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PARTIES AND COALITIONS: EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES

A Dissertation in
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Abstract

All leaders need to build support coalitions in order to gain power and achieve their office and policy objectives. Very little is known about the partisan composition of the government—the president or prime minister and the cabinet—in African democracies. This lack of research on partisan coalition formation in Africa can be explained by the regular portrayal, both in the media and academic scholarship, of African presidents as all-powerful big men. It is reinforced by the widespread perception that parties and legislatures are inconsequential, and the common assumption that coalition governments are rare or somehow less meaningful than elsewhere in the world.

I challenge this conventional wisdom, both theoretically and empirically, and provide the first cross-national analysis of executive-legislative relations and partisan government coalition formation in African democracies. My theory builds on general institutional arguments, and draws on an original dataset of government composition in African democracies from 1990 through 2015. I demonstrate that these general institutional arguments, once tailored to take account of the particularities of the African context, apply equally well in Africa. Among other things, I investigate (i) the determinants of coalition formation, (ii) the partisan composition of governments, (iii) the partisan allocation of ministerial positions, and (iv) the economic consequences of coalition governments.

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Preface

Parts of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have been presented at The Pennsylvania State University, the University of Georgia, and Clemson University. I am grateful to audiences in all three places for their helpful comments.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

A long tradition in the scholarship on African politics emphasizes presidents and leaders; specifically, the powers of these leaders relative to other institutional actors. It is easy to see why once charismatic leaders like Thomas Sankara, or long-lasting leaders like Robert Mugabe, capture the attention of scholars. Indeed, the prevalence of "big man" leadership and cults of personality have illustrated the importance of understanding African leaders and their ability to consolidate power, often for decades at a time. These leaders, however, did not rule in democratic contexts. As a result, they were considerably less constrained by the institutional environment in which they operated, and when these leaders found themselves faced with institutional barriers, they were often able to change the institutions.

As democratic norms have become more established in much of Africa, scholars have not necessarily adapted their views on the role of political institutions accordingly. By failing to consider the way that democratic institutions shape the behavior of political actors, we may incorrectly conclude that weakly institutionalized legislatures are unimportant, or that parties that lack clear platforms serve no real purpose. Because of the history of authoritarian regimes in many African countries, scholars have often seen the military as a key actor, rather than political institutions like the legislature. All leaders must build support for their rule, but the *source* of that support may not be identical. I argue that in democracies, leaders care about building up legislative support – and that this can, under certain circumstances, lead to the formation of partnerships with other political parties. These partnerships between political parties with legislative representation are familiar to many scholars of comparative politics by another name: partisan coalition governments.

In this dissertation, I focus on the government formation process as a critical interaction between political institutions in democratic contexts. My research is motivated by fundamental questions about the nature of interactions among legislative parties, and the interactions among legislative parties and the leader. The decision to include multiple parties in a government is one way that leaders can build support coalitions, and it is widely recognized that all leaders need such support coalitions in order to gain power and achieve policy objectives (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).[1]

In democracies, the greatest threat to a leader's continuation in power is the political opposition. Scholars outside of the literature on government formation often use the designation of "opposition parties" to mean several different things. In this context, the political opposition is any political party that is not *currently* participating in the government. In order to be "participating in the government," a legislative party must hold at least one, full-rank ministerial portfolio, as well as at least one legislative seat.[2] For democratic leaders, the political opposition is key to

[1] I use the terms 'government' and 'cabinet' interchangeably.

[2] This differs from the way that many scholars of African politics discuss "opposition" parties, sometimes referring to the participation of "opposition parties in government." The use of "opposition" in the context of many of these discussions is in order to take account of the rich historical trajectory of political parties, emphasizing historical rivalries and position-taking. My definition of "opposition" is in keeping with the use of the term in the government formation literature, which acknowledges shifting rivalries across time instead by delineating the parties participating in a government at any given time versus those that are not participating. By the definition I have provided, an opposition party can *never* concurrently be a member of the government.

building institutional support. Opposition parties are able to credibly demonstrate their popularity in the broader population at election times, and they can leverage their legislative strength in order to negotiate with the leader and his or her party.

While there is almost no existing scholarship on government formation in African democracies, government formation is a particularly well-studied feature of European politics. Among other things, scholars have examined the partisan composition of governments (Martin and Stevenson, 2001), delays in government formation (Golder, 2010), and the allocation of ministerial portfolios (Warwick and Druckman, 2006; Laver, de Marchi and Mutlu, 2011; Bäck, Debus and Dumont, 2011). Because Europe is populated by parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, there was some debate about whether these theories were relevant in the context of presidential democracies (Linz, 1990, 1994; Samuels, 2002). However, subsequent scholarship has demonstrated that government formation is no less strategic in the primarily presidential systems of Latin America (Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh, 2004; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010; Kellam, 2015). I build on these existing theories to examine what the government formation process looks like in African democracies. I show that while African presidents and prime ministers are powerful, executive-legislative relations are nonetheless complex. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I also show that partisan coalition governments form in nearly half of the African governments I identify.

There are several reasons for the lack of research on government formation in African democracies, both substantive and practical. For one, the prominence of African leaders has meant that they are generally seen as the most important actors in their respective countries (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; van de Walle, 2005). Given the zero-sum nature of relative power in this context, this assessment has undoubtedly contributed to a belief that other institutional actors are less relevant to understanding African political phenomena. This emphasis on the leader has led most scholars to focus on leaders rather than on the government as a whole, as illustrated by the majority of studies of distributive politics that focus on the president or prime minister's favoritism of co-ethnics (Wantchekon, 2003; Posner, 2005; Kramon and Posner, 2013; Carlson, 2015).

The focus on the president and presidential democracies in Africa also led many scholars to conclude that partisan coalition governments are rare, or somehow unusual in African democracies (Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2014), which is a second reason for the general absence of scholarship on government formation. In addition to powerful African leaders, the origins of government formation research in European parliamentary democracies led many to believe that partisan coalitions were the exclusive purview of parliamentary democracies. This belief stems from the fact that the government is not responsible to the legislature in presidential democracies, as is the case in parliamentary democracies. Substantively, this means that presidents are not obligated to maintain majority legislative support, whereas prime ministers risk losing office due to a vote of no confidence if they cannot muster majority support.[3] Taken in concert with the perceived power of African presidents, most scholars likely failed to consider that African leaders might, as do their counterparts elsewhere in the world, choose to strategically form partisan coalitions. Despite evidence to the contrary from the presidential democracies of Latin America (Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh, 2004; Amorim Neto, 2006; Martinez, 2017), this belief has persisted in many studies of African politics.

A third reason that government formation has remained understudied in the

[3] I discuss the vote of no confidence and its implications for the government formation process generally at greater length in Chapter 2.

African context is the weak institutionalization of African political parties and legislatures relative to the advanced industrialized democracies usually examined in this literature. Weak institutionalization has generally favored the establishment of dominant presidential parties, and/or parties so weak that party-switching is rampant, and party labels are all but meaningless (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Goeke and Hartmann, 2011; Riedl, 2014; Young, 2014). In either of these cases, it would appear that there are few incentives to form partisan coalitions, particularly given that the perception of legislatures as weak and ineffectual suggests that legislative support is not valuable. Because parties are often seen as vehicles for the promotion of individuals rather than clearly articulated programmatic appeals, scholars have not generally considered the strategic incentives that might drive even powerful presidents to work with other legislative parties in order to build a majority.

A fourth reason for the dearth of research on government formation in African politics is related to one matter that people frequently see as more important than political institutions: ethnicity. The handful of scholars who have empirically examined government formation cross-nationally in Africa have not differentiated their sample on the basis of democratic or authoritarian regimes, nor have they focused on institutional incentives for coalition formation (Arriola, 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015). These studies have instead examined how leaders can leverage ethnicity to reinforce their cause, whether by increasing the cabinet size to increase the number of groups represented, or by awarding ministerial portfolios in proportion to an ethnic group's share of the broader population. However, ethnicity's salience is not constant across countries (Basedau and Stroh, 2012; Elischer, 2013). I argue that the reduction of government formation in African democracies to an ethnic census ignores the role that political institutions play in shaping executive-legislative relations.

Political institutions determine which parties are able to win legislative representation and how much, and it is from that legislature that the leader builds support by forming a government. As I demonstrate throughout this dissertation, leaders are interested in building, and maintaining, broad legislative support. Without taking into account the way that the composition of the legislature influences the type of government that forms, we miss an important part of the incentives that motivate a leader's strategic behavior.

Finally, one reason for the limited research on government formation in Africa is purely practical: there is no existing empirical dataset that permits the analysis of government formation processes. There are some case studies that cast light on the specific conditions surrounding the formation of notable coalition governments, but these studies tend to focus on a limited number of countries and governments (Kadima and Owuor, 2006; Oyugi, 2006; Kapa, 2008; Amadi, 2009; LeVan, 2011). The few existing studies have attempted to examine governments using information about ministers by country-year, rather than classifying governments by "government formation opportunities" as is the standard in existing scholarship from Europe and Latin America. These cross-national studies also focus almost exclusively on the formation and stability of ethnic coalitions (Arriola, 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015). While such ethnic coalitions undoubtedly play important roles in some African democracies, they cannot directly address the ways in which institutional dynamics can also be leveraged to build other types of support.

I contribute to the study of government formation processes in Africa by presenting original data on governments using the government formation opportunity as the unit of analysis, and I argue that leaders specifically seek the support of legislative parties in order to help them consolidate power and implement their policy agenda. As scholars in Latin America have demonstrated, even powerful presidents have incentives to form coalitions, and ministerial portfolios are valuable to parties and elites because they provide access to resources. African democracies also provide a unique opportunity to compare the effects of parliamentary and presidential systems within a single region. Existing scholarship has focused either on Europe's parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, or on Latin America's presidential democracies. African democracies include parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential democracies, which allows me to examine how these different institutional arrangements can affect our theoretical expectations in a single region.[4] Although some contextual features of African political systems can affect the probability that a partisan coalition will form, the prevalence of these coalitions in African democracies suggests that leaders see them as valuable tools for building support.

Outline of the Dissertation

In Chapter 2, I describe the data I collected on African governments in detail. I explain how I chose which countries would be considered democratic for the purposes of this dissertation, as well as the time frame and the data's structure. I show that despite conventional wisdom, partisan coalition governments form in nearly half of the governments I identify. I also show that my coalition includes a diverse sample of countries that are understudied in much existing cross-national research, including Francophone, Lusophone and Anglophone countries, as well as several smaller, island nations.

In Chapter 3, I examine the factors associated with the formation of partisan

[4]For reasons I discuss at greater length in Chapter 2, I group parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies throughout this dissertation because of the presence of a vote of no confidence. The vote of no confidence does not exist in presidential democracies.

coalition governments. I show that different measures of legislative characteristics can be tied to a leader's decision to include other parties in government. I also show that although African democracies are often known for their "dominant" parties, parties that lack a simple majority in the legislature still frequently seek out partners with the goal of building a legislative support coalition.

