

The Pennsylvania State University

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**“DRIVER’S LICENSE, MILITARY ID, AND PROOF OF REGISTRATION  
AND INSURANCE, PLEASE.”**

**AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF OFFICER DISCRETION SURROUNDING  
TRAFFIC STOPS ON AN AIR FORCE INSTALLATION**

A Thesis in

Criminal Justice

by

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## ABSTRACT

Officer discretion is a well-debated concept across American culture today. Movements such as “Driving While Black,” “Driving While Brown,” and the most well recognized today, “Black Lives Matter” all deal with officer discretion, whether the movement is aware of it or not. A plethora of research has been conducted on how local, county, and state law enforcement officers use their discretionary authority, however to date, no such study has been conducted on a policing entity within the United States military. This study, through observational ride-alongs, breaks that barrier and assesses how one particular Air Force unit’s law enforcement patrolmen exercise such a profound authority.

Keywords: *discretion, Air Force, race, gender, age, infraction, citation, seriousness of offense, qualitative*

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## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

Traffic stops are the most common form of police-citizen encounters across America (Langton & Durose, 2016). According to this data, 42% of all citizen encounters with the police occurred because of traffic stops; that statistic amounts to nearly 26.5 million recorded traffic stop encounters nationwide. These traffic stop encounters are not black-and-white however and are instead highly discretionary practices performed by police officers (Schafer & Mastrofski, 2005). The concept of discretionary practices has also been referred to and known as ‘officer discretion’ and can be defined as the flexibility of police officers to make their own choice as to how they shall proceed with their job (Nowacki, 2015), or the difference between full enforcement and what police are practically capable of doing in reality (Goldstein, 1963; Joh, 2007). In regard to traffic stops, discretion allows police officers the opportunity to personally decide on whom and when a traffic stop will be initiated, how long it will last, and how the stop will be concluded.

Law enforcement officials use their discretionary power in many ways throughout every shift. Many people tend to believe that when speeding only slightly, the police will not pull them over. This notion has the ability to exist only because of an officer’s discretionary authority; without it, police officers would be required to maintain a policy of full enforcement (Goldstein, 1963). Thus, traveling only one mile-per-hour over the posted speed limit would result in a traffic stop and citation every time because the police would have no power or authority to be lenient towards the infractions they observe. Through their discretionary power however, police officers can instead observe a speeding car and decide not to stop it for a variety of reasons (both professional and unprofessional ones), or decide not to write a traffic citation after initiating a stop.

A large body of literature has accumulated where researchers have investigated possible relationships between how police officers use (whether through appropriate or inappropriate means) their discretionary authority relating to traffic stops and a driver's race, gender, age, characteristics of the vehicle being driven, police officer characteristics and demographics, as well as situational and environmental characteristics (see for example Allen & Monk-Turner, 2010; Brown & Frank, 2005; Farrell, 2015; Leinfelt, 2006; Lundman, 2009; Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003; Phillips, 2009; Phillips & Sobol, 2012; Schafer, Carter, & Katz-Bannister, 2004; Schafer, Carter, Katz-Bannister, & Wells, 2006; Schafer & Mastrofski, 2005; Tillyer, & Engel, 2012, 2013; Tillyer, & Klahm, 2011). Despite this, no prior research has evaluated how military policing entities utilize their discretionary power and how it plays a role in traffic stop encounters. This is a very large population that has otherwise been untouched through the myriad of previous studies; the purpose and objective of this research was to investigate this void and to observe how Air Force Security Forces patrolmen utilize their discretionary authority in relation to traffic stops.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Literature Review**

#### **Opinions and Background on Officer Discretion**

Some researchers, and citizens alike, believe discretion allows police officers to act unprofessionally, while others believe it is a crucial tool police have on their duty belt. Klockars (1999) argues that the duties of a law enforcement officer are incredibly discretionary and that the majority of his or her duties take place in areas absent of supervision or other bystanders. While in today's modern age body-worn cameras are minimizing the supervisory claim, the fact of the matter is that not all departments or agencies are utilizing body-worn cameras, and the long term effects of these cameras are still unknown (for example, will the prolonged use of these devices cause the oversight they now provide to lose its edge and fall away when they are no longer "cool?"). In either case, the discussion of body-worn cameras and their effects on an officer's use of his or her discretionary authority is beyond the purview of this study. Nevertheless, Klockars' assertion that the bulk of police officers' duties do take place in unsupervised areas that may or may not have bystanders present capable of witnessing every aspect of the officer's behavior and decision-making process is accurate. For this reason, he claims policing is highly susceptible to officer misconduct, or in other words, discretionary misconduct.

Related, Goldstein (1963) provides the argument that discretion produces outright corruption from police officers. This argument stands on the basis that with discretionary authority, police officers are able to make decisions that provide a private gain, all the while remaining under the protective umbrella of their discretionary authority. One example of this is when officers allow friends and colleagues to get away with observed infractions. The private gain in this instance is not upsetting the friend or colleague who could then turn, or at least away

from them. In policing, where colleagues can literally save an officer's life, this potential issue is a big deal and therefore a big motivator of using discretion to overlook their infraction(s).

Another commonly argued example of the misuse of discretionary authority is the pretextual stop. Pretextual stops are traffic stops that are initiated for one reason (the official reason), but ulterior motives for the traffic stop exist and were, in reality, the actual reason for the initiation of said traffic stop (Joh, 2007). Critics of these stops believe this type of power allows police officers to racially profile drivers and ultimately leads to disproportionate policing practices (Allen & Monk-Turner, 2010).

Contrary to that proposition however, data shows a decline in driver characteristics playing a role in traffic stops; instead, decisions appear to be made from contextual and situational details as well as the police officer's prior experiences and level or extent of training (Schafer et al., 2004, 2006; Schafer & Mastrofski, 2005). These types of studies, as well as others, support the notion that it is in the best interest of the police to not take part in discretionary misconduct (Goldstein, 1963). Together, this specific body of research asserts that unique and/or exigent circumstances, situational and environmental factors, as well as training and experiences individual officers have partaken in, are more likely to shape the officer's discretionary decision. With that in mind, these pretextual stops are therefore argued to be appropriate and successful in stopping offenses that an officer may not have otherwise had enough probable cause to prevent. So long as the official reason for the stop is justifiable and constitutionally legal, is there a problem with law enforcement officers using this tactic in an appropriate manner?

In the end, the officer is simply attempting to maintain public safety in the least invasive manner possible; whether that means he or she believes the driver can learn his or her lesson with a warning or whether the police officer believes they need a citation, the end-goal is still achieved. The purpose of this thesis is to explore what type of extralegal factors may or may not

play a role in Security Forces patrolmen's discretionary decision-making process and which factors appear to be more prevalent.

### **Driver Characteristics**

Drivers' race, age and gender have all been commonly evaluated variables to explain how patrolmen use their discretionary power. The most prevalent of these three is the evaluation of racial and/or ethnic disparities with numerous studies specifically examining the idea of racial profiling, 'Driving While Black,' and 'Driving While Brown' (see, for example, Allen & Monk-Turner, 2010; Alpert, Dunham, & Smith, 2007; Brown & Frank, 2005; Farrell, 2015; Gaines, 2006; Joh, 2007; Leinfelt, 2006; Lundman, 2009; Miller, 2009; Petrocelli et al., 2003; Phillips, 2009; Phillips & Sobol, 2012; Schafer et al., 2006; Tillyer & Engel, 2012, 2013; Tillyer & Klahm, 2011; Vito & Walsh, 2007). Generally, research has shown that racial and ethnic differences do appear, however no common justifications have emerged, and other research still finds conflicting data. This is because while controlling for variables such as age and gender, some of these studies' findings show Blacks and Hispanics are subjected to more searches (both discretionary and mandatory) of their person and vehicle over Whites, whereas others present data that discretionary searches are less common for racial minorities. One of these studies (Joh, 2007) shows how officers use their past experiences with similar individuals (in context of race, gender, and/or appearance, for example) to create a stereotyped image of that/those characteristics to collectively associate them as individuals up to no good (termed "symbolic assailants" (p. 207)). Even still, the other studies cited suggest race has no impact on officers' decisions to initiate a traffic stop, has no correlation to arrest data, and/or is statistically insignificantly when comparing traffic stop outcomes.

As previously mentioned, age is another variable that has been found to be subjected to disproportionate policing practices. Younger drivers are steadily found to be stopped and/or cited more frequently than their older counterparts on the road (Brown & Frank, 2005; Farrell, 2015; Leinfelt, 2006; Lundman, 2009; Lundman & Kaufman, 2003; Phillips & Sobol, 2012). One reason for this could be that younger drivers are riskier and more dangerous drivers meaning they catch the eye of law enforcement more often (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA], 2017). According to national statistics from 2015, 42% of all injuries and deaths from traffic accidents were from those between the ages of 16 and 34. Of all traffic accidents reported in the U.S. in 2015, 65% of occupants injured or killed were the driver. Together, these statistics could imply that younger drivers were behind the wheel more often during accidents that resulted in serious injuries.

Empirically, Tillyer and Engel (2012) reported that in their study younger drivers were 1.1 times more likely to speed than middle-aged drivers, whereas older drivers were 1.4 times less likely to speed over middle-aged drivers. Lundman and Kaufman (2003) and Phillips and Sobol (2012) found that younger drivers were more likely to be pulled over to begin with. Further, younger drivers have also been reported to be more likely to receive a traffic citation at the conclusion of their stop (Brown & Frank, 2005; Farrell, 2015; Lundman, 2009). Similarly, Schafer and his colleagues (2006) determined driver age to be an important predictor of their dependent variables; in this study older drivers were found to be more likely to be left with a warning.

