does nationalism mobilize popular energies to the tasks of war, it can also provoke the wrath of “national enemies” and their foreign allies, lead to biased strategic assumptions, empower domestic interest groups that favor aggressive foreign policies, permit the suppression of opposition groups, and promote the necessary conditions for “nationalist bidding wars.” In other words, an environment is created in which extremely violent wars become more likely. However, different forms of nationalism may not have similar effects on soldiers’ propensities to sacrifice their lives for the nation. Different nationalisms may influence the intensity and brutality of interstate conflict in different ways and to different degrees.

The purposes of this study are to extend Snyder’s theory of nationalist war to the question of interstate war severity; connect it to Stern’s (1995) argument about the relationship between
the nation, the family, and the willingness to sacrifice; and derive and test specific hypotheses about nationalism and war severity. I also propose to move beyond the nonrandom sample of case studies that has characterized hypothesis testing in regards to nationalism and war initiation and onset. I test my expectations using data I collected on the existence and type of nationalism in the initiator and target states of each interstate war from 1816 to 1991. I thus assess the popular belief that nationalist conflicts tend to be deadlier than non-nationalist ones.

I find that nationalism in either the initiator or the target significantly increases interstate war severity. Brutality further intensifies when nationalism characterizes both states. However, the effect of nationalism on war severity depends on the type of nationalism. For example, in terms of the initiator, ethnic nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism significantly increase the number of battle deaths, while civic nationalism and revolutionary nationalism do not. Based on these results, I conclude that nationalism generally leads to a greater loss of life in interstate wars.

These findings are noteworthy for three reasons. First, they indicate the theoretical and empirical importance of nationalism in understanding interstate war severity. In this regard, they demonstrate that the widely-accepted association between nationalism and deadly wars is correct. This conclusion supports Snyder’s (2000) argument that nationalism is integral to the construction of an accurate theory about international conflict behavior and Stern’s (1995) claim that nationalism promotes military sacrifice when the nation is successfully equated with the family. Second, these results suggest that other cultural and ideational variables may influence the dynamics of war, especially given their role in shaping the political and social context in which more traditional correlates of war are embedded. Lastly, they imply that policymakers
must recognize nationalism’s power during wartime and address its consequences at both the domestic and international levels so as to limit the destructiveness of wars.

This chapter is organized as follows. The first section links Stern’s (1995) theory of national sacrifice to an extension of Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict and thereby delineates the connection between nationalism and interstate war severity. The second section disaggregates nationalism into its various permutations and outlines how the severity of war may depend on the specific form of nationalism espoused by state elites. Overall, nine hypotheses are presented. The third section describes the dataset, the operationalization of the variables, and the statistical models. The fourth section presents the results of the statistical analyses and discusses the findings.

A THEORY OF THE SEVERITY OF NATIONALIST WARS

According to some scholars, there is a relationship between the degree of nationalism within a state and that state’s propensity for war. Mansfield and Snyder (1995; 2002; 2005) determine that, in emerging democracies, belligerent nationalism, propagated via elite persuasion campaigns, increases the probability that the state will experience violent conflict. Similarly, Snyder (2000) offers a series of case studies suggesting that democratization creates incentives for elites to promote nationalism, which in turn increases the likelihood that the state will engage in war. Concentrating on an established democracy instead of democratizing states, Fousek (2000), Hixson (2008), and Lieven (2004) all argue that nationalism increased the propensity of the United States to participate in violent international conflict throughout its history. Narrowing their analytical purview to only one form of interstate conflict, Saideman and Ayres (2008) look at the central role of nationalism in the prevalence of irredentism in five formerly communist
countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Woodwell (2007) concludes, through quantitative analysis and case studies, that nationalism is instrumental in the instigation of militarized interstate disputes, though only in the context of dyads involving transborder nationalities. However, these studies focus on nationalism’s role in the onset or initiation of war without adequately hypothesizing or analyzing the effect of nationalism on the severity of war. Yet, we can extend some of the proffered theories in ways that address the question of interstate war severity.

Nationalism should not only raise the probability of international conflict, but should also create soldiers prepared to give their lives for their nation and as a result, increase war’s deadliness. “Nationalism increases the intensity of warfare, and specifically the ability of states to mobilize the creative energies and the spirit of self-sacrifice of millions of soldiers” (Posen 1993, 81). It is widely believed that nationalism, defined as the doctrine that a people who perceive themselves as distinct should rule themselves in a political system that defends their distinctiveness, has this effect (Snyder 2000, 23).

But, two questions arise. Why are individuals willing to sacrifice their lives for their nation in the first place? Second, how is this readiness connected to increased war severity? By addressing these questions in turn, we might begin to explain why nationalism is often associated with more vicious wars.

Stern (1995, 225) argues that individuals are prepared to give their lives for their nation because leaders convince them through various means to identify with the nation and associate it with emotions and norms they normally express only toward primary groups. By constructing the nation as an object of primordial attachment and manipulating the resulting emotional reactions and social pressures, leaders can mobilize citizens for war. To ensure that citizens are
ready to make the ultimate sacrifice, they tie national identity symbolically to the groups to which people have the strongest and most primordial ties for which they are already willing to sacrifice (Stern 1995, 229-230). The nation becomes a “spiritual family” (Renan 1996, 52). The ubiquitous use of words and phrases like “mother tongue,” “fatherland,” “brothers in arms,” and “defending the homeland” is one method of creating this “imagined national family.” However, these efforts must cause national identity to supersede other identities, especially if the latter demand that the sacrifice not be made (Stern 1995, 229).

If individuals are predisposed to fight and die for their families’ well-being and if the nation is successfully equated with a family, then it is logical to expect individuals to be inclined to sacrifice for their nation if necessary. Once people see their fellow nationals as kin, they empathize with them and gladly sacrifice for them, just as they would for a family member (Stern 1995, 230). Furthermore, nations provide individuals with a sense of identity, meaning, and security, just as families do (Langman 2006). When threats or attacks from “others” generate uncertainty about the continuation of these psychological benefits, greater loyalty is felt toward the nation (or the family) and the desire to sacrifice emerges. This explains why people often act in the national interest, even when it is not necessarily in their immediate interest.

If these “nationalist persuasion campaigns” are successful (in that citizens not only accept the existence of the nation, but also have a deep emotional attachment to it), several mechanisms may become operative that increase the severity of interstate war. Most of these processes derive from Snyder’s (2000) theory of violent nationalist conflict under democratization.

First, nationalism leads to greater support for the state and its military policies. It engenders in the domestic population a common desire to protect its state through whatever policies and actions are deemed necessary. This desire is predicated on the notion that, in theory,
all nations have the right to territorial self-determination and as a result of this right, the state should express and ensure the nation’s unique cultural, historical, institutional, and/or ideological characteristics. In other words, nationalism convinces the citizenry that the state is the defender of the national family and that its foreign policies will guarantee the nation’s continued existence and strength. Nationalism also creates consensus regarding the content and details of these foreign policies because it provides the populace with a sense of shared beliefs, attitudes, and goals in regards to the processes and outcomes of international relations. The need to protect national sovereignty, for instance, may entail a realist view of global politics and skepticism of international cooperation. Due to their consistent support for the state and their common outlook on international politics, both citizens and soldiers will be more willing to sacrifice if that means national military objectives will be achieved.

Second, the construction of the national family and the propagation of nationalism are only effective when the “other,” that is, those who are excluded from membership in the nation, are clearly identified and described. This dichotomization between “us” and “them” is essential in that “we” cannot know who or what “we” are without knowing who and what “we” are not. The delineation of certain domestic and foreign groups as devious “outsiders” and thus “enemies of the nation” can easily lead to their discrimination, powerlessness, expulsion, and/or extermination. If these “national enemies” and/or their foreign allies have the ability to resist the nationalist state’s demands, the severity of war should increase. The reasoning is that, with the ability to fight back, even to a small degree, the target can inflict some casualties and other damage upon the nationalist state, thereby adding to the brutality of the conflict.

Third, nationalism leads to biased strategic assumptions. Other nations are portrayed as more threatening, more obstinate, and more liable for historical transgressions, but more easily
defeated than they really are (Snyder 2000, 67). Nationalist leaders tend to juxtapose the weak and evil “them” to the strong and inherently good “us.” The undervaluation of the “national enemies’” military capabilities and determination, combined with the conviction that providence is on the nationalists’ side due to their innate morality, can persuade nationalist leaders to engage in wars that turn out to be more costly in terms of battle deaths than initially anticipated. One may contend that this argument can be extended to contexts other than nationalist ones because many types of leaders employ biased strategic assumptions prior to and during warfare. However, the myths and prejudices inherent in nationalism render its components more persuasive. Nationalist elites can reinforce the image of the enemy as relatively powerless by claiming that they lack the martial and moral virtues that define their superior national character.

Fourth, nationalism creates interests inside and outside the government that wish to maintain the belligerent nationalist rhetoric and its related military policies for their own economic and political benefit. They may have little concern for the actual costs in terms of battle deaths as long as they continue to profit from the conflict (e.g. through more lucrative defense contracts or access to valuable natural resources). Unfortunately, these nationalist groups may wield so much political influence by themselves that the government may downplay the significance of an increasing body count and implement strategies or tactics that may not only prolong the war, but also place more soldiers in the line of fire.

Another consequence of having politically powerful nationalist interest groups is that they have an important role in shaping the content of the national identity and the measures by which that national identity should be protected and reinforced. Their interpretation of the nation as a family and the means of defending national kin may, due to their economic and political
interests, have strong militaristic tendencies. These war-promoting characteristics may help to persuade citizens as to the necessity and glory of sacrifice.

Fifth, nationalism allows elites to undermine any domestic opposition to their foreign policies, whether from political parties or individuals, by depicting them as threats to the “nation” and its interests. Characterizing the opposition as outside the realm of the “nation” and thus untrustworthy renders it less attractive to the public as participants or leaders in the government and contributors to public political discourse. The opposition becomes a smaller menace to the integrity of the state’s nationalist project and in turn, to its military agenda as it can no longer credibly question the construction of the nation and the wisdom of the attendant policies. Leaders can more effectively connect the nation to the family in the desired manner and more easily persuade their citizens to sacrifice.

Finally, citizens are likely to internalize nationalist rhetoric, believing that their national identity, reputation, and self-rule are endangered by foreign “others” and can only survive through significant military action. As a result, they support the aggressive pursuit of national military objectives and believe that their participation and sacrifices may assist in their realization. Hence, they are inclined to inflict large costs on their enemies and are willing to sustain heavy casualties before surrendering. Otherwise, they risk the loss of national prestige or worse, self-rule. The public, spurred on by the elite’s past nationalist rhetoric, demands that the state do everything it can to forestall such an eventuality. The state is caught in a “nationalist bidding war” with its own citizens that it is unable to control completely (Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). It may have little choice but to appease its constituents by instigating and/or prolonging war, supplying soldiers with ever more deadly weapons, implementing risky strategies or tactics, and strengthening military recruitment efforts.
Furthermore, competing elites try to persuade the masses that their party or group alone can effectively formulate and implement the policies necessary to protect the nation from existential threats. These “nationalist bidding wars” among elites, combined with those between the state and the masses, pave the way for unexpectedly more aggressive policies that will only increase the opportunities for soldiers to die for their nation.

Due to mobilized popular energies, the provocation of “national enemies” and their foreign allies, biased strategic assumptions, nationalist interest groups, marginalized political opponents, and “nationalist bidding wars,” nationalist states should fight more severe wars than non-nationalist states. The former not only believe in the necessity of military success for national security, integrity, and reputation and in the high probability of victory despite the increasing wrath of “enemy-others.” They also have soldiers willing to fight to the death because nationalism portrays the nation as a family, unifies the masses through this representation, and excludes political dissent. The presence of nationalism in the initiator or the target should then increase interstate war severity, according to the process depicted in Figure 3. This expectation leads me to the following hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1:** Nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war severity.

**Hypothesis 2:** Nationalism in the target increases interstate war severity.
The combination of the disputants’ respective characteristics may also affect the severity of warfare. If both the initiator and target are nationalistic, then interstate war severity should be greater than if one state or neither of the states is nationalistic. Each side is likely to depict the other as a national threat. Doing so may produce more fatalities as soldiers on both sides are willing to inflict and assume significant costs to protect their national security and power. In other words, the potentially destructive effects of each belligerent’s nationalism are added together in such a way so as to make especially vicious wars even more likely.

If only one state is nationalistic, at least one disputant will depict its opponent as a danger to national self-determination. That state’s leaders will persuade its soldiers that sacrificing their lives may prevent a loss of independence and even secure national benefits. The armed forces of the non-nationalist belligerent will be less emotionally attached to their nation, if they identify
with a nation at all. As a result, they will be less motivated, less committed to the war aims, and less desirous of national military glory through sacrifice. This particular combination will increase battle deaths, though to a lesser degree than if both states are nationalistic. These possibilities direct me to the following hypothesis.

_Hypothesis 3:_ Nationalism in the initiator and target increases interstate war severity more than nationalism in only the initiator or the target.

THE TYPES OF NATIONALISM AND THEIR EFFECT ON WAR SEVERITY

Nationalism is neither homogenous nor unchanging. It has assumed many forms since its birth as elites in different national contexts have altered it to promote their particular military and economic interests. Different nationalisms have defined the “nation,” its goals, and its enemies differently, thereby producing different nationalist dynamics. Recognizing that various forms of nationalism exist and may diversely affect domestic political interactions, I would expect them to have different implications for the elite’s ability to elicit identification with the national family, mobilize popular energies to the tasks of war, incite “national enemies,” disseminate biased strategic assumptions, be persuaded by nationalist interest groups, marginalize political opponents, and satisfy a nationalist public. They should then have distinct effects on the brutality of war.

One methodological problem in examining the effect of different types of nationalism on interstate war severity is the array of contrasting classification schemes (see Breuilly 1993; Gellner 1983; Smith 2001; Snyder 1976; Snyder 2000). A categorization must be chosen that will permit fair tests of the proposed relationship between nationalism and interstate war.
severity. While each classification scheme has its merits and scholars will disagree about their comparative usefulness, I follow the categories of nationalism proposed by Snyder (2000, ch. 2) for two reasons. First, he is one of the two scholars to hypothesize, though implicitly, about the relationship between the different types of nationalism and war severity. Since I expand upon his hypotheses and I want to be consistent with his expectations, I employ his classification scheme. Second, he includes civic and ethnic nationalism, which are often used in case studies to explain the incidence of violent conflict (in contrast to Breuilly 1993 and Snyder 1976, 1990).

Snyder (2000, 69) divides nationalism into four categories on the basis of its collective appeals and criteria for inclusion in the national group. The categories are civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, and counterrevolutionary nationalism, the main characteristics of which are listed in Table 9. According to Snyder (2000, 80), each type of nationalism influences warfare in a distinct manner by producing different types of violent conflict as well as different degrees and patterns of violence, which may affect the viciousness of wars.

---

6 Snyder’s (2000) work is primarily concerned with the relationship between nationalism and the onset of violent conflict in the context of democratizing countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Nationalism</th>
<th>Main Characteristics</th>
<th>Consequences for Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effect on Interstate War Severity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Emphasis on loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective</td>
<td>Cost-conscious foreign policy</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion in the group depends on birth or long-term residence within nation’s territory.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Emphasis on common culture, language, religion, shared historical experience, and/or shared kinship</td>
<td>High conflict until domination of the ethnic homeland is achieved</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion in the national group depends on these criteria.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Emphasis on the defense of a political revolution that brings to power a regime that governs for the nation</td>
<td>Open-ended external conflict</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion in the group depends on support for the political revolution.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Emphasis on resistance to internal factions that seek to undermine the nation’s traditional institutions</td>
<td>Open-ended external conflict</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any social classes, religions, cultural groups, or political ideological opponents that are deemed “enemies of the nation” are excluded from the national group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The descriptions of the variants of nationalism and the proposed consequences for violent conflict are obtained from Snyder (2000).
Snyder (2000, 82) claims that “states embodying civic nationalisms are . . . the most prudent in their foreign relations” and more likely to extricate themselves from costly military ventures. They should then experience less severe wars than do other nationalist states because they tend to participate only in wars which they believe will end with a quick and relatively painless victory. The reasoning is that most mature democracies either have civic nationalism (e.g. the United States) or have had their historic nationalism tempered by civic features (e.g. post-WWII Germany). Since mature democracies permit open criticism of government policies and politicians are concerned about re-election, costly wars are likely to be prevented, terminated, or moderated. Too many coffins would be detrimental to the aggressive prosecution of foreign military policies, as evidenced by the U.S. Defense Department’s attempt to ban photographs of military coffins during the early years of the Iraq War. Mature democracies are often associated with civic nationalism because it is inclusive within the state boundaries and “seeks to accommodate all citizens within a nondiscriminatory legal and institutional framework” (Snyder 2000, 80). These features inform the popular perception that civic nationalism is “rational,” “good,” “benign,” and “desirable,” especially when compared to “violent” and “hateful” ethnic nationalism (Brown 1999). Therefore, states with civic nationalism should have wars with fewer fatalities than those with other forms of nationalism.

However, civic nationalism nevertheless allows elites to connect the nation to the family, increase public support for their military policies, delineate “national enemies,” spread biased strategic assumptions, satisfy nationalist interest groups, limit the appeal of opponents, and wage “nationalist bidding wars.” Thus, civic nationalism can lead to deadlier wars than if there were no nationalism. The following hypotheses derive from these expectations.
**Hypothesis 4:** Civic nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.

**Hypothesis 5:** Civic nationalism in the target increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism should render a state more prone to deadlier wars than civic nationalism because the ethnic nationalist state is less cost-conscious. The potential benefits of war are seen to be greater than the potential costs. If the ethnic nationalist state is victorious, it may maintain its independence and unique national identity or acquire control and possibly sovereignty over territories inhabited by ethnic kin (Snyder 2000, 82). Soldiers in such states should be willing to sacrifice and impose substantial costs on their enemies so that their ethnic group is sufficiently reunited under one political system and protected from “others.” Since the ethnic group is often described in familial terms, these tasks take on a greater importance.

The motivations of ethnic nationalist states for fighting frequently preclude cost considerations. Ethnic nationalism tends to entail issues of culture, language, and religion, which are commonly seen as zero-sum issues and less amenable to compromise. For example, it would be difficult for ethnic nationalists to accept the incorporation of a historically integral piece of their national homeland into the territory of a state dominated by another ethnic group. To do so would imply a potential revision of their national history and as a result, the gradual erosion of the foundational myths of their distinctive national identity. Therefore, capitulation, negotiation, and halfhearted fighting may be deemed unacceptable. The only option is aggressive warfare, despite its costs.
However, the aspirations of ethnic nationalist states have natural limits. An ethnic nationalist state should be less inclined to extremely violent conflict once its goal of a homogenized state, a sustainable pattern of domination, or security from “others” is achieved (Snyder 2000, 82). Its soldiers should be less inclined to sacrifice on the battlefield in the name of the conquest and domination of a large number of “foreigners” since their very presence may threaten the construction and interests of the “national family.” These assertions suggest the following hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 6:** Ethnic nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.

**Hypothesis 7:** Ethnic nationalism in the target increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.

In contrast to ethnic nationalism, the military ambitions of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalisms do not have natural limits and states with these types of nationalism should have the most severe wars. Revolutionary nationalism has two characteristics that differentiate it from other forms of nationalism and make the corresponding states likely to have wars with very high levels of brutality. First, it wants to protect the political revolution from its domestic and foreign enemies. Second, it is preoccupied with “the possibility of spreading the benefits of political transformation to potential revolutionists abroad” (Snyder 2000, 82).
In the eyes of revolutionary nationalists, the revolution is precarious. The popular energy that it unleashes creates a long-term threat to neighboring states. The latter may try to kill the revolution, especially in its infancy, through preventive aggression so as to shield themselves from contagious domestic revolution. This potential military intervention convinces revolutionary nationalists that spreading the revolution to other countries, as in the military campaigns of Napoleonic France, will obtain the security necessary for a successful and enduring revolution. “The revolutionary state’s goals for conquest are not necessarily limited to a finite set of historic or cultural objectives but are spurred by a more open-ended competition for security” (Snyder 2000, 82). This quest for national security demands heightened aggression and greater sacrifice on the part of the revolutionary armed forces.

In contrast to the politically, economically, and socially transformative basis of revolutionary nationalism, counterrevolutionary nationalism arises when threatened elites attempt to fend off internal political, economic, and/or social change by unifying the nation against its external foes. In addition, these elites may try to preserve traditional institutions and their place in them through the exclusion of the putative class, ideological, religious, and cultural enemies of the nation (Snyder 2000, 83). In the 1870s, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck and his fellow ruling elites feared a working-class revolution and demands for a fully democratic political system. Therefore, they appealed to the Protestant middle classes, while labeling the working class, the socialists, the Catholics, and the Poles as the enemies of the “true” German nation (Snyder 2000, 93-94).

This strategy may not only prevent or reverse any domestic change by silencing the voices of revolution, but also enhance the ability of the state to foster national unification. The marginalization of particularly menacing groups would decrease the amount of opposition to the
elite conceptualization of the national family, the resulting domestic and international policies, and the popularly accepted notion of sacrifice. In such a context, the state is more likely to engage in extremely aggressive military action.

Furthermore, like revolutionary nationalism, counterrevolutionary nationalism perpetually needs external enemies to serve as internal unifiers (Snyder 2000, 82). Since counterrevolutionary nationalism is defined by its opposition to any group wanting to undermine the nation’s traditional institutions, its impetus for internal unification comes from the desire to preserve tradition and the status quo. In contrast, revolutionary nationalist states seek domestic unity through the defense of the political revolution. Yet, the constant construction of threatening “others” in both forms of nationalism provides leaders with more opportunities to bring people together through violent international conflict.

Due to these dynamics, states with these types of nationalism lack inherent limits on the methods by which they prosecute their wars. The unlimited nature of their warfare is enhanced by the uncertain future of the revolution or tradition and by the glorification of war and sacrifice as the means of guaranteeing their security. These arguments imply not only that there will be less reluctance in these states to initiating and prolonging war, but also to aggressively pursuing military objectives. This aggression may entail the development of an overly permissive military culture and a cult of self-sacrifice, possibly increasing battle deaths and other atrocities. These features of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism suggest the following hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 8:** Revolutionary or counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism and more so than civic and ethnic nationalism.
Hypothesis 9: Revolutionary or counterrevolutionary nationalism in the target increases interstate war severity relative to no nationalism and more so than civic and ethnic nationalism.

I have no *a priori* expectation of a substantial difference between the effects of revolutionary nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Both depend on the constant identification of external enemies for the maintenance of internal cohesion. In addition, both emphasize war and sacrifice as means to combat the insecurity of the revolution or the status quo. The combination of these characteristics precludes them from having inherent constraints on their military ambitions. The primary difference between revolutionary nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism is their bases for national unification. I see no theoretical reason why this distinction should cause either nationalism to affect interstate war severity more than the other, especially given their similarities.