In Chapter 4, I use relatively new empirical strategies to address a question that has long fascinated scholars of government formation: Of all the possible combinations of parties that *could* form the government, which one is actually selected? As I discuss at greater length in this chapter, these empirical strategies allow me to take into account the fact that the probability of a single party entering the government is affected by the characteristics of the other parties in that government, meaning that parties cannot be treated as independent observations. It also allows me to examine coalition-level characteristics, as well as party-level characteristics.

In Chapter 5, I analyze the partisan allocation of ministerial positions, known as portfolios. When partisan coalitions form, by definition, it means that multiple parties possess full-rank ministerial portfolios. How many portfolios should each party receive? I build on an existing argument, known as "Gamson's Law" for the strong empirical support it finds in existing work. I show that parties are allocated portfolios in rough proportion to the number of seats they contribute to the government's total number of seats. I also illustrate that there are systematic differences between Africa's parliamentary and presidential systems that can be explained by my argument.

In Chapter 6, I look beyond the government formation process itself to examine the consequences it may have on outcomes of interest to citizens. I specifically examine whether there is evidence to support existing arguments, tested largely in industrialized democracies thus far, that suggest partisan coalitions will lead to higher levels of government spending than single-party governments. I do not find evidence to suggest there are systematic differences in spending levels in African democracies, although there are empirical issues that arise from modeling time series data in this constrained data environment that make these findings tentative.

In these chapters I sometimes include analyses that incorporate data from European democracies as a comparison. I choose to compare Africa's democracies to Europe's democracies for a few reasons. First, the literature on government formation is the most extensively developed in the context of European parliamentary democracies, which means that we know more about how different parts of government formation processes behave in the context of Europe than elsewhere. Second, the fact that Europe is composed of parliamentary democracies provides a clear counterpoint to the variety of democracy types in Africa, as well as the existing scholarship's general emphasis on the power of presidents and leaders in Africa more generally. As I discuss throughout the dissertation, there are theoretical reasons to expect that presidential systems will produce different governments than parliamentary systems. Prime ministers are constrained by their dependence on majority legislative support, whereas presidents are popularly elected to fixed terms, and thus do not rely on the legislature in order to remain in office. By focusing on Europe's parliamentary democracies and the mix of democracy types in Africa, I am able to clearly separate out when I expect features of government formation to behave similarly across regions, and when I expect them to diverge.[5]

[5]Some readers may argue that the comparison between Africa's mixture of democracy types would be better served by a comparison to Latin America's presidential democracies. While this is certainly a comparison worthy of further research, it is complicated by the fact that there is less existing research on government formation in Latin America compared to the research on Europe. It is also, from a theoretical standpoint, more difficult to assess expectations about how African democracies will compare to Latin American democracies. Although there is a common expectation about the powers of the president, and both regions feature presidential democracies prominently, Latin American democracies are generally seen as better institutionalized, and have longer histories

I conclude this dissertation by discussing the broader implications of government formation processes for scholars of African politics. The relationship between the executive and legislative powers is one of growing interest as African countries continue to democratize and consolidate their democracies. There has been a great deal of attention directed toward African presidents, as well as to the ways that parties develop and institutionalize over time. I argue that the next logical step is to consider how these different institutions affect each other, by examining how legislative parties interact with the leader. As I hope to convince readers throughout these chapters, even strong African leaders are not always immune from legislative considerations.

of democracy (on average). Comparisons between African and Latin American democracies are also complicated by conflicting elements of the institutional structure. For example, the higher prevalence of presidential regimes in Latin America would suggest that leaders are less constrained by their legislatures, but better institutionalized legislatures imply a countervailing effect. The advantage of a comparison with Europe is that the expected regional effects are consistent.

Chapter 2

Governments in Africa

In this chapter, I examine what governments in Africa look like descriptively. As I mention in Chapter 1, many scholars of African politics have not considered the government formation process because they assume that only the president matters, or that there is little variation in the partisan composition of African governments. I provide detailed information about the composition of African governments, showing specifically that partisan coalition governments are not rare in African democracies.

This chapter discusses the data that underpins all of the dissertation's subsequent analyses – from defining components like 'governments' and 'coalitions' to the data collection process itself. I also share a variety of descriptive statistics to help illustrate what African governments look like substantively. In order to examine the topics discussed in later chapters—including who gets into governments, how they share power, and what these governments mean for policy—we must first understand what coalitions are, and with what frequency they form.

2.1 Defining Concepts and Scope

For for the purposes of understanding government formation and its consequences, I define a country as ‘African’ if it is a member of the African Union. As of 2017, there are 55 members of the African Union.[1] It is common in political science and economics scholarship to differentiate between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. In some types of research this distinction may be rooted in a complex understanding of different phenomena that link some regions more tightly than others. However, I am interested in fairly general political institutions and how they interact with one another. Given shared religious and cultural ties, as well as shared colonial histories, I see this distinction as unnecessary for the purposes of studying government formation. Practically speaking, North Africa shares a great deal of its institutional heritage with Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the countries of the Sahel.[2] If we are to argue that government formation processes in South Africa can be compared with those in Senegal, it seems no less credible to compare government formation in Mali and Tunisia.

In addition to these cultural and religious commonalities, many scholars believe that colonial history has had a persistent effect on the development of political and economic institutions in Africa (Crowder, 1970; Herbst, 2000; Lange, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Schleifer, 2008; LeVan and Assenov, 2015). I am unaware of any theoretically motivated reason why the legacy of colonial institutions should affect government formation differently in North and Sub-Saharan Africa.[3] To the

[1] The member states are listed on the African Union’s website.

[2] The political grouping known as the “Sahel G-5” includes Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger (Reuters 2014). Nearly all of these countries share borders with North African neighbors – the development of political concerns, such as armed terrorist groups, have made ties between these countries and their northern neighbors even more relevant.

[3] Furthermore, North African and Sub-Saharan African countries share and dispute borders, facilitate negotiations in each other’s countries, and in some cases even administer within the confines

extent that colonial legacy has affected the evolution of political institutions, I expect such hallmarks to be visible in the political trajectories of all former colonies, albeit contingent upon the nature of the colonial institutions that were put in place.

Next, I restrict the sample to the period from 1990 to 2015. I begin my examination in 1990 because it was around this time that many single-party dictatorships transitioned to multi-party democracies during a period known as the "third wave of democratization" (Huntington, 1991; Golder and Wantchekon, 2004; Manning, 2005; Brierley, 2012). During this period a number of countries moved from highly restrictive single-party dictatorships to multiparty regimes, and many were also affected by shifts in the global order that promoted more political openness.[4]

For these 55 members of the African Union over the time period 1990-2015, I impose a final restriction: they must meet a minimal level of democracy. It is important to distinguish between those countries that are at least relatively democratic and those that are not because of the way that governments form. Throughout this dissertation, I draw on theories of government formation that are designed to apply to executive-legislative relations in democracies. In more authoritarian countries, the government formation processes and outcomes that I discuss in the following chapters are likely to function somewhat differently. Following a common practice in political science scholarship, I rely on the Polity IV project's assessment of democracy.[5] I consider a country to be democratic in any year in which it scores a six or higher

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of one another's territory, as in the case of Egypt and Sudan with Bir Tawil and the Hala'ib triangle (discussed in an address by Kenneth Schultz).

[4]Notably, the 'Washington Consensus' led to a rise in the promotion of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). As Herbst (1990) discusses, the political implications of these SAPs, which frequently included provisions for restructuring the public sector and reducing state intervention in the economy, affected the ways that leaders maintained their influence. This, in turn, had implications for the relationships between elected officials and their constituencies.

[5]Polity IV codes countries on a scale of -10 (most authoritarian) to +10 (most democratic) for each year.

on the Polity IV scale, which is a typical threshold for scholars interested in a more broadly inclusive definition of democracy (Leeds, 2003; Johnson and Leeds, 2011; Weeks, 2012). Of the 55 members of the African Union, 25 have experienced at least one democratic year over this time period.

The African countries that experience at least one year of democracy in this time period are shown in Figure 2.1. The colors in this map are used to show the last formally recognized European colonizer.[6] I color-code by colonizer in order to emphasize a few points. Some scholarship in political science has posited that being colonized by one power rather than another has led to lasting differences on a variety of metrics. Such arguments usually focus on 'direct' and 'indirect rule,' defined principally by the degree of centralization of colonial institutional organization. Direct rule is usually considered the mode used primarily by the French and Portuguese, while indirect rule is widely associated with British rule (Crowder, 1970). If being colonized by a specific power has led to persistent differences in norms about which types of government are legitimate and the processes by which governments should form, then this characteristic has implications for my arguments in the following chapters. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, my sample encompasses a variety of colonial institutional legacies. This variation in colonial institutions helps affirm that any patterns I observe are robust to potential differences in colonial institutions. Furthermore, the fact that my study includes former French colonies—as well as smaller, under-studied, former Portuguese colonies—helps address the systematic exclusion of some colonial legacies in existing scholarship (Briggs, Forthcoming).[7]

[6]This information is taken from the Correlates of War Colonial Contiguity Dataset (*Colonial/Dependency Contiguity Data*, 2017).

[7]Briggs (Forthcoming) finds that "former French colonies are especially neglected in Anglophone journals," and although he found no evidence of a similar bias against former Portuguese colonies, smaller countries (and particularly island nations) are also frequently understudied. He cautions that generalizations from existing scholarship should be tempered, as they are often drawn from

Figure 2.1: African Countries Experiencing Periods of Democracy, 1990-2015



Note: Countries highlighted are those for which one or more years were coded as a 6 or higher on the Polity IV scale (-10 most authoritarian, 10 most democratic). Shapefile data is from Natural Earth Data large scale data, while classification by last European colonizer is from the Correlates of War Colonial Contiguity Dataset. Africa Albers Equal Area Conic Projection.

The countries and years meeting my requirements for African and democratic between 1990 and 2015 are provided in Table 2.1. This table lists the years for which countries are classified as democracies, demonstrating that many are classified as democracies for relatively continuous periods of time. In fact, these 25 countries

samples that may not be broadly representative of *all* African countries.

represent a cumulative total of 375 democratic country-years.

Table 2.1: Periods of Democracy in African Countries, 1990 – 2015

Country	Democratic Years
Benin	1991 – 2015
Botswana	1990 – 2015
Burundi	2005 – 2014
Cape Verde	1991 – 2015
Comoros	2004 – 2015
Gambia	1990 – 1993
Ghana	2001 – 2015
Guinea-Bissau	2005 – 2011, 2014 – 2015
Kenya	2002 – 2015
Lesotho	2002 – 2015
Liberia	2006 – 2015
Madagascar	1992 – 1998, 2014 – 2015
Malawi	1994 – 2000, 2014 – 2015
Mali	1992 – 2011
Mauritius	1990 – 2015
Namibia	1990 – 2015
Niger	1992 – 1995, 2004 – 2008, 2011 – 2015
Nigeria	2015
Sao Tome and Principe	1990 – 2015
Senegal	2000 – 2015
Seychelles	1993 – 2015
Sierra Leone	2007 – 2015
South Africa	1994 – 2015
Tunisia	2014 – 2015
Zambia	2008 – 2015
25 countries	*375 country-years*

Note: Countries were classified as democratic if they achieved a score of six or higher on the Polity IV 'polity' variable (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2016). The index runs from −10 to 10, where −10 is the most authoritarian, and a 10 is the most democratic.