The last, and the most incongruent, of the driver characteristics is gender. Some studies (such as Farrell, 2015; Lundman, 2009; Schafer et al., 2006) present data showing men are stopped and/or cited more frequently than women, however others collected data showing the opposite (Lundman & Kaufman, 2003). Males have been shown (seemingly undisputedly) to be arrested more often than females (Brown & Frank, 2005). In Tillyer and Klahm's (2011) work on

police searches and traffic stops, they discovered nearly 83% of all mandatory searches and almost 89% of discretionary searches were performed on male suspects. Comparably, Schafer and associates (2006) found significant differences between the rates at which men were searched, compared to searches conducted on women. One diversion from harsher sanctions given to males is during equipment violations; there, warnings were given more than citations. The most common explanation cited in these studies for why women received more leniencies was chivalry from the officers towards the female offender. This explanation views the woman as a fragile, helpless, and/or submissive being that needs the extra help in the way of leniency. It is because of this that women are more often than not seen as “topping out” their sanction at a traffic citation (Brown & Frank, 2005). Despite these statistically significant findings, other studies have not been able to find any significant correlation or other formal connection between gender and traffic stops (Leinfelt, 2006; Phillips & Sobol, 2012). In these studies, the authors again cited police officers making their decisions regarding initiating traffic stops and sanctions based on driving behavior alone.

### **Driver Characteristics and Theoretical Analysis**

Related to all these variables, Leinfelt (2006) and Tillyer and Engel (2012) evaluated the theoretical possibility of the disparity among Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites to be attributed to their disproportionate levels of offending. This concept has been turned into the differential offending hypothesis and simply states that the cause of any disparity of police contact and action across any variable could be caused by that variable’s increased participation in criminal acts. For instance, in one study, Black drivers have been shown to be more likely to be speeding, and at higher speeds, than other races, which can mean their increased rates of being pulled over and cited could be explained by their differential offending rates (Tillyer & Engel, 2012).

Although this concept has not been evaluated thoroughly, there is a decent body of evidence that lends to support to this theoretical framework. These studies show that driving behavior, not the color of the driver's skin (and theoretically any other demographic), is the true predictor of police action. Therefore, those that partake in riskier, or more deviant behavior, should and would have a larger amount of police contact and associated sanctioning. Regardless of the reason however, biased policing, whether perceived or actual, can have negative implications against police (Leinfelt, 2006; Tillyer & Engel, 2012). Even as far back as 1963, Goldstein stated that it would behoove police agencies to avoid behaviors that could unnecessarily create tensions amongst certain community groups.

### **Time**

In several aspects, time has the possibility of affecting police decisions relating to initiating traffic stops and conducting searches. One example of this is the identified correlation between the time of day, rush hour specifically, and the number of observed speeding instances (Tillyer & Engel, 2012). Another shows a majority of police searches taking place during the evening hours, outside of rush hour timeframes, and on the weekends (Tillyer & Klahm, 2011). When evaluating trends and correlations with arrest in the same study, they were unable to find any relationship between the time of day and arrest rates or likelihood for suspects. Finally, Schafer and Mastrofski (2005) hypothesize that police officers may be averse towards initiating traffic stops when their scheduled break time or the end of their shift is quickly approaching. The rationale behind this is that once initiated, the officer's hands may be tied in having to take action (because of a warrant, for example), which could potentially overlap their break time, forcing the officer to miss it, or could elongate his or her shift because last minute paperwork and processing

must be completed for the last minute action. This rationale was not measured and therefore not tested in their study, however the concept makes sense and remains plausible.

### **Vehicle Characteristics**

Correlations between vehicle characteristics have also been identified to be related to police officer decisions and performing traffic stops. Most reported correlations are positive, however at least two negative correlations have been published as well. Both negatively correlated variables appeared in Phillips' (2009) study in traffic stop decisions; he found negative relationships between a driver driving an SUV and a vehicle having tinted windows. Officers reported being less likely to initiate traffic stops on both of these types of vehicles. Broadly put, this study was able to assert that vehicle characteristics do seem to influence officers' decisions of whether to stop vehicles. Related, and not in contradiction, another study identified sedans and sports cars being the most common vehicle types to be pulled over compared to all other vehicle types (Tillyer & Engel, 2012). This study also found that vehicles in visibly poor condition were less likely to be found speeding, thus loosely implying that these vehicles could potentially be pulled over less frequently (considering speeding is the most common reason stated for traffic stops; Eith & Durose, 2011). Finally, it has been found that commercial vehicles are significantly less likely to be ticketed at the conclusion of a traffic stop (Lundman, 2009). One potential explanation for this is an understanding among police and commercial drivers that clean driving records are necessary for commercial drivers to keep their jobs (Schafer & Mastrofski, 2005).

### **Infraction Details**

Several studies have also identified a connection between moving violations and an increased likelihood of being pulled over (Leinfelt, 2006; Phillips, 2009; Phillips & Sobol, 2012); two of which show significant relationships between speeding violations and a driver's likelihood of being pulled over (Phillips, 2009; Phillips & Sobol, 2012). Another common reason for a stop to be initiated was for drivers using a hand-held phone while driving. Leinfelt's (2006) data amounted to 71% of all stops within his study were initiated due to driving violations; 49% of these stops resulted in a warning for the driver while 42% resulted in a citation. The likelihood of receiving a citation for speeding does increase however as the driver's speed increases (Farrell, 2015). Inversely, registration and equipment violations are more likely to be met with a stern warning from the officer conducting the stop (Schafer et al., 2006). Schafer and colleagues (2004) surmise that as the number of infractions increases, or as the severity of the observed violation(s) increases, police officers are more likely to initiate traffic stops. They hypothesize that the more severe an officer believes an offense to be, the less likely that officer will be to allow it to go unchecked; similarly when drivers disregard traffic codes and laws to a degree where multiple infractions can be easily observed at once, officers would be less likely to provide them full leniency. Finally, there is data in opposition of these previously mentioned studies. Lundman (2009) found in his data that there were no differences between stops initiated due to speeding compared to all other reasons. In this study, speeding violations were treated the same as any other stop's variability in terms of the likelihood of being stopped and the variability in the officer's sanctioning decision.

### **Relevance of Military Police Studies**

All of these aforementioned studies have focused on how local, county, and/or state police agencies use discretionary authority in their decisions. Despite long standing traditions of police agencies targeting the recruitment of military veterans (Goldstein, 1963), at the time of writing, there were no studies discovered that focused on, or even considered, how military law enforcement agencies act in similar situations. Depending on the study, military veterans account for between 19% and 27% of sworn police officers within various local, county, and state police agencies (Castaneda & Ridgeway, 2010; Tsimekles, 2006; Weichselbaum & Schwartzapfel, 2017). Furthermore, police agencies also provide preference to recruits and applicants that have prior law enforcement experience. Of the sworn officers with military experience, between 28% and 34% also have law enforcement experience prior to being hired in their current agency, usually from while serving in the military (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2009). Additionally, the federal government has also implemented financial incentives for police agencies to hire military veterans (U.S. Department of Justice [USDOJ], 2012).

Do not misinterpret these statements however, though these two professions can be similar in many ways, the overarching mission and focus of these two types of organizations is quite different, and for good reason (Campbell & Campbell, 2010). Thus, the point of these assertions are not to state these two types of organizations can be compared equally, however it is to illustrate the level of influence military police veterans can have in local departments. The dearth of scholarship concerning this overlap is brought to light here because although internal administrative rules, regulations, and supervisory styles can impact (through either constraint or liberty) the amount of discretion a police officer has the authority to utilize, officer discretion is still a conscious act derived from officer thoughts, attitudes, and motives (Nowacki, 2015; Vito & Walsh, 2007). It can be reasonably assumed that these thoughts, attitudes, and motives can likely

be the same after a civil police academy as they were while the individual was in the military. Thus observing discretion within the military can aid to the collective knowledge of how police officer discretion is utilized and how it potentially affects individuals and certain aspects of the officer's job. The bottom line here is that military veterans tend to have clear advantages in police officer application processes, yet no attention has been made to studying these military policing units. This thesis focused on lessening this gap by specifically observing Air Force Security Forces personnel; after all, one in five of those military veterans are coming from the Air Force.

## Chapter 3

### Methodology

#### Security Forces' Primary Responsibilities and Organizational Structure<sup>1</sup>

The United States' Air Force's Security Forces career field is the primary force protection entity on an Air Force base or installation. Among other duties, they perform all law enforcement, confinement (jail), K-9, resource security, and entry control functions on the base. Those in the career field, commonly referred to as "Defenders" (the same way city police officers are commonly referred to as "cops"), perform these tasks as well as others while assigned to installations within the United States, overseas, and in deployed environments. The responsibility of maintaining the safety and security of all personnel, facilities, and resources within the boundaries of an Air Force installation ultimately falls on Defenders both around the clock and across the globe.