According to Stern’s (1995) argument about the “national family” and the desire to sacrifice and my extension of Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict, nationalism should increase interstate war severity. However, some forms of nationalism should cause more vicious wars than others. If my hypotheses receive empirical support, it would indicate the theoretical importance of nationalism in understanding the dynamics of war. Such a conclusion would hopefully persuade policymakers and diplomats to consider seriously the deadly consequences of nationalism when crafting their foreign policies and to search for ways to prevent or reduce excessive fatalities and atrocities. Finally, this study would suggest that more cultural and ideological factors should be taken into account in our explanations of interstate war severity.
DATA AND METHODS

The wars in the dataset are from the Correlates of War (COW) Project (Sarkees 2000), but are modified following Slantchev (2004). The COW requirements for system membership are relaxed, and some multilateral wars are disaggregated into a series of smaller ones (i.e. World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War). The relaxed system membership requirements alone add 12 wars to the dataset. The dataset consists of one observation per interstate war, for a total of 104 wars from 1816 to 1991. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the interstate war.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is Deaths, measured as the number of total battle fatalities. The data are primarily from the COW Project, but for those wars excluded from the COW list of interstate and extrastate wars, I consulted Small and Singer (1982) and Clodfelter (2002).\(^7\)

Since Slantchev (2004) divides three multilateral wars into smaller ones, total battle deaths for each smaller war had to be ascertained. I consulted Small and Singer (1982) and Clodfelter (2002) for the battle deaths of each belligerent in each of the major campaigns of World War II and the Vietnam War. I then added the combat fatalities for each campaign’s initiator and target to estimate the total deaths on each battlefront. For example, the total fatalities in the Pacific Theater of World War II are the sum of Japanese and American deaths in that theater.

---

\(^7\) These wars are the Cisplatine War, the War of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, the War of the Cakes, the First British-Afghan War, and the Second Turko-Egyptian War.
Due to data availability issues regarding the Persian Gulf War, I applied the following formula to approximate Iraqi battle fatalities during the invasion of Kuwait and the war against the United States, each of which is considered a separate war in the dataset:

\[
\text{Duration of small war in months} \times \frac{\text{Duration of multilateral war in months}}{\text{Total number of battle deaths}}
\]

Each smaller war’s duration is obtained from Slantchev (2004) and the multilateral war’s duration is the sum of the durations of its component wars. This formula provides a rough calculation of the Iraqi battle deaths in each portion of the multilateral war, especially since it assumes that fatalities occur at a constant rate throughout the war. The battle fatality data for the United States and Kuwait are available through the COW Project.8

Several qualifications should be made regarding the battle death data obtained through sources other than the COW Project. In some cases, the available data included casualties and/or those dead of disease, while in others, information was only accessible for the initiator or target. For the War of the Cakes, various estimates were given so their mean was used. Therefore, the data are approximations as the number of soldiers who gave their lives on the battlefield will never truly be known.

**Independent Variables**

**General Nationalism Variables**

As there is no pre-existing dataset on the incidence of nationalism in general or its many permutations, I constructed my own variables and collected my own data using national histories and reference works on nationalism, governments, and political parties. Following Snyder

---

8 I do not include as separate wars in the dataset those dyads composed of Iraq and the other members of the UN coalition (e.g. the United Kingdom) because I am interested in how nationalism in the primary initiator and target, not the nationalism in “the joiners,” affects interstate war severity.
I define nationalism as “the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.” This definition expands Gellner’s (1983) standard conceptualization of nationalism as the doctrine that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the nation) should be congruent. It allows nations to be organized around characteristics other than culture and recognizes that the aim of nationalism can be something other than a sovereign state.

Nationalism exists in the initiator or target if there is evidence in the historical record that state elites propagated some form of nationalism within five years of the outbreak of war. Such evidence of nationalism is the occurrence of one or more of the following events. First, a politically relevant nationalist party is present. A party is politically relevant if it achieves either a victory in a presidential election, a majority of seats in the national legislature, control of the most prominent cabinet positions, or the ability to affect coalition building. Second, the state implements laws limiting the rights, freedoms, and activities of groups not considered part of the “nation.” Such laws could be restrictions on citizenship rights, use of a native language, membership in specific cultural or religious organizations, and/or political participation. Third, there is significant internal or external violence justified by the state via nationalism. Fourth, the state takes other military actions that it contends will protect the “nation” (e.g. troop mobilization or increased weapons procurement). See Appendix B for my coding of nationalism in the initiator and target of each interstate war and Appendix C for an example of my coding procedures.

**Initiator Nationalism** is coded as 1 if the initiator had some form of nationalism within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. **Target Nationalism** is coded as 1 if the
target had some form of nationalism within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Three variables allow me to test the proposition that increasing dyadic nationalism renders an interstate war more deadly. **No Nationalist Sides** equals 1 if neither state in the dyad is nationalistic and 0 otherwise. **One Nationalist Side** equals 1 if only one state in the dyad is nationalistic and 0 otherwise. **Two Nationalist Sides** equals 1 if both states in the dyad are nationalistic and 0 otherwise.

**Specific Nationalism Variables**

I disaggregate the general nationalism variables above into separate variables representing civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Definitions for these nationalisms derive from Snyder (2000, 70) and are based on the criteria for national membership and the nature of collective appeals.

---

9 I encountered several problematic cases while coding countries for their incidence of nationalism. First, there were states with pan-nationalism. This type of nationalism poses a coding problem because it may challenge the existence of the state in which its proponents reside. Until 1967, Arab nationalism aimed to make the state and nation congruent, which would have dissolved many Arab states. Because the state does not adequately represent the nation, pan-nationalism may render soldiers less willing to sacrifice for the state’s military objectives. On the other hand, this form of nationalism may generate support for the state’s military policies if the masses unite behind the pan-nationalist cause and perceive aggressive fighting as a means of achieving its goals. Pan-nationalism may also alienate “national enemies” and their allies, promote biased strategic assumptions, create and maintain nationalist interest groups, justify political opponents’ marginalization, and provoke “nationalist bidding wars.”

The two cases of pan-nationalism were pan-Italianism and pan-Arabism. I did not code any state as nationalist unless state elites espoused pan-nationalist sentiment. No state was classified as having Italian nationalism because the major supporters of pan-Italianism were among the intelligentsia and the masses. In addition, the governments in question were either ruled by incoherent monarchies (e.g. Naples), revolutionary regimes (e.g. the Roman Republic), the Vatican, or realists (e.g. Count Camillo di Cavour, prime minister of Sardinia). I considered Egypt prior to its wars with Israel (except the 1973 war), Syria, and Iraq in the early 1990s as Arab nationalist, but coded them as having an “other” form of nationalism.

The second difficult case was Turkey during its war of independence (1919-1920). It was unclear whether the dissolving Ottoman Empire or Mustafa Kemal’s Turkish resistance movement was the effective government prior to the wars. It was the resistance movement which fought France and Greece, but the Ottoman Empire was not officially extinct. If Kemal’s movement is considered the effective government, then Turkey was ethnic nationalist. If it was the Ottoman Empire, then Turkey was not nationalist because the state was in disarray. I coded Turkey as ethnic nationalist because it was Kemal’s movement that engaged in military conflict and I presume that if his movement was not considered the government, this war would not be in the COW Project’s interstate war dataset.
Civic nationalism emphasizes loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that promote justice, tolerance, and the rule of law and includes in the nation anyone born or who has lived for a long time within the national territory (Snyder 2000, 70). Thus, it is the most inclusive nationalism as its requirements for national membership are fairly easy to fulfill. Civic nationalism often occurs in democracies and may be considered a proxy for democracy. I coded a state as civic nationalist if citizenship was based on birth or a process of naturalization, if the rule of law and fair political institutions played a prominent role in national life, and if there was a national desire to ensure liberty, tolerance, individual rights, and equal justice under the law. Civic Initiator Nationalism and Civic Target Nationalism are coded as 1 if the initiator and the target had civic nationalism, respectively, within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Post-revolutionary France is an example of a civic nationalist state.

Ethnic nationalism stresses the importance of common culture, language, religion, historical memory, and/or kinship in constructing and maintaining the nation. It excludes anyone who does not have the necessary cultural, linguistic, religious and/or ethnic attributes (Snyder 2000, 70). If the government favored one culture, language, religion, and/or ethnicity through laws, educational opportunities, business contracts, and/or patronage, that country may be ethnic nationalist. However, for the state to qualify, the historical record must also indicate that national membership depended on cultural, linguistic, religious, and/or ethnic criteria and the political elite emphasized the intrinsic superiority and uniqueness of the associated group. The fulfillment of the above criteria may point to a state controlled by a dominant ethnic group. Ethnic Initiator Nationalism and Ethnic Target Nationalism are coded as 1 if the initiator and the target were ethnic nationalist, respectively, within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Nazi Germany is a prominent example of an ethnic nationalist state.
Revolutionary nationalism frames national defense and self-rule in terms of protecting a revolutionary political regime. It excludes anyone from national membership that threatens the revolutionary regime’s stability (Snyder 2000, 70). I coded a state as revolutionary nationalist if it denied national membership to any group it believed was trying to undermine the political revolution and if it implemented discriminatory laws or instigated violence against these groups in order to preserve the revolutionary regime. As these criteria imply, a state resulting from a revolutionary victory is more likely to be revolutionary nationalist than other states.

Revolutionary Initiator Nationalism and Revolutionary Target Nationalism equal 1 if the initiator and the target were revolutionary nationalist, respectively, within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Ethiopia, prior to the Ogaden War, is an example of a revolutionary nationalist state.

Counterrevolutionary nationalism perceives the nation’s well-being as primarily served by resistance to internal factions and external foes seeking to weaken the nation’s traditional political, social, and/or economic institutions. It also excludes from national membership any social classes, religions, cultural groups, or adherents to “alternative” political ideologies that might change the status quo (Snyder 2000, 70). I coded a state as counterrevolutionary nationalist if the political elites described the nation with reference to the past, traditional institutions, the status quo, and/or social convention. For a state to be considered counterrevolutionary nationalist, the elite had to employ nationalism in an attempt to maintain their dominant positions, forestall political or social change, and/or protect the nation from “revolutionary” ideologies. The exclusion from the nation of anyone who opposed the establishment also indicated counterrevolutionary nationalism. Counterrevolutionary Initiator Nationalism and Counterrevolutionary Target Nationalism equal 1 if the initiator and the
target were counterrevolutionary nationalist, respectively, within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Benito Mussolini’s Italy is an example of a counterrevolutionary nationalist state.

A “no nationalism” variable is the base category in the empirical analysis.\textsuperscript{10} The four variables of nationalism and the categories of nationalism they represent are exhaustive. However, I recognize that the coding of the specific types of nationalism is not always unambiguous and in many cases, require a judgment call that could be challenged. Table 10 provides some descriptive statistics regarding each form of nationalism and the base category of “no nationalism” for the initiators and targets of the interstate wars in the dataset. For the initiators, ethnic nationalism is the most frequent category and revolutionary nationalism is the least frequent one. In contrast, the target is more often than not lacking in nationalist sentiment. But if it does exhibit nationalistic tendencies, it tends to be of the civic variety.

\textsuperscript{10} There were cases in which nationalism existed, but did not conform to the categories of nationalism in my typology. I coded them as having an “other” form of nationalism, instead of categorizing them as non-nationalist. Choosing the latter course would have resulted in inaccurate data in that these cases were clearly instances of nationalism (for example, pan-nationalism or anti-imperialist nationalism). While the dyads with these “other nationalist” states are included in the empirical analysis of the relationship between generalized nationalism and interstate war severity, they are dropped from the empirical analysis of the relationship between the specific types of nationalism and interstate war severity, decreasing the number of observations in the latter model to 86.
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of the Types of Nationalism among Initiators and Targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage of Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiator</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary nationalism</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary nationalism</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalism</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No nationalism</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary nationalism</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary nationalism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalism</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No nationalism</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the historical record indicated a state evinced multiple types of nationalism, I used the most prominent and influential one in coding that state’s nationalism. If more references were made to the characteristics of one type of nationalism than another, the country was coded as having the former nationalism.11

For example, after the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union possessed revolutionary nationalism as it eliminated from the “pays legal” all members of the propertied classes and the clergy. In the 1922 constitution, it disenfranchised propertied society, people who hired labor, kulaks, priests, and White army officers (Suny 1997, 146). The emphasis on the communist

---

11 I do not estimate the effect of the presence of multiple state-level nationalisms on interstate war severity because of the relative scarcity of this phenomenon. Out of the 104 interstate wars in the dataset, only five initiators and two targets could be coded as having multiple forms of nationalism. Furthermore, of these seven states, four of them are the Soviet Union. Needless to say, there is too little variation for meaningful conclusions to be drawn about the impact of multiple state-level nationalisms on interstate war severity.
revolution’s protection from the capitalist powers continued throughout the first half of the twentieth century. However, Soviet leaders sometimes employed ethnic nationalist rhetoric and imagery to mobilize the citizens to the defense of the communist experiment. From 1936 to 1938, Josef Stalin purged the minority nationalities in a campaign of mass terror because he saw the Russian people as the true guardians of Marxism and would not accept “nationalist deviators,” “bourgeois nationalists,” or “counterrevolutionary-Trotskyite-diversionist-espionage” individuals or parties (Snyder 1976, 216). Because Soviet leaders used Russian ethnic nationalism primarily as a means of securing communism and because this policy was inconsistently implemented, I consider the Soviet Union to be revolutionary nationalist rather than ethnic nationalist.

Control Variables

In order to draw accurate conclusions regarding the statistical relationship between nationalism and its variants and the severity of interstate war, I include five control variables, all measured according to Slantchev (2004, 818-819). Total Population Reserves measures the total size of the populations (in billions) of the warring sides using the immediate pre-war numbers. Total Military Personnel measures the total size of the armies involved (in thousands of personnel) using the immediate pre-war numbers. Larger populations and militaries mean that more soldiers can potentially be sent into battle and the belligerents can worry less about conserving their fighting strength. As the number of soldiers on the battlefield increases, battle deaths should rise.

Terrain measures the difficulty of terrain over which the majority of battles in a war are fought, using the procedures in Stam (1999). Higher values represent tougher terrains, such as
steep mountains or dense jungles, which should be related to less severe wars because the movement of vehicles becomes more challenging, forcing both sides to deploy in relatively small units. The number of soldiers involved per engagement is reduced and thus fewer soldiers are killed. Lower values indicate flat terrain or desert areas, which should correlate with more severe wars. Vehicles and troops can be more easily transported, raising the number of soldiers involved per engagement. In addition, the topography provides no cover or concealment, making it easier to target the opponent (Lacina 2006, 281-282).

**Number of States** indicates the total number of states in each war. Cioffi-Revilla (1991) argues that the number of states fighting and battle fatalities are positively related and that this relationship is found in all great power wars after 1815. However, Moul (1994, 164) disagrees with his statistical methods and contends that “[k]nowing the extent of a war provides little purchase on the numbers killed fighting a war.” These conflicting hypotheses lead me to no *a priori* expectation regarding the effect of the number of states on interstate war severity.

**Democratic Initiator** uses POLITY IV’s “institutionalized democracy” score to classify democracies (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). It ranges from 0 to 10, but I employ a dummy variable version that equals 1 if the democracy score was greater than or equal to 6 and 0 otherwise. Democracies should be less likely than autocracies to have severe wars because democratic leaders are inclined to be more selective in their foreign aggression, especially towards other democracies. They tend to initiate wars that they think they can win quickly with minimal casualties (which are unlikely to occur when confronting other democracies) so as to avoid public backlash and ensure their political survival (Bennett and Stam 1996; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003; Siverson 1995).
**Statistical Models**

Since the dependent variable is the number of battle fatalities during an interstate war, I use an event-count model.\(^{12}\) Event-counts modify the basic regression model using maximum likelihood estimators and by accounting for both distribution and a continuous underlying process (Krain 1997, 344; King 1989b, 128). Events such as battle deaths are usually not independent of each other and cannot be assumed to have a distribution like that of a dependent variable in an OLS regression, especially since they are unable to take on negative values or, in some cases, zero (see Krain 1997, 344). Since OLS regression models presume that negative and zero values are included in the distribution of events, using these estimation procedures yields “surprisingly large inefficiencies and nonsensical results” (King 1989a, 126). Furthermore, estimates may be biased and/or inconsistent (Long and Freese 2006, 349).

I employ a zero-truncated negative binomial event-count model for two reasons. First, it is designed for data in which observations with an outcome of zero are excluded from the sample. Second, if overdispersion exists and a Poisson model is used, the estimated $\beta$s will be biased and inconsistent. In addition, the estimated probabilities will be biased (Long and Freese 2006, 382-383). The dependent variable **Deaths** exhibits serious overdispersion. Its mean is 236,422, while its variance is $1.25 \times 10^{12}$. The likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis $H_0: \alpha = 0$ for each model shows strong overdispersion, indicating that the correlation between events is substantial. Based on these results, the Poisson model is inappropriate because it assumes that events are independent and the variance and mean of the dependent variable are equal.

---

\(^{12}\) According to the COW Project, a military conflict can only be considered a war when battle fatalities are equal to or greater than 1,000. However, some wars in my dataset have estimated battle deaths less than 1,000. I tested the robustness of my results by excluding these cases. Doing so did not change coefficient direction, magnitude, or significance.
First, I estimate the zero-truncated negative binomial event-count model with Initiator Nationalism and Target Nationalism, the general nationalism variables for the initiator and the target, included. Second, to determine the effect on interstate war severity of dyads containing no nationalist states, one nationalist state, or two nationalist states, I add One Nationalist Side and Two Nationalist Sides to the model. I exclude Initiator Nationalism and Target Nationalism from this specification because both are highly correlated with One Nationalist Side and Two Nationalist Sides. No Nationalist Sides is the base category. Third, I assess the effect of different types of nationalism in the initiator and target on interstate war severity.

RESULTS

The summary statistics in Table 11 provide an initial description of the relationship between nationalism and the severity of interstate war. They show that wars with nationalist initiators have a substantially higher average number of battle deaths than wars with non-nationalist initiators. But, the accuracy of this conclusion may be affected by the presence of outliers (e.g. World War I and the Great Patriotic War between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany). The median may be a more useful statistic due to its resistance to outliers. I can still infer that wars with nationalist initiators are far deadlier than those with non-nationalist initiators. The median number of battle deaths is considerably higher for the former than the latter. My preliminary conclusion that there appears to be a relationship between nationalism and the severity of interstate war is further bolstered by the observation that wars with a nationalist target have a noticeably higher mean and median number of battle deaths than wars with non-nationalist targets. However, these statistics do not present any solid evidence as to the direction, magnitude, and strength of the proposed relationship.
Table 11. Battle Death Statistics with Nationalist and Non-Nationalist States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All wars</td>
<td>236,422</td>
<td>1,118,552</td>
<td>9,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No nationalist initiator</td>
<td>23,385</td>
<td>60,140</td>
<td>7,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist initiator</td>
<td>318,795</td>
<td>1,309,751</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No nationalist target</td>
<td>30,218</td>
<td>68,456</td>
<td>5,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist target</td>
<td>450,712</td>
<td>1,574,994</td>
<td>19,283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The models in Table 12 provide the necessary information. The first model includes the variables for nationalism in the initiator and target, as well as the control variables. Initiators that promote nationalism prior to an interstate war fight significantly deadlier wars than initiators that do not, in line with Hypothesis 1 (\( p = 0.004 \) using a one-tailed test). A nationalist initiator increases the expected number of battle fatalities by a factor of 2.81, holding all other variables constant.\(^{13}\) Nationalism in the target also significantly increases battle deaths, supporting Hypothesis 2 (\( p = 0.033 \)). A nationalist target raises the expected number of battle fatalities by a factor of 2.13, holding all other variables constant. More military personnel, more belligerents, and surprisingly tougher terrain significantly increase battle fatalities, while democratic initiators are associated with significantly less deadly wars.

\(^{13}\) The factor change is calculated by taking the exponential of the coefficient.
Table 12. The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate War Severity: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Regression Models, Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiator nationalism</td>
<td>1.033***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.391)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target nationalism</td>
<td>0.754**</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.409)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One nationalist side</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.931**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.435)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two nationalist sides</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.783***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.487)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population reserves</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>-0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.150)</td>
<td>(2.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total military personnel</td>
<td>0.0003***</td>
<td>0.0004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
<td>4.275***</td>
<td>4.218***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.792)</td>
<td>(0.769)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states</td>
<td>0.251***</td>
<td>0.248***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic initiator</td>
<td>-1.231***</td>
<td>-1.233***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.350)</td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.848***</td>
<td>5.920***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.582)</td>
<td>(0.564)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(alpha)</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>0.730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>210.36</td>
<td>209.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob.&gt; $\chi^2$</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1184.7367</td>
<td>-1184.8389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-tailed tests *$p<0.10$, **$p<0.05$, ***$p<0.01$

The second model uses an alternative operationalization of nationalism in the warring dyad. **One Nationalist Side** and **Two Nationalist Sides** measure whether nationalism in only one state or both states in the dyad increase interstate war severity compared to the complete
absence of nationalism. Hypothesis 3 finds support. If nationalism is present in only one state, the expected number of battle deaths increases by a factor of 2.54, holding all other variables constant. But, if it is present in both states, the expected number of battle deaths increases by a factor of 5.95. More nationalism in the warring dyad leads to more fatalities. Therefore, it is important for scholars to consider how belligerents’ nationalisms can combine to produce certain international conflict behaviors. Based on these findings, I conclude that nationalism in general significantly increases the severity of violent international conflict.14

Disaggregating nationalism into its variants indicates that some forms of nationalism increase interstate war severity, while others do not, as shown in Table 13. Holding all other variables constant, ethnic nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator significantly increase the expected number of battle deaths by a factor of 2.70 and 2.32, respectively. Hypothesis 6 finds support in that ethnic nationalism in the initiator increases the severity of interstate war relative to no nationalism. Furthermore, it can be concluded that ethnic nationalism has a greater positive effect on the brutality of war than civic nationalism due to the latter’s insignificant negative coefficient. Hypothesis 8 is somewhat confirmed because counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator increases battle deaths more than no nationalism.