Collecting information about the governments that formed, as well as details about the parties that were included in these governments and their legislative seats, required extensive data collection. I examined a wide variety of documents and sources in an effort to collect information that could be cross-validated from multiple sources. These sources include a variety of media accounts, case studies, government websites and officials, *Africa South of the Sahara*, the African Elections Database, the *Africa Research Bulletin*, the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, *Keesings*, the *Political Handbook of the World*, the *Europa World Year Book*, and IPU-Parline, among others. When applicable, I consulted sources for multiple years, as these volumes often change or add new information as they are updated. The source information that was used to produce this data is documented in a codebook that is over 200 pages long, and explains the decisions that were made on the basis of available information.

As each chapter focuses on a more restrictive set of information in order to conduct the analyses, it is reasonable to ask whether the ability to find detailed information about government composition is a strategic calculation on the part of the government or other actors. I find no evidence that the governments for which I was able to locate complete information are systematically different from those for which I was only able to locate partial information. It was not unusual, for example, for a source to provide the information that I required for a particular government in some country but not to provide this same information for an earlier or later government in the same country. In my experience, there was neither rhyme nor reason as to why a particular source would contain complete, incomplete, or no information on the government's composition, or the allocation of portfolios. Realistically, governments have few reasons to hide information about government composition: citizens are generally aware of the parties participating in government at a given time.[8] Even though this information is commonly known at the time of a given government, the

[8]While I believe that information about partisan composition is not particularly sensitive as it is often known to the public, the same is not true of all political information about the government and its activities. For example, data on government spending is notoriously difficult to acquire, and is frequently seen as unreliable. This limits the scope of my analyses in Chapter 6, as spending data limits the countries I am able to include in the analyses.

volatility of African party systems means that it is hard to reconstruct that information five, ten, or twenty years later. As a result, it remains difficult to collect precise information even if one has access to country experts.

Although I identify 375 democratic country-years, focusing on data structured by country-year is not the most appropriate unit of analysis given my interest in governments themselves. In keeping with the the government formation literature from European and Latin American democracies, I take the government as the unit of analysis. In government formation research, the *government* is defined as the head of government (a president or prime minister, depending on the type of democracy) and the rest of the cabinet ministers.[9] The unit of analysis is the government that forms at each government formation opportunity, which has become a standard unit of analysis in the government formation literature. Practically, this means that a new government is coded as having formed when there has been: (1) an election, (2) a change in the identity of the head of the government, (3) a change in the cabinet's partisan composition, or (4) the government resigns (Müller and Strøm, 2000).

Table 2.2 shows the distribution of the governments I identify across African democracies. In total, I was able to identify 176 distinct governments that formed during the 375 democratic country-years listed in Table 2.1. The number of governments coded in each country ranged from a low of one in Nigeria and Tunisia to a high of 20 in Sao Tome and Principe.[10] Table 2.2 also includes the mean duration

[9] There is a tremendous amount of variation in the nomenclature for these positions used by each country, which sometimes also changes in a given country over time. For example, despite the parliamentary system, the title of the head of government in South Africa and Botswana is "president." Cabinet ministers are sometimes called "secretaries," or "chairmen," among other titles.

[10] Note that Table 2.2 has the total number of governments per country in the first column. In order to calculate the average number of days, I exclude governments that had not ended by 2015 when the dataset ends. These observations are censored by the data collection process, and thus would bias the information about mean duration in column two. After excluding these 15 observations, the total number of governments is 161. Throughout the following chapters, the number of governments

of each government by country (in days). This data clearly shows that governments in Africa are not in a constant state of flux – in no country is the mean duration of governments shorter than one year. There is, however, variation in the average duration by country, which suggests that there is variation in the processes surrounding the rise and fall of governments.

Table 2.2: Mean Duration of African Governments, by Country

Country	# Governments (total)	Mean duration (days)
Benin	13	666
Botswana	8	1285
Burundi	5	709
Cape Verde	6	1508
Comoros	7	598
Gambia	2	1332
Ghana	4	1409
Guinea-Bissau	6	518
Kenya	6	737
Lesotho	4	1419
Liberia	3	1047
Madagascar	11	539
Malawi	10	754
Mali	11	652
Mauritius	11	882
Namibia	7	1430
Niger	9	559
Sao Tome and Principe	20	395
Senegal	11	517
Seychelles	8	1057
Sierra Leone	2	1863
South Africa	7	1210
Tunisia	1	542
Zambia	3	904
All countries	*176*	*808*

Note: Column one includes all governments in the data. Column two lists the mean duration of governments by country. The mean durations in column 2 does not include 15 governments which were dropped from the data because they had not ended by 2015 when the data stops; they are considered artificially censored. Durations in column two are given in days.

included in each table and empirical model is stated to indicate explicitly when a subset of the total data is being used.

The few existing studies of African governments have relied on country-years to conduct their analyses of government characteristics, such as ethnicity and gender (Arriola, 2009; Arriola and Johnson, 2014; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015; LeVan and Assenov, 2015).[11] For studying government formation and composition, however, country-year data is problematic. For example, a government that formed in 2001 and ended in 2004 would be counted four times in country-year data: in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Repeatedly counting the same government could lead me to incorrectly identify relationships in my data because it makes it appear as though there are more observations, and thus more information.[12] My data thus represents an important contribution to existing scholarship because it is the first dataset to use the government as the unit of analysis for studying government characteristics in African democracies.

2.2 Single-party and Coalition Governments

Existing scholarship on government formation typically examines the different types of government that can form, distinguishing between coalitions and single-party governments. A *partisan coalition government* is defined as a government in which two or more parties share full-rank ministerial portfolios. For example, imagine a cabi-

[11]Arriola (2009) uses the number of cabinet ministers for each country-year, and Arriola and Johnson (2014) use the share of ministers who are female in each country-year. Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015) use the share of portfolios controlled by a particular ethnic group in each country-year in their analysis. While no one has looked at the partisan elements of the government formation process in Africa, LeVan and Assenov (2015) do examine the effect of coalitions on government spending. However, they do not distinguish democracies from non-democracies, and they rely on country-year data from Banks and Wilson (2017), as well as raw counts of ministers annually.

[12]Specifically, using country-year level observations artificially deflates the standard errors in empirical models of government formation. Substantively, this means that analysts could potentially identify statistically significant relationships that are a reflection of the data's structure rather than a real relationship.

net comprising three ministries: Defense, Health, and Finance. If Party A's ministers head the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health, but Party B's minister heads the Ministry of Finance, the government is considered to be a partisan coalition. If, however, Party A heads the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Finance, and Party B has only a Deputy Minister position in the Ministry of Finance, the cabinet is not considered a partisan coalition government.[13] Scholars of government formation care about the types of governments that form because the type of government has been shown to affect things like the economic size of the government (Hallerberg and Marier, 2004; Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006; Wehner, 2010; Martin and Vanberg, 2013), government stability (Warwick, 1994; Somer-Topcu and Williams, 2008), and voter representation and accountability (Powell, 2006; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013).

Scholars of African politics, however, have not systematically examined partisan coalitions, nor have they examined other types of governments that can form. The relatively limited existing research on African governments mostly takes the form of case studies of specific coalition governments, but the nature of case studies means that they are limited to a smaller number of governments, frequently within a single country (Kadima and Owuor, 2006; Oyugi, 2006; Kapa, 2008; Amadi, 2009; LeVan, 2011). Some scholars have concluded that partisan coalition governments are rare in Africa, and that if they do form, they are short-lived and potentially detrimental to democratic consolidation (Resnick, 2011; Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2014). I argue that partisan coalitions are neither rare, nor are they ephemeral. In Table 2.3 I show

[13]Note also that parties lacking legislative representation but that receive ministerial positions are not counted as partisan coalition partners. This is in keeping with existing literature, which focuses on government formation processes as a means of consolidating legislative support. Technocrats and "independents" appointed to full-rank ministerial portfolios are also not considered to be coalition partners because they can not contribute explicit legislative support to the president or prime minister.

the percentage and number of coalition governments that form in African democracies. As the "Total" column shows, I find that partisan coalition governments form in just under half of the total governments I identify in African democracies (49%). Furthermore, the mean duration (in days) of a partisan coalition government is about 660 days, compared to 954 days in single-party governments. This provides the first empirical cross-national evidence to suggest that partisan coalition governments in Africa's democracies are not atypical or short-lived coincidences, but rather that they are a frequent and enduring phenomenon that existing empirical research has largely ignored.

Table 2.3: Coalition and Single Party Governments Forming in Africa (1990-2015) and Europe (1945-2010)

Cabinet Type	**Africa**						**Europe**	
	Presidential		**Non-presidential**		**Total**			
	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count
Single party	49%	30	52%	60	52%	90	31%	195
Coalition	51%	31	48%	55	48%	86	69%	429
Total	100%	61	100 %	115	100%	176	100%	624

Note: European data from ERD 2014 Release 3.0 (Andersson, Bergman and Ersson, 2014). Non-presidential countries are those with a vote of no confidence, including both parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies in the Africa data. European democracies are exclusively non-presidential.

One reason that scholars may have assumed that partisan coalitions are rare—and thus unimportant—in Africa stems from a common perception that partisan coalitions only form in parliamentary-style democracies. In parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, the government is responsible to the legislature. This means that the legislature possesses the ability to bring down the government by a vote of no confidence. The legislature can do this at any time, generally for any reason.[14] As

[14]The difference between parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies is whether there is also

long as the government has the support of a majority of legislators, however, such a motion would fail. In presidential democracies the government is not responsible to the legislature, which means that there is no analog to the vote of no confidence – the government can only change if and when the president decides to change it, or if a coalition partner were to withdraw its participation in the government. Substantively, this means that presidents are not obligated to maintain majority legislative support in order to stay in office, whereas prime ministers risk a vote of no confidence if they lack the majority's backing. This means that in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, there are clear incentives to build governments that are backed by a majority in the legislature, so as to avoid losing a vote of no confidence. In contrast, governments headed by presidents are frequently assumed to be immune to this necessity, insulated by the security of their fixed-term position.

In order to consider whether the coalitions in African democracies are merely the product of these different forms of democracy, Table 2.3 also splits the sample by those countries that are presidential and non-presidential.[15] There is no substantial difference in the rate that government coalitions form in presidential (31 governments, or 51%) and non-presidential democracies (56 governments, or 48%). This reinforces existing scholarship, in which scholars have argued that even presidents have strategic incentives to form partisan coalition governments (Altman, 2000; Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh, 2004; Amorim Neto, 2006; Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power, 2014;

a head of state who is elected to a fixed term, and cannot be removed. For an overview of this topic see Clark, Golder and Golder (2018).

[15] I follow a fairly common practice of grouping parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes (Laver and Schofield, 1998), as both are characterized by the presence of a vote of no confidence. In the Africa data, non-presidential democracies include: Botswana (parliamentary), Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho (parliamentary), Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius (parliamentary), Namibia, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, South Africa (parliamentary), Tunisia, and Zambia. Presidential democracies include: Benin, Burundi, The Comoros, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Seychelles, and Sierra Leone. Separating semi-presidential and parliamentary democracies did not substantively alter any of the analyses.