Like most Air Force career fields, Security Forces consists of both commissioned officers and enlisted personnel (the two rank tiers within the Air Force). In Security Forces units, the commissioned officers can be considered roughly equivalent to white-collar managers and leaders in the civil sector, while the enlisted personnel can be compared to the blue-collar workers. In the Air Force, the type of unit to be observed in this study is called a *Squadron*; the leader of a squadron is called the *Squadron Commander*. He or she is the highest-ranking officer in the squadron and is advised, assisted, and guided by the *Security Forces Manager* who is the highest-ranking (by tenure, rank, or both) enlisted member in the Security Forces Squadron. Beneath the commander is another commissioned officer known as the *Operations Officer*, and another enlisted Defender with the duty title of *Operations Superintendent*. Together, these two oversee

the *Flights* that make up the Squadron. Flights are one level below the squadron in terms of organizational structure, and consist of the men and women that work each shift. Compared to a local police department, the personnel assigned to these Flights would be patrol sergeants and patrolmen. For each shift there is one Flight working, covering all security and law enforcement operations needed on their installation, therefore there is always one Flight on duty. A commissioned officer, called a *Flight Commander*, and/or a *Flight Chief* (the enlisted equivalent to a Flight Commander) lead each flight. Refer to Appendix A for a hierarchical illustration of the Air Force's organizational structure and the duty titles within each level.

### **Study Site Setting<sup>2</sup>**

Falcon Air Force Base (FAFB; pseudonym) is located in a Southwestern state within the United States. This base, dating back to the early 1940s, is on the outskirts of what is now a large metropolitan city and encompasses nearly 14,000 acres of land. The base employs nearly 15,000 military and civilian employees daily. Due to the sensitivity of the information, the total number of personnel assigned to the Security Forces Squadron cannot be listed. An estimate for the total military population, including dependents (these are family members of military personnel) and retirees within the surrounding area reaches 40,000. Falcon Air Force Base is accustomed to regular visits from the local retired and dependent population as well as visiting international and sister-service military members taking part in the base's daily operations. This base does have an active training mission and is considered a focal point for various advanced training courses. Because of this, FAFB also maintains a steady flow of military members in "training" or "student" status that are not permanently assigned to the base (amounting to an approximate total of 1,200 every day).

As with most cities, FAFB can be divided into five distinctly zoned areas. Being that it is an Air Force Base, there is the airfield area. This area consist of the flight line, aircraft parking areas, as well as a plethora of aircraft hangers and awnings used for maintenance and additional parking. Next to this area is the primary “business” area. This area houses the multitude of squadrons assigned to the base and is thus filled with office buildings and other types of work centers. On the outskirts of this area is a small commercial zone. Here you can find the mini-mall, gas station, grocery store, fast-food establishments, and convenient stores, as well as the chapel. Butting up against this area is the residential are that also includes several school buildings, a few daycare facilities, and a medical facility. Also worth noting, this residential area is split in half by a major local thoroughfare, thereby requiring drivers to leave and re-enter the base if traveling from one end to the other. Together, this residential area and the business zone consume the majority of the base. The opposite edge of the business area leads to two more rural areas for personnel traveling out to the two additional, secluded business areas. The roads leading out to these sites are several miles in length and appear to lead to nowhere if unfamiliar with the area.

These rural-like roads and the residential areas are prone to speeding behavior. The rural-like roads because of the absence of surroundings; the residential area because the posted speed limit throughout this zone is 15 miles per hour, yet looks like any other neighborhood consisting of both long winding roads as well as short choppy cul-de-sacs. Likewise, because of the number of intersections and stop signs within the business area, it is prone to having drivers run through (or at least commit the infamous “California Stop”) stop signs and fail to signal their turns at intersections.

Also in line with most business or industrial areas around the country, the activity level and traffic density follows typical business hours. The residential areas of the base consequently have more motor and foot traffic outside of business hours until later in the evening, again, just as

a typical residential area in any city. Traffic in and around the commercial areas of the base also fluctuates throughout the week, similar to the way it does in any average city across the country.

### **Methodology and Sample**

Data for this study was collected through observational “ride-alongs” from 15 patrolmen within the Security Forces Squadron. Due to not all patrolmen being comfortable with taking part, some patrolmen consented to being observed over multiple shifts. All observations took place over the course of 12 days in October of 2018. During this time, I visited the unit and sat in on their regular pre-shift briefing, called *Guardmount*, and introduced myself, the purpose of my being there, as well as the purpose of this study. Interested volunteers were asked to see me after the formation ended at which point the eligibility screening and consent process began. This process took approximately 10 minutes to complete, and never interfered with their official duties. Eligibility for this study only required the volunteers be posted as a law enforcement patrolman and be an Active Duty Air Force member. Once eligibility was confirmed and the volunteer provided consent the patrolman was observed from within his or her patrol vehicle for the duration of their shift<sup>3</sup>. Throughout the course of this study period, observations took place each day of the week and across all shifts in the unit’s duty day.

During these 19 observations a standardized observation checklist created to collect data, annotating when, where, why, and upon whom traffic stops were and were not conducted was utilized. Due to limitations placed upon this study, patrolmen were unable to be interviewed or otherwise asked questions on their perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, or opinions, however at the conclusion of each observed traffic violation, a short debrief with the patrolman was conducted in order to verify information collected was accurate as well as to collect any factual data potentially missed during the observation or interaction.

Due to the importance in prior civil sector studies, as discussed earlier, the items of interest evaluated throughout these observations fell within four categories: situational, infraction, individual demographics, and vehicle characteristics. Situational variables included the time (the exact time of the observation, as well as the patrolman's time on duty and time remaining on duty, both rounded to the nearest quarter hour), weather, temperature, and whether there were any passengers or bystanders present at the time of the observed traffic violation. The specific infraction(s) observed was also recorded. As for individual demographics, the patrolman's and driver's race, gender, age, military status (Active Duty, Guard, Reserves, Dependent, Retired), the driver's or their sponsor's pay grade (pay grade is a standardized rank system used across the entire Department of Defense, Table 6 in Appendix B explains how pay grade relates to Air Force rank), the military service the driver is affiliated with, and finally, whether the driver was searched or not. Lastly, the vehicle category included items such as the condition and type of vehicle, the color, approximate age, whether it had tinted window, and whether it was searched as part of the potential stop.

In the event a traffic stop did not take place following an observed traffic violation, I recorded my perception of what the attribute would have been. For example, if a traffic stop did not occur, there would have been no way to know the driver's age, in this instance I recorded what I believed to be the driver's age. Alternatively, items of interest that were not discernable, such as branch of military or pay grade, were left blank. Finally, any and all observations as to the patrolman's or violator's actions or demeanor surrounding the violation and/or stop, as well as statements the patrolman and/or violator made regarding the observed violation(s) and/or during the stop were annotated on this form as well.

### **Observer Effects**

One additional piece worth making at this point is how observer effects, also known as the Hawthorne effect, were accounted for. A common critique of the qualitative methodology is that by infiltrating the natural environment, researchers alter the reliability and validity of their findings due to observer effects (Monahan & Fisher, 2010). The notion behind this effect is that participants will behave differently when observed in order to appear better and/or provide the researcher with the data the participant believes they want. Interestingly, Monahan and Fisher believe, through their experiences working with this methodology, that the simple presence of a researcher does not in fact automatically adjust the behavior of the participant. For instance, a researcher's status with the organization being observed or simply creating relationships with participants can negate these observer effects (Monahan & Fisher, 2010).

This was the case in the present study; while I was not going to withhold the truth if specifically asked, I did not intend to openly advertise my status as an Air Force Defender. It quickly became known amongst all within the sample population however, that I am in fact a Defender. I believe this was in part due to the unit's leadership informing the flight's leadership why the "random guy in civilian clothes" was hanging around their people. Through no mistake of their own, when giving this notification to the flight leadership, I believe the unit leadership informed them I was an Active Duty Defender looking to collect data on the career field. In the end however, I believe this assisted me in opening the lines of communication between the participants and I, and actually allowed for more realistic data to be captured. The first few observations conducted had a little bit hesitation in the air when I first got in the patrol vehicle with them. They were completely willing to take part in the study, but they seemed cautious in what they did or said. Once we began conversing and the inevitable question, "So, what do you

do?” came up, they realized I was essentially the same as them and I could visibly see the tension fade away.

I attribute this to the *brotherhood* or *thin blue line* commonly referred to among civil police officers. Much like civil police officers, Defenders look out for each other and form a family wherever we go. Once I identified this as a benefit to the observations, and discovered some already knew who I was prior to even speaking to me, when I introduced myself in Guardmount, I stated I was an, “Active Duty officer, Security Forces by trade.” From that point on, the first few questions received once in the patrol car shifted from, “Who are you?” and “What do you do?” to “So, where have you been stationed?” or “How long have you been in?” This type of conversation is commonplace in Security Forces units (and probably other types of units as well) when a new person moves in. During some of the observations, the patrolmen appeared to welcome me as an insider so much that they asked if I was going to assist them during their assigned calls for service and traffic stops. Likewise, I observed a couple instances where patrolmen I was observing partook in blatant infractions of policy/law themselves, or simply sat back and let the time pass without attempting to “impress” me. Therefore, rather than seeing any negative effects of the Hawthorne effect, building rapport and being recognized as an insider actually aided in the collection of this data.

Another possible concern regarding the validity of the data collected centered around my rank in relation to the rank of those I was observing. While I fall within the officer rank tier, all of patrolmen observed held enlisted rank; in the military enlisted members report to officers in the chain of command or supervisory line. The concern here is that the patrolmen would feel the pressures of a superior watching their every move and therefore be hesitant to fully open up or conduct themselves as usual. While this is certainly a possibility, several of the patrolmen observed, made specific comments referring to how they would appreciate their leadership riding around and “doing the job” with them. One patrolman stated that he had never had meaningful

conversation with an officer before, let alone for how long he did. This patrolman stated that he really enjoyed being able to ask questions about the career field and certain decisions that had been made throughout his career while searching for a more senior-level perspective. As he put it, he is the ground pounder; he does what he is told and does not get to see the big picture; the time with me in the vehicle, answering those questions, allowed him to see how the bigger picture works and why certain things have to be done a specific way. With these unsolicited responses, and the previously mentioned policy/law infractions observed by patrolmen, I believe that overall this concern was nullified as well.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Findings**

The 129 hours of observations in this research yielded a total of 81 observed violators committing a total of 109 traffic infractions. Of those 81, only 46 resulted in traffic stops of some form being initiated by the patrolman under observation. The most common violation witnessed was failure to stop at a posted stop sign (27 instances), followed by expired registration, and failure to signal a turn or lane change (15 and 14 instances, respectively). Similarly, the most common reason for a patrolman to initiate a stop was for failure to stop at a posted stop sign and expired registration (18 and 14 instances, respectively). The 46 traffic stops resulted in a total of 72 individual violations of which, 40 received citations, 17 verbal warnings, 8 were ignored or not noticed by the patrolman, 2 were met with written warnings, another 5 ended in apprehension, and of the apprehended individuals, 2 ended up having their vehicle towed<sup>4</sup>. Tables 1 through 5 on the following pages depict the descriptive statistics of this collected data.

**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Individual Characteristics****(Patrolman N=15/Driver N=81)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>	<b><math>\bar{x}</math></b>	<b>Range</b>
<b>Patrolman's Race</b>				
White	5	33.33		
Black	6	40		
Hispanic	3	20		
Asian	1	6.66		
<b>Patrolman's Gender</b>				
Male	14	93.33		
Female	1	6.66		
<b>Patrolman's Time on Duty (All)</b>				
			3.5	7
0-1 hours	7	8.64		
1.25-2 hours	16	19.75		
2.25-3 hours	21	25.93		
3.25-4 hours	12	14.81		
4.25-5 hours	9	11.11		
5.25-6 hours	5	6.17		
6.25-7 hours	8	9.88		
7.25-8 hours	3	3.70		
<b>Patrolman's Time on Duty (Stopped)</b>				
			4.21	6.5
0-1 hours	2	4.35		
1.25-2 hours	9	19.57		
2.25-3 hours	11	23.91		
3.25-4 hours	7	15.22		
4.25-5 hours	8	17.39		
5.25-6 hours	2	4.35		
6.25-7 hours	5	10.87		
7.25-8 hours	2	4.35		
<b>Driver's Race (All)</b>				
White	37	45.68		
Black	8	9.88		
Hispanic	9	11.11		
Asian	2	2.47		
Unknown	25	30.86		
<b>Driver's Race (Stopped)</b>				
White	24	52.17		
Black	6	13.04		
Hispanic	7	15.22		
Asian	2	4.35		
Unknown	7	15.22		
<b>Driver's Gender (All)</b>				
Male	48	59.26		
Female	13	16.05		
Unknown	20	24.69		
<b>Driver's Gender (Stopped)</b>				

Male	32	69.57		
Female	11	23.91		
Unknown	3	6.52		
Driver's Age (All)			31.65	49
18-25	21	25.93		
26-35	16	19.75		
36-45	5	6.17		
46-55	2	2.47		
56-65	3	3.70		
66-75	1	1.23		
Unknown	33	40.74		
Driver's Age (Stopped)			30.10	49
18-25	17	39.96		
26-35	14	30.43		
36-45	4	8.70		
46-55	2	4.35		
56-65	3	6.52		
66-75	1	2.17		
Unknown	5	10.89		
Driver's Status (All)				
Military Member	32	39.51		
Retired Military	3	3.70		
Dependent	2	2.47		
Civilian Employee	3	3.70		
Civilian Contractor	3	3.70		
No Affiliation	5	6.17		
Unknown	33	40.74		
Driver's Status (Stopped)				
Military Member	29	63.04		
Retired Military	3	6.52		
Dependent	2	4.35		
Civilian Employee	2	4.35		
Civilian Contractor	3	6.52		
No Affiliation	3	6.52		
Unknown	4	8.70		
Driver's Service Affiliation (All)				
USAF	39	48.15		
USA	1	1.23		
USN	1	1.23		
Unknown	34	41.98		
Not Applicable	6	7.41		
Driver's Service Affiliation (Stopped)				
USAF	36	78.26		
USA	1	2.17		
USN	1	2.17		
Unknown	4	8.70		
Not Applicable	4	8.70		

Driver's (or Sponsor's) Rank Tier (All)		
Airman	16	20.00
NCO	5	6.17
SNCO	1	1.23
CGO	3	3.70
FGO	4	4.94
Unknown	42	51.85
Not Applicable	10	12.35

Driver's (or Sponsor's) Rank Tier (Stopped)		
Airman	16	34.78
NCO	5	10.87
SNCO	1	2.17
CGO	3	6.52
FGO	4	8.70
Unknown	9	19.57
Not Applicable	8	17.39

**Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for All Observed Infractions (N=109)**

Variables	Count	Count	%
<b>Infraction Type</b>			
Abandoned Vehicle		1	0.92
Broken/Driving Without Tail Lights		3	2.75
Broken/Driving Without Head Lights		8	7.34
Driving Without a License		2	1.83
Eluding a Law Enforcement Patrol		3	2.76
Expired/Failure to Display Current Registration/Tag		15	13.76
Expired/Failure to Provide Current Insurance		6	5.50
Failure to Signal Turn/Lane Change		14	12.84
Failure to Stop at Entry Control Point		3	2.76
Failure to Stop at Posted Sign		27	24.77
Failure to Utilize Hands-Free Device		4	3.67
Illegally Parked		10	9.17
Improper Use of a Government-Owned Vehicle		1	0.92
Possession of a Controlled Substance		1	0.92
Possession of a Weapon		1	0.92
Speeding (1-5 MPH)		2	1.83
Speeding (10+ MPH)		6	5.50
Unauthorized Access to a Restricted Area		1	0.92
Unsafe Operation of a Motor Vehicle		1	0.92
<b>Stop Initiated (N=81)</b>			
Yes		46	56.79
No		35	43.24
<b>Outcome</b>			
Driver Searched (out of 72 encounters with driver present)		3	4.17
Vehicle Searched (out of 81 total vehicles)		3	3.70

Nothing Done (stop may/may not have occurred)	43*	39.45
Verbal Warning	17	15.60
Written Warning	2	1.83
Citation	40	36.70
Apprehension	5	4.59

\*This value contains 2 instances where the patrolman was left with no option but to do nothing as the infraction was on an unattended car and enough identifying information on the driver/owner could not be gathered to write a written warning or citation.

**Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Observed Infractions Resulting in a Traffic Stop**

(N=72)

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Infraction Type</b>		
Abandoned Vehicle	1	1.39
Broken/Driving Without Tail Lights	1	1.39
Broken/Driving Without Head Lights	2	2.78
Driving Without a License	2	2.78
Eluding a Law Enforcement Patrol	3	4.17
Expired/Failure to Display Current Registration/Tag	14	19.44
Expired/Failure to Provide Current Insurance	6	8.33
Failure to Signal Turn/Lane Change	4	5.56
Failure to Stop at Entry Control Point	3	4.17
Failure to Stop at Posted Sign	18	25.00
Failure to Utilize Hands-Free Device	2	2.78
Illegally Parked	6	8.33
Improper Use of a Government-Owned Vehicle	1	1.39
Possession of a Controlled Substance	1	1.39
Possession of a Weapon	1	1.39
Speeding (10+ MPH)	5	6.94
Unauthorized Access to a Restricted Area	1	1.39
Unsafe Operation of a Motor Vehicle	1	1.39
<b>Outcome</b>		
Driver Searched (out of 37 encounters with driver present)	3	8.11
Vehicle Searched (out of 81 total vehicles)	3	3.70
Nothing Done	8*	11.11
Verbal Warning	17	23.61
Written Warning	2	2.78
Citation	40	55.56
Apprehension	5	6.94

\*This value contains 2 instances where the patrolman was left with no option but to do nothing as the infraction information on the driver/owner could not be gathered to write a written warning or citation.

**Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for All Vehicle Characteristics**

**(N=81)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Vehicle Type</b>		
Commercial Vehicle	4	4.94
Coupe	6	7.41
Government	1	1.23
Hatchback	3	3.70
Luxury Car	2	2.47
Motorcycle	2	2.47
Sedan	25	30.86
Sports Car	10	12.35
SUV	10	12.35
Truck	15	18.52
Van	2	2.47
Other	1	1.23
<b>Condition</b>		
Good	72	88.89
Fair	7	8.64
Poor	2	2.47
<b>Age</b>		
Newer Model	50	61.73
2000s Model	6	7.41
Older Model	15	18.52
Unknown	10	12.35
<b>Color</b>		
Black	13	16.05
Blue	3	3.70
Company Paint	4	4.93
Custom Paint	1	1.23
Green	4	4.94
Grey	6	7.40
Red	8	9.88
Silver	7	8.64
Tan	2	2.47
White	25	30.86
Unknown	8	9.88
<b>Window Tint</b>		
Yes	58	71.60
No	20	24.69
Unknown	3	3.70

**Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Vehicle Characteristics of Traffic Stops****(N=46)**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Vehicle Type</b>		
Commercial Vehicle	2	4.35
Coupe	4	8.70
Government	1	2.17
Hatchback	2	4.35
Motorcycle	2	4.35
Luxury Car	2	4.35
Sedan	15	32.61
Sports Car	2	4.35
SUV	8	17.39
Truck	7	15.22
Van	1	2.17
<b>Condition</b>		
Good	42	91.30
Fair	2	4.35
Poor	2	4.35
<b>Age</b>		
Newer Model	31	67.39
2000s Model	3	6.52
Older Model	7	15.22
Unknown	3	6.52
<b>Color</b>		
Black	7	15.22
Blue	2	4.35
Company Paint	2	4.35
Green	2	4.35
Grey	4	8.70
Red	7	15.22
Silver	4	8.70
Tan	2	4.35
White	13	28.26
Unknown	3	6.52
<b>Tint</b>		
Yes	33	71.74
No	11	23.91
Unknown	2	4.35

### **Observational Themes**

In addition to the numerical data collected through these observations, five themes also emerged from the patrolmen's comments and conduct.<sup>5</sup> The first of these was the existence of policy within the unit and/or career field limiting the use of the patrolman's discretion. Another, was the concept of patrolmen creating personal, mental checklists with criteria necessary for their intervention regarding certain infractions. Next, was the concept that as the seriousness of the violation or violations increased, so too did the response from the patrolmen increase. Following, was the way patrolmen viewed the demeanor or attitude of the violator, and lastly, patrolmen's moods and beliefs continuously shaped how they reacted to certain situations.