14 I ran some robustness checks to ensure that this conclusion is accurate. First, I tested whether nationalism’s effect on battle deaths is contingent on the time period. There are two reasons for this hypothesis. Nationalism did not become a global phenomenon until the twentieth century and advancements in military tactics and technology throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g. mass armies, railroads, the machine gun, tanks, guided missiles, guerrilla warfare) allowed soldiers to inflict greater fatalities on their enemies and raised the probability of their own demise. It is possible that, over time, wars should have become more destructive. I interacted all of the general nationalism variables with a variable indicating the year that the interstate war began. None of the interaction terms were significant, but two nationalism variables, Initiator Nationalism and Two Nationalist Sides, remained significant with positive coefficients. I also estimated Model 1 and 2 separately for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this case, all of the nationalism variables were significant and in the expected direction during the twentieth century, but not the nineteenth century. Thus, it appears that the influence of nationalism on interstate war severity is not unequivocally conditional on time. Second, I estimated two OLS regression models with the dependent variable being the natural log of battle deaths. In this case, the coefficients for Target Nationalism, One Nationalist Side, and Two Nationalist Sides were positive and significant. Based on these results, I can be fairly confident in the validity of my inference that nationalism increases the severity of interstate war.
and civic nationalism, but not more than ethnic nationalism. In terms of the target, revolutionary nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism both significantly increase the expected number of battle fatalities relative to no nationalism, the former by a factor of 3.69 and the latter by a factor of 9.16, holding all other variables constant. It appears that counterrevolutionary nationalism in the target has the largest positive effect of all nationalisms. Hypothesis 9 is then only partially supported because there seems to be a substantial difference in the magnitude of effect between revolutionary nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism in the target.

Surprisingly, revolutionary nationalism in the initiator significantly decreases battle fatalities, contrary to Hypothesis 8. An explanation for this negative coefficient is not apparent, given revolutionary nationalism’s supposed tendency for unlimited warfare. Revolutionary nationalism in the initiator reduces the expected number of battle fatalities by a factor of 0.43, holding all other variables constant. The other initiator and target nationalisms do not influence interstate war severity, refuting the remaining hypotheses. For the most part, nationalism, when disaggregated into its various forms, does not unambiguously affect the brutality of war.
Table 13. The Effect of Specific Nationalisms on War Severity: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Regression Model, Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic initiator nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.602)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic initiator nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.519)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary initiator nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.529)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary initiator nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.492)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic target nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic target nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.482)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary target nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.566)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary target nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.838)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.725)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic initiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.535)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.557)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(alpha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob.$&gt;\chi^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-tailed tests. *$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$
Nonetheless, the specific nationalism variables as a whole are important for explaining the deadliness of war. A block log-likelihood ratio test shows that these variables as a group significantly improve the model of interstate war severity. The difference in the log-likelihoods is significant at the 0.07 level, indicating that these variables’ exclusion would substantially decrease the model’s explanatory power. Yet, the block log-likelihood test does not specify how these types of nationalism affect the violence of interstate war.

Three conclusions emanate from the results of Model 3. First, counterrevolutionary nationalism increases battle fatalities. Second, the other forms of nationalism have an unclear relationship to interstate war severity. Third, nationalism as a whole is associated with interstate war severity, though in an ambiguous and complex manner, necessitating further study.

CONCLUSION

My theoretical argument centers on the claim that nationalism creates soldiers who are willing to die for their nation and as a result, increases the brutality of interstate wars. It combines Stern’s (1995) proposed relationship between the nation, the family, and the desire to sacrifice with an extension of Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict. Due to elite persuasion campaigns that construct the nation as a “family,” individuals have the same emotions and norms toward the nation that they ordinarily have for other primary groups. The most important of these norms is dying for the family’s well-being, which translates into a willingness to sacrifice for the national interest.

But, the successful portrayal of the nation as a family can produce serious domestic and international consequences. I argue that several mechanisms can arise from these “nationalist persuasion campaigns” that increase interstate war severity. Nationalism can mobilize popular
energies to the tasks of war, provoke the wrath of “national enemies” and their foreign allies, lead to biased strategic assumptions, create domestic interest groups that favor aggressive foreign policies, permit the suppression of domestic opposition groups, and spur “nationalist bidding wars.” Consequently, nationalism encourages violent aggression toward national enemies, increasing battle deaths.

The results of the statistical analysis substantiate these claims and demonstrate that the conventional wisdom on the deadliness of nationalist conflicts is accurate. Nationalism is theoretically and empirically important to understanding interstate war severity because it leads to a greater loss of life. I find that nationalism in the initiator and nationalism in the target both significantly increase interstate war severity. Fatalities rise further when both belligerents can be described as nationalistic. However, the effect of nationalism on war severity depends on the type of nationalism. For example, in terms of the initiator, ethnic nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism significantly increase battle deaths (with the former having a larger effect), while revolutionary nationalism actually decreases them. Civic nationalism in the initiator has no effect.

These findings suggest that further consideration should be given to the potential influence of nationalism and other cultural and ideological variables on international conflict behavior and resolution, especially given the relative scarcity of such studies in international relations (Cederman 2002). Most studies of interstate war severity focus on the relationship between the brutality of war and regime type, the number of participants, terrain, conflict duration, and total population size. While these explanations are informative, they ignore how nationalism creates soldiers who die willingly for their nation and unleashes domestic dynamics.
that contribute to destructive wars. This is despite the fact that in many case studies, nationalism has been shown to be significant in the initiation and onset of violent international conflict.

This study is the first that quantitatively measures nationalism and examines its statistical relationship to interstate war severity. Future research may uncover a different relationship since this analysis can be improved and refined. Nonetheless, investigating the effects of nationalism on the deadliness of war is a research agenda that merits greater attention. Not only will the popular belief that nationalism promotes extremely violent wars be thoroughly scrutinized, but we will more completely understand why some wars are so deadly, compared to others. By following this path of inquiry, the global community will better appreciate nationalism’s powerful influence on the course of international conflict and may be able to develop more effective policies that limit human suffering during wartime.
Wars vary significantly in their duration. Some conclude within a few days (e.g. the Six-Day War), while others drag on for almost a decade (e.g. the Vietnam War). Fortunately, from the standpoint of conflict resolution, we know quite a bit about what contributes to this considerable disparity in the length of international conflicts. For example, large military capabilities, difficult terrain, punishment strategies, and military power parity increase interstate war duration (Bennett and Stam 1996; Slantchev 2004). Democracies are less likely to engage in long wars because their governments fear eroding public support (Bennett and Stam 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002). However, the role of nationalism in a state’s decision to continue fighting has yet to be considered, even though it has been shown to be important in interstate conflict initiation and onset (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Snyder 2000; Woodwell 2007). If nationalism increases the propensity for states to participate in and initiate interstate wars, it should also influence how long armies remain on the battlefield.

Building upon Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict under democratization, I argue that nationalism may not only justify involvement in an interstate war on the grounds of protecting the integrity and security of the “nation” from dangerous “others,” but may also produce several mechanisms that extend war involvement. Nationalism mobilizes popular energies to the tasks of war, provokes the wrath of “national enemies” and their foreign allies, leads to biased strategic assumptions, empowers domestic interest groups that favor protracted
military engagements, permits the suppression of opposition groups, and provides the necessary conditions for “nationalist bidding wars” among political elites and between these elites and the masses. In other words, an environment is created in which government leaders find it fairly easy to prolong an international conflict in the hope of attaining ultimate victory. However, different forms of nationalism may not have similar effects on states’ propensity for continued war participation. Different nationalisms may influence the course and duration of interstate conflict in different ways and to different degrees.

The purpose of this study is to extend Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict to the question of interstate war duration, and then derive and test specific hypotheses about the relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration. I also propose to move beyond the nonrandom sample of case studies that has characterized hypothesis testing in regards to nationalism and war initiation and onset. I test my expectations using data I collected on the existence and type of nationalism in the initiator and target states in each interstate war from 1816 to 1991. I thus evaluate the popular notion that nationalism propels states to fight to the last man.

Contrary to expectations, I find that nationalism in the initiator significantly decreases the duration of interstate war, while nationalism in the target insignificantly increases it. But if the analysis is limited to the twentieth century, both of these relationships are statistically significant, implying that the aggressiveness of soldiers on the battlefield combined with advanced military technologies may be important in understanding the relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration. When nationalism is disaggregated into its civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary variants, I find little evidence that any specific type of nationalism systematically lengthens interstate war. For the most part, my findings challenge existing
conceptions of nationalism’s impact on this dimension of international conflict behavior, though it appears that nationalism played a larger role in determining the duration of interstate war in the twentieth than in the nineteenth century.

These results are valuable for three reasons. First, they refine our theoretical and empirical knowledge of the determinants of interstate war duration by demonstrating the limited role of nationalism and reinforcing the significance of military power parity, terrain, contiguity, and democracy as explanatory variables. As a result, they undermine Snyder’s (2000) argument that nationalism is essential to an accurate explanation of international conflict behavior. Second, they suggest that scholars must be careful when considering the incorporation of cultural and ideological variables into their theories and statistical assessments of the dynamics of international conflict because such variables may not always be informative. Third, they indicate that containing international conflict through a reduction of nationalist sentiment among the belligerents may be unrealistic.

This chapter is organized as follows. The first section expands upon the causal mechanisms outlined in Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict and thereby delineates the connection between general nationalism and interstate war duration. The second section disaggregates nationalism into its various permutations and explains why the length of war depends on the particular form of nationalism articulated by the state. Overall, nine hypotheses are given. The third section describes the dataset, the operationalization of the variables, and the statistical models. The fourth section presents the results of the statistical analyses and discusses the findings.
According to some scholars, there is a relationship between the degree of nationalism within a state and that state’s propensity for war. Mansfield and Snyder (1995; 2002; 2005) determine that, in emerging democracies, belligerent nationalism, propagated via elite persuasion campaigns, increases the probability that the state will experience violent conflict. Similarly, Snyder (2000) offers a series of case studies suggesting that democratization creates incentives for elites to promote nationalism, which in turn increases the likelihood that the state will engage in war. Nationalism may also foster violent international conflict in established democracies as Fousek (2000), Hixson (2008), and Lieven (2004) all argue that nationalism rendered the United States more likely to participate in warfare throughout its history. Confining their analysis to only one form of interstate conflict and one geographical region, Saideman and Ayres (2008) emphasize the central role of nationalism in the prevalence of irredentism in five formerly communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Woodwell (2007) concludes, through quantitative analysis and case studies, that nationalism is instrumental in the instigation of militarized interstate disputes among dyads involving transborder nationalities. However, these studies focus on nationalism’s role in the onset or initiation of war without adequately hypothesizing or analyzing the effects of nationalism on the duration of war. Yet, we can extend some of the proffered theories in ways that address the question of interstate war duration.

Nationalism should influence all aspects of international conflict behavior, not just the probability of war onset or initiation. It should also compel armies to fight as long as is necessary to obtain military victory and thus the safety of the national family. When political elites disseminate nationalism effectively among the masses through rhetoric, imagery, laws, and
other actions in the course of a war, several mechanisms may arise that increase interstate war
duration. These processes are a natural consequence of Snyder’s (2000) theory of violent
nationalist conflict under democratization.

First, nationalism, defined as the doctrine that a people who perceive themselves as
distinct should rule themselves in a political system that defends their distinctiveness, leads to
greater support for the state and its military policies. It provides the domestic population with
the common desire to protect its state through whatever policies and actions are required. This
desire is predicated on the notion that, in theory, all nations have the right to territorial self-
determination and as a result, the state should express and ensure the nation’s unique cultural,
historical, institutional, and/or ideological characteristics. If it does so, defending the nation
means defending the state.

In addition, nationalism creates agreement on the content and details of the state’s
military policies by endowing the populace with a sense of shared beliefs, attitudes, and goals in
regards to the processes and outcomes of international relations. The need to protect national
sovereignty, for instance, may entail a realist view of global politics and skepticism of
international cooperation. Due to their constant support for the state and their common
orientation toward international politics, the masses will be less inclined to demand the reversal
of belligerent military policies once they have been implemented. In other words, once a war has
begun, a nationalist participant will be less likely to acquiesce, withdraw, or admit defeat,
thereby prolonging the war.

Second, the propagation of nationalism is only possible when the “other,” that is, those
who are excluded from membership in the nation, are clearly identified and described.
Unambiguous boundaries have to be constructed that differentiate compatriots from foreigners.
This dichotomization between “us” and “them” is essential in that “we” cannot know who “we” are or what “we” stand for without knowing who “we” are not and what “we” oppose. For example, Americans characterize themselves as individualistic, not communitarian, and therefore tend to marginalize social democrats by claiming that they sympathize with godless communists and are inherently un-American. The delineation of certain domestic and foreign groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, rival great powers) as devious “outsiders” and “enemies of the nation” can easily lead to their discrimination, disarmament, powerlessness, expulsion, and/or extermination. If these “national enemies” and/or their foreign allies have the ability to resist the nationalist state’s demands, even to a small degree, they will be less likely to acquiesce, negotiate, or accept defeat relatively quickly, increasing the duration of war.

Third, nationalism leads to biased strategic assumptions. Other nations are portrayed as more threatening, more obstinate, and more liable for historical transgressions, but more easily defeated than they really are (Snyder 2000, 67). Nationalist leaders tend to juxtapose the weak, irresolute, and evil “them” to the strong, resolute, and naturally good “us.” The undervaluation of the “national enemies” military capabilities and determination, combined with the conviction that providence is on the nationalists’ side due to their innate morality, can persuade nationalist leaders to engage in wars that turn out to be not as quickly won as initially expected. They may find, contrary to nationalist propaganda, that their opponents are equally, if not more, capable and desirous of military victory and that they must expend greater resources on the battlefield for a longer period of time if they want to win.

One may contend that this argument can be extended to contexts other than nationalist ones because many types of leaders employ biased strategic assumptions prior to and during warfare. However, the myths and prejudices inherent in nationalism render its components more
persuasive. Nationalist elites can reinforce the image of the enemy as relatively powerless and undetermined by claiming that they lack the martial and moral virtues that define their superior national character.

Fourth, nationalism creates interests inside and outside the government that want to maintain the belligerent nationalist rhetoric and its attendant military policies for their own economic and political benefit. They may not be bothered by an increasingly protracted war and all the costs that it entails in terms of battle fatalities and lost materiel as long as they continue to profit from the conflict (e.g. through more lucrative defense contracts or access to valuable natural resources). Unfortunately, these nationalist groups may wield so much political influence by themselves that the government may not only implement strategies and tactics that prolong the war, but also rationalize these policies by arguing that their application will demonstrate the nation’s unwillingness to surrender when faced with significant threats to national existence.

Fifth, nationalism allows elites to suppress any domestic opposition to their foreign policies, whether from political parties or individuals, by depicting them as threats to the “nation” and its interests. Characterizing the opposition as outside the realm of the “nation” and thus untrustworthy renders it less attractive to the public as participants or leaders in the government. The opposition becomes a smaller menace to the integrity of the state’s nationalist project and in turn, its military agenda as it can no longer credibly question the construction of the nation and the wisdom of the resulting policies. Therefore, the state has less incentive to halt potentially costly military policies (e.g. war) as it appears that there is overwhelming public support for their continuation and maybe even their escalation. For example, Adolf Hitler was able to continue his aggressive military policies, in part, because he used nationalism to justify
the silencing of liberals, Jews, and socialists, whom he portrayed as against the interests of the German *volk* (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 26).

Lastly, citizens are likely to internalize nationalist rhetoric and imagery, believing that their national identity, reputation, and self-rule are endangered by foreign “enemy-others” and can only survive through successful military action. As a result, they expect the constant pursuit of national military victory until it is attained, forcing state elites to maintain the appropriate military policies. To do otherwise would risk the loss of national prestige or worse, self-rule. The public, influenced by the elite-constructed nationalist environment in which they reside, demands that the state do everything it can (e.g. continue to fight) to forestall such an eventuality. The state is caught in a “nationalist bidding war” with its own citizens that it is unable to control completely (Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Snyder 2000). It may have little choice but to appease its constituents by increasing its demands of its enemies; refusing to negotiate a ceasefire, let alone a peace treaty; expanding the scope of the war in terms of belligerents and/or territory; implementing new strategies or tactics that promise eventual victory; and acquiring allies that are not anathema to the state’s nationalists. This “nationalist bidding war” between the elites and the masses is likely to be even more intense when elites are competing amongst themselves for greater nationalist prestige and political power because they will tend to promote more aggressive, expansive, and obstinate policies than they would under

---

15 Lewis (1988) in his discussion of Somali nationalism during the Ogaden War provides an illustration of how citizens support the pursuit of military objectives perceived to be in the “national” interest. He contends that the fighting in the Ogaden became “a national obsession.” “All interest focused on the progress of the war and the unofficial contribution to the war effort had unquestioned priority over all other activities” (236). All aspects of life in Somalia were affected. Government workers left their posts to fight for their ethnic kin in Ethiopia, while day care centers were turned into cottage factories for making uniforms. Radio reports of the war’s progress were followed with such interest that it became impossible to find transistor radios and batteries (236). With this level of domestic support, the political and military elite could be more confident of being able to sustain the war effort, but they probably also felt constrained to continue the fight. However, the Somali armed forces were defeated before conquering the Ogaden, mainly due to Soviet and Cuban military assistance to Ethiopia, not decreasing nationalist sentiment.
different circumstances. As a result of the unrelenting demands of a nationalist public, which are reinforced by the nationalist outbidding of competing elites, the probability that the war will be of considerable length is increased.

Due to mobilized popular energies, the provocation of “national enemies” and their foreign allies, biased strategic assumptions, nationalist interest groups, marginalized political opponents, and the constraints of “nationalist bidding wars,” nationalist states should fight longer wars than non-nationalist states. The former states not only recognize the necessity of military success for the nation’s security, integrity, and reputation and believe in the high probability of victory despite the increasing resentment and potentially considerable military capabilities of “enemy-others.” They also possess the requisite level of citizen support as seen in the intense pressure placed upon political leaders to continue the fight. This is because nationalism unifies the masses through a common identity and ideology and permits the political exclusion of opponents. The presence of nationalism in the initiator or the target should then increase the duration of interstate war, according to the process depicted in Figure 4. This expectation leads me to construct the following hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1:** Nationalism in the initiator increases the duration of interstate war.

**Hypothesis 2:** Nationalism in the target increases the duration of interstate war.
However, the combination of the disputants’ respective characteristics may also affect the continuation of warfare. If both the initiator and target are nationalistic, then the duration of interstate war should be longer than if one state or neither of the states is nationalistic. Each side is likely to portray the other as a national threat. Such a depiction will persuade the citizens in both states to support a sustained war effort so as to achieve a peace agreement that will fully protect their political autonomy and unique national identity. Since both states desire a settlement favorable to their national welfare, the probability of early concessions or substantive negotiations is significantly reduced. In other words, the obstinacy inherent in the initiator’s nationalism combines with that in the target’s nationalism in such a way so as to make long wars even more likely.
If only one state is nationalistic, at least one disputant will portray its opponent as a danger to national self-determination. That state’s leaders will convince their soldiers and citizens that they must continue the fight, regardless of the costs, until they are victorious. To do otherwise would jeopardize their self-rule and the acquisition of national benefits, such as greater international clout. In contrast, the leaders of the non-nationalist belligerent cannot persuasively use the preservation of national sovereignty and identity as an argument for the prolongation of war. Instead, they have to rely on political ideologies (e.g. communism) or issues (e.g. the natural resources of a neighboring territory) that tend not to have the same emotional resonance at the individual level as nationalism. In light of this constraint, it will be difficult for these leaders to sustain effective combat operations without provoking significant domestic opposition. This particular combination will increase the duration of war, though to a lesser degree than if both states are nationalistic. These possibilities direct me to the following hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 3:** Nationalism in the initiator and target increases interstate war duration more than nationalism in only the initiator or the target.

**THE FORMS OF NATIONALISM AND THEIR EFFECT ON WAR DURATION**

Nationalism is neither homogenous nor unchanging. It has assumed many forms since its birth as elites in different national contexts have altered it to promote their particular military, economic, and social interests. Different nationalisms have defined the “nation,” its goals, and its enemies differently, thereby producing different nationalist dynamics. Recognizing that various forms of nationalism exist and may diversely affect domestic political interactions, I would expect them to have different implications for the elite’s ability to mobilize popular
energies to the tasks of war, provoke “national enemies,” formulate biased strategic assumptions, resist the lobbying efforts of nationalist veto groups, suppress any political opposition, and satisfy a nationalist populace. They should then have distinct effects on the continued involvement in war.

One methodological problem in examining the effect of different types of nationalism on interstate war duration is the array of contrasting classification schemes (see Breuilly 1993; Gellner 1983; Smith 2001; Snyder 1976; Snyder 2000). A categorization must be chosen that will fairly test the proposed relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration. While each classification scheme has its merits and scholars will disagree about their comparative usefulness, I follow the categories of nationalism proposed by Snyder (2000, ch.2) for two reasons. First, he hints at a relationship between the different types of nationalism and war duration in the course of explicating the relationship between nationalism and the onset of violent conflict in democratizing countries. Since these suggestions motivate my own theory and expectations regarding this relationship, I employ his classification scheme. Second, he includes civic and ethnic nationalism, which are often used in case studies to explain the incidence of violent conflict (in contrast to Breuilly 1993 and Snyder 1976, 1990).

Snyder (2000, 69) divides nationalism into four categories on the basis of its collective appeals and criteria for inclusion in the national group. The categories are civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, and counterrevolutionary nationalism, the main characteristics of which are listed in Table 14. According to Snyder (2000, 80), each type of nationalism distinctly influences warfare by producing not only different types of violent conflict, but also different degrees and patterns of violence, which may impact the length of wars.
Table 14. The Relationship of the Different Types of Nationalism to Interstate War Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Nationalism</th>
<th>Main Characteristics</th>
<th>Consequences for Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effect on Interstate War Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Emphasis on loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective</td>
<td>Cost-conscious foreign policy</td>
<td>Slight increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion in the group depends on birth or long-term residence within nation’s territory.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Emphasis on common culture, language, religion, shared historical experience, and/or shared kinship</td>
<td>High conflict until domination of the ethnic homeland is achieved</td>
<td>Moderate increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion in the national group depends on these criteria.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Emphasis on the defense of a political revolution that brings to power a regime that governs for the nation</td>
<td>Open-ended external conflict</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion in the group depends on support for the political revolution.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Emphasis on resistance to internal factions that seek to undermine the nation’s traditional institutions</td>
<td>Open-ended external conflict</td>
<td>Large increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any social classes, religions, cultural groups, or political ideological opponents that are deemed “enemies of the nation” are excluded from the national group.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The descriptions of the variants of nationalism and the proposed consequences for violent conflict are obtained from Snyder (2000).
Snyder (2000, 82) claims that “states embodying civic nationalisms are . . . the most prudent in their foreign relations” and more likely to extricate themselves from costly military ventures. They should then experience wars of shorter duration than other nationalist states because they tend to participate only in wars which they believe will end with a quick and relatively painless victory. The reasoning is that most mature democracies either have civic nationalism (e.g. the United States) or have had their historic nationalism tempered by civic features (e.g. post-WWII Germany). Since mature democracies permit open criticism of government policies and politicians are concerned about re-election, lengthy wars are likely to be avoided or terminated. Mature democracies are often associated with civic nationalism because it is inclusive within the state boundaries and “seeks to accommodate all citizens within a nondiscriminatory legal and institutional framework” (Snyder 2000, 80). These features inform the popular perception that civic nationalism is “rational,” “good,” “benign,” and “desirable,” especially when compared to “unreasonable,” “violent,” and “hateful” ethnic nationalism (Brown 1999).