Martinez-Gallardo, 2012).

The fact that coalitions seem to form in a similar proportion of governments across different types of democracy in Africa is particularly informative given the established focus on Africa's "big man" type of leadership. African leaders have often been considered the most important actors in their respective countries, which has led many scholars to focus on the leader and his power, rather than examining the government as a whole (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; van de Walle, 2005).[16] However, if coalitions are not only common across African democracies, but also equally common in both presidential and non-presidential democracies, this suggests that even "big man" leaders in African presidential democracies see substantial value in building legislative support. Thus, in spite of the well-documented shortcomings in African party system institutionalization and legislative effectiveness, legislative parties seem to exert some influence over how leaders construct their governments.

Given that this is the first cross-national empirical study of government formation in African democracies, it is important to assess how this new information relates to existing research. While this dataset introduces a new set of considerations for those interested in African politics, it is not immediately obvious what the numbers in Table 2.3 can tell us about coalition formation in Africa compared to coalition formation elsewhere. In order to give a sense of how these percentages compare to existing research, the last two columns of Table 2.3 provide this same information about single-party and coalition governments for European democracies.[17] This comparison is not meant to imply that there is a normatively "correct" rate of partisan

[16]This emphasis on African leaders is well illustrated by the numerous studies of distributive politics that focus on the president or prime minister's favoritism of co-ethnics rather than considering the entire government (Wantchekon, 2003; Posner, 2005; Kramon and Posner, 2013; Carlson, 2015).

[17]Although I split the sample by presidential and non-presidential governments in African democracies, I do not compare presidential and non-presidential governments in Europe. This is because all European countries in the sample are non-presidential.

coalition formation, but simply to provide a reference for how the African data looks with respect to existing scholarship from European cases. The ample research on European governments also means that there are well-established expectations about the mechanisms that underpin government formation in democracies. This facilitates theory-building when one attempts to consider the implications of this existing scholarship for a new context, such as African democracies.

Table 2.3 shows that single-party governments form more frequently in Africa (90 governments, or 51%) than they do in Europe (195 governments, or 31%). This is not surprising, as many have discussed the prevalence of 'dominant' political parties in Africa (Bogaards, 2004; Erdmann and Basedau, 2008). When a party is dominant, it can form a majority government without forming a partisan coalition, and building up a legislative majority is one of the main purposes of a coalition government. Conversely, the legislatures of many European countries frequently fail to produce a single party with a definitive majority, meaning that they cannot securely build a majority government without support from one or more other parties. Despite the greater perceived "need" for partisan coalitions in European democracies, partisan coalitions are not rare in African democracies. The fact that coalitions form in 49% of African governments means that the inattention to the executive-legislative dynamics of government formation in African democracies may be affecting our understanding of African political institutions and their role in the consolidation of democracy.

2.3 Distinguishing Sub-types of Governments

Up until now, I have focused exclusively on the differences between single-party and coalition governments. However, not all single-party and coalition governments are created equal. In fact, it is common in government formation scholarship to differentiate between the different types of majority and minority governments that can form. Single-party governments can control either a majority or minority of legislative seats, depending on the party's legislative strength. A minority coalition can form if the parties in the coalition control only a minority share of legislative seats (two or more parties do not control 50% plus one legislative seats). There are two possible types of majority coalition: minimal winning coalitions and surplus coalitions. A minimal winning coalition (MWC) is a government coalition in which all parties in the coalition are necessary to maintain majority status – if a single party were to leave, the coalition would flip from majority to minority status. Surplus coalitions are those in which a coalition of parties contains parties that are superfluous – that is to say, at least one party could exit government coalition without causing the government to lose its majority of legislative seats.

In order to identify these specific types of government, one must have information about the number of legislative seats won by each party, and the exact parties that participated in the government.[18] As I discuss more extensively in Chapter 5, obtaining information about exactly which parties participated in each government at the time it was appointed is difficult for most African countries. There is no existing norm regarding the reporting of each minister's partisan affiliation, such as we might usually observe in write-ups about new governments in European democracies. What's more, the emphasis on strong leaders and weak parties in African democracies has meant that sources also have a tendency to report that a coalition government formed between the president's party, and "other small parties." With such vague

[18]Recall that independents and technocrats are not included as 'parties,' and that two or more parties must possess full-rank ministerial portfolios in order for a government to be counted as a coalition.

information, it is unclear whether the government is truly a partisan coalition, and if so, exactly which parties were members.[19]

Given the difficulties of collecting detailed information about government composition, I am not able to provide this information for all 176 governments I identify in my dataset.[20] The subset for which this information is available is shown in Table 2.4. I provide similar data for European governments in the last two columns to help contextualize this information for scholars who are more familiar with government formation literature from that region, and to illustrate the similarities and differences that the two regions exhibit.

While Table 2.3 could only tell us that 51% of governments were single-party governments, Table 2.4 shows that most of these governments are single-party *majority* governments, as opposed to single-party *minority* governments. Again, given what is known about the prevalence of dominant parties in Africa, it is not surprising that many of these dominant parties form a majority government on their own. This is also noteworthy because it suggests that when a single party lacks a majority, it does not usually form a government on its own. Given the emphasis on the supremacy of leadership in Africa, this is somewhat surprising. In the absence of a legislative majority, it appears that even powerful leaders see an interest in bringing other parties into the cabinet, thereby bolstering legislative support. The African results diverge somewhat

[19]This is particularly true given that many sources do not define partisan coalitions in line with the definition provided by scholars of government formation, and thus a reference to a 'coalition partner' may or may not refer to a party that also possessed a full-rank ministerial portfolio as well as legislative seats. In the absence of definitive information, I code governments as single-party. My data thus errs on the side of caution, and is likely an underestimate of the true number of partisan coalition governments that have formed.

[20]It is important to note that although I am unable to locate this information for all governments, I see nothing to suggest that the availability of information is in any way related to the type of cabinet. The haphazard reporting of detailed information on composition varies both from year to year in a single country, as well as across countries and time. I am nonetheless cautious in making broad claims about the data in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Cabinet Types in Africa (1990-2015) and Europe (1945-2010)

Cabinet Type	**Africa**		**Europe**	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Single-party minority	11	11%	118	19%
Minority coalition	8	8%	93	15%
Single-party majority	47	46%	77	12 %
Minimal winning coalition	7	7%	197	32%
Surplus majority coalition	29	28%	139	22%
Total	102	100%	624	100%

Note: Cabinet types are described in the text. African governments total 102 due to missing information about composition for some governments. Data for European governments from ERD 2014 Release 3.0 (Andersson, Bergman and Ersson, 2014). Counts are the raw number of governments in each category, while the percentages are out of the total number of governments listed in the last row of the table.

from the same results in Europe. MWCs are far less common in Africa than they are in Europe, where they are the most common type of government. While the sample size of African cabinets in Table 2.4 is considerably smaller than for Europe given the longer time period, we can nonetheless observe that there is a great deal of variation in both regions. This emphasizes the importance of better understanding government formation processes in African democracies, as well as executive-legislative relations more broadly.

In addition to examining governments by the type of majority or minority support they find in the legislature, we can also examine how long they last on average. Existing scholarship has suggested that single-party governments last the longest for the relatively straightforward reason that any tension regarding policy and office occurs under the umbrella of a single party. This same scholarship from Europe finds that MWCs last almost as long as single-party governments. Finally, European minority governments and surplus governments are the most short-lived. If we examine the average duration (in days) for African cabinets by type in Figure 2.2, we can readily observe interesting patterns. As expected, single-party majority governments still last the longest. In stark contrast with the European data, where MWCs are almost as durable as single-party majority governments, we see that MWCs in Africa are one of the *least* durable government types, second only to the very short-lived minority coalitions. Both types of single-party government seem to last the longest in African democracies, which provides some limited evidence that powerful leaders can sometimes afford to ignore their legislative standing.[21] Unlike the European cases where minority coalitions and surplus majorities are similarly brief in nature, the African cases suggest that surplus majority coalitions are relatively long-lasting, outlasting MWCs by nearly 100 days.[22]

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that despite conventional wisdom, partisan coalition governments are not rare in African democracies, nor are they ephemeral. African democratic governments display all of the variation that we observe in existing government formation scholarship, including the extensive scholarship on European democracies. The emphasis on powerful African leaders, combined with beliefs about weakly institutionalized political parties and ineffectual legislatures, has led many scholars to neglect the role that executive-legislative relations play in structuring politics in African democracies.

As I have shown, partisan coalitions form in 49% of the African governments I

[21]Given the small sample size, it is unwise to draw any strong conclusions. However, these cases are not dominated by presidential democracies or specific countries: In fact, six observations are from semi-presidential democracies (Madagascar, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zambia) while the other five are from presidential democracies (The Comoros, Ghana, and Malawi).

[22]In African democracies, MWCs last an average of 635 days, while surplus majority coalitions last an average of 728 days.

Figure 2.2: Average Government Duration by Cabinet Type, 1990-2015 (Days)



Note: Mean durations for each cabinet type are shown in days. Based on a sub-sample of the full data for which complete information about the composition of the government is known and cabinets that are not truncated by the end of the data collection process in 2015 (91 observations).

identify. I have endeavored to make my coding decisions and the scope of my dataset as transparent as possible, and I provide the first dataset that uses the government as the unit of observation for understanding characteristics of governments. This dataset shows both that coalitions are not particularly short-lived, and that their formation is not limited to non-presidential types of democracies. Furthermore, my data provide a conservative estimate of the prevalence of partisan coalitions – in the absence of compelling evidence that a partisan coalition formed, I report governments as single-parties. If anything, partisan coalitions are an even more commonplace feature of

African politics, and one which has received almost no empirical examination thus far.

My work extends that of scholars of Latin America's presidential democracies to show that partisan coalitions are a useful tool for leaders in *all* types of democracy. As I draw attention to the role that executive-legislative relations play in determining what governments form and what that means for political outcomes, I hope that future scholarship will pay greater attention to the government formation process and the effect in may have on other political phenomena.

Chapter 3

The Determinants of Coalition Formation

As the previous chapter illustrates, partisan coalition governments are a commonplace feature of democratic governments in Africa. Acknowledging that partisan coalitions occur regularly in African democracies represents a significant step forward in our understanding of government formation in Africa, but it also creates many new lines of inquiry. In this chapter, I build on this knowledge in order to ask a new question: *Why* do partisan coalition governments form in African democracies? Because I am interested in the strategic uses of partisan coalitions, I focus on how the composition of the legislature influences decisions about whether to form a partisan coalition.

I argue that, as is the case in other regions of the world, the most important factor influencing the emergence of a coalition government is the composition of the legislature. The composition of the legislature provides information about possible ways a leader can construct a majority support coalition, which is important for repelling challenges and consolidating support more broadly. When the leader's party lacks a majority of legislative seats, partisan coalitions become a useful strategy for shoring up support.

This argument contributes to the literature on African politics by addressing a topic that has largely been ignored by scholars. The weak institutionalization of African party systems and the perception that legislatures are also weak has led scholars to overlook the executive-legislative dynamics of the government formation process. Though African parties may lack clear programs and be largely organized around personalities—rather than left-right ideological divisions—the prevalence of partisan coalitions suggests that legislative parties play a role in the government formation process. The existing literature's focus on the president or prime minister, rather than on the partisan composition of the entire government, implicitly assumes that African leaders are so powerful as to render legislative support irrelevant.