#### **Limitation of Discretion Through Policy**

This theme presented itself in two repeated manners. The first dealt with abandoned vehicles and the actions the patrolmen were permitted to take with them. Local unit policy directed that when patrolmen are confronted with a suspected abandoned vehicle they were limited to only citing it for that, nothing more if further infractions were identified during their investigation. For instance, when Patrolman Halstead (all Security Forces' Patrolmen names are pseudonyms) stopped to investigate a motorcycle he believed was abandoned and found it had expired registration, insurance, and appeared to have been stolen at some point, he was limited to leaving a citation for the abandoned vehicle notification. This policy therefore prohibited him from investigating whether it was in fact stolen, or further citing the driver/owner for the expired registration and insurance.

The other situation where this presented itself was when patrolmen wanted to confront speeders. Because of either unit or departmental policy, each patrolman had to go through

training to use the RADAR and LIDAR speed measuring devices at this particular base, regardless of whether the training had been accomplished prior in their career at another base. Similarly, the alternative of using what the patrolmen know as “follow speed,” is also prohibited. To use this method, a patrolman would simply follow a suspected speeder, match their speed and use the speed represented on their own speedometer as the violator’s speed. As many of the patrolmen in this particular unit were new to the unit at the time of the observation, and because calibration issues were being addressed with some of the RADAR devices, many instances presented where patrolmen believed drivers were speeding, but had no legal course of action to take.

### **Patrolmen’s Criterion-Related Checklists**

The next theme that emerged was the presence of patrolmen’s personal checklists or criteria sets for certain offenses to warrant their response. For instance, Patrolman Dangle commented on how despite his understanding of the legal definition of a stop, he has his own criteria of what must occur at a stop sign in order for him to respond. He feels that, “as long as the driver attempts to stop, yields to pedestrians, and doesn’t jump their turn, I say they’re good to go.” Therefore, a driver that is alone in an intersection and slows, but clearly does not stop, could be ignored by Patrolman Dangle because he or she did not violate any of his criteria. Related, the same patrolman expressed an understanding when an infraction was “excusable,” such as not fully stopping at a stop sign in order to beat oncoming traffic. In this instance, the driver slowed at the intersection (attempt at a stop), and did not jump their turn because oncoming traffic did not have to stop; thus because there were no pedestrians present, none of the criteria was broken and the driver was not stopped.

Similarly, Patrolman Schmidt has what he called a “2 in 1 rule”. He explained this to mean that he’ll “let two [violators] go for the same offense, but the third one for the same offense gets the ticket.” He explained having this rule because he does not want to hem everybody up over every little infraction, however if a particular infraction is occurring that often, he feels, “obviously there is a problem with that offense that needs to be addressed.” Thus with his discretionary power to pull over and cite those whom he chooses, he has made the conscious decision to be lenient until the third “strike” presents.

Both Patrolman Schmidt and Patrolman Voight presented another example of patrolmen having a predetermined set of criteria when they addressed how drivers’ rank played a role in all of their discretionary decisions. For Patrolman Schmidt, he felt that “the law is the law...rank shouldn’t matter...rank matters nothing whatsoever.” Similarly, Patrolman Voight expressed his view on drivers’ rank by stating, “your rank does not put you above the law. My badge gives me the authority of the installation commander to uphold the law. Therefore my orders and decisions come with the authority of the installation commander.” Contrary to the patrolman’s perspective however, Patrolman Halstead made mention of how he believed a citation he issued to a Major would be thrown out by his unit while being processed because she was a commander. Whether or not this is true is unknown; it may have just been the patrolman’s perspective, but a pertinent and justifiable concern of the patrolman nonetheless.

### **The Seriousness of the Offense**

The next observed theme had to do with the seriousness of the offense. The first example of this comes from Patrolman Voight when he was addressing the issue of drivers not having their headlights on at night. It is customary and courteous for drivers to turn their headlights off when approaching the entrance to the base in order to not blind the entry controller working that gate.

With this in mind Patrolman Voight will stop drivers for not having their lights on as it is a safety concern, however as long as the driver is able to turn the lights on when he approaches them, he lets them go without hesitation. Similarly, Patrolman Peralta will simply flash the driver with his own high beams to remind the driver to turn on their lights. Even if Patrolman Peralta does initiate a stop for the “simple things,” such as a vehicle’s headlights not being on, “[he doesn’t] even call it in, [he] just briefs and releases.

Patrolman Brown also showed how he believed leniency could be the best answer for more minor infractions. One instance he expanded upon during his observation period was a driver he believed to have been talking on the phone without using a hands-free device. Although he determined she was not in fact on her phone he had already discovered she was driving without her license on her. He informed both the driver and I that this offense could result in her getting cited and her vehicle towed, but because she stated she forgot her wallet on her desk, he felt “the reasonable answer for me being that she just forgot it was to issue the citation.” He further defended his decision over not just letting her go with a warning by explaining how “[the citation will] act as a reminder to never forget it again since the next person that stops her may not be as nice.”

Likewise, Patrolman Halstead (one of the few patrolman that had been certified to use the RADAR and LIDAR devices at the time of observation) mentioned that the severity of the speed is what determined whether he would react to it. He stated, “I don’t stop people for stuff I do myself. When driving, I usually go between 5 and 7 miles-per-hour over,” as well as, “My limit is 10 over. If it was 9, I wouldn’t have pulled him over,” when referring to someone he stopped for going 13 miles-per-hour over the posted speed limit. He provided this explanation both before and after observing three violators traveling between 1 and 9 miles-per-hour over the posted speed limit.

The final example of this trend comes from Patrolman Esposito, and presented itself in two ways with him. The first instance was when considering the impact of a driver's lackadaisical stop at a stop sign. Although he conducted a traffic stop, Patrolman Esposito stated that he issued them a written warning over a citation because the roadway was not busy, thus implying the severity and safety of the offense was not overly high. On the other end of the spectrum, however, when faced with an individual that had committed three infractions (failure to stop, expired registration, failure to provide proof of insurance), he stated, "there were too many infractions to let go with a warning only." Thereby signaling the severity of the situation, not necessarily the individual infractions are also weighed by some patrolmen.

### **The Violator's Demeanor**

This notion of the violator's behavior, attitude, and/or demeanor having an impact on the patrolman's decision was the most consistently observed trend across all the patrolmen. In total, over half of the observed patrolmen made comments supporting this concept. Patrolman Schmidt clearly described that his "decision depends on the violator's attitude or demeanor." Likewise, Patrolman Rollins summarized her decision-making process as simply as, "generally I base my decision on their demeanor--if they take ownership and are understanding I just brief and release." Patrolman Dangle mentioned during one stop that "[the driver] is being nice so I'll let her go [with a warning]," and during another, "her demeanor didn't determine the outcome, but it helped me make my decision." Finally, Patrolman Dangle was confronted with an irritated, impatient driver he had stopped for running through a stop sign right in front of him. After getting her pulled over she exited her vehicle and began approaching his patrol car without being instructed to do so. After he returned her to her car and made his way to her window she was cooperative and understanding, but did not have valid registration or insurance. Locally, both of

those offenses (especially together) could easily get the vehicle towed, and potentially end in her apprehension, however because the driver calmed down throughout the stop and was cooperative, Patrolman Dangle chose to only cite her for each of her infractions.

When presented with a similar situation that could have resulted in the towing of a violator's car, Patrolman Halstead told his dispatcher that he would wait to make that decision until after he presented the driver with his citation. He explained that if after receiving the citation the driver was "a dick, then he'd tow it." Similarly, although Patrolman Brown had already begun writing the citation, when the violator blatantly lied to him about the committing the still evident parking violation, he felt more inclined to issue the citation because of her choices. Alternatively, Patrolman Peralta occasionally had a slightly different take on making decisions based on the driver's reactions and statements. In one stop where the violator openly admitted to committing the violation (running a stop sign), Patrolman Peralta felt it necessary to enforce the fullest sanction and issue him a citation because of their conscious disregard for the law.

### **The Patrolman's Personal Mood and Beliefs**

At times, there was just no getting away with something in front of certain patrolmen based simply on the mood they were in, or the outlook they had on certain issues. For instance, Patrolman Atwater looks at certain infractions, such as expired registration, as pure laziness and therefore when spotted, he was sure to issue a citation to that individual. On one occurrence of this infraction, while completing the citation, he stated in the patrol car to himself, "if I have to pay for my registration, then so do you." Later on in that stop it was discovered that the individual had in fact registered the car and received the plates, but had never removed the

temporary tag and affixed the permanent plates. In frustration he exclaimed, “that just makes them even more lazy, they're really lazy.”

During one particular observation, Patrolman Jenko got into the patrol car, made his way to his sector, and made a comment, “I'm in a ticketing mood today. Not because you're here but because it is the weekend. You shouldn't do anything stupid around me on the weekend.” For the duration of his shift, every infraction noticed led to both a traffic stop and a citation.

Alternatively, Patrolman Dawson believes more of a focus should be made towards community policing efforts and initiatives. He explained:

I don't go after the petty stuff some of these other guys go after. Its like they like hemming up base population. Its no wonder they don't like us.... When I pull someone over I like to make sure there are at least one or two other violations too. Then I let them off on two and cite them on the one, but it still ends the encounter somewhat positive for them.... It's more about community policing.

With this outlook, Patrolman Dawson only conducted a traffic stop on approximately one third of the observed infractions; and he issued no citations during that shift.

Patrolman Halstead had a belief that if he had to get out of his patrol vehicle, the driver was going to get a citation. Consequently, any traffic stop Patrolman Halstead performs should, theoretically, result in at least one citation, which based on my observation period with him, was true. Patrolman Peralta expressed a similar outlook when he questioned some of his peers saying, “What's the point of pulling them over if you're just going to brief and release or give a [written] warning?” Patrolman Peralta feels letting drivers go with warning, verbal or written, does little in the long run as there is little to no record of both that driver's past or punishment for committing such infractions.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

#### **Expected Versus Reality**

Going into this study, I expected to see a large amount of leniency given towards the drivers in the way of traffic stop sanctions. Air Force traffic citations work differently than citation received from a local municipality. For this reason I did not expect to observe as many patrolmen who were willing, if not eager, to conclude a traffic stop with a citation. In the Air Force, traffic citations are purely administrative. Whereas municipal tickets come with monetary fines and usually a demerit system against your driver's license, Air Force citations only serve as a notification to your unit's leadership and a demerit system against the driver's base driving record, specific to that base only. In reality, what this means is that once a citation is issued from a Defender, a copy goes to the driver and two copies go to the Reports section of the Security Forces Squadron. No fines, no court date, no driving school.

Once the Reports section receives their two copies, they process it to place the necessary demerits against your on-base driving record. As long as that driver is under the threshold of allowable demerits (usually 12 within a 12-month period, though bases can be more strict and have a lower allowed limit) one of the copies given to the Reports section is forwarded to the driver's unit (assuming it was a military member or dependent), or the driver's employer (if in any other category of driver). The final copy gets filed in the Reports section's database. What the driver's unit does after receiving notification is up to them; some leaders reprimand the driver, while others simply say, "don't do it again." Written warnings are even worse; it is only documentation, no demerit system. Considering this, I expected many of the patrolmen to not

want to spend the time writing citations or warnings, and would instead give a verbal warning, or what they call “brief and release.” Interestingly however, this was not the case. Instead, as seen in the findings above, and will be discussed below, many of the patrolmen preferred to write citations because they viewed anything else as a waste of their time.

### **By the Numbers**

While some variables in this study maintained common majorities with prior studies by numbers alone, statistically it is difficult to determine whether they are in fact significant, or simply roughly congruent with the sample population parameters. In a way, similarities between some studies’ prior findings and this present one regarding the role a driver’s race, as well as the nexus of time plays in making traffic stop decisions exists. Additionally, findings regarding driver’s age, infraction types, and severity all had similar findings in this study. Alternatively, findings surrounding certain vehicle characteristics, as well as other types of infractions were contradictory to previous published findings.

### **Driver’s Characteristics**

As depicted in Table 1 above, the racial composition of those pulled over compared to those observed committing infractions remained relatively close. The largest changes in this area were the percentages of Whites and Unknown races pulled over. Whereas 45% of the violator sample was White, 52% of the stopped sample was White. As for individuals who’s race remained unknown, that percentage dropped from 30% to 15%. This large drop tends to reason however, as when individuals are pulled over their race is easily identifiable by the patrolman. The remaining 7 individuals that were unknown were those sanctioned for violations observed or

noticed while their vehicle was parked (illegal parking and/or expired registration). These findings add to the hodgepodge of conflicting results as to the validity of movements previously mentioned such as “Driving While Black” and “Driving While Brown”. Just as most samples observed in other studies, the majority of the sample observed here was White, and while the percentages of Blacks and Hispanics pulled over both rose by 4 points from their representation amongst all violators, (9% to 13% and 11% to 15%, respectively) they were both still far behind the percentage of Whites pulled over, even when combined. With such a small sample size however, it is difficult to truly measure the significance of such shifts.

The commonness of tinted windows among the sample of vehicles could potentially be a contributing factor to not identifying more common racial minority disparities in this present data. In both the sample of vehicles stopped and of those not stopped, 71% of them had tinted windows. With the heat in this particular region, it goes without saying that the vast majority of drivers have their windows tinted; Patrolman Dawson was even recorded saying, “I can't imagine not having window tint here. It's almost a necessity.” Therefore, it could be argued that this fact potentially skewed the results if any of the observed patrolmen did in fact have racial biases. While this argument could have merit, the vigor of the argument showing how patrolmen operate not knowing the race prior to walking up the driver's window is at least equally strong.

The first driver characteristic that found similar results to previous studies was the driver's age. Sixty-nine percent of all drivers stopped were under the age of 36. This supports Leinfelt's (2006), Lundman and Kaufman's (2003), and Phillips and Sobol's (2012) findings that younger drivers were incrementally more likely to be pulled over than their older counterparts. Within their respective groups however, 90% of those 36 or older were stopped for their infractions, whereas only 83% of those under the age of 36 were stopped. This could imply the younger drivers were only pulled over more on average because there were simply more of them within the sample. Again, a larger sample size, or at least equal samples for all age ranges could

have controlled for this. Indisputable however, is the fact that younger drivers were, on average, far more likely to be cited for their infractions than were the older drivers in the sample (52% versus 35%). This finding goes to support Brown and Frank's (2005), Farrell's (2015), and Lundman's (2009) pieces where in they found strong correlations between younger drivers and their likelihood of being given traffic citations over warnings.

### **Patrolman's Time on Duty**

As for the concept of time, the data here only provided one similarity when compared to prior findings. In conversation, Patrolman Voight mentioned that due to their dispatcher working a slightly modified shift compared to the rest of the flight, their paperwork was due to the Flight Chief prior to the end of everybody else's shift. This meant that if a patrolman was to generate paperwork, most easily through a citation or written warning, at the end of their shift, it would require the dispatcher to rework all of their paperwork and likely have to stay beyond the end of their shift. Therefore, Patrolman Voight explained how there is an unwritten understanding across all of the flights that you do not typically proactively do much in the last 45 minutes or so of a shift in order to avoid tying up themselves and the dispatcher. This concept matches the hypothesis that Schafer and Mastrofski (2005) posed after noticing a declining likelihood of officers in their study initiating traffic stops as it neared the end of their shift. Specifically, they hypothesized that in order to avoid missing a schedule break time or having to stay beyond the scheduled limits of their shift, officers would avoid initiating traffic stops the closer it got to either scenario.

As for the rest of the shift however, the results showed a sharp incline in the number of stops in the first few hours of the shift, followed by a somewhat gradual decline as the shift went on. While the number of observed infractions followed the same general curve throughout the

shift, the numbers for those that did not result in a stop appear to remain more consistent than those where a stop did occur. In the end however, over half of all observed infractions resulted in a traffic stop every hour of the shift, with two exceptions.

The first exception was in the first hour of the shift. This could potentially be explained by the fact that not all patrolmen observed were able to get to their assigned sectors in a timely manner. For instance, some patrolmen had to lend their patrol vehicles to static posts in order for them to conduct changeover thus delaying how quickly they could get on the road. Similarly, other patrolmen got tasked with duties or responses immediately after guardmount ended, tying them up during that first hour of the shift. As for the second exception, between hours 5 and 6, no overtly plausible explanation appears to exist from the observations. The only possible explanation for this is the overall low number of observed infractions during this hour (five in total). Even in the last hour though, only three infractions were observed and two of them resulted in a traffic stop, this despite the understanding amongst all personnel on the flights previously addressed. Both of those observed stops however, did only result in a verbal warning and took place within the first half of said hour however, so they do not counter the unwritten agreement.

### **Vehicle Characteristics**

Whereas Phillips (2009) provided data to show SUVs and vehicles with tinted windows were both less likely to be pulled over, the data collected here showed otherwise. Again, 71% of the vehicles both pulled over and observed committing some form of violation had tinted windows, thereby contradicting Phillips' findings. As discussed previously however, this could have been skewed by the location of the study and the increased likelihood of individuals having tinted windows to begin with. As for SUVs, whereby SUVs accounted for 12% (third most

common type of vehicle) of the vehicles in this study observed committing one or more infractions, they accounted for 17% of the vehicles stopped (rose to second most common). Similar to other driver characteristics, this jump is not major, but it does increase where Phillips' data showed a decrease.

Next, Tillyer and Engel (2012) presented findings that sedans and sports cars were the two most likely types of vehicles stopped for traffic violations. This study's data somewhat agreed with sedans accounting for nearly a third of all traffic stops, however as just mentioned, the second most likely car to be stopped in this study was the SUV, not sports car. In fact, sports cars did not come anywhere close to SUVs, they only accounted for 4% of all stopped vehicles, despite being observed as the violator in 12% of the cases. Of note as well however, is that sedans were also the type of vehicle observed committing infractions most often and therefore could easily explain why they were stopped more often. No other vehicle characteristics seemed to have any correlation with the likelihood of being stopped or not stopped, or the type of sanction levied at the conclusion of a stop.

### **Infraction Details**

The data collected in this study showed that out of 17 instances where two or more violations occurred, 15 of them resulted in a stop; 13 of those ended in at least one citation, the other two were split between a verbal and written warning. This replicates findings in Schafer and colleagues' (2004) work that found as the number of infractions increased, the likelihood of being stopped also increased. Similarly, data collected from the one patrolman observed in this study that was certified to use speed measuring devices supported Schafer, Carter, Katz-Bannister, and Wells' (2006) finding that as the speed violation increased in severity, the chances of receiving a citation equally increased. While this was only one patrolman adding to this

concept in the present study, the faster he recorded an individual going, the quicker he was to respond and the more excited he was while responding. Therefore, though limited by number, the behavior of Patrolman Halstead surrounding every observed speeding infraction mirror their prior finding exactly.

As detailed in Tables 2 and 3 above, the most prevalent infractions observed were drivers failing to stop at stop signs (N=27, 24%), expired registration (N=15, 13%), and failure to signal turns and lane changes (N=14, 12%). Similar findings presented in the reasons for traffic stops: failure to stop at a stop sign (N=18, 25%), expired registration (N=14, 19%), followed by being illegally parked (N=6, 8%). While two of these top three reasons for traffic stops are not moving violations, over half (55%) of all stops were because of one or more moving violations, thereby lending support to Leinfelt's (2006) study which showed a large majority (71%) of his traffic stop data emerged from driving violations. The disparity between the two percentages could be attributed to the inability to police speed infractions throughout this present study. Recall from earlier that speeding is the leading reason for traffic stops nationally (Eith & Durose, 2011). Had this study been able to consider speed violations the percentage of violations, and potentially stops, could have drastically increased. Unlike Lienfelt's (2006) study however, the most common outcome (N= 27, 45%) for these driving violations was nothing: either no stop was initiated, or the patrolman did not acknowledge the violation during the traffic stop.

All-in-all, there is no significant link between any characteristic or detail discussed and how patrolmen make their decisions. Given the sample size and the ensuing limited statistical analysis available, it would appear as though the decisions made for each individual variable roughly matches how that variable is found within the sample as a whole. The more defining answers to how each patrolman made their decisions were found in what they said and how they viewed their roles within their job. These come from the "human side" of this study and will be discussed in the following section.

### **The “Human Side”**

As discussed in the previous chapter, five themes emerged from the qualitative-type data collected in this study: policy limiting discretionary decisions, patrolmen’s criterion-based checklists, the seriousness of the offense, the driver’s demeanor, and lastly the patrolman’s personal mood or beliefs. Interestingly, none of these themes are original to this study; all of these themes have been discovered and explained in prior works surrounding the discretionary decisions surrounding traffic stops.

#### **Limitation of Discretion Through Policy**

The first one for instance, is discussed at length in Joh’s (2007) work on “discretionless” policing. In this study Joh looked at how local or higher policy can curtail or otherwise direct officer discretion-based decisions. In the present study I witnessed how patrolmen were restricted from writing citations for otherwise serious offenses on base simply because it was believed the vehicle was abandoned. Similarly, another patrolman believed a citation he issued would be trashed internally before being processed simply because of whom the citation was written out to.

These types of policies, whether intended to or not, limit the discretion these patrolmen have at their disposal and can easily tie their hands. On the one hand the unit was pushing for patrolmen to tighten up on expired registration and insurance (the reason so many parking lot patrols took place, and likely why the number of expired registration infractions were observed), yet when presented with an opportunity to write a citation for it, the patrolman was kept from doing so because of another unit policy. It is for this reason that officer discretion exists in the first place. Strict policies cannot be applied in every situation equally, nor can every situation be described or covered by policy.

The patrolman's understanding of why this policy was put in place was because too often abandoned vehicles come up with limited information on their registered owner and therefore it is difficult or impossible to properly write/issue citations. If that is in fact the reason for such a policy, can it go without saying that the patrolmen would not write the ticket if they could not complete it? And if that is the case, what is the purpose of the policy in the first place? The patrolmen charged with upholding the law should be entrusted to do so in an appropriate and justified manner, and be given their discretionary power to make decisions in the moment based on the circumstances in question.

This is the argument Joh (2007) appears to try and make in her work through explaining an impressively large proposal to limit the interaction and thus opportunity for police to make discretionary traffic stops on public roads. In it she states that even with such a massive plan, there would still be the opportunity for discretionary decisions to abound, thereby essentially nullifying the proposal's intended goal (Joh, 2007). Creating policy to curb incorrect behavior, whether that behavior is incorrectly/insufficiently completing traffic citations or letting personal biases dictate the patrolman's decisions, sounds good on paper, but in reality it stifles the job patrolmen are able to do. In the instance of the motorcycle Patrolman Halstead encountered, it is fair to assert that a stolen motorcycle is more severe of an infraction, worthy of at least a cursory investigation, than expired registration or the suspicion of abandonment. Yet because this policy did not account for every potential situation patrolmen could be faced with while on the road, Patrolman Halstead lost his discretionary ability and was forced to ignore the warning flags he was seeing. Therefore, the effects of these types of policies on Defenders' ability to perform their duties are paralleled to the effects local police officers are faced with when presented with similar policies.

### **Patrolman's Criterion-Related Checklists**

As far as the criteria-related checklists, Kent and Regoeczi (2015) studied what have previously been termed *working rules* and how exactly they pertain to officers' discretionary decisions. They define these working rules as strategies, beliefs, and/or tactics used by police officers to aid or determine how discretionary decisions are going to be made. These are essentially the mental checklists observed in the patrolmen in this study. Patrolman Halstead has the personal rule that speeders will not be stopped unless they are travelling 10 miles-per-hour over the posted speed limit; Patrolman Dangle knows that as long as drivers make an attempt, yield to pedestrians, and wait their turn at intersections, he will not stop them for rolling through a stop sign. While some of the working rules reviewed and analyzed by Kent and Regoeczi are poor in nature, not all are—the ones in this study included. While a violation is still being committed in the presence of the patrolman, the decision is being made that full enforcement is impractical (for further discussion on this concept see Goldstein, 1963), and as long as the working rule is justifiable, fair, and equitable, there should be nothing wrong with it.

Through the use of these working rules, patrolmen are essentially standardizing their patrol habits in a way that prevents full enforcement of the law, but still creates a baseline for when to intervene. There are at least two benefits to this. First, it allows for an easily explainable and standardized reason for the officer's decision if later questioned. Consider how some civil jurisdictions require their officers to Mirandize suspects by reading from a card. This is not because the officer does not know the Miranda warnings; it is in case the officer is later questioned in court to explain how the suspect was Mirandized. It is much easier to defend a standardized action taken with every individual simply to ensure consistency, than it would be to try and recall every detail of every situation, and defend it was done correctly. Second, it frees the patrolman up thereby remaining available for other actions. Security Forces Squadrons face

the same challenges many municipal agencies face in regards to staffing, the only difference is the Pentagon and Department of Defense make the decision for the squadron, not a city budget. Because of this, there are not an over abundance of patrolmen roaming the streets of every base. This means that when something happens, whether it be a traffic accident, an assault, or an attack on the base, by not policing every single infraction, that patrolman is available to respond, not tied up with a traffic stop because someone did not fully stop at an otherwise empty intersection.

### **The Seriousness of the Offense and The Violator's Demeanor**

In the same study by Kent and Regoeczi (2015), they also address the working rule of a violation's seriousness and the demeanor of the driver, the next two themes that materialized here. Similarities emerged between these two studies in the way of demeanor and seriousness at least appearing to be the two leading sets of working rules for patrolmen/police officers. In Kent and Regoeczi's study, these two sets of rules were the most common of all 157 rules provided by officers in their study. Although there were no specific counts of how or when patrolmen in this study asserted these two types of rules, based on comments, decisions, and observations made, they seem to be the most prevalent amongst patrolmen's justifications for their actions or inactions.

In another study, data was collected that showed formal actions are more likely when offenders present themselves with a disrespectful demeanor (Brown & Frank, 2005). As presented earlier, patrolmen just want, and justifiably expect, to be treated decently. When drivers act in opposition of that because they've simply been pulled over, the officer is likely to think that a simple warning will not make a difference; that is, the driver may not learn their lesson from a warning alone. Think about how humans react when we are mad at someone who is speaking to us. Do we openly listen and process what is being said or is it more often we shut

down and maintain an internal dialogue waiting for the person to finish? More often, it is likely the latter; therefore increased sanctioning is the answer the patrolman or officer turns to.

Regarding the level of seriousness specifically, Kent and Regoeczi (2015) found that as the level of seriousness increases, the likelihood of a ticket being issued also increases. Recall how several patrolmen made comments leading to the same conclusion: “there were too many violations to let go,” or “my limit is 10 over, if he were going 9 over I would not have stopped him.” Related, consider the discussion in the previous section regarding how 15 of the 17 instances where a violator committed more than one infraction a traffic stop occurred, and 13 of those 15 traffic stops ended in a citation. One additional observation Kent and Regoeczi made in this section of their work was the relationship between seriousness and safety towards the public. While it was not a trend in the present study, there were a couple of instances, where the threat to safety significantly contributed to the patrolman’s decision of whether or not to initiate a stop.