Therefore, states with civic nationalism should engage in shorter wars than those with other forms of nationalism. But, by differentiating between those who believe in tolerance, inclusion, justice, democracy, and the rule of law (the moral “us”) and those who do not (the depraved “them”), civic nationalism still allows elites to increase public support for their military policies, identify “national enemies,” disseminate biased strategic assumptions, satisfy nationalist interest groups, limit the appeal of political opponents, and participate in “nationalist bidding wars.” Thus, civic nationalism can lead to longer wars than if there were no nationalism. The following hypotheses derive from these expectations.
**Hypothesis 4:** Civic nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war duration relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.

**Hypothesis 5:** Civic nationalism in the target increases interstate war duration relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.

Ethnic nationalism should render a state more prone to longer wars than civic nationalism because the ethnic nationalist state is less cost-conscious. The potential benefits of war are seen to be greater than the potential costs. If the ethnic nationalist state is victorious, it may maintain its independence and unique national identity or acquire control and possibly sovereignty over territories inhabited by ethnic kin (Snyder 2000, 82). Leaders of such states will demand that the armed forces continue fighting until they believe that their ethnic group is sufficiently reunited under one political system and protected from “others.”

The motivations of ethnic nationalist states for fighting often preclude cost considerations. Ethnic nationalism tends to entail issues of culture, language, and religion, which are commonly seen as zero-sum issues and less amenable to compromise. For example, it would be difficult for ethnic nationalists to accept the incorporation of a historically integral piece of their national homeland inhabited by ethnic kin into the territory of a state dominated by another ethnic group. To do so would imply a potential revision of their national history and the geographical and psychological boundaries of their national group, resulting in the gradual erosion of the foundational myths of their distinctive national identity. Therefore, capitulation and negotiation may be deemed unacceptable. The only option is warfare, regardless of its costs.
However, the aspirations of ethnic nationalist states have natural limits. An ethnic nationalist state should be less inclined to prolong violent conflict once its goal of a homogenized state, a sustainable pattern of domination, or security from “others” is achieved (Snyder 2000, 82). If leaders of such states tried to persuade their citizens that the fight must continue in the name of the conquest and domination of a large number of “foreigners,” they would most likely encounter indifference, if not outright opposition, especially when the “foreigners’” very presence would threaten the definition and interests of the nation. These assertions lead to the following hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 6:** Ethnic nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war duration relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.

**Hypothesis 7:** Ethnic nationalism in the target increases interstate war duration relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.

In contrast to ethnic nationalism, the military expansionism of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalisms does not have natural limits and states with these types of nationalism should have wars of the longest duration. Revolutionary nationalism has two characteristics that differentiate it from other forms of nationalism and render the corresponding states more likely to have exceptionally long wars. First, it seeks to protect the political revolution from its domestic and foreign enemies. Second, it is preoccupied with “the possibility of spreading the benefits of political transformation to potential revolutionists abroad” (Snyder 2000, 82).
Revolutionary nationalists consider the revolution to be precarious. The popular energy that it unleashes creates a long-term threat to neighboring states. The latter may try to kill the revolution, especially in its infancy, through preventive aggression so that their own populations will not consider revolting themselves. This potential military intervention convinces revolutionary nationalists that spreading the revolution to other countries, as in the military campaigns of Napoleonic France, will ensure a successful and enduring revolution at home. “The revolutionary state’s goals for conquest are not necessarily limited to a finite set of historic or cultural objectives but are spurred by a more open-ended competition for security” (Snyder 2000, 83). This search for national security requires that soldiers and citizens alike must accept the possibility of continuous warfare, even the opening up of new fronts in the war, so that the revolution will not be defeated nor have its domestic ambitions substantially thwarted.

In contrast to the politically, economically, and socially transformative basis of revolutionary nationalism, counterrevolutionary nationalism arises when threatened elites try to prevent domestic political, economic, and/or social change by unifying the nation against its external foes. In addition, these elites may seek to preserve traditional institutions and their dominant positions in them through the exclusion of the putative class, ideological, religious, and cultural enemies of the nation (Snyder 2000, 83). In the 1870s, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck and his fellow ruling elites feared a working-class revolution and demands for a fully democratic political system from an alliance of industrial workers and other mass groups. Therefore, they appealed to the Protestant middle classes for political support, while labeling the working classes, the socialists, the Catholics, and the Poles as the enemies of the “true” German people (Snyder 2000, 93-94).
While counterrevolutionary nationalism differs considerably from revolutionary nationalism in terms of its origins and political consequences, it shares with revolutionary nationalism the perpetual need for external enemies to serve as internal unifiers (Snyder 2000, 83). Since counterrevolutionary nationalism is defined by its opposition to any group wanting to undermine the nation’s established institutions, its impetus for internal unification comes from the desire to preserve tradition and the status quo. In contrast, revolutionary nationalist states seek domestic unity through the defense of the political revolution. Yet, the constant construction of threatening “others” in both forms of nationalism provides leaders with more opportunities to bring people together through violent international conflict.

Due to these dynamics, states with these types of nationalism lack inherent limits on their continued involvement in war. Three characteristics enhance the unlimited nature of their warfare: the uncertain future of the revolution or tradition; the view that defeat, concessions, and even the lack of an overwhelmingly favorable peace settlement are unacceptable if the objective is the security of the revolution or the status quo; and the resulting belief that war must continue until complete national security is achieved. These arguments imply that these states will be less reluctant to initiate and prolong war. These features of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism suggest the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 8: Revolutionary or counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war duration relative to no nationalism and more so than civic and ethnic nationalism.
**Hypothesis 9:** Revolutionary or counterrevolutionary nationalism in the target increases interstate war duration relative to no nationalism and more so than civic and ethnic nationalism.

I have no *a priori* expectation of a substantial difference between the effects of revolutionary nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Both depend on the constant identification of external enemies for the maintenance of internal cohesion. Furthermore, both stress the necessity of relentlessly pursuing military victory in order to overcome the insecurity of the revolution or the status quo. The combination of these characteristics precludes them from having inherent constraints on their military expansionism. The primary difference between revolutionary nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism is their bases for national unification. I perceive no theoretical reason why this distinction should cause either nationalism to affect interstate war duration more than the other, especially in light of their similarities.

According to my extension of Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict, nationalism should prolong interstate war. However, some forms of nationalism should cause lengthier wars than others. If my hypotheses receive empirical support, it would indicate the theoretical importance of nationalism in understanding the behavior of states during wartime. It may then be possible for policymakers, diplomats, and peacekeeping forces to contain international conflict by giving the belligerents incentives to reduce their nationalist rhetoric and actions, or at least transform them into more peaceful forms. Finally, this study would suggest that culture and ideology should have a more prominent place in our explanations of interstate war duration.
DATA AND METHODS

The wars in the dataset are from the Correlates of War (COW) Project (Sarkees 2000), but are modified following Slantchev (2004). The COW requirements for system membership are relaxed, and some multilateral wars are disaggregated into a series of smaller ones (i.e. World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War). The relaxed system membership requirements alone add 12 wars to the dataset. The dataset consists of one observation per interstate war, for a total of 104 wars from 1816 to 1991. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the interstate war.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is Duration, measured as the length of war in months. The data are obtained from Slantchev (2004). The initiation of war is determined by its formal declaration, or, when this is nonexistent, by the beginning of intentional sustained fighting. “[A]n effected armistice, an implemented cease-fire, a preliminary treaty that ends active campaigning, a decisive battle that eliminates the opponent, or a formal capitulation” may signal war termination (Slantchev 2004, 818). The mean war duration is 13.94 months, but the median war duration is only 5.62 months. These statistics reflect a highly skewed distribution, resulting from the low number of observations in the right-hand tail of the distribution. Thirty-four wars last for more than one year and only 19 wars last for more than two years.
Independent Variables

General Nationalism Variables

As there is no pre-existing dataset on the incidence of nationalism in general or its many permutations, I constructed my own variables and collected my own data using national histories and reference works on nationalism, governments, and political parties. Following Snyder (2000, 23), I define nationalism as “the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.” This definition expands upon Gellner’s (1983) standard conceptualization of nationalism as the doctrine that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the nation) should be congruent. It allows nations to be organized around characteristics other than culture (e.g. political ideology) and recognizes that the aim of nationalism can be something other than a sovereign state (e.g. increased regional autonomy).

Nationalism exists in the initiator or target if there is evidence in the historical record that political elites propagated some form of nationalism within five years prior to the outbreak of war. The indicators of nationalism are the same as those described on page 78. Initiator Nationalism is coded as 1 if the initiator had some form of nationalism within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Target Nationalism is coded as 1 if the target had some form of nationalism within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Three variables allow me to test the proposition that increasing dyadic nationalism further prolongs an interstate war. No Nationalist Sides equals 1 if neither state in the dyad is nationalistic and 0 otherwise. One Nationalist Side equals 1 if only one state in the dyad is nationalistic and 0 otherwise. Two Nationalist Sides equals 1 if both states in the dyad are nationalistic and 0 otherwise.
Specific Nationalism Variables

I disaggregate the general nationalism variables above into separate variables representing civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Definitions for these nationalisms derive from Snyder (2000, 70), are based on the criteria for national membership and the nature of collective appeals, and are described, in addition to the indicators of each type of nationalism and some examples, on pages 80 to 82. Civic Initiator Nationalism and Civic Target Nationalism are coded as 1 if the initiator and the target had civic nationalism, respectively, within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Ethnic Initiator Nationalism and Ethnic Target Nationalism are coded as 1 if the initiator and the target were ethnic nationalist, respectively, within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Revolutionary Initiator Nationalism and Revolutionary Target Nationalism equal 1 if the initiator and the target had revolutionary nationalism, respectively, within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. Counterrevolutionary Initiator Nationalism and Counterrevolutionary Target Nationalism equal 1 if the initiator and the target were counterrevolutionary nationalist, respectively, within five years prior to the interstate war and 0 otherwise. A “no nationalism” variable serves as the base category in the empirical analysis. The four variables of nationalism and the categories of nationalism they represent are exhaustive. Descriptive statistics regarding each form of nationalism and the base category of

---

16 There were cases in which nationalism existed, but did not conform to the categories of nationalism in my typology. I coded them as having an “other” form of nationalism, instead of categorizing them as non-nationalist. Choosing the latter course would have resulted in inaccurate data in that these cases were clearly instances of nationalism (for example, pan-nationalism and anti-imperialist nationalism). While the dyads with these “other nationalist” states are included in the empirical analysis of the relationship between generalized nationalism and interstate war duration, they are dropped from the empirical analysis of the relationship between the specific types of nationalism and interstate war duration, decreasing the number of observations in the latter model to 86.

17 I discussed how I dealt with states with multiple types of nationalism on pages 83 and 84.
“no nationalism” for the initiators and the targets of the interstate wars in the dataset are presented in Table 10 on page 83.

Control Variables

In order to accurately assess the statistical relationship between nationalism and its variants and the duration of interstate war, I include five control variables, all measured according to Slantchev (2004, 818-819). Military Parity is measured as the absolute difference in army sizes, scaled between 0 and 1. The result is subtracted from 1 so that lower values represent severe power asymmetries and higher values increasing power parity. Military parity should be linked to longer wars not only because both sides may find it harder to attain military victory, but also because they have strong incentives to delay agreement and use warfare to reveal information about their relative strength (Slantchev 2004, 818-819).

Terrain measures the difficulty of terrain over which the majority of battles are fought, using the procedures in Stam (1999). Higher values represent tougher terrains, such as steep mountains or dense jungles, which should be associated with longer wars because the movement of military personnel and materiel becomes more challenging and large numbers of troops can be simply hidden from the opponent. Lower values indicate flat terrain or desert areas, which should correlate with shorter wars. Vehicles and troops can be more easily transported and the topography provides no cover or concealment, making it easier to target the opponent (Stam 1999, 100-102).

Contiguity is based on the COW contiguity score. It equals 1 if the warring states are contiguous by land, 2 if they are separated by 12 miles of water or less, 3 if they are separated by 24 miles of water or less, 4 if they are separated by 150 miles of water or less, 5 if they are
separated by 400 miles of water or less, and 6 if they are separated by more than 400 miles of water. This variable captures the difficulty of supplying troops and materiel over long distances.

**Number of States** indicates the total number of states in each war. Slantchev (2004), following Blainey (1988), argues that more actors imply longer wars. However, Bennett and Stam (1996) contend that as more states fight in a war, the war should decrease in duration due to potential collective action problems in the coalitions. These conflicting hypotheses, which are both empirically supported, lead me to no *a priori* expectation regarding the effect of the number of states on interstate war duration.

**Democratic Initiator** uses POLITY IV’s “institutionalized democracy” score to classify democracies (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). It ranges from 0 to 10, but I use a dummy variable version that equals 1 if the democracy score was greater than or equal to 6 and 0 otherwise. Democratic initiators should be less likely than autocratic initiators to have long wars because democratic leaders are inclined to be more selective in their foreign aggression, especially when other democracies are the potential targets. They tend to initiate wars that they think they can win quickly with minimal costs (which are unlikely to occur when fighting other democracies) so as to avoid declining public support and ensure their political survival (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Reiter and Stam 2002; Siverson 1995).

**Statistical Models**

Since the dependent variable measures the time until an interstate war ends, I employ an accelerated-failure time, log-normal hazard model with robust standard errors. The reasons for this choice of hazard model are threefold. First, the hazard function, both unconditional and
conditional on the explanatory variables, is non-monotonic. The log-normal hazard model permits such a hazard function. Second, the generalized gamma hazard model, which can test the validity of simpler parametric models, indicates that the log-normal hazard model is appropriate. Third, the log-normal hazard model has the smallest value for the Akaike Information Criterion, indicating that it is preferred over the other potential models.

First, I estimate the accelerated-failure time, log-normal hazard model with Initiator Nationalism and Target Nationalism, the general nationalism variables for the initiator and the target, included. Second, to determine the effect on interstate war duration of dyads containing no nationalist states, only one nationalist state, or two nationalist states, I add One Nationalist Side and Two Nationalist Sides to the model. I exclude Initiator Nationalism and Target Nationalism from this specification because both are highly correlated with One Nationalist Side and Two Nationalist Sides. No Nationalist Sides is the base category. Third, I assess the effect of different types of nationalism in the initiator and target on interstate war duration.

RESULTS

The summary statistics in Table 15 provide some initial insight into the direction and magnitude of the relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration. They show that wars with nationalist initiators are of approximately the same average duration as those with non-nationalist initiators. The mean duration of wars initiated by a nationalist state is 14.05 months, while the mean duration of wars initiated by a non-nationalist state is 13.63 months. There appears to be no significant positive relationship between nationalism in the initiator and interstate war duration, especially given that the difference of means is insignificant ($p = 0.91$ in a two-tailed test). The median duration of wars with nationalist and non-nationalist initiators
confirm this supposition. In fact, wars started by a nationalist state are shorter than those started by a non-nationalist state. The median duration of wars with a nationalist initiator is four months, roughly half the median length of wars with a non-nationalist initiator.

| Table 15. War Duration Statistics with Nationalist and Non-Nationalist States |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                                 | Mean | Standard Deviation | Median |
| All wars                        | 13.94| 20.94            | 5.62 |
| No nationalist initiator        | 13.63| 14.13            | 8.6  |
| Nationalist initiator           | 14.05| 23.13            | 4    |
| No nationalist target           | 11.22| 14.89            | 5.33 |
| Nationalist target              | 16.76| 25.63            | 5.7  |

The summary statistics for wars with nationalist and non-nationalist targets render even more plausible the preliminary conclusion that nationalism in general has no association with interstate war duration. While wars with nationalist targets are, on average, more than five months longer than those with non-nationalist targets (a fairly substantial difference), it is insignificant in a difference of means test ($p = 0.184$ in a two-tailed test). The observation that the median duration of wars with nationalist targets is only 0.37 months (or roughly 11 days) longer than the median duration of wars with non-nationalist targets further supports this conclusion. However, these statistics do not present unequivocal evidence that nationalism and interstate war duration are wholly unrelated phenomena.
Models 1 and 2 in Table 16 indicate that nationalism and interstate war duration are somewhat related, though not in the manner hypothesized. The first model includes the variables for nationalism in the initiator and the target, in addition to the control variables. Initiators that expound nationalism prior to the outbreak of an interstate war tend to fight significantly shorter wars than initiators that do not, in contradiction to Hypothesis 1 ($p = 0.065$ using a one-tailed test). A nationalist target increases the duration of interstate war in comparison to a non-nationalist target, but this result is insignificant ($p = 0.217$). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is unsupported. It appears that nationalism in neither the initiator nor the target has a lengthening effect on interstate war. Yet, interestingly, the direction of the coefficients suggest that nationalist initiators fight so effectively that their wars tend to be shorter, while nationalist targets resist so successfully that their wars tend to be longer. Greater military parity, more difficult terrain, lesser contiguity, and a greater number of states involved all significantly increase interstate war duration, while the presence of a democratic initiator significantly decreases it. All of the findings regarding the control variables are consistent with those of Slantchev (2004).

The second model uses an alternative operationalization of nationalism in the warring dyad. **One Nationalist Side** and **Two Nationalist Sides** measure whether nationalism in only one state or both states in the dyad increases interstate war duration compared to the complete absence of nationalism. While the coefficients are negative, indicating that nationalism in one or both states decreases war duration, only the coefficient for **One Nationalist Side** is significant ($p = 0.035$ in a one-tailed test). This result implies that if only one state in the dyad, whether it is the initiator or the target, is nationalistic, the war is shortened because the nationalist state is
more aggressive and effective on the battlefield than its opponent as it is fighting for its national
security, integrity, and reputation. Based on the above findings, Hypothesis 3 and 4 must be

Table 16. The Effect of Nationalism on War Duration:
Accelerated-Failure Time Log-Normal Duration Models,
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiator nationalism</td>
<td>-0.492* (0.327)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Nationalism</td>
<td>0.224 (0.286)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Nationalist Side</td>
<td>-- (-0.672** (0.370)</td>
<td>-- (-0.308 (0.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Nationalist Sides</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.308 (0.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military parity</td>
<td>0.990*** (0.392)</td>
<td>1.113*** (0.392)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
<td>3.348*** (0.593)</td>
<td>3.404*** (0.582)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>0.237*** (0.068)</td>
<td>0.258*** (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states</td>
<td>0.141*** (0.052)</td>
<td>0.130*** (0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic initiator</td>
<td>-0.460* (0.300)</td>
<td>-0.437* (0.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.873*** (0.565)</td>
<td>-1.895*** (0.543)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>1.297</td>
<td>1.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>80.73</td>
<td>82.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob.$&gt;\chi^2$</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-174.623</td>
<td>-174.016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-tailed tests. ***$p < .01$ **$p < .05$ *$p < .10$
rejected. It seems that nationalism in general does not increase the duration of international military conflict, but, in some cases, may actually decrease it.\footnote{I checked the robustness of my findings by estimating a series of accelerated failure-time log-logistic hazard models, which also permits a non-monotonic hazard function. The substantive findings are not altered. All variables maintain their level of statistical significance and direction. In addition, I estimated a series of Cox proportional hazards models, which does not assume a particular parameterization of the baseline hazard. The substantive findings are not altered. All variables maintain their level of statistical significance and direction. It should be noted that these Cox proportional hazards models show evidence of violating the proportional hazards assumption.}

However, it is possible that the effect of nationalism on interstate war duration may be contingent on the time period. In other words, nationalism may significantly increase interstate war duration in some time periods, but not in others. If this is the case, it may explain the unexpected findings thus far.

By the mid-nineteenth century, few governments espoused nationalism (i.e. Great Britain, France, and the United States). As the nineteenth century progressed, the idea of nationalism spread throughout Europe and influenced the government policies of Japan and China as they struggled against European imperialism. In contrast, elite-driven nationalism was virtually impossible in the states of Latin America until elites centralized their governments and pacified their countrysides at the end of the nineteenth century (Centeno 2002). Moreover, nationalism only became a possibility in Africa and some parts of Asia with decolonization and the independence movements of the mid-twentieth century. Not until the last decades of the twentieth century did the potential for elite nationalism reach most areas of the world. Therefore, it is possible that the passage of time affects nationalism’s impact on interstate war duration.

Time is measured by Year, which equals the year in which the interstate war began minus 1823, the year that the first interstate war in the dataset began. Year is then interacted with Initiator Nationalism and Target Nationalism to capture nationalism’s global progression.
with each subsequent year. Model 3 in Table 17 shows the results of this interaction. Nationalism in the initiator fails to have a discernible influence on interstate war duration as both the coefficient for \textbf{Initiator Nationalism} and the coefficient for the interaction between \textbf{Initiator Nationalism} and \textbf{Year} are statistically insignificant. This insignificance may be due to the relatively high multicollinearity between \textbf{Initiator Nationalism}, \textbf{Target Nationalism}, and their interactions with \textbf{Year}. In contrast, nationalism in the target significantly increases the length of interstate war later in the sample period. While nationalism in the target decreases interstate war duration in 1823 by 26 percent, it increases interstate war duration by 67 percent in 1900 and by 184 percent in 1950. However, these latter two effects may be partially offset by the fact that interstate war duration decreases with the passage of time.

I also account for the potential relationship between time and nationalism by estimating Model 1 only for the years 1900 to 1991, during which time nationalism should exert its greatest influence on interstate war duration. As shown in Model 4 in Table 17, I find that \textbf{Initiator Nationalism} significantly decreases interstate war duration ($p = 0.018$ in a one-tailed test), while \textbf{Target Nationalism} significantly increases interstate war duration ($p = 0.043$ in a one-tailed test). This finding implies that nationalist initiators fight so hard that their wars tend to be shorter, while nationalist targets resist so well that their wars tend to be longer, at least in the context of the twentieth century. Combining the latter conclusion with the results of Model 3, defensive nationalism appears to be more robust over time, compared to offensive nationalism.

---

19 I chose this transformation of \textbf{Year} because it eases interpretation of the interaction term by allowing a value of 0 for \textbf{Year} to represent the year 1823, which approximates nationalism’s infancy.

20 For example, the correlation between \textbf{Initiator Nationalism} and the interaction of \textbf{Target Nationalism} and \textbf{Year} is 0.50.

21 Interaction effects in hazard models are calculated differently from those in other regression models. The effect of nationalism in the target on interstate war duration in 1823 (\textbf{Year} = 0) is calculated as $e^{-0.30} = 0.74$, which translates into a decrease of 26 percent. The effect of nationalism in the target in 1900 (\textbf{Year} = 77) is calculated as $e^{-0.30} * (e^{0.01})^{(1900-1823)} = 1.67$, which translates into an increase of 67 percent. The effect of nationalism in the target in 1950 (\textbf{Year} = 127) is calculated as $e^{-0.30} * (e^{0.01})^{(1950-1823)} \approx 2.84$, which translates into an increase of 184 percent.

125
Table 17. The Interaction between Nationalism and Time and Its Effect on War Duration: Accelerated-Failure Time Log-Normal Duration Models, Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4 (year ≥1900)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiator nationalism</td>
<td>0.281 (0.519)</td>
<td>-0.981** (0.465)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiator nationalism* Year</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.006)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target nationalism</td>
<td>-0.304 (0.503)</td>
<td>0.808** (0.469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target nationalism* Year</td>
<td>0.011** (0.006)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>-0.012*** (0.004)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military parity</td>
<td>0.763** (0.392)</td>
<td>0.998** (0.493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
<td>3.103*** (0.539)</td>
<td>4.053*** (0.770)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>0.173*** (0.066)</td>
<td>0.171* (0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states</td>
<td>0.161*** (0.045)</td>
<td>0.162*** (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic initiator</td>
<td>-0.615** (0.284)</td>
<td>-0.417 (0.413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.846* (0.614)</td>
<td>-2.349*** (0.575)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
<td>1.212 (0.082)</td>
<td>1.279 (0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>148.99</td>
<td>84.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob.$&gt;\chi^2$</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-167.602</td>
<td>-101.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-tailed tests. ***$p < .01$ **$p < .05$ *$p < .10$

Yet, the main conclusion to be drawn from these two models is that nationalism seems to play a larger role in international conflict behavior as time progresses, but in unexpected and more
nuanced ways. In both models in which nationalism’s hypothesized conditionality on time is taken into account, the control variables remain fairly consistent in their direction and level of statistical significance.

It is also plausible that the surprising findings above regarding the relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration is a consequence of collapsing all forms of nationalism into one general indicator, despite Snyder’s (2000) argument that civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalisms have different internal dynamics and different implications for violent conflict. By discriminating between the types of nationalism, I may be able to determine not only whether nationalism in general matters for interstate war duration, but also which specific forms of nationalism matter and how they are important.

Model 5 in Table 18 estimates the relationship between interstate war duration and the presence of specific nationalisms in the initiator and the target. What is most striking about the results is the inconsistency in the coefficient estimates for the indicators of specific nationalisms. Civic nationalism in the initiator increases interstate war duration. However, civic nationalism in the target decreases it. Ethnic nationalism and revolutionary nationalism in the initiator decrease interstate war duration, but these nationalisms in the target increase it. Lastly, counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator and the target both decrease the length of interstate wars.

Most of the previous relationships are statistically significant. Revolutionary nationalism in the initiator and the target significantly influence interstate war duration, as does counterrevolutionary nationalism in the initiator and the target. The effect of ethnic nationalism in the initiator is also significant. But, only Hypothesis 9 finds some empirical support in that revolutionary nationalism in the target significantly increases the duration of war. The
coefficients for Revolutionary Initiator Nationalism, Counterrevolutionary Initiator Nationalism, Counterrevolutionary Target Nationalism, and Ethnic Initiator Nationalism, though significant, are in the opposite direction from what was hypothesized.²² The rest of the hypotheses are not confirmed, leading to the conclusion that, for the most part, nationalism, when disaggregated into its various forms, does not promote continued state participation in war, but may actually hinder it in some cases.²³

²² The direction of the coefficients for Ethnic Initiator Nationalism, Revolutionary Initiator Nationalism, and Counterrevolutionary Initiator Nationalism suggest that nationalist initiators fight so aggressively and effectively that their wars are significantly shorter than non-nationalist initiators.

²³ I checked the robustness of my findings by estimating an accelerated failure-time log-logistic hazard model, a Cox proportional hazards model, and a model limiting the analysis to the twentieth century. The substantive findings are not altered. All variables maintain their direction and level of statistical significance, with the only exception being the insignificance of Counterrevolutionary Initiator Nationalism in the last model.
Table 18. The Effect of Specific Nationalisms on War Duration: Accelerated-Failure Time Log-Normal Duration Models, Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic initiator nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnict initiator nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary initiator nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary initiator nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic target nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic target nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary target nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary target nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic initiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob.$&gt;\chi^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-tailed tests. ***$p<.01$  **$p<.05$  *$p<.10$
In order to determine whether it is analytically useful to disaggregate nationalism into its various types when considering the question of interstate war duration, I conducted a block log-likelihood ratio test on Model 5. The rationale for this technique is that the duration models may be unable to distinguish between the individual effects of civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism due to unknown multicollinearity between some combination of these variables and the control variables. It may, nevertheless, be possible that, as a group, they add significant explanatory power to the model of interstate war duration. To conduct the block log-likelihood ratio test, I first estimate the model with all the variables and obtain its log-likelihood. Then, I estimate the model without the group of nationalism variables and attain its log-likelihood. I subtract the latter log-likelihood from the former and multiply by two. I assess this value in a $\chi^2$ test with degrees of freedom equal to the number of excluded variables. A statistically significant difference implies that including the nationalism variables improves the model as a whole, despite the insignificance of some of the individual nationalism variables.\(^\text{24}\)

The block log-likelihood ratio test indicates that the nationalism variables as a group significantly improve the model of interstate war duration. The difference in the log-likelihoods is significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that the exclusion of the nationalism variables would substantially decrease the model’s explanatory power. The block log-likelihood ratio test does not indicate how these forms of nationalism affect the length of interstate war. Nonetheless, I can conclude from the statistical models and the block log-likelihood ratio test that scholars should at least consider the relationship between the different forms of nationalism and interstate war duration because some types of nationalism (e.g. revolutionary nationalism and counterrevolutionary nationalism) affect interstate war duration, while others do not. Combining

\(^{24}\) See Bennett and Stam (2004, 66).
this finding with those emanating from the analysis of general nationalism and interstate war duration, it is clear that nationalism has a more nuanced impact on the duration of interstate war than expected and further study is warranted.

CONCLUSION

My theoretical argument, which extends Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict under democratization, maintains that nationalism ought to prolong interstate war due to the domestic and international consequences of “nationalist persuasion campaigns.” Nationalism can mobilize popular energies to the tasks of war, antagonize “national enemies” and their foreign allies, lead to biased strategic assumptions, foster domestic interest groups that benefit from protracted military engagements, support the marginalization of opposition groups, and constrain the actions of the political elite through “nationalist bidding wars.” Consequently, leaders find themselves in a political environment conducive to extended war involvement if such a policy is deemed necessary for the attainment of military victory.

The results of the statistical analysis cast some doubt upon these claims and previous understandings of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior. Nationalism does not appear to have a systematic effect on how long states fight in interstate wars. I find that nationalism in the initiator decreases interstate war duration, though this result is barely significant. Nationalism in the target insignificantly increases interstate war duration. The conclusion that there is no significant positive relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration in the period from 1815 to 1991 persists even when the dyadic level of nationalism is considered.
However, when the analysis is limited to the twentieth century, there appears to be a statistically significant relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration. Nationalism in the initiator significantly reduces interstate war duration, and nationalism in the target significantly increases it. These findings suggest that soldiers’ willingness to sacrifice and level of aggressiveness on the battlefield should be considered in order to fully understand any potential association between nationalism and interstate war duration. In other words, the inclination of soldiers to fight extremely hard for the national interest may help to determine the length of warfare.

I also uncover little evidence that any specific type of nationalism systematically prolongs interstate war. In fact, the presence of some forms of nationalism, namely counterrevolutionary nationalism, may actually decrease interstate war duration. Therefore, for the most part, my results challenge existing conceptions of nationalism’s effect on this aspect of international conflict behavior, though nationalism seems to play a larger role as time goes on.

Despite the ambiguous nature of the statistical results, they are still important for three reasons. First, they improve our theoretical and empirical understanding of the determinants of interstate war duration by demonstrating the limited role of nationalism and underlining the strong and consistent explanatory power of such political, military, and geographic variables as democracy, military power parity, contiguity, and terrain. Nationalism may not always be essential to an accurate explanation of all aspects of international conflict behavior. Second, they suggest that the value of including cultural and ideological variables in our theories and statistical assessments of international conflict dynamics may be negligible in some cases; therefore, their incorporation should be carefully weighed. Third, they indicate that the
resolution of international conflict in a timely manner may not be best achieved through a reduction of nationalist sentiment among the belligerents.

Most studies of interstate war duration focus on how military capabilities, difficult terrain, punishment strategies, and military power parity prolong wars, whereas the presence of democracy shortens them (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002; Slantchev 2004). While these explanations are informative, they do not consider the role of nationalism in the decision to continue fighting, despite the fact that it has been shown to be significant in the initiation and onset of violent international conflict. This study is the first that quantitatively measures nationalism and examines its statistical relationship to interstate war duration. Future research may uncover a different relationship since this study can be improved and refined, especially in regards to the operationalization and measurement of nationalism.

Nonetheless, investigating the effects of nationalism on the duration of warfare is a worthwhile research agenda. By focusing more explicitly on the question of nationalism’s impact on the continuation of war, scholars will be able to more thoroughly assess the popular belief that violent nationalist conflict tends to be more protracted than other forms of conflict due to its perceived irresolvable nature. In addition, they will be able to provide the global community with more comprehensive explanations of why wars last as long as they do. The latter outcome will assist diplomats and international organizations in their attempts to persuade belligerents to cease hostilities, come to the negotiating table, and reach a permanent settlement to their conflict, thereby preventing further human suffering.
Chapter 5
The Lexus vs. the Olive Tree: Individual Choice between Globalism and Nationalism

In a popular account of the characteristics and implications of contemporary globalization, Thomas Friedman (1999) identifies two groups of individuals. The first group, symbolized by the Lexus, is “dedicated to modernizing, streamlining, and privatizing their economies in order to thrive in the system of globalization” (27). In contrast, the second group, symbolized by the olive tree, seeks to maintain the customs and institutions that provide a sense of belonging in and identification with a community, tribe, nation, and/or religion. These groups do not coexist peacefully because, according to Friedman, the “Lexus” group with its “anonymous, transnational, homogenizing, standardizing market forces and technologies” threatens the “olive trees’” survival (29). Benjamin Barber (1992) echoes this categorization by arguing that we are witnessing both the “onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity…pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network” and a “retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed.” Therefore, globalization creates two antagonistic groups, one which supports globalization because it may expand economic prosperity and one which opposes globalization because it may eliminate difference.

Are individuals divided into “Lexuses” and “olive trees” as Friedman suggests? Is there a group of globalists and another group of nationalists? More importantly, given the supposedly increasing irrelevance of national borders and national governments under globalization, are
there individuals who remain nationalistic? The literature on globalization and nationalism has not addressed these questions empirically, nor has it adequately examined how individuals choose between these allegedly conflicting attitudes, if they do so at all. While the prevailing view is that globalism and nationalism are incompatible and individuals ascribe to only one position (e.g. Kaldor 2004), there is little explanation for why this is the case. I draw on arguments from economics and political science to motivate hypotheses about a number of economic, political, and social factors influencing individual choice.

I first examine the distribution of individuals into nationalists and globalists to determine whether a significant number of individuals remain nationalistic under globalization. I thus assess the accuracy of Friedman’s conceptualization of the “Lexus” and the “olive tree.” I find that the vast majority of individuals divide themselves in the manner postulated by Friedman and that nationalism persists at the individual level.

I then argue that economic conditions are central to the choice between globalism and nationalism. Drawing upon the factor endowment model and arguments regarding support for financial liberalization (see Quinn and Inclan 1997), I contend that a higher skill level (especially in wealthier countries) and a higher socioeconomic status correlate with globalism. But, personal economic conditions do not fully explain preferences for globalism or nationalism. Since the environment in which individuals are embedded helps to shape their opinions and choices, the state of the national economy must be considered as well. Residence in a more prosperous country or one with greater public social protection should encourage globalism.

Yet, economic theories only go part of the way in clarifying attitude formation. I therefore control for various political and demographic characteristics of individuals, such as political affiliation, employment sector, sex, age, and place of residence. I also account for the
degree to which a country is globalized as the greater probability of a negative experience with globalization may cause individuals to retreat to economic and cultural nationalism.

I test these arguments using data from 11,354 individuals in 20 countries in 2003. Employing a multilevel multinomial regression model, I ascertain whether these variables influence the choice between four attitudes: globalism, traditional nationalism, enlightened nationalism, and anti-ism. However, I primarily focus on the determinants of the first two attitudes because I want to address directly the “Lexus”/“olive tree” dichotomy.

My economic theories of attitude formation concerning globalism and traditional nationalism are mostly supported. Higher-skilled individuals and citizens of more prosperous countries are significantly more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Furthermore, residence in a wealthier country increases the effect of skill level on the odds of globalism. Individuals with access to greater public social protection are also more disposed toward globalism. The results for national prosperity and public social protection indicate that national characteristics must be considered when theorizing how globalist and nationalist attitudes are constructed. Socioeconomic status does not influence globalism or nationalism. In terms of the control variables, I find that females and urban residents are significantly more inclined toward globalism, while older individuals, political rightists, and public sector employees favor traditional nationalism. Interestingly, the level of a country’s global integration has no effect on the probability of globalism versus traditional nationalism at the individual level.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I define globalization and nationalism. Second, I review the literature on these phenomena. Third, I examine the distribution of individuals into globalists and nationalists. Fourth, I provide an economic theory that explains the choice between globalism and traditional nationalism. Fifth, I describe the data used and the
econometric model estimated. Sixth, I present the findings and their implications. Lastly, I conclude and introduce some avenues for future research.

DEFINING GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM

Before determining whether and why individuals divide themselves into “Lexuses” and “olive trees,” globalization and nationalism must be defined. Otherwise, it will be difficult to understand nationalism’s continued salience or decline, as well as why individuals support globalization or nationalism. It is in these phenomena’s attributes that we may begin to find answers.

Defining globalization has been contentious as scholars have argued that different aspects of the trend are critical to assessing the reasons for, extent, and consequences of globalization. However, most definitions emphasize one or a combination of four characteristics: the increasing political, economic, social, and geographical linkage of people around the world.

For example, Croucher (2004, 13) treats globalization as a cluster of related changes in economics, technology, culture, and politics that further global interconnectedness. These changes include expanding and intensifying trade and investment, the central role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in organizing global production and financial transactions, increasing technological sophistication, the rapid and extensive flow of cultural goods, and multilayered governance. Blum (2007, 5) also underlines globalization’s economic and cultural nature by defining it as accelerated and intensified flows of capital, people, goods, information, and ideas. Yet, he adds a geographical component to his definition by characterizing globalization as greater penetration across nation-state borders leading to deterritorialization and the growing irrelevance of physical and national borders. Other scholars emphasize this aspect
of globalization as well (e.g. Held et al. 1999; Scholte 2005), suggesting that globalization compresses space and pulls together individuals and communities which were separate or loosely connected (Brown 1995).

This brief survey shows that globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be reduced to one characteristic, whether it is economics or geography (see Stiglitz 2003). Otherwise, the ability to understand the causes and consequences of globalization at varying levels of analysis is lost. Therefore, I define globalization as the growing interconnectedness between individuals, firms, governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other groups through increasingly sophisticated technology that renders distance and location almost insignificant. As a result of this increasing interconnectedness, trade and investment expand, production structures go global, information and ideas disseminate more intensely, cultures integrate, governance diffuses, and territory is superseded.

The concept of nationalism is contested as well. Gellner (1983) provides the standard definition of nationalism as the doctrine that the political unit (the state) and the cultural unit (the nation) should be congruent. Croucher (2004, 118) agrees when she differentiates nations from ethnic groups because nations possess “a degree of political self-consciousness that manifests itself as widespread support for or mobilization in pursuit of a state.” Snyder (2000, 23) views nationalism more broadly as “the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.” This definition allows nations to be organized around characteristics other than culture and recognizes that nationalism’s aim can be something other than a sovereign state. In this regard, it is similar to that of Scholte (2005, 225, 227), who conceptualizes nationalism as a “circumstance where people construct their being,
belonging and becoming first and foremost in terms of national affiliation” and nationhood as depending upon the existence of a large population, a territorial homeland, a series of distinctive attributes, and uniqueness constructed via interactions with “foreigners.”

These definitions indicate that nationalism rests upon a group of people perceiving themselves as different from “others” based upon some set of characteristics that it deems vital to creating and maintaining a sense of belonging and identity. With one exception, they suggest that nationalism involves a political project (e.g. an independent state or autonomy within an existing state) that will preserve the nation’s uniqueness. Given these definitions’ similarities, I employ Snyder’s (2000) description because it best captures nationalism’s ideational and political aspects.

THE STATUS OF NATIONALISM UNDER GLOBALIZATION

The literature on globalization and nationalism tends to take one of two positions: globalization erodes national identity or globalization reinvigorates national identity. In the enthusiasm greeting the collapse of communism and the rapid acceleration of global integration in the 1990s, many scholars predicted that national identities would weaken, contributing to the emergence of a supranational identity or the reversion to local identities. National attachment would deteriorate in the face of globalization for four reasons (Evans and Kelley 2002, 304).

First, transnational linkages internationalize and universalize culture (Barber 1992). Second, increasing economic complexity and international market integration renders the nation-state obsolete in that states are unable to manage their economies effectively through traditional fiscal and monetary policies (Friedman 1999; Held 1996; Held et al. 1999; Ruggie 1994; Scholte
Third, the expanded scope of the market within and among countries decreases what the state can offer its citizens in terms of social welfare, undermining national attachment and pride (Croucher 2004; Kapstein 1996; Rodrik 1997). Lastly, the strengthening of local identities, the rise of supranational identities, and the pluralization and hybridization of identities chip away at the foundations of national loyalty (Alonso 1995; Blum 2007; Croucher 2004; Dogan 1994; Scholte 2005).

However, national identity and pride are not eroding. Evans and Kelley (2002) find that individuals in 24 developed countries have strong national pride in their country’s science, economy, arts and literature, and sport in 1995. Based on individual-level data from the 1973 Eurobarometer survey and the 1981 and 1990 World Values Survey, Dombrowski and Rice (2000) conclude that national identity is not weakening in Europe in favor of a unified European identity or sub-national identities. Loyalty to territorially-based organizations has been stable, despite geographic region, socioeconomic class, educational level, and age cohort.

Using data from public opinion surveys from 1981 to 2004, Klesner (2006) determines that Mexican national pride has not diminished. In fact, identification with the nation, as opposed to regions, states, and localities, has grown. In a 2003 Gallup Poll, 76 percent of Canadians had strong national pride with 41 percent saying that they were “extremely” proud to be Canadian (Burkholder). Similarly, in a June 2006 Gallup poll, 82 percent of Americans were “extremely” or “very” proud to be an American (Newport). Finally, the relative electoral success of some European far-right parties (e.g. Austria’s Freedom Party), the persistence or eruption of national identity-based conflicts (e.g. the Kurds), and post-9/11 American foreign and domestic

---

policies (e.g. stricter immigration controls) are further evidence of nationalism’s continued salience.

What explains this enduring national attachment and pride, despite globalization’s supposedly homogenizing tendencies? Kaldor (2004, 169) argues that national pride in general and especially the more nationalistic variety are still prevalent because they respond to the growing insecurity and frustration resulting from the dramatic structural changes of globalization. With declining state provision and public employment, rapid urbanization, and large-scale migration from the countryside to the cities and from the underdeveloped to the developed countries in the past two decades, more people are feeling economically threatened, culturally lost, and politically alienated. Nationalist ideologies and membership in nationalist groups offer a sense of purpose, belonging, and power that would not otherwise exist.

Globalization also threatens “to wash away all cultural difference, undermining the foundation of distinct social and political institutions” (Blum 2007, 12). It endangers the integrity of many individuals’ identities and their means of “being, belonging, and becoming” (Rupert 2000, chapter 5; Scholte 2005). In order to protect their national identity and its supporting institutions, individuals may reject components of globalization, while affirming their unique national characteristics and “localizing” some products transmitted through globalization (Blum 2007). Individuals rely on nationalism as a way of mediating the effects of globalization.

Thus, nationalists should be hostile to free trade, foreign investment, international cultural flows, political interdependence, and globalization in general as they feel more politically, economically, and culturally aggrieved than others by the new global system.26 Individuals should divide into two groups—those who support globalization and its institutions

26 See Mayda and Rodrik (2005) for evidence that nationalism fosters protectionist attitudes.
and those who oppose globalization and embrace nationalist policies. Within and across countries, individuals should be partitioned into a group of “Lexuses” and a group of “olive trees,” to borrow Thomas Friedman’s (1999) labels.

Table 19 displays a cross-tabulation of individuals in 32 countries in 2003 according to their level of globalism and nationalism. A large majority of individuals oppose global integration, while being strongly nationalistic. I label these individuals “traditional nationalists.” At the same time, approximately 10 percent of individuals favor globalization and have weak nationalist sentiment. These individuals are “globalists.” More than 71 percent of the sample separates in the manner postulated, though traditional nationalists dominate.

Table 19. A Cross-Tabulation of Nationalism and Globalism in 32 Countries in 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak nationalist</th>
<th>Strong nationalist</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Globalization**
| opponent       | 2,783 (9.25%)    | 18,597 (61.82%)    | 21,380 (71.07%) |
| **Globalization**
| supporter      | 2,951 (9.81%)    | 5,752 (19.12%)     | 8,703 (39.09%)  |
| **Total**      | 5,734 (19.06%)   | 24,349 (80.94%)    | 30,803 (100%)   |

For the most part, the same pattern occurs within countries. In 24 out of the 32 countries in Table 19, a majority of citizens are traditional nationalists, while less than 15 percent are globalists. The exceptions to this pattern are the Netherlands, Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and Switzerland, in which individuals are more evenly distributed among the possible

---

27 The measurement of individual-level globalism and nationalism will be explained below. Data are from the International Social Survey Programme’s National Identity II Survey. Bulgaria and New Zealand are excluded from this cross-tabulation. Bulgarians were not asked a question that forms part of the nationalism index, while New Zealanders were not asked a question included in the globalism index.
attitude sets. These countries are either above average in terms of global integration, multinational, or haunted by a horrific nationalist past. Nonetheless, I can conclude nationalism is alive and well, even under globalization.

Approximately 19 percent of individuals in the sample profess support for both globalization and nationalism, contrary to conventional theories. I consider these individuals “enlightened nationalists” because they may believe that globalization could usefully serve national interests. In addition, roughly nine percent of individuals oppose globalization and nationalism. I classify them as the “antis.” This group is likely composed of disparate individuals, such as communitarians, localists, and anarchists, who abhor the idea of overarching organizations, whether they are corporations, nations, or international institutions. Though the existence of these groups is unexpected and in need of explanation, I do not account for them in this study, either theoretically or empirically. I focus on understanding the other attitude sets because they have received the most attention in the literature.

UNDERSTANDING GLOBALISM AND NATIONALISM

The choice to be a globalist or a nationalist should primarily depend on one’s personal economic situation, as well as the state of the national economy. The factor endowment model, otherwise known as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, partly explains the first causal mechanism. Commodities differ in their factor intensities, and countries differ in their factor endowments. Given the conditions of supply and demand, abundant factors tend to be less expensive inputs to production than scarce factors. A country can benefit from international trade by exporting those

---

28 The cross-tabulation of the Czech respondents is not informative because there are few observations.
commodities whose factor intensities match its factor endowments, while importing those products whose factor intensities fit less well with its factor endowments (Sobel 2006, 124).

As a result, trade liberalization benefits the abundant factors of production. When production shifts to commodities that employ the abundant factors due to their greater supply and lower costs, the relative prices of the abundant factors increase as demand for these factors increases. A country’s abundant factors should support free trade, while its scarce factors do not (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Sobel 2006, 124-125). For the higher-income countries included in the empirical analysis, the abundant factor is skilled labor. In order to protect their increasing income from freer trade, skilled workers should be more likely to support globalization and oppose economic nationalist policies (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001).

The role of personal economic conditions in determining attitudes toward globalism and nationalism is further justified by Quinn and Inclan’s (1997) argument regarding support for financial liberalization. Skilled workers in the higher-income countries benefit economically from financial openness compared to semi-skilled workers because their relative income increases with greater financial liberalization. Since semi-skilled workers do not have a marginal advantage in global markets due to unionization and relatively high wages, foreign capital has little incentive to invest in domestic enterprises that intensively employ semi-skilled labor. On the other hand, skilled workers, at least in capital-scarce economies, see their wages driven up as foreign capital competes for their services. Again, skilled workers should be more inclined toward globalism than nationalism so as to maintain their increasing incomes. These expectations lead to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Higher-skilled individuals in the higher-income countries will be more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists.

In no way does skill level adequately capture an individual’s personal economic situation, though we can roughly infer from it the type of work they do, the amount of compensation they receive for that work, and where they stand socioeconomically. It would be theoretically better to consider other aspects of an individual’s economic position. I suspect that how an individual views their economic status, especially when compared to their fellow citizens, has a strong impact on whether they favor globalism over nationalism.

Those individuals who think that they are relatively well-off may feel more secure about their economic situation because their wealth affords them a financial cushion in the event of unemployment or a recession (Scheve and Slaughter 2004). Wealthier individuals also tend to be more skilled, making it easier for them to find a job quickly if they become unemployed. The financial position of the comparatively wealthy is thus less threatened by the structural changes inherent in economic globalization. For them, globalization is a phenomenon that must not necessarily be feared.

In contrast, those who perceive themselves to be relatively poor may worry about the repercussions of decreased wages, sudden unemployment, and recession due to their potentially devastating effects on their economic well-being. These individuals may not have the savings necessary to pay their bills on time while they seek new or more gainful employment. If they think the current global economic and political environment puts them at a disadvantage, in terms of relative income and/or social standing, they might seek ways of ameliorating the situation. Economic nationalism may become an attractive option, compared to international
competition, capital mobility, heightened immigration, and other aspects of globalization that affect businesses’ ability to maintain profitability and in turn, high wage and employment levels.

The decrease in public social protection expenditures accompanying globalization in many countries compounds the potentially precarious financial situation of relatively poorer individuals. As Scheve and Slaughter (2004, 662) point out, if globalization limits the actual or perceived capacities of governments to provide social insurance, then economically insecure individuals may further fear globalization, especially if global integration heightens labor-market risks. Lower-income individuals may blame their economic insecurity on globalization and oppose policies aimed at expanding international trade, immigration, foreign direct investment (FDI), and participation in international economic regimes. Instead, they favor policies that promise to maintain domestic economic strength and autonomy. In contrast, wealthy individuals are economically secure in the present and foresee little need for government assistance in the future if they become unemployed, leading to a higher probability of globalism on their part. These expectations lead to the following hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 2:** Individuals with a higher perceived socioeconomic status will be more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists.

Yet, individuals do not sympathize with globalists or nationalists solely on the basis of their personal socioeconomic attributes. Many of these attributes shape and are shaped by the political, economic, and social context in which individuals are embedded. As insinuated by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and Quinn and Inclan’s (1997) theory of financial liberalization
support, the abundance of human capital and the level of domestic economic prosperity are important in the development of globalist and nationalist attitudes.

High-income countries should be associated with greater globalist sentiment among their citizens for two reasons. First, high-income countries are comparatively more endowed with skilled labor, which favors free trade and financial liberalization. Second, high-income countries have been better able to formulate and implement policies that stimulate and sustain economic growth and high standards of living. These policies have increasingly meant further integration into the global system. Free trade, FDI, immigration, and greater security through international organizations, among other components of globalization, enlarge the opportunities for additional economic growth. Citizens of advanced countries will not want to jeopardize future economic growth and their national and personal economic prosperity by forgoing global integration and supporting nationalist policies, such as trade protectionism and political isolationism. They should prefer globalism over nationalism. These expectations lead to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals in more prosperous countries will be more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists.

Another reason why citizens of the high-income countries may be more disposed toward globalism is that their governments have the financial resources with which to provide substantial social welfare and help their citizens deal with globalization’s vagaries (Rodrik 1997, 1998). But, the impact of social welfare is not confined to the advanced countries. As the social safety net for individuals whose wages and benefits have been reduced or who become unemployed due to foreign competition widens, the probability that an individual opposes
globalization should decrease (Adserà and Boix 2002; Hays et al. 2005). Citizens with government-sponsored social protection may see their poor economic situation as temporary and perceive opportunities for future success. They will be more optimistic about their prospects and less averse to globalization. They may also believe that the level of social protection renders nationalist policies less needed. These arguments lead me to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals in countries with greater public social protection expenditures are more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists.

Economic theories can only partly explain individual propensities toward globalism and nationalism as they do not account for the political and demographic characteristics of individuals or the political and social environment in which they are embedded. In order to assess adequately the strength of the previous economic models, I must include some relevant control variables. I focus specifically on political affiliation, employment sector, sex, age, place of residence, and the degree to which a country is globalized.

I suspect that right-party supporters are more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists since right parties have traditionally represented the interests of MNCs, commercial banks, capital owners, and other groups that often benefit from economic integration. On the other hand, leftists should be more inclined toward traditional nationalism. Their parties tend to represent labor interests, which are shaped in part by the disadvantaged position of semi-skilled and unskilled labor in the developed countries.

Public sector employees should be more disposed to traditional nationalism than globalism. The shift in governance away from territorial bureaucratic national governments to
municipal, provincial, national, macro-regional, global, and private bodies renders the national public sector less vital to domestic regulation and employment in it less prestigious. In addition, the need to attract foreign capital and maintain competitiveness via balanced budgets leaves less money available for national bureaucracies and state-owned industries. These threats to their livelihood convince public sector employees that policies that preserve the national public sector’s role in governance and economics are superior to those that promote global integration.

While feminist scholars may disagree and point to the increased hardships and inequalities for women under globalization (e.g. low pay, poor working conditions, and a disproportionate presence in informal, temporary, and part-time jobs), I expect that women should be more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Economic globalization has helped women in terms of narrowing the gender wage gap and providing opportunities for gainful employment (Bhagwati 2004, chapter 7), while cultural globalization has diffused the norm of gender equality in politics. According to Kaldor (2004), women are less frustrated and alienated by the structural changes of globalization and thus less inclined to seek membership in nationalist or religious groups for a sense of belonging and purpose. Smith and Kim (2006) find supporting evidence in that men express more national pride than do women.

Previous work on national pride and nationalism indicate that older individuals should be more likely to be traditional nationalists than globalists (Dogan 1994; Evans and Kelley 2002; Smith and Kim 2006). National pride and nationalism have declined across generations in reaction to the nationalist extremes that triggered World War II and as the intense patriotism of that period dissipated (Smith and Kim 2006, 132). Furthermore, younger people have spent most of their lives in a globally integrated world and should more easily adapt to its relationships, expectations, and changes. In contrast, older individuals are often excluded from globalization.
Middle-aged workers find it more difficult to adjust their skill set in this period of global economic restructuring and face the prospect of long-term unemployment. Older people are also less likely to participate in new modes of communication due to, in their view, the daunting nature of computer technologies (Scholte 2005, 342).

Urbanites should prefer globalism over nationalism for two reasons. First, urban centers tend to be favored under globalization relative to rural areas. Global communications, global markets, global finance, and global organizations locate their headquarters in and focus their attention on cities, not the countryside (Scholte 2005, 341). Second, urbanites are more likely to interact meaningfully everyday with people of different ethnicities, nationalities, and/or religions than those in more sparsely populated areas. This renders them less likely to harbor exclusionary nationalist sentiments and more likely to accept cosmopolitanism.

Finally, citizens of countries little touched by globalization should be less likely to be traditional nationalists, if they have a discernable attitude at all. Because these individuals have less exposure, especially of the negative variety, with globalization’s economic, political, and social effects, they may perceive less need for nationalistic policies. In contrast, citizens of countries deeply intertwined with the global economy or culture may hold favorable or unfavorable opinions of globalization, depending on their personal experience and their country’s relative position in international relations. To a degree, the relationship between a country’s level of globalization and the propensity toward globalism and nationalism is indeterminate ex ante.

Before describing the research design and findings, I should mention that there is a counterargument to the claim that nationalists are hostile to free trade, FDI, immigration, and economic interdependence. Some scholars maintain that nationalists do not uniformly support
protectionist and autarkic policies and may support global economic integration as a means of bolstering national growth and competitiveness and reducing the influence of the nation’s “other” in the region (Helleiner and Pickel 2005; Shulman 2000). For example, both the Liberal Party of Québec and the Parti Québécois support free trade and economic integration, especially with the United States, “because of the benefits they offer to Québécois autonomy through increased economic diversification and strength, despite the potential loss to Québécois identity through the threat of increased cultural penetration from the United States” (Shulman 2000, 375).

In addition, there is evidence that individuals possess “conflicting” attitudes in that they are both globalists and nationalists. Klesner (2006) finds that Mexicans demonstrate strong national pride and a willingness to deepen integration with the United States, provided they have had positive experiences with economic integration. Table 19 indicates that roughly 19 percent of individuals in 32 countries in 2003 are globalization supporters and strong nationalists. While I recognize the theoretical possibility and the empirical reality of “enlightened nationalists,” I focus in this chapter on delineating and understanding the determinants of globalism and traditional nationalism. I leave the explanation of enlightened nationalism to future work.

**DATA AND METHODS**

The objective of the empirical analysis is to assess the impact of several individual- and country-level economic characteristics on globalist and traditional nationalist attitudes. In accordance with the factor endowment model and theories of support for financial liberalization, I evaluate how skill level, socioeconomic status, and domestic economic prosperity shape opinions of globalization and nationalism. I also estimate the effect of public social protection expenditures because greater government intervention in the economy may alleviate the negative
consequences of globalization and increase globalism. To obtain the most accurate estimates, I control for political affiliation, sex, age, place of residence, employment sector, and national exposure to globalization. My data cover individuals in 20 high- and middle-income countries, providing a valuable opportunity to study the relationship between the explanatory variables, globalism, and traditional nationalism.29

The individual data are from the International Social Survey Programme’s National Identity II Survey from 2003 (ISSP Research Group). This survey is a cross-national representative sample of approximately 46,000 individuals in 34 countries.30 It has detailed information about each respondent’s national consciousness, national identity, and demographic attributes. The most important information for my analysis are the indicators of national pride and support for global integration, as well as the measures of the respondent’s educational attainment, socioeconomic status, political affiliation, sex, age, place of residence, and employment sector.

The data on national economic prosperity are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Online Database. The data on public social protection are from the International Labor Organization’s Social Security Expenditure Database. This database covers 124 countries and contains information regarding sickness, maternity, old-age, invalidity, survivors’, family, employment injury, and unemployment benefits.

The data on each country’s degree of global integration are from the CSGR Globalisation Index (Lockwood and Redoano 2005). This index measures the economic, social, and political

29 These countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Fourteen countries were excluded due to issues of data availability.
30 The number of individuals in the empirical analysis decreases to 11,354 because I limit the analysis to citizens and because there are missing data.
dimensions of globalization for 196 countries and territories on an annual basis from 1982 to 2004 and combines them into an annual overall globalization score for each country or territory. The economic globalization sub-index measures trade, FDI, portfolio investment, foreign investment income, and employee compensation paid to non-resident workers and resident workers abroad. The social globalization sub-index measures foreign stock, foreign population flows, worker remittances, tourists, international phone calls, Internet users, film imports and exports, book and newspaper imports and exports, and international mail. The political globalization sub-index includes the number of foreign embassies in a country, UN peacekeeping operations in which a country participates, and memberships in international organizations.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is the respondent’s choice between four attitudes: traditional nationalism, globalism, enlightened nationalism, and anti-ism. The dependent variable’s construction proceeded in three steps. First, I created a nationalism index, similar to that of Smith and Kim (2006). It was composed of the responses to the following six questions:

1. “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think having been born in [COUNTRY] is?”

2. “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
   a. I would rather be a citizen of [COUNTRY] than of any other country in the world.
b. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY].

c. Generally speaking, [COUNTRY] is a better country than most other countries.

d. People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.”

3. “How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?”

For each question, lower scores indicate greater nationalism. Scores to these questions were summed, giving the nationalism index a range of 6 to 28. Respondents with scores between 6 and 17 were coded as strong nationalists, while those with scores between 18 and 28 were coded as weak nationalists. 31

Second, I constructed a globalism index. It was composed of the responses to the following five questions, which capture the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of globalization:

1. “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
   a. [COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.
   b. [COUNTRY’S] television should give preference to [COUNTRY] films and programmes.
   c. Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [COUNTRY].

31 I chose this cutoff because it divides the range into roughly equal halves. The cutoff between the globalization supporters and opponents was chosen for the same reason.
d. International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] government.

e. Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures.”

The responses vary from a minimum of 1 for individuals who give the response “agree strongly” to a maximum of 5 for those individuals giving the response “disagree strongly.” Scores to these questions were summed, giving the globalism index a range of 5 to 25. Respondents with scores between 5 and 15 were coded as globalization opponents, while those with scores between 16 and 25 were coded as globalization supporters.

Third, the dependent variable Attitude was created. It equals 1 if the respondent is a weak nationalist and a globalization opponent (i.e. an anti), 2 if the respondent is a strong nationalist and a globalization supporter (i.e. an enlightened nationalist), 3 if the respondent is a weak nationalist and a globalization supporter (i.e. a globalist), and 4 if the respondent is a strong nationalist and a globalization opponent (i.e. a traditional nationalist). The number and percentage of respondents in the sample with each attitude is provided in Table 19.

Independent Variables

I hypothesize that four economic variables play a significant role in the choice between globalism and traditional nationalism: skill level, socioeconomic status, domestic economic prosperity, and public social protection expenditures. I use educational attainment as a proxy for skill level. Education is a categorical variable that measures the highest educational level or degree the respondent has completed. It equals 0 if the respondent has no formal qualification, 1
if the respondent has the lowest formal qualification, 2 if the respondent has above the lowest qualification, 3 if the respondent completed the higher secondary level, 4 if the respondent completed more than the higher secondary level, and 5 if the respondent has a university degree.

**SES** is the respondent’s self-placement on a scale of socioeconomic status ranging from 1 (the lowest class) to 10 (the highest class). While an objective measure of socioeconomic status (e.g. income) may be preferable to reduce measurement error, this indicator assesses the respondents’ perception of their economic situation relative to others, which I argue has a greater impact on their opinion of the costs and benefits of globalization and nationalism than would their actual socioeconomic status.\(^{32}\)

Domestic economic prosperity is measured as the logged GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. **GDP per capita** is interacted with **Education** to better assess the factor endowment model and theories of support for financial liberalization.

The amount of public social protection is measured as the public social protection and health expenditures of each country as a percentage of GDP. For the previous two country-level variables, the data are from the year prior to the implementation of the National Identity II Survey in that country.

The variable **Party** captures political affiliation. It is a categorical variable that measures the respondent’s self-placement on a left-right continuum for party preference or vote intention. It ranges from 1 if the respondent favors far-left parties to 5 if the respondent favors far-right parties. The variable **Sex** equals 0 for males and 1 for females.

**Age** is the age of the respondent in years. **Urban** equals 1 if the respondent indicated that he or she lives in an urban area, the suburbs, a town, or a small city and 0 if the respondent

\(^{32}\) It may seem that **Education** and **SES** measure similar constructs and should not be included in the same model. However, their correlation in the estimation sample is only 0.29.
indicated that he or she lives in a country village or on a farm. **Public** equals 1 if the respondent works for the government, a publicly-owned firm, or a national industry and 0 otherwise.

The variable **Global Index** is the overall globalization index for each country in the year prior to the implementation of the National Identity II Survey in that country. This index ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating greater global integration.

**Statistical Model**

To determine the role of individual and national economic conditions on globalism and traditional nationalism, I employ a multilevel multinomial regression model. As previously mentioned, my dataset is comprised of individuals from 20 countries. While pooling individuals across many countries has obvious advantages, it generates some estimation issues. Because one unit of analysis (individuals) is nested within another unit of analysis (countries), my data have a hierarchical structure, which necessitates the use of multilevel regression modeling techniques. Otherwise, the fact that individuals from the same country may be more similar to each other than to individuals from a different country may lead to correlated residuals, underestimated standard errors, biased hypothesis tests, and a violation of the independence assumption of OLS regression.

In addition, I am interested in the variation between countries in their citizens’ propensity for globalism or traditional nationalism and the possible explanations for this variation. Traditional regression models would not adequately estimate the relationship between country-level factors and individual attitudes. Therefore, I estimate a multilevel multinomial regression model with explanatory variables at the individual and country levels.\footnote{Robust standard errors cannot be computed for my model.} I choose multinomial
regression because the dependent variable is composed of four unordered categories. The model is shown below with $i$ indexing each individual observation in country $j$. There are $M$ possible categories of the outcome, $\text{Attitude}$, which takes on the value of $m$ with $\text{Prob (Attitude} = m) = \varphi_m$, for $m = 1, \ldots, M$.

\begin{align}
\text{Prob (Attitude}_{ij} = 1) &= \varphi_{1ij} \\
\text{Prob (Attitude}_{ij} = 2) &= \varphi_{2ij} \\
\text{Prob (Attitude}_{ij} = 3) &= \varphi_{3ij} \\
\text{Prob (Attitude}_{ij} = 4) &= \varphi_{4ij} = 1 - \varphi_{1ij} - \varphi_{2ij} - \varphi_{3ij} \\
\eta_{mij} &= \log (\varphi_{mij}/\varphi_{Mij}) \\
\eta_{mij} &= \beta_{0j(m)} + \beta_{1j(m)} \text{Education}_{ij} + \beta_{2j(m)} \text{SES}_{ij} + \beta_{3j(m)} \text{Party}_{ij} + \beta_{4j(m)} \text{Sex}_{ij} + \beta_{5j(m)} \text{Age}_{ij} + \beta_{6j(m)} \text{Urban}_{ij} + \beta_{7j(m)} \text{Public}_{ij} \\
\beta_{0j(m)} &= \gamma_{00(m)} + \gamma_{01(m)} \text{Global Index}_{j} + \gamma_{02(m)} \text{Public Social Protection}_{j} + \gamma_{03(m)} \text{GDP per capita}_{j} + u_{0j(m)} \\
\beta_{1j(m)} &= \gamma_{10(m)} + \gamma_{11(m)} \text{GDP per capita}_{j} + u_{1j(m)} \\
\beta_{2j(m)} &= \gamma_{20(m)} + u_{2j(m)} \\
\beta_{3j(m)} &= \gamma_{30(m)} + u_{3j(m)} \\
\beta_{4j(m)} &= \gamma_{40(m)} \\
\beta_{5j(m)} &= \gamma_{50(m)} + u_{5j(m)} \\
\beta_{6j(m)} &= \gamma_{60(m)} + u_{6j(m)} \\
\beta_{7j(m)} &= \gamma_{70(m)}
\end{align}
Equations 1 through 4 denote the probabilities with which Attitude takes on particular values. Equation 5 is the multinomial logit link function in which the outcome at the individual level is the log-odds of falling into category $m$ relative to category $M$. Thus, $M$ is the reference category. Equation 6 is the individual-level model. Education, SES, Party, and Age have been grand-mean centered to ease interpretation of the intercepts. The other individual-level predictors remain in their dummy variable metric. I model $\beta_{0j(m)}$, the intercept, as a function of three country-level variables, all grand-mean centered, as shown in Equation 7. Equation 8 shows that $\beta_{1j(m)}$, the Education variable’s slope, is modeled as a function of GDP per capita, specifying a cross-level interaction. I view the other individual-level coefficients as random, except $\beta_{4j(m)}$ and $\beta_{7j(m)}$. The variance components of these latter coefficients are statistically insignificant in a $\chi^2$ test.

RESULTS

My predictions about the economic determinants of individual-level globalism and traditional nationalism are mostly borne out. Table 20 shows the relationship between the independent and control variables and the log-odds of globalism relative to traditional nationalism.34

34 To determine whether there is enough variation at the country level to warrant its estimation and explanation, I estimated a model with no predictors at either level. For individuals residing in a country with a “typical” rate of globalism and traditional nationalism (that is, for a country with the random effects equal to zero), the log-odds of globalism is less than the log-odds of traditional nationalism, $\gamma_{00(3)} = -1.980, p < 0.001$. The log-odds of anti-ism and enlightened nationalism are also less than the log-odds of traditional nationalism, $\gamma_{00(1)} = -2.062, p < 0.001$ and $\gamma_{00(1)} = -1.151, p < 0.001$, respectively. There is significant variation across countries in the log-odds of globalism (relative to traditional nationalism), $u_{0(3)} = 1.031, p < 0.001$. There is also significant variation across countries in the log-odds of anti-ism and enlightened nationalism (relative to traditional nationalism), $u_{0(1)} = 0.622, p < 0.001$ and $u_{0(2)} = 0.447, p < 0.001$, respectively.
Table 20. A Conditional Model of Individual-Level Globalism versus Traditional Nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.565***</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.459***</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-0.384***</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.140**</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.025***</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.354**</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>-0.180**</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Index</td>
<td>-0.229</td>
<td>1.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Social Protection</td>
<td>0.064**</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>1.038*</td>
<td>0.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-Level Interaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education x Log GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.189*</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance Components</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (u₀)</td>
<td>1.084***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (u₁)</td>
<td>0.030***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (u₂)</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (u₃)</td>
<td>0.078***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (u₅)</td>
<td>0.0002***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (u₆)</td>
<td>0.235**</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two-tailed tests. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Holding GDP per capita at its mean, higher-skilled individuals are more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Each unit increase in educational attainment significantly increases the odds of the respondent supporting globalization and opposing nationalism by 58 percent. As a country’s GDP per capita increases, higher-skilled individuals are even more
inclined toward globalism relative to traditional nationalism. When GDP per capita is one unit above the mean, educational attainment increases the odds of globalism by 91 percent. These findings confirm Hypothesis 1, as well as the logic of the factor endowment model and theories of support for financial liberalization.

In contrast, Hypothesis 2 finds little support. While the direction of the SES coefficient corresponds with my expectations, it is insignificant. Perceptions of socioeconomic status do not affect the propensity for globalism or traditional nationalism.

But, the extent of national economic prosperity does, in accordance with Hypothesis 3. Holding Education at its mean, individuals in wealthier countries are more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Each unit increase in GDP per capita significantly increases the odds of globalism by 182 percent. A country’s endowment of skilled labor and ability to formulate and implement policies that foster economic growth and increase standards of living are clearly vital to the predominance of globalism and the diminution of traditional nationalism.

The provision of substantial public social protection also matters. Individuals in countries with greater public social protection expenditures are significantly more prone to globalism than traditional nationalism, in line with Hypothesis 4. A one-unit increase in public social protection expenditures translates into a seven percent increase in the odds of globalism. When governments use social welfare policies, such as unemployment insurance, to combat the negative effects of globalization, individuals become less averse toward globalization because they may view a poor financial situation in the future as temporary.

Four control variables perform in the expected manner. Sex, age, place of residence, and employment sector are all significantly related to the choice between globalism and traditional nationalism. Women are more likely to be globalists than men with the odds of a woman
favoring globalization and rejecting nationalism 15 percent higher than a man’s odds of doing so. Younger individuals are also more likely to favor globalism over traditional nationalism. A one-year increase in age translates into a two percent decrease in the odds of globalism. The same conclusion can be drawn about urbanites; they are predisposed toward globalism. Dwelling in an urban area increases the odds of globalism by 42 percent. In contrast, public sector employees are significantly less likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. If an individual is employed in the public sector, the odds of globalist sentiment decrease by 16 percent.

Contrary to my expectations, individuals with right-leaning political views are significantly less likely to be globalists in comparison to traditional nationalists. A one-unit movement toward the right leads to a 32 percent decrease in the odds of globalism. This finding could be attributed to far-right parties. While center-right parties usually represent business interests and should be more amenable to globalization, far-right parties tend to speak for xenophobic and strongly nationalistic individuals. The coefficient for Global Index is negative and surprisingly insignificant. I conclude that individuals do not support globalization or traditional nationalism based on their country’s level of global integration.35

Both individual- and country-level economic conditions are important for understanding the origins of globalist and traditional nationalist attitudes. Individuals who are higher-skilled or residents of countries with greater economic prosperity or extensive public social protection are significantly more likely to be globalists. Yet, economic theories provide only a partial explanation as political affiliation, sex, age, place of residence, and employment sector are also significant. It is clear that individuals are not only affected by their personal characteristics and

---

35 I substituted the KOF Globalization Index (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 2008) for the CSGR Globalization Index. The results are similar with three exceptions. GDP per capita, its interaction with Education, and Sex became insignificant.
experiences, but also by the political, economic, and social environment in which they are embedded. If we ignore this latter effect, much information necessary to comprehend individual perceptions of globalization and nationalism would be lost.

CONCLUSION

The conventional view of globalization, popularized by Friedman (1999) and Barber (1992), asserts that it produces two antagonistic groups. The first group opposes globalization because it supposedly diminishes national, religious, and communal differences. Instead, it embraces nationalism as a defense against the homogenization and instability wrought by global integration. In contrast, the second group supports globalization and opposes nationalism because the former may promote modernization and economic growth. But, the extant literature has not empirically examined whether individuals divide in this manner nor has it adequately theorized about how individuals choose between globalism and nationalism. Our current understanding of the demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors influencing this decision is, at best, partial. I have attempted to fill these gaps.

I first examined the distribution of individuals into globalists and nationalists to see whether a significant number of individuals remain nationalistic under globalization. I thus determined that Friedman’s conceptualization of the “Lexus” and the “olive tree” has merit. I found that the vast majority of individuals divide themselves in the manner he suggested. Roughly 62 percent of individuals in the sample are traditional nationalists, while almost 10 percent are globalists. Nationalism clearly persists at the individual level.

I argued that personal and national economic conditions explain the choice between globalism and traditional nationalism. Drawing upon the factor endowment model and theories
of support for financial liberalization, I asserted that a higher skill level (especially in wealthier countries) and perceived socioeconomic status correlate with globalism. I also proposed that residence in a more prosperous country or one with greater public social protection expenditures encourage globalism. In order to account for the fact that economic theories may only partially clarify attitude formation, I controlled for various political and demographic characteristics of individuals, as well as the degree to which a country is globalized.

I tested these arguments using data from 11,354 individuals in 20 countries in 2003. I used a multilevel multinomial regression model to ascertain whether the prior variables influence the choice between four attitudes: globalism, traditional nationalism, enlightened nationalism, and anti-ism. I focused on the determinants of the first two attitudes so as to address directly the “Lexus”/“olive tree” dichotomy.

The economic explanations for the formation of globalist and traditional nationalist attitudes are mostly supported. Higher-skilled individuals and citizens of higher-income countries are significantly more likely to be globalists than traditional nationalists. Furthermore, residence in a wealthier country increases the effect of skill level on the odds of globalism. Individuals with access to greater public social protection are also more disposed toward globalism. The country-level findings indicate that national characteristics must be considered when theorizing how globalist and traditional nationalist attitudes are constructed. However, an individual’s perceived socioeconomic status has no discernable impact.

As for the control variables, females and urbanites are significantly more inclined toward globalism, while older individuals, political rightists, and public sector employees favor traditional nationalism. Interestingly, the level of a country’s global integration has no effect on the odds of globalism compared to traditional nationalism.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest a few reasons for the enlightened nationalism on the part of some individuals (at least compared to traditional nationalism). It appears that the individual- and country-level economic factors proposed above are important for explaining this attitude as well (see Appendix D). For example, more educated individuals in higher-income countries are more likely to be enlightened nationalists than traditional nationalists. However, more theoretical and empirical work needs to be done in order to illuminate the degree of congruence between globalism and nationalist goals, at least in individuals’ minds. By pursuing this line of inquiry, the validity of the popular claim that globalism and nationalism are incompatible can be assessed and the probability that globalism reduces nationalism’s violent tendencies can be ascertained.

Two other limitations of this chapter suggest avenues for future research. First, the temporal domain of the empirical analysis is constrained to one year due to data availability. It would be useful to know how attitudes toward globalization and nationalism change over time, especially given changes in the degree and form of global integration, as well as governmental responses to these developments. To answer this question, panel data must be collected.

Second, globalization and nationalism are analyzed in their totality. Little attention was given to attitudes toward specific components of globalization and nationalism (e.g. the role of international organizations, the importation of cultural goods). The concepts of globalization and nationalism should be decomposed to examine which aspects of these phenomena individuals accept or reject, when they do so, and the reasons behind these choices. There are many other directions for future research that will further clarify the sources of individual preferences for globalism and/or nationalism. But, this study’s theories and findings provide a useful starting point.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

Scholars and laypeople alike often consider nationalism to be a sentiment, an ideology, and/or a socio-political movement that should be avoided, especially by political leaders, government officials, and others in positions of power. The conventional wisdom maintains that nationalism has the potential to promote extremely violent international conflict and other atrocities (e.g. genocide and ethnic cleansing) and thus it is a phenomenon with primarily negative consequences. The fact that nationalism can foster a sense of community, belonging, and purpose among the members of a national group is frequently minimized, if not ignored. Instead, it is argued that the glorification of the history, myths, and attributes of a national group inherent in nationalist discourse and actions creates the social and political space for the marginalization or even the dehumanization of excluded groups. By constantly reinforcing national greatness at the expense of “inferior” groups, this dynamic leads to unbridgeable differences, irresolvable animosities, and perceptions of existential threat, all of which increase the likelihood of violence.

Despite the widespread acceptance of this argument, the extant literature does not adequately theorize about or assess the relationship between nationalism and violent international conflict. While there are some theories as to why nationalism might easily provoke interstate wars (e.g. Gagnon 1994; Hixson 2008; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Snyder 2000), the relationship between nationalism and other aspects of international conflict behavior, such as war
severity and duration, has received little theoretical and empirical consideration. For the most part, there are only brief references to or implicit assumptions about the connections between nationalism and these features of warfare. Due to this lack of scholarly interest, a comprehensive theory addressing the effect of nationalism on international conflict behavior has yet to be formulated.

Furthermore, any insights derived from existing theories regarding the mechanisms linking nationalism to interstate war are dubious because of inadequate hypothesis testing. The literature supports its conclusions primarily on the basis of a nonrandom sample of case studies, introducing concerns about generalizability. Determining whether nationalism in general raises the probability of interstate war initiation and increases its brutality and duration is difficult because our empirical understanding of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior is limited to particular countries and regions in specific historical periods (e.g. Yugoslavia during its violent collapse in the 1990s). In order to obtain an accurate description of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior, large-N quantitative analyses are necessary.

My dissertation addressed these problems in the existing literature by systematically answering three questions. (1) Does nationalism increase the risk of severe and prolonged international conflict? (2) If so, which types of nationalism are most likely to trigger or prevent sustained combat with massive fatalities? (3) What are the causal mechanisms connecting nationalism to such international conflict behavior?

I began by developing a comprehensive theory of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior, specifically in terms of war initiation, severity, and duration. I assumed that political elites have a military and/or economic goal for which they require mass
cooperation (or, at the very least, complacency). They then embed this goal and its related policies in nationalist rhetoric and images. Their reasons for doing so are twofold. First, nationalism leads to a common desire among the domestic population to protect its state regardless of the proposed methods and potential consequences because the state, in theory, expresses and ensures the nation’s unique cultural, historical, institutional, and/or ideological attributes. Second, through the medium of nationalism, the citizenry obtains a sense of shared beliefs, preferences, and attitudes in regards to war, diplomacy, cooperation, economics, and other common features of international relations. Elites can easily capitalize upon and manipulate this conformity of ideas, interests, and viewpoints to increase public approval of their policies and advance their objectives.

However, while these “nationalist persuasion campaigns” may seem relatively benign in that their primary purpose is to generate popular backing for the state’s military and economic projects, they have potentially negative consequences for both the nation and the international community. They can lead to several mechanisms that promote long and deadly international conflict. First, nationalism necessarily entails the delineation of a set of threatening “others,” which can descend into demands for their disempowerment, marginalization, even extermination. These demands create intense, long-lasting hostilities between the nationalists and their “national enemies” and the latter’s foreign allies. Second, nationalism lends itself to the construction and propagation of biased strategic assumptions in which other groups are depicted as more menacing, more stubborn, and more sinful, yet militarily weaker than they really are. Third, nationalism can produce both governmental and private interest groups that encourage sustained belligerent nationalist rhetoric and its attendant foreign policies for their own economic and political benefit. Fourth, nationalism provides elites with a persuasive
argument for the marginalization of opposition groups: they are a major threat to the “nation” and its interests and must be neutralized or eradicated. Fifth, nationalism can result in the formulation and implementation of unexpectedly more aggressive military policies due to “nationalist bidding wars” among elites and/or between elites and the masses.

These mechanisms may affect the probability of the initiation of long and deadly interstate wars to varying degrees depending on the form of nationalism present in a particular state. Since all nationalisms do not conceptualize nationhood in a similar manner nor do they emphasize the same features of the national community, their objectives and perceived “national enemies” differ. These differences in content can produce substantially different domestic political dynamics with diverse implications for the operation of the mechanisms linking nationalism to international conflict. Therefore, I developed a series of hypotheses regarding the effect of four types of nationalism (i.e. civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, and counterrevolutionary nationalism) on three facets of international conflict behavior, using the goals of each type of nationalism and its relative degree of cost-consciousness in foreign policy as inputs.

In order to assess the accuracy of the above argument connecting nationalism to various aspects of international conflict behavior, I operationalized and measured state-level nationalism from 1816 to 1991 and employed quantitative analysis to determine the direction, magnitude, and strength of the expected positive relationships. In other words, I collected original data on the existence and type of nationalism and eschewed the qualitative techniques that have dominated the literature and limited generalizability. Instead, I used summary statistics, cross-tabulations, and specialized regression models, all of which allowed for greater precision and use of control variables and thus produced more general conclusions. This methodology has not
previously been used in the literature and represents a significant advance in the study of nationalism and international conflict.

I find that nationalism contributes to the initiation of more deadly conflicts, but not necessarily to longer wars. Nationalism significantly increases both the probability that a state will initiate an interstate war and the number of battle deaths the war will include. The effect of nationalism on interstate war duration is more ambiguous. Nationalism in the initiator significantly decreases the length of war, while nationalism in the target significantly increases it, though only during the twentieth century. This result suggests that the aggressiveness of soldiers on the battlefield, encouraged via nationalism, combines with the more advanced military technologies of the last century to affect the relationship between nationalism and interstate war duration. That is, nationalist soldiers may tend to fight so effectively with the prevalent weaponry that the war may be shortened or lengthened, depending on which side they are on.

Not much more insight is gained on the empirical relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior when nationalism is disaggregated into its four variants. None of nationalism’s subtypes has an unambiguous effect on international conflict behavior that is consistent with the expected pattern of violent conflict, as demonstrated in Table 21. For example, if the initiating state espouses ethnic nationalism, the probability of interstate war initiation and the severity of interstate war significantly increase, but the duration of interstate war significantly decreases. In contrast, if the target demonstrates ethnic nationalist sentiment and implements the corresponding policies, the number of battle fatalities and the length of warfare are unaffected. A definite conclusion regarding the association between ethnic nationalism and international conflict behavior is further hindered by the fact that some of the
significant effects of ethnic nationalism appear to be of a larger magnitude than those of counterrevolutionary nationalism, even though the latter supposedly lacks inherent limits on its military ambitions and promotes open-ended external conflict (unlike ethnic nationalism). These results, as well as those of the other variants of nationalism, call into question the usefulness of differentiating among the types of nationalism when analyzing the relationship between nationalism and war. It is plausible that all forms of nationalism, though differing in their content, have similar dynamics prior to and during violent international conflict and it is this commonality on which scholars should concentrate their energy.

Table 21. A Summary of the Results Regarding the Relationship between the Types of Nationalism and International Conflict Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interstate War Initiation</th>
<th>Interstate War Severity</th>
<th>Interstate War Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiator</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary nationalism</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary nationalism</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary nationalism</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionary nationalism</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All relationships were expected to be positive and significant.
Given the general conclusion that nationalism encouraged the initiation of more lethal conflicts from 1816 to 1991, one may suspect that the international community might not have to concern itself as much in the future with the violent consequences of nationalism due to increasing global interconnectedness. Globalization is widely believed to decrease the salience of national identity and promote the emergence of supranational or universal identities (e.g. European, human), the construction of hybrid or plural identities (e.g. through dual citizenship), and even the reversion to local identities (Alonso 1995; Barber 1992; Blum 2007; Croucher 2004; Dogan 1994; Scholte 2005; Spencer and Wollman 2002; Spiro 2008). Yet, the empirical evidence described in the last part of my dissertation shows that this is not the case; national attachment and pride are still ubiquitous among individuals in more developed countries. I find that the continued prevalence of traditional nationalist attitudes, in comparison to more globalist ones, is the result of less than ideal personal and national economic conditions.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Since nationalism remains a widespread phenomenon, even in the advanced democracies allegedly being transformed by the cosmopolitanism inherent in globalization, and it has been linked historically with extremely violent international conflict, it is imperative that three things occur. First, political leaders, diplomats, international organizations, and the global community in general must appreciate the causes, dynamics, and potentially fatal consequences of nationalism around the world. Nationalism cannot be dismissed as a sentiment, ideology, or movement confined to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nor can it be considered a characteristic of the less developed countries that will disappear with substantial economic growth and development. The need to remain cognizant of nationalism’s destructive power is
especially true of the United States, which has an unfortunate tendency to misunderstand or
discount foreign nationalisms (Pei 2003, 35).

Second, methods must be devised that can effectively combat nationalism’s divisive
myths, symbols, rhetoric, and actions at both the domestic and international level. Centrist
politicians, professional journalists, intellectuals, human rights organizations, foreign democratic
governments, and other interested parties should try to persuade the relevant population (e.g.
through political campaigns, news stories, and international conferences) that these myths,
symbols, and rhetoric have little basis in reality and are the product of elite construction and
manipulation. These same actors should also promote attempts at dialogue between the citizens
and leaders of the nation in question and their counterparts in the supposed “enemy-nations” so
that tolerance and understanding may be achieved.

Third, the political influence and governmental accession of extreme-right parties and
leaders (e.g. the National Front in France and the Freedom Party in Austria) must be prevented or
mitigated. Otherwise, it is more likely that strident nationalist rhetoric will become acceptable to
the masses; myths emphasizing national superiority in relation to “others” will remain
unquestioned; and discriminatory policies, such as restrictions on citizenship rights, will be
implemented. As a result, both minorities and foreigners will feel increasingly alienated,
creating further division, animosity, and conflict.

These policy prescriptions are, however, complicated by the fact that nationalism can be
beneficial in terms of generating and maintaining domestic unity, cooperation, and stability. It
might then be prudent to avoid policies that try to eradicate nationalism completely from
potentially volatile states. Instead, the focus should be on neutralizing nationalism’s most
belligerent and divisive components with an increased emphasis on inclusiveness.
FUTURE RESEARCH

In order to illustrate further the necessity of the above policy prescriptions and nationalism’s propensity to produce extremely violent conflict, I plan to follow four avenues of research, the first two of which will figure in the transformation of my dissertation into a book. First, I will analyze the relationship between nationalism and interstate war outcomes using quantitative techniques with the expectation that nationalist wars are fought to victory by one side (or stalemate), but not to compromise peace settlements. Second, I will complement my quantitative analysis of the relationship between nationalism and international conflict behavior with several in-depth case studies. Unlike past case studies of nationalism and war, my case studies will look for evidence of the five causal mechanisms at work. Thus, my case studies will be designed explicitly to complement my statistical analyses. Third, I will explore the theoretical and empirical connections between state-level nationalism, rebel nationalism, and the dynamics of civil war. Fourth, I will examine the role of nationalism in creating an environment conducive to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other war crimes.

The first extension of my dissertation will examine the theoretical and empirical connections between nationalism and the outcomes of international conflict. I suspect that the negotiation and implementation of compromise peace settlements are less likely (compared to victory by one side or stalemate) when one or more belligerents are nationalistic. Because the nationalist state’s opponent is often portrayed as a significant threat to national sovereignty, identity, and interests, it would be considered national suicide to make concessions. Even minor concessions (e.g. the release of a few prisoners of war) might be perceived as demonstrating national weakness and providing an opening for the enemy in their efforts to destroy the nation. Furthermore, many nationalisms are predicated upon military prowess and glory, which cannot
be easily reaffirmed through compromise peace settlements, especially when the nation agrees to substantial concessions (e.g. the return of conquered territory). As a result, nationalist states should be more inclined to fight until they are victorious, decisively defeated, or locked in a stalemate. Any of these outcomes can be construed as evidence of the nation’s martial spirit and unwillingness to surrender unless absolutely forced to. Surprisingly, the literature on interstate war outcomes has yet to evaluate such an argument, focusing instead on other probable determinants of war outcomes, for example war duration, rate of loss, military reserves, and issue salience (Slantchev 2004).

As for the case study component of my book project, I will carefully select two or three nationalist states and examine the intersection of their foreign and domestic policies to determine how well the theoretical mechanisms outlined above explain their international conflict behavior. Within each case, I will try to answer two questions. First, did the content and practice of that state’s nationalism mobilize popular energies to the tasks of war; provoke intense, long-lasting hostilities with “national enemies” and their foreign allies; propagate biased strategic assumptions; foster domestic interest groups that favored sustained belligerent nationalist rhetoric and its accompanying foreign policies; justify the suppression of the domestic opposition; and trigger “nationalist bidding wars” among elites and/or between elites and the masses? Second, if a sufficient number of these processes were in existence, did they play an integral part in bringing about long, bloody interstate wars that ended in either military victory or stalemate?

One might argue that there is little need for this qualitative research, given that Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict motivates my theoretical mechanisms and he provides several case studies to support his argument. However, he focuses only on states undergoing
democratization. It is quite plausible that these mechanisms also operate in democracies and autocracies. The United States and Israel are prominent examples of nationalist democracies with exceptionally violent foreign relations, while the Soviet Union is an example of an authoritarian regime with nationalist overtones and a strong and active militant history. Therefore, it would be more convincing from an empirical standpoint to investigate the domestic and international consequences of nationalist persuasion campaigns in different regime types. Scholars might then know whether the theoretical mechanisms linking nationalism to certain international conflict behaviors operate in diverse political environments or are confined to particular cases. Yet, complementing my quantitative analysis with qualitative research techniques and examining the likely outcomes of nationalist conflict are not the only means by which the relationship between nationalism and war can be further assessed.

Since the end of World War II, civil wars have replaced interstate wars as the most frequent and destructive form of armed conflict in the international state system. According to the Correlates of War Project, there were 23 interstate wars between 1945 and 1997 with 3.3 million battle deaths, but 108 civil wars with 11.4 million battle deaths (Sarkees 2000). The Armed Conflict Dataset identifies 225 major armed conflicts between 1946 and 2002, of which 163 were internal conflicts, 21 were “extrastate” conflicts (mostly anti-colonial wars), and only 42 were interstate conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 620). In addition, civil wars last on average about four times as long as interstate wars. The 108 civil wars in the Correlates of War Project lasted an average of 1,665 days, whereas the 23 interstate wars lasted only an average of 480 days. In fact, the average duration of civil wars in progress has been steadily increasing throughout the postwar period, causing the cumulative death toll to substantially exceed that of
interstate wars. These statistics indicate that it is increasingly imperative that scholars understand the origins and dynamics of civil wars.

Nationalism among the belligerents could be a key determinant of their behavior before and during civil wars. Therefore, I plan to explore the theoretical and empirical relationship between nationalism and various aspects of civil war behavior by addressing three research questions. First, does the presence of state-level nationalism and rebel nationalism make the relevant parties more likely to instigate a civil war and if so, how? Second, does it influence the civil war’s duration and make the conflict more destructive in terms of lives lost? Third, how does the existence of nationalism affect the outcome of a violent domestic conflict? Does it render a ceasefire or negotiated settlement more unlikely, given that nationalism may entail issues of culture, language, and religion, which are frequently seen as zero-sum issues and less amenable to compromise?

The extant literature has several problems which have hindered adequate explanations and analyses of this potential relationship. First, nationhood is often either equated with ethnicity or assumed to be based on a politically active ethnic group (e.g. a Minority at Risk). This tendency is problematic because nations can arise from groups whose membership criteria are defined not by ancestry, culture, language, religion, or kinship, but by respect for democratic political institutions or protection of a political and social revolution. For example, Toft (2009, 232) argues that “[w]hereas an ethnic group is a latent nation, a nation is a politically active group that demands greater cultural autonomy or self-determination.” Fox (2004, 720) has an equally narrow conceptualization of nationalism in that he defines it as separatism on the part of an ethnic or religious minority. Fearon and Laitin (2003) are also guilty of this conceptual confusion.
Second, due to the assumption that nationhood and ethnicity are roughly equivalent concepts, empirical research has concentrated primarily on ethnic wars and/or how shared ethnic or religious identity provides a basis for conflict mobilization and continuance (Ellingsen 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fox 2004; Lacina 2006; Reynal-Querol 2002; Sambanis 2001). Little insight about the relationship between nationalism and civil conflict can be gleaned from this research not only because of the mixed results, but also because measures of “ethnolinguistic fractionalization,” “religious fractionalization,” or “ethnic heterogeneity” are often used as the main independent variables (see, for example, Collier et al. 2004; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2001). These measures do not capture the degree of national fractionalization or heterogeneity, even in its ethnic form, because there is no reference in the operationalization procedures to the quest for national self-determination, independence, or autonomy.

Third, in the course of this empirical research on the origins and attributes of ethnic wars, ethnic conflict and communal wars are often conflated with nationalist wars in either the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable (conflict initiation) or the delineation of the relevant observations for studies of other components of civil war behavior. For example, Reynal-Querol (2002, 37) describes an ethnic war as “an episode of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status.” Such a definition implies that conflicts predicated upon the pursuit of national self-determination or independence and those based upon other ethnic or communal grievances (e.g. inadequate representation in the federal government or restricted language rights) have such similar causes, dynamics, and outcomes that they can be grouped together in the category “ethnic war.” However, given the
prominent place accorded to national self-determination and independence in the vast majority of definitions of the nation and nationalism (unlike those of ethnicity), it may be wrong to assume that these types of civil conflict are comparable in their fundamental nature. The maintenance of this problematic assumption will further produce inaccurate explanations of civil war behavior.

Fourth, the literature has yet to consider explicitly the role of nationalism in generating certain civil war behaviors because it has focused primarily on other causes. Political regime type, socioeconomic development and inequality, natural resources (Ross 2004), the balance of military capabilities (Cunningham et al. 2009), state capacity (DeRouen and Sobek 2004), credible commitment problems (Fearon 2004), and other conditions favorable to insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003) have been the correlates of civil war behavior most notably studied up to this point. The exclusion of nationalism from this list is intriguing because nationalist sentiment is sometimes mentioned as a motivation for rebels and their supporters (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 76).36

My research on the association between nationalism and civil war behavior will proceed in four separate, though related, directions. First, I will theoretically and statistically examine whether the domestic and international consequences of government-sponsored “nationalist persuasion campaigns” previously outlined (i.e. mobilized popular energies, the provocation of “national enemies” and their foreign allies, biased strategic assumptions, domestic interest groups favoring belligerent nationalist rhetoric and policies, the suppression of domestic opposition groups, and “nationalist bidding wars”) foster an environment amenable to the outbreak of civil conflict.

36 While most scholars suggest that the presence of nationalism among the rebels increases the probability of civil war onset, Misra (2008) argues that the failure of (civic) nationalism, especially in underdeveloped and developing countries, is a cause of civil conflict.
Second, I will explore social movement theory in hopes of deriving testable hypotheses about the relationship between rebel nationalism and civil war in both its revolutionary and secessionist forms. I will argue that, in order to overcome the collective action problem involved in mobilizing people for violent political action, dissident leaders take advantage of already existing social networks, community institutions, and other mobilizing structures to recruit supporters. One potential social network that dissident leaders can utilize is membership in a nation.

To capitalize fully upon this social network, these leaders must not only tap into existing “repertoires of contention” (i.e. collective behaviors with which the members of the national community have had some experience and success), but also employ framing processes that make participation in the revolutionary or secessionist movement attractive, even necessary. Successful framing involves identifying the injustices that afflict the national community (e.g. economic deprivation or restricted linguistic and cultural rights) and attributing them to the state or some other entity that is the intended target of the national movement. They need to frame the issues in such a way as to convince the people that (1) their problems are shared by the national community as a whole; (2) the conditions that produced their grievances are unjust and not inevitable; (3) the state is either responsible for their grievances or has the capacity to remedy them; and (4) they will succeed in pressuring the state to implement reforms, grant greater autonomy or independence, or be overthrown only if each member contributes to the success of the national movement. In order to construct this political reality, persuade citizens of its importance for their overall well-being, instill in the masses a new set of values and beliefs about the state, and attract more recruits, rebel leaders make use of the national symbols, myths, rhetoric, and customs that deeply resonate with the populace (Mason 2009, 77-80). In other
words, nationalism can be a key component to successful rebel recruitment, mobilization, and activities.

Third, I will consider whether and how the interaction of state and rebel nationalism influences the course of events in a civil war. I suspect that, depending upon its particular content, the extent of its dissemination, and its resulting policies, state nationalism can either generate or hinder favorable changes in the dissidents’ political opportunity structure. The presence of nationalist sentiment at the level of the state may alter its institutional features, political coalitions, or its repressive capacity to such a degree that rebel attitudes toward the likelihood, timing, form, and outcome of collective action are transformed (Mason 2009, 80-81). However, the content, strength, and demands of rebel nationalism may prevent, dampen, or further any changes in the dissidents’ beliefs and decision-making processes. The questions that then arise are (1) how do these contending nationalisms deal with each other in the political arena and on the battlefield and (2) what is the effect of this confrontation on civil war behavior.

Fourth, given that the members of a nation may not all reside in one specific territory, but may instead be divided between the inhabitants of the national homeland and a diaspora, it would be useful to examine the effect of diaspora nationalism on the behavior of the participants in a civil war. Diasporas, which are composed of people with a common origin who live, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic, religious, or national homeland, tend to be more nationalistic or extreme than the population of their homelands. For example, Hungarian-Americans are more interested in regaining the territories lost under the 1920 Treaty of Trianon than are those residing in Hungary. Similarly, Croats in North America supported the ultranationalist Croatian elites in the late 1980s and early 1990s, contributing to Yugoslavia’s eventual violent disintegration (Saideman and Jenne 2009, 265). Because diasporas are likely to
take their political preferences with them to their new country (especially if dispersion was forced), their politically mobilized members are more visible compared to their relatively moderate members, and the distance from their homeland protects them from the costs of nationalistic policies, diasporas seek to influence their homeland in various ways. They may fund insurgencies, send campaign contributions, and lobby their host governments for a favorable foreign policy, all of which may increase the nationalist sentiment and/or bellicosity of rival factions (Saideman and Jenne 2009, 266).

Lastly, since genocide and other war crimes are often an integral part of the most violent civil wars (Krain 1997), it makes sense to analyze theoretically and empirically the relationship between nationalism and these atrocities. It is widely believed that nationalism, due to its emphasis on exclusivity and national superiority, promotes genocide. The Holocaust, the slaughter of Bosnians at Srebrenica, and the mass killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda are examples of the intersection of nationalism and genocide. But, is there a general relationship between state and/or rebel nationalism and the commission of genocidal acts during wartime? The current literature on genocide suggests that there may be such an association. According to Bauman (2000), nationalism, as one of the core features of modernity, was a necessary condition for the Jewish Holocaust. Jones (2006, 292) argues that ethnic nationalism, when employed towards “ethnic minorities” by the dominant ethnic collectivity at the state level, carries “explosive consequences for intercommunal violence, including genocide.” Harff’s (2003) empirical analysis demonstrates that countries in which the ruling elite adhere to an exclusionary ideology (e.g. nationalism) were significantly more likely to have a state failure leading to genocide or politicide.
Yet, this literature leaves many questions unaddressed and unanswered. Under what conditions does nationalism promote such extreme violence, given that not all nationalisms lead to genocide and war? At what point does state and/or rebel nationalism lend itself to mass killing? Is there a threshold above which genocide becomes possible? Are particular forms of nationalism (e.g. ethnic nationalism) more amenable to greater atrocities and inhumanities than others?

While there are multiple theories attempting to explain genocide and many probable causes have been identified and evaluated, nationalism has yet to be thoroughly considered, which the scholarly neglect of the above questions demonstrates. Instead, research efforts have focused upon political upheaval, extra-constitutional changes, interstate and civil war, lack of democracy, democratization (Mann 2005), territorial and economic loss, and state insecurity (Midlarsky 2009) as possible correlates of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Other enabling conditions such as modern bureaucracy; cultures of violence; the combination of economic competition, scarce resources, and population growth; and difficult life conditions and their psychological effects have also been mentioned (Jones 2006; Shaw 2007; Smith 2009). However, nationalism may also be instrumental in bringing about genocide and other war crimes because it necessarily entails the construction of “others” who are inherently different from “us” and therefore possible threats to national identity, unity, sovereignty, and ambitions. Unfortunately, discrimination, disempowerment, expulsion, and extermination are all means of dealing with this perceived existential danger.
CONCLUSION

Nationalism is an ideology and movement that has not only survived, but flourished in the more than two centuries since its first manifestations during the French Revolution. Its influence has reached all corners of the globe, evident in the platforms of the extreme right parties of Western Europe and the state-building efforts of postcolonial Africa. However, nationalism has not been an entirely peaceful phenomenon, despite its promise to create a greater sense of unity, belonging, and purpose among a community of people. Instead, it has often fostered an environment conducive to extremely violent international conflict wherever elites have used it for their own political purposes. Even though globalization supposedly promotes the emergence of supranational or universal identities, the construction of hybrid or plural identities, and the reversion to local identities, the evidence suggests that it will not completely counteract the increased salience of national identity and nationalism.

What then can policymakers, diplomats, international organizations, and the global community as a whole do to neutralize the destructive tendencies of nationalism? The answer is not entirely clear and undoubtedly complex as the benefits of nationalism must also be considered in the formulation of any solution. The questioning of nationalist myths, symbols, and rhetoric; increased dialogue between “national enemies;” and the marginalization of extreme-right parties are possible components of a solution. But, in order to devise an effective response, more theoretical and empirical research must be done on the nature of the relationship between nationalism and violent conflict, as well as the mechanisms connecting these two phenomena. My dissertation represents a first step on the path to greater understanding and, as such, will hopefully convince other scholars of the necessity of this research agenda.
Appendix A: An Example of the Coding Procedures for Nationalism Using the Country-Year Unit of Analysis

Country Name: Belgium

Years: 1862, 1881, and 1891

War Initiation: No for 1862, 1881, and 1891

Existence and Type of Nationalism: Yes, ethnic for 1862, 1881, and 1891

Reasons: I coded the Belgian government as nationalist during the nineteenth century due to the presence and strength of Belgian “state nationalism.” This nationalism, largely fed by the memory of a collective past and latent hostility toward Holland, laid the basis for the revolt against William I. After gaining independence in 1830, the Belgian government actively worked to stimulate Belgian patriotism and a uniquely Belgian culture as a way of ensuring the future of the country. In particular, it promoted a “national” historiography and oriented cultural life in a “national” direction. This Belgian nationalism, which found support among middle-class liberals, Catholics, and the Francophone bourgeoisie of Brussels, increased in size and significance throughout the nineteenth century and strengthened state authority. While it was most evident in the arts, literature, and cultural life in general, it was prominent in politics as well. Belgian nationalists wanted to demonstrate the greatness of the Belgian nation through active foreign and defense policies. For example, they attached great importance to the accumulation of colonies in Africa (Lamberts 1998, 328-330, 343-346).

However, the efforts of the Belgian nationalists were ultimately divisive, undermining the very national unity they desired to construct. These national artificers chose French to serve as the voice of Belgium and to give linguistic unity to the new nation. The public and cultural life
of the whole country was largely dominated by the French. Secondary and higher education were accessible only to those who knew French. Flemish speakers, if brought to court, could not hope to be tried in their own language. French was the language of the provincial governments and even some of the municipal councils in Flanders. Flemish was reduced to the tongue of a second-class culture (Cook 2002, 80-81). Since participation in the Belgian nation was predicated on knowledge of the French language and culture, I coded Belgian state-level nationalism as ethnic during the nineteenth century.

In response to this linguistic marginalization, an increasingly popular Flemish movement emerged in the 1840s. Its first objective was to promote the study of Flemish literature and art with the eventual goal of establishing Flemish on an equal footing with French in education and government. Yet, the Flemish movement was not anti-state or anti-Belgium. Its proponents believed that Flemish history and culture were an essential, though neglected, part of the larger Belgian nation (Lamberts 1998, 328-330; Vos 1998, 85).

But after 1848, the Flemish movement made more emphatic political demands, such as the desire to completely rid public life in Flanders of Francophone influence and make Flemish the only officially recognized language in the north of the country (it was successful in making Flemish, along with French, the official language of Belgium in 1898). The French-speaking political establishment was unsympathetic to these demands. The state’s hostile reaction prompted many in the Flemish movement to lose their patriotic zeal for the nation-state of Belgium (Lamberts 1998, 328-330). Thus, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as Flemish ethnic and national identity began to assert itself, a Flemish sub-nation emerged within the greater Belgian nation (Cook 2002, 83). But, it was not until the shock of World War I that Flemish nationalists became further radicalized and raised the question of regional autonomy. It
is at this point that Walloon nationalism emerged as a reaction to the Flemish movement and the sense of Belgian nationhood began to decline among the masses.
## Appendix B: Nationalism and Interstate Wars, 1816-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War name</th>
<th>Year began</th>
<th>Initiator</th>
<th>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</th>
<th>Type of nationalism</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</th>
<th>Type of nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Spanish</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Anglo-Burmese</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cisplatina</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Russo-Persian</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russo-Turkish</td>
<td>1828</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru-Bolivia Confederation</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War of the Cakes</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First British-Afghan</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Turko-Egyptian</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguayan Dispute</td>
<td>1845</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican-American</td>
<td>1846</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austro-Sardinian</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Republic</td>
<td>1849</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Plata</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Anglo-Burmese</td>
<td>1852</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War name</td>
<td>Year began</td>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>Type of nationalism (if present)</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>Type of nationalism (if present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimean</td>
<td>1853</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Persian</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Austrian</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Spanish-Moroccan</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italo-Roman</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Papal States</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Sicilies</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Naples</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Mexican</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuadorian-Colombian</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple Alliance</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Union</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven Weeks</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British-Abyssinian</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Prussian</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russo-Turkish</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Egyptian</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonkin</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

189
## Appendix B (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War name</th>
<th>Year began</th>
<th>Initiator</th>
<th>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</th>
<th>Type of nationalism (if present)</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</th>
<th>Type of nationalism (if present)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbo-Bulgarian</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Siamese</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Siam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Japanese</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Italo-</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greco-Turkish</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-American</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>United</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Boer</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxer Rebellion</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Russian</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russo-Japanese</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Spanish-Moroccan</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripolitianarian</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Balkan</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Balkan</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian-Allies</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War name</td>
<td>Year began</td>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>Type of nationalism (if present)</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>Type of nationalism (if present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Turkish</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russo-Polish</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greco-Turkish</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian-Polish</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Soviet</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukden Incident</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaco</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi-Yemeni</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italo-Ethiopian</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Japanese</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Khasan</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalkin Gol</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: German-Polish</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: German-French</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russo-Finnish</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: German-Danish</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: German-Norwegian</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: German-Belgian</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War name</td>
<td>Year began</td>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>Type of nationalism (if present)</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>Type of nationalism (if present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: German-Dutch</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: Western</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: Italo-Greek</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vichy France-Thailand</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Vichy France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: German-Yugoslav</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: Great Patriotic War</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII: Pacific</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Kashmir</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli War of Independence</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Revolution</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himalayan</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Kashmir</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six-Day</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli-Egyptian</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Name</td>
<td>Year began</td>
<td>Initiator</td>
<td>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>Type of nationalism (if present)</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Nationalism (1 = yes, 0 = no)</td>
<td>Type of nationalism (if present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yom Kippur</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turko-Cypriot</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnam-South Vietnam</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogaden</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese-Cambodian</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugandan-Tanzanian</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Sino-Vietnamese</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran-Iraq</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falklands</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>counterrevolutionary</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ethnic</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Sino-Vietnamese</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>revolutionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>civic</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: An Example of the Coding Procedures for Nationalism Using the Interstate War Unit of Analysis

**Interstate war:** Serbo-Bulgarian War

**Start date:** 1885

**Initiator:** Serbia

**Target:** Bulgaria

**Existence and type of nationalism in the initiator:** Yes, ethnic

**Reasons:** I code Serbia as ethnic nationalist primarily because Snyder considers it to be so during the nineteenth century (Snyder 2000, 169-180). Since I incorporate an extension of Snyder’s theory of nationalist conflict into my argument, I use his coding where possible.

In the case of Serbia, the government promoted nationalism as a way of mobilizing mass support for the Obrenovic dynasty, various state-building projects, and international military actions. Most importantly, it used nationalism to protect the state’s independence in the face of potential threats from the Austrian and Ottoman empires. The public school system disseminated the idea that only a strong, unified state could defend the Serbian nation from foreign domination.

This nationalism was ethnic for three reasons. First, civic nationalism was virtually impossible. The civic-territorial institutions were too weak and disordered to serve as a basis for popular loyalty. The democratic procedures that existed were often violated, preventing liberal principles from flourishing. Second, the Obrenovic dynasty was seen as illegitimate because it could not claim any historic right to rule. In order to gain some semblance of legitimacy, it insisted that it would protect Serbian national interests from foreigners. Third, the state played a
central role in defining what it meant to be an ethnic Serb and rendering this definition salient for the populace.

The Serbian government’s actions prior to the war with Bulgaria were nationalist in nature. After an electoral setback in 1883, Milan Obrenovic sought to use nationalism as a means of generating popular support for a conservative government. An opportunity to do so presented itself when Bulgaria annexed Rumelia, a formerly Ottoman region populated by Bulgarians. Milan argued that any increase in Bulgaria’s size would shift the balance of power against Serbia and Bulgaria should compensate Serbia with some territory. When this suggestion was rejected, Milan invaded Bulgarian territory with disastrous results. Because nationalist manipulations were attempted by the government, I code Serbia as nationalist prior to this war.

**Existence and type of nationalism in the target:** No

**Reasons:** The Bulgarian state was non-nationalist for several reasons. First, it was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire according to the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. As such, it had to acknowledge the suzerainty of the sultan. Therefore, its independence was incomplete. Second, its foreign policy was dominated by Russian interests. While the Bulgarian government wanted to unite Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia with the Bulgarian state, it feared Russia’s reaction and took no action. Only after a secret organization undertook a coup in Eastern Rumelia to unite it with Bulgaria did Prince Alexander accept the union. Third, the period from 1880 to 1884 was characterized by constitutional instability and heated debate between the prince, the national assembly, and the political parties, not the desire for territorial expansion (see Hall 2000; Kellas 2004; Crampton 2005).
## Appendix D: A Conditional Model of Individual-Level Enlightened Nationalism versus Traditional Nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Level</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.485***</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.265***</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.207***</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.015***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.381***</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>-0.206***</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Level</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Index</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Social Protection</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.978***</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cross-Level Interaction                 |             |                |
| Education x Log GDP per capita          | 0.221**     | 0.081          |

| Variance Components                    |             |                |
| Var (u0)                                | 0.266***    | --             |
| Var (u1)                                | 0.023***    | --             |
| Var (u2)                                | 0.004       | --             |
| Var (u3)                                | 0.012       | --             |
| Var (u5)                                | 0.0002***   | --             |
| Var (u6)                                | 0.233*      | --             |

* *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01*


University of Michigan Press.


Cederman, Lars-Erik. 2002. “Nationalism and Ethnicity.” In *Handbook of International*


Correlates of War Project. *Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006*. Version 3.1. Online:


Diehl, Paul F. and Gary Goertz. 2000. *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor, MI:
The University of Michigan Press.


Gallup Poll. 2001. Telephone survey of 1,032 randomly selected U.S. adults, September 14-15. Question: “As a result of the terrorist attacks this past Tuesday, have you, personally, done or plan to do any of the following?” Display an American flag: yes: 82%; no: 18%.


Kellas, James G. 2004. *Nationalist Politics in Europe: The Constitutional and Electoral*


Mayda, Anna Maria and Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Why are Some People (and Countries) More


Washington Post/ABC News Poll. 2001b. Telephone survey of 506 randomly selected U.S. adults, October 7. Question: “Today the United States led air strikes on targets in Afghanistan, including military sites of the Taliban government and training camps of the Al Qaeda terrorist group led by Osama bin Laden. Do you support or oppose these U.S.-led air strikes on Afghanistan?” Support: 94%; Oppose: 4%.


World Bank. World Development Indicators Online (WDI) Database. Available at
Vita

Gretchen Ursula Schrock-Jacobson

Education
Ph.D.: Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, December 2010
  Major Field: International Relations
  Minor Fields: Comparative Politics and Political Methodology
  Dissertation Title: Fighting and Dying for One’s Country: Nationalism, International Conflict, and Globalization
  Committee: Douglas Lemke (Chair), D. Scott Bennett, Burt Monroe, Catherine Wanner (History)

M.A.: Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, 2006

B.A.: International Relations and French, Bucknell University, 2003

Grants and Awards
Program in Empirical International Relations (PEIR) Pre-Doctoral Teaching Fellow, Fall 2010

Program in Empirical International Relations (PEIR) Pre-Doctoral Teaching Fellow, 2009-2010

Bruce L. Miller Graduate Fellowship, The Pennsylvania State University, 2004

Teaching Experience
Graduate Lecturer, International Relations Theory, Fall 2010

Graduate Lecturer, Nationalism and International Politics, Spring 2010

Graduate Lecturer, Quantitative Political Analysis, Fall 2009

Graduate Lecturer, Introduction to International Relations, Summer 2009

Teaching Assistant, Quantitative Political Analysis, Spring 2009

Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Comparative Politics, Fall 2008

Graduate Lecturer, International Relations Theory, Summer 2008

Teaching Assistant, Introduction to International Relations, Spring 2008

Teaching Assistant, Multivariate Analysis, Spring 2006

Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Comparative Politics, Fall 2005