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THE ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE OF WHITE SUPREMACY

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ABSTRACT

Little past research has examined how the partitioning of the white supremacist social movement industry (SMI) compares to other SMIs. This is in spite of evidence that organizations within this SMI may be unique in their deployment of protest tactics and willingness to utilize violence. Scholarly analysis of other SMIs indicates that identifying diversity in organizational characteristics like professionalization, membership, frames, and organizational strategies is useful for partitioning SMIs. By evaluating the white supremacist SMI in terms of these four organizational characteristics, this study finds substantial evidence that there are eight distinct organizational clusters operating within the white supremacist SMI, that this diversity is driven by deployed organizational strategies, and that this SMI is unique in its use of violence and willingness to deploy a merchandizing-based organizational strategy. These findings provide both an alternative framework through which to understand diversity in the SMI of white supremacy, as well as evidence that the SMI of white supremacy is distinct within the US social movement sector in its deployment of violence and the merchandizing organizational strategies.

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THE ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE OF WHITE SUPREMACY

Introduction

Scholars of white supremacy have made strong claims regarding the nature of the white supremacist social movement industry (SMI). For example, this scholarship has argued that this SMI is saturated with violence and dominated by social movement organizations (SMOs) that deploy community and protest oriented tactics (Ezekiel 1995; Blee 2002). However, other social movements literature argues that the deployment of violence and protest-based strategies are rarely dominant within SMIs (Andrews and Edwards 2005; Minkoff 1995). This incongruence may emerge because most past scholarship on white supremacy studies the industry based on groups' own ideological labels rather than their organizational characteristics.

This thesis takes a different approach by mapping the full known population of white supremacist SMOs, gathering data on these SMOs using online web content, and partitioning this population into clusters based on SMO organizational characteristics. By deploying this alternative approach, this thesis furthers our understanding of how the white supremacist SMI fits within the US social movement sector (SMS) through evaluating the following question: how does variation in organizational characteristics like professionalization, membership, frames, and organizational strategies partition the white supremacist SMI? I find lower frequencies of violence and protest oriented organizational strategies than what may be inferred from prior literature on white supremacy and also a relatively high frequency of SMOs deploying a merchandizing organizational strategy.

Past social movements literature, while acknowledging the relative importance of these organizational characteristics has often leveraged a single subset of these characteristics in any given analysis (Benford and Snow 2000; McCarthy and Zald 1973; McCarthy 2005; Minkoff 1995). For example, Walker, McCarthy and Baumgartner (2011) evaluated the American social movement sector (SMS) in terms of membership, and Minkoff (1995) did a similar analysis of four distinct SMIs in terms of organizational strategies. It is currently unclear if these organizational characteristics carry equal value in partitioning SMIs when used together. As such, this study also seeks to answer the following question: is variation in organizational characteristics like professionalization, membership, frames, and organizational strategies of equal importance when partitioning the white supremacist SMI? I find that the partitioning of the white supremacy SMI is primarily driven by organizational strategy.

The outline of this thesis is as follows. First, I review findings from the social movements' literature that assist in understanding diversity in SMIs. Second, I discuss past work on white supremacy arguing that organizational characteristics in this SMI may not express themselves in line with this literature. Third, I evaluate the current literature on white supremacy to discern how these key organizational characteristics are present within this SMI. Fourth, I detail the unique, web-based dataset and clustering method I utilize to evaluate how these

organizational characteristics partition the SMI. Finally, I review the results and discuss the major findings of this study.

Literature Review: Social Movements

Past social movements literature highlights numerous indicators useful for understanding diversity within SMIs. I focus here on four: professionalization, membership, frames, and organizational strategies.

Professionalization

Social movement organizations (SMOs) professionalize when their staffing transitions from a near-exclusive reliance on volunteers to a core of well-educated (and better paid) career social movement activists. Professionalized SMOs have different types of organizational objectives, use membership differently, deploy different strategies, are more likely to survive, pursue social movement ends differently than their un-professionalized counterparts. For example, Staggenborg's (1988) analysis of 13 pro-choice SMOs found that professional leadership played an important role in encouraging organizations to adapt "tactics that aid organizational maintenance" (p. 600), such as actively soliciting outside funding, formalizing internal processes, specializing staff through heightened delegation, and engaging in increased "coalition work" with other organizations within the industry. Similarly, McCarthy and Zald (1973) argue that professionalized SMOs are more likely than unprofessional SMOs to expand their grievances to match available exterior funding, to utilize media as a mechanism to mobilize sentiment, and to attempt to influence *policy* towards the constituency it represents.

Past research has also indicated that the professionalization of SMOs within SMIs may transform the SMIs norms and goals. Staggenborg (1988) argued that SMIs dominated by formalized SMOs may have a longer lifespan than those dominated by informal SMOs due to the increased emphasis on organizational maintenance. DiMaggio's (1991) analysis of the institutionalization of the organizational field of art museums indicated that the increased reliance that these institutions placed on university-trained, professional museum curators led to the field's objectives shifting from the preservation of art to emphasizing art education for the masses. This shift in field objectives, he argues, indicates that institutionalization carries with itself "if not the seeds of its own destruction, at least openings for substantial change" (p. 287).

There are numerous potential criteria for professionalization, including credentialization, specialization, organizational durability, use of media, and a shift in funding from the immediate constituency to sympathetic third parties (See DiMaggio and Powell 1983; DiMaggio 1991; McCarthy and Zald 1973). This thesis focuses on specialization, which refers to the degree to which organizations have a clear division of labor among staff.

Membership

Past literature argues that there is a cleavage within the US social movement sector between those organizations with membership and those without (McCarthy and Zald 1973). While these

two sets of organizations often complement each other in the pursuit of movement goals, they also behave differently (Walker, McCarthy, and Baumgartner 2011). Organizations with membership are more likely to pursue organizational strategies that require the involvement of persons, to proliferate their chapter presences, and to derive their funding from their membership as opposed to outside sources (McCarthy 2005). While organizations without membership vary in their activities, past research indicates that there are subsets focused on influencing public policy, developing movement infrastructure, providing services, and creating alternative funding sources for movement constituents (Walker, McCarthy, and Baumgartner 2011; Minkoff, Aisenbrey and Agnone 2008).

Past literature has indicated that determining if an organization maintains a membership list is the preferred method for evaluating if an organization has formalized membership (Gamson 1990). However, past research on white supremacy indicates that such membership lists are elusive in this industry, and that membership is often rather signified by participation in group activities and events (Blee 2002). Because of this, this thesis attempts to tap into the importance of membership by evaluating evidence of membership activities and membership processes within an organization as opposed to searching for the presence of a formalized list of members.

Framing

Past literature has emphasized that SMOs vary in the frames (understood to be the result of the process by which an organization constructs its grievances, attributes blame for those grievances, and proposes solutions to those grievances) that they deploy (Benford and Snow 2000). For example, Benford (1993) noted variation in framing among peace movement SMOs was associated with both different targeted audiences and preferred tactics. Further, past literature argues that framing impacts the ability of SMOs to obtain the more tangible resources and support necessary to achieve their goals (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986). For example, Cress and Snow's (2000) study of homeless shelters found both that the degree of framing varied among homeless shelters and also that those homeless shelters with higher levels of framing were better able to obtain both approximate objectives (increased SMO capacity) and also movement goals (better care for the homeless).

Beyond SMO outcomes, past research indicates that innovative framing can lead to dramatic shifts in how effective an SMI is at achieving movement goals (Cress and Snow 2000). Benford (1993) found that the development of the "national freeze campaign" (which called for the United States and the Soviet Union to cease development, production and testing of new nuclear weapons) was a highly successful frame for the entire peace movement SMI. The adaption of the "drunken driver" frame in the drunk driving SMI produced similar results (Gusfield 1981).

Past literature has indicated that the specific list of frames deployed by SMOs is useful for conceptualizing diversity in the white supremacist SMI. As Snow, Tan and Owens (2013) demonstrate, white supremacists' sort themselves by the frames they deploy. Further, Berbrier

(1998) indicates that there are clusters of white supremacist SMOs which intentionally downplay particular frames, thereby distinguishing themselves within the SMI.