The first example of this was with Patrolman Halstead when he observed a speeder traveling in the opposite direction of us on a narrow two-lane road. The road had light to moderate traffic on it and while the driver was speeding enough to meet Patrolman Halstead’s criteria for a stop, the threat to public safety coming both from the speeder as well as from Patrolman Halstead attempting to make a U-turn in the middle of the narrow road, in his opinion, did not warrant the initiation of a stop. Alternatively, Patrolman Dangle observed an individual drive straight through a stop sign, and after considering the “totality of the circumstances” decided a stop was necessary. He too had to make a U-turn in the middle of a busy roadway to initiate this stop, however he deemed it was necessary because the offender committed her violation adjacent to the residential area shortly after school let out, while pedestrians were around, and in the middle of a congested intersection... “She gave no regard to that sign.”

Through even just these two examples, it is easy to see how patrolmen contemplate and balance both safety and severity in the same equation. Again, this enables the patrolmen to stray

from the idea of full enforcement and instead focus on the more egregious infractions they observe. In doing so, these patrolmen policed their streets in a similar manner as civil authorities do (according to findings in studies such as Kent & Regoeczi, 2015; or Brown & Frank, 2005). Just as was presented in the last theme, by essentially ignoring the more minor infractions these patrolmen are policing what they see as more important, or severe, thus likely remaining available for other infractions or calls for service more often.

Take for example one situation with Patrolman Dangle. I was completing the field notes of an infraction observed when a radio call came out needing a response to a suicide attempt/ideation in base housing. Hearing the location, Patrolman Dangle knew it was in his sector and began responding before even being dispatched. Now consider if Patrolman Dangle was in the business of practicing full enforcement; by the time that radio call went out he would have likely already had the driver's paperwork, probably waiting for the results of the wants and warrants check on the driver. Obviously someone's life is more important than a simple traffic violation on a slow evening, but before breaking away Patrolman Dangle would have had to run back to the driver he stopped, return their paperwork, run back to his patrol car and then begin driving away. This may sound like it would still make for a quick response, however when someone's life is on the line, that extra minute or two could make all the difference.

### **The Patrolman's Personal Mood and Beliefs**

Last, but not least, the patrolman's mood at the time of their decision. When Patrolman Jenko made his comment that he was, "in a ticketing mood," the base public was at a loss in terms of receiving informal sanctions from him. Similarly, Schafer and Mastrofski (2005) concluded that the officer's mood at the time of their sanctioning decision greatly influenced their participants' decisions too. When Patrolman Hitchcock was focused on assisting his peers with

finding answers to their problems in military regulations, he was, in effect, making a decision that the violations occurring around him were not as important, and were therefore not addressed.

Alternatively, when Patrolman Halstead was excited about using the new LIDAR equipment, he made specific efforts to locate known speeding areas within his sector and sit in wait to catch offenders. Just as our mood directs how we make everyday decisions, patrolmen's moods similarly direct their decisions, whether consciously or not.

### **Limitations**

Aside from the already discussed limitation of sample size, four additional limitations of this study have also been identified. The first is that this sample was not random. In order to meet eligibility requirements, not all Defenders working had an equal chance of being selected. Further, understanding the purpose of this study, there were several law enforcement patrol posts that uncommonly volunteered because the patrolmen knew only limited amounts of data could be collected from that post. Additionally, because of the small sample population, several patrolmen were observed multiple times. While this was a benefit because it allowed for the collection of more detailed data to be collected from individual patrolmen, its drawback was that it limited the number of perspectives available to collect from.

The next limitation identified here was the restriction placed upon the study preventing the asking of opinionated or attitudinal questions. Although many of the patrolmen were open and willingly provided such information unsolicited, there were still notable instances where such questions would have been beneficial in order to understand the entire decision-making process of the patrolmen. Nevertheless, adequate information was still gathered in order to identify a number of common trends and themes amongst the patrolmen thus gaining pertinent and relevant insight into this previously untouched population.

The final two limitations are somewhat connected and they are the short observation window and only one Security Forces Squadron being observed. Had additional time been available, it would have been ideal to at least double the observation time and attempt to observe multiple squadrons in order to compare findings across the career field. Instead, this one unit, with limited consenting and available patrolmen was used as a convenience sample and therefore limits the amount of data capable of being recorded. Furthermore, an additional recommendation to future studies looking at military policing entities would be to look at a service other than the Air Force. Each military branch has its own quirks and facets and can therefore yield drastically different results, even if everything else is done in the same manner.

### **Conclusion**

Military bases are essentially smaller versions of municipal towns and cities, but the population of military installations is usually smaller and does not seem to intentionally set out to cause or make trouble like some populations in the standard town and city do. With this in mind it was unclear how many traffic infractions were going to be able to witness and observed, let alone how many stops were really going to occur. Absent any prior data to relate to, the initial hypothesis going into this study, if there was one at all, would have been that there would be few infractions and even fewer traffic stops—if anything there would be large amounts of leniency from the patrolman.

To much surprise however, a larger number of simple traffic infractions occurred than expected, and the patrolmen seem to have responded to each situation similarly to the way previous research depicts civil law enforcement agencies react when they observe traffic infractions. Make no mistake, these findings do not mean nor do they even insinuate military and civil police entities are exactly the same. Rather, the way discretionary decisions are handled in

relation to traffic infractions and stops in both types of agencies can be viewed as similar, in as far as the current pool of data suggests. Further research must be done in this specific area of officer discretion in order to continue to grasp the entire picture of officer discretion, as well as to understand how a large number of civil police recruits are entering the force in terms of “practiced” discretionary backgrounds.

Appendix A

Air Force Organizational Structure and Duty Titles




Figure 1: Air Force Organizational Structure and Duty Titles

## **Appendix B**

### **Comparison of Pay Grade and Air Force Rank**

While each branch of military service has their own rank structure and names, the Department of Defense has a standardized scale for each tier of military rank. This scale is called pay grade, and as it sounds is used to determine the correct pay amount for military members each month. The 'E' prefix denotes it is an enlisted rank, whereas the 'O' prefix denotes officer rank. Because BAFB does have a partial joint mission, other branches of military service are consistently present at the base; for this reason, the present study uses pay grade rather than members' actual rank titles in order to maintain simplicity and to remain as standardized as possible. Table 1 below lists all of the Air Force ranks and their corresponding rank name and tier.

**Table 6: Comparison of Pay Grade and Air Force Rank**

	<b>Tier</b>	<b>Pay Grade</b>	<b>Rank Title</b>	<b>Abbreviation</b>
<b>Airman</b>	Airmen	E-1	Airman Basic	AB
		E-2	Airman	Amn
		E-3	Airman First Class	A1C
		E-4	Senior Airman	SrA
	Noncommissioned Officer (NCO)	E-5	Staff Sergeant	SSgt
		E-6	Technical Sergeant	TSgt
	Senior Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO)	E-7	Master Sergeant	MSgt
		E-8	Senior Master Sergeant	SMSgt
		E-9	Chief Master Sergeant	CMSgt
<b>Officer</b>	Company Grade Officer (CGO)	O-1	Second Lieutenant	2d Lt
		O-2	First Lieutenant	1st Lt
		O-3	Captain	Capt
	Field Grade Officer (FGO)	O-4	Major	Maj
		O-5	Lieutenant Colonel	Lt Col
		O-6	Colonel	Col
	General Officer (GO)	O-7	Brigadier General	Brig Gen
		O-8	Major General	Maj Gen
		O-9	Lieutenant General	Lt Gen
		O-10	General	Gen

### **Author's Notes**

1. As a current member of both the United States Air Force and the Security Forces career field, the information contained within this section comes from personal knowledge and experiences.
2. In order for the study site location and therefore the study's participants to remain confidential, this section purposely remains uncited. All information pertaining to the base, to include military population sizes in the surrounding city, came straight from the base's official website. The population of the metropolitan city as a whole was sourced from the U.S. Census Bureau's "Quick Facts" website. Information regarding "busy" times came from observations during the study.
3. Although the majority of observations took place for the duration of the patrolman's shift, a small number of observation periods were cut short due to individual patrolman not wanting to take part for the duration of their shift. Additionally, three observations were not observed for the entirety of the shift; one on the first day due to a mandatory meeting with unit leadership taking place during the shift's time, a second when the patrolman was tasked with non-patrol related duties, and the third on the last day when another meeting with unit leadership took place in the middle of the shift.
4. The apprehensions and vehicle towing were within three separate instances and took place during simulated exercises conducted by a member within the squadron authorized to test the response of posted members. Therefore, these members were not actually apprehended, nor were their vehicles actually towed, but based on the circumstances and violations committed (simulated) by these individuals, the responding patrols would have taken that course of action if it were a "real world" situation. It can be argued that a simulated exercise should not be considered in this data, however I would articulate how the patrolmen responding to the situation were free to use their discretion in the same manner as they would have during any other

encounter they faced while I was there and therefore is just as applicable as any other observation made.

5. Although I mentioned earlier I was not approved to conduct interviews or ask any opinionated or attitudinal questions with any of the patrolmen, many of the patrolmen observed still made willing, unsolicited comments surrounding their decisions and thought processes. All of the quoted and paraphrased material from the patrolmen in this section was recorded from these unsolicited explanations or conversations.

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