I have mentioned previously that even powerful leaders recognize the value of building a legislative support coalition. Here, I argue that it is the complexity of the legislative environment that drives decisions about whether they should form a partisan coalition. In this chapter I show how African legislatures affect the type of government that forms, drawing on a literature that has primarily evolved in the context of European parliamentary democracies. I adapt this argument to the African context by identifying assumptions about party system institutionalization that are a part of the existing scholarship on government formation. After relaxing these assumptions, I show how government formation in Africa is broadly comparable to similar processes in Europe, although I also describe slightly different expectations about when coalitions will be the most valuable to leaders.

3.1 The Government Formation Process

Why do partisan coalitions form in African democracies? I argue that African leaders choose to form coalitions when they need to consolidate elite support. Most existing research focuses on how leaders build up popular support in the electorate, frequently leveraging ethnicity in order to do so (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005; Fridy, 2012; Ferree, 2010; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013; Casey, 2015). Instead, I concentrate on how leaders build up support among other political elites – specifically those whose parties win seats in the legislature. Leaders want to build support among other political elites because parties that are able to win legislative seats are parties that enjoy popular support in elections. The ability to win popular support can signal a potential challenge to the existing leadership. Whether leaders choose to co-opt these potential challengers as coalition partners or ignore them depends in large part on the composition of the legislature more generally. In this chapter, I show that African leaders frequently use coalitions to build up support when they do not control a majority in the legislature. However, a leader's willingness to use coalitions in this way is constrained by the comparatively weak institutionalization of African party systems. As I discuss in greater detail throughout this chapter, the nature of party systems in Africa changes the value of a coalition depending on the legislature's composition.

To make it clear why the composition of the legislature is so important to the government formation process, it is helpful to first describe the process by which governments typically form. The *formateur* is responsible for creating the government, either by deciding that the formateur party will receive all ministerial portfolios, or by convincing other parties to join them in forming a coalition government. In presidential democracies, the formateur party is the party of the president, and in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies this is typically (though not always) the leader of the largest legislative party.[1] If the formateur decides to build a coalition, the formateur bargains over policy and office with the leaders of legislative parties. Coalition partners use this bargaining process to ensure that some of their policy preferences are accommodated, and they also receive some elite office positions, usually ministerial portfolios, in exchange for their legislative support.

Why might leaders of legislative parties be willing to negotiate with the formateur? First, ministerial positions are valuable because they grant some degree of influence over the direction of policy in that particular ministry. For programmatic parties this is a major priority because, by definition, programmatic parties have policy preferences that they are committed to enacting. Second, ministerial portfolios are prestigious and provide access to resources. For particularistic parties, who care most about extracting resources for themselves and/or their constituents, ministerial portfolios provide a way to direct government resources to supporters (Wantchekon, 2003; Green, 2010; Burgess et al., 2015; Harding, 2015).[2]

Prestige, policy, and resources help explain why potential coalition partners would have reasons to work with the formateur – but why would a formateur willingly give up resources in order to form a coalition, rather than keeping everything for members of their own party? The main reason formateur parties choose to form coalitions is the need for legislative support.[3] Formateurs whose parties lack a majority of

[1] The party of the president is always in the government in a presidential democracy. The successful formateur in a non-presidential democracy becomes the prime minister.

[2] Of course, all parties are some combination of office-seeking and policy-seeking behaviors. Programmatic parties care about office because without it they cannot enact their policies, and most particularistic parties hold some views about policy issues.

[3] Many scholars have persisted in viewing partisan coalitions as exclusive to parliamentary democracies. As I discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have already demonstrated that this is not true in Latin American presidential democracies. My data show that there is no evidence that coalitions are restricted to any one type of democracy in Africa.

legislative support often see value in bringing other parties into their government in order to reinforce their legislative strength. Adding the voting power of another legislative party's legislators to the formateur's legislators can reinforce the perception of the leadership's strength, and also deter potential challengers. Furthermore, parties receive legislative seats because they were able to win votes. The ability to win votes is a credible indication of how much support a party enjoys in the broader population. This means that building a partisan coalition is not only a good way to co-opt potential elite opposition threats, but it can also help build popular support among voters.

Note that this description of the government formation process takes the elected legislature as the starting point. Features such as electoral rules and the mechanisms for converting votes to seat shares in the legislature are, as a result, already taken into account. There are undoubtedly many ways in which electoral processes affect which parties are viable, how they choose to run across the constituencies, and how their vote shares are translated into seat shares. While these processes raise interesting questions about who is able to win legislative representation in the first place, these questions are not the main focus of this dissertation. I am interested in understanding how parties, once they arrive in the legislature, affect the type of government that forms. By focusing on the relationships between the executive and the legislature, I am able to ask different questions about how these two institutions interact, and what it means for the types of government that form from these interactions. As a result I take the legislature as my starting point, and focus on how variation in the composition of the legislative parties produces variation in the probability that partisan coalition governments will form.

As previously discussed, one of the main reasons that formateurs consider coalition governments is a need to build up legislative support. When a formateur party lacks a legislative majority, the formateur can use a coalition to consolidate support in the legislature in exchange for sharing access to resources. This necessarily results in the cession of some resources and positions to members of other parties, but this sacrifice is justifiable because it helps consolidate elite support for the formateur. However, if the formateur party possesses a legislative majority on its own, it does not need to work with other parties in order to build a majority. In fact, a formateur party with majority control of the legislature would be giving up resources and positions to other parties that they, from a majority-building perspective, do not *have* to share. Because formateurs with legislative majorities are already well-supported, it is generally less clear what they receive in exchange from their potential coalition partners that they cannot already enjoy. As a result, I expect that single parties with a legislative majority will be less likely to form partisan coalitions, because they want to maximize their share of the resources that government positions can provide. This leads to the *Majority Party Hypothesis*:

> **Majority Party Hypothesis**: Coalition governments are always less likely when there is a majority party in the legislature.

The previous hypothesis underscores the most straightforward relationship between the legislature and the executive. To the extent that leaders care about maintaining legislative dominance, a single party with a legislative majority makes the government formation process fairly simple. A single party with a legislative majority typically has both the interest and the ability to govern alone. It should be able to enact its policies on the strength of its own legislators, and decision-making can be centralized under a single party's leadership. However, treating government formation as a simple dichotomy between majority and non-majority parties obscures the fact that not all non-majority party arrangements are equally likely to form a coalition government. Having discussed why coalitions are less likely to form when there is a majority party in the legislature, I now focus on differentiating non-majority party legislatures.[4]

3.2 Coalitions and Legislative Complexity

In the previous section I distinguish between legislatures that have a majority party and those that do not. This distinction alone is not sufficient to explain why non-majority party legislatures are not all equally likely to form coalition governments. I argue that coalition formation occurs as a result of differing levels of legislative complexity. I use the term 'legislative complexity' to describe the composition of a given legislature, including dimensions such as the number of parties with seats, the seat shares of each party, and also the seat shares relative to one another. The goal of differentiating levels of legislative complexity is to assess the characteristics of the bargaining environment in which governments form. In this section I explain how research on coalition formation has generally understood legislative complexity's role in government formation, and then I discuss some of the assumptions about party systems that are implicit in this scholarship. I then explain how our knowledge of the differences in African and European party systems can inform our expectations about the relationship between legislative complexity and the type of government that forms.

One way to categorize legislatures is in terms of the effort required to build a majority of legislative support. For example, a legislature with a majority party

[4]These are also described as "minority legislatures" in existing scholarship (Laver, 1998).

would be the least complex type of legislature, because there is a simple option for a leader interested in building up majority support in the form of a single-party majority government. As we move towards cases in which no party has a majority on its own, the legislature generally becomes more complex. Not all legislatures that lack a majority are equally complex, though. For example, a legislature with a party that can form a majority by partnering with any other party in the legislature is fundamentally less complex than a legislature in which the largest party must partner with at least two other parties in order to obtain a majority share of seats. As legislatures include more parties, the number of possible governments that *could* form increases. This also means that there are more possible majority coalitions, including majority coalitions that have three or more parties.

It follows that as a legislature becomes more complex, partisan coalitions should become more likely. This is because of the value placed on possessing support from a legislative majority. As the legislature moves away from a single-party majority and towards an arrangement where at least three parties must partner up in order to control a majority of the legislature, I expect partisan coalitions to have a higher probability of forming. This is the basic intuition that emerges from a long tradition of scholarship from European parliamentary democracies, and provides the basis for a general hypothesis about the government formation process. This logic produces what I call the *European Legislative Complexity Hypothesis:*

> **European Legislative Complexity Hypothesis**: The probability of a coalition government forming monotonically increases as legislative complexity increases.

I refer to this hypothesis as the "European" hypothesis because it draws on what we know from the government formation research in Europe. To the extent that we might expect that coalitions are valuable to African leaders for the same reason they are valuable to leaders in Europe or Latin America, it is reasonable to expect that the underlying intuition of the *European Legislative Complexity Hypothesis* holds. Indeed, as Chapter 2 shows, partisan coalitions are neither rare nor short-lived in African democracies, which suggests that leaders do find coalitions valuable.

However, the *European Legislative Complexity Hypothesis* is subject to assumptions about the level of party system institutionalization. I am concerned principally with the degree to which parties express programmatic goals, and the extent to which parties are disciplined. That is, to what extent do the party members, specifically the elected officials, follow the demands of party leaders? Party discipline is important to coalition formation because the main reason for including parties in a coalition is to build up one's legislative support. If parties cannot credibly commit the support of their members to the government, their usefulness as coalition partners decreases because formateurs cannot be sure that their partners will follow through when it comes to voting on policies. Similarly, the degree to which parties are programmatic is important to government formation because it provides a signal about whether the formateur needs to share ministerial power in order to win a party's support. Programmatic parties, such as those in European democracies, tend to be associated with particular policy goals, and thus care about receiving ministerial portfolios that allow them to enact their preferred policies. Parties that are more particularistic care more about access to resources and personal enrichment. As a result, a particularistic party may be more likely to accept rewards and influence other than a ministerial portfolio. If particularistic parties can be persuaded to vote with the government in exchange for rewards that are not ministerial portfolios, a formalized coalition government may not form.

Until now, it has not been necessary for scholars of government formation to explicitly note assumptions about party systems because most of this research has been restricted to European cases.[5] While there certainly exists variation in European party systems, it is not particularly unreasonable to assume that parties are relatively programmatic and well-disciplined. However, because I am interested in examining the process of government formation in a new context, it is important to consider whether these assumptions remain reasonable.