Organizational Strategies

Past literature has argued that SMOs often intentionally deploy a particular set of tactics (an “organizational strategy”), that this set varies from SMO to SMO, and that this selection carries important implications for both the SMO and the SMI. Minkoff’s (1995) analysis of the Hispanic, Asian, black and women’s SMIs identified four subsets of organizations within these SMIs. Some specialized in deploying purely institutional tactics (“Advocacy”), some focused on extra-institutional tactics (“Protest”), some focused on providing some sort of financially meaningful service to the constituents of the industry (“Service”), and others provided the constituents with activities and community events oriented around movement ideals (“Cultural”). Minkoff, Aisenbrey and Agnone (2008) also connected organizational structure to the deployment of specific organizational strategies.

How organizational strategies are deployed matter for SMO outcomes. Soule and King (2008) argue that protest-oriented SMOs which deploy a larger variety of protest tactics have longer organizational life spans, and Munson (2001)’s historical analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood attributes a portion of its success in the mid-20th century to its investment in the local communities (or, the deployment of what Minkoff would refer to as a “Service” organizational strategy) alongside its political activities. However, Minkoff (1999) argues that any SMO that *switches* its organizational strategy decreases its chances of survival.

The organizational strategies that SMOs utilize also impact SMI outcomes. Levitsky’s (2007) analysis of Chicago’s LGBTQ SMI indicates that the differentiation identified by Minkoff (1995) may reflect a division of labor within SMIs, and that this division of labor is useful for developing a “movement identity” that aids with achieving movement goals. Additionally, Armstrong’s (2002) analysis of the emergence of San Francisco’s LGBTQ SMI indicates that the widespread adaption of the “Gay + 1” organizational strategy (a combination of Minkoff’s (1995) “service” and “cultural” organizational strategies) did much to develop the infrastructure and to expand the membership of the LGBTQ community in San Francisco. This, in turn, did much to help the SMI achieve key movement ends such as reduced restrictions on the community and electing one of their own (Harvey Milk) to public office.

Conservative SMI analysis

Some past scholarship has voiced skepticism regarding the direct applicability of the literature described above to SMIs like white supremacy (Blee and Creasap 2010; McVeigh 2009; Blee 2017). This is in part because the social movements literature described above has been anchored in “progressive” SMIs, while the SMI of white supremacy is a “conservative” SMI.

McVeigh (2009) argues that *conservative* social movements like that of white supremacy are distinct from their *progressive* counterparts for two broad reasons. First, while progressive movements often emerge when a group whose grievances are constant gain access to the

resources and political opportunity required to provide solutions to those grievances (such as the civil rights or women's movements), conservative social movements emerge from the dominant class, where resources and political opportunity are essentially constant. In those cases, McVeigh argues, grievances and relative power-devaluation of that privileged class are more useful for explaining movement emergence. Second, the privileged constituency of conservative social movements means that they play by a fundamentally different set of rules than their progressive counterparts. One effect of this is that these social movements are often given more leeway on their use of extra-institutional tactics. For example, as McVeigh points out, interfering with the 1920's Klan would have been "tantamount to political suicide for many political and legal authorities" (p. 197) of that era, especially for those who drew their support from white, protestant voters. These officials preferred to turn a blind eye to Klan activities whenever possible, so long as any violence that emerged was kept "under control" (p. 197).

There is reason to suspect that these two distinctions influence how the organizational characteristics described above map the white supremacist SMI. For example, while much past literature has pointed to a strong negative correlation between professionalization and violence, this is often because violence is viewed as a risky tactic by movement professionals in progressive SMOs who must rely on sympathizers beyond their constituency to maintain their funding. However, if a movement's constituency can provide enough funding to maintain the organization and that constituency also approves of violence, it is possible that this relationship may shift within the SMI, leading to a type of "professionalized violence". Indeed, research indicates that such violence in the white supremacist SMI serves as a key mechanism to establish its validity as a social movement. As Ezekiel (1995) argues, "without periodically re-earning its reputation for violence, the movement would disappear" (p. xxix). Similarly, since much social infrastructure is already constructed to the benefit of the privileged classes, it is possible that formalized membership and organizational strategies may be proxied through this infrastructure. For example, the Klan is notorious for cooperating with and infiltrating law enforcement (FBI Counterterrorism Division 2006). In 1979, the Klan worked with Greensboro police to orchestrate the violent attacks on peaceful protesters that later became known as the "Greensboro massacre" (Bermanzohn 2003). A similar pattern of cooperation between the Klan and local police existed in Birmingham, Alabama through the 50s and 60s, leading to, among other violent incidents, the 16th street Baptist Church bombing in 1963 (McWhorter 2001).

Summary

The above literature indicates that the four organizational characteristics of professionalization, membership, frames, and organizational strategies are effective tools for partitioning SMIs into clusters of SMOs and that the diversity they identify carries sociologically meaningful implications for both the SMO and SMI. It also indicates that how these four organizational characteristics operate may differ depending on if the SMI in question is conservative or progressive.

Note that past social movements literature, while it has acknowledged the relative importance of all of these various organizational characteristics, tends to leverage one subset of these characteristics in any given analysis. While any of these organizational characteristics could theoretically be used to successfully identify diversity within the white supremacist SMI, it is currently unclear if they all carry equal utility for partitioning SMIs when used together. This is one of the questions investigated by the present project. What follows is a more formal discussion regarding how these organizational characteristics have been implicitly used to organize the SMI of white supremacy.

Literature Review: White Supremacy

Here, I review how past scholarship on white supremacy has conceptualized diversity within the industry and discuss the findings of this past literature in terms of the four dimensions discussed above. My objective is to develop an approximate picture from past literature of how these four organizational characteristics may organize this SMI.

Past approaches

Those scholars of white supremacy who have evaluated diversity within this SMI have done so by using a series of indicators which fall into one of three broad “dimensions”: ideological distinctions, historical contexts, and cultural markers. *Ideological distinctions* refer to the justifications deployed by groups for their white supremacist beliefs. For example, scholarship on white supremacy has pointed out that Neo-Nazis often deploy pseudoscience (IQ differences and genetic markers) to justify their beliefs while Christian Identity advocates deploy an intricate theological framework (numerology and “10 tribes” mythology) and biblical fundamentalism (Blee 2002). *Historical contexts* refer to when and why subgroups emerged. For example, scholarship indicates that Klan and White Nationalists are distinct in part because the former was born in the 1860’s from anti-government and anti-black sentiment, while the latter emerged in the 1980’s due to immigration concerns and “White Genocide” (Swain 2002; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997). *Cultural markers* refer to the accepted norms, behaviors and paraphernalia of the ideological grouping. The Neo-Nazis favor formal protests, (pseudo) academic conferences, think tanks, and thick books while Racist Skinheads favor street fights, music festivals, house parties and music CDs (Blee 2002; Simi and Futrell 2010).

Scholars of white supremacy have leveraged these three dimensions primarily to identify “ideological and stylistic differences” among these ideological streams (Simi and Bubolz 2016, p. 298). Scholars acknowledge that the distinctions identified by these dimensions are “blurry” boundary markers at best because white supremacist organizations often “embrace basic doctrines that transcend their ideological differences” (Simi and Futrell 2010, p. 10). Because of this, the categories identified by these labels are “rather arbitrary” (Kaplan 2000, p. xxiv) and “complexly intertwined to form the current white separatist movement” (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997, p. 34). As Blee (2002) notes, “Even well-established groups often have fuzzy boundaries. Ku Klux Klan leaders often proclaim Nazi-like sentiments. Some Klan leaders are

CI preachers. Nazi skinheads appear at Klan rallies and cross burnings” (p. 193). In other words, while these ideological streams may *appear to be* distinct, this diversity only operates at the surface level. At their core, so the argument goes, these ideological streams are all but identical. Thus, while this literature has identified (at minimum) four such ideological streams operating in this industry (the Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi, Christian Identity, and White Nationalism streams), its style of analysis places little substantive emphasis on these streams when evaluating the industry (Blee 2002).

These ideological streams are, of themselves, not particularly useful for partitioning the SMI of white supremacy. However, this thesis argues that a careful analysis of these streams in terms of the organizational characteristics outlined above does reveal that these characteristics do vary within the white supremacist SMI and that this variation has the potential to generate partitions within the SMI of sociological interest. The remainder of this section demonstrates this by evaluating the four ideological streams just identified in terms of what the literature on white supremacy has indicated regarding their relative specialization, propensity to have educated leadership, membership, framing, and organizational strategies. This review also considers two organizational characteristics highlighted by the current literature on white supremacy: educated leadership and propensity to commit acts of violence. This evaluation is summarized in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

Specialization.

Klans have a long history of intra-organization specialization, detailed hierarchies and chains of command, and this tendency has persisted in reduced form within some Klans to this day (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Craig 2015; Blee 2002). In contrast, Neo-Nazi and Christian Identity groups rarely emphasize specialization (Hamm 1993; Blee 2002). White Nationalist organizations vary in the degree to which they have specialized staffing, with some segments of this ideological stream (like the alt-right) avoiding it while others exhibiting a relatively high degree (Hawley 2017).

Membership.

Many modern KKKs have members (Blee 2002). Not all Neo-Nazi SMOs have members, as there is a substantial subsection of this cluster being made up of small music producers/distributors (Simi and Futrell 2010). There is some ambiguity in terms of how common “membership” is among Christian Identity groups, though there are cases (like the *Church of Israel*) where it is clearly present. White Nationalist groups also vary in terms of membership. Some organizations, like the editorial/advocacy organization *American Renaissance*, do not have members, but others, like the political entity *The American Freedom Party*, have members.

Framing.

While all ideological streams within this SMI identify a similar set of core grievances, often revolving around non-white immigration, affirmative action, racial inner-marriage and “white genocide” (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Blee 2002; Barkun 1997; Swain 2002), they differ on who they blame for those grievances and their proposed solutions. Klans attribute blame for these issues to failed and incompetent government policies and passive, racially unaware whites, although some groups extend this frame to include Jewish subversion of the government (or the “ZOG”) (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Blee 2002). These groups propose solutions that emphasize politics or education, such as homeschooling and “American First” immigration policy (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Blee 2002). Neo-Nazis see these grievances as the result of a global Jewish conspiracy that has rendered United States government in its current form fundamentally illegitimate, and their proposed solutions focus on mass education, public exhibitions of their ideas and the use of “lone wolf” and terrorist violence (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Blee 2002).

Christian Identity groups see these grievances as the forerunners of a coming racial apocalypse which has been brought on by the continuing decay of social and religious institutions and Jewish subversion (although this anti-Semitism varies in degree and type) (Barkun 1997). Their proposed solutions often involve the rejection of the generally “godless” society in favor of Christian communalism built around maintaining racial purity and following biblical law, although Barkun (1997) notes some individuals with Identity ties have been heavily involved with electoral politics (such as James Wickstrom, Tom Metzger and David Duke). White Nationalists place blame on overly compassionate and racially ignorant whites and ill-advised immigration policies (Swain 2002). Their solutions focus on building a political bloc focused on promoting “white interests” (such as ending affirmative action, ceasing non-white immigration and outlawing interracial marriage) and eventually forming a nation grounded in white national identity (Swain 2002).

Organizational Strategy.

Traditionally, Klans have deployed community and protest-based organizational strategies in the pursuit of social movement ends, of which night rides, picnics, public protests, and cross burnings are classic examples (Blee 2002). Extra-institutional tactics like protests and community events (such as Hitler birthday parties) are commonly deployed by Neo-Nazis (Blee 2002; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile’s 1997). Christian Identity groups deploy a wide range of organizational strategies, including strategies oriented around service provision and community development (Barkun 1997). Most White Nationalist groups deploy an advocacy-focused organizational strategy though recent groups have deployed a more protest-oriented strategy such as meme-warfare and online trolling (Swain 2002; Hawley 2017).

Educated leadership.

Past literature indicates that Klans and Neo-Nazi organizations rarely have highly educated leaders (though David Duke and Dr. William Pierce are notable exceptions) (Swain

2002; Hamm 1993; Kaplan 2000). Christian Identity groups place some emphasis on education, though these credentials are often mediocre at best (Barkun 1997; Aho 1990). However, White Nationalist groups often prize advanced college degrees quite highly, and leaders within this stream often have advanced degrees from elite institutions (including, for example, Harvard, University of Chicago, and University of Wisconsin-Madison) (Swain 2002; Hawley 2017).

Violence.

Literature indicates that there is a split among Klans in terms of violence, with some organizations disavowing violent tactics while others embrace such extra-institutional methods (Kaplan 2000; Blee 2002). Violence is commonly deployed by Neo-Nazis range from vandalizing synagogues and Jewish cemeteries to stockpiling weapons and tracking the movements of local minority individuals to a variety of violent attacks bathed in anti-Semitism (Blee 2002; Hyacinth 2013; Royce, 2009; Miller, 2017; Parkin et al 2015). Relatively few Christian Identity groups have engaged in overt violence, though the *The Order* and *Aryan Nations* are exceptions. Most White Nationalist groups actively avoid utilizing violence for movement ends (Swain 2002; Hawley 2017).

Summary

As is demonstrated in Table 1, past literature provides evidence that there is a high degree of diversity within the white supremacist SMI in terms of professionalization, membership, frames, and organizational strategies. However, while Table 1 suggests that each ideological stream within this SMI is comprised of a different combination of organizational characteristics, these organizational characteristics often cut across ideological streams. This indicates that using the ideological labels provided by the SMI itself carry little utility when attempting to understand this SMI in terms of the organizational characteristics described above. For example, Table 1 indicates that ideological streams are not useful for evaluating if membership and non-membership organizations operate in a cooperative or competitive fashion in this SMI, or if organizations that deploy a protest organizational strategy and those that deploy an advocacy organizational strategy complement each other. To get these kinds questions that are of interest to social movement scholars, an alternative categorical scheme is needed.

Research Question

The above literature argues that organizational characteristics are useful for discerning diversity in SMIs, that these characteristics vary between white supremacist ideological streams, and that the conservative nature of the white supremacist SMI may shift how these organizational characteristics operate. Following from this literature, this thesis centers on the empirical evaluation of the following research questions:

Research Question: How do key organizational characteristics partition the white supremacist SMI?

Sub-Question 1: Which organizational characteristics are most important for partitioning the white supremacist SMI, and how do the resulting partitions compare with past white supremacy research?

Sub-Question 2: How is the white supremacy SMI different regarding these organizational characteristics than other SMIs?

Methods

Data

The data for this project are comprised of white supremacist SMO websites, as determined by the Southern Poverty Law Center's (SPLC) 2017 list of hate groups. While much past research that attempts to map the SMI of white supremacy has relied on snowball sampling (Caiani and Kröll 2015; Zhou et al 2005) this method assumes a high degree of network density among the SMOs within this SMI. Research indicates that such network density within SMIs is often driven by professionalized SMOs and that white supremacist SMOs vary in terms of their professionalization (DiMaggio 1991; Blee 2017). Because of this, snowball sampling has the potential to over-emphasize professionalized SMOs within this SMI. Past literature focused on mapping organizational fields has found professional directories from organizations within the field to be an effective method for mapping these fields (Powell et al 2005). Similar research on social movements also supports this conclusion (Armstrong 2002; Earl 2013).

Scholars of white supremacy have leveraged SPLC data in the past as an effective estimate of the white supremacist and extreme right SMI (Parkin, Freilicha and Chermak 2015; Gruenewald 2011; Chermak, Freilich and Suttmoeller 2013; Suttmoeller, Chermak, and Freilich 2017; Swain 2002; Mullins 1997). However, past scholarship has indicated that the SPLC's place as an actor within the white supremacist social movement field incentivizes it to define the SMI as broadly as possible, potentially including organizations on its list that are only loosely related to the industry (Chermak 2002). Further, past literature has also noted that the SPLC tends to classify "units" or chapters or organizations rather than organizations (Chermak 2002). Because of these concerns, I both independently check each SPLC entry to verify if it belongs to the white supremacist SMI and nest chapter affiliates of an organization together.

While the SPLC listed 954 entities, I classified those entities with the same name to be chapter affiliates of the same organization¹. This classification nested the 954 groups listed by the SPLC into 360 distinct organizations. I have verified that 346 (96%) of these organizations have current or recent websites by using a series of targeted internet searches in conjunction with SPLC data, past hate directories, and organization information available on the white supremacist site *Stormfront*.

¹ Additionally, several groups are known affiliates of larger groups. For example, the *Mary Noel Kershaw Foundation* was founded to "support the educational work of the League of the South", which is also listed by the SPLC. Similarly, while both are listed by the SPLC, the *Traditionalist Workers Party* formed the *Traditionalist Youth Network* as an outreach to white youth.

