The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

School of Public Affairs

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: ITS IMPACT ON
IDENTITY, COMMITMENT, INTERORGANIZATIONAL
PERCEPTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR

A Dissertation in

Public Administration

by

George J. Woods, III

© 2008 George J. Woods, III

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

August 2008
The dissertation of George J. Woods, III was reviewed and approved* by the following:

James T. Ziegenfuss, Jr.
Professor of Management and Health Care Systems
Dissertation Adviser
Chair of Committee

Stephen P. Schappe
Associate Professor of Management

Robert F. Munzenrider
Associate Professor of Public Administration

Steven A. Peterson
Professor of Politics and Public Affairs
Director, School of Public Affairs

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School
ABSTRACT

Public organizations at all levels struggle to address complex problems in today’s global, interdependent world. Traditional, vertically-structured government institutions are now inadequate to solve the “horizontal problems” they face. The Department of Defense (DoD), one of many public organizations, has long faced challenges trying to solve complex, horizontal problems in the national security realm. Traditional service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine) solutions to military problems have long been unacceptable. This condition precipitated the 1986 landmark national security legislation known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). Recent changes in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2005 modified the GNA mandates and changed policy regarding how DoD conducts joint professional military education for its senior military officers. The policy’s intent focused on further enhancing joint acculturation—the desired change in cultural behavior and thinking of senior officers from each of the services through contact with officers from the other services—through changes in DoD’s senior service colleges for their resident students. The U.S. Army War College, one of DoD’s schools and the focus of this study, entered its inaugural year of the policy’s implementation as it transitioned to the new structure in Academic Year (AY) 2006.

Identity theory provided a useful framework to assess the impact these changes had on the students attending the U.S. Army War College. Both the sociological (macro) and social psychological (micro) literature on identity theory
were used to establish the theoretical foundation for this study. In addition to the identity theory literature, numerous Goldwater-Nichols Act studies are reviewed and gaps in the research identified.

The identity theory foundation was used to study the impact organizational change, stemming from the NDAA 2005 mandates, had on the U.S. Army War College resident class in 2006. A mixed-methods study was designed to test four hypotheses to measure the effect the organizational changes in professional military education had on the identity, commitment, interorganizational perceptions, and behavior of the resident students. 298 students were invited to respond to one of two surveys. The usable responses, amounting to 57%, were used to inform the quantitative analysis with sixty-one interviews conducted providing the basis for qualitative analysis in testing the four hypotheses.

In assessing the impact the organizational changes had on joint acculturation, the study determined that the changes did have a positive impact on some students’ identities as well as positive shifts in student perceptions of service members from other services. The study also found, that while changes in identity and interorganizational perceptions were malleable, changes in commitment were more stable and less adaptable in response to organizational changes. In addition, the study found behavioral changes demonstrated significant results, but in directions not predicted by identity theory.

Although the findings of this study advance the body of knowledge with regard to the impact organizational change can have on the identity, commitment, interorganizational perceptions, and behavior of its members, gaps still remain. The
study’s design, although appropriate for conditions pertinent to the U.S. Army War College, can be improved and used not only to better assess the impacts changes like these have on similar public organizations (i.e. other senior service colleges), but can also be used to assess the impact similar change strategies have in other public organizations. Such studies can assess the impact legislative, policy, and/or organizational changes have on vertical organizations’ efforts to better achieve horizontal solutions in today’s complex, interdependent world.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................ vii

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................... viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................... x

Chapter 1  Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1

Chapter 2  Literature Review ............................................................................................................. 13

Organizational identity and organizational identification ......................................................... 15
  Organizational identity ................................................................................................................. 15
  Organizational identification ...................................................................................................... 25
An integrative approach ................................................................................................................. 33
Organizational Identity and Identification in the U.S. Department of Defense ................................. 38
Gaps in the Research ....................................................................................................................... 43

Chapter 3  Methodology .................................................................................................................. 46

Purpose ........................................................................................................................................... 54
Research Design ............................................................................................................................. 60
Quantitative: Survey responses ...................................................................................................... 63
  Identification with Psychological Group (IDPG): Organizational Identity ............................... 64
  Organizational Commitment: Normative and Affective ............................................................ 65
  Interservice Perceptions: The Interservice Perception Instrument (ISPI) ................................. 67
Qualitative: Interviews ................................................................................................................. 72
Research design advantages ......................................................................................................... 77
Ethical considerations .................................................................................................................... 78

Chapter 4  Findings and Analysis ................................................................................................... 80

Quantitative Measures ................................................................................................................... 82
  Independent T-tests for ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY .................................................... 82
  Independent T-tests for ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT ............................................. 86
    Normative commitment ......................................................................................................... 87
    Affective commitment ......................................................................................................... 90
    Total commitment ............................................................................................................. 93
  Independent T-tests for INTERSERVICE PERCEPTIONS .................................................. 96
Measures of Behavior .................................................................................................................... 103
  Survey Response Measures .................................................................................................... 103
  Measures from Post-graduation Assignment Data .................................................................... 112
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2-1: The Organizational Identity Dynamics Model
................................................................................................................................. 36

Figure 3-1: The Joint Acculturation Model applied to the U.S. Army War College Experience
...................................................................................................................................... 51
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3-1: Faculty Classification by Type ................................................................. 59
Table 3-2: Survey Response Rates ........................................................................... 63
Table 3-3: Interview Demographics ...................................................................... 74
Table 4-1: Identity Mean Comparisons by Faculty Type .......................................... 82
Table 4-2: Identity Mean Score Comparisons for Respondents in Similar Groups ... 85
Table 4-3: Normative Commitment Mean Score Comparisons by Faculty Type ...... 87
Table 4-4: Normative Commitment Mean Scores Comparisons for Respondents in Similar Groups ...................................................................................................... 89
Table 4-5: Affective Commitment Mean Score Comparisons by Faculty Type ........ 91
Table 4-6: Affective Commitment Mean Scores Comparisons for Respondents in Similar Groups ...................................................................................................... 92
Table 4-7: Total Commitment Mean Score Comparisons by Faculty Type ............. 94
Table 4-8: Total Commitment Mean Scores Comparisons for Respondents in Similar Groups ...................................................................................................... 95
Table 4-9: Interservice Perception Mean Scores of Respondents’ Views (own Service and Others) by Faculty Type ............................................................. 99
Table 4-10: Respondent Ratings of Faculty by Faculty Type .................................... 102
Table 4-11: Respondent Duty Assignment Preferences Post-Graduation .......... 105
Table 4-12: Independent T-Test Results of Behavior by Faculty Type ..................... 111
Table 4-13: Post-Graduation Assignment Trends for Army Students .................... 114
Table 4-14: Post-Graduation Assignment Trends for Air Force Students ............... 116
Table 4-15: Post-Graduation Assignment Trends for Navy Students ..................... 118
Table 4-16: Post-Graduation Assignment Trends for Marine Students ................. 119
Table 4-17: Identity Salience .................................................................................. 123
Table 4-18: Identity Salience Intensity .................................................................. 130
Table 4-19: Curriculum, Student Composition, and Faculty Composition Effect on Joint Identity .......................................................... 131

Table 4-20: Factors’ Effect on Joint Identity ......................................................... 134

Table 4-21: Electives’ Term Effect on Students’ Joint Identity .............................. 138

Table 4-22: Independent t-test Results of Electives’ Impact by Faculty Type......... 139

Table 4-23: Summary of Test Findings ............................................................... 142
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This trek has been a bit longer and more arduous than I had anticipated. I could not have successfully negotiated the journey without the help and encouragement of many. I would like to thank my teaching colleagues at the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. Their encouragement and thought-provoking ideas kept me going. I would especially like to single out COL (Ret) Mike Pearson, the former Chairman of the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management whose encouragement and support started me down this path. I am grateful to COL Jim Oman, the current Department chairman for his support, most importantly in providing the time needed to complete this task in lieu of many other competing demands. Others at the U.S. Army War College also assisted in the process. Dr. Antulio “Tony” Echevarria, of the college’s Strategic Studies Institute, assisted me in receiving grant money to assist with the research. Without his advice and support I would not have been able to employ Mrs. Erin Girard who saved me countless hours of labor transcribing the taped 16 hours of interviews conducted for this dissertation. The senior Service representatives at the U.S. Army War College helped immeasurably in understanding their Services’ assignment policies and dynamics that affect assignments for the graduates from each of the Services. Thanks go to Col Rod Zastrow, USAF; CAPT Dave Armitage, USN; and Col John Terrell, USMC for their help. Tech Sgt Aaron Kavanagh, USAF too assisted in compiling USAF officer assignment trends since 2002. COL Elton Manske, USA provided his time and expertise as an Army personnel officer to understand U.S. Army assignment policy for senior service college graduates. Other thanks go to: COL Susan Myers, USA, for the many hours we discussed topics and strategies as my fellow doctoral student and car pool mate; Dianne Schoop and the Doctoral Studies Organization at Penn State-Harrisburg for their helpful tips; and COL (Ret) Dan Jensen and COL Joe Charsagua for their help understanding the reserve component perspective and assignment policies for Reserve officer graduates. Thanks also go to my committee, particularly Dr. James T. Ziegenfuss, who served as my committee chairman. Without his sage advice and encouragement I would likely have lost my way in this process. I owe a great debt of gratitude and thanks to the students of the U.S. Army War College class of AY06 for their participation in the study and their candid reflections during the interviews. Finally, thanks go to my loving wife, Beth, and to my family whose support and patience with me permitted me to pursue this endeavor and kept me grounded throughout the process.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Public organizations struggle to address complex problems in today’s global, interdependent world. Globalization, the internet and information technology boom, technological advances in transportation, and the rise of radical fundamentalist terrorism have significantly changed the complexity of the public problems governments face. Likewise, so has the complexity of the solutions required in addressing them. No longer can problems and their solutions be neatly assigned to one institution to solve. Kettl stated that the traditional, vertically-structured government institutions previously well suited to solve public problems are now inadequate to solve the “horizontal problems” they face today and into the foreseeable future (Kettl, 2005). Horizontal problems exist at the nexus between traditional institutions. To solve, they require more than hierarchical, vertical, and institutional capacity. Horizontal problems require the government’s institutions to work interdependently to create new capacity—designing and implementing multi-institutional policy and organizational solutions. Government institutions must be able to conceive policy and strategy solutions by spanning organizational and institutional boundaries to resource and implement the programs to achieve desired policy outcomes.

Homeland security is an example of a horizontal problem existing today. In order to secure the United States and its territories, coordinated and
collaborative efforts must be initiated and supported by several agencies. The Department of Homeland Security protects the borders, controls immigration, and inspects and secures the nation’s ports. However, the Department of Defense has responsibility for the air and sea spaces surrounding the homeland. Further, the Department of Justice and the Intelligence community provide international and domestic intelligence.

These “horizontal”, complex problems are ever-present today as the nation addresses foreign policy issues that require the integration of diplomatic, informational, military, legal, economic, technological, and agricultural capabilities synchronized to accomplish particular goals to achieve national interests. The nature of the operations currently being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States, and its coalition partners, face make the difficulty abundantly clear. Domestically, the U.S. government attempts to address horizontal problems trying to resolve complex trade issues, domestic education issues, and security issues. The recent response to the devastation Hurricane Katrina caused underscores the difficulties faced by local, state, and federal organizations providing timely and adequate emergency response to its citizenry (United States Congress, 2006). The desperation reporters observed and felt followed by the vicious finger-pointing that dominated the airwaves captured America’s attention (Keil and Murray, 2005), affected Presidential approval ratings (Harwood, 2005; Purdum and Connelly, 2005), and significantly affected the public’s trust in the government’s capacity to respond to catastrophes and other complex problems (Feldman, 2005).

To solve these complex interorganizational problems requires governmental and relevant non-governmental institutions spanning organizational
boundaries. Not only must they be capable of spanning boundaries and thinking interorganizationally at the same level (i.e. federal to federal), but they must also span boundaries to solve complex problems across multiple levels—the international, national, state, and local levels.

The Public Administration field has been addressing these complex problems. Their efforts are evident in the direction the literature and research have taken in the past two decades in several subfields within public administration—public policy, public management, and organization theory. Public policy theory and research has responded to the impact global changes have had. A change in emphasis from government to governance is one such shift. Changes in the field coming from the development of new paradigms challenging the basic assumptions upon which the old paradigms were built—an apolitical civil service, hierarchy and rules, permanence and stability, institutionalized civil service, internal regulation, and equality (Peters, 2001)—is yet another example.

Some dimensions around which these new paradigms are being organized include shifts: 1) from agents and programs to the tools used to accomplish government programs, 2) from organizational or institutional hierarchy to policy networks, 3) in outlook from a “public versus private” to a “public and private”, 4) in emphasis from traditional managerial skills (i.e. POSDCORB (Gulick, 1937)) to teaching enabling skills to equip public managers to function effectively across multiple organizations, and 5) in building repertoires of proven tools or solutions assisting public problem-solvers to address complex public issues in
more collaborative ways (Salamon, 2001). It is further evidenced in: the shifts needed in assessing how policy framing requires redefinition to remain relevant and government held accountable (Fischer, 2003); how the role government actors play has shifted from functioning less as an analyst to more of an entrepreneur (Radin, 2000) or deliberative planner (Forrester, 1999); and the “reinvented” government solutions proffered to address these public challenges (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; and Gore, 1993).

These changes described thus far require public and private actors to engage in perspective-taking outside their normal purview to address and solve complex, horizontal public issues. They must extend their vision horizontally, rather than maintain the traditional myopic perspective associated historically with bureaucratic, hierarchical organizations and institutions.

Likewise, public management has shown similar trends. Scholars from three major schools of thought: the American Society of Public Administration (ASPA) and the American Political Science Association (ASPA); and the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM)—collaborated during the first National Public Management Research Conference held in 1991 to define a new direction for the field. To form a new common definition and research agenda from a previously divergent agenda (Brudney, O’Toole, and Rainey, 2000, pp. 4-5), the organizations that represented these schools of thought agreed on a strategy to study not just the intersections of public policy and management, but more germane for this research, an emphasis on interorganizational relations among public managers (Bozeman, 1993, p. xiii).
Interorganizational relationships were not new as a concept. Rather its importance has become more salient in the increasingly complex domain. The shift to interorganizational relations emphasized less the public management’s roles and behaviors internal to their organizations—those traditionally associated with public administration—shifting more to an emphasis on the more complex external and interorganizational roles public managers were being compelled to assume. These roles, characterized by less power and authority; a need for increased cross-cultural understanding and communication; and the ability to function collaboratively and influentially in network structures, have assumed new importance in the research agenda. Scholars in this genre emphasize the study of the artistic, intuitive, principled, and inspirational aspects of leadership in public organizations (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985; Behn, 1988; 1990; and Barzelay, 1992).

From an organization theory perspective, Malone, Laubacher, and Morton (2003) liken the impact felt today to that experienced a century ago when the railroad and telegraph emerged and equate the current changes to a revolution. These drivers, among others, cause organizations to break into smaller, more autonomous groups, and emphasize inter-firm (or interorganizational) relationships as organizations are forced or opting to externalize functions previously conducted within their own organizations. Consequently, organization theory has adapted to contextual changes shifting from a primarily hierarchical and positivist-oriented study of organizations to one incorporating multiple perspectives in conceptualizing and studying organizations (Clegg and Hardy, 1999). As a result, new images have emerged to describe organizations such as using
computer or communications metaphors to describe them. Terms like connections and clustering (Buchanan, 2002), transmissions (through conduits and lenses), and connections through nodes, linkages, and voice (Putnam, Phillips, and Chapman, 1996) have entered into the organizational theory lexicon.

Post-modernists, another force for change through their challenges to the preconceived notions and assumptions of positivist-based theories, have forced scholars to critically reevaluate previously held conceptions. Thinking of organizations less as objects and more as socially constructed entities (Weick, 1995) has stressed the importance of communication and discourse. Language, increased differentiation and specialization, and the importance of identity and images attributed to organizations become more vital to understanding today’s reality in organizations.

From an American perspective, organization theorists have responded to these challenges. Adaptive theoretical approaches by Shulman (1996), Roberts and Grabowski (1996), and Malone’s (2003) technological view of organizations; Pettigrew and Fenton’s (2000) networked structural approach, and several frameworks viewing the human component of organizations such as Purser and Cabana’s (1998) self-managing teams concept have gained renewed importance in the field. Others like Cameron and Quinn’s (1999) competing values framework, Pasmore’s (1988) organizations as decision-making entities, and Argyris and Schon’s (1996) learning organizations demonstrate the field’s response to the drivers that create rapidly changing, uncertain, ambiguous, and complex environments, and demonstrate the field’s attempts to conceptualize and understand the changing nature of today’s realities.
Another theoretical approach—social identity theory—has potential for explaining, predicting, and changing behavior in organizations. It originated in the 1980’s from both sociology and social psychology. As a movement or genre, it has gained much more acceptance among European scholars than among American scholars. However, recently American scholars have given it renewed attention, specifically its modified versions as they pertain to organizational identity and organizational identification. Organizational identity, stemming from the sociological tradition, focuses on the effects of the “identity”—attributes and characteristics—people attribute to organizations, work groups, institutions, and other collective bodies (such as gender, race, etc…). Organizational identification, originating from social psychology focuses on understanding the processes by which organizational members internalize identity aspects of the organizations to which they belong.

The Department of Defense has long faced challenges trying to solve complex, horizontal problems in the national security realm. The nature of today’s security environment has been changing over the past 30 years. Traditional service (Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines) solutions to military problems have long been unacceptable. Missions such as Desert One—the failed Iranian hostage rescue in 1980—and operations in Grenada in 1983 provide but two examples that demonstrate inadequacies that typified the conduct of joint, or multi-service operations. Subsequent actions by the Defense Department further demonstrated its inability to find its own solutions to address these inadequacies. This inability to fix its own problems internally precipitated the landmark national
security legislation known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) passed in 1986 (Lederman, 1999; Locher, 2002).

The Act’s intent was to move the department from single-service solutions (sequential interdependence) to multi-service, joint solutions (reciprocal interdependence) to address increasingly complex national security problems. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has been widely recognized both inside and outside the Department for its impact on strengthening interoperability of the Armed Forces. It was touted as making the difference in the conduct of both Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 and the resounding victory in Iraq in 1991. Further, many have recognized the impact the Act has had on the way those who wear the uniform perceive themselves.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act established eight goals to achieve this outcome (Locher, 1996).

- reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian authority
- improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense
- place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant command for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands
- ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands are fully commensurate with the responsibilities of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.
- increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
- provide for the more efficient use of defense resources
- improve joint officer management policies
- otherwise enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DoD management and administration
One of those goals focused on joint officer management, the management of the Department’s multi-service officer corps, to promote and achieve a more joint perspective outlook amongst military officers (United States General Accounting Office, 2002). Previous management policies perpetuated service parochialism. Goldwater-Nichols Act changes relevant to joint officer management focused primarily on achieving this joint perspective among the most senior officers serving in the military by mandating each service meet minimums set in filling established joint officer positions and achieving minimum promotion rates among those who served in these positions. The eventual outcome envisioned would be to achieve a joint culture or identity among the most senior serving officers.

The method used to achieve this ultimate outcome was to expose officers to joint perspectives through joint professional military education and mandating officers filling at least one joint officer duty assignment for a two or three-year period. Since the Act’s enactment in 1986, the Department of Defense has achieved significant progress in planning and conducting joint operations as well as achieving a more joint outlook among its officer corps. Previous rules governed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act have created difficulties in meeting the supply and demand necessary to meet the Act’s joint management objectives. In response to this dilemma and to accelerate and expand joint perspective-taking, recent changes in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 (United States Code, 2004) approved and mandated changes in joint professional military education.
Joint professional military education has been delineated into two levels. Level one educates and arms military officers with rudimentary joint concepts to prepare them for possible future joint officer service. Level two, was conceived to be a more in depth treatment of joint education, restricted to specific institutions (three colleges within the National Defense University), and essential in meeting management objectives Congress established for the services. Joint education at the advanced level at the three designated schools was achieved by creating a joint educational experience with the combined effects of a joint curriculum designed and taught by a joint faculty (one third Army, one third Air Force, and a third Navy/Marine Corps) to a joint student body (the same mix as the faculty). Recent changes in law authorized by the 2005 Act and implemented by the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff have mandated changes to the Senior Service colleges’ faculty and student bodies (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

To achieve a more joint perspective yet preserve the unique contribution each service school (the Army, Navy, Marine, and Air war colleges) adds, each Service school’s faculty and student body must change to reflect a ratio of no more than 60 percent faculty from the hosting service with 40 percent being composed of a mix from non-host services. For example, the U.S. Army War College would have no more than 60% of its faculty and student body consist of Army personnel while at least 40% must come from the other Services. Previously, the faculty and student body at each of these Service schools might have been as high as 85% from the host service, allowing only 15% from the
others. The composition change at each of these schools would occur over several years and, when complete, would warrant awarding Joint Professional Military Education credit at the advanced level for its graduates once accredited.

Academic Year 2006 (August 2005 to June 2006) marked a transition year for the U.S. Army War College which entered its inaugural year of implementation of these structure changes. The transition provided a window of opportunity to measure the outcomes of these changes. The purpose of this research is to determine the effect the Officer Professional Military Education Policy’s (OPMEP) implementation at the U.S. Army War College, as a result of legislation embodied in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005, had on the organizational identity, commitment, interservice (interorganizational) perception, and behavior of the resident students in Academic Year 2006. The main purpose of the research is not to evaluate Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Rather, it is to investigate the impact the organizational changes had, as a result of the legislation, on the way the U.S. Army War College resident students defined or redefined themselves to determine if solutions like these could be applicable to the larger public administration field as a way to implement change in public organizations. Specifically, the research seeks to determine the effect the policy changes had on the joint and service identities of the students after a year of resident attendance. If the desired effects occur as hypothesized, the changes experienced in this situation may be generalized and applied in other conditions for other institutions for the purpose of development of interorganizational leaders...
and managers in the public sector as a way of addressing complex, horizontal problems.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

The horizontal problems being poorly dealt with by vertical organizations in the previous chapter that were attributed to Kettl, challenge today’s organizations. In an environment of increasing globalization and interdependency within and between organizations, how organizations cope with adapting their human capital to thrive effectively in multinational, inter-institutional, and merged or acquired organizations presents a complex challenge. Even routine issues of how a traditional organization deals with developing its leaders in the organization when managers move up the corporate ladder from a functional position to general management, presents a challenge. Both the simpler task and the more complex task currently concern many organizations, public and private. Of the literature available, identity theory—specifically social and organizational identity—provides a promising framework to examine how organizations can approach shaping the people within their organization to meet the demands their environment is placing upon them. Organizations and institutions functioning in the current environment give a plethora of examples. For instance, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force, a multinational organization, operates in Afghanistan. Private corporations create and dissolve strategic partnerships within their own country’s boundaries and abroad for specific purposes. Companies buy out other companies and have the option of either replacing the current work force in the company subsumed or must attempt to “reprogram” those they keep in order for them to adapt to the “new” organization. The
former option is risky in that the tacit knowledge employees from the subsumed company possess is no longer available to the new company. It is also an expensive option creating significant costs in turnover and expensive startup costs associated with socializing, training, and developing the replacements. The latter option has its drawbacks too because it creates a condition in which effectiveness declines initially as members of two organizations attempt to work together for the new one.

This study focuses on looking at the impact structural and procedural changes might have on changing the outlook its work force has on the organization. Specifically, it examines how organization changes in structure and procedure aid (or not aid) its work force in achieving a more global or organization-wide perspective using identity theory as a framework for testing or evaluating the effect the changes have on its work force.

Identity theory has become the product of two disciplines and their way of thinking about the issue. The sociological perspective, the macro identity approach, and the social psychological approach, the micro approach to identity theory, each provides a unique perspective on the same phenomenon. The review of the literature, in addition to describing the unique perspective viewed through each theory’s lens, will also address how behaviors, attitudes, and organizational change are understood and studied. The review first assesses the theory from the macro, sociological perspective, then transitions into an assessment of the micro, social psychological perspective.
Organizational identity and organizational identification

Organizational identity and organizational identification stem from two theoretical foundations, identity theory and social identity theory. Identity theory, a sociologically-based theory (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995) and often termed the “macro” perspective of organizational identity, examines how social structures affect the structure of self and how structure of the self then influences social behaviors. Social identity theory, on the other hand, originated from psychology (Hogg, et. al, 1995) and ignores the structural effects on self. Rather it focuses on examining the internal dynamics of self-processes or how social processes affect identity formation (Stryker & Burke, 2000).

Organizational identity

Organizational identity, the first of the two theoretical approaches, originated from identity theory research and, as a theoretical construct, posits that by creating organizational roles that the organization’s members must enact causes the members to change their self-concept. They identify with the organization and construct themselves as a member of that organization. This self-construct then affects behavior in ways that benefit the organization. For example, a married fireman in New York City who has a family fulfills the roles created by New York City Fire Department and then, over time, views himself not just as a fireman, but as a New York City Fire Department fireman. When he faces situations where conflicting loyalties or roles collide (i.e. when he has to respond to a fire instead of attending his son’s birthday party) he chooses to respond to
the call of duty because he identifies with the organization: what the organization is and how it is viewed. Responding to the alarm is what New York City Fire Department firemen do.

As a theory, organizational identity has largely been attributed to Albert and Whetten (1985, 2004) and defines organizational identity as those features organizational members collectively attribute to their organization. These features are “central, distinctive, and enduring.” Central features describe or define an organization’s essence. Distinguishing features set one organization apart from another. Distinguishing features can represent either a monolithic or dualistic quality to the organization. Monolithic qualities pertain to the entire organization and imply the organization possesses a singular characteristic. In the military, the United States Marine Corps probably best exemplifies this. Marines characterize themselves as a monolithic entity which affects the personal identity each Marine possesses. Dualistic identities imply the organization possesses multiple characteristics that affect the roles members assume which affect their identity. Keeping with the military example, the Army is composed of several functional branches (Armor, Infantry, Aviation, etc…) which affect how its members identify themselves. They are all soldiers, but they also see themselves as tankers, infantrymen, and pilots. Enduring features add a temporal component to organization identity. They convey a sense of continuity or sameness over time. Together these features answer the questions for members and members-to-be—“who are we?” or “what or who do we want to be?”

Albert and Whetten’s approach to organizational identity stems from identity theory which is based on the works of Mead (1934) and further developed by Stryker (1968, 1980, and 1987a). Stryker’s modifications to identity theory postulate that the
“self” is a product of interaction between the person and the social context within which he or she operates. Their self-image is a collection of identities and reflects the multitude of roles people occupy in their lives. Society is made up of role positions people assume. These roles provide them not only self-meaning, but influence their behavior as well. In achieving self-meaning, people develop identities—the sum of multiple roles—hierarchically based on the salience of the roles played in their lives. Salience is affected by the number and strength of roles individuals occupy. Therefore, organizational identities, or the way individuals define themselves shift based on changes in the salience of the roles they assume.

Changes in organizational identity impact behavior. Behaviors change based on the roles members enact and their understanding of role expectations (Hogg, et. al., 1995). One might use the example of a sports fan in this case. The fan, from Philadelphia, may support multiple teams from the city and call himself an Eagles fan, a Phillies fan, or a Flyers fan. His loyalty to one team or another may be stronger because he views himself more as a football fan than a hockey fan. Therefore, his identity as an Eagles fan may be more dominant. Or the salience may be affected by the sports seasons. From April to September he may identify himself as a Phillies fan and from October to December he may identify himself as an Eagles fan simply because salience is affected by which team is currently in season and/or in the news or on the television sportscasts more frequently. Further, this identity influences the fan’s behavior. He acts how a fan of these teams is supposed to act. He wears team paraphernalia, cheers for the team, or displays other behaviors demonstrating team loyalty.
Modification and expansion of organizational identity theory’s basic assumptions and principles have occurred as a result of the research this theoretical approach spawned. Scott and Lane (2000a) developed a descriptive model depicting the process by which organizational identity construction occurs. Organizational identity emerges from “complex, dynamic, and reciprocal” interactions between and among managers, organizational members, and stakeholders. Organizational identity emerges as “negotiated cognitive images” as a result of interactions from these actors and become embedded into systems within the organization that promote its enduring quality. In this construct, organizational managers may not necessarily have concretely defined roles. Rather they negotiate those roles based on interactions within the organization. These negotiated roles then more accurately define who they are.

Research and conceptualization have expanded the organizational identity lexicon. Since socialization processes—how members are brought into the organization—are imperfect, perceived organizational identities emerged as a new construct. Perceived organizational identities are the imprecise definitions of the central, distinct, and enduring features characterizing an organization (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Further, organizational members develop collective thoughts on the central, distinctive, and enduring characteristics they believe outsiders ascribe to their organization. These shared beliefs, called construed external identities, affect behavior, identity, and identification (Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail, 1994).

Several concepts were covered in the previous paragraph. What might they look like in organizations? In the case of perceived organizational identity, employees come into an organization and might adopt a self-image different than what the organization
had designed or anticipated. As an example, a recruit attends infantry basic training. Upon graduation he perceives himself to be a warrior rather than a soldier. In Trefry’s definition (1992), a warrior’s role behaviors are a subset of those expected of a soldier. The Army may have desired to create a “soldier”, but the recruit perceived the desired identity was that of a “warrior.” The recruit may have misinterpreted what the most central, distinctive, and enduring characteristics of the Army based on his limited experience and preconceived notions of the U.S. Army. On the other hand, the recruit may have adopted the warrior identity not because it is an identity he constructed. Rather, it became an identity constructed based on what the recruit thought others outside the organization (i.e. society or his family) perceived the Army and its soldiers to be—the misconstrued external identity—the construed identity young recruits attribute to the organization, or the image society attributes to the Army. Perceptions of the organization’s members and the perceptions they think others have of the organization often affect the salience of factors that influence how identities form and are sustained in organizations.

Differences in construed organizational identities and organizational images—the characteristics organizational members want outsiders to attribute to their organization—change behavior within organizations, change the salience of roles affecting identity, and motivate changes in how identity is internalized. Organizational identity and image incongruence can elicit change. In proactive conditions, management may face two choices, align the identity with the image or manage impressions to convey a more appropriate image. Organizations can and should strive to align identity and image (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000a). Managers play the critical role in this process.
Identity and image alignment occurs when management inspires identity change through the use of aspirational, future-tense terms (Gioia and Thomas, 1996). Or they can, through hiring and firing in critical positions in management, portray an image more congruent with stakeholders’ perception of the organization’s identity (Scott and Lane, 2000b). In simpler language, management in organizations plays the key role in aligning their employees’ perception of the organization and the external stakeholders’ perception of the organization. If the two are out of alignment or will be, management can or is forced to take a reactive or proactive stance to align the two as part of a change strategy.

Threats to an organization’s identity affect behavior as well. When perceptions of a negatively construed external identity exist, thereby creating a threat, the organization’s members reconsider the salient aspects of their own organization’s identity. In the process they emphasize or perceptually alter those aspects of the organization’s identities that portray a more positive image, thereby restoring positive reinforcement to each member’s self-esteem (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996).

In other words, when an organization experiences a threat in its environment, employees tend to accentuate the positive aspects of the organization rather than the negative. They do this to protect the image of the organization to which they belong as well as their own self-image. In the wake of Abu Ghraib, soldiers rallied to defend the Army and themselves. They knew that they did not join a force that abuses prisoners, nor did they want to be viewed as belonging to an organization that did such things. Therefore, they denied the negative attributes, accentuated the positive, and management sought justice in punishing the guilty parties and restoring the positive image of the Army in the public’s eye and in the eye of the international community through the use of the
media. The Army initially met varying degrees of success, but has largely been successful in restoring its esteemed reputation over time.

Research examining the role of emotions in identity (Stets, 2005) reinforces this dynamic within organizations and sheds light on how this information affects emotional responses in workers. Workers’ feedback received was classified as either verifying or non-verifying. Verifying feedback reinforces worker’s identities consistent with their expectations. On the contrary, non-verifying feedback is incongruent with their expectations. Non-verifying feedback can be positive or negative. The Abu Ghraib example explained earlier serves also as an example of non-verifying negative feedback. An example of positive non-verifying feedback might come in the form of a compliment to the organization for doing something for which the organization’s members had no previous expectation or for which the organization is not known. For example, members of all the services are periodically lauded in the media for doing excellent work in adapting to nation-building activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Working with local councils, establishing and building infrastructure, and conducting negotiations between competing parties and receiving favorable feedback for these roles may be classified as positive non-verifying feedback. Service members may not have attributed nation-building as one of the central, distinctive, or enduring qualities of their service. Service members may adopt an identity as nation-builders and enact the requisite roles as a result.

Stets also found that the quality of role feedback received, how frequently workers receive role feedback, and who provides the feedback differentiated the workers’ emotional response. In his research he discovered that verifying and positively non-verifying feedback elicits positive emotions. Positive emotional reactions to feedback
also increase the salience of that role (Stryker, 1987a). By providing self-enhancing information and positive emotions, salience increases—thereby strengthening identity. With regards to frequency, persistent feedback (both verifying and non-verifying) decreases rather than increases affective responses. Stets posits that workers adjust to the feedback and make it the new standard by which they measure their identity, thereby inferring an identity change. Finally, the theoretical foundation from which Stets developed his hypotheses predicts that feedback provided from people familiar to the recipient would elicit more negative emotions. Contrary to theoretical predictions, he discovered that feedback originating from familiar sources did not significantly influence workers’ emotional reactions. In other words, feedback from familiar sources did not elicit the negative reactions expected.

Trends discovered in the organizational tendency to match identity and image, either proactively or reactively, have caused some to take issue with the “enduring” feature of organizational identity (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley, 2000a). Those challenging this notion conclude that enduring does not connote permanency. Organizations must adapt to their environment to survive (Thompson, 1967; Katz and Kahn, 1978). Therefore, identities must also adapt appropriately. Consequently, Gioia and his colleagues assert that a more accurate term to describe organizational flux and adaptability would be “continuity” or “continuous”. This means that organizations can reinterpret their defining features, yet retain certain core beliefs and values extending over time.

Scott and Lane (2000b) take issue with Gioia’s emphasis on the identity’s fluidity. They acknowledge that organizational identity must adapt, but counter that organizational
identity is neither static nor fluid. Rather they characterize the organization’s identity as having a “sticky” quality to it—that it has a malleable quality, essentially retaining its originality. Chreim (2005) explores and confirms this notion in her research into the continuity-change duality in various narrative texts used within a large Canadian Bank and the media articles reflecting others’ perceptions of that organization. Management’s distribution of messages, intent on changing their organization’s identity and image over time, and their response to stakeholders’ perceptions of their identity, present clear examples of organizational identity’s duality—its need to retain some of its essence resonating with its organizational members, yet responding to shifting environmental demands at the same time. These theoretical perspectives further accentuate the importance management plays in balancing the internal identity—how the organization and its members perceive the organization—as well as managing the external image the organization has among its stakeholders—customers, investors, clients, etc…

In reviewing the organizational identity literature, Pratt and Foreman (2000) identified three points of convergence that could advance the research agenda as well as points of friction interfering with the research agenda’s progress. The first point of conversion they classified dealt with identity and plurality. Organizations are collections of multiple, competing identities either individually or collectively in groups, suggesting that these identities benefit an organization’s ability to adapt to rapidly changing environments. Consequently, the second point of conversion follows, that multiple identity management can and should be an intentional and proactive process in organizations and constitutes a fundamental responsibility for top management. Finally, the third point of conversion—identity and power—suggests that power relationship
studies would aid in understanding which roles influence identity more significantly,
which should be subordinated, and other dynamic interrelationships and their effect on
identity.

In classifying barriers that prevent a fuller understanding of organizational
identity, Pratt and Foreman identify holes in the research agenda that, if addressed, would
aid in overcoming much confusion that exists in the multi-faceted field of organizational
identity. They found studies lacking because they fail to name identity claimants
(individuals or specific populations holding beliefs) and the targets (social groups or
organizations) they hold identity beliefs about. They also fail to delineate the identity
audience—a failure specifying who is viewing the identity. Finally, they lack clarity
defining temporal aspects of their research—when the identity existed, exists, or should
exist. Putting them together, they suggest continued research in doing identity or
multiple identity work should answer the following questions:

(1) where do identities come from? (theoretical origins and antecedents);
(2) where do identities reside? (identity claimants);
(3) to who or to what do identities refer? (identity targets);
(4) who is viewing the identities? (identity audience); and
(5) when are the identities? (past, present, future) (Pratt and Foreman, 2000).

Others concur regarding the diversity and complexity of the organizational
identity construct. They state it is a construct that is “seen to provide a relatively stable
component of the self-concept, at the same time it reflects the state of contextual
instability and flux that arise from both the diversity inherent within organizations and
the multiplicity of audiences to which organizations are accountable (Hogg and Terry,
2000, p. 152).” Echoing similar sentiments, Gioia, Schultz, and Corley (2000b) call for
an increased study of the organizational identity construct. Although they appreciate the
contributions made by the identification side of the dichotomy, they recommend a shift in emphasis away from the micro, the identification approach (the social psychologically-based theory to organizational identity to be covered below), because they think it too restrictive. Rather, they urge the field to place more emphasis on the macro, sociologically-based identity approach—the structural-individual interaction over the group process impact on individual self-concept formation. The other half of the dichotomy, organizational identification, presents useful research in understanding the self in social contexts.

Organizational identification

Organizational identification, the “micro” branch claiming explanation of organizational identity, stems from a social identity theory foundation and largely attributed to Tajfel (1982). Social identity is that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives “from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership (Tajfel, 1981, 155).” Social identification entails three components. First, the cognitive recognition of a group (or groups) exists. Similar to identity theory, groups (later extended to organizations) must be recognized by both its members and those outside the group. Second, an evaluative component must exist that causes members to make value judgments regarding the group. Finally, there is an emotional one that elicits emotional investments in both the awareness and evaluative components. Therefore, identification is experienced at both the cognitive and affective levels.
Turner (1985 and Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) extended Tajfel’s work by introducing self-categorization theory, a theoretical framework often cited or coupled with Tajfel’s work on social identity theory. Self-categorization theory elaborates on and enhances understanding of the processes that work in contributing to social identity. Self-categorization accentuates the perceived similarities between physical objects or people (including the self) belonging to the same category and the perceived differences between those belonging to different categories (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995). The accentuation is contextual and occurs based on distinct characteristics the individual deems important. The characteristics can include age, gender, race, or religion among many others. Motivation to seek membership and identification with a particular group, the in-group, occurs to fill two needs; to enhance self-esteem (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Hogg & Ridgeway, 2003) and to reduce uncertainty (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Combined, social identity theory and self-categorization theory account for a range of group behaviors. They include conformity, stereotyping, discrimination, and ethnocentrism (Hogg & Terry, 2000).

In essence, people seek membership in groups to satisfy their need for status and esteem as well as providing a degree of predictability and certainty in their lives. Belonging to an organization that reinforces aspects of the self can fulfill the esteem needs. For example, a child who identifies with or wants to become a teacher or a police officer because of what those positions represent to the child later has that need fulfilled as an adult by teaching in a school or joining a police force. Further, by belonging to organizations such as these, the adult then adds a degree of predictability and certainty to
his or her life because a teacher or police officer generally acts or behaves in prescribed ways, earns a salary, lives a particular lifestyle, etc…

Membership and identification with an in-group entails the process of depersonalization. In other words, the individual has to give up some of their autonomy in belonging to a group or organization. The cognitive representations attributed to one’s self and one’s group members causes members to see each as interchangeable or indistinguishable from one another (Yuki, 2003). As a result of depersonalization at the collective level, the group classifies norms or prototypical characteristics that define the behavior and other attributes expected of its members. Higher status is awarded within the group to those who represent the most prototypical behaviors and characteristics the group reifies. Those that best embody the defining characteristics are rewarded with higher status.

When members become dissatisfied with their group membership, one of three responses occurs: 1) members leave the group and, in the process, cease to conceive the group’s identity as part of their own identity; 2) they join a more positively perceived group; or 3) they make a distinguishing characteristic of their group (one that is perceived to be a more positively defining aspect of their identity) a more salient quality that now defines them (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, members of a college fraternity who perform poorly academically but perform invaluable community service might minimize their comparison fraternity’s academic achievements and accentuate their own group’s community contributions as a means of protecting their own self-esteem. Research suggests that the motivation to attain a positive social identity may affect or influence stereotype formation in group members’ minds. The group, although acknowledging
negative attributes of the in-group’s identity, tends to remember or make the positive aspects more salient in their definition of the group’s identity over time (Ford & Tonander, 1998).

Ashforth and Mael (1989) further adapted and applied social identity theory and self-categorization theory in organizational contexts—viewing organizations as a specific social context that often defines members’ identities. The distinctiveness of an organization’s values and practices provide the potential for enhancement of members’ self-esteem—an outcome consistent with social identity theory principles. They further posit that three likely effects result from organizational identification: 1) it likely enhances the support and commitment individuals give to the organization; 2) it likely enhances the group processes that achieve cohesion and employee loyalty; and 3) it may also enhance the internalization of organizational values. Ashforth and Mael suggest that socialization processes, like those Schein describes in the organizational culture literature (Schein, 1985), enable or assist the identification process. Consequently, they posit that leaders within an organization manage organizational identification by creating appropriate socialization processes and conditions for its members through manipulation of symbols such as “traditions, myths, metaphors, rituals, sagas, heroes, and physical settings (Ashforth & Mael, 2004, p. 145).”

Scholars have acknowledged the strength of organizational identification, that “the more one identifies with the group, the more one conceives of oneself in terms of the membership of a group…[and] the more one’s attitudes and behaviour [sic] are governed by this group membership (van Knippenburg & van Schie, 2000, p. 139).” However, the foci group members use strongly affects the level of organization identification. For
instance, work groups, as opposed to the larger organization, may provide more salient attributes that form members’ identities. Rather than identifying themselves as members of a particular corporation or company, they find more identification with divisions or departments within the larger organization. In a military context, Army officers often perceive of themselves as Rangers, or field artillerymen, or logisticians given their functional background rather than identifying themselves as Army officers. Likewise in the Navy, officers may view themselves as submariners, a fleet service officer, or a naval aviator. They even wear different colored shoes with their uniforms identifying them as such (i.e. the “brown shoe” Navy vice the others who wear black shoes). Size, status, and distinctiveness are several dimensions that affect the foci around which members define themselves.

Elsbach and Bhattacharya (2001) used the same principles taking the identity concept a step further by conceiving the concept of organizational disidentification. Organizational disidentification is motivated by individuals’ desires to affirm positive distinctiveness while avoiding negative distinctiveness. Individuals accomplish this by distancing themselves from organizations with incongruent values and negative stereotypes. In this case, the authors investigated organizational disidentification regarding National Rifle Association membership and identity. In other words, as the NRA becomes associated with negative qualities based on media coverage, members distance themselves from the association and no longer incorporate their membership as part of their identity. This is the process of disidentification.

Others expanded the model to include allowances for degrees of organizational identification. Kreiner and Ashforth (2004) determined four dimensions in their model:
identification, disidentification, ambivalent identification, and neutral identification. Identification and disidentification, previously defined, differ from the other two concepts. Ambivalent identification is defined as an overlapping or mixing of identities with an organization (i.e. being both proud and embarrassed to be identified with a particular organization) whereas neutral identification occurs when an organization’s members neither identify nor disidentify with their particular organization. The NRA example could suffice to explain this concept as well. NRA members may be both proud of what the NRA stands for when looking at its origin and being the embodiment of the Constitutional right to bear arms. They may also be embarrassed because of the political stance the organization has taken or how it is characterized in the press. This combination of factors may make them ambivalent about their membership and its affect on their identity. These expanded identification conditions are affected by two groups of factors, those characteristics inherent in the organization’s members (need for identification, individuality, and positive affectivity) and characteristics of the organization (i.e. image or reputation, and identity strength). Variations along these dimensions affect the degree of identification experienced by organizational members.

Research has shown that organizational identification is affected by a multitude of factors and that organizational identification mediates other factors associated with organizations’ members’ attitudes and behavior. Chen (2004) demonstrated that members who strongly identified with a particular group or organization achieved higher standards on the group’s stereotyped task. Their higher performance was attributed to a higher motivation to live up to the perceived stereotypical task. Identification is also highly contextual. Context changes over time and, in some contexts, certain categories
upon which an organization’s identity is based become more salient. When conditions existed to make organizational categorizations salient, researchers found the strength of organizational identification among members mediated extra-role behaviors (van Dick, Ulrich, & Christ, 2005). The values that serve as the core of individuals’ personal identities affect the degree to which organizational identity occurs (Hitlin, 2003).

Because organizations place demands on specific role behaviors stemming from strong organizational expectations and/or group expectations, Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) discovered the role organizational identification plays in mediating the effects of stressors and emotional labor experienced by an organization’s members. Likewise, when employees perceive their organization cares about them and perceived organizational support is high, strong organizational commitment usually ensues (Fuller, Barnett, Hester, and Relyea, 2003). Social identity theory predicts that contextual factors symbolizing an appreciation for its members are experienced as reinforcing messages expressing the person’s value to the organization. When the organization demonstrates its commitment to its employees via these contextual factors, the employee reciprocates with strong intentions to remain in the organization.

Others advocate the interactive or reciprocal nature of context and identity. Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2002) describe the effect contextual feedback has on a person’s identity. Feedback provides information about the person’s status within the organization. Therefore, the individual can experience feedback as reaffirming or threatening. A person’s reaction to feedback is further moderated by the commitment he or she feels toward the organizations and the strength of his or her identification with the organization. Witt, Patti, and Farmer (2002) found similar identification with occupation
versus identification with the organization moderated expressed commitment to an organization as a result of organizational politics. Those whose identity was occupation-based expressed less effect on their organizational commitment as a result of organizational politics than those whose identity was based primarily on the organization. For example, people identifying themselves as nurses in general (occupation-based) rather than a nurse at County General Hospital (organization-based) would be less affected by organizational politics than those who identified themselves based on their particular organization.

Identification and status within the in-group also affects the influence members are able to exert within an organization. In ambiguous or uncertain conditions, status—an outcome of in-group membership—affects the propensity for in-group members to be more easily and significantly influenced by another in-group member when compared with out-group members. Further, group membership affects perceptions of competence among social interactions. Those from the in-group are perceived to be more competent, and therefore more influential, when compared to the influence exercised by a member of the comparison out-group (Oldmeadow, Platow, Foddy, and Anderson, 2003). As an example, an Army officer facing nation-building activities that are foreign or unfamiliar to him is more likely to be swayed by advice given from a fellow Army officer as opposed to a contractor or a State department officer. The fellow Army officer has more influence over him because he is from the in-group and the other, who may have more experience, knowledge, or training in nation-building may have less influence on him simply because he or she is from an out-group. The Army officer looking for advice assumes that the other Army officer is more competent in this realm and therefore
weights his advice more heavily in deciding what should be done to accomplish the nation-building tasks.

**An integrative approach**

With globalization, information technology proliferation, and the explosion of available information, change in organizations is a constant. Knowledge of the context under which identity and identification occurs and affects results can arm organizational leaders with useful insights and approaches regarding organizational change dynamics and management using communication-based influence strategies (Chreim, 2002; Tyler, & De Cremer, 2005). Further, understanding identity and identification in organizations enhances a leader’s repertoire and informs a leader’s actions. More effective leadership occurs as a result of knowing the effect individual differences have in moderating the relationship between leadership style and enhanced organizational identification, thereby, influencing the many positive outcomes of organizations with higher member identification (Epitropaki and Martin, 2005; van Knippenberg, van Knippenburg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2005). When leaders are perceived as prototypical members of the in-group, their actions are more often perceived as being just (Lipponen, Koivisto, and Olkkonen, 2005). When combined with the awareness of other moderating variables, like need for closure, the organization perceives the leader to be more effective (Pierro, Cicero, Bonaiuto, van Knippenberg, & Kruglanski, 2005). Understanding identification also provides a framework from which to create a development process for leaders in organizations (Lord & Hall, 2005).
Understanding organizations today and how organizational identification transforms the way social reality is deconstructed and reconstructed in organizations to accommodate needed change (Reider, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005) is important for organizations to remain relevant in current contexts. Finally, in global, multi-cultural, and diverse work environments, understanding the implications and applicability of identity and identification processes has become an area of increased research interest. Research conducted across organizations whose composition includes members from individualistic and collectivistic-based cultures (Yuki, 2003), are demographically diverse (Brickson, 2000) or functionally diverse (Randel, & Jaussi, 2003), coupled with research focused on the impact of competing values and personal identities in the workplace (Herriot & Scott-Jackson, 2002) is important. Armed with this knowledge, leaders can be enabled to better cope with new and challenging organizational dynamics today’s globalized society and complex organizations create.

Though originating from two philosophically different disciplines, sociology and social psychology, recent work has been done to identify the similarities and differences as a way of steering the research agenda (Brown, 2001) and enlarging the macro (sociological) and micro (social psychological) explanatory power of these theoretical constructs. Stets and Burke (2000) claim differences exist in emphasis rather than in kind. They offer suggestions on how to develop a more generalized theory of the self. Social psychologists focus on understanding “who one is” while the sociologists concentrate on understanding the self by “what one does.” A comprehensive theory of the self would account for both being and doing in its structure. Deaux and Martin (2003) attempt to merge the macro and micro perspectives of identity and identification
by integrating interpersonal networks where people develop role identities with social
categories the context within which various aspects become more salient. The three
factors they combine include the larger context of identity created by factors such as race
or gender, strength of identification and characteristics of the person’s social network,
and the process of identity negotiation—a process influenced by salient characteristics,
status within groups, and the level of support received by the organization.

Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton (2000) argue that both organizational identity and
organizational identification are root concepts in organizational phenomena. Dutton,
Dukerich, and Harquail (1994) approach the problem by providing twelve propositions
associated with the organizational identification and organizational image interaction—an
organizational image can be both an antecedent to organizational identification and a
product of it. Brown and Starkey (2000a), applying psychodynamic constructs, offer an
alternative explanation as to why resistance to organizational identity formations and
organizational resistors to change occur. Later, they synthesize the literature and call for
further expansion by urging scholars to:

1) consider the irrational and emotional aspects of organizations;
2) include contributions from the psychodynamic perspective;
3) acknowledge a temporal component because identity is not static, but fluid to a
degree; and
4) acknowledge and account for the effect politics and other power-related aspects
have on identity and identification within and outside organizations (Brown & Starkey,
2000b).

Brickson (2000) sees several emerging commonalities. First, is the recognition
that individuals possess multiple self identities and that contexts determine which aspects
are most salient. Second, identification processes entail both static and fluid aspects
influenced by stakeholders (both internal and external to the organization) at all levels.
Third, managers are the linchpin because they are charged with authority and have access to the organizations’ resources. Therefore, they play the most critical role by shaping identification processes within organizations by questioning and altering their organization’s identities, negotiating images, managing the number and relationships between various identities, and manipulating the social context. Their power or influence in affecting the organizational members’ well-being and the vibrancy of their organizations can be far-reaching.

In response to, and as a result of, the various approaches, Hatch and Schultz (2002) link several concepts—identity, image, and culture—together to create an integrative framework for future research. The interaction of these factors creates four processes accounting for many of the considerations cited by other scholars and are depicted in the diagram below in figure 2-1.

---

Figure 2-1: The Organizational Identity Dynamics Model (Hatch & Schultz, 2000, p. 991)
The first process occurs as identity is *expressed* as a manifestation of the organization’s culture. Reciprocally, identity expressions *reflect* back to the culture further embedding the organization’s identity into its culture. Identity and image interrelate through *mirroring*, or the process of image-identity alignment as previously discussed. Finally, *impressing* is the process by which the organization affects, shapes, and influences the organization’s image. Mirroring and impressing subsequently affect the other two processes as well and vice versa. All four are interrelated and simultaneous, demonstrating the complexity of identity and identification processes with organizations as they relate to their external environments.

Identity is not culture, but they are “inextricably interrelated by the fact that they are so often used to define one another (Hatch & Schultz, 2002, 997).” In spite of this inextricable link, they have been distinguished from one another along three dimensions. Whereas culture possesses contextual, tacit, and emergent dimensional qualities within and of an organization, identity entails the textual, explicit, and instrumental dimensional qualities (Hatch & Schultz, 2000). They are so closely related that identity is embedded in the organization’s culture and becomes the expressed manifestation of cultural artifacts that provides meaning to both the organization and its members by reflecting that culture and to those outside the organization through the act of impressing them. The artifacts chosen to represent the culture to its members must also communicate the organization’s identity to outsiders (Hatch & Schultz, 2002, 998-1005).
Organizational Identity and Identification in the U.S. Department of Defense

Organizational identity is applicable to the U.S. Department of Defense. One purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, expressed earlier, was to move the department from single-service solutions (sequential interdependence) to multi-service, joint, solutions (reciprocal interdependence) by better managing its officer population. Through more effective joint officer management, the Act desired to promote and achieve a more joint perspective or outlook within its officer corps. Previous management policies perpetuated service parochialism. Furthermore, the Services within the Department of Defense have strong institutional cultures (Builder, 1989; Dorn and Graves, 2000). The socialization processes the Services have honed over the years have no comparable mechanism in the joint community (Meyer, 2004). Consequently, Service cultures play a more dominant role in determining how an officer thinks and behaves (Mastroianni, 2005) and, by extension, who he or she identifies him or herself to be. These identities are reinforced by the Services’ uniforms, languages, customs and courtesies, and other visible manifestations of their cultures. There is no equivalent joint uniform, language, customs and courtesies, or other cultural manifestations to offset the strong Service cultures to promote a Joint culture.

Many laud the Goldwater-Nichols Act as having significantly and positively impacted the way the Armed Forces operate since 1986 and, over time, see a joint culture emerging (Jones, 1996; White, 1996; Riscassi, 1997; and Locher, 2001). Others argue there is still room for improvement and urge further integration to increase jointness across the services (Sheehan, 1996; Shelton, 1998; Myers, 2003; Snider, 2003). There is
a natural tension in filling demands for joint duty assignments while meeting each Service’s own demands.

Concerns persist that each Service’s best and brightest were, and are still, pulled from their parent service to fulfill Congressional mandates to enhance jointness in the Defense Department. But this comes at a cost, or, at a minimum, at least creates a dilemma. With each Service’s requirements becoming more complex, requiring ever-increasing technical competence, time spent serving in joint assignments, away from Service-specific assignments, potentially affects the parent service negatively. Although joint culture is the desired endstate, key figures accept that it can only be achieved if officers who make up the joint community are experts in their Service first (Skelton, 2004).

As a result of Congressional, Department, Joint Staff, and Service interest in the impact the Goldwater-Nichols Act has had, significant research has been conducted analyzing the Act’s effect and effectiveness. Most of the studies focused on joint officer management. These studies assessed the Act’s impact on the Services, identified areas in which the Services did not comply with the Act’s directives, or identified obstacles the Services faced in achieving the stipulations addressed by the law. Some studies were comprehensive, others focused on particular aspects of joint officer management.

The comprehensive studies addressed all aspects of the Act’s implementation regarding joint officer management (United States General Accounting Office, 2002; Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 2003). They analyzed the Services’ performance record in meeting the mandates required by law, they looked at Department of Defense compliance with defining requirements and tracking progress, and they assessed joint officer quality
(skills and competence primarily) for those serving in joint headquarters. The most recent study by the RAND Corporation (Thie, Harrell, Yardley, Oshiro, Potter, Schirmer, & Lim, 2005) followed up an earlier study done by the General Accounting Office (2002) that criticized the Defense Department’s lack of applying a strategic approach to joint officer management. In response and subsequent to their analysis of the problems joint officer management experiences, the RAND researchers provided a framework by which the Defense Department can improve upon its ability to manage its officer corps from a joint perspective.

Other studies focused on particular aspects of joint officer management. Some dealt with officer management compliance looking at the supply and demand side of filling authorized joint duty positions (Harrell, Schank, Thie, Graf, & Steinberg, 1996; Schank, Thie, & Harrell, 1996). Others assessed the next phase of the Goldwater-Nichols Act based on a thorough analysis of future national security requirements driven by future threats and environmental changes (Murdock, Flournoy, Williams, & Campbell, 2004). Still others approached the analysis from a single-service perspective—the Army in this case (Davis, Shapiro, Nardulli, Bensahel, Rostker, Pirnie, Gordon, Orletsky, Hosek, Peltz, Halliday, Kassing, McNaugher, 2003). A Center for Strategic and International Studies second phase report assessed needed improvements to the 1986 Act and concluded that environmental demands required changes to the current Act. Consistent with their analysis, they made recommendations for new legislation both within the Department of Defense and recommendations for change that spanned all the departments in the Executive Branch (Murdock, Flournoy, Campbell, Chao, Smith, Witkowsky, and Wormuth, 2005).
Yet another study, a doctoral dissertation on joint management, looked at how the Act differentially affected combat officers and support officers in the Services. Given the differences in joint and service-specific requirements each category of officer had to meet, the study assessed the potential impact Goldwater-Nichols policies had on the overall culture. Because joint assignments assigned combat officers more to staff related functions then to job assignments performing their core warrior functions like command, the author argued that the policies were in fact changing the overall military culture from a warrior-centric culture to a more staff-like and bureaucratic culture—an area of concern from a military perspective (Medlock, 1993). Other studies assessed the criteria by which joint duty assignments were coded and classified (Schank, Thie, Kawata, Harrell, Graf, & Steinberg, 1996).

Finally, a large group of articles in the literature addressed another important impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). These articles discussed the direction JPME curricula in the Service schools needed to take to enhance joint officer development and management. They were primarily literature reviews and conceptual pieces, not research aimed at understanding the effect JPME II has on “jointness”, joint culture, or officer identity and commitment measures. Most of the arguments assessed favored incorporating JPME II at all Service schools (Kenney, 1996; Pasierb, 1998), at all levels (Carney, 1999), and/or to create a more holistic and integrated joint curriculum throughout an officer’s career (Carrel, 2000). The authors’ recommendations seemed more motivated to achieve equity and equal opportunity within the officer corps, increase the supply of potential joint educated officers, or a desire to enhance the force’s competency in conducting joint operations.
Of all the related studies mentioned, two provided potentially interesting understandings regarding joint officer quality. However, neither measured joint culture nor organizational identity or commitment. The first, done by Booz, Allen and Hamilton (2003), addressed many of the aspects of joint officer management and joint professional military education. They found that the Department of Defense had not met all its requirements, primarily in defining what “joint matters” means and what constitutes the desired qualities of the “joint specialty officer.”

Further, problems existed in the classification and number of joint duty positions that most accurately reflected the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s intent of joint duty assignments and the required number of positions needed to qualify officers for promotion to the flag (or general officer) ranks. The report marginally addressed some subjective differences of joint officers based on self-reports about the importance of joint education and joint experience on their career. The report did not specifically address factors such as the impact on joint culture or on attitudes joint officers had towards their joint duties. Further, these reports were based on data compiled by officers who had served in joint assignments only and did not compare them or their qualities to officers serving in the Armed Forces that had not served in joint assignments.

The second study also focused on joint officer development. This study, by the General Accounting Office (2002), took a comprehensive look at the impact the Goldwater-Nichols had on the joint officer corps. Its primary focus was on joint officer competence and how JPME II was linked to their actual joint duty requirements. For example, it assessed what aspects of JPME II were actually used on the job or what aspects of JPME II best prepared officers serving in joint duty positions for those jobs.
Like the other study, it only assessed or surveyed joint officers and did not compare that population to other officers serving in the Armed Forces to ascertain whether or not there was a difference in the quality or characteristics of joint officers compared with all others. Ultimately, the reports did not assess or address the impact the Goldwater-Nichols Act had or was having on officer attitudes or identity.

**Gaps in the Research**

Recognizing the gaps in identity research, structuring a research design focused on filling in those gaps, and applying the lessons learned from these studies can help government organizations immensely. They can assist in determining appropriate public organizational strategies for providing more effective government organizations like creating a Department of Homeland Security with workers from previously separate organizations into a single organization whose members possess a singular identity. It might help in devising policy or training and development programs for interagency coordination groups that seek to combine the power several executive departments can bring to bear to solve complex problems—not just in a crisis or for a short duration project, but for a sustained period of time. Finally, it may assist public organizations in more effectively applying solutions not just at the federal level, but across federal, state, and local levels as will be needed in response to either catastrophic natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina represented or in response to a catastrophic terrorist act within U.S. borders.
The research and literature reviewed to date demonstrates a gap in the research that this study intends to fill. As the review regarding the literature on the effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act reveals, no previous research found addressed the effect structure changes in joint organizations, as a result of joint policy, have on the identities service men and women form or develop. Nor does any of the research in joint officer quality use identity or commitment measures as a means of determining the effectiveness of policy designed to change the joint behavior of officers from diverse backgrounds based on cognitive and affective changes in the way they see and define themselves.

Further, as identified in the review of identity theory literature several gaps have been expressed.

1. where do identities come from? (theoretical origins and antecedents);
2. where do identities reside? (identity claimants);
3. to who or to what do identities refer? (identity targets);
4. who is viewing the identities? (identity audience); and
5. when are the identities? (past, present, future) (Pratt and Foreman, 2000).

Determining the effect, or lack of effect, organizational changes have on organizational identities and the effect they may have on organizational performance can inform like strategies in other public organizations as a means of improving interorganizational communication, cooperation, and performance. By understanding and changing the organizational influencers that shape the way the organization’s members answer the question—who am I—and how those identity changes are formed, when they are informed, and to what those identities refer may better assist decision makers in determining organization change strategies to achieve new ends in this ever complex environment to solve the many horizontal problems organizations today and, in the future, must resolve.
This study focused on an organization seeking to expand the capabilities of its members by expanding their interorganizational awareness and mindset to solve interorganizational problems they will soon face. Specifically, the study set out to examine the effect structural changes at one military senior service college had on the identity, commitment, and interservice perception of its resident students to accomplish a joint outlook and lessen service parochialism. Since Academic Year 2006 (August 2005 to June 2006) represented a transition year for the changes to be put into effect as a result of Congressional legislation in the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act at the United States Army War College, this study focused on assessing the effect these changes had on the resident students in attendance that year.
Chapter 3
Methodology

The Department of Defense has long faced challenges trying to solve complex, horizontal problems in the national security realm. The nature of today’s security environment has been changing over the past 30 years. Traditional service (Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines) solutions to military problems have long been unacceptable. Several demonstrated inadequacies in conducting joint, or multi-service operations—Desert One in 1980 and operations in Grenada in 1983—and the Department’s inability to find solutions to address these inadequacies precipitated landmark National Security legislation in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) in 1986 (Lederman, 1999; Locher, 2002). The Act’s intent was to move the department from single-service solutions (sequential interdependence) to multi-service or joint solutions (reciprocal interdependence) to the increasingly complex national security problems the Department faces. Of the eight goals the Act addressed, one focused specifically on joint officer management.

Joint officer management mandates focused primarily on achieving a joint perspective amongst the Department’s senior officers serving by establishing goals each service must meet in minimally filling specifically coded joint officer positions as well as achieving minimum promotion rates among those who served in these positions. The eventual outcome envisioned would be to achieve a joint culture, or identity, among the most senior serving officers. The method used to achieve this ultimate outcome was to
expose officers to joint perspectives through joint professional military education and mandating assignment to fill at least one joint officer duty assignment in an officer’s career for a two or three-year duration. Since the Act’s passage in 1986, the Department of Defense has achieved significant progress in planning and conducting joint operations as well as achieving a more joint outlook among its officer corps. Previous rules governed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act have created difficulties in meeting the supply and demand necessary to meet the Act’s joint management objectives. In response to this dilemma and to accelerate and expand joint perspective-taking, recent changes in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 (United States Code, 2004) approved and mandated changes in joint professional military education.

Graduates of these revised programs would be awarded Joint Professional Military Education Level II (JPME II) credit. Previously, only the National Defense University, whose faculty and student body consist of equal representation of officers from the land, sea, and air Services met that standard. However, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2005 changes approved awarding JPME II credit to the Services’ senior colleges’ resident students. All Senior Service Colleges must make these changes and achieve accreditation by 2009.

Senior Service Colleges (SSC), in general, educate senior officers (Colonels and Captains averaging 18 years of military service) and equivalent level civilians to prepare them to serve in positions of increased responsibility in devising and implementing national security policy. The Army War College entered its inaugural year in Academic Year 2006 transitioning to and seeking JPME II accreditation in accordance with the
Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

To achieve the conditions specified by the new law, both the faculty and student bodies of each of these colleges (the US Army War College in Pennsylvania; the Naval War College in Rhode Island, the Marine Corps University in Virginia, and the Air War College in Alabama) must migrate from a 15% population from other services to 40% representation. To achieve a multi-service perspective, officers from host Services would be combined with a faculty—one more evenly composed of officers from other Services—thereby creating a joint curriculum and joint environment within which students would learn. This effect would further be enhanced by the student body composition achieving the same mix. Theoretically, these shifts in demographics would produce graduates with a sufficiently “joint” orientation.

To date no common definition of what joint orientation means has emerged. Consequently, there have been no instruments created to measure the construct as the desired outcome or state-of-mind of the officers who have undergone both joint training and joint education at various Department of Defense schools. However, there have been abundant organizational studies conducted measuring such factors as identity and commitment. Both organizational identity and organizational commitment measures have been used in a variety of studies to assess the changes in individuals’ outlook or in assessing how these dimensions affect other outcomes such as retention, turnover, and effort for the organization. Therefore, for the purpose of this study identity theory serves as the theoretical foundation to measure the effect the 2005 National Defense
Authorization Act mandates have on the students in one of the Defense Department’s Senior Service Colleges.

How does identity theory or social identity theory help explain this desired shift in joint orientation? In both theories, “the self is reflexive in that it can take itself as an object and can categorize, classify, or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social categories or classifications (Stets & Burke, 2000, p. 224).” The process is called identification in identity theory and self-categorization in social identity theory. Identification occurs through a process of social comparison when a person, occupying a particular role, defines him or herself by the “meanings and expectations associated with that role and its performance…[which in turn] form a set of standards that guide behavior (Stets & Burke, 2000, p. 225).” Multiple identities can occur simultaneously. Which one is most salient at any given time varies depending on the person and the condition. Moreover, once formed identities are not permanent, they can and do change over time (Burke, 2006). McFarland and Pals posit that identity change occurs based on the context one finds him or herself in and the motive to achieve balance between one’s internal concept and the external view others hold of him or her (McFarland & Pals, 2005).

On the other hand, social identity theory self-categorization explains identity change through the creation of new in-groups and out-groups based on salient reference group characteristics. The person is then motivated to enhance their self-esteem by seeking higher status in the group. Identity becomes more internalized as they experience greater membership in the group. Full-fledged membership as part of the in-group enhances esteem which further increased that person’s self-categorization and identity.
In the U.S. Army War College scenario resident students are assigned to a reference group—seminars of 16-17 students with whom each student has almost daily contact from August to March of each academic year. Theoretically, those assigned to seminars with Joint faculty teams (faculty teams made up of more than one service) should experience a context in which “jointness” becomes a more salient contextual characteristic. Identity theory would posit that a subsequent desire to experience more internal balance in a joint setting should elicit a stronger expressed identity, a joint identity in this case, than the students in seminars taught only by Army faculty (one service). Social identity theory would posit that the joint faculty representation would likely have two effects. First, it changes the reference points from a single service focus to a multi-service focus within the seminar thereby, broadening the potential in-group (i.e. a Naval officer on the faculty team gives status to the Navy officer students who then experience higher status in the group in addition to the other services represented in that seminar by a faculty team member from their service). Second, the representation of more than one service on the faculty team makes it less likely that the Army (in the Army War College’s case) is the sole reference point for the students. This factor should theoretically cause students’ self-reflection within the seminar to reconsider their reference points and reflect on who they are (am I a soldier/sailor/Marine/airman or am I a joint officer?). The theory would suggest that identity change—from a service identity to a joint identity—would occur in seminars taught by a joint faculty team. Figure 3-1 provides a graphic depiction of the theory as applied at the U.S. Army War College.
Meyer, et al.’s conception of affective commitment, one’s “emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement with an organization (Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin & Jackson (1989, p. 152)”, is closely linked to a person’s identification with an organization. Further, in the midst of the structural changes the U.S. Army War College is undergoing, Herscovitch and Meyer’s study (2002) found that of the three components of commitment, affective and normative commitment were the two that demonstrated stronger associations with higher levels of support for change, and that the components combined to predict behavior. Therefore, affective and normative commitment measures were also incorporated as a way to measure the effect these organization structural changes were having on the resident students. Further, since organizational identity is a cognitive perspective of the self, commitment is an attitudinal measure and can aid in assessing the impact on more than one dimension.

Figure 3-1: The Joint Acculturation Model applied to the U.S. Army War College Experience
Measures of interservice perception changes were also assessed. These measures have long been used at the Joint Forces Staff College as a means of measuring attitudinal shifts among its students. The Joint Forces Staff College, one of the institutions granted authority to award Joint Professional Military Education Level II credit to its graduates, has used the indicators to show how shifts in interservice attitude occur at the conclusion of a 12-week intensive course. When students first arrive, the Joint Forces Staff Colleges administers a questionnaire, using ten dimensions, to measure the attitudes of the student’s own service as well as their view of all the other services. Initially, the students’ own service ratings are more positive than their ratings of the other services. At the end of the 12-week course the attitudes towards the other services become more positive and the difference between the students’ own service ratings and those of the other services become less salient.

The interservice perception measure is not a report that measures a respondent’s perception of him or herself across the ten dimensions assessed. Rather, it is a measure of how the respondent sees or perceives others in their parent service and stereotypical members of the other services. For example, two of the dimensions measure responses along an ambitious-apathetic continuum as well as a disciplined-undisciplined continuum. Asked to rate his or her own service along these dimensions one would expect a higher rating for the respondents own service on all ten dimensions compared to his or her response of other the other services on these same ten dimensions. At the Joint Forces Staff College they measure the shift in perceptions as a means of assessing joint acculturation. At the end of the 12-week course, they typically find the difference between the respondent’s measures of their own service differ little from their response
of the other services who they have just spent the past 12 weeks getting to know. The full ten dimensions used for the interservice perception measures will be described later in the study.

These three factors were deliberately chosen to triangulate measures to detect effects the organizational changes were designed to achieve. Triangulation, according to Denzin (1978), is the "combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon (p. 602)." Triangulating methodologies can be a mix of measuring, feelings and behaviors; direct and indirect reports; or obtrusive and unobtrusive observations (Jick, 1979). In this design measuring the dependent variable occurs in several ways. First, the primary dependent variable, organizational identity, measures a cognitive perspective the subject reports. The second variable is organizational commitment. It measures affective responses and reactions among the subjects. Organizational commitment is a construct distinct from organizational identity (Mael & Ashforth, 1995). However, there are thought to be similarities between questions used to measure Allen and Meyer’s affective commitment and Mael and Ashforth’s organizational identification measure, but they are yet untested (Feather & Rauter, 2004). The third quantitative measure assists in triangulating the effect the independent variable has on the subjects by measuring differences in their perceptions of others (interservice perceptions in this case), in addition to the self-perceived cognitive and affective differences already described.

Finally, what people want to do and intend to do often differ from what they actually do. Consequently, this research measures student intentions as well as a joint behavior equivalent. One assumes that if the organizational changes influence student cognitive self-perceptions and attitudes, the perceptions and attitudes would in turn affect
their behaviors. In this case, if the organizational changes succeed in creating students with an increased joint perspective one would expect the students to express intentions to seek joint assignments following graduation and/or demonstrate joint behaviors consistent with their newfound self-concept. Research shows that expressed intent does not necessarily predict actual behavior. Therefore, organizational identity and commitment self-reports do not guarantee behavior consistent with expressed self-concepts (Ajzen, 1991). Although questions in each survey measure intended behavior, separate measures were used to assess actual behavior. Measures of these factors discussed follow later in this chapter.

**Purpose**

The purpose of this dissertation research focused on assessing the impact the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act mandated structural changes had on the organizational identity and commitment of the resident student body at the U.S. Army War College. The study’s purpose is NOT to evaluate the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols Act nor does it specifically assess the effectiveness of the changes implemented in compliance with the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act changes. Rather, the study’s intent is to measure the impact these changes have on the students who attend the U.S. Army War College as a way of measuring the general effectiveness of organizational change strategies like this to assess if and how these strategies may be used as a means to achieve the same outcome in other organizations.
In Academic Year 2006, the U.S. Army War College found itself in the midst of transitioning to a new structure—a change in student and faculty demographics shift from what had been an 85% Army population and 15% other services to one in which no more than 60% of the student body and faculty composition could be from the U.S. Army. This structural change transition thereby created an opportunity to assess the impact the change had on the resident students attending studies during Academic Year 2006. The student body change fully met the criteria in accordance with the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, but the faculty change could not fully achieve the requirement until Academic Year 2007. Therefore, six of the twenty seminars’ faculty teams were composed of Army officers only—both active duty and retired officers. Fourteen of the twenty seminars had assigned faculty teams whose instructors represented more than one service, either active or retired officers.

In addition to the faculty and student demographic changes, the U.S. Army War College instituted a revised and expanded core course curriculum the entire U.S. student body was required to take.\(^1\) The change in curriculum was designed to better meet the Joint Professional Military Education requirements necessary for JPME II accreditation. This also had the effect of extending the time students had to interact with each other in their assigned seminars. They remained in these assigned seminars from August through March. Then from March to June, they participated with other students in other seminars based on the electives they took during the electives term.

\(^1\) The international students took a modified version of the one core course they missed with their U.S. counterparts to permit them to travel extensively to visit various Combatant Commands (i.e. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Miami) and other geographical regions of the country, including Hawaii (which included a visit to Pacific Command Headquarters) as part of their educational experience in resident study at the U.S. Army War College.
Given these conditions—a longer and more joint-focused curriculum as well as student and faculty demographic changes—identity theory suggests there might be a measurable and predictable difference in the way the War College students defined “who they are” based on their seminar experience. Those assigned to seminars that fully met the conditions established by the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, further refined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), and as implemented by the U.S. Army War College, could experience a change in how they identified themselves when comparing their service identity to their joint identity.

Therefore, using identity theory, as the basis for this study and using commitment, interservice perception, and behavior as additional measures to detect effects these organizational changes have on the resident students, four hypotheses were tested.

**Hypothesis 1:** Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service (called joint faculty) should express a significantly stronger joint identity than those students taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army.

The seminar at the U.S. Army War College is an important aspect of the resident students’ lives. Students, assigned to one of 20 seminars in the college, attend classes daily with the 16 other students assigned to their seminar. In addition, the seminars have assigned faculty teams—one instructor from each of the three resident academic departments—whose instructors stay with the seminar throughout the six core course curriculum\(^2\). The assigned faculty team also serves as faculty advisors each for a third of

---

\(^2\) U.S. students must take six core courses: Fundamentals of Strategic Thinking; Theory of War and Strategy; Strategic Leadership; National Security Policy and Strategy; Implementing National Military
the students in their assigned seminars. Therefore, they get to know their students very well. The seminar is the center of the students’ academic and social life in their year of study at the college from August through March. Seminar learning is based on an adult learning model and the Socratic method. Students arrive for class having done some preliminary reading. Faculty instructors, having designed the course and learning objectives for each lesson, guide the learning process using combinations of presentations—their own and numerous guest speakers—facilitation of student discussion, and structured in-class activities and exercises. The bulk of the learning, however, occurs in the interaction between students who examine, question, and seek to understand their own assumptions and perspectives as well as those of their fellow students. Interaction and learning is not just reserved for the classroom. Seminars typically have busy social lives as well. Students often organize the activities themselves while others are organized by the college. Frequently, in-class discussions continue into the social events where significant learning occurs. By the November/December timeframe, the students within each seminar know each other very well. Combined with a group they come to implicitly trust, students reflect deeply on how they think and feel about important and controversial issues in an atmosphere conducive to collaborative exploration of difficult topics. The point of this discussion is to demonstrate how much

Strategy; and Joint Processes and Landpower Development. The international students take five of the six courses. They travel during the Joint Processes and Landpower Development course and take a modified version of it upon their return. Each of the three teaching departments has responsibility for five of the six courses. The Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) is responsible for delivery of instruction for Theory of War and Strategy and National Security Policy and Strategy. The Department of Military Plans, Strategy, and Operations (DMSPO) delivers Implementing National Military Strategy. Finally, the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (DCLM) delivers both Strategic Leadership and Joint Processes and Landpower Development courses. DCLM has the responsibility for administratively organizing the Fundamentals of Strategic Thinking course which is course taught in the first two weeks of the academic year by each seminar’s faculty team.
of a focal point the seminar becomes for the students and to demonstrate how significantly the seminar at the U.S. Army War College differs from most graduate studies seminars. Because the seminar becomes the focal point of the students’ lives many build strong bonds and develop an appreciation for the differences experienced among the seminar’s members.

The seminar consists of seventeen students deliberately selected to create diversity based on several factors. Each seminar has two or three international officers. They are also composed of students from the other services. There are usually two U.S. Air Force officers, and either a Naval officer or a United States Marine officer in each seminar. Seminars also usually have two civilians who come from either the Department of Defense or agencies outside the department (Homeland Security, State, or the Intelligence community). Additionally, each seminar has two officers from the Reserve Component—one Reserve officer and one from the National Guard (either Army or Air). The Army officers assigned to each seminar vary in their technical specialties as well. They come from the ranks of operators, administrators, logisticians, and may include a Chaplain, a military lawyer, and/or a military medical specialist.

Given the diversity of perspectives and the close bonds experienced among the students and their assigned faculty team, the seminar becomes the focal point for the students for most of the academic year. Since the seminars are comparable across the various dimensions (service, gender, race and ethnic background, component and technical expertise), the difference experienced in academic year 2006 was the faculty composition. Six of the 20 seminars were composed of faculty teams whose instructors were only from the Army (retired and/or active) while the fourteen other seminars had
teams made up of instructors from more than one service. Civilian professors who had no previous service affiliation were neutral in determining the seminar categorization (see Table 3-1).

Table 3-1: Faculty Classification by Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall classification</th>
<th>Seminar</th>
<th>Instructor 1</th>
<th>Instructor 2</th>
<th>Instructor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>USA (Ret)/USA</td>
<td>USA (Ret)</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>CIV</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA (Ret)</td>
<td>USA/USA (Ret)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>USA (Ret)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA (Ret)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>CIV</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>USA (Ret)</td>
<td>CIV</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA (Ret)</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>USA/USA (Ret)</td>
<td>USA (Ret)/CIV</td>
<td>USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>USN/USAR</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>USAFR</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>USAF (Ret)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>USMC (Ret)</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>USA (Ret)</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>USA/CIV</td>
<td>USAF/USA</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>USA/USA</td>
<td>USA/CIV</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>CIV</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USA = Army, USA (Ret) = Retired Army, ARNG = Army National Guard, USAR = Army Reserve, USN = Navy, USMC = Marines, USMC (Ret) = Retired Marine, USAF = Air Force, USAFR = Air Force Reserve, USAF (Ret) = Air Force Retired, DOS = State Department, and CIV = Civilian

Theoretically, those with more than one service represented on their faculty teams should adopt a more joint outlook since those characteristics would likely be more salient.
than if the faculty team was composed of instructors from only one service background (Army only in the U.S. Army War College’s case). Further, measures of commitment, interservice perceptions, and behavior should reflect similar results and lead to three additional hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 2:** Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service should express a significantly stronger joint commitment than those students taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army.

**Hypothesis 3:** Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty only from the U.S. Army should express significantly stronger interservice perception differences than those students taught by faculty instructors only from more than one service.

**Hypothesis 4:** Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service should demonstrate a significantly stronger proclivity for joint behavior than those students who belonged to seminars taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army.

**Research Design**

Ideally, using a pre-test, post-test design would be most appropriate to ascertain the difference in identity, commitment, interservice perception, and behavior experienced during the academic year at the U.S. Army War College. Taking a measure at the beginning of the academic year and one at the end, then assessing the change would be the most appropriate way of measuring the impact of the year on the resident students. However, that kind of design would make it difficult to cull out the effect the changes AY 2006 versus AY 2005 had since no measure of identity, commitment, interservice perception, or behavior was taken the year prior. Further, in order to protect the students’ time, the U.S. Army War College was resistant to approving multiple surveys. Instead they preferred to minimize the number of surveys they asked students to respond to and
ideally preferred one survey to support the research. These factors ultimately affected the study’s design.

To minimize the number of times the student body were surveyed, only one measure was taken during the academic year. Hence, a singular post-test was given near the end of the academic year to assess the differences attributed to the organizational change. Two surveys were created. One measured the difference between service identity, commitment, interservice perception, and behavior (Appendix C). The other instrument measured the same factors from a joint perspective (Appendix B). Two sample populations were created by randomly assigning the students to one of two groups. U.S. students were randomly selected and assigned to one of two groups, the joint group and the service group as a means of controlling various biases and threats to internal validity (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, 2003, pp. 58-9). Both groups included students who had faculty composed solely of Army instructors (partial treatment) and those categorized as joint faculty seminars (full treatment). The students assigned in these two groups were invited to take either a service instrument or a joint instrument. The invitation to participate in the research was conducted in late April and early May in order to ensure sufficient time had transpired to experience the effect the yearlong resident study was supposed to elicit, yet with sufficient time to conduct interviews with selected students before the academic year ended and the students departed. The design used both quantitative and qualitative measures to assess the structural changes’ effect on the resident students. Students invited to participate in interviews were selected based on

---

3 International students were not involved in the study since their professional military education differed significantly and had no bearing on measuring U.S. joint professional military education policy changes.
the type of seminar they were assigned to—Army only or joint—and individually selected to create a population similar to the larger student body. For example, students were randomly selected based on gender, race, and component (service and active and reserve) to best replicate the demographics found in the entire student body⁴.

Two equivalent surveys were created. The first survey instrument measured joint identity, joint commitment and interservice perceptions. Half of the U.S. resident student body was asked to complete this instrument (see Appendix B). The other, a service survey instrument, was sent to the other half. It measured service identity, service commitment, and interservice perceptions (see Appendix C). The survey was sent to the students through electronic mail inviting them to respond to the joint or service survey instrument using Inquisite web-based software. Using the software minimized error that can occur when transposing data from manually completed surveys. Further, the software kept track of those who did and did not respond to the survey. Those who did not respond were sent two more invitations to participate in the survey invitation (an example is at Appendix A). To preserve anonymity for those students who responded, student survey responses were tracked using their student mailbox number rather than another form of personal information such as their social security number.

Overall, 298 U.S. students were invited to participate voluntarily. By randomly assigning the students to the two groups, 148 were invited to complete the joint survey instrument and 150 students were asked to complete the service survey instrument. As a result of no mailbox entries in the data, seven entries of the 84 who responded on the

---

⁴ The interview demographics are reported later in Table 3-3.
service survey were unusable. For similar reasons ten of the 103 survey responses for the joint survey instrument were also unusable. Without a mailbox entry in their responses, there was no way to link a respondent’s data to a specific individual. Therefore, one could not tell whether the data was from a student assigned to an Army only faculty seminar or to a joint faculty seminar. Response rates for the joint and service survey instruments were 70 and 56 percent, respectively. Usable response rates were 63 and 51 percent, respectively. Overall, the average usable response rate was 57% (see Table 3-2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey type</th>
<th>Invited</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
<th>Usable surveys</th>
<th>Usable rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Quantitative: Survey responses**

Both the joint and service survey instruments were built using a combination of three previously established and tested questions. The first measured organizational identity with modifications made to detect joint and service identity. The second set of questions measured organizational commitment and was modified to detect the degree or
intensity of joint or service commitment. The third measure used a continua of characteristics used to measure interservice perceptions of each service. The instruments chosen were adapted specifically for this research in creating the two instruments—the joint survey and the service survey. Both surveys were designed and administered using established ethical practices and approved by both the Institutional Review Boards from Pennsylvania State University and the U.S. Army War College.

**Identification with Psychological Group (IDPG): Organizational Identity**

Modifications of Mael’s IDPG were used to assess joint and service identity. Mael (1988) developed a measure of organizational identity to study college alumni organizational identity as part of his doctoral research. The Identification with Psychological Group (IDPG) instrument is a ten-question measure of organizational identity using a 5-point Likert scale structure (1= strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree). One item is reverse scored as shown below.

1. When someone criticizes the group, it feels like a personal insult.
2. I don’t act like the typical person of this group (reverse scored).
3. I’m very interested in what others think about this group.
4. The limitations associated with this group apply to me also.
5. When I talk about this group, I usually say "we" rather than "I".
6. I have a number of qualities typical of members of this group.
7. This group's successes are my successes.
8. If a story in the media criticized this group, I would feel embarrassed.
9. When someone praises the group, it feels like a personal compliment.
10. I act like a person of this group to a great extent.

For the joint survey, modifications replaced the word “group” with the phrase “the joint force community”. For example, question number 2 asked participants to respond to: “I don’t act like the typical person of the joint force community.” Likewise,
questions modified for the service survey instrument appeared like this: “I’m very interested in what others think about my service.” Questions one through ten were then combined in each survey to create a joint or service identity mean score for the sake of comparison. For those asked to respond to the joint survey instrument, joint identity mean scores were added for respondents from seminars with joint faculty teams and statistically compared with the cumulative joint identity mean scores from students assigned to the six seminars with Army-only faculty teams.

Mael’s IDPG instrument passed rigorous psychometric testing in development to support his dissertation. The psychometric properties have been reported in other research as his instrument has been adapted for use in numerous studies (Mael & Tetrick, 1992; Mael & Ashforth, 1995; Greene, 1999, 2004; Riordan & Weatherly, 1999; van Knippenberg & van Schie, 2000; Randel & Jaussi, 2003; Shamir & Kark, 2004; Feather & Rauter, 2004; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004; Lipponen, Helkama, Olkkonen, & Juslin, 2005; & Pierro, Cicero, Bonaiuto, van Knippenberg & Kruglanski, 2005). Reliability coefficient alphas ranged from .75 to .80.

**Organizational Commitment: Normative and Affective**

Meyer-Allen (1984) developed an instrument to measure organizational commitment. Their instrument included three components that, together, comprise organizational commitment. The three factors include: affective commitment (commitment based on feeling, believing and identifying with an organization or an occupation); normative commitment (commitment based on loyalty or an exchange for
benefits already received); and continuance commitment (commitment based on perceptions of limited options or sunk costs). The instrument is an 18-item, 7-point Likert scale measure. Meyer, Allen and Smith (1993) reported that “measures…were developed and found to be psychometrically sound. Analytic studies of the Affective, Continuance, and Normative Commitment scales have shown that they measure relatively distinct constructs (McGee & Ford, 1987; Allen & Meyer, 1990; Meyer, Allen, & Gellatly, 1990; Hackett, Bycio, & Hausdorf, 1992; Shore & Tetrick, 1991; Meyer, Allen, & Smith, 1993). The instrument’s reliability has further been confirmed independently and used widely by other scholars (Jaros, 1995; Cohen, 1996; Magazine, Williams, & Williams, 1996; Jong-Wook, Price, & Mueller, 1997; Culpepper, 2000; Feather & Rauter, 2004).

For the purpose of this research only affective and normative measures were used. Continuance commitment was not used since it has little relevance to the study and would lengthen the survey instruments used, possibly negatively affecting response rates. Further, to make the IDPG and commitment scales comparable, the commitment scale changed from a 7-point Likert scale to a 5-point one for this study. Therefore, the instrument used for this study was a modified 12-item, 5-point Likert scale measure. Previous research using the Meyer-Allen instrument measured commitment to both occupations and specific organizations. Since the respondents in this case, U.S. Army War College students, are not members of specific service or joint organizations while they attend the resident course, the occupational factors were used and modified for this study. Examples of questions modified from the original questions are shown below. Items reverse scored are so noted.
Normative Commitment Scale (NCS) (service survey instrument version).

1. I believe people who have been trained in my service have a responsibility to stay in the profession for 3 to 5 more years.
2. I do not feel any obligation to remain in my service. (reverse scored)
3. I feel a responsibility to my service to continue in it.
4. Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel that it would be right to leave my service now.
5. I would feel guilty if I left my service.
6. I am in my service because of a sense of loyalty to it (Meyer, et.al., 1993).

Respondents denoted a value of 1 for strongly disagree to a 7 for strongly agree.

Questions one through six were combined to create an overall affective commitment mean score.

Affective Commitment Scale (ACS) (joint survey instrument version).

1. Being a joint officer is important to my self-image.
2. I regret having entered the joint force community. (reverse scored)
3. I am proud to be in the joint force community.
4. I dislike being a joint officer. (reverse scored)
5. I do not identify with the joint force community. (reverse scored)
6. I am enthusiastic about the joint force community (Meyer, et.al., 1993).

Questions one through six were combined to create an overall normative commitment mean score. Affective and normative commitment scores were also combined to create a total commitment mean score for comparison sake.

Interservice Perceptions: The Interservice Perception Instrument (ISPI)

The InterService Perception Instrument (ISPI) developed at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) in 1994 and modified in 1997, has been used to measure perceptions and attitudes of service members for every resident class at the JFSC since the instrument’s

---

5 The term joint force community is a constructed variable. There is no joint service. Joint force is a recognizable term, but implies a particular organization and does not equate to a larger joint institution comparable to a service. Therefore, the term joint force community was the best acceptable term available that conveyed the meaning comparable to a service. The term was vetted and tested among students who would possibly take the survey.
creation. The instrument consists of ten word pairs measuring such traits as fitness, resourcefulness, discipline, and broadmindedness. Measures depict perceptions service members have of their own service and perceptions they hold of the other services with whom they interact in a joint environment. The scale stemming from the measures along each of these dimensions represents a mean value of the sum of the ten word pairs with 70 being the maximum. Students were asked to respond to the following word pair comparisons for their own Service and then for each of the other Services (i.e. Army rated their own Service, then completed a similar rating for each of the other Services—Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Lower scores on this scale connote a more positive perception while higher scores represent a poorer perception.

Students rated their perceptions of their own service first, then they rated each of the other services on the following dimensions:

- a. Ambitious 1 2 3 5 6 7 Apathetic
- b. Combative 1 2 3 5 6 7 Pacificistic
- c. Disciplined 1 2 3 5 6 7 Undisciplined
- d. High Tech 1 2 3 5 6 7 Low Tech
- e. Neat 1 2 3 5 6 7 Unkempt
- f. Broadminded 1 2 3 5 6 7 Parochial
- g. Physically fit 1 2 3 5 6 7 Out of shape
- h. Resourceful 1 2 3 5 6 7 Dependent
- i. Respectful 1 2 3 5 6 7 Disrespectful
- j. Unbiased 1 2 3 5 6 7 Biased

Since these questions were the same on both surveys, mean scores were developed for respondents from Army-only seminars and Joint seminars. Their scores for their own service were compared with the scores they assigned to the other services to create a mean difference score. The mean differences were compared to ascertain whether the students in the Army-only faculty seminars were significantly higher than
those found from reports of students from joint faculty seminars. The expectation is that a student in a joint faculty seminar should achieve or indicate a more balanced perception of the other Services in to be consistent with social identity theory (i.e. identity changes make reference group changes so the out-group members become in-group members).

**Measures of intent and actual behavior**

To measure behavioral intentions, students were asked to respond to the following question:

At the completion of the academic year most of you will be assigned to one of a variety of possible duty assignments. Assuming you will be reassigned and your service or component (active, reserve, or civilian) would support any assignment you desire, rank order the type of assignment you would like to have. When filling out this ranking complete it as if you would actually have to serve in this assignment. Please click the box to the left of your choices in priority order. If you make a mistake, please clear all boxes and try again.

This was the first question students were asked. They responded to this question before filling out any of the identity or commitment questions to encourage candid student responses prior to completing answers to questions either about their joint or service identity and commitment. Students rank ordered the following responses:

- Joint staff or multi-national staff duty (serve on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, NATO, etc...)
- Joint duty serving in either a Combatant Command or Joint Task Force (CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, JTF 6, etc…)
- Service duty assignment at the Institutional level (service school, training and doctrine, etc…)
- Service duty assignment in a field or operational assignment (i.e. command)
- Not applicable
- Other  (Please enter a brief description of the position you desire.)
One would expect that if embued with a stronger joint identity and commitment, then students would be more apt to rank order the first two choices rather than the two service options.

A subsequent question was designed to ascertain their motivation for choosing the top rank-ordered response in the previous question. Respondents could respond choosing one of four answers that best described their motive: it’s what I want to do; it’s what I have to do to remain competitive in my career; it’s what I have to do for other reasons (family, medical, etc…); or other (in which they would offer a brief explanation).

To measure actual behavior, two measures were used. First, the U.S. Army War College requires students to write and submit a strategy research paper on any topic of their choosing for grade. The topic is normally chosen in the September to October timeframe and evolves based on the student’s research. The students submit their papers for grade in March of each academic year. The papers should be focused on a national security issue at an appropriately strategic level. They must also meet a minimum length requirement. Reviewing students’ paper abstracts and coding them as joint-focused, service-focused, or other (interagency, theoretical, or historical) provided a means of assessing a behavioral manifestation potentially attributable to changes in the organization’s structure.

The second measure of actual behavior is an indirect one. Determining the trends in officer assignments post-graduation is another possible indicator of impacts of changes at the War College had on behavior. Although filling duty assignments is a complex process run by each service, post-graduation assignments are influenced by the service
members’ requests or desires. However, service member desires or requests are but one factor used to determine which assignment that service member will fill. Interviews were conducted with each of the service’s assignment personnel, but there was no fair way to determine how much individual preferences affected a graduate’s actual assignment after graduation. The data were not captured by these assignment officers.

Because of the difficulty in measuring the actual behavior of the respondents following graduation and realizing that their desire or request was only one factor among many in determining joint or service behavior, a variable for measuring joint or service behavior had to be constructed. The measures of intended behavior (i.e. assignment preferences) and actual behavior (research topic selection) were combined to construct this variable. To create a joint behavior measure, respondents were awarded points. If a respondent chose a joint assignment as his or her first assignment preference, the respondent was awarded three points. If the respondent chose a joint assignment as his or her second preference, he or she was awarded two points. If the respondent wrote his or her research paper on a joint topic, he or she was awarded one point. If the respondent chose a topic that was not joint, he or she received zero points. The same scale was used to create a service behavior measure too. This means each respondent could have a measure of both service behavior and joint behavior. However, when statistically measured using means across both conditions, differences should be possible to identify as identity theory would predict. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis was tested to determine the impact organization changes had on the student population behavior.
Hypothesis 4: Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service should demonstrate a significantly stronger proclivity for joint behavior than those students who belonged to seminars taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army.

Qualitative: Interviews

To better capture what might be behind the numbers generated by the quantitative approach described above, the design also incorporated qualitative data. To achieve a mixed-methods approach to the research design, 61 half-hour interviews were conducted with resident students. The students selected participated in either focus-group interviews or individual interviews. Of the 61 students who participated, one student’s interview was unusable due to a technical error with the recording equipment. However, since some manual data was recorded to summarize key points during the interview a summary of his responses was included in the quantitative data that emerged from the interviewees’ responses. Student selection was done by first inviting all students in the six seminars taught only by Army faculty members. These were intended to be group interviews. Nineteen students from these seminars voluntarily participated in the interviews, of which four of them were interviewed as individuals because of scheduling conflicts. Focus groups varied from two to seven people per seminar.

Originally, there were seven seminars coded as Army-only faculty seminars until the interviews for that seminar revealed that one of the faculty members in a seminar had previously spent 20 years in the Marine Corps, a factor not evident on the instructor’s biography. That seminar was then recoded as a joint seminar, reducing the mix of Army-only faculty seminars from seven to six. Among the remaining fourteen seminars, six
seminars were randomly chosen to participate in the focused group interviews. From the four other seminars not previously selected to participate, students from low density populations in the student body were randomly selected and invited to participate. These low density populations included students chosen because of service, civilian status, reserve component status, and gender. In all, 42 students from joint faculty seminars participated in the interviews compared to the nineteen from Army-only faculty seminars. 56 participants were men, 5 were women. More were asked to participate but did not volunteer. Participant demographic data appear in Table 3-3.

The actual percentage of participants, when comparing participants in Army-only seminars and joint seminars, matched their percentage among U.S. only students in the resident class—the target population—and slightly underrepresented for the overall population when the international students were included. The actual percentage (eight percent) of participation by gender equaled the overall percentage women represented in the class (the entire resident student body) and was close to their representation for the U.S. only student population (nine percent). The actual Reserve component participation population (20%) was a higher representation than their normal representation in the class among the U.S. only student population (12%) and the overall student population (10%). Of the uniformed participants, Army student participants (n=39) represented 71% of the total uniformed participants for the interviewees—a cut above the 60% they should represent for the U.S. military population within the resident class (i.e. the percentage mandated by NDAA 05).
### Table 3-3: Interview Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics of participants</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Actual Pct</th>
<th>U.S. Pct</th>
<th>Overall Pct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army only faculty</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint faculty</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Actual Pct</th>
<th>U.S. Pct</th>
<th>Overall Pct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Actual Pct</th>
<th>U.S. Pct</th>
<th>Overall Pct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Service category</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army NG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Reserve</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Reserve</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air NG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Marines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>US Marines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Coast Guard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>US Coast Guard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Army Civilian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of State civilian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The interviews were semi-structured (see Appendix F). The questions used for the interviews were vetted prior to the conduct of the interviews. Questions were modified accordingly. Structuring the questions used to prompt responses ensured consistency among the participants and focused on the identity changes each experienced (or not), to what degree they experienced these identities, and assessed which factors (curriculum, fellow students, and faculty in both the core course and electives term of the academic year) were most significant in affecting these identity formations. The students, whether interviewed in groups or as an individual, were asked the same questions during the interviews.

The questions first defined identity as:

that part of an individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a particular social group together with the value and emotional significance of that membership. In other words Service identity is the identity you define for yourself in terms of the membership in your particular Service (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, or Coast Guard). Joint identity is the identity you define for yourself in terms of the membership in the Joint Force Community (not Service specific).

Students were first asked which identity was stronger in their mind at that time. They were asked to explain why the one they stated was stronger in their perception. They were then asked to think only of the first term of their academic year (the core curriculum) and assess the impact of three factors—the curriculum, their seminar student composition, and their seminar faculty team composition—on their joint identity (since multiple identities can be active simultaneously) by rating them. Ratings were classified

6 This was the question directly quoted from the surveys. Interservice perceptions of the Coast Guard were measured because there was a student in the class from the Coast Guard, but there was only one. Therefore, there was no data presented in tables referencing the Coast Guard because it was statistically irrelevant.
as either: significant; moderate; slight; or none at all. In order to assess the weight they assigned to each of these factors, they were asked to distribute 100% of the effect on their joint identity to correspond to the degree of impact each one had on them individually. For example, one might respond that curriculum accounted for 40% of the effect while student seminar composition might have 30% and faculty composition 30%. Another might have an entirely different view on the distribution these factors had in affecting their joint identity. They were also asked to explain their ratings.

The second half of the interview focused on the second term of their academic year when they took electives and were separated from their parent seminar—exposing them to new instructors and students they had not known during the core course term of the academic year. Similarly, they were asked to rate the impact the same three factors had on their joint identity and distribute the percent each factor accounted for in shaping that identity (regardless of whether their identity shift was slight or significant). Finally, they were asked if any other factor positively influenced their joint identity anytime during the academic year.

Interviews were recorded on audio taped cassettes, converted to electronic files, and transcribed to Word documents for analysis. Consistent with ethical practices, no personally identifying information was recorded on the tapes and all participants were volunteers.

**Gender, race, educational background, and age.** Respondents were asked to identify themselves as male or female. They were also asked to identify their race as Caucasian, African-American, or Other. Respondents were asked to provide information regarding their education level (undergraduate, graduate, and/or post-graduate) and asked
to provide their age. Age in one study proved to have an effect on commitment scores (Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974). Naval officers attending the Army War College tend to be significantly younger, on average, than their counterparts from the other Services. Naval policy normally only affords these officers attendance at either an intermediate or the senior level military schools, rarely both. The data were gathered to determine whether age had any effect on the study.

**Research design advantages**

The study’s design had several advantages and appealing features. First, surveying the entire student population, the beneficiaries of the treatment, increased the study’s power and the significance of any potential findings. Second, the study was designed to ensure any findings, whether supportive of the hypotheses or not, could provide valid evidence that could be attributed to the independent variable. Controlling for differences in student body demographics and differences in curriculum, as has been done in this design, isolated the independent variable (faculty team composition) to support potential determinants of cause and effect through inferential statistical analysis. The design also controlled for potentially confounding variables, thereby enhancing validity and controlling for error. Third, the design and collection methodology permitted the conduct of T-tests to determine the significance of the findings by comparing the means of the groups (Joint faculty vs. Army-only faculty) (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, 2003, p. 270). Fourth, the design permitted using analysis of variance methods to examine both within-group and between-group variance thereby
increasing the effect of the study’s findings. Fifth, since respondents were surveyed late in the academic year (early May), the full effect the structural changes were designed to impact could be measured. Further, sufficient time remained in the academic year for the researcher to identify participants for interviews and assess the interviews for any new directions the research might take. The timing also allowed for a quick review of the data collected to permit time to address any new directions might need to take prior to graduation because the student body in its entirety departs to assume duties in a multitude of assignments around the world. Finally, the use of twelve focus groups, augmented by specially selected individuals, permitted the collection of qualitative data to add to the richness of understanding the study’s quantitative findings.

Ethical considerations

The study relied heavily on human participants since the data necessary could not be collected using secondary data or unobtrusive methods. Participation was voluntary and the risk to participants minimal to none. Consistent with ethical practices, student participation was clearly delineated as voluntary. The following introductory statement was used to emphasize the fact:

U.S. students attending the U.S. Army War College (civilian and military): Your participation in this study would be greatly appreciated. Participation in this research is entirely voluntary. Responses you make in the course of this study will be anonymous. Entering your student mailbox number is a method of tracking responses to gauge participation. Your mailbox will not be used for the purpose of attributing any response you make back to you. The data you provide will be aggregated and compared to other sub-populations within the U.S. Army War College. The data collected will assist the college and researcher in determining the effect organizational changes are having or might have on the U.S. Army
War College. *Entering data in this survey constitutes acknowledgement of this statement and voluntary consent to participate in this research.* Thank you again for your participation.

Similar declarations and warnings were used prior to student participation in group and individual interviews. The only caveat for group interviews was to warn students that anything others in the group said during the interview could not be attributed back to them individually. All participants acknowledged consent with their signature or with their movement past the introductory page on the web survey prior to anyone’s participation.

Further, the study’s design and data collection methodology protect respondent privacy. Student mailbox numbers are temporary indicators and would have to be matched with a separate list during the same academic year to directly relate an instrument to the respondent.

Both surveys and the instruction sheet read before each interview were approved by the Institutional Review Boards for both Pennsylvania State University and the U.S. Army War College consistent with the ethical practices when involving human subjects.
Chapter 4
Findings and Analysis

The purpose of this research was to determine the impact organizational structure changes had on the primary dependent variable—the organizational identity of its members. Secondarily, it also measured three other dependent variables: commitment, perceptions of others, and behavior. Specifically, the research sought to determine the impact curriculum and faculty and student demographics had on the resident students of the class of 2006 at the U.S. Army War College. Achieving more joint demographics in student and faculty composition intended to create a greater sense of jointness in the students attending the year-long resident course. Measures of service and joint identity were measured between two randomly selected sample populations. These measures were supplemented with three other dependent variable measures: commitment (service or joint), interservice perceptions, and behavior. Commitment measures incorporated normative commitment, affective commitment, and a total commitment score (the sum of normative and affective commitment results). Interservice perceptions measured respondents’ views of their own service as well as those they held of the other services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard). Behavioral measures included constructed variations of service and joint behavior.

Identity theory would predict that those students who received the full treatment of structural changes—a joint faculty, a joint seminar composition, and joint curriculum—should differ significantly from those who did not receive the full treatment
(i.e. experience the full structural changes). The following four hypotheses describe the results organizational identity theory would predict.

**Hypothesis 1:** Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service should express a significantly stronger joint identity than those students taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army (one service).

**Hypothesis 2:** Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service should express a significantly stronger joint commitment than those students taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army.

**Hypothesis 3:** Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty only from the U.S. Army should express significantly stronger interservice perception differences than those students taught by faculty instructors only from more than one service.

**Hypothesis 4:** Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service should demonstrate a significantly stronger proclivity for joint behavior than those students who belonged to seminars taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army.

Further, as a mixed-methods approach, the 61 student interview analysis should provide additional evidence to aid in explaining the results of the quantitative analysis regarding the four hypotheses above.

In situations where there are two experimental conditions and different participants have been used in each condition, the independent t-test is the appropriate statistical test (Field, p. 296). Further, since the two groups differed in size the pooled variance estimate t-test was used to account for the differences in sample size. This test had the effect of weighting the variance for each sample (Field, p. 298). Finally, since the research was based on organizational identity theory to identify specific predictions regarding the direction of the effect, one-tailed probability—by dividing the two-tailed results by two—was used (Field, p. 302).
Quantitative Measures

Independent T-tests for ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY

Hypothesis 1: Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service should express a significantly stronger joint identity than those students taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army (one service).

To test this hypothesis, an independent t-test of joint identity measures was compared between those respondents assigned to joint faculty teams and those with only U.S. Army instructor teams.

Results in table 4-1 show the compared means in joint and service identities between those in faculty teams classified as Joint and Army only. Directly testing the first hypothesis the following results were found.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-1: Identity Mean Comparisons by Faculty Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Levene's test significant at p < .05, therefore equal variances were not assumed
On average, participants in the Army only faculty team seminars experienced greater joint identity (N=20, M=3.47, SE=.06), than those assigned to joint faculty team seminars (N=73, M=3.43, SE=.053). This difference was not significant t(48)=.41, p>.05 (one-tailed test significance p=.34). Further, it had a small effect size r=.06.

Findings: The hypothesis was not supported. The results of the test were not significant.

One would expect Service identity to be stronger in seminars with faculty from only one service (Army only faculty seminars) than those students in joint faculty seminars. Since jointness in Army only seminars would likely be less salient, seminar students should, theoretically, be less likely to identify with a joint identity. Therefore, their strong service cultural development should elicit a stronger service identity when compared to service identities among students in joint faculty seminars. As an alternate means of checking the impact the changes had on the respondents, an additional test was conducted. A corollary to hypothesis one suggests that the service identity of students in the U.S. Army only faculty seminars should be higher than the service identity of the respondents assigned to joint faculty teams. To test this corollary, independent t-test measures of service identity were compared between the two groups. When compared, the following results appeared.

On average, participants in the joint faculty team seminars experienced greater identity to their services (N=58, M=3.53, SE=.05), than those assigned to Army only faculty team seminars (N=18, M=3.52 SE=.091). This difference was not significant t(74)=-.08, p>.05 (one-tailed test significance p=.47); further, it had a small effect size r=.01. Again, the results were not significant and the mean service identity score for
Joint faculty students (M=3.53) was slightly higher than the same score for respondents assigned to the Army only faculty seminars (M=3.52).

Findings: Although not specifically listed as a hypothesis to be tested, on average, students in Joint faculty seminars had slightly higher service identities when compared with the service identities in the Army only seminars. Since the results for this test were insignificant the corollary hypothesis that service identities in Army only seminars should be higher than joint identities was also not supported.

The results above depicted between-group comparisons of identity scores. Within-group tests were also conducted comparing the service organizational identity with the joint organizational identity for respondents in like conditions (i.e. Army-only respondents’ scores for service identity compared with the other Army-only respondents’ scores for joint identity) to determine if there were significant differences in their mean identity scores. Theoretically, service identity should be more salient than joint identity when faculty members represent only one service. Independent t-tests were conducted to determine whether the mean differences between these scores are significant and displayed in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2: Identity Mean Score Comparisons for Respondents in Similar Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty Type</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Effect direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.448</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-1.229</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On average, participants in the Army faculty team seminars experienced greater identity to their services (N=18, M=3.52, SE=.091), than to the joint community (N=20, M=3.47, SE=.063). This difference was not significant t(36)=-.448, p>.05 (one-tailed test significance p=.33). Further, it had a small effect size r=.07.

**Findings:** Although the results showed the effect was in the expected direction (i.e. service identity was higher than joint identity), the findings were not significant. Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that the corollary is not supported.

Likewise, within-group comparisons of joint identity scores among respondents in joint faculty seminars were also tested. On average, participants in the Joint faculty team seminars also experienced greater identity to their services (N=58, M=3.53, SE=.05), than to the joint community (N=73, M=3.43, SE=.053). This difference was not significant t(129)=-1.229, p>.05 (one-tailed test significance p=.11). The effect size here too was small with an r=.11.

**Findings:** Although the results of the independent t-test were non-significant, they approached significance at the p<.10 level. This finding suggests service identity
might be higher than joint identity—an effect opposite of what identity theory might predict.

Independent T-tests for ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT

Hypothesis 2: Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service should express a significantly stronger joint commitment than those students taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army.

As explained earlier, commitment measures would be done in three subcomponents 1) normative commitment; 2) affective commitment; and 3) total commitment (normative plus affective). Normative commitment represents the degree to which a person feels a sense of loyalty to the organization either out of a moral sense (it’s the right thing to do) or because of reciprocation based on benefits a person has received from his or her organization (I owe the organization my loyalty). A person is normatively committed to an organization when they feel they should belong to their organization. On the other hand, affective commitment measures the degree of commitment a person experiences as a result of the feeling of belongingness to the organization or occupation. A person affectively committed to the organization stays with an organization or occupation because he or she wants to. Since these concepts of commitment mean something slightly different, they were measured separately before being combined for a total commitment score to measure the effect structural changes had on individual commitment to either their service or the joint community.
Normative commitment

Results of testing normative commitment measures for normal distribution indicated they were not distributed normally. Therefore, non-parametric tests were used to assess the differences in means (Field, pp. 521-33). For non-normal distributions test differences there are two choices available: the Mann-Whitney test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. “These tests are the non-parametric equivalent of the independent t-test (Field, p. 522).” In this case, Mann-Whitney tests were used. Results are reported as M-W U in Table 4-3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative commitment</th>
<th>Faculty type</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>M-W U</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Effect direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>46.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.25</td>
<td>689.00</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>40.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.83</td>
<td>483.00</td>
<td>-0.480</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When joint normative commitment was compared between groups in the joint and Army only faculty seminars, test results demonstrated little difference between joint faculty seminar students’ joint normative commitment (Total M=47.25) and Army-only faculty seminar students’ joint normative commitment (Total M=46.08). Mann-Whitney test results showed U=689.0, Z(93)= -0.174, non-significant p(one-tailed)=.43, and small effect size r= -.02.
**Findings:** Students assigned to joint faculty team seminars did express a slightly higher *joint* normative commitment when compared with the *joint* normative commitment reported by students in Army-only faculty teams. The results were not significant however.

Likewise, as a corollary, one would expect service normative commitment to be higher than joint normative commitment in seminars with Army-only faculty members when compared with respondents in Joint faculty seminars.

When these non-parametric tests were conducted, the following results appeared. *Service* normative commitment (Total $M=40.67$) was higher than the *joint* normative commitment mean ($M=37.83$). However, Mann-Whitney test results $U=483.0$, $Z(76)=-.48$, with a $p$(one-tailed)$=.32$ were non-significant and had a small effect size $r=-.06$.

**Findings:** In this study, participant *Service* normative commitment was higher than joint normative commitment for those assigned to Army only faculty seminars than respondents in the joint faculty seminars. However, the results were not significantly conclusive.

Like the hypothesis for identity, one would expect that service normative commitment among students assigned to Army-only faculty teams to be higher than joint normative commitment. A within-group Mann-Whitney test conducted compared the strength of service normative commitment to the joint normative commitment of respondents from the Army-only seminars. Table 4-4 depicts the following results.
Students assigned to Army-only faculty team seminars did express a significantly higher *service* normative commitment (Total M=26.33) than *joint* normative commitment (Total M=13.35). Mann-Whitney results showed $U=57.0$, $Z(38)=-3.62$, a significant $p<.0001$, and a medium effect size of $r=-.55$.

*Findings:* Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests demonstrated significant results. Service normative commitment was significantly greater than joint normative commitment among respondents in Army only seminars. Results were in the expected direction.

Similar results were found when tests were conducted comparing service normative commitment to joint normative commitment among respondents in joint faculty seminars. Students assigned to Joint faculty team seminars expressed a significantly higher *service* normative commitment (Total M=82.97) than *joint* normative commitment (Total M=52.52). Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests results revealed the following: $U=1133.0$, $Z(131)=-4.57$, a significant $p<.0001$, and a medium effect size of $r=-.40$.

### Table 4-4: Normative Commitment Mean Scores Comparisons for Respondents in Similar Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty type</th>
<th>Normative commitment</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>M-W U</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Effect direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>26.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>13.35</td>
<td>57.00</td>
<td>-3.62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>Expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>82.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>52.52</td>
<td>1133.00</td>
<td>-4.57</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>Unexpected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at the $p<.001$ level
Findings: When scores of joint normative commitment and service normative commitment were compared with students in like categories, the comparison generated significant results. In joint faculty team seminars, service normative commitment scores were significantly higher than joint normative commitment scores. These results appeared in the opposite direction expected. Rather than joint normative commitment being higher than service normative commitment in joint faculty seminars, the exact opposite occurred.

Given the results of both conditions, one could conclude that, regardless of faculty type respondents were assigned to, service normative commitment was significantly greater than joint normative commitment. In other words, regardless of condition, service members felt they should be more committed to their service than to the joint community.

Affective commitment

Tests of normal distribution for affective commitment scores also revealed a non-normal distribution. Therefore, Mann-Whitney tests were used once again to measure differences in affective commitment between- and within-groups.
When joint affective commitment was compared between groups in the joint and Army-only faculty seminars results showed little difference between joint faculty seminar students’ joint affective commitment (Total M=46.07) and Army only seminar students’ joint affective commitment (Total M=48.05). Mann-Whitney test results calculated a U=689.0, a non-significant p(one-tailed)=.38, and a small effect size r=.03. The results, though not significant, were in an unexpected direction.

Findings: Students assigned to joint faculty team seminars expressed a slightly lower joint affective commitment when compared with the joint affective commitment reported by students in Army-only faculty team seminars. The effect is opposite of the expected results. The results were not significant, however.

As a corollary to the original hypothesis, one might expect respondents assigned to Army-only faculty team seminars to demonstrate a significantly stronger service affective commitment than joint affective commitment. Mann-Whitney tests were conducted to measure this possibility.

Students assigned to Army-only faculty team seminars expressed a significantly lower service affective commitment (Total M=30.97) when compared with students’
service affective commitment in joint faculty team seminars (Total M=40.84). The results were significant at the p<.05 level and in an unexpected direction. Mann-Whitney tests produced the following results: U=386.5, Z(76)= -1.67, a significant p<.05, and a small effect size r= -.19.

Findings: Results for this test demonstrated, unexpectedly, that respondents assigned to Army-only faculty seminars actually expressed a significantly lower service affective commitment than did the respondents assigned to joint faculty seminars. In other words, respondents assigned to joint faculty seminars felt a stronger affective allegiance to their own service than those respondents assigned to single service faculty team seminars. They felt they wanted to belong to their service more strongly when assigned to joint faculty seminars more than those assigned to Army only faculty seminars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty type</th>
<th>Affective commitment</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>M-W U</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Effect direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>26.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>13.38</td>
<td>57.50</td>
<td>-3.61</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>93.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>42.60</td>
<td>439.50</td>
<td>-7.75</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at the p<.001 level

Within-group comparisons using the Mann-Whitney tests were also conducted for affective commitment. When scores of joint affective commitment and service affective
commitment were compared with students in like categories (i.e. joint faculty team seminars), both comparisons generated significant results. In the case of joint faculty team seminars the joint affective commitment score (Total M=42.60) was significantly lower when compared with the service affective commitment score (M=93.92). This is a result in the opposite direction expected. Mann-Whitney test results produced a U=439.5, Z(130)= -7.75, a significant p<.001, and a large effect size r= -.68.

Similarly, Army-only faculty students’ joint affective commitment scores (Total M=13.38) were significantly lower than their service affective commitment scores (Total M=26.31). The results were significant but in the expected direction. Mann-Whitney results were U=57.5, Z(38)=-3.61, a significant p<.001, and a large effect size r=-.59.

**Findings:** Regardless of conditions, service affective commitment was significantly stronger than joint affective commitment when comparing responses among respondents in like conditions. In other words, regardless of being assigned to an Army-only faculty seminar or a joint faculty seminar, students were significantly more allegiant and committed to their own service than they were to the joint community.

**Total commitment**

Consistent with Meyer and Allen’s measure of organizational commitment, normative and affective commitment means, two of the three components of commitment used in this study, were combined to create a total commitment mean score for each respondent. Tests of normal distribution for affective commitment scores resulted in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test score of p<.05 again revealing a non-normal distribution.
Therefore, Mann-Whitney tests were used again to measure differences in total commitment scores for between- and within-group comparisons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total commitment</th>
<th>Faculty type</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>M-W U</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Effect direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>47.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>46.86</td>
<td>719.50</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>36.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>39.13</td>
<td>485.50</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When joint total commitment was compared between groups in the joint and Army-only faculty seminars, results showed little difference between joint faculty seminar students’ joint total commitment (Total M=46.86) and Army-only faculty seminar students’ joint total commitment (Total M=47.53). Mann-Whitney tests produced results of a U=719.5, Z(93)=-0.98, a non-significant p(one-tailed)=.46, and a small effect size r= -.10.

*Findings:* Students assigned to joint faculty team seminars expressed a slightly lower joint total commitment when compared with the joint total commitment reported by students in Army-only faculty team seminars. The results were not significant, however.

Conversely, when service total commitment was compared between groups in the joint and Army-only faculty seminars, results showed some difference between joint faculty seminar students’ service total commitment (Total M=39.13) and Army-only
faculty seminar students’ *service* total commitment (Total M=36.47). Mann-Whitney tests produced results of a U=485.5, Z(76)=-.98, a non-significant p(one-tailed)=.33, and a small effect size r= -.05.

*Findings:* Students assigned to joint faculty team seminars expressed a slightly higher *service* total commitment when compared with the *service* total commitment reported by students in Army-only faculty team seminars. These results too were not significant, however.

Like normative and affective commitment measures, tests were conducted to determine if there were significant differences within groups. The first test examined whether students assigned to Army-only faculty seminars expressed stronger service commitment than joint commitment since joint salience should not have been as prevalent given a single service faculty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty type</th>
<th>Total commitment</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>M-W U</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Effect direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>26.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>13.35</td>
<td>34.50</td>
<td>-4.27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>90.81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>46.29</td>
<td>678.00</td>
<td>-6.68</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at the p<.001 level

When scores of joint total commitment and service total commitment were compared with students in like categories (i.e. joint faculty team seminars), *both* comparisons generated significant results. Students assigned to Army-only faculty team
seminars expressed a significantly higher service total commitment (Total M=27.58) when compared with students’ joint total commitment (Total M=12.23). Results were in the expected direction. Results were significant. Mann-Whitney tests showed U=34.5, Z(38)= -4.27, a significant p<.0001, and a medium effect size r= -.69. In the case of joint faculty team seminars the joint total commitment score (Total M=46.29) was significantly lower when compared to the service total commitment score (Total M=90.81)—a result in the opposite direction expected. Mann-Whitney test results showed U=678, Z(131)= -6.68, a significant p<.001, and a medium effect size r= -.58.

Findings: Regardless of conditions, service total commitment was significantly stronger than joint total commitment when comparing responses among respondents in like conditions. In other words, regardless of being assigned to an Army-only faculty seminar or a joint faculty seminar, students were significantly more allegiance and committed to their own service than they were to the joint community.

Independent T-tests for INTERSERVICE PERCEPTIONS

Hypothesis 3: Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty only from the U.S. Army should express significantly stronger interservice perception differences than those students taught by faculty instructors from more than one service.

Respondents rated their perceptions of their own service first. Then they rated each of the other services on the following dimensions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Ambitious</th>
<th>1 2 3 5 6 7</th>
<th>Apathetic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Combative</td>
<td>1 2 3 5 6 7</td>
<td>Pacificistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Disciplined</td>
<td>1 2 3 5 6 7</td>
<td>Undisciplined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. High Tech</td>
<td>1 2 3 5 6 7</td>
<td>Low Tech</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To determine interservice perceptions and assess hypothesis three, responses to the ten dimensions each respondent was asked to quantify were combined first for an overall mean score for their own service, then a combined score for the perception of the other services was calculated. For example, if the respondent was an Army student, a composite mean score of their responses on the ten dimensions was calculated for that respondent’s own service—the Army in this example. Then, scores were combined for a mean score for that respondent’s perceptions of the other three services (the U.S. Coast Guard was eliminated as a separate entry in this case because there was only one Coast Guard student).

Interservice perception responses in both survey instruments came after respondents quantified their responses to service or joint identity and commitment. Therefore, there was concern that respondents’ might be influenced by the instrument they were asked to respond to. For example, a respondent answering questions on the joint survey might be influenced to respond more favorably to the other services as a result of taking the survey, regardless of the type of seminar to which they were assigned (joint or Army only). Therefore, before running independent t-tests for interservice perceptions, the data were reviewed and tested to determine if there was an influence by survey type.
First, respondents were grouped by service and a mean score for perceptions of their own service was calculated and used as a base score for their own service. Then scores were calculated measuring the perception of other services. These two mean scores were then subtracted to create a new measure of the difference between their service base score and their perception of other services’ base score. These new mean scores were then grouped by the type of survey respondents took. An independent t-test was calculated to determine if there was a significant difference between the interservice perception differences measured by respondents taking the service survey instrument versus those who took the joint survey instrument. Results of independent t-tests determined there was not a significant difference between these means. That lack of significance indicated that there was not a bias created based on the type of survey instrument the respondents took. Therefore, tests were run to compare means based on the type of faculty the students were assigned to as a way of assessing the validity of hypothesis three.

Tests for normal distribution revealed non-significant results. Since results demonstrated a normal distribution, independent t-tests were calculated comparing mean scores of respondents’ perceptions of their own service and those perceptions they held of the other services on the same ten dimensions. Mean scores were categorized by seminar faculty type (joint or Army-only). Lower mean scores indicate a more positive view. Higher scores indicate a more negative view.
Independent t-tests first measured whether there was a significant difference between service members’ views of their own service for respondents assigned to Army-only faculty and joint faculty seminars. Table 4-9 indicates that there were no significant differences between the perceptions respondents held of their own services regardless of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Perception means</strong></th>
<th><strong>Faculty type</strong></th>
<th><strong>M</strong></th>
<th><strong>SE</strong></th>
<th><strong>t</strong></th>
<th><strong>df</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sig.</strong></th>
<th><strong>Effect direction</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army's view of Army</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-1.003</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy's view of Navy</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force's view of Air Force</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-1.194</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines' view of Marines</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-1.253</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army's view of others</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy's view of others</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.428</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force's view of others</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-1.402</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines' view of others</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at the p < .10 level

Coast Guard was not calculated since there was only one Coast Guard student in the class.
the type of seminar to which they were assigned. All of the scores were in the expected direction with the exception of Navy students. Navy students in joint faculty seminars expressed a more positive view of their own service than the Navy students assigned to Army-only seminars. Of the groups that responded, Marines held the most positive view of their service when assigned to Army only faculty seminars. Army students held the most positive view of their own service when assigned to joint faculty seminars.

Findings: Results of independent t-tests were not significant although results in three of the four conditions approached significance levels at p<.10 (Army, Air Force, and Marines at p=.16, .12, and .13 respectively). Therefore, there was no conclusive evidence that Hypothesis Three should be accepted. Further, sample sizes for all services other than Army were much smaller—especially among the Navy and Marine students that responded to the surveys.

Independent t-tests were also calculated to determine if there were significant differences between the mean scores respondents held of the other services based on the type of faculty seminar to which they were assigned. Theoretically, one would expect respondents to have more positive perceptions of the other services in the joint faculty seminar condition and less favorable views of the other services when assigned to the Army-only faculty condition. Results in Table 4-9 indicate that in three of the four cases this was true with the exception of Air Force students who held a more positive view of the other services in the Army-only condition rather than the joint faculty condition. Further, these results were significant at the p<.10 level (M=3.01 and 3.36, SE=.17 and .37, and t(18)=-1.40) as were the results in the expected direction for Navy respondents’ views of other services (M=3.53 and 3.03, SE=.18 and .16, and t(8)=1.428).
Findings: Consistent with theoretical expectations, Navy students demonstrated a significantly more positive view of other services when assigned to joint faculty seminars than when assigned to a single service faculty (Army-only) seminar. Contrary to theoretical expectations, Air Force respondents demonstrated a significantly higher view of other services in the single service faculty (Army-only) condition than they did in the joint faculty condition. Marine respondent results, although not significant, were close to being significant at the p<.10 level (p=.18). Further, they held the least positive view of the other services when compared to all other services in both conditions (Army-only and joint faculty seminars). The Army respondents held the most positive views of the other services regardless of the condition to which they were assigned.

In measuring the interservice perception dynamics, one explanation for the results may be that student perceptions of their faculty teams may have influenced the way they experienced interservice relations and perspectives. Measures in both surveys asked respondents to rate each of their faculty members (three to four instructors). From these individual faculty ratings, mean scores for faculty team ratings were calculated and compared. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests demonstrated significant results (p<.05) indicating the results were not normally distributed. Once again, non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests were used to determine whether significant differences existed between the way Army only faculty teams and joint faculty teams were perceived by the students. Table 4-10 displays the results of the Mann-Whitney t-test equivalent.
Students in both faculty team types rated their instructors very high. On a scale of five, students rated Army only faculty with a mean score of 4.04 (Total M=82.67) and joint faculty teams with a mean score of 4.14 (Total M=85.68). On average, the faculty received a rating of 4.09. When comparing the mean scores to determine if there was a significant difference between the way students viewed Army-only faculty compared to the views they held of joint faculty teams, results indicate there is no significant difference. Mann-Whitney results indicate a U=2400.5, a Z(169)=-.34, a non-significant p=.37, and a small effect size of r= -.03.

Findings: Mann-Whitney tests above indicate that there is no significant difference between the way students viewed their faculty members regardless of whether they were in an Army-only faculty team or a joint faculty team. Across the board, students held their faculty in high esteem. Since there were no significant differences between how they were viewed by students from both joint faculty seminars and Army-only faculty seminars, one can conclude that the type of faculty to which students were assigned likely had no bearing on the interservice perceptions or normative, affective, and total commitment ratings. Given social identity theory precepts, the high esteem students held of their faculty instructors should have the positive effects on experienced identity scores as the theory predicts.

Table 4-10: Respondent Ratings of Faculty by Faculty Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions of faculty</th>
<th>Army only</th>
<th>M-W U</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>85.68</td>
<td>2400.50</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean score was 4.09 on a scale of five
Measures of Behavior

**Hypothesis 4:** Resident students assigned to seminars taught by faculty from more than one service (joint faculty seminars) should demonstrate a significantly stronger proclivity for joint behavior than those students who belonged to seminars taught by faculty instructors only from the U.S. Army.

**Survey Response Measures**

Ultimately, measuring joint or service behavior was a difficult task given the survey nature of the study. Assignments post-graduation are affected by a multitude of factors depending on the service’s needs, the service’s assignment policy, and the individual’s desires. However, understanding what respondents prefer to do post-graduation, regardless of service needs or policies, helps understand what their post-graduation assignment intention is to serve—whether they had a more joint or service oriented assignment preference. Therefore, in the course of answering the survey, respondents were asked what type of duty assignment they would ask for upon graduation if they had their choice and their service would honor their request. The same questions were asked for both survey types. Respondents were asked these questions before they answered any other questions regarding service or joint identity, commitment, and interservice perception. Therefore, their answers were not influenced by the type of survey they took.

For military personnel, respondents were asked to rank order which assignment they would prefer to have post-graduation. For joint assignments, they were asked if they wanted to serve on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, or serve in a joint assignment at the Combatant Command or Joint Task Force level. The Joint Staff largely coordinates the
activity of the Combatant Commands around the world and work at the policy interface with the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as coordinate with each of the Service staffs. Serving on the Joint Staff, although considered the epitome of being “joint”, also entails serving in the Pentagon and living in the Washington, DC area—a factor that works against officers willingly serving in that assignment. Combatant Commands and Joint Task Forces, on the other hand, are considered more operational assignments. Personnel serving in these assignments deal less with policy coordination and work almost exclusively in policy implementation. By the nature of this work, War College graduates find it more familiar and, therefore, more naturally appealing.

For service specific assignments, respondents were asked to also choose among two types of service assignments. They were asked if they prefer to serve in a command position following graduation or whether they preferred to serve in an institutional level assignment—either working at the Pentagon on their service staff or at a major command one level below that level. Normally these assignments focus on institutional service functions such as training and doctrine, acquisition, personnel, etc… Across all the services, command is far more appealing. The services are command-centric in their selections for promotion and the work is more intrinsically satisfying. The institutional service assignments are less intrinsically satisfying as the work is highly demanding and is largely staff work, and activity that entails studying, analyzing, and making recommendations to more senior officials for them to decide. However, institutional service assignments normally do not entail a requirement to deploy to locations far away from family and, for some functions in each of the services that do not offer command, is actually more beneficial career wise. Timing of this survey occurred after Army
promotion lists to the O-6 rank were released as well as those selected for command. Therefore, those Army officers who responded to the survey who were eligible for command were already fully aware of their chances for command. The officers from the other services, being slightly junior in rank, were not yet aware of where they stood for promotion to O-6 or for O-6 command.

---

**Table 4-11: Respondent Duty Assignment Preferences Post-Graduation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of assignment</th>
<th>Preference (pct)</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff/MN Staff</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Institutional</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Command</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MN is Multi-national

Overall among the assignments, command was the highest rated among the respondents. As depicted in Table 4-11, 59.2% of the respondents chose command as their *first* assignment preference. This does not come as a surprise. Command is, among most officers, the most intrinsically rewarding (and demanding) job officers assume. It is also the job most extrinsically rewarding as well. Command is essential for officers of most branches and specialties to qualify for promotion to the next rank. Therefore, it is the one the system most highly treasures and rewards. It is the job that carries the most prestige and status as well. These circumstances tend to bias the results since commands are a service assignment until the officer reaches only the most senior ranks (two-star level). At that level some commands become joint. Virtually all of the commands these
respondents will assume will be service commands. Therefore, the results favor service behavior measures.

However, the next two choices respondents preferred were joint assignments. First among them was assignment to Combatant Commands as the more preferred joint assignment. Overall, 49.7% of the respondents chose it as their second most preferred assignment. There are probably several reasons that the respondents chose Combatant Commands as the first among the joint assignments. First, the work at the Combatant Commands focuses more on the operational, or applied aspects, of the military. It is more “warrior” focused and the services tend to create and promote a warrior culture. Therefore, it implies more status since warrior-like jobs or functions are more highly valued in the services. Further, the result of one’s work at the Combatant Commands tends to be more tangible when compared to work at the Joint Staff. Working at the Combatant Commands is somewhat closer to the results. Therefore, the officer is better able to make the connection between what they do and the result of that work, even if they cannot directly see the results of the work they do. Second, practically all of the Combatant Commands are in locations that are more attractive to service members. Quality housing, attractive lifestyles and amenities, and good schooling for family members—important factors to most officers—is commonly associated with service in these locales.

\[\text{Pacific Command is located in Hawaii. Central Command, Special Operations Command, and Southern Command are located in Florida (Tampa Bay and Miami). Northern Command is located in Colorado. European Command is located in Germany. Joint Forces Command is based in Norfolk, VA while Transportation Command is in the St. Louis area and Strategic Command is in Omaha, Nebraska.}\]
Service on the Joint Staff or on Multinational Staffs was the respondents’ third most preferred assignment with 34.7% marking it as their third priority. Multinational Staffs exist in several locations, but their locations imply different meaning. There are very attractive locations such as SHAPE headquarters is in Mons, Belgium and AFSOUTH headquarters in Naples, Italy. Conversely, there are also deployed Multinational Headquarters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. Assignments in deployed headquarters mean service members serve without their families accompanying them. Work on Multinational Staffs can be very educational and rewarding as well as very frustrating. Learning and appreciating different cultures most officers experience as broadening and rewarding. However, the differences in work ethic, discipline among various forces, and other norms often creates frustrating work conditions that detracts from the otherwise rewarding aspects of an assignment on one of these staffs. Service on the Joint Staff can only be performed in the Pentagon. Service in the Pentagon is often perceived as less rewarding. The hours are often long. The work is often more difficult and frustrating because it is more closely tied with the political decisions and realities associated with work done at the national level. It is also less prestigious in two ways. First, it is more removed from the actual results and less warrior focused. Second, there are more layers of senior officers serving at the Pentagon which connotes less flexibility and autonomy experienced in the work Colonels or their equivalent (the rank of War College graduates) do. Finally, the areas where most of the officers and their families would live while working in the Pentagon are expensive, the lifestyle is very hectic, and the commute to and from work is very aggravating.
Service institutional assignments were the least preferred assignment with 49.4% of the respondents placing it in the fourth position. Service institutional work is probably least popular among the respondents because it is the least warrior focused of the four categories and it usually connotes working in the Pentagon area where all the service staffs are located. The reasons why work at the Pentagon is less popular have already been mentioned. In Table 4-11 mean scores have been calculated. The mean scores depict the placement of the respondents’ choices with lower scores reflecting a higher preference. The higher service mean score is a reflection of the respondents’ preferences for command assignments.

Respondents were also asked why they chose their first preference. They were given five response options: 1) it is what they want to do; 2) it is what they need to do to remain competitive in their field; 3) it was chosen for family reasons; 4) it was chosen for medical reasons; or 5) other. The intent in measuring their choice of preferences was to ascertain the motives behind their choices. What the respondents want to do was resoundingly the primary motive behind their preferences. 78.1% of the respondents chose their first preference because it was what they wanted to do. Only 11.2% of the population chose the response indicating is was based on what needed to do to remain competitive in their career as their first choice. All other choices ranked below these two as the first reason respondents gave in choosing their preferred assignment. As stated earlier, answers to assignment preferences are a measure of intent. Measuring actual behavior was a little more difficult to assess.

Students at the Army War College are required to write a research paper to meet graduation requirements. The only stipulation is that their paper has to be of a strategic
issue, but the strategic issue they pick can cover a wide variety of topics and interests.

Students usually choose the paper’s topic around the September to November timeframe in the academic year and submit the final paper by late March. Students choose a faculty member to be their project advisor and work with this advisor, usually a subject matter expert, until the paper’s completion. The advisor also evaluates their paper to ensure it is academically rigorous and meets the college’s requirements. In the course of submitting their papers, students include an abstract that describes their paper’s content.

These abstracts were reviewed and categorized into one of four general topic areas: 1) service oriented; 2) joint in nature (topic focused on more than one service or focused at the defense department writ large); 3) generically theoretical or conceptual in scope (history, theory of war, etc…); or 3) multinational or interagency (topics focused on the nexus of executive departments or agencies at the national and international level).

As stated earlier in the chapter on methodology, measuring behavior to test hypothesis four was challenging. Trying to measure joint or service behavior that might be attributable to the organizational changes was highly problematic. Using the information gathered in the interviews with service assignment personnel presented a dilemma in providing information unusable to test the hypothesis attributable to the conditions the students experienced. Therefore, two constructed variables were created: service behavior and joint behavior. Both variables were based on expressed intention of the respondents as well as their choice in research topics. The expression of assignment preference is a form of behavior indicating the respondent’s intent and/or desire to serve

---

8 More will be discussed on the interviews with Service assignment personnel later in the chapter.
in a particular assignment and expressed an intent to serve in a joint or service oriented
job—-independent of service policies. The choice of research topics was solely up to the
student and not dictated by the faculty or anyone else. Therefore, the topic they chose to
research and write about was also a manifestation of individual behavior. Combined,
they created some measure of behavior that allowed comparison by treatment group to
ascertain whether the organizational changes experienced may have had an effect on their
choice of behavior.

In assigning a value for these constructed variables, respondents were assigned
three points for the first assignment preference they chose (service or joint), two points
for their second preference, and one point if they chose a joint or service topic for their
research paper. The assigned numbers were added up to create a composite service and
joint behavior score for each respondent. For example, a respondent may have chosen
preferences of command, then combatant command, joint staff, then service institutional
assignments as their preference. They may also have written on a joint topic for their
research paper. For their assignment preferences they would have received three points
for service behavior and three points for joint behavior. Another respondent may have
chosen a combatant command and the joint staff as their first two assignment preferences
and written a paper on a joint topic. This respondent would be given a joint behavior
score of six and a service behavior score of zero. Each respondent received a joint
behavior score and a service behavior score. A mean score was then calculated for both
variables and those means were used to compare between groups—those from Army-
only faculty and those from joint faculty—for comparison to test hypothesis four.
Tests for normality were not significant so equal variance was assumed. Independent t-tests conducted comparing the mean of joint and service behavior by faculty type revealed the following results. Joint behavior in Army only seminars (M=3.22, SE=.25) was significantly higher than the joint behavior of respondents in joint faculty seminars (M=2.63, SE=.16). The t-test revealed a t(64)=2.015, a significant p<.05 level, and a medium effect size r=.24. Additionally, service behavior in joint faculty seminars (M=3.04, SE=.16) was significantly higher than service behavior in Army only faculty seminars (M=2.34, SE=.26). T-test results revealed a t(61)= -2.316, a significant p<.05, and a medium size r=.28. Both results were in an unexpected direction.

Table 4-12: Independent T-Test Results of Behavior by Faculty Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Faculty type</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Effect direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>2.015</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-2.316</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at the p < .01 level

Findings: Students in the Army-only seminar groups demonstrated a significantly higher joint behavior score than their joint faculty student counterparts. Results were in the unexpected direction and were significant at p<.05. Further, service behavior composite scores were also in the unexpected direction. Joint faculty students demonstrated a significantly higher Service behavior score than their Army only faculty counterparts. Results were significant at p<.05.
Measures from Post-graduation Assignment Data

Another way of measuring joint behavior among graduates is to obtain data of where graduates went after graduation. This is not an ideal way to assess whether or not the year of resident study had a measurable effect since the assignment process is complicated by law, regulations, and service-specific policies. All services are command-centric in their policies. Many of the students attending the War College are at decisive points in their military careers. Those selected for command, either before they attend or while they are attending the course, will either move directly into a command assignment following graduation or will be pre-positioned in a location to assume command the year after they graduate (to save money for moves and to provide a bit more stability for families).

Another factor complicating post-graduation assignment analysis comes from legal mandates spawned from the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act that gives joint assignment preference to students attending any of the National Defense University (NDU) colleges. By law, the services must fill 50% (plus one more person) of the available joint assignments from those attending NDU. The remaining joint billets are filled by students attending each of the service colleges. For example, if the Army is given fifty joint billets to fill among their graduates of all senior service colleges, the Army personnel officers will have to fill 26 of them from the students attending one of the NDU colleges. The remaining 24 billets are then distributed among the Army students graduating from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine War Colleges.
Students who attend each of the services’ senior war colleges, therefore, have a higher probability of filling a service specific assignment than they do a joint assignment following graduation either because they are designated to command or must fill assignments each of the services have designated for War College graduates. Further, officers who have never served in joint assignments before coming to any of the War Colleges are given preference over those who have served in joint assignments previously in order to meet the other requirements the Goldwater-Nichols Act established.

In summary, the services generally give first preference to command assignments, then to joint assignments as they are available, then to service-specific assignments for their graduates. Each Service approaches the assignment process very differently, but all of them take into account the needs of their service, the needs of the officer (either driven by career needs or by other needs such as medical or family reasons), and the officer’s preference.

Army

Given the background on Service assignment policies and practices, Tables 4.13 to 4.16 show the trends in post-graduation assignments U.S. Army War College graduates filled. Table 4-13 depicts the Army assignment trends for AY 04-06. The trends show a fairly steady rate of assignments to joint, service, and command assignments. There was a slight drop in percentage of Army graduates filling joint assignments. However, the students in the AY 06 were somewhat different than students in the previous two years. In AY 06 there were several students deferred from attending
previous classes because of operational assignments in Iraq and Afghanistan that delayed their attendance at the War College. They were a class obviously more competitive for command. Previous years of graduates in AY 04 and 05 averaged only 16 officers filling command billets post-graduation. AY 06 had 25 graduates fill command billets upon their graduation. This trend drove the higher service number in comparison to the joint assignment percentages. Even with an almost 50% jump in officers filling command billets in the AY 06 class, there was only a corresponding drop of 2% in those assigned to joint billets following graduation. This probably indicates there is still a strong desire by Army graduates to fill joint assignments as well as an Army policy that emphasizes theses types of assignments as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AY 04</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 05</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AY 06</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Across all the services, command is not based on self-selection or application for a command. Rather commands in each service are filled by officers selected by a board of officers who have previously served at that command level and review hundreds of personnel files among those eligible for selection for
Air Force

Table 4-14 shows an interesting trend in U.S. Air Force officer assignments post-graduation. Previous years (AY 01-05) showed a steady joint assignment rate from either zero to two assignments per year representing a 9% assignment rate among U.S. Air Force Army War College graduates. However, in AY 06 even counting the increased population demographics among Air Force students (an increase of about seven students per year), the assignment rate increased from 9% to 27% of the population (six assignments compared to a maximum of 2 in previous years) while the numbers of those assuming command remained relatively the same. In conversations with the senior Air Force officer at the U.S. Army War College, he stated that command is the Air Force’s first priority followed by Air Force priority jobs and joint billets. Lower Air Force priority jobs were the third priority to fill. Air Force students in residence represented the top 15-20% of Air Force officers in their year groups. Officer selections he likened to an NBA draft in which general officers pick four to five officers they would like to have in their command and assignment officers try to match those desires with officers available, keeping in mind their individual preferences. He did state that requests for joint assignments were very high among the Air Force graduates of the U.S. Army War College. Although hard to attribute the significant increase in joint assignments for the Class of AY 06 to an increase in individual preferences as a result of their year of study, the numbers probably do reflect an increase in both the individuals’ desires to serve in

---

10 Interview conducted 29 March 2007 with Col Rod Zastrow, Senior Air Force officer at the U.S. Army War College.
joint billets as well as senior Air Force officers’ desires to have more of their officers serve in joint billets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AY 01</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 02</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 04</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 05</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 06</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Navy officer assignments post-graduation, shown in Table 4-15, demonstrate no change in filling joint billets following graduation in spite of a change to assignment policy directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the senior officer in the U.S. Navy. The Navy student population rose from about 14 students per year to 20 in AY 06. Even with this increased population only 30% of the AY 06 Navy officer graduates filled joint billets following graduation compared to 31% in AY 02 to 05 (given the numbers are small, the percentages are relatively the same). Although there was an expressed intent
by the Chief of Naval Operations to increase the percentage of Naval officers filling joint assignments after graduation from a senior service college, the numbers in AY 06 remained consistent with percentages witnessed in the previous four years. The Chief of Naval Operations’ change in policy was in response to the Secretary of Defense’s officially stated policy in 2005 that exceptions to policy would no longer be granted for promotion to General officer/Flag rank among military officers who had not met the joint assignment criteria directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. If officers did not meet the criteria, they would not be promoted. As a response, the Chief of Naval Operations became personally involved in approving assignments for senior service college graduates to make a concerted effort to fill more joint billets with Navy officers as stipulated by law.

This assignment policy ran counter to the Navy’s cultural norm. The Navy, the most traditional of the services (Dorn and Graves, 2000), had been more reticent to assigning officers to joint billets since it took officers away from very technical jobs they needed to fill in the surface, sub-surface, and Naval air components of the Navy. It appears, even after the change in AY 06, that the policy had little impact when compared to the previous four years. However, the senior Navy officer at the U.S. Army War College did say that he witnessed an increase in requests for joint assignments among the Navy officers graduating from the U.S. Army War College. Again, it is difficult to

11 Based on an interview with CAPT Dave Armitage, the Senior Navy officer at the U.S. Army War College, on 29 March 2007 and Commander Charmaine Savage of the Navy’s Personnel Office on 20 April 2007.
attribute their increased desire as a result of their year of resident study, but it likely had a positive effect on their preferences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AY 02</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 03</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 04</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 05</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AY 03 and 05 each had one officer retire immediately after graduation

Marines

Finally, Table 4-16 reflects the assignment trend for U.S. Marine Corps graduates of the U.S. Army War College from AY 02 to 06. The Marines’ data represents a more cyclical assignment process than the other services with regard to filling joint billets.\^{12} With Marines filling joint assignments upon graduation for a minimum of two years, the even numbered years show a slightly higher number of graduates being assigned to joint

\^{12} Interview conducted with Col John Terrell, senior USMC officer at the U.S. Army War College, on
billets compared to odd numbered years. But the assignment patterns also reflect Marine Corps senior leadership philosophy that has typically equated joint billets with command priorities and the accompanying desire by Marine officers to serve in joint billets. The senior Marine officer at the U.S. Army War College also commented that the Secretary of Defense’s policy on granting no more exceptions for promotion to general officer had an impact on assigning more officers to joint billets post-graduation. He also added that war time demands for Marine Corps’ specific requirements in support of operations in Southwest Asia, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere would likely have a negative impact on joint assignments in the future years. Senior Service Marine graduates would be needed to fill essential Marine positions deployed in support of theater operations.

Table 4-16: Post-Graduation Assignment Trends for Marine Students

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AY 02</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 03</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 04</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 05</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AY 06</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Qualitative analysis: Student interviews

To better capture what might be behind the numbers generated thus far, 61 half-hour interviews were conducted with resident students. The students selected participated in either focus-group interviews or individual interviews. Of the six Army-only faculty seminars, four seminars had two or more of its members voluntarily participate in the interviews. Average participation for these seminars was 3.75 with the lowest being two and the maximum being five. Because of scheduling problems, four individuals from the other two Army only faculty seminars were interviewed individually. Of the six seminars that had a joint faculty instructor team, six participated voluntarily in group interviews with an average of four participants in each group. The lowest had two participants and the highest had seven. An additional seventeen individual interviews were conducted to create a sample demographic distribution that closely replicated the larger student body in terms of gender, component, and service (as explained earlier in Table 3.3). Of the seventeen additional interviews conducted, one was unusable due to a technical error with the recording equipment. However, since some manual data was recorded to summarize key points during the interview, a summary of his responses were included in the quantitative data that emerged from the interviewees’ responses.

The interviews were semi-structured. The questions used for the interviews were vetted to provide prompts to appropriately focus the respondents’ answers and to elicit responses that would provide information helpful to explaining the quantitative results used to test the four hypotheses. They were also vetted to ensure the questions were
clearly and commonly understood among the possible sample set. Structuring the prompting questions ensured consistency among the participants focused on the identity changes each experienced (or not), to what degree, and affected by which factors (curriculum, fellow students, and faculty in both the core course and electives term of the academic year). The students, whether in groups or individually, were asked the same questions during the interviews (see Appendix F). The questions first defined identity as:

that part of an individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a particular social group together with the value and emotional significance of that membership. In other words **Service** identity is the identity you define for yourself in terms of the membership in your particular Service (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, or Coast Guard). **Joint** identity is the identity you define for yourself in terms of the membership in the Joint Force Community (not Service specific).

Students were first asked which identity was stronger in their mind at that time. They were asked to explain why the one they stated was stronger in their perception. They were then asked to think only of the first term of their academic year (the core curriculum) and assess the impact of three factors—the curriculum, their seminar student composition, and their seminar faculty team composition—on their joint identity (since multiple identities can be active simultaneously) and rate the degree of impact they had. Ratings were classified as either: significant, moderate, slight, or none at all. In order to assess the weight they assigned to each of these factors, they were asked to distribute 100% of the effect on their joint identity to correspond to the degree of impact each one had on them individually. For example, one might respond that curriculum accounted for

---

14 Student interviews occurred in early through late May of their resident year. This was desirable because it was late enough in the year for the desired effect to occur and was early enough before graduation to gain their participation in the interview process.
40% of the effect while student seminar composition might be responsible for 30% and faculty composition 30%. Another might have an entirely different view on the distribution these factors had in affecting their joint identity. They were also asked to explain their ratings.

The second half of the interview focused on the second term of their academic year when they took electives and were separated from their parent seminar—exposing them to new instructors and students they had not known during the core course term of the academic year. Similarly, they were asked to rate the impact the same three factors had on their joint identity and distribute the percentage each factor accounted for in shaping that identity (regardless of whether their identity shift was slight or significant). Finally, they were asked if any other factor positively influenced their joint identity anytime during the academic year. In addition to their interviews being recorded on audio tape and subsequently transcribed to documents, summaries of their answers to these questions were manually recorded on an answer sheet. Data were later converted and transcribed into tables for statistical analysis.

**Which identity is salient: Joint or Service?**

Respondents were asked which identity was more salient to them at the time of the interview and to capture their response on the answer sheet as slightly stronger, moderately stronger, or much stronger than the other identity.

Respondents’ answers were grouped by the faculty type for their assigned seminars. Among the 24 respondents who came from seminars with Army-only faculty
members seven claimed that their joint identity was more salient to them than their service identity. The other 17 respondents felt a stronger service identity. In the joint faculty seminars, there was little difference. 16 respondents chose joint identity over service identity while the overwhelming majority chose their service identity over joint. Overall, about 75% of the respondents chose their service identity over a joint identity.

Table 4-17: Identity Salience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity salience</th>
<th>Army only faculty</th>
<th>Joint faculty</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of those from Army-only seminars who identified more strongly with a joint identity, one respondent felt that being joint was indicative of his service. He said, “…we also work with state and local authorities and other Government agencies a lot so to me it is not the same. We don’t look at ourselves, as maybe some of the other people in other services do, as being that their identity is that service.” Another strongly stated his transformation from service to joint, “…this is just the uniform, I have lost the color green in my mind. I affiliate myself to joint.” Surprisingly, two of the students interviewed that identified more with a joint identity were Army National Guard officers. One of them stated that:

15 Reserve officers in both the National Guard and the Federal Reserve, unlike their active component peers, have few formal incentives to become joint. Because sending them to Joint Professional Military
[the] National Guard Bureau, has mandated all states have a joint force headquarters. We have done that in North Carolina, so I mean it is just blue and green right now, Army and Air, but we do operate joint everyday down there, even before I came up here we did. We were getting into it so I think joint more than I do service now and that is just a recent change in the last three years.

Similar responses were recorded among the respondents from joint faculty seminars. A woman respondent said, “I really do feel more aligned right now with a joint arena than I do with the service arena and I sought to go back to a joint assignment primarily because of that…” Another commented:

…the last two assignments prior to here, one was working an Active Component/Reserve Component swap, so I kind of lost a little bit of the green. Then I did a joint job after that for two years and I came up here and I am going to a joint job after this so I tend to view myself more as a 25-year Army guy who has really lost the service specific and I have become Purple [joint].

Every one of the respondents, when asked where their identity was formed, stated that the identity they most closely associated with was formed before coming to the U.S. Army War College. Virtually all of the respondents who chose joint identities commented that their shift in identity from a service identity was the result of previous a joint assignment. The duration of the joint assignment may have been as little as two years while others had multiple joint assignments. Five of the six who chose joint identities in the Army-only faculty seminars had prior joint experience while six of nine

Education and assigning them to joint assignments are both difficult, they are not included in the Goldwater-Nichols mandates requiring them to have joint qualifications for promotion to flag or general officer rank. Therefore, there are no career-enhancing incentives for them to seek joint billets or joint schooling. However, as professionals, the students interviewed aspire to achieve becoming the best qualified officer they can be and, therefore, adopt the identity like their active component counterparts. This information was based on conversations with COL Joe Charsagua (USAR) and COL (Ret) Dan Jensen (ARNG)—both currently serving or previously serving senior Reserve Component advisors at the U.S. Army War College.
in the joint faculty seminars had prior joint assignments. Conversely, that means that one of the six in the Army-only faculty seminars and three of the nine in the joint faculty seminars responded that their joint identity was more salient even though they had no previous joint experience in their assignment history. Although they never expressed it explicitly, they likely had experienced events during their year of resident study that made that identity more salient.

Of those who stated their joint identity was more salient, their comments, like the ones that represent the majority of them, shed some light on why those identities are more salient: “that is based on both what I was doing just before coming here to the War College and then the year and knowing where I am going next” or “I would say joint, and I wouldn’t have three years ago but my most recent job was at U.S. Central Command Headquarters in Operations and Plans.” Similar expressions were conveyed in the joint faculty seminars.

I would tell you that two years ago or three years ago I think I really would have identified primarily with my service because that is what I had known and had been brought up in, but I had two years of CENTCOM [Central Command] before I came to the War College…[and]…I would say up until 2003 it was strictly Air Force service specific. In 2003 the first time I deployed for OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] as a Lieutenant Colonel working then in a more joint environment…but coming through that experience I learned a lot more about joint operations and how to work and what has to happen because you only have so many assets.

The dynamic worked in the other direction too. Experiencing the year in a joint faculty seminar or having had a previous joint assignment was no guarantee the respondent would identify with a stronger joint identity. Officers who had served in joint assignments still identified most with their own service. However, the majority of those interviewed who identified with their service and who had previously served in a joint
assignment commented that their identities had shifted from service to joint and back again as a result of the context in which they served. When they were in a joint assignment, they identified with their organization and had a joint identity. When they served back in their service, they adopted a stronger service identity. Therefore, many of the Army officers, because they were assigned to the Army War College felt they were back with their service and had therefore adopted their own service identity. One officer’s comments typifies those made by the majority of others: “Earlier in my career obviously I wouldn’t have given a second thought to anything other than just being an Army officer, but now I am getting ready to go to a joint billet and I have worked in joint Commands before and when I am in that Command, I think of myself as a Joint Officer. I am loyal to the Command.”

Others, regardless of context, strongly identified with their service as a result of serving years within that service. Each service has strong cultural mechanisms embedded in their systems that cause strong identities among their service members. One Navy officer commented, “Well I went to the Naval Academy so that is engrained in you day one…they drill it into you… I have done one joint tour and I think I was a Naval Officer in that joint tour, trying to understand what the other services bring to the mix and play well as a team, but never considered myself a joint officer, [I] have always been a Naval Officer.”

Further, two other trends emerged as a result of the interviews. First, service subcultures had a strong influence on respondents’ identities. Several of the respondents commented that their functional specialty within their service had a stronger impact on how they identified themselves. Two respondents’ comments
represent those made by others: “Yeah I am an Air Force Communications Officer” and “A submariner...[and when asked if a subcomponent identity was even stronger than a service identity he responded] Yes.”

The second was the impact that family upbringing had on several of the respondents. Many of them had been raised in military families. Some were serving in the service their parents and other relations served in while others were currently serving in another service. One Army officer described his traditional family background—“my Dad was in the Army, my Grandfather was in the Army, my father-in-law is Army as well, and my wife will admit to you to this day that she was looking for her Army Lieutenant to marry because she liked the career and wanted to have another one.” In cases where the respondent was currently serving in a service different than the one their parent served in, the current service identity was stronger at this point in their careers than the identity they had when growing up. One such case:

I am an unusual case I guess, I was Air Force enlisted and then I became Army as an officer and even though I was brought up in the Air Force as an enlisted man to begin with and my dad is prior service Air Force and I try to have a joint mentality, I was actually trained as an Army officer, so I think Army most of the time, and I have been around jets and been at an air base and all that kind of stuff, so I appreciate the Air Force and I just think that it is the Army or the service training and because there is no other avenue to do joint for me at the early age, then I am an Army trained person and that is where I will have a strong dependency on that background.

Another respondent stated a similar experience.

I am a Department of the Army civilian and have been for 24 years and even though I feel part of the greater DOD [Department of Defense] community with other civilians as a Federal worker, even around other service civilians, you build an affinity towards your service which was counter to my upbringing, my dad was a Marine, so I am going against the fold there.
Her response also highlights another interesting dynamic. Career civilians working in each of the services or public agencies (i.e. State Department) had strong affiliations and identity with their own service even though the mechanisms for transmitting culture among the civilians is not as strong as it is among the uniformed members of their service. This too is a phenomenon that distinguishes identity theory from culture. Identity is not dependent on strong cultural artifacts and is more likely a result of the roles these respondents have played over many years of service in the public sector.

In all the interviews, not one respondent claimed that identifying with a joint identity was the result of his or her experience at the U.S. Army War College. However, as stated earlier, four of the 15 respondents who identified more closely with a joint identity had no previous joint experience. They did not claim they realized their joint identity as a result of their year of residence at the college either, but also did not offer an explanation of where that identity came from. For those who identified more strongly with their service identity, several of them stated that the U.S. Army War College experience was either moving them more in that direction or that their service identity was less strong as a result of their exposure to other points of view during their year of study. One respondent’s comments typified what others shared. He said, “since coming here I think I am developing more of a joint identity in the sense that I think the emphasis here has been on the joint on ‘jointness’ and ‘interagencyness’ which I think is the next step where we need to go with this.”

When asked which identity was more salient, respondents were asked to assess the degree to which that identity was stronger. They were asked to identify the difference
as slightly stronger, moderately stronger, or much stronger than the other identity.

Interestingly, comparisons between Army only faculty seminar respondents and joint faculty seminar respondents demonstrated a very noticeable difference in the degree to which they experienced that identity difference. In Army only faculty seminars, 50% of the respondents categorized the identity difference as “much stronger”. Given that 75% had picked service identity over joint identity, the majority meant that their service identity was much stronger than their experienced joint identity. However, in joint faculty seminars, the majority of respondents (57%) stated the difference was moderate with only 16% categorizing the difference as “much stronger.” This shift in degree of service identity strength represented a 34% drop in the “much stronger” category and a 44% increase in the percentage claiming they experienced it as moderate. With the 2% shift in the “slight” category, this means almost half the respondents in the joint faculty seminars experienced the salience difference as moderate or less. This shift is one social identity theory would predict—because the respondents in joint faculty seminars were exposed more to instructors from other services which would grant esteem or higher status to those students in the seminar, their joint identity would be more salient and their service identity less strong.
Impact of three factors in the core curriculum

Regardless of how great or small the respondents’ joint identity was experienced in their answer to the previous questions, the next series of questions asked about what impact the three factors (curriculum, student composition, or faculty composition) had on their joint identity during the core curriculum term. The core curriculum term is a significant influence during the academic year. It encompasses six core courses taught from August through March. The core curriculum, since it is core, is standard across the twenty seminars. Realizing there are some differences in the way the instructors in each seminar teach their lessons and the dynamics of each seminar room, the differences are minimal across the twenty seminars. The curriculum in the elective term, on the other hand, is based more on student interests and becomes more problematic to compare and draw conclusions from. Further, during the core course term, the students remain in their assigned seminars with their assigned faculty teams for the duration. The seminar’s students and faculty get to know each other very well and, because of their familiarity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Army only faculty</th>
<th>Joint faculty</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much stronger</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slight</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-18: Identity Salience Intensity
with each other, explore thoughts, perspectives, and assumptions more deeply. In the elective term that runs from March to late May, the students are exposed to other students and faculty members of various backgrounds, but the same degree of familiarity is rarely achieved in this shorter term. Students taking electives meet for 30 contact hours with 3 to 4 different seminar groups ranging in size from 5 to 18. Comparatively in the core course term, they experience 122 contact days together which equates to a minimum of 366 contact hours in the classroom with each other. Further, they meet with each other socially, travel together for the annual New York City trip and the Washington DC trip, and play on seminar sports teams together.

Table 4-19: Curriculum, Student Composition, and Faculty Composition Effect on Joint Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Curriculum</th>
<th>Army only</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slight to none</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate to significant</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student Composition</th>
<th>Army only</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slight to none</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate to significant</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>97%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 missing case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty Composition</th>
<th>Army only</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slight to none</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate to significant</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE: 1 case missing which represents 3% of the total
The operating theory behind the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act and the Chairman’s policy on professional military education, posits that three factors (curriculum, student composition, and faculty composition) positively influence joint acculturation. In this study, joint acculturation equates to joint identity and measured by other variables (commitment, interservice perceptions, and behavior). When asked to assess the impact curriculum, student composition, and faculty composition had on their joint identity, results were tabulated into one of two categories: 1) those that thought the factor had no effect to slight effect on their joint identity; or 2) those who perceived the factor to have a moderate to significant effect on their joint identity. The results were further grouped by which type of faculty team they had—Army-only or joint. Table 4-19 lists the results of the analyzed interview comments.

The results described some interesting perspectives the students recounted in the interviews. First, student composition clearly represented the factor the students thought had the greatest impact on their joint identity. Student composition was rated the highest by students in both categories of seminars. 92% of the students from the Army-only seminars and 72% of the students in joint faculty seminars categorized the effect as moderate to significant. Second, students in the Army only faculty seminars held a more positive view of the impact the core curriculum had on their joint identity than their joint faculty seminar colleagues (71% compared to 43% perceiving the curriculum as having a larger effect). This is not a surprising result since the students equate joint faculty with the type of uniform the faculty member wears as opposed to the faculty members’ joint attitude (i.e. is the instructor’s attitude more service parochial or joint oriented in nature). In other words, Army-only faculty teams were NOT perceived as aiding the students’
joint identity because the team members were only from one service. Therefore, students from the Army-only faculty seminars would attribute more to the curriculum than faculty when assessing the impact all three factors had on their joint identity. However, both groups of students had similar depictions of the impact the faculty had on their joint identity. Whereas there were sharper contrasts between the impact curriculum and faculty composition had among students with Army-only faculty, the joint faculty students attributed virtually equal impact to both faculty composition and curriculum. Additional questions were asked about the distribution of the impact these three factors had on the respondents’ joint identity.

The overwhelming majority of students agreed that the year spent at the U.S. Army War College enhanced their joint identity to some degree. If the three factors assessed above represented 100% of the influence on their joint identity, the students interviewed were asked how they would distribute that 100% among the three factors. Students responded with some distribution of the degree of effect. They assigned percentages to each of the three factors. The factors were grouped into percentage categories (i.e. 1-19%, 20-29%, 30-39%, etc…). The category means were determined and compared in an independent t-test to determine if there were any significant differences between those who responded from Army only faculty and joint faculty seminars. Two of the differences were found to be significant and are captured in Table 4-20.

When asked this way, the results of the t-test indicate that there is a significant difference between the degree students from Army-only faculty seminars distribute the degree of impact to curriculum (M=3.67, SE=.29) and faculty composition (M=1.58,
SE=.16) than their counterparts view curriculum (M=2.75, SE=.23) and faculty composition (M=2.42, SE=.19). The differences were significant at the p<.05 level for curriculum with t=2.48 and df=58 and significant at the p<.01 level for faculty composition with t=-3.094 and df=58. These results do confirm that students perceive faculty members as joint based on what service they come from. This supports the acculturation concept, that making members from other services in more significant numbers (in both faculty and student composition) increases the likelihood that they will favorably impact on the perception of jointness among the students. This is also consistent with predictions social identity theory would espouse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-20: Factors’ Effect on Joint Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effect on joint identity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army only faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army only faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army only faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at the p<.05 level **significant at the p<.01 level

**Comments on Curriculum**

Some representative comments from students on the *curriculum* reinforce the numbers described above:
[A Coast Guard student who was a former Army officer] I would say the curriculum itself not a lot because it was more Army centric particularly in this portion of the curriculum. That was a big chunk. It was what eight, nine weeks or something and I you know having some Army background I think was probably a little bit more in tune with that than maybe some of the other folks from the other services. The rest of the curriculum to me was very joint curriculum. I think it was applicable across the services and even as to our civilian partners.

[A Navy officer] I think the Navy guys are probably affected more by the curriculum because as you mentioned doctrine is Army and Navy, we don’t do doctrine.

[An Air Force Reserve officer commented] I just concur with what both have said that it had a significant impact on my thought thinking joint but it will get better as you bring in more instructors, joint service instructors and the student population. It will just get better. It was good but it was Army centric, but I thought it was good to learn more about the Army.

[An Army officer commented] Wow, I think it had a significant impact on me because the good thing about coming here is that it forced me to think in ways I had not either been forced to, that I had to, and at another level with my peer group that were in the same glide path of the learning curve as I was, having some of the same intentions, but because the experiences were so diverse and so different, it provided for a very positive learning experience for me.

**Comments on Student Composition**

Students also commented on *student composition*:

[An Air Force officer commented] It was good. It was stronger than the curriculum. I had had a joint tour so I had already been exposed to a lot of the different thinking and feelings and beliefs of the other services but I thought it was good. It really helped you increase your perspective and remind you that you are not just on your team, you are all on the same team. I thought it had a bigger impact than the curriculum.

[A Navy student’s comment] I was just going to say that it is the interaction between all of the students and being part of a group that determines personal identity. It is not more so than the curriculum is. The curriculum can provide the internal knowledge about how things work and the inner workings, but it does not include you as part of a group. It is the
talking and discussing, the building of friendships and ideas through just
discussion with each other that forms a team and bonds.

[An Air National Guard officer’s comment] I think if anything realize
when you sit around the table and drink beer or actually do the exercises
or hang out in class, there is the interaction that goes on there, and you
can’t help but be influenced by a whole bunch of really smart people from
all the different services, so I would think that I have taken more of that
portion away and that has kind of drug me into the joint world more
certainly than the curriculum has. I would say probably the same for the
instructors. I mean you guys did a great job in kind of bringing us up to
speed on the subject matter that really I think in my opinion the people in
the class that had the greatest impact on it.

Comments on Faculty Composition

Representative student comments on faculty composition:

[A Department of the Army Civilian opined] I would boost trip off that
and say I agree with a majority of what he said but I see that the seminar
student composition is the critical aspect of it. I can see that the Faculty
Team Composition…I was sitting here thinking and looking at it going
moderate, slight, moderate, slight and I kind of go it is moderate because
there has got to be some kind of composition there that reaffirms the
seminar, but it is the seminar in my mind

[An Army officer’s comment] It is pretty even. I mean the only reason I
kind of go higher with the students [student composition] because we had
so many different service guys and I thought the curriculum was well
structured, so it doesn’t take anything away from the instructors, it is just I
think the foundation was laid because of the curriculum and because of the
makeup of the seminar that the instructors followed suit and frankly to be
honest with you, and no disregard to the instructors, a good instructor
really didn’t instruct that much but facilitated because we taught
ourselves, and I mean that in the best way.

[Another Army officer comments] I will say moderate but I will also say
that is by design. I mean they are facilitating the seminar. The seminar is
supposed to be the cauldron in which this catalyst takes place so they
should not have a big impact. That is by design, but then again they weigh
in and keep us on track so they kind of move the herd back and forth so
moderate.
Impact of Electives on joint identity

Following the core curriculum term, students were required to take four electives in subjects of their own choosing. Some students were permitted to take independent study courses for reading or writing, but the vast majority attended classes in seminars like they did in the core curriculum term. For the majority of students, they were assigned to seminars that met 10 times for three hours each or a total contact time of 30 hours per elective (a total of 120 hours across all four electives). Although the majority spent time in seminars, the seminar experience in the electives term differs significantly from those in the core curriculum term. First, the students are not together as long. Second, the seminars vary in size. Some had enrollments as low as five or six students while others approached twenty students. Finally, there were no controls in place to create a specific student composition or faculty composition. Electives were taught by one or more instructors who were largely subject matter experts. Therefore, the type of elective the student chose was often closely correlated to the other students who took that course and the faculty that taught it. If the course was an Army-centric course then the other students were predominantly Army and so were the instructors. If the course was focused on a joint subject, the opposite was true. Taking into account the variety of possible combinations of factors students experienced, students who were interviewed were next asked a series of general questions focused on determining the effect the electives curriculum had on their joint identity, what degree that impact had, and how

---

16 Students chose electives based on their own selection criteria. Generally, the college tried to honor their preferences while balancing enrollment in the electives offered. Therefore, the college could not give every student their top four choices in every case.
they may have redistributed the percentage of the three factors’ (curriculum, student composition, and faculty composition) impact on their joint identity.

When asked about the kind of impact the joint curriculum had on their joint identity 54% (Table 4-21) of the respondents said it had a positive effect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electives' impact on joint identity?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Pct</th>
<th>Valid Pct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negatively</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed the same</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positively</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-21: Electives’ Term Effect on Students’ Joint Identity

Valid percentage is the percentage calculated with the missing cases excluded

Some student comments that reflect positive impacts on students’ joint identity:

[An Army student in an Army only faculty seminar] As far as the curriculum piece, it varied, depending on what elective I took obviously because some of them needed a joint focus, others didn’t from that perspective. As far as the actual student composition, I think that that was lesser simply because, especially in the second term you don’t have time to enter a relationship, it is just fleeting and then it is gone, so you don’t really get to pool that information that we have talked about and how we were able to garner the positions of the other folks, so that wasn’t fair.

[An Air Force Reserve student in an Army only faculty seminar] It is difficult for me to compare though the electives in general pale in value to the core for me. I will try to address each of the three elements: Faculty I would say has had a bit more of an impact in the elective phase. I have had to experience a broader mix to include some interagency stuff. Much less impact from my fellow students and I attribute that to the fact that we are just not together often enough to get to know one another other than the structure of the electives is such that it just does not provoke the same level of the intellectual interaction exchange so that is much less, and Curriculum, mine by their nature is somewhat narrower in their scope I guess maybe that is typical of electives, so I guess what I am saying is a
greater impact from a faculty perspective, less from a student, and I guess I would rate the curriculum about the same if that makes sense.

[An Army officer from a joint faculty seminar] Of all the electives I had, that probably has had the biggest impact because we got lots of guys with classes almost all folks from different services so about 20 guys in there, only about five are Army officers. The other 15, so it is reverse of [his experience in his home seminar group]…the growth in that one seminar probably, I forgot about that, but it has been huge, so I would say that single elective has grown my appreciation, especially for the intelligence component of what we do which is a lot of what I will be doing in my next job.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difference of electives' impact by faculty grouping</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army only</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selecting just those who experienced a positive effect on their joint identity a mean score for the degree of impact (based on slight, moderate, and significant impact) was determined and an independent t-test was run for the means by faculty type. The intent was to see if there was any significant difference between the two sub-populations in the way they experienced the impact of the electives’ term on their joint identity. The results in Table 4-22 indicate that, although the Army-only seminar groups experienced the electives’ term more positively on average, there is no significant difference between the Army-only mean (M=1.86, SE .23) and the joint faculty mean (M=1.83, SE .19) with
Therefore, among those in both populations who experienced a positive impact on their joint identity, it did not matter which seminar type (based on faculty composition) they originally came from. In other words, both populations experienced the electives’ term similarly. It had no more impact on the Army-only seminar group than the joint seminar group in terms of the curriculum, student composition, and faculty composition effect on their joint identity.

Summary of findings and analysis

As stated earlier in the paper, social identification theory provided a framework by which to evaluate or measure the effect organizational changes at the U.S. Army War College intended to accomplish in terms of joint acculturation. Social identification entails three components. First, the cognitive recognition of a group (or groups) exists. The group must be recognized by both its members and those outside the group. Second, an evaluative component must exist that causes members to make value judgments regarding the group. Finally, there is an emotional one that elicits emotional investments in both the awareness and evaluative components. Therefore, identification is experienced at both the cognitive and affective levels. The thought that student assignments to seminars staffed by faculty from more than one service would adopt a stronger joint identity and have a stronger emotional attachment to the joint

---

17 A mean between 1 and 2 indicates that the effect is, on average, somewhere between an assessed “somewhat” and “moderate” effect. Since both means are close to 2.00 the effect is closer to “moderate” than “somewhat.”
community compared to their counterparts in seminars staffed by faculty from just the
Army was what the various measures were intended to assess.

Self-categorization theory further elaborates and enhances understanding of the
processes that work in contributing to social identity. Self-categorization accentuates
the perceived similarities between physical objects or people (including the self)
belonging to the same category and the perceived differences between those belonging
to different categories (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995). The accentuation is contextual
and occurs based on distinct characteristics the individual deems important. The
characteristics can include age, gender, race, or religion among many others.
Motivation to seek membership and identification with a particular group, the in-group,
occurs to fill two needs; to enhance self-esteem (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Hogg &
Ridgeway, 2003) and to reduce uncertainty (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Again, assignment
to seminars meeting all three criteria under the new structure: faculty composition;
student composition; and curriculum would theoretically establish a condition by which
resident students would seek higher status by seeking affirmation by the group—which
would be more joint oriented in those seminars staffed by joint faculty.

Membership and identification with an in-group entails the process of
depersonalization. The cognitive representations attributed to one’s self and one’s group
members causes members to see each as interchangeable or indistinguishable from one
another (Yuki, 2003). As a result of depersonalization at the collective level, the group
classifies norms or prototypical characteristics that define the behavior and other
attributes expected of its members. Higher status is awarded within the group to those
who represent the most prototypical behaviors and characteristics the group reifies.
Table 4-23: Summary of Test Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Effect direction</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 1: identity</strong></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 2: commitment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 2a: normative commitment</strong></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 2</td>
<td>expected</td>
<td>supported***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 3</td>
<td>expected</td>
<td>supported***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 2b: affective commitment</strong></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 1</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
<td>supported*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 2</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
<td>supported***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 3</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
<td>supported***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 2c: total commitment</strong></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 2</td>
<td>expected</td>
<td>supported***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 3</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
<td>supported***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 3: interservice perceptions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army own service view</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy own service view</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force own service view</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines' own service view</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army other service view</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy other service view</td>
<td>expected</td>
<td>supported*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force other service view</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
<td>supported*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines' other service view</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 4: behavior</strong></td>
<td>unexpected</td>
<td>supported**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corollary 1</td>
<td>unexpected</td>
<td>supported**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interviews</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors' effect on joint identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core curriculum</td>
<td>no expectation</td>
<td>significant**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student composition</td>
<td>no expectation</td>
<td>not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty composition</td>
<td>no expectation</td>
<td>significant***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electives' impact</td>
<td>no expectation</td>
<td>not significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significance at p<.10  **significance at p<.05  ***significance at p<.001
Table 4-23 summarizes the test results conducted to evaluate the hypotheses that identity theory would predict and some corollaries that might have provided some further explanations. The first hypothesis specifically measured the strength of identity experienced by those who responded by comparing joint identity with service identity both by faculty type and within faculty type. As Table 4-1 showed the test results were not significant. Theory would predict joint identity would be higher in seminars with a joint faculty assigned. The strength of joint identity in joint faculty seminars was slightly lower than the joint identity expressed from respondents who were assigned to seminars with only Army faculty members, but because the results were not significant no conclusions can be taken from the data. Similarly Table 4-1 also showed that service identities in both conditions was slightly higher for those assigned to joint faculty seminars than the service identity expressed by respondents from seminars where faculty was composed solely of Army instructors, but because the results were not significant no conclusions can be drawn from the data.

Table 4-2 compared joint and service identities first for those assigned to Army-only faculty seminars, then compared the same for those in joint faculty seminars. In the first condition, service identity was shown to be stronger than joint identity as theory would predict, but the results were once again not significant. However, in the second condition, service identity was again stronger than the respondents’ joint identity which was not expected. Although the results were technically non-significant they approached significance in this condition at the p<.10 level. This might suggest that the effect polarized them more towards their service identity rather than encourage them to adopt a stronger joint identity. What did this suggest? Regardless of seminar type, service
identity was stronger than joint identity. Since the results were not significant and response rates were less than 100% it might not be true, but there was insufficient evidence to support this hypothesis or any of the corollary hypotheses.

Stets found that the quality of role feedback received, how frequently workers received role feedback, and who provided the feedback differentiated the workers’ emotional response. In his research he discovered that verifying and positively non-verifying feedback elicits positive emotions. Positive emotional reactions to feedback also increase the salience of that role (Stryker, 1987a). By providing self-enhancing information and positive emotions, salience increases thereby strengthening identity. The seminar environment at the U.S. Army War College is a very collegial, threat-free, and positive learning environment within the seminars as evidenced by the high satisfaction rates expressed regarding student-to-student interaction and student-to-faculty interaction. Therefore, the positive emotions associated with the learning environment might be expected to have a positive impact on the emotional responses expressed by the resident students.

Hypothesis Two focused on the affective or emotional measures respondents experienced at the time they completed their surveys by measuring joint and service commitment. Commitment was divided into two sub-components—normative and affective—which were then combined to create a total commitment score. Normative commitment measured what respondents thought they “should” feel while affective commitment focused more on what they “actually” felt at the time of the survey.

The results summarized in Table 4-23 for Hypothesis Two and all its corollaries present a similar picture as the one for identity. Generally, service normative and service
affective commitment were higher than joint normative and joint affective commitment regardless of the condition to which respondents were assigned, with some exceptions. First, joint normative commitment was actually reported higher than service normative commitment for respondents who were assigned to the joint faculty seminar condition. This result was in the expected direction for that condition. Students felt they should be more committed to the joint community than to their service when they were in the joint faculty seminars. However, the results were not significant so the hypothesis was not supported. Second, joint affective commitment had higher reported mean scores among the respondents in the Army only seminar condition than those expressed in the joint faculty seminars. These results were opposite of the direction expected but were not significant, again suggesting this corollary hypothesis was not accepted. Third, like identity results, service affective commitment was higher in the joint faculty seminars than in the Army-only seminars, but this time the results were significant at the .05 level. This result strongly suggests that respondents felt a stronger emotional allegiance to their own service in the joint faculty seminars than students in the Army-only seminars felt toward their own service. Finally, in all conditions in which service and joint commitment were compared in like conditions (Army-only seminars and joint seminars), commitment to the respondents’ own service was significantly higher than expressed commitment to the joint community. In other words, students felt a stronger allegiance to their own service than they felt the cognitive difference in identity. As an additional note, affective commitment mean scores were higher across the board than normative commitment in all like conditions. In other words, how students actually felt commitment was stronger than how they felt they should feel commitment.
Hypothesis Three, as another way of measuring the differences organizational change may have impacted the organization’s members (in this case the students), anticipated that interservice perceptions would be significantly different for respondents assigned to the Army only faculty seminars than for those assigned to joint seminars. In other words, students in joint faculty seminars would express less difference in perceptions between the services (i.e. they would see the other services much like they saw their own) because they should hold the other services in higher esteem as a result of having those services represented in their seminar’s faculty. In all cases (except the Coast Guard because there is only one student) each of the services did hold their own service in higher esteem in the Army-only seminar condition, with the exception of the Navy. Navy officers held the other services in higher esteem than their own service in that condition, but none of the results were significant. Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported.

On the other hand, when scores of interservice perceptions were measured for respondents in joint faculty seminars each of the services did hold the other services in higher esteem with the exception of the Air Force students. They thought more highly of their own service in that condition than they did the other services. In two of the cases, the Navy and the Air Force, the difference in their views was significant at the .10 level. The Navy officers in joint faculty seminars did hold the other services in higher esteem while the Air Force officers, as already stated, thought more positively of their own service in that condition. Because the other services, given their response rates, provided such a small sample size, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the results even if they are significant. Further, the results are mixed requiring further investigation beyond the
data collected thus far for this study. But the results do indicate that interservice perception may be a viable means of measuring the impact organizational changes have on its members—how, in this case, the U.S. Army War College’s operationalization of the policy affected its resident students.

Joint behavior was difficult to measure in this design because the students’ post-graduation assignments were the result of many factors, to include their own desires, but could not be attributed solely to their desires. Therefore, measuring expressed intent to actual behavior was difficult to ascertain. However, the trends indicate that with this class more students are serving in joint billets after graduation than they had in the previous years. A measure of joint behavior and service behavior was constructed with the data collected. Interesting results emerged. In both cases, joint behavior and service behavior were significantly higher in the conditions not expected by theory. Service behavior was significantly higher in students who were assigned to joint faculty seminar while students from Army only faculty seminars measured significantly higher on joint behavior. Therefore, both were significant and “supported” in the opposite direction.

Stryker’s modifications to identity theory postulate that the “self” is a product of interaction between the person and the social context within which he or she operates. Their self-image is a collection of identities and reflects the multitude of roles people occupy in their lives. Society is made up of role positions people assume. These roles provide them not only self-meaning, but influence their behavior as well. In achieving self-meaning, people develop identities—the sum of multiple roles—hierarchically based on the salience of the roles played in their lives. Salience is affected by the number and strength of roles individuals occupy. Therefore, organizational identities,
or the way individuals define themselves shift based on changes in the salience of the roles they assume. Changes in organizational identity impact behavior. Behaviors change based on the roles members enact and their understanding of role expectations (Hogg, et. al., 1995).

The interviews conducted of the students who did participate focused on trying to assess which identity was most salient and how strongly the students experienced that difference. Table 4-17 indicated that about 75% of the student body claimed their service identity was stronger than their joint identity. This data supported the identity scores measured in the survey results. However, Table 4-18 depicts a shift in the strength of the identity experienced by the 61 students who participated in the interviews. Clearly, the students in the Army-only faculty seminars experienced a strong service identity salience while students in joint faculty seminars showed a dramatic shift from a strong salience to a moderate salience. Although the majority of students who said their joint identity was more salient than their service identity developed that identity as a result of assignment experiences prior to their arrival at the U.S. Army War College, four of the sixty-one respondents interviewed who claimed a stronger joint identity had no prior joint experience. Those four students likely developed a more salient joint identity while in attendance at the U.S. Army War College—four students who would likely not have otherwise developed that identity.

In trying to understand what impact the three factors (curriculum, student composition, or faculty composition) had on the students’ joint identity (however strongly they experienced it) during the core curriculum, the students clearly expressed student composition as the most decisive factor. The assessment of the curriculum and
faculty composition impact was mixed. However, when comparing the impact
curriculum and faculty composition had on the students by seminar faculty type, it was
clear that faculty did have an impact on joint identity even though the interviewed
students did not express that explicitly. Since the students associated the faculty’s
“jointness” based on the services their faculty team represented, rather than the
broadmindedness of the faculty they were assigned, there was a significant difference
between the impact students in Army-only seminars assessed the impact of the faculty
and the curriculum. In the Army-only seminars, the faculty had a significantly smaller
impact on their joint identity and the curriculum had a significantly higher impact on
them than the impact the joint faculty students claimed. Hence, faculty composition did
have a significant impact on joint identity even if it was not the significant impact.

Finally, the study looked at the impact the electives’ term had on joint identity.
The students interviewed stated that the term generally had a positive impact on their
joint identity. However, when assigning a mean score to the degree the term had on
their joint identity there was no significant difference between the way students
assigned to the joint faculty seminars and the Army-only faculty seminars experienced
the electives term. Because there was a significant difference in the distribution of the
factors that affected student joint identity and that Army-only faculty seminar students
expressed a stronger service identity salience than their joint faculty counterparts, the
data suggest that the core curriculum design (i.e. control over curriculum, student
composition, and faculty composition) has a beneficial impact on student joint identity
where joint identity salience is more important than other competing educational
outcomes (i.e. overall education, interagency awareness and education, etc…). Hence,
the structural changes have a positive effect on the joint identity of its students even though it may not be a significant effect as measured by the dependent variables in this study.
Chapter 5
Conclusions

This study set out to measure the impact organizational changes had on the identity, commitment, perceptions, and behavior of its members. Specifically, the study measured the impact demographic changes in faculty and student body composition at the United States Army War College, along with a common core curriculum, designed to meet joint educational requirements, had on the joint identity, commitment, perception, and behavior of its resident students during Academic Year (AY) 2006. The organizational changes, precipitated by changes in law, were designed to increase an appreciation for and an awareness of the other services in the Department of Defense with the goal of promoting non-parochial or non-partisan decision-making which would lead to more effective and efficient use of our nation’s Armed Forces. Because AY 2006 was a transition year, not all of the students received full treatment of the conditions designed to elicit this change in its students. Approximately one third of the students experienced two of the three conditions (curriculum and student composition change) while two thirds experienced all three conditions—full treatment. The specific design of this study set out to detect the differences in identity, commitment, perception, and behavior between the two populations. The study revealed a number of interesting findings.

First, in determining which identity was more strongly rooted in the students their identity with their service was still pervasive and strongly felt—by a 75% overwhelming
majority. This is not surprising. There are numerous reasons for their service identity to remain strong. The students who participated in the study were highly successful in their services and had been chosen to attend the resident course as a result of their success. They were also chosen to attend the resident course at the U.S. Army War College and the other Senior Service Colleges because they had the potential to serve in positions of increased responsibility following graduation. They had served successfully in those services for 17 or more years. In addition, the military students wore their service uniforms (although uniforms were optional for most days while attending classes) that reinforced their service identity. Finally, their service expertise and functional backgrounds were reinforced in the seminar classrooms. Usually, the function or specialty they represented in their seminar was a specialty only they had. Consequently, they were constantly reminded of their service or specialty affiliation precisely because they brought a particular perspective and skill set to the seminar that was important for everyone’s education.

By the same token, the study also revealed that there were plenty, among the students who had participated in the study, who experienced a joint identity—at least 25%—stronger and more salient than their service identity. They experienced this identity even though they were no longer serving in a joint assignment and, in some cases, were not even scheduled to serve in a joint assignment after graduation. Further, they had little in the way of artifacts, trappings, symbols, or other visible reminders to reinforce their connection to the joint community. In spite of the fact that they still wear their service’s uniform, they continue to experience a more salient joint identity.
Further, there was some percentage of the 75% who identified more strongly with their service who admitted that they had previously had a joint identity and could easily readopt one if they were to be assigned to another joint organization. This subpopulation found their time in a joint assignment to be both beneficial and educational. Further, the previous joint assignment broadened their horizons and outlook. Ultimately, however, their identity returned to a service identity since that is where they are currently assigned. This subgroup tends to define itself by the type of organization to which they are assigned and saw their time in a joint unit to be a temporary condition. Their identity was largely defined by what role they played and what job they held. Where did the reported joint identities come from? Virtually all of the participants who admitted experiencing a stronger joint identity at any time in their careers had served in joint assignments prior to coming to the U.S. Army War College. When asked about these previous joint assignments, they reported assignments spanning a range both in the number of assignments held and in their duration.

Some of the service identities came from more deeply rooted origins. Several of the participants discussed family upbringing in a particular service or having a respected family member who served in one of the Armed Forces establishing an early and formative impression that informed or formed their identity. In the case of some of the civilian participants, family preference for a service steered these participants to join a particular service and seek employment with that service in a non-uniformed capacity. They too experienced a strong identity with their service in spite of not wearing distinctive military uniforms and in spite of not having undergone a rigorous socialization process like basic training. Although the sample size was small for participants in other
executive branch agencies, the ones who participated in the study also experienced a strong identity with their parent organization (the State Department in this case).

The study indicated that the structural changes at the U.S. Army War College were insufficient to change the strongly experienced service identity to a joint identity, in the aggregate. Further, the study’s design isolated faculty composition as the sole variable that distinguished one group from another and it too was insufficient to alter the identity orientation for the students who participated in the study. However, in spite of the strong organizational cultures, reinforced by the artifacts associated with membership in a particular service and their service rituals, traditions, and norms, the study did reveal that the year of resident study and the conditions the students experienced at the U.S. Army War College did have an effect in making a joint identity more salient for some of the students for some who had no prior joint experience. In other words, for a small portion of the participating population, the year’s experience was significant enough for some with no previous joint experience to change their identity—they now define themselves with a joint identity vice a service one.

The interviews with participants also indicated that the students from services other than the Army appeared to have had a more salient joint experience in their year of resident study then their Army student counterparts. Exposure to a service college named for a service other than one’s own seemed to cause students from the other services to experience the year as more of a joint experience than that which their Army counterparts experienced. As an example, Navy students attending the U.S. Army War College tended to experience the Army War College as a more defining joint experience than the Army students. The Army students tended to view their year of resident study as simply
attending yet another Army school. Similar reactions were captured among students who participated in the study who belonged to organizations outside the Defense Department too. The fact that the Army War College was not yet accredited as a joint professional military education institution seemed to have a strong impact in affecting the Army students’ perceptions of their year. In other words, since it was not recognized as a joint institution, it therefore was not a joint institution in their eyes. Instead it remained an Army institution. Because the school was not “joint” approved, they continued to perceive it as an Army-only experience. The school’s image and its name had a lot of influence on that perception. Therefore, attending the Army War College had little or no impact on redefining the Army students’ perceptions of their identity.

The study also revealed that, among the three factors associated with the desired acculturation change, student demographics were significantly the most influential factor that positively affected the students’ joint identity formation. The U.S. Army War College’s application of the Socratic teaching method contributes to the conditions that makes student composition the most influential of these three factors. Further, the homogenization that occurs in constructing each of the twenty seminars to distribute the various backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives creates the conditions by which students experience the different perspectives and benefit from the seminar’s composition in the ensuing core curriculum term.

Another finding the study revealed dealt with commitment. Of the variables measured, commitment was the most stable and least affected variable. Emotional commitment to each of the respondent’s service was very high. When comparing commitment to one’s service, regardless of the condition the students experienced,
commitment to service was significantly higher than commitment to the joint community. These findings certainly emphasize the difference between the two constructs—identity and commitment. One is cognitive and the other emotional. Comparing service and joint identities, in like conditions, revealed no such significant differences (Table 4-2) like those seen in comparisons of commitment. Therefore, this suggests that cognitive changes may be more malleable to organizational changes than emotions are to organizational change. Once embedded in the person’s “organizational DNA”, they may be less receptive to organizational change influencers. This may be a fruitful avenue for further research—studying the differences in organizational change impacts on the affective versus the cognitive aspect of the organization’s members.

Likewise regarding interservice perceptions in this design, perceptions of the respondent’s own service were less susceptible to change influencers. Table 4-9 indicated that, generally, respondents held their own service in higher esteem than the others regardless of condition in which they found themselves. Therefore, they seemed less responsive or susceptible to environmental influencers the organization created. However, their perceptions of the other services seemed more malleable and more readily influenced by organizational change factors—at least among the services other than Army in this study. In the case of the Navy students and the Air Force students, the changes in their views of the other services were significant. The Navy respondents’ change was in the direction theory predicted. The Air Force respondents, however, reflected change in the opposite direction expected. The Marines, like their Navy counterparts, experienced change in perceptions of the other services in line with theoretical predictions. Although these results were not significant, they were not far
from significance at the p<.10 level (actual p was .18). These results may be an artifact of something unique across the services, they may be attributed to the smaller sample sizes among the respondents from the other services compared to the Army respondents’ sample size, or they may be an artifact that other services experience when attending a school not from their own service or in conditions in which they are a minority population—a factor which appears to contradict social identity theory. Further, these were results experienced in a non-competitive environment and one conducive to openness and inclusion. The same effect may not be experienced in organizational conditions that are more competitive and exclusive. These would be valid questions for future research endeavors.

Finally, the study revealed some unexpected findings. Results in Table 4-2 indicated that when service and joint identity were compared among students in like conditions, service identity was higher than joint identity for students in joint faculty seminars. Although not significant, the results approached significance at the p < .10 level (actual p was .11). Affective commitment measures demonstrated unexpected results too. Service affective commitment was significantly higher (p<.05) in joint faculty seminars when compared with service affective commitment in Army-only faculty seminars (see Table 4-5). Theory would predict that joint affective commitment should be higher than service affective commitment in this condition. In measuring behavior, two tests demonstrated results in an unexpected direction. Table 4-12 shows that students in Army only seminars reported significantly higher joint behavior scores than those students in the joint faculty seminars. Similarly, service behavior measures were significantly higher among students in joint faculty seminars than in Army-only
seminars—an effect opposite of what social identity theory predicts. These unexpected results may indicate something that really exists and warrants further exploration or may be an indicator of something peculiar to just the sampled population (i.e. that those sampled somehow differ from the actual population).

**Future Research**

There were several questions this study did not answer. How much identity, commitment, perception, and behavior change is desired or how much is enough? Did students achieve an appropriate amount of joint acculturation (measured by the four variables) or is more necessary? Is relying primarily on self-reports a valid measure to address these questions?—probably not. This study set out to measure the impact organizational change had on the identity, commitment, perceptions, and behaviors of its members. The study isolated the differences between two groups, one that had received full treatment and another that had only received partial treatment. Therefore, it was limited in its ability to assess the magnitude of change experienced as a result of organizational interventions. Because the U.S. Army War College was rightfully protective of its student body and resisted over-sampling them during the academic year, this study was designed to measure an effect using a one-time measure. Within its design, the study was tailored to measure some impact, but limited in its ability to answer the real important question—how much impact did the year of resident study have in moving the resident students in the right direction toward joint acculturation?
Implications for continued research at the U.S. Army War College

Ideally, the research could have been designed differently to measure the real impact organizational changes at the U.S. Army War College had or is having on its resident students with regard to joint acculturation.

First, the institution could reassess its students using a pre-test, post-test design to ascertain and measure the total difference the year of resident study has on the entire student body. This type of design would measure the magnitude of change by initially measuring service and joint identity, commitment, interservice perceptions, and behavior as the students entered the academic year. Then, it could assess them at the end of the year to measure the degree of difference in the four variables. Second, the institution could compare two populations, those with no prior joint experience and those who have. Comparing these two populations would allow the institution to isolate the effect the U.S. Army War College alone has on those with no prior joint experience by measuring the degree of difference on each of the variables. Third, the U.S. Army War College could also use regular measures on an annual basis to conduct a longitudinal time-series design to assess the degree of change over time.

Reassessing the students in light of changes that have occurred since this study was conducted may also have an impact on the results detected. First, the college met its requirement for faculty composition as scheduled for AY 2007. Faculty composition is now in full compliance with the 60-40% requirement set forth in law and policy. Further, as a result of meeting the implementation schedule, the U.S. Army War College has undergone accreditation and been granted authority to award JPME II credit to its
graduates (Mullen, 2007). In light of these changes, the U.S. Army War College may have a different “image” to its current student body. Consequently, the students may perceive the institution as a “joint” institution and might, therefore, demonstrate higher measures on the factors previously assessed.

In addition, the institution currently conducts assessments as to its success in meeting the service’s needs by surveying general officers as to the effectiveness of the Army War College’s graduates. However, the surveys are only sent to Army generals in various assignments around the Department of Defense. Given the senior service colleges have been chartered to perform an additional function—to provide graduates for a joint environment, rather than just providing graduates for a service function, the survey should expand its audience to assess the views or perspectives of “strategic consumers.” The surveyed audience should be expanded to include: general officers from other services besides the Army, should target specific joint and multinational audiences (i.e. commanders of joint and multinational headquarters that actually have U.S. Army War Colleges graduates in their command); and target various civilian leaders within the Department of Defense and the other executive branches where U.S. Army War College graduates serve. In that way, assessing whether the Army War College is providing graduates with sufficient jointness could be possible.

Additionally, the graduates themselves should be surveyed post-graduation. Assessing graduates after they report to assignments upon graduation and have an opportunity to practice the skills and apply the knowledge and perspectives gained, would be a beneficial way to assess the impact the resident year at the U.S. Army War College had. The year at the U.S. Army War College may have planted a seed that needs
time to germinate or, upon reflection, take time to assess the full impact—one this study was unable to accomplish due to its limitations. Measuring the students’ changes after graduation may provide results that aid in answering the question—how much time do identity, commitment, perception, or behavioral changes need to take root or how durable are the changes experienced upon graduation?

Finally, whether with this data or with data gathered during a subsequent study with a similar design and purpose, the U.S. Army War College could conduct a multiple regression analysis to determine which, if any, of the independent variables are more significant than others in affecting changes in identity, commitment, interservice perceptions and/or behavior in the desired direction. Knowledge of which factors are more instrumental in affecting change in the students attending the resident course should elicit a more effective and efficient strategy to sustain those factors and put less emphasis on the factors that only marginally impact the dependent variables. Knowledge of the impact some factors might have in the U.S. Army War College context may also be of great value to other institutions considering or using similar change strategies for similar desired outcomes.

**Implications for future research in public administration**

In the larger field of public administration, the use of identity, commitment, interservice or interorganizational perceptions, and behavioral measures provides a template to apply in research for a wide variety of organizations and to attempt to answer a plethora of questions multiple vertical organizations face in trying to solve horizontal
problems. First, identity theory provides a useful theoretical framework to inform managers’ actions, to predict organizational change results, and to evaluate organizational change strategies.

Using the macro, micro, or integrative approaches to identity theory provide useful frameworks for conducting research to address some of these complex problems. From the macro perspective researchers can emphasize the effects image and role enactment have on the desired changes in identity, perceptions, commitment and behavior. A way to apply this approach is for managers to assess the organization’s current image, then change, establish, sustain, or align the organization’s image as appropriate. Another strategy might be to modify the roles the organization’s members enact in line with accomplishing or solving horizontal tasks or solutions. Evaluations of the change can then test the variables used in this study, coupled with an appropriate design, to assess the effectiveness of the organization’s change strategy. From a micro perspective, managers can affect identity and the other variables to first measure and assess: current in-group and out-group relations; what values, reflected in esteem and status, the organizations’ members perceive to be prominent in the organization; and assess the relationships and values with what the leadership envisions is appropriate for their organization. Then, through manipulation of the relationships and/or modification of the organization’s desired values and those values actually experienced, managers can then assess the impact these change strategies have on the organization’s members. The micro approach, in contrast to the sweeping, organization-wide changes the macro approach provide may be better suited and/or tailored for subgroups within the organization for study and applicability. Finally, using the integrative approach Hatch
and Schultz (2000) espouse may add a level of complexity to the researcher’s design, but provides a more comprehensive framework by which to measure the impact organizational change strategies may have on its members by evaluating or studying the impact reflecting, expressing, mirroring, and impressing processes have on the people who belong to the organization.

Second, using the variables applied in this study also has the advantage of assessing whether an organization’s change strategy is sufficiently comprehensive—does it affect not only the mind of the organization’s members, but also their hearts. If change strategies appeal not only to the cognitive or rational aspects of its members, but also to their emotions, the change strategy’s effect has to be more effective in both magnitude and duration. Use of the identity theory framework coupled with the variables used in this study can provide a more comprehensive way of assessing the effects organizational changes can have on both aspects on the people that make up the organization’s human resources.

This study, within its limits, attempted to address some of the questions below. The results may have shed some light or provided partial answers to these questions, but the bottom line is that many of them remain unanswered and require further study. These questions, identified by Pratt and Foreman (2000) remain for research to address:

(1) where do identities come from?
(2) where do identities reside?
(3) to who or to what do identities refer?
(4) who is viewing the identities? And,
(5) when are the identities? (past, present, future).
As advised by Brown and Starkey (2000b), the following considerations were kept in mind when creating the design for this study. The first and third lines were addressed to some extent, but others were not.

1) consider the irrational and emotional aspects of organizations;
2) include contributions from the psychodynamic perspective;
3) acknowledge a temporal component because identity is not static, but fluid to a degree; and
4) acknowledge and account for the effect politics and other power-related aspects have on identity and identification within and outside organizations (Brown & Starkey, 2000b).

They remain considerations to include or address in future research.
Bibliography


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (22 December 2005). Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff instruction 18001.01C. Officer professional military education policy (OPMEP).


MEMORANDUM FOR Resident Students, U.S. Army War College Class of 2006

SUBJECT: U.S. Army War College Study

1. This is one final request for assistance in completing a survey. Currently, survey response rates average only 50%. You have received this message because you have not previously responded or have started the survey but did not complete it.

2. Your participation is voluntary. But your support of this U.S. Army War College study will benefit both the college and the undersigned as part of his doctoral research. A better response rate would ensure more accurate, reliable data upon which to base future decisions. The study the survey supports is designed to assess the impact of organizational structural changes on resident student body perceptions.

3. The input you provide can affect the future development of the U.S. Army War College’s Joint Professional Military Education. I recognize your time is important, especially at this time of year. The survey will only take 10-15 minutes to complete. If you can give me 10-15 minutes of your time, please go to the survey link below to input your data. I will leave the survey open until 9 June 2006 to allow you sufficient time to complete it prior to graduation.

4. The results of the survey you complete will be kept confidential. The results, fed back to Dr. William Johnsen, the U.S. Army War College Dean, and my Penn State dissertation committee chairman, Dr. James Ziegenfuss, will be aggregated data and will not identify you individually.

5. Please contact me if you have any questions. You may contact me at (717) 245-4790, DSN 242-4790, or by email at George.Woods@Carlisle.Army.Mil.

6. Thank you in advance for your participation.

GEORGE J. WOODS, III
COL, IN
Director of Public Administration Studies
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management
Appendix B

Joint Identity, Commitment, and Interservice Perception Survey

Introduction: Results of this research may help identify potential changes in structure and process at the U.S. Army War College. Your participation in this project will also assist a U.S. Army War College Faculty member complete his doctoral research. Your participation is greatly appreciated.

Purpose of the Study: To explore the impact mandated US Army War College structural changes have on the perceptions of identity and commitment among its resident students.

Procedures to be followed: By completing and submitting the survey, you agree to participate in this research. Upon pressing the "Next" button you will advance to the survey instrument for completion. The completed surveys will serve as data points to measure if there is change in perceptions of identity, commitment, and interservice perception associated with your year of resident study at the US Army War College. You may also be asked to participate in a focus group to discuss the survey instrument before you graduate and or you may be asked to voluntarily participate in individual interviews.

Duration: It will take about 15-20 minutes to complete the survey questions. The focus group will last approximately 30-45 minutes.

Statement of Confidentiality: Your participation in this research is confidential. Only the person in charge, George Woods, will know your identity. The data will be stored and secured in Room C320 or on the main server in the principal investigator's personal drive in a password protected file. Your student mailbox number is the only data that will identify your survey responses. In the event of a publication or presentation resulting from the research, no personally identifiable information will be shared. Since this is an electronic form, your confidentiality will be kept to the degree permitted by the technology used. No guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data sent via the Internet by any third parties.

Right to Ask Questions: Please contact George J. Woods at (717) 245-4790 or george.woods@carlisle.army.mil with questions or concerns about this study.

Voluntary Participation: Your decision to participate in this research is voluntary. You can stop at any time. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer. Refusal to take part in or withdrawing from this study will involve no penalty or loss of benefits you would receive otherwise.

You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. Completion and submission of the survey implies your consent to participate in this research. Please print a copy of this form to keep for your records.

Thank you again for your participation.

Please press "Next" to continue. Continuation implies consent to participate in this research.
Instructions:

The following survey instrument will ask you to respond to questions regarding some demographic information, immediate assignment choice following graduation from the War College, and the degree to which you experience identity and commitment towards the Joint Force/Community.

Then it will ask you to rate perceptions of your view of "stereotypical" members of your own Service on ten attributes.

Then it asks you to rate "stereotypical" Service members from each of the other Services on those same dimensions. Non-military resident students respond the best you can to the questions asked of you. In each set of statements on identity and commitment, select the button of the choice that best characterizes the way you think or feel (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; or strongly disagree).

After you have completed the identity and commitment questions you will be asked about perceptions you have regarding your own Service and those of the other Services. Respond to these questions by selecting the position on the continuum that best depicts where you perceive the "average" or "stereotypical" Service members of each component rest.

*Please press "Next" to continue or "Save" to continue later.*

< Back Next > Save

1. At the completion of the academic year most of you will be assigned to one of a variety of possible duty assignments. Assuming you will be reassigned and your service or component (active, reserve, or civilian) would support any assignment you desire, rank order the type of assignment you would like to have. When filling out this ranking complete it as if you would actually have to serve in this assignment. Please click the box to the left of your choices in priority order. If you make a mistake, please clear all boxes and try again.

- Joint staff or multi-national staff duty (serve on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, NATO, etc...)
- Joint duty serving in either a Combatant Command or Joint Task Force (CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, JTF 6, etc...)
- Service duty assignment at the institutional level (service school, training and doctrine, etc...)
- Service duty assignment in a field or operational assignment (i.e. command)
- Not applicable
- Other Please enter a brief description of the position you desire.

2. I chose the top assignment in the previous question because:

- It's what I really want to do.
- It's what I have to do to remain competitive in my career.
- It's what I have to do for other reasons (i.e., Family or medical).
- Other Please insert a short description of the reason.

Please press "Next" to continue or "Save" to continue later.
Part II: Demographic Data.

3. Student Mailbox Number:

4. My Joint Qualifications are:

- I have had no joint military duty assignments in my career
- I have had one joint duty assignment in my military career
- I have had multiple (more than one) joint duty assignments in my military career
- As a civilian, I have worked with a joint organization in my career (DoD agency or interagency experience)

5. My cumulative joint duty assignment(s) duration has been (pick the one that fits best):

- one year or less
- two years
- three years
- more than three years
- Not applicable, I have had no joint duty assignments in my career.

Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.

< Back   Next >   Save
Part II: Demographic Data.

6. My joint duty assignment(s) was in (check all that apply):

- The Joint Staff
- A Unified Command Headquarters (CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, etc...)
- A sub-unified or joint task force headquarters
- A DoD or other joint equivalent agency
- A Joint school
- Other Please enter a brief description
- Not applicable

7. The highest level of Joint professional military education (JPME) I have received is:

- JPME I at the INTERMEDIATE level (CGSC)
- JPME II at the INTERMEDIATE level (JFSC)
- JPME II at the SENIOR level (JFSC)
- Army or Service Management Staff College
- None

8. Highest Level of Education:

- Associate degree
- Baccalaureate degree
- Master degree or equivalent (not including your degree from the USAWC)
- Doctorate degree or equivalent

Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.
Part III: Joint Identity and Commitment

The following questions ask you about your thoughts and feelings towards the Joint force/community and perceptions you hold about members of your own and other services.

Note: "Official" is used in a generic sense in order to apply to various positions or descriptions of your role (officer, civilian manager, administrator, technician, etc...) in your career or in your official career capacity.

"Joint force/community" is used as a term to refer to multi-service organizations or communities of practice. If you have not served in a joint assignment respond the best you can, but please choose the response that best fits your situation (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. When someone criticizes the joint force/community, it feels like a personal insult.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I don't act like the typical person of the joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. I'm very interested in what others think about the joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The limitations associated with the joint force/community apply to me also.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. When I talk about the joint force/community, I usually say &quot;we&quot; rather than &quot;they.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. I have a number of qualities typical of members of the joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The joint force's/community's successes are my successes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. If a story in the media criticized the joint force/community, I would feel embarrassed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. When someone praises the joint force/community. It feels like a personal compliment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. I act like a person of the joint force/community to a great extent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*

< Back  Next >  Save
Part III: Joint Identity and Commitment

The following questions ask you about your thoughts and feelings towards the Joint force/community and perceptions you hold about members of your own and other services.

Note: "Official" is used in a generic sense in order to apply to various positions or descriptions of your role (officer, civilian manager, administrator, technician, etc...) in your career or in your official career capacity.

"Joint force/community" is used as a term to refer to multi-service organizations or communities of practice. If you have not served in a joint assignment respond the best you can, but please choose the response that best fits your situation (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. I believe people who have been trained in the Joint force/community have a responsibility to stay in that profession for 3-5 more years.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. I do not feel any obligation to remain in the Joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. I feel a responsibility to the Joint force/community to continue to serve in it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel that it would be right to leave the Joint force/community now.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. I would feel guilty if I left the Joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. I am in the Joint force/community because of a sense of loyalty to it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25. Being an official in the Joint force/community is important to my self-image.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. I regret having entered the Joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. I am proud to be a member of the Joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. I dislike being an officer in the Joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. I do not identify with the Joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. I am enthusiastic about the Joint force/community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Overall, in the past year, my perception of oneness with the Joint force/community has:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased a lot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased a little</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stayed the same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decreased a little</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decreased a lot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.
**Part IV: Interservice Perception**

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

### U.S. Army (Questions 32 - 41)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Scale 1</th>
<th>Scale 2</th>
<th>Scale 3</th>
<th>Scale 4</th>
<th>Scale 5</th>
<th>Scale 6</th>
<th>Scale 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apathetic  
Pacifistic  
Undisciplined  
Low Tech  
Unkempt  
Parochial  
Out of Shape  
Dependent  
Disrespectful  
Biased

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*
Part IV: Interservice Perception

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

### U.S. Navy (Questions 52 - 61)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pacificist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Undisciplined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Low Tech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Unkempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Out of Shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Disrespectful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Biased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*
Part IV: Interservice Perception

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

### U.S. Navy (Questions 52 - 61)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*

< Back  Next >  Save
**Part IV: Interservice Perception**

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

### U.S. Marine Corps (Questions 62 - 71)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comitative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Apathetic*  *Pacifistic*  *Undisciplined*  *Low Tech*  *Unkempt*  *Parochial*  *Out of Shape*  *Dependent*  *Disrespectful*  *Biased*

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*

< Back  Next >  Save
Part IV: Interservice Perception

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

U.S. Coast Guard (Questions 72 - 81)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apathetic          Pacifistic    Undisciplined Low Tech Unkempt Parochial Out of Shape Dependent Disrespectful Biased

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*
82. If you serve in the military, how often do you wear civilian or business attire per week (please choose the response that best describes your behavior)?

- 4-5 times per week.
- 2-3 times per week.
- Once a week.
- None. I wear my uniform except for off-site seminars.
- Does not apply. I am attending the course as a civilian.

83. I hold my assigned seminar faculty teaching team in very high esteem (ratings by instructor; number designation is not linked to any particular faculty member).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty Member</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Member 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Member 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Member 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Member 4 (If applicable)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this survey, please contact George Woods at (717) 245-4790 or via e-mail at george.woods@carlisle.army.mil.

*Please press "Finish" to submit, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*
Appendix C

Service Identity, Commitment, and Interservice Perception Survey

Service Identity, Commitment, and Interservice Perception Survey Instrument

Introduction: Results of this research may help identify potential changes in structure and process at the U.S. Army War College. Your participation in this project will assist a U.S. Army War College Faculty member complete his doctoral research. Your participation is greatly appreciated.

Purpose of the Study: To explore the impact mandated US Army War College structural changes have on the perceptions of identity and commitment among its resident students.

Procedures to be followed: By completing and submitting the survey, you agree to participate in this research. Upon pressing the "Next" button you will advance to the survey instrument for completion. The completed surveys will serve as data points to measure if there is change in perceptions of identity, commitment, and interservice perception associated with your year of resident study at the US Army War College. You may also be asked to participate in a focus group to discuss the survey instrument before you graduate and or you may be asked to voluntarily participate in individual interviews.

Duration: It will take about 15-20 minutes to complete the survey questions. The focus group will last approximately 30-45 minutes.

Statement of Confidentiality: Your participation in this research is confidential. Only the person in charge, George Woods, will know your identity. The data will be stored and secured in Room C320 or on the main server in the principal investigator's personal drive in a password protected file. Your student mailbox number is the only data that will identify your survey responses. In the event of a publication or presentation resulting from the research, no personally identifiable information will be shared. Since this is an electronic form, your confidentiality will be kept to the degree permitted by the technology used. No guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data sent via the internet by any third parties.

Right to Ask Questions: Please contact George J. Woods at (717) 245-4790 or george.woods@carlisle.army.mil with questions or concerns about this study.

Voluntary Participation: Your decision to participate in this research is voluntary. You can stop at any time. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer. Refusal to take part in or withdrawing from this study will involve no penalty or loss of benefits you would receive otherwise.

You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. Completion and submission of the survey implies your consent to participate in this research. Please print a copy of this form to keep for your records.

Thank you again for your participation.

Please press "Next" to continue. Continuation implies consent to participate in this research.
Instructions:

The following survey instrument will ask you to respond to questions regarding some demographic information, immediate assignment choice following graduation from the War College, and the degree to which you experience identity and commitment towards your Service.

Then it will ask you to rate perceptions of your view of "stereotypical" members of your own Service on ten attributes.

Then it asks you to rate "stereotypical" Service members from each of the other Services on those same dimensions. Non-military resident students respond the best you can to the questions asked of you. In each set of statements on identity and commitment, select the button of the choice that best characterizes the way you think or feel (strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; or strongly disagree).

After you have completed the identity and commitment questions you will be asked about perceptions you have regarding your own Service and those of the other Services. Respond to these questions by selecting the position on the continuum that best depicts where you perceive the "average" or "stereotypical" Service members of each component rest.

Please press "Next" to continue or "Save" to continue later.
**Part I: Duty Assignment Preference.**

1. At the completion of the academic year most of you will be assigned to one of a variety of possible duty assignments. Assuming you will be reassigned and your service or component (active, reserve, or civilian) would support any assignment you desire, rank order the type of assignment you would like to have. When filling out this ranking complete it as if you would actually have to serve in this assignment. Please click the box to the left of your choices in priority order. If you make a mistake, please clear all boxes and try again.

| Joint staff or multi-national staff duty (serve on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, NATO, etc...) |
| Joint duty serving in either a Combatant Command or Joint Task Force (CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, JTF 6, etc...) |
| Service duty assignment at the Institutional level (service school, training and doctrine, etc...) |
| Service duty assignment in a field or operational assignment (i.e. command) |
| Not applicable |
| Other Please enter a brief description of the position you desire. |

2. I chose the top assignment in the previous question because:

| It's what I really want to do. |
| It's what I have to do to remain competitive in my career. |
| It's what I have to do for other reasons (i.e., Family or medical). |
| Other Please insert a short description of the reason. |

*Please press "Next" to continue or "Save" to continue later.*

< Back  Next >  Save
Part II: Demographic Data.

3. Student Mailbox Number:

4. My Joint Qualifications are:
   - I have had no joint military duty assignments in my career
   - I have had one joint duty assignment in my military career
   - I have had multiple (more than one) joint duty assignments in my military career
   - As a civilian, I have worked with a joint organization in my career (DoD agency or interagency experience)

5. My cumulative joint duty assignment(s) duration has been (pick the one that fits best):
   - one year or less
   - two years
   - three years
   - more than three years
   - Not applicable, I have had no joint duty assignments in my career.

Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.
Part II: Demographic Data.

6. My joint duty assignment(s) was in (check all that apply):

- [ ] The Joint Staff
- [ ] A Unified Command Headquarters (CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, etc...)
- [ ] A sub-unified or joint task force headquarters
- [ ] A DoD or other joint equivalent agency
- [ ] A Joint school
- [ ] Other
- [ ] Not applicable

Please enter a brief description

7. The highest level of Joint professional military education (JPME) I have received is:

- [ ] JPME I at the INTERMEDIATE level (CGSC)
- [ ] JPME II at the INTERMEDIATE level (JFSC)
- [ ] JPME II at the SENIOR level (JFSC)
- [ ] Army or Service Management Staff College
- [ ] None

8. Highest Level of Education:

- [ ] Associate degree
- [ ] Baccalaureate degree
- [ ] Master degree or equivalent (not including your degree from the USAWC)
- [ ] Doctorate degree or equivalent

Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.
**Part III: Service Identity and Commitment**

The following questions ask you about your thoughts and feelings towards your own Service and perceptions you hold about members of your own and other services.

Note: "Official" is used in a generic sense in order to apply to various positions or descriptions of your role (officer, civilian manager, administrator, technician, etc…) in your career or in your official career capacity.

"Service" is a term used that represents the primary armed service, agency or institution to which you belong.

In responding to the following questions, think of your responses in terms of the service (Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps), agency, or institution to which you are assigned. Answer by choosing a response that best fits your situation (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree).

| 9. When someone criticizes my service, it feels like a personal insult. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

| 10. I don’t act like the typical person of my service. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

| 11. I’m very interested in what others think about my service. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

| 12. The limitations associated with my service apply to me also. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

| 13. When I talk about my service, I usually say “we” rather than “they.” |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

| 14. I have a number of qualities typical of members of my service. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

| 15. My service’s successes are my successes. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

| 16. If a story in the media criticized my service, I would feel embarrassed. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

| 17. When someone praises my service, it feels like a personal compliment. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

| 18. I act like a person of my service to a great extent. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*
Part III: Service Identity and Commitment

The following questions ask you about your thoughts and feelings towards your own Service and perceptions you hold about members of your own and other services.

Note: "Official" is used in a generic sense in order to apply to various positions or descriptions of your role (officer, civilian manager, administrator, technician, etc...) in your career or in your official career capacity.

"Service" is a term used that represents the primary armed service, agency or institution to which you belong.

In responding to the following questions, think of your responses in terms of the service (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps), agency, or institution to which you are assigned. Answer by choosing the response that best fits your situation (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. I believe people who have been trained in my service have a responsibility to stay in that profession for 3-5 more years.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. I do not feel any obligation to remain in my service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. I feel a responsibility to my service to continue to serve in it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel that it would be right to leave my service now.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. I would feel guilty if I left my service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. I am in my service because of a sense of loyalty to it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25. Being an official in my service is important to my self-image.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. I regret having entered my service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. I am proud to be a member of my service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. I dislike being an officer in my service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. I do not identify with my service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. I am enthusiastic about my service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31. Overall, in the past year, my perception of oneness with my service has:

- Increased a lot
- Increased a little
- Stayed the same
- Decreased a little
- Decreased a lot

Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.
Part IV: Interservice Perception

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

U.S. Army (Questions 32 - 41)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.

< Back   Next >   Save
Part IV: Interservice Perception

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

U.S. Air Force (Questions 42 - 51)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characterization</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pacifistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Undisciplined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low Tech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unkempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parochial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Out of Shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disrespectful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.
Part IV: Interservice Perception

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

**U.S. Navy (Questions 52 - 61)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pacifistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Undisciplined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low Tech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unkempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parochial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Out of Shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disrespectful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*

< Back    Next >    Save
**Part IV: Interservice Perception**

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

**U.S. Marine Corps (Questions 62 - 71)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pacifistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Undisciplined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low Tech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unkempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Parochial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Out of Shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disrespectful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*
**Part IV: Interservice Perception**

In this part of the survey, you will see characterizations of the 5 services (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard). Please respond to the following by marking the response that best fits your characterization of members of the Armed Forces using the designated continuum.

### U.S. Coast Guard (Questions 72 - 81)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Apathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pacifistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disciplined</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Undisciplined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Tech</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Low Tech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unkempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadminded</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Parochial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically Fit</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Out of Shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourceful</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disrespectful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Biased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*
82. If you serve in the military, how often do you wear civilian or business attire per week (please choose the response that best describes your behavior)?

- 4-5 times per week.
- 2-3 times per week.
- Once a week.
- None. I wear my uniform except for off-site seminars.
- Does not apply. I am attending the course as a civilian.

83. I hold my assigned seminar faculty teaching team in very high esteem (ratings by instructor; number designation is not linked to any particular faculty member).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty Member</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Member 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Member 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Member 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Member 4 (if applicable)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Please press "Next" to continue, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.*
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this survey, please contact George Woods at (717) 245-4790 or via e-mail at george.woods@carlisle.army.mil.

Please press "Finish" to submit, "Back" to change responses, or "Save" to continue later.
Appendix D

Focus Group Invitation

4 May 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Seminar # U.S. Resident Students, U.S. Army War College Class of 2006

SUBJECT: U.S. Army War College Study Student Focus Group Interviews

1. You are requested to attend a brief focus group interview to support a U.S. Army War College study assessing the impact of organizational structural changes on resident student body perceptions.

2. The interview will take 30 minutes. Your participation is important for the future development of the U.S. Army War College’s Joint Professional Military Education. The time and location for your seminar’s interview is:

   Date: Wednesday, 10 May, 1225 hours.
   Location: Root Hall, Room C331 (the DCLM Conference room).

3. Participation is voluntary and the results will be kept confidential (see attached informed consent form). The results of this study will be fed back to Dr. William Johnsen, the U.S. Army War College Dean and my Penn State dissertation committee chairman, Dr. James Ziegenfuss. Results will be aggregated data and will not identify you individually. Your participation in this interview is part of my doctoral research with Penn State University and the Army War College.

4. If your academic schedule precludes attendance during this scheduled time and you would like to participate in the study, please contact me to make individual arrangements.

5. Thank you in advance for your participation and if you have any questions, contact me at (717) 245-4790, DSN 242-4790 or by email at George.Woods@Carlisle.Amy.Mil.

GEORGE J. WOODS, III
COL, IN
Director of Public Administration Studies
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management
MEMORANDUM FOR Seminar # U.S. Resident Students, U.S. Army War College Class of 2006

SUBJECT: U.S. Army War College Study Student Focus Group Interviews

1. You are requested to attend a brief focus group interview to support a U.S. Army War College study assessing the impact of organizational structural changes on resident student body perceptions.

2. The interview will take 30 minutes. Your participation is important for the future development of the U.S. Army War College’s Joint Professional Military Education. The time and location for your seminar’s interview is:

   Date: Wednesday, 10 May, 1225 hours.
   Location: Root Hall, Room C331 (the DCLM Conference room).

3. Participation is voluntary and the results will be kept confidential (see attached informed consent form). The results of this study will be fed back to Dr. William Johnsen, the U.S. Army War College Dean and my Penn State dissertation committee chairman, Dr. James Ziegenfuss. Results will be aggregated data and will not identify you individually. Your participation in this interview is part of my doctoral research with Penn State University and the Army War College.

4. If your academic schedule precludes attendance during this scheduled time and you would like to participate in the study, please contact me to make individual arrangements.

5. Thank you in advance for your participation and if you have any questions, contact me at (717) 245-4790, DSN 242-4790 or by email at George.Woods@Carlisle.Army.Mil.

GEORGE J. WOODS, III
COL, IN
Director of Public Administration Studies
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management
Appendix F

Focus Group and Individual Interview Protocol

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact structural changes at the U.S. Army War College (curriculum, student composition, and faculty composition) are having on resident student identity, commitment, and interservice perceptions. The focus of the study is to determine what factors of the resident program’s education process are most significant in forming, changing, or strengthening resident student identity—curriculum, seminar student composition, faculty team composition, or a combination of these or other factors. This evaluation will facilitate providing a blueprint for the Army War College to assess the impact of the changes and make modifications or improvements as necessary.

This interview is to focus on specific effects of the educational process for the resident course and your assessment of what factors were most salient and influential in shaping perceptions of yourself and your fellow classmates throughout the year. It is important to understand what this means in order to better structure and improve the context of the educational environment at the Army War College to better meet its mission, goals, and objectives in providing strategic leaders focused on the nation’s security. The results from these interviews will help in developing an informed blueprint for future structural systems designed to accomplish the college’s mission.

Please give me your name and a brief background of who you are.

A. Identity salience question:

1. What identity would you characterize to be the stronger in defining who you are today—your joint identity or your service identity? Why? When did this identity form?

B. Thinking of just the core curriculum (AUG through MAR), your assigned seminar group, and your assigned faculty team:

2. What impact has the curriculum at the Army War College had on your joint identity? Would you characterize the effect as being significant, moderate, slight, or none at all? Why?

3. What impact has your seminar student composition at the Army War College had on your joint identity? Would you characterize the effect as being significant, moderate, slight, or none at all? Why?
4. What impact has your assigned faculty team composition had on your joint identity? Would you characterize the effect as being significant, moderate, slight, or none at all? Why?

5. If you had 100% to distribute to these three factors, what percentage would you assign to each of them in terms of the effect they have had on your joint identity (i.e. 33, 33, 33) during this period?

C. Thinking of the electives periods (MAR through MAY):

6. How have the three factors (curriculum, student composition, or faculty composition) affected your joint identity (positively, negatively, or stayed the same)? Would you classify the effect as significant, moderate, slight, or none at all? If your joint identity changed, how and why did it change?

7. If you had 100% to distribute to these three factors, what percentage would you assign to each of them in terms of the effect they have had on your joint identity (i.e. 33, 33, 33) during this period?
VITA

George J. Woods, III

Colonel George J. Woods, III was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to a career Army officer and has called many locales home. Colonel Woods graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1980 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in General Engineering. He entered military service in the U.S. Army as an Infantry officer that same year, beginning a 28 year military career. He was awarded a Ph.D. in Public Administration from Pennsylvania State University, a Master of Organizational Psychology from Columbia University, and two master degrees, one each from the Advanced School of Military Studies (Military Art and Science) and the U.S. Army War College (National Security Studies). He also completed three executive fellowships in negotiations from the John F. Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Law School and an education policy fellowship with the Education Policy and Leadership Center in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Colonel Woods, a qualified Ranger and parachutist, has served in a variety of assignments throughout his career to include: tactical infantry units; teaching assignments, and staff positions at various levels. As an infantry officer, he commanded D Company, 3d Battalion 6th Infantry Regiment at Fort Polk, Louisiana and the 1st Battalion 41st Infantry Regiment at Fort Riley, Kansas. In other assignments, Colonel Woods served in Germany as Battalion Operations officer for 1st Battalion 15th Infantry Regiment and Chief of Plans and Deputy Operations officer for the 3rd and 1st Infantry Divisions. He has served stateside as a Division Operations officer for the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Carson, Colorado and as a Leadership Policy officer in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters Department of the Army, the Pentagon. From 1989-1991, he served on the faculty as an Associate Professor in the Behavioral Sciences and Leadership Department, United States Military Academy. He taught at both the undergraduate and graduate level. In 2002, he joined the faculty of the United States Army War College Department of Command, Leadership, and Management where he currently serves as the Director of Public Administration Studies. In 2008, he was privileged to teach a leadership course at the Afghanistan National Army’s Senior Command and Service College.

Colonel Woods’ military education includes completion of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Staff Service School, the Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the United States Army War College. Colonel Woods is a member of several professional organizations to include the American Society for Public Administration.

Colonel Woods is married and has three children. His son, Lieutenant Joseph Woods, is married and currently serving his country as a Field Artillery officer stationed in Kansas. Colonel Woods can be reached by telephone at 717-245-4790 or by electronic mail at george.woods2@us.army.mil.