While a variety of questions are asked in the literature on African parties and party systems, none of these studies explicitly focus on understanding what the composition of parties in the legislature means for the government formation process. There is a general sense that leaders are too powerful to be constrained by weak political institutions, which has resulted in very little attention to government formation. Because of the perceived irrelevance of government formation processes broadly, it is unsurprising that scholars have also not considered the role that executive-legislative relations play in the type of governments that form. Scholars have focused instead on the parties and party systems, particularly opposition parties (Olukoshi, 1998; Kopecký and Mair, 2003; Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; Resnick, 2011), dominant parties, and how to understand the role each one plays in elections and democratic consolidation (van de Walle, 2003; Bogaards, 2004; Manning, 2005; Erdmann and Basedau, 2008; Riedl, 2014). The consensus that emerges from most of this research is that African political parties are not programmatic in the traditional sense (van de Walle, 2003; Bogaards, 2004; Manning, 2005; Bleck and van de Walle, 2012), party-switching and volatility are common (Rakner, Svåsand and Khembo, 2007; Rakner and van de

[5]Party systems in Latin America have also generally been viewed as better institutionalized than those in Africa, in part perhaps because of their longer experience with democracy (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).

Walle, 2009; Ferree, 2010; Goeke and Hartmann, 2011; Resnick, 2011; Young, 2014), and legislatures are extremely weak (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Manning, 2005; Rakner and van de Walle, 2009).[6]

As I stated before, the two major elements of party system institutionalization that affect coalition formation are levels of party discipline, and particularism. In a sense, particularism is an explanation about the supply side of a story about coalition formation, because the degree to which parties prefer particularistic goods or ministerial portfolios determines their interest in joining a formalized government coalition. Party discipline addresses the demand side of coalition formation, because the formateur party only wants to include other parties in government to the extent that they are credibly committing to vote with the leadership's policies.

In order to see how the supply side story about particularism affects coalition formation across levels of legislative complexity, we need to consider what a party's size in the legislature can tell us about its motivations. A legislature containing fewer parties suggests that parties are able to appeal to broad enough constituencies to win substantial numbers of seats. These parties are most likely to be interested in ministerial portfolios, because it is through the provision of larger public works projects that they will best be able to serve larger constituencies. A legislature with many smaller parties suggests that voters may be less able to coordinate their voting efforts. This could be for a variety of reasons, but one is that voters in low-information environments with low levels of literacy, such as in rural African districts, may find it more difficult to coordinate across larger geographical areas (Rozenas

[6]Some scholars have discussed the considerable variance in the autonomy of African legislatures (Barkan and Matiangi, 2009; Adamolekun and Laleye, 2009; Lindberg and Zhou, 2009; Barkan, 2009*b*; Brierley, 2012), and others have explicitly called for increased attention to legislatures and legislative parties (Barkan, 2008; Opalo, 2012). In any event, the consensus is that legislatures in Africa are generally less influential than legislatures in other regions.

and Sadanandan, 2018).[7] Given that it is costly to reach these populations from far away, there are two types of parties likely to win support in these areas: the incumbent party of the leader, which can use its resources to get out the vote; or smaller, localized parties. This implies that when we see many small parties entering a legislature, as in a highly complex legislative environment, they are more likely to be supported by geographically compact populations. Small parties lack the pre-electoral credibility of larger parties, meaning that they are likely to rely on promises of targeted spending and patronage networks in order to get enough support to win legislative representation (Keefer, 2007). This, in turn, means that these small parties are more likely to accept particularistic payoffs from the formateur party than larger, more established parties.

African parties are widely seen as clientelistic, rather than programmatic (van de Walle, 2003; Bogaards, 2004).[8] In particularistic parties, prestige and access to resources are often seen as the principal reasons for seeking office (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Wantchekon, 2003; Manning, 2005), which can also be translated into motives for joining a coalition government. Thus, as parties become smaller and more particularistic because of the nature of their constituencies, formateurs may find that it is less costly to negotiate with individual party members for specific perks. Put another way, when parties are small and motivated by resources rather than policy considerations, it is possible to earn their allegiance by offering prestigious job placements, promises of projects in home districts, and other non-ministerial rewards. This allows the government to trade prestige and resources in exchange for support from specific legislators, rather than negotiating with a party's leadership for a diffuse re-

[7] Rozenas and Sadanandan (2018) are interested in examining this information and literacy story in the context of coordination failures in plurality voting systems in India. However, the general idea that illiteracy and low information restricts large-scale voting coordination is applicable here.

[8] I use the terms clientelism and particularism interchangeably.

ward in the form of a few ministerial portfolios. This is practical for the formateur party, which can then retain additional ministries for its own supporters, rather than being forced to give some up to appease partners (Kellam, 2015).

The demand side story about party discipline is relatively straightforward. Formateur parties seek support from other legislative parties because they want those other legislators to vote in favor of their agenda. In order for this to work as expected, party leadership must be able to enforce voting behavior in the legislature, and sanction members of the party who fail to vote as instructed. However, the fact that African party systems are generally seen as weakly institutionalized, combined with party-switching and electoral volatility, suggests that parties are not particularly well-disciplined (Ferree, 2010). If members of legislative parties can disobey their party leadership and suffer few consequences, the value of their party as coalition partners is diminished. If the formateur gives up policy influence and the resources associated with ministerial portfolios, they expect that, in exchange, they can count on their coalition partners to vote for the government's preferred policies. If if is unclear whether legislative support is enduring, formateurs are less likely to be interested in giving up significant influence and resources in the form of ministerial portfolios.

I expect that particularism and weak party discipline are correlated with legislative complexity. This is largely due to the nature of small parties, which increase in number as legislative complexity increases. Because they serve smaller populations, I expect that they are less well organized than larger, national parties with established hierarchies, meaning that they are less disciplined on the whole. I also expect that the geographic concentration of their support makes them more likely to prefer particularistic payoffs, rather than ministerial portfolios, for the reasons discussed before. Thus, existing research on African political parties suggests that the assumptions from European government formation literature may not be realistic. As a result, the expected relationship between legislative composition and the type of government that forms in the context of African democracies may not be identical.

While the violation of basic assumptions in the existing government formation literature requires us to modify our expectations, it does not require us to completely abandon existing theory. For example, in the least complex legislatures where a single party controls a majority of legislative seats, both African and European formateurs have fewer incentives to build a coalition government. Once no party controls a majority on its own, the incentives to build a coalition begin to increase in both regions as well. This is because at intermediate levels of complexity, I expect that African parties are still somewhat disciplined, and particularism is not yet so overpowering as to completely undermine the incentives that leaders have to build formalized legislative majorities. Where the European and African cases diverge is in the case of the most complex legislatures. While the value of forming a coalition is increasing monotonically over increasing levels of legislative complexity in Europe, I expect that the value of coalitions in Africa begins to diminish once some threshold of legislative complexity is reached. That is, once there are large numbers of legislative parties with particularistic interests and weak party discipline, I expect that it becomes less valuable for formateurs to negotiate with party leaders. In these cases, as I alluded to before, it becomes easier for formateurs to negotiate with individual legislators, exchanging various prizes other than ministerial posts for support in legislative matters. As a result of these ad hoc exchanges, we are less likely to see the formateur party share ministerial portfolios, which by definition means that we will observe fewer formalized partisan coalitions. This logic produces the final hypothesis for this chapter:

African Legislative Complexity Hypothesis: The probability of a coalition government forming first increases with legislative complexity, then decreases.

By thinking about the specific contextual features of African politics, we can expand hypotheses developed in other contexts, while remaining mindful of the assumptions implicit in these existing arguments. Recognizing that existing theories of government formation originating in Europe take institutionalized party systems for granted leads me to think critically about how the process of government formation is affected by weak party system institutionalization. In the next section, I explain how I operationalize the various concepts needed to test empirical support for my hypotheses, and demonstrate that the composition of the legislature has practical implications for the types of governments that form.

3.3 Empirical Analysis

In addition to the data on African governments introduced at length in Chapter 2, I use three measures of legislative complexity to test support for these hypotheses. The first operationalization of legislative complexity is a simple dichotomous indicator of the presence of a majority legislative party. The second is the effective number of legislative parties (ENLP). The third is a categorical typology developed by Laver and Benoit (2015) to capture the dynamics of legislative competition as they relate to the government formation process.

3.3.1 Majority Parties and Coalition Formation

I begin by examining empirical support for the *Majority Party Hypothesis*. In this hypothesis, I am interested in the most basic understanding of the factors driving coalition government formation: whether there is a single legislative party that controls a majority of seats. As discussed, the impetus for coalition formation is the leader's desire to ensure majority legislative support in order to consolidate power and pass policies. A single party possessing a legislative majority should have fewer reasons to form a coalition because they already control the majority of the legislature. In order to examine support for this argument empirically, I construct the dependent variable, *coalition*, to reflect whether a partisan coalition government formed. I next construct the independent variable, *majority party*, a binary indicator for whether a party controls a simple majority of legislative seats. I define a majority of legislative seats as 50% plus one.[9] In line with my theoretical story, I expect that the presence of a single party majority will have a strongly negative effect on coalition formation.

I use a difference in proportions test to compare the share of coalitions forming when there is (or is not) a majority party in the legislature. The results for African democracies indicate that there is a statistically significant difference in the proportions, and that not having a majority party makes the formation of a government coalition significantly more likely. In situations where there is no majority party, the proportion of coalitions forming is 0.71 [0.61,0.81].[10] However, when a majority party does exist in the legislature, the proportion of coalitions forming drops to 0.32 [0.22, 0.41].[11] These results are consistent with the theoretical mechanism, which points to the diminished necessity of coalition formation in the case of a single-party legislative

[9]Scholars have dedicated considerable discussion to the idea of party "dominance," including a single party possessing anywhere from 45% to 70% of legislative seats (Bogaards, 2004). I am concerned primarily with the need for a simple majority of legislative support in order to dissuade challengers and pass most legislation, hence my use of the most basic definition of a majority, rather than a more subjective focus on "dominance."

[10]95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets.

[11]I also ran an interactively specified logistic regression to examine whether the effect of having a majority party differs across presidential and non-presidential democracies. There was no statistical difference between the two types of democracy.

majority.[12]

3.3.2 Legislative Complexity as the 'Effective Number of Legislative Parties'

In order to evaluate empirical support for the *European Legislative Complexity Hypothesis* and the *African Legislative Complexity Hypothesis*, I use two additional measures of legislative complexity. The first is the effective number of legislative parties (ENLP), and the second is a categorical typology of legislatures developed by Laver and Benoit (2015). I use multiple operationalizations to capture legislative complexity in order to demonstrate that my results are robust to some of the common measures used in studies of legislatures, both in Africa and elsewhere. Given that African leaders have long been seen as the main actors, studies of the government formation process have been sparse. By thinking about legislative complexity both as a continuum, and as something that can change over time, I seek to illustrate how legislative dynamics have played a role in executive composition over time.

The first way I measure legislative complexity is by using the effective number of legislative parties. This is frequently employed to measure fragmentation in party systems (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979; Tavits, 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Ferree, 2010). This measure uses Laakso's formula, which is one divided by the sum of all legislative parties' seat shares squared. The formula is shown in Equation 3.1, where N is the *Effective Number off Legislative Parties*, i is each party that has legislative seats (i through n), and p_i is the share of total legislative seats belonging

[12] Although my hypothesis does not specifically address majority parties in Europe, readers may be interested to know that the results are substantively similar: In situations where there is no majority party in Europe the proportion of coalitions forming is 0.78 [0.74,0.81]. This is contrasted with the proportion of coalitions that form when there is a majority party, which is 0.23 [0.15,0.31].

to party i:

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2} \tag{3.1}$$

Recall that my research question does not pertain to electoral competition, nor does it extend to how that competition leads votes to be translated into legislative seats. Instead, I am interested in how parties interact with the formateur in the context of government formation *after* they win legislative representation. By focusing on the effective number of legislative parties, I am tailoring my measurement to legislative composition and complexity, explicitly examining how the effective number of legislative parties affects the type of government that forms.