[Table 2 about here]

As summarized in Table 2, I classified 154 (44%) of these 346 organizations as white supremacist based on one of the following indicators²: 1) Explicit statement of ethnic/racial whiteness as central to ideology, 2) Explicit statement that the organization is speaking to a group of people which is either explicitly or can be safely defined as exclusively white, 3) Explicit statement of exclusive white membership, 4) Acceptance and support of ideological concepts that hinge on whiteness (such as “White pride” or “White genocide”), 5) Explicit use of the “14 words”, “88 precepts” or “mantra” in identity content, 6) Explicit identity claims (KKK, Neo-Nazi, Alt-right and Christian Identity) that imply relevance to study, 7) The non-ironic use of any ideological concepts that hinge on whiteness, 8) The use of any images or memes commonly associated with the alt-right/white supremacy, 9) Hosting alt-right activity.

Due to the wide variation in content available for coding on each website, I standardized which pages were selected for coding as follows. Framing codes were based on the front page of the website and all self-referential pages³ immediately accessible from the front page. All other codes were based on these pages as well as all pages accessible within a single click of these pages.

Note that, while all 154 of these websites could be identified as white supremacist based exclusively on their own web content, these sites varied both in content breadth and density. Of these 154, 84 (55%) had more than 500 words of self-referential content and 90 (58%) had more than ten unique pages worth of content within a single click of the main page of their website. A total of 64 (42%) sites both had more than 500 words of self-referential content and also more than 10 pages of content. However, restricting the analytical sample to only those sites with high breadth, density or both impacted only the size as opposed to the composition of the clusters developed in this study. This suggests that most websites fit a pattern regardless of their level of development. Further, the fact that certain clusters were shrunk more than others by restricting the analytical sample indicates that the “underdevelopment” of certain sites may be reflective of a strategic decision of a certain type of organization that a lack of resource investment into the website. For example, the majority of organizations in the merchant cluster had fewer than 500 words of self-referential content on their website, and about half of the organizations within the violent cluster had fewer than 10 unique pages on their website.

Measures

This section outlines how I operationalized the organizational characteristics of professionalization, membership, frames, organization strategy and violence. First, I operationalized *specialization* through a single binary variable indicating if the organization

²The frequency that any specific indicator was used to classify relevance is available upon request.

³ Examples of “self-referential” pages include pages titled “About us”, “What we believe”, “Mission statement” and “10-points”. The purpose was to catch any and all pages immediately accessible on the website in which the organization talked about itself.

listed staff with differentiated roles. Second, I operationalized *membership* as a binary variable based on if the organization alluded to having a membership base. Examples of this include if the organization had a membership application, spoke of membership activities, or provided photographic evidence of “members” participating in group events. Note that this measure likely underestimates the number of white supremacist SMOs that have members, as SMOs with membership have a strong incentive to conceal the presence of members from the general public.

Third, I operationalized *framing* as any instance when an organization problematized a clearly demarcated group (“immigrants are bad for society”), assigned blame a clearly demarcated group (“we have high levels of immigration because of Jewish influence”), or encouraged the implementation of a specific tactic (“The way to solve our immigration problem is through the voting booth”). I selected five framing elements highlighted by prior literature as key for understanding the SMI of white supremacy: (anti-) Immigration, (anti-) LGBTQ, (anti-) Jews, (anti-) Government, and (pro-) Traditional Religion (Blee 2002; Aho 1990; Berbrier 1998; Adams and Roscigno 2005).

Fourth, I operationalized *organization strategy* as a set of four (non-exclusive) indicator variables: advocacy, protest, merchandising and community. The *advocacy* indicator refers to organizations that demonstrated the use of or attempt to deploy routine institutional tactics in the pursuit of movement ends on their websites. Examples of this include publishing a specific statement detailing the organization’s stance on salient policy issues, encouraging their members to contact legal officials, or publishing policy briefs. The *protest* indicator refers to organizations that demonstrated use of or attempt to deploy extra-institutional tactics in the pursuit of movement ends on their websites. Examples of organizations deploying this organizational strategy include photographic or video evidence of the group members attending protests, the organization providing flyers for offline distribution or providing photographic evidence of having posted said flyers. Note that this organizational strategy is based on only the deployment of *non-violent* extra-institutional tactics. The *merchandising* indicator variable refers to those organizations that provided some type of service for the social movement had financial value. For the purposes of this project, this definition was further restricted to only those organizations that provided at least 3 items for sell on their website. Note that having a dedicated page labeled “Store” was viewed as enough justification for this code, even if the store page itself could not be accessed due to methodological limitations. The *community* indicator variable refers to those organizations provided networking activities for movement members and sympathizers that were not directly related to achieving social movement goals. Examples include hosting private meetings for movement members (such as Klan cross-burnings) and facilitating community events not explicitly linked to raising awareness about specific issues (such as Klan “meet-and-greets” and Christian Identity church services).

Fifth, I operationalized *violence* as an indicator of if the organization had either demonstrated, advocated, or enabled violence on their website. Examples of this include providing video evidence of having utilized violent tactics, providing advice for how to successfully deploy violent tactics, or advocating for the use of violent tactics in framing content.

Sixth, I operationalized *educated leadership* as a binary variable indicating if the leader of the organization had a master's degree or higher.

Clustering Method (HAC)

This project makes use of Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering (HAC)⁴. HAC is a clustering method which iteratively merges observations into clusters based on their relative similarity to each other. Each iteration merges the two most similar observations (or clusters), after which relative proximity is re-calculated before the next iteration. If no cutoff point is defined beforehand, this process continues until only one cluster remains (Everitt, Landau and Leese 2001). As is common for clustering methods, I defined three HAC parameters in advance: the proximity parameter (how relative similarity is calculated), the linkage parameter (how similarity to a cluster of observations is calculated), and a partitioning cutoff (at what level of dissimilarity clusters are treated as substantively distinct). My *proximity* measure is the Jaccard similarity coefficient. This coefficient is calculated as the proportion of characteristics mutually possessed by two observations divided by the total number of characteristics possessed by at least one observation. I selected complete linkage as my *linkage* measure because it creates compact clusters (Everitt, Landau and Leese 2001) without projecting a certain type of distribution on the data. This linkage measure computes dissimilarity between clusters by comparing the two most dissimilar observations within each cluster. I *partitioned* at the .9 level ($h = .9$) because any value lower than this produces so many clusters that interpretation becomes unwieldy. Specifically, while ($h = 1$) produced 8 clusters and ($h = .9$) produced 9 clusters, ($h = .8$) produced 18 clusters and ($h = .7$) produced 27 clusters.

Results

The results of this study are divided into four sections. The first section describes the univariate and bivariate relationships present in the data. The second section focuses on interpreting the HAC results as they partition the SMI of white supremacy.

Univariate and Bivariate Statistics

This section focuses on the univariate and bivariate relationships observed between professionalization, membership, organizational size, framing, organizational strategies and violence. The descriptive results are summarized in Table 3.

[Table 3 about here]

Specialization. Specialization was present in 18% (N=28) of the sample.

Membership. The data indicates that 51% (N=78) of the sample does not provide evidence of having members on their website, while 49% (N=76) do.

⁴ An alternative analysis built on a different clustering method (correlational class analysis) is presented in the appendix as a robustness check.

Organizational Size (> 4 chapters). A cross-tabulation of membership and organizational size indicates that the 18 membership organizations that have more than four chapters collectively account for 52% of the field (220 of 425 total chapters). The three largest organizations with membership account for 19% of the field (81 of the 425 total chapters). This cross-tabulation is presented in Table 4.

[Table 4 about here]

*Organizational Strategy*⁵. The advocacy strategy was deployed by 30% (N=45) of the sample. The protest strategy was deployed by 25% (N=38) of the sample. The service strategy was deployed by 29% (N=44) of the sample. The community strategy was deployed 25% (N=38) of the sample. Evaluation of organizational strategies that white supremacist SMOs utilize indicates that white supremacist organizations vary both in terms of which organizational strategy they choose as well as the number of strategies they are willing to consider. I failed to observe evidence of any organizational strategy being actively deployed on the websites of forty-three groups⁶. Sixty-two groups deployed only one organizational strategy on their website. Forty-five groups deployed two or more organizational strategies on their website. These results are detailed in Table 5.

[Table 5 about here]

Framing. Of those organizations that engage in specific framing work around contemporary social issues: 32% of the sample (N=50) problematized immigration, 26% (N=40) problematized Jews, and 25% (N=38) problematized the government. The decline of traditional religion was problematized by 20% (N=31), racial inner marriage by 18% (N=28), LGBTQ individuals by 17% (N=26), the job market by 10% (N=16) and racial integration by 8% (N=13). Higher frequency counts indicate that certain social issues (like immigration and “White Genocide”) are generally of more importance in framing work than other issues (such as the labor market and racial integration). The frequency of framing work that implicates a clearly demarcated group of persons is listed in Table 6.

[Table 6 about here]

Violence. Based on this data, 15% of the sample (N=23) either demonstrate, enable or otherwise advocate for violence on their website. While not high in absolute terms, this number does indicate a sufficient presence of violence in this SMI for analysis to be meaningful.

⁵ Four organizations had missing data on organizational strategy because I could not access those portions of the website that may have contained evidence of strategy deployment due to methodological limitations.

⁶ Failing to observe the deployment of an organizational strategy does not mean that no organizational strategy was deployed, but rather that my sampling framework did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate the deployment of an organizational strategy.

Educated leadership. Educated leadership was present in 8% (N=12) of the sample.

While of theoretical and substantive importance, univariate and bivariate statistics do little to help organize the SMI of white supremacy. To this end, I now turn to the HAC results.

Hierarchical Agglomerative Cluster (HAC) Analysis

The results of the HAC analysis are reproduced in Figure 1, and the characteristics of each cluster are presented in Table 7. Sixteen of the original 154 organizations were removed from this analysis, leaving an analytical sample of 138 organizations⁷.

[Figure 1 about here]

The HAC analysis identified eight organizational clusters active in the SMI of white supremacy. Note from Figure 1 that the clustering is not equally distributed. The largest two clusters (the pink and red clusters) each respectively account for 20% (27/138) of the SMI and the smallest cluster (gray) accounts for 4% (6/138).

[Table 7 about here]

I label these eight clusters as follows: the Merchant cluster, the Clandestine cluster, the Respectable cluster, the Proselytizer cluster, the Violence cluster, the Community cluster, the Government cluster, and the Professional Services cluster.

Merchant cluster (Pink) (N=27). The defining characteristic of the Merchant cluster is the merchandizing organizational strategy. Substantively, these organizations use their websites as storefronts rather than as platforms on which to discuss or demonstrate controversial beliefs. *Label 56* is an example of an organization that falls into this cluster. Its goal is to bring “to the forefront music that is ignored by the corporate owned record labels, radio stations, magazines, and television”, and its website is comprised of a catalog of music titles alongside assorted interviews and podcasts featuring “ignored” artists. Indeed, the primary reason this organization was defined as white supremacist is because most of its artists are popular in the music subculture of white supremacy, and the products it sells feature a wide range of overt white supremacist symbolism (one band tee-shirt features a “Red Sun” background, and several music CD’s feature iron crosses on the front).

Clandestine cluster (Green) (N=11). Organizations within the Clandestine cluster are defined by their high degree of membership, and, substantively, these organizations use their websites as access points for potential members or sympathizers. An exemplar of this cluster is

⁷ Of those that were dropped, four were due to missing data on organizational strategy, five because they produced clusters unique to themselves, and eight because they failed to exhibit any of the relevant characteristics on their websites (they were coded as a zero on all variables).

the organization *True Cascada*. Its website is comprised of a logo, four punchy sentences describing their broad beliefs, and nine regional contact pages.

Respectable cluster (Teal) (N=25). The Respectable cluster centers on the deployment of the advocacy organizational strategy and the presentation of professionalization, as well as the utilization of relatively more mainstreaming framing elements such as LGBTQ issues and immigration. An exemplar of the organizations in this cluster is the *National Policy Institute* whose website content is comprised chiefly of a series of policy-oriented articles, a short video focused on the need for “white identity”, and a professional-looking bio page for its president.

Proselytizer cluster (Yellow) (N=18). The defining characteristic of the Proselytizer cluster is a high degree of religious framing. An exemplar of this cluster is the *Church of Israel*. Its web content contains pictures of their church services and community events (deployed organizational strategies), some details on how to join the church (membership), and several dedicated pages that outline the specific beliefs, political orientations, and practices of the church (frames).

Violence cluster (Red) (N=27). The organizations in the Violence cluster distinguish themselves from all other organizational clusters in this industry by both their willingness to demonstrate, enable, or advocate for violence in their web content and also their willingness to deploy protest-based organizational strategies in the pursuit of social movement ends. An exemplar of this cluster is the *Atomwaffen Division*. Its website is comprised of a brief bio on the organization (which mentions the “militant training” of its members and its dedication to “ultimate uncompromising victory”) and numerous graphic (and printable) posters detailing portions of the organization’s ideology.

Community cluster (Blue) (N=13). The defining characteristic of the Community cluster is the community organizational strategy. An example of an organization in this cluster is *American Renaissance*. Its web content contains numerous guest editorials on a range of issues, a news feed of articles relevant to its issues from around the web, self-referential content that emphasizes the immigration frame, as well as proceedings from every American Renaissance conference dating back to 1994.

Professional Services cluster (Black) (N=10). This cluster is chiefly characterized by a high degree of specialization. Substantively, these organizations provide services to the SMI that are both professionalized enough in nature to generally require specialized staff but that are also not explicitly sold. These professional services range from alternative funding platforms (*Counter.Fund*), to legal services (*Foundation for the Marketplace of Ideas*), to alt-media and television services (*Red Ice*).

Government cluster (Gray) (N=6). This cluster is primarily characterized by a high usage of anti-government framing.

Discussion

This study set out to investigate a central question: how do the key organizational characteristics of professionalization, membership, framing, and organizational strategy partition the white

supremacist SMI? In conjunction with this, it also set out to answer two additional questions. First, which organizational characteristics are most important for partitioning the white supremacist SMI and how do the resulting partitions compare with past white supremacy research? Second, how is the white supremacy SMI different regarding these organizational characteristics than other SMIs? Each of these questions is examined in turn below.

Note that this thesis only seeks to understand the variation present within the white supremacist SMI. By doing this, I bracket those characteristics that are ubiquitous within the white supremacist SMI, such as a racially charged ideological structure and a racially homogeneous membership. While highly important for understanding differences between the white supremacist SMI and other SMIs, these characteristics play a minimal role in the current project due to their ubiquity within the industry. In other words, while the racially charged ideology of a white supremacist SMO may lead it to behave significantly differently than SMOs outside of this SMI, it plays a minimal role in predicting differences between organizations already present in the white supremacist SMI.

How is the SMI of white supremacy organized?

There is substantial evidence for eight organizational clusters within the white supremacist SMI. These can be labeled as follows: a Professional/Advocacy cluster, a Religious cluster, a Community cluster, a Clandestine cluster, a Merchant cluster, a Protest cluster, a Professional Services cluster, and an anti-Government cluster. While there is some degree of heterogeneity within several of these clusters, the above analysis indicates that each occupies a unique space within the white supremacist SMI.

This central finding of meaningful organizational diversity within the white supremacist SMI has three key implications. First, these clusters cut across ideologies, as is presented in Table 8. While certain ideological categories align with the clustering scheme presented here, in several cases (such as the White Nationalists and Neo-Nazi's) they do not. This indicates that the clustering scheme presented in this thesis offers a genuinely distinct framework from that currently applied by scholars of white supremacy. This alternative framework moves the emphasis away from how white supremacists distinguish among themselves towards a categorization based in organizational characteristics. An implication of this alternative framework is that ideological markers like dress (Klan robes, steel-toed shoes) or group names (such as "Ku Klux Klan", "Aryan", or "Knights") are ineffective for identifying *organizational* diversity of interest to social movement scholars.

[Table 8 about here]

A second implication of this is that organizational diversity exists *within* each ideological stream of white supremacy. While the relative frequency of each type of organization varies, Table 8 provides evidence that organizations in the ideological camp (Neo-Nazi, White

Nationalist, etc) specialize their organizational form and behavior within that ideological camp. As has been noted in other SMIs, there is an organizational division of labor within the white supremacist SMI. For example, while both *PzG Inc.* and the *Atomwaffen Division* are categorized by the SPLC as being Neo-Nazi organizations, an analysis of their websites reveals that they push their agenda differently. *PzG Inc.*, categorized as a Merchant by the HAC analysis, says little about itself on its website but provides a large amount historical Nazi paraphernalia for sell. The *Atomwaffen Division*, categorized by the HAC analysis as a Violent organization, boasts about the “militant training” of its members and commitment to “total uncompromising victory” but sells nothing on its website. Partitioning solely on ideology would miss these types of organizational variation.

A third implication is that past research, by focusing on organizations’ forward-facing ideological labels or visible activities, has implicitly emphasized certain types of organizations over others even when attempting to gather a representative sample. For example, Simi and Futrell’s (2010) sampling frame was built on the attendance “parties, concerts and other gatherings” (pp. 128-129) such as skinhead gatherings and the Aryan Nations World Congress. Since only certain organizations utilize community gatherings or protests as a part of their organizational strategies, Simi and Futrell’s (2010) research should be viewed as an evaluation of a subset of the white supremacist SMI. Similarly, while Blee (2002) was careful to diversify the ideological streams of white supremacy present in her sample, she selected the 30 organizations in her sample with the intention of evaluating the “recruitment and commitment of women members” (p. 199). Given that this thesis indicates that approximately half of active white supremacist SMOs do not have membership (a characteristic common of SMIs), Blee’s analysis should be seen as pertaining only to those white supremacist organizations with membership. Similarly, Dobratz and Shanks-Meile’s (1997) sample from events like rallies and private gatherings. Only one (the Populist Party’s Conference) would qualify as an advocacy-oriented event, and none would qualify as a private event of a chiefly religious nature (such as a church service or religious retreat). This indicates that their research provided a solid analysis of that subset of the white supremacist SMI that utilize community and protest activities in the pursuit of movement goals.

Each of these researchers explicitly constructed their sample to capture the range of *ideological* variation present in this SMI, but their emphasis on ideological labeling resulted in them failing to capture the full range of *organizational* diversity present. Because of this, past literature has emphasized specific organizational clusters over others, missing or under-emphasizing clusters such as the mercantile and advocacy cluster that have been empirically identified here. This means that past literature may have both significantly underestimated the size of the white supremacist SMI and given undue emphasis to certain types of strategies (violence, protest) over others (advocacy, merchandizing).

[Table 10 about here]

This is important because past literature on social movements has repeatedly found evidence that variation in organizational characteristics like membership, professionalization, framing and organizational strategies is highly useful for predicting SMO survival, effectiveness at achieving immediate and movement objectives, and even changes in the structure of SMI. Not surprisingly, literature on white supremacy acknowledges that ideological variation among white supremacist SMOs is a poor predictor of SMO survival, effectiveness or success. This current study, by focusing on organizational characteristics, does a better job than ideological categorization of identifying those organizations most willing to demonstrate, enable or advocate for violence (see Table 10). Future research on organized white supremacy would do well to either discard ideological partitioning entirely in favor of organizational partitioning or -- at minimum -- ensure that there is sufficient organizational variation within their sample to be representative of the SMI.

What drives this specific organization of the SMI?

Given that this study made use of a large variety of organizational characteristics not normally used in unison when partitioning SMIs, it is natural to ask how much information regarding the SMI each provided. A cursory evaluation of Table 7 indicates that, of the four broad categories of organizational characteristics utilized in this study, organizational strategy provided the most information. It is key for defining four (Advocacy, Merchant, Community and Protest) of the eight clusters identified by the HAC analysis. In contrast, specialization only distinguishes one cluster (the Specialized Services cluster), and membership divides the clusters into two broad groups which each possess a high degree of heterogeneity. Religious framing does play a significant role in defining several of the clusters (chiefly the Religious cluster) and (anti-) Government framing also plays a significant role in defining the Government cluster. However, beyond these two exceptions, Table 7 indicates the framing chiefly serves to separate those organizations that frame from those who do not. Although the HAC analysis does indicate that using all the organizational characteristics in unison produces better results than using any one alone, this thesis does provide evidence that examining organizational strategy has the highest utility for both generating meaningful partitions within the white supremacist SMI and also for predicting the demonstration, enablement, or advocacy for violence within this SMI.

Is this SMI organized differently than other SMIs?

The white supremacist SMI distinguishes itself from other SMIs in two ways. First, white supremacist SMOs demonstrate, enable or advocate for violence at a far higher rate than what has been observed in other current SMIs. While acknowledging that past social movements have been willing to deploy high levels of violence (the labor movement of the 19th and early 20th centuries is a notable example of this, see Gamson 1990), current scholarship has argued that the use of violence within social movements has decreased over time, and that today the “vast

majority” of social movement activists avoid the deployment of violence (Zald 1986; Snow & Cress 2011, p. 115). Current empirical work supports this. Andrews and Edwards (2005, p. 226) found that only 8.2% of environmental SMOs in North Carolina utilized “disruptive” tactics (a category that includes litigation and boycotts as well as violence). Compared to these figures, the finding that 15% of white supremacist SMOs are willing to either demonstrate, enable or advocate for violence is of substantive importance.

As was discussed above, the demonstration, enablement or advocacy for violence requires the organization to do more than merely mention the potential for violence in its web content. For example, the Patriot Front demonstrated violence by posting a video in which masked members of the organization trashed a protester camp outside of an ICE facility. The Golden State Skinheads demonstrated violence when they acknowledged that they were involved in an attack at one of their rallies that “left a higher number of the opposition injured”. The National Socialist Liberation Front advocated for violence when it acknowledged that it views “armed struggle as the only effective means of forcing political change”. These cases go beyond simply mentioning violence or alluding the possibility of violence at some indefinite future time.

The chief takeaway from this is that, while the “lone wolf” violence that emerges from the white supremacist SMI is a real threat, organized violence within the white supremacist SMI is not a thing of the past. Past literature has noted continually that certain segments of this industry are highly violent (Simi and Futrell 2010; Blee 2002). This study not only reinforces this concern, but also indicates that rates of organized violence may be higher than what has been observed in scholarship on even the most violent contemporary social movements outside of white supremacy.

Secondly, the white supremacist SMI distinguishes itself in terms of how prevalent the merchandizing organizational strategy (as defined as the selling of three or more items on the organization’s website) is within it. Of course, there is a long line of literature pointing to service provision as a commonly deployed organizational strategy in social movements. Minkoff’s (1995) analysis indicated that 45% of the SMIs she analyzed utilized service as a part of their organizational strategy, and her analysis notes organizations like the *United Negro College Fund* and *Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund*, which funnel money towards vulnerable groups within their constituency, as organizations with this service-based strategy.

However, while this service type of organization is not entirely absent from the white supremacist SMI (the *Foundation for the Marketplace of Ideas* and *Counter.Fund* are current examples of this type of SMO), the service strategy among SMOs in the white supremacist SMI has a large emphasis on *selling* products to the white supremacist constituency. For example, *Resistance Records* and *Free Your Mind Productions*, while both provide an online gathering spaces, music reviews and 24-hour streaming radio, both exist primarily to selling merchandise to white supremacists (Simi and Futrell 2010, p. 77).

Merchandising is neither a historical fluke within this SMI nor a tactical innovation that has emerged from a flavor of white supremacy. Past literature on white supremacy has identified evidence of merchants within most ideological branches of white supremacy, and this finding is

re-iterated in the present study (see Table 10) (Simi & Futrell 2010; Blee 2002 p. 168; Barkun 1997 p. 30, 51). Additionally, historical research on the Klan and Christian Identity reveals that this approach has deep historical roots within this industry (Barkun 1997; Harcourt 2017, p. 54). These findings indicate that organizations that utilize merchandising as a portion of their organizational strategy consistently find a place within white supremacist SMI, and that this place is constant over time and ideological variations.

Following from McVeigh's (2009) research on conservative social movements, it is likely that merchandizing has emerged and found such success within the white supremacist SMI but not other, more progressive, SMIs because of the uniquely privileged constituency of white supremacy. White supremacists have access to more discretionary income than most SMI constituencies. This provides a strong economic incentive for white supremacist SMOs to utilize merchandise to raise funds. Past literature has found evidence that this strategy has been quite successful in this regard, as certain merchandizers within the white supremacist SMI have topped one million dollars in annual sells despite only selling white supremacist material (Simi and Futrell 2010, p. 77).

Limitations

There are two central limitations to the current study. First, it is unlikely that the source list provided by the SPLC contains every white supremacist organization that was active in 2017. The clandestine nature of the white supremacist SMI makes it highly difficult to verify that any one list contains the full SMI. Further, it is likely that the organizations listed by the SPLC are systemically different from those that are not listed. Past literature argues that source lists like the SPLC's may be biased towards larger and better-known organizations, potentially excluding smaller and lesser known SMOs (Earl 2013).

Second, even for those organizations who were listed by the SPLC, it is likely that not all organizations provided information on relevant organizational characteristics on the first few pages of their site. For example, *The Right Stuff* is known to have quasi-membership and to deploy the community organizational strategy (they host "pool parties" in multiple states for sympathizers) (Southern Poverty Law Center 2019). However, none of this information is available on its website. The implication of this is twofold. First, it indicates that failing to observe an organizational characteristic does not mean that that organizational characteristics is not present. Second, this also means that there are some known inaccuracies in this dataset in terms of unobserved organizational characteristics.

Conclusion

This study set out to evaluate if the organizational characteristics like professionalization, membership, frames and organizational strategies are useful for partitioning the SMI of white supremacy in a way of interest to social movement scholars. In doing so, it identified an alternative clustering scheme that can be leveraged to evaluate organizational diversity within this SMI. This alternative framework de-emphasizes the ideological streams deployed by SMOs

within the industry to distinguish among themselves in favor of emphasizing variation among SMOs in terms of their deployed strategies. Deployed organizational strategies play a central role in developing this alternative framework, implying that the examination of organizational strategy may be preferred for mapping SMIs when only one set of organizational characteristics can be effectively leveraged.

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Appendix A: Correlational Class Analysis

While HAC has been leveraged effectively in past research on social movements, the distinctiveness of the findings within this current study merit checking their robustness via an alternative method. Correlational class analysis (CCA), an alternative clustering method to HAC, is particularly well suited to this end because it clusters based on a different set of presuppositions and provides broad continuums along which clusters can be placed. This appendix briefly reviews the statistical details of CCA, the results produced by the CCA, and how these results compare to the HAC analysis.

Method

CCA first leverages the eigenvalues of the row correlation matrix to identify the number of schematic class that maximize modularity within the correlation “network” and to assign class memberships to observations (Boutyline 2017; Newman 2006). The specific characteristics of those classes are evaluated by interpreting each class’s network of column-based correlations. There are two methodological notes that are necessary to understand the CCA that was implemented in this analysis. First, because the first step of this method operates by transforming a row correlational matrix into a network adjacency matrix, it is common practice to filter out row correlations below a certain value in order to reduce noise. Following from Boutyline (2017), I filter out all row correlations below $|.16|$. Second, several classes partitioned by the CCA lacked column correlations on certain organizational characteristics due to all observations within that class possessing the same value for a specific characteristic. Since this only impacts the *graphical interpretation* of those correlational classes and not the actual partitioning of the classes (which is built on row correlations), I dropped all invariant characteristics from each class when graphing the results.

Results

The CCA partitioned the white supremacist SMI into three schematic classes: the “Offline” class (N=47), the “Specialized-Generalized” class (N=48), and the “Professional-Protest” (N=47) class⁸. Each is described below.

Class 1: The Offline (N=47). The correlational network of the Offline class is depicted in Figure 2.

[Figure 2 about here]

While the network sparsity of this schematic class discourages traditional CCA interpretation, the high level of intercorrelation among Immigration, Jewish menace and LGBTQ

⁸The CCA dropped 12 cases from the analysis. Four were dropped because of missing data on the organizational strategy variables, and eight were excluded due to invariance in organizational characteristics. These 12 cases were also excluded from the HAC analysis.

issues frames and violence does delimit one coherent cluster of organizations. This grouping points to a connection between advocating violence and pinpointing a specific, delimited group of people as the target for violence. Substantively, this indicates that there is a violent cluster of organizations within this class, that this cluster often frames some clearly demarcated group of people as problematic and deploys the protest organizational strategy. Examples from this cluster include alt-right fight clubs (such as the *Rise Above Movement*), as well as paramilitary organizations (such as *Aryan Strikeforce* and *American Front*).

Class 2: Specialized-Generalized (N=48). The correlational network for Class 2 is depicted in Figure 3. The high level of network density indicates that this class shows a continuum between two opposed groupings of organizations operative in the industry.

[Figure 3 about here]

This continuum divides highly specialized organizations and large organizations that display a wide range of organizational characteristics. The former are centrally defined by their deployment of the service organizational strategy. *Label 56*, as described above, is exemplary of this grouping as well. The latter engage in a large variety of framing work on their websites, are relatively professional, and deploy a wide range of organizational strategies. An example of an organization that falls into this grouping is the *American Freedom Party*. This organization's website presents an exhaustive overview of its party platform and provides visitors with a news stream of articles pulled from various 3rd party sites. It also invites the viewer to consider attending its annual conference, purchasing a book written by one of its members/leaders (a process handled by a 3rd party site), or perusing the websites of several related organizations.

Class 3: Professional-Protest (N=47). The correlational network for Class 3 is depicted in Figure 4.

[Figure 4 about here]

The continuum depicted divides three organizational clusters from each other. On one end is a set of relatively professionalized and advocacy-oriented organizations (a "professional" cluster). The *National Policy Institute*, as described above, is an exemplar of this cluster. On the other extreme is a set of relatively violent and protest-oriented organizations (a "protest" cluster). The *Atomwaffen Division*, as described above, is also exemplary of this cluster. Between these two extremes is a third organizational cluster that deploys the community organizational strategy and does framing around religion and government conspiracy, as well as immigration, LGBTQ issues and Jews. The *Church of Israel*, as described above, is a good example of organizations in this cluster.

As is displayed in Table 8, a crosstabulation of HAC cluster membership and CCA class memberships reveals this kind of shared categorization. There is clear evidence that HAC 1 and

HAC #2 is contained within CCA #1, that HAC #4 is contained in CCA #2, and that HAC #5 is contained within CCA #3. This provides strong evidence for the presence of coherent groupings of community and sectlike organizations, of mercantile organizations, and of religious organizations within this SMI.

[Table 10 about here]

Disparity in categorization emerges when the core, observed pattern of organizational characteristics (on which the HAC is based) does not predict the same behavioral pattern for all organizations in the HAC cluster (on which CCA is built). In other words, while a cluster of organizations defined by the HAC may share the same core set organizational characteristics, their total pattern of online activity leads them to be placed into a different CCA classes. This happened in the third and sixth HAC clusters, as is explored below.

HAC #3 is defined by the advocacy organizational strategy, professionalization, and mainstream framing work. This fits with the Professional cluster indicated by CCA #3 and is reflected in the high level of overlap between HAC #3 and CCA #3. However, organizations in HAC #3 vary in their overall activity pattern. While the *Alternative Right* deploys the advocacy organizational strategy, its lack of both framing and other deployed organizational strategies reflects an overall pattern of activity akin to CCA #1. Similarly, while *Counter-Currents Publishing* is specialized, has educated leadership and deploys an advocacy organizational strategy, it also deploys the mercantile organizational strategy and does little framing work. This total pattern of activity is in keeping with the mercantile cluster in CCA #2.

In the same vein, most organizations placed in HAC #6 do limited framing work, primarily deploy the protest organizational strategy, and are willing to demonstrate, enable or advocate for violence. Exemplar of this is the *United Dixie White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan* (UDWK), which has little web content beyond framing work around LGBTQ individuals, immigrants and Jews, pictures of a recent rally its members had attended, and an essay arguing that “men like Louis Beam, Bob Mathews and Sam Bowers were on the right path” in their efforts to “restore this nation by any means necessary”. However, while organizations like the *American Freedom Party* frame just as broadly as the UDWK and deploy the protest organizational strategy, their full pattern of activity incorporates both claims of professionalization and a whole range of other deployed organization strategies. This total pattern of activity is much more reflective of the *continuum* depicted in CCA #2. Similarly, the *American Nazi Party* (CCA #3) does far more than its counterparts in CCA #1 but exhibits more selective online activity than those organizations in CCA #2, lacking both claims of professionalization and a more restrictive deployment of organization strategies. This aligns with the Professionalization-Protest continuum of CCA #3.

Conclusion

This appendix has provided an overview of a CCA analysis of the white supremacist SMI. Broadly, it aligns with the HAC analysis, providing further evidence that the results detailed in this study (especially the presence of a “merchandizing” cluster within the white supremacist SMI) are reflective of the white supremacist SMI as opposed to a quirk of the clustering method utilized in this study.

Appendix B: List of tables

Table #1: Organizational characteristics of white supremacist ideological streams.				
	Ku Klux Klan	Neo-Nazi	Christian Identity	White Nationalism
Specialization	High	Low	Low	Mixed
Membership	High	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed
Attributional frames*	Split. Government Incompetence/ Jewish Conspiracy	Jewish Conspiracy	Jewish Conspiracy	Government Incompetence
Prognostic frames	Split. Explicit violence/ Political action.	Explicit violence targeting government/minorities	Christian Communalism, racial purity, biblicalizing American law.	Political action.
Organizational Strategies	Community, Protest	Protest	Community, Service	Advocacy, Protest
Violence	Mid	High	Mid	Low
Educated leadership	Low	Low	Mid	High
Size of cluster (SPLC)	28 orgs. (70 chap.)	42 orgs. (145 chap.)	19 orgs. (20 chap.)	50 orgs. (163 chap.)
*Note that all groups problematize essentially the same set of issues: non-white immigration, political correctness, affirmative action and racial intermarriage. However, they differ on who they blame for these grievances: whether they are the result of the government failing to understand the significance of race or they are the result of a (generally Jewish) conspiracy against the white race.				

Table #2: Breakdown of analytic sample:	
Are listed by the SPLC as hate groups:	954 entities
...Are unique organizations (after collapse):	360 unique orgs.
... <i>did not have an identifiable website:</i>	14
... <i>are classified as relevant to study:</i>	154
*This table describes how I derived the relevant population of organizations the SPLC source list.	

Table #3: Descriptive Statistics					
Variable Name	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Professionalization...					
...Specialization	154	0.18	0.39	0	1
...Leadership Transition	154	0.06	0.25	0	1
Membership	154	0.49	0.5	0	1
Federation (> 4 chapters)	154	0.12	0.33	0	1
Framing...					
...(anti-)LGBTQ	154	0.17	0.38	0	1
...(anti-)Immigration	154	0.32	0.47	0	1
...(anti-)Government	154	0.25	0.43	0	1
...(anti-)Jews	154	0.26	0.44	0	1
...(pro-)Religion	154	0.2	0.4	0	1
...(anti-)Integration	154	0.08	0.28	0	1
...(anti-)Racial					
Intermarriage	154	0.18	0.39	0	1
...Jobs	154	0.11	0.31	0	1
...White Genocide	154	0.24	0.43	0	1
Organizational Strategy...					
...Service	150*	0.29	0.46	0	1
...Protest	150	0.25	0.44	0	1
...Advocacy	150	0.3	0.46	0	1
...Community	150	0.25	0.44	0	1
Violence	154	0.15	0.36	0	1
Educated Leadership	154	0.08	0.27	0	1
Founding Date	154	0.45	0.5	0	1
*Four organizations were coded missing regarding their organizational strategy.					

Table #4: Membership organizations chapter count by frequency of that chapter count:															
Number of chapters:	1	2	3	4	5	7	9	12	13	15	17	22	24	25	32
Frequency of chapter count:	32	13	7	5	6	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
*This table describes the size of membership organizations within the white supremacist SMI. For example, it indicates that 7 organizations in this field had 3 chapters, and 1 organization has 22 chapters.															

Table #5: Organizational strategy deployment	
Category of organization:	N of orgs:
No Organizational Strategy Deployed:	43
ONLY Merchant Strategy deployed:	26
ONLY Protest Strategy deployed:	8
ONLY Advocacy Strategy deployed:	17
ONLY Community Strategy deployed:	11
MULTIPLE Strategies deployed:	45
*This table displays the relative frequency at which an organizational strategy was deployed on an organizational website.	

Table #6: Frame deployment	
Category of organization:	N of orgs:
No Frame deployed:	68
ONLY Immigration frame deployed:	7
ONLY Jewish Menace frame deployed:	6
ONLY Government deployed:	2
ONLY Traditional Religion deployed:	11
ONLY LGBTQ issues deployed:	2
MULTIPLE Strategies deployed:	58
*This table displays the relative frequency at which an particular frame was deployed on an organizational website.	

Table #7: HAC descriptive statistics by cluster

Cluster	Clandestine	Community	Advocacy	Merchant	Religious	Violent	Government	Professional
N	11	13	25	27	18	27	6	10
Color	Green	Blue	Teal	Pink	Yellow	Red	Gray	Black
Chapters	0%	23%	0%	4%	17%	33%	17%	10%
Members	100%	54%	36%	7%	44%	100%	50%	50%
Spec.	9%	15%	16%	11%	11%	22%	0%	100%
Comm.	9%	100%	4%	0%	33%	52%	33%	10%
Advo.	0%	31%	100%	7%	33%	30%	0%	0%
Service	0%	38%	24%	100%	6%	11%	0%	10%
Protest	0%	31%	16%	7%	28%	81%	17%	0%
Religion	36%	23%	4%	15%	100%	0%	0%	0%
Jews	0%	0%	24%	7%	50%	56%	0%	30%
Gov.	9%	0%	40%	0%	61%	30%	100%	10%
LGBTQ	0%	0%	8%	15%	39%	44%	0%	0%
Immi.	9%	8%	56%	7%	56%	63%	67%	10%
Viol.	0%	0%	12%	0%	6%	61%	0%	0%
Edu.	0%	23%	16%	0%	11%	7%	0%	10%

Table #8: SPLC "Hate Type" by HAC cluster membership					
HAC Cluster:	Christian Identity	KKK	Neo-Nazi*	White Nationalist	Other
Clandestine	0	8	4	2	0
Community	1	2	2	1	3
Advocacy	2	0	2	10	10
Merchant	3	0	4	6	12
Religious	11	7	0	2	2
Violent	0	6	14	6	1
Government	0	1	3	1	1
Professional	0	2	3	4	1

*Organizations labeled by the SPLC as "racist skinhead" were merged with organizations labeled as "Neo-Nazi" for the purposes of this comparison. Otherwise, all labels correspond with SPLC labels (except for the "Other" label).

Table #9: Association of HAC/Ideological clusters with violence			
	Not Violent	Violent	% Violent
HAC Clusters:			
Clandestine	11	0	0%
Community	13	0	0%
Advocacy	22	3	12%
Merchant	27	0	0%
Religious	17	1	5%
Violent	11	16	59%
Government	6	0	0%
Professional	10	0	0%
Ideological Clusters:			
KKK	25	1	4%
Neo-Nazi*	20	12	38%
White Nationalist	28	4	13%
Christian Identity	16	1	6%
Other	28	2	7%
*Organizations labeled by the SPLC as "racist skinhead" were merged with organizations labeled as "Neo-Nazi" for the purposes of this comparison. Otherwise, all labels correspond with SPLC labels (except for the "Other" label).			

Table #10: Crosstabulation of HAC Cluster and CCA Class Memberships								
	HAC #1	HAC #2	HAC #3	HAC #4	HAC #5	HAC #6	HAC #7	HAC #8
CCA #1	11	9	4	0	1	15	3	3
CCA #2	0	4	6	27	2	7	0	1
CCA #3	0	0	15	0	15	5	3	6

Appendix #C: List of figures




Figure 1 (Dendrogram)

Figure 1 - This dendrogram illustrates the hierarchical clustering identified by the HAC analysis. Nodes for the 138 organizations included in the analysis are arrayed along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis indicates the relative dissimilarity of organizational characteristics between the organizations or groups of organizations merged at that level, with 1 indicating perfect dissimilarity and 0 perfect similarity.

Figure #2




Figure 2 - The first schematic class identified by CCA ("Offline" class). Ties represent correlations between organizational characteristics, with positive ties represented by gray lines and negative ties represented by red lines. Thicker lines indicate stronger correlations, and correlations below $|.2|$ are not plotted.

Figure #3




Figure 3 - The second schematic class identified by CCA ("Specialized-Generalized" class). Ties represent correlations between organizational characteristics, with positive ties represented by gray lines and negative ties represented by red lines. Thicker lines indicate stronger correlations, and correlations below $|.2|$ are not plotted.

Figure #4




Figure 4 - The third schematic class identified by CCA ("Professional-Protest" class). Ties represent correlations between organizational characteristics, with positive ties represented by gray lines and negative ties represented by red lines. Thicker lines indicate stronger correlations, and correlations below |.2| are not plotted.