The *European Legislative Complexity Hypothesis* states that the probability of a coalition forming should increase monotonically across levels of legislative complexity, because as a legislature becomes more complex, the incentives to form a coalition will never decrease. However, the theory underlying this hypothesis relies on assumptions about parties being both programmatic and disciplined. Explicitly taking account of these assumptions means that the expectations for African democracies, where more complex legislatures signal party indiscipline and more particularistic parties, lead to the expectations outlined in the *African Legislative Complexity Hypothesis.* This hypothesis states that the probability of forming a coalition first increases as legislatures become more complex, then decreases because high levels of complexity in the legislature suggest that parties are less disciplined and can be bought off with particularistic goods. Equation 3.2 outlines the model used to test the relationship between ENLP and the likelihood that a government coalition forms in both Africa and Europe:

$$Coalition = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ENLP + \beta_2 ENLP^2 + \epsilon \tag{3.2}$$

For the European democracies, I expect that β_1 should be positive, and the coefficient on β_2 should be zero. This would produce the hypothesized monotonically increasing relationship for European democracies. In the African democracies, I expect β_1 will be positive and β_2 will be negative, as this indicates a relationship between coalition formation and legislative complexity that first increases and then decreases.

Because the dependent variable for whether a coalition government formed is binary, I employ logistic regression for this analysis. The results for the logistic regressions are shown in Table 3.1. For the sample of European governments, the coefficient on ENLP is positive and significant. The coefficient for ENLP^2 is substantively small, and does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. This provides support for the *European Legislative Complexity Hypothesis*, which states that increasing legislative complexity monotonically increases the probability that a coalition forms. For the sample of African governments the results show that the coefficient for ENLP in African democracies is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient on the squared term is negative and also statistically significant. This means that, as predicted by the hypothesis, the probability that a coalition government forms increases, then begins to decrease as legislative complexity increases. This provides empirical support for the *African Legislative Complexity Hypothesis*: African formateurs have incentives to build coalitions in order to obtain legislative support for their policy agenda at intermediate levels of legislative complexity, but extremely high levels of legislative complexity reduce incentives for the formateur to build a coalition in African democracies. This is consistent with the the theory that weak party discipline and high levels of particularism make coalitions less valuable to formateurs when legislative complexity is high.[13]

Table 3.1: Legislative Complexity and Coalition Government Formation in Africa (1990-2015) and Europe (1945-2010)

	Africa	Europe
ENLP	2.88**	1.59**
	(0.67)	(0.37)
ENLP^2	-0.30**	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.04)
Constant	-5.13**	-3.81**
	(1.11)	(0.74)
Log likelihood	-101.17	-321.37
N	176	624

* indicates $p < 0.05$; ** indicates $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Note: The dependent variable is binary, and is coded 1 if a government coalition formed. ENLP is the *Effective Number of Legislative Parties.* Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. European data from ERD 2014 "Release 3.0" (Andersson, Bergman and Ersson, 2014).

To facilitate the interpretation of Table 3.1, Figure 3.1 illustrates the predicted

[13] I employ several alternate model specifications to examine the robustness of the relationship between legislative complexity and coalition formation. The first is clustering by country, given that governments forming in each country are unlikely to be entirely independent from one another. There is some disagreement about the minimum number of clusters (Wooldridge, 2003; Arcenaux and Nickerson, 2009), but clustering on the 25 countries in this data has no effect on the results. The results are also robust to alternative specifications including cluster-robust bootstrapped standard errors, fixed effects, and random effects. I also use jackknife procedures to ensure that no one country or government is driving my empirical results. This procedure recalculates the model excluding each government, or alternatively each country, and I find that the results are robust to these procedures. It is thus unlikely that the results in Table 3.1 are an artifact of any specific governments or countries. I also examine common measures of model fit to ensure that the model including the quadratic term is performing better than the model without it. A basic likelihood ratio test indicates that the model including the quadratic term is superior, and the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC curve) is also larger for the quadratic model than it is for the model without the quadratic term. In terms of percent correctly predicted, we see that the model without the quadratic term correctly predicts about 63% of observations, while the quadratic model increases that number to nearly 72%.

Figure 3.1: Predicted Probability of Coalition Formation (Africa)



Note: The horizontal axis is the effective number of legislative parties, and vertical axis on the right is the predicted probability of a coalition government forming. The solid line represents the predicted probability of coalition formation across levels of the effective number of legislative parties. The dotted lines around it are the 95% confidence intervals. Behind the plot, the histogram indicates the percentage of observations grouped by the effective number of legislative parties; the axis on the left shows those percentages.

probability of a coalition government forming in Africa. The solid black line shows the predicted probability, surrounded by dotted lines that show the 95% confidence intervals (right axis). The histogram shows the percentage of observations, grouped by the ENLP (left axis). As predicted by the *African Legislative Complexity Hypothesis*, the probability of a partisan coalition government forming first increases and then decreases as the ENLP increases. Coalition government formation is most likely when the ENLP is about 4.76. To provide some indication of where specific countries tend to cluster, I provide a few examples. Botswana has an ENLP value ranging from about 1.4 to 1.9, and never forms a government coalition. Conversely, Kenya has an ENLP that spans 3.5 to 5, and frequently forms partisan coalition governments.

In addition to evaluating the strength of this relationship with regards to methodological considerations, I also address potential substantive concerns. As I first described in Chapter 2, many scholars believe that colonial institutions have the ability to influence contemporary political dynamics. As a result, I consider the possibility that political norms reinforced during the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods could have an effect on the formation of coalition governments. Typically such stories hinge on arguments made about the levels of direct or indirect rule employed by colonizers. I examined the possibility that my results were in some way related to the legacy of colonial power-sharing institutions by incorporating several alternative specifications of binary colonizer indicators designed to capture these dynamics. The results are robust to the inclusion of binary indicators for colonization by the British, French, and direct rule (categorized as Portuguese or French rule). None of these indicators achieved statistical significance, and the results for legislative complexity were both substantively and statistically unchanged. These findings suggest that despite the probable influences of the colonial period on African politics more generally, these dynamics do not appear to play a major role in the politics of government formation in the contemporary period.

I also examine whether there is a systematic difference in the probability of a coalition forming based on the timing of government formation with respect to elections. There are two categories of ways in which election timing could affect the relationship between legislative composition and government formation, each with a different methodological solution. It may be that the probability of a coalition forming as a legislature becomes more complex is increasing at a different rate when an election has just been held than when no election has just been held. For example, if elections are hotly contested, we might expect to see more coalition governments post-elections, resulting from a desire to build unity.[14] To account for this possibility, I rerun the models in Table 3.1 as interactively specified models that incorporate a binary indicator variable for whether elections have just been held.[15] I test these interactive models using three different indicators for the type of election: any election, a presidential election (where applicable), or a legislative election. The results suggest that there is no statistical evidence that any type of election affects the probability that a coalition forms.

The second way that election timing could affect this relationship is if conditions surrounding an election, such as electoral violence or unrest, affect whether a coalition government forms. I rerun these same models, now including the indicators for types of election additively in separate models. This allows me to examine whether the conditions surrounding elections have an effect on the outcome of the government formation process. The coefficient on the variable for governments formed after any election is insignificant, as is the coefficient on the indicator for governments forming after a presidential election. The coefficient on the indicator for governments forming immediately after a legislative election, however, is positive and weakly statistically significant. This provides some tentative support for the claim that the environment after legislative elections favors coalition-building in the government. Since legislative elections provide a clear signal about current levels of support for different legislative

[14] Readers may recognize the term "government of national unity," which is often used by governments in Africa as a sort of public relations tactic to encourage public unity after difficult elections. Whether this strategy has any meaningful effect on popular opinion is unclear.

[15] See Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and Berry, Golder and Milton (2012) for more detailed explanations of the nature of interactive hypotheses, as well as the proper way to test them.

parties, it is reasonable to expect that this type of information may make leaders more likely to form a coalition. Large swings in seat share can lead to new dynamics in executive-legislative relations, particularly if a formateur party is revealed to be weakened. However, this result is weak, and is not particularly robust to alternative model specifications. This suggests that while the timing of legislative elections may affect coalition formation, it is not the primary mechanism affecting government formation outcomes.

These results using the ENLP indicate that there is empirical support for the theoretical story about coalition formation in African democracies. However, the ENLP has been criticized for its inability to account for dominant parties (Bogaards, 2004), as well as the fact that similar values for the effective number of legislative parties can mask considerable variation in the composition of the legislature. Given the frequency with which majority parties form, and the fact that it is these types of differences in legislative composition that I argue influence government formation, I further test the strength of this relationship using an alternate measure of legislative complexity.

3.3.3 Legislative Complexity as 'Legislative Arithmetic'

To illustrate one of the major shortcomings of the ENLP measure, I focus on its inability to distinguish cases with a majority legislative party from those without one. For example, take the case of the two governments shown in Table 3.2. In Malawi, the DPP party controls 113 out of a total of 193 legislative seats. This represents a majority of legislative seats. Conversely, in Sao Tome and Principe, the largest party controls 27 out of 55 seats, which represents a plurality, rather than a majority, of legislative seats. These two legislatures, despite this important difference in seat shares, have ENLP values of approximately 2.70.

Table 3.2: Comparing Legislative Variation and the Effective Number of Legislative Parties (ENLP)

(a) Malawi (7)

Party	Seats
DPP	113
MCP	27
UDF	17
AFORD	1
MAFUNDE	1
MPP	1
Independents	33
Total seats	193

(b) Sao Tome and Principe (6)

Party	Seats
MLSTP-PSD	27
ADI	14
PCD-GR	14
Total seats	55

Note: The Malawi government listed here is coded as Malawi Cabinet 7 (June 2009-August 2011), and the Sao Tome and Principe government is coded as Sao Tome and Principe Cabinet 6 (November 1996-November 1998). The Malawi government and the Sao Tome and Principe governments both have an effective number of legislative parties score of approximately 2.7. As illustrated here, in the case of Malawi, a single party (the DPP) possesses a majority of legislative seats. In the case of Sao Tome and Principe, however, the MLSTP-PSD has a plurality of seats, but falls short of a majority.

To address the ENLP's inability to distinguish different types of legislative dynamics, I turn to the categorical typology of legislatures derived by Laver and Benoit (2015). This typology is specifically designed to take account of different configurations of parties and seat shares in the legislatures, and then classify them into five mutually exclusive and exhaustive types based on their legislative bargaining characteristics. This typology explicitly accounts for the presence of a majority party in the legislature, which addresses one of the key shortcomings of other measures of legislative fractionalization. It is also superior to the Sartori (1976) classification favored by some scholars (Bogaards, 2004; Erdmann and Basedau, 2008) because it focuses specifically on classifying dynamics in the legislature that affect the bargaining process, rather than classifying types of party systems.[16]

Laver and Benoit (2015) determine that there are five broad types of legislative configuration. Each party, P_i, has a share of seats, designated as S_i. P_1 has the largest share of seats, and parties are arranged in descending shares to P_n. A simple majority (50% of seats plus one), denoted W, is the quantity of interest because it is often sufficient to control the legislature. In this model, a 'successful' government proposal must include greater than or equal to W seats.[17]

The first type of legislature, Type A, is defined by a single party winning at least a simple majority of seats ($S_1 \geq W$). This party is almost always the formateur, meaning that the party of the president or the prime minister has a majority in the legislature without needing to form a coalition. This is the system most commonly described in the literature on parties and party system institutionalization in African politics, where there is a widespread tendency for a single party to emerge as "dominant," surrounded by a multitude of smaller parties (Kopecký and Mair, 2003; van de Walle, 2003; Rakner and van de Walle, 2009).

In Type B party systems, there is a "strongly dominant" party. The party is strongly dominant because despite its size, it does not possess a single-party majority, and thus cannot form a successful government proposal on its own ($S_1 < W$). While it cannot form a majority government on its own, it *must* be a member of any two-party

[16]Sartori's classification, even with a qualitative assessment included to distinguish 'blackmail potential,' does not permit the nuance that Laver and Benoit's typology of legislatures can provide to an analysis of government formation. This is because Sartori is interested in classifying party systems, not bargaining dynamics. Thus the main categories distinguish on the basis of regime type, and then subset by five or more legislative parties, or the presence of a majority party. As I will illustrate, Laver and Benoit (2015) uses bargaining dynamics to formalize the categories of legislature, making the coding decisions replicable and more broadly generalizable.

[17]This model of legislatures was developed in the context of European non-presidential democracies. As shown in Chapter 2, coalitions are as likely to form in presidential democracies as they are non-presidential democracies in Africa, so I consider this framework to be applicable to presidential and non-presidential democracies alike. Robustness checks indicate that the type of democracy does not condition (or alter) any of the effects reported in the tables and figures.

winning coalition ($S_1 + S_2 \geq W$ and $S_1 + S_3 \geq W$). However, in order to exclude P_1 (the largest party), P_2 and P_3 would have to join forces with at least one additional party ($S_2 + S_3 < W$). This means that P_1 has a privileged bargaining position – it can always tempt either P_2 or P_3 away from a three-party coalition by making them a better offer in a two-party coalition.[18]

A Type C system is called a "top-three party system." In this scenario, any pair of the three largest parties can form a minimal winning coalition ($S_1 + S_2 \geq W$, $S_1 + S_3 \geq W$, and $S_2 + S_3 \geq W$). It follows that any coalition that excludes two of the three largest parties will be losing. In fact, it is also true that no matter how many parties there are in the legislature, only the top three can make or break a winning coalition. These top three parties are known as "pivotal" parties, defined as a party whose departure from a winning coalition transforms it into a losing coalition. Similarly, Type D systems are "top-two party systems," in which the only two-party minimal winning coalition is a coalition of the two largest parties ($S_1 + S_2 \geq W$, but $S_1 + S_3 < W$). As a result of this configuration of seat shares, any winning coalition must contain either P_1 or P_2 (or both).

Finally, Type E encompasses "open systems." In an open party system, there is no two-party winning coalition. In effect, $S_1 < W/2$ is a sufficient condition for an open party system. Open party systems also imply that the number of parties must be at least five. In this configuration, even the largest party is forced to work with a coalition of parties in order to attain a majority in the legislature. Because

[18] A subtype of Type B is what Laver and Benoit (2015) call a "system dominant" party. In this special case, denoted as Type B*, P_1 cannot win alone ($S_1 < W$), but it can form a minimal winning coalition with *any* other party in the legislature. Conversely, any winning coalition that excludes P_1 would have to contain every other party in the legislature. This subtype is theoretically interesting because it provides a level of flexibility in coalition bargaining that is fairly rare in many parliamentary democracies. This type is particularly flexible and powerful in African democracies, given that there are rarely ideological hurdles to coalition formation. While these might seem rather unlikely, they in fact do form in a handful of African governments.

of the fragmented nature of Type E, these are the cases in which I expect African formateurs may choose not to form formalized coalitions. Given that at least five parties are required for this type of system, I argue that particularism is likely to be higher, and party discipline is likely to be lower. Smaller parties, as we would expect to find in legislatures with five or more parties, are likely to have more localized voter support, making them more subject to particularistic considerations. Large numbers of legislative parties also suggests weaker party system institutionalization, which suggests that it is harder for parties to discipline their members and make credible commitments to the formateur about voting.

Essentially, as one moves from a Type A system to a Type E system the legislative environment becomes more complex. This is because moving away from a single-party dominant system means there are fewer clear expectations about who, precisely, might be included in the government. The level of legislative complexity helps explain why the presence of strong opposition parties may not always result in coalition formation in African democracies. While two countries may have similarly well-developed opposition parties, the presence of a strongly dominant party needing just one partner (Type B) in the bargaining environment may encourage the formation of coalitions in one case, while a fragmented open system (Type E) may discourage coalition formation because it signals a lack of party discipline, and high levels of particularism.

The probability of a coalition forming by these five legislative types is shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2a shows the probability of a coalition forming by legislative type in African democracies, moving from least complex to most complex legislative type. Consistent with the results from the models using ENLP, the probability of a coalition forming increases over intermediate ranges of legislative complexity, before decreasing

Figure 3.2: Probability of Coalition Formation by Legislative Type, African and European Democracies

(a) African Democracies



(b) European Democracies



Note: Type A is a Dominant Party, Type B is a Strongly Dominant Party, Type C is a Top-Three system, Type D is a Top-2 system, and Type E is an Open System. Probabilities come from the proportions in the binary *Coalition* variable.

in the most complex legislatures (Type E). This is in line with the expectations outlined by the *African Legislative Complexity Hypothesis*. Figure 3.2b shows the probability of a coalition forming by legislative type in European democracies, and also provides additional support for the *European Legislative Complexity Hypothesis*. These results, in addition to matching the theoretical expectations outlined in the hypotheses, are also consistent with the results presented in Table 3.1 that rely on the ENLP.

The results using the legislative typology provide support for my argument about the way that underlying assumptions about party system institutionalization affect the government formation process. When parties are well-disciplined and programmatic, the value of ministerial portfolios does not decrease as legislatures grow more complex – which we see in the monotonically increasing probability of a partisan coalition forming in the European governments. When we relax these implicit assumptions about party systems to allow parties to be more particularistic and less disciplined, we see that the value of coalitions evolves over different levels of legislative complexity. Using both measures of legislative complexity, coalitions become more likely to form in African democratic governments up until a certain point, and then their value decreases. I argue that this decrease is due to a lack of party discipline that makes them less credible as coalition partners, and increased levels of particularism that make it more advantageous for the formateur to negotiate individual deals with legislators, rather than with their party leadership.

3.4 Conclusion

Ultimately, government formation is a story about who gets into power, and how they build alliances to stay there. Despite the vast literature on government formation in Europe and Latin America, very little is known about the partisan composition of governments in African democracies. In this chapter, I show that when we build on existing theories of government formation it becomes clear that legislative composition matters for the type of government that forms in African democracies. However, I show that existing theories make implicit assumptions about the level of party system institutionalization, and it is important to address these assumptions theoretically. When we allow for less institutionalized party systems, the value of coalitions changes as legislatures grow more complex. This leads African formateurs to pursue different strategies to ensure legislative support once parties are too weakly disciplined to be reliable coalition partners.

This chapter provides clear evidence that political institutions matter in African democracies. Existing scholarship on African politics has often emphasized the power of African leaders at the expense of other political institutions like parties and legislatures. As a consequence, scholars have largely failed to consider the fact that strong leaders may also see advantages to forming partisan coalitions in order to consolidate power and deter potential challengers. I show that it is not sufficient to consider political institutions in isolation – the leader's decision about forming a coalition government is influenced by conditions in the legislature, and not all legislative arrangements are equally likely to result in coalitions. The small but growing literature on African legislatures emphasizes their role in institutional development, and there is a growing consensus that strong legislatures are important to democratization (Barkan, 2009*a*; LeVan and Assenov, 2015), and any increase in the strength of the legislature requires concessions in the strength of the leadership (Barkan, 2009*a*, 234).

Understanding what motivates parties and whether they can be disciplined by party leadership matters for government formation because it illuminates both reasons why parties may be motivated to join coalition governments, and also addresses concerns formateurs may have about including them as partners. In the next chapter, I consider the characteristics of the government that actually forms at each government opportunity, out of all of the possible governments that *could* have formed. This helps to expand our understanding not only of why coalitions form, but why a *specific* coalition forms, instead of any of the others.

Chapter 4

Which Government Forms?

Out of all the potential governments that could form, which government *does* form? Scholars have long asked questions about the characteristics that make parties more likely to join some governments, and less likely to join others. While the total number of possible governments is determined by the number of legislative parties, in reality, there are far fewer governments that are *likely* to form. In this chapter, I focus on the factors that make some governments more likely than others.

Most existing scholarship focuses exclusively on governments in "minority legislatures," or those legislatures in which no single party wins a majority of seats (Laver, 1998; Martin and Stevenson, 2001). However, as Glasgow and Golder (2013) note, there is no theoretical argument or empirical evidence that justifies ignoring "majority" legislatures, and indeed there is some evidence that even single parties with legislative majorities sometimes see fit to form a coalition government (Laver and Schofield, 1990). As I have discussed in previous chapters, single-party majorities occur frequently in African democracies. Given the lack of existing existing theoretical justification for excluding majority legislatures, I choose to include African government formation opportunities with majority legislatures.[1] We can consider characteristics of these government formation opportunities empirically, as we do with all other types of potential governments in minority legislatures. As a result, this chapter is distinguishable from much of the existing scholarship not only because of its focus on African government formation, but also in the decision to include majority parties in the analyses.[2]

In order to address questions about the characteristics of parties and coalitions that make some governments more probable than others, it is not enough to know which government actually formed: I also need to know about all of the other possible governments that *could* have formed, but did not. In this chapter, I examine how existing arguments about the effect of government size, ideology, and institutional factors change the likelihood that a particular government forms. I also explain how, empirically, I create an expanded dataset with observations of all possible governments, and I also describe some of the methodological problems that I can solve by incorporating recent innovations in the way scholars study these questions. I show that, as expected, potential governments are more likely to form if they include a single-party with a legislative majority. Relatedly, I also show that governments that include the largest legislative party are more likely to form. Finally, I show that the party of the incumbent head of government is more likely to be a member of the next government that forms in presidential democracies, but this is not the case in parliamentary democracies.

[1] This amounts to about half of the government formation opportunities in my subsequent analyses.

[2] There are some noteworthy exceptions to this tendency to drop data without theoretical cause; for example, Glasgow and Golder (2013) include majority party legislatures in their joint analysis of the choice of formateur and coalition.

4.1 Theory

The matter of "who gets in", or which parties enter which governments, has been the source of many theoretical and empirical studies (Laver and Schofield, 1990; Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Glasgow, Golder and Golder, 2012; Glasgow and Golder, 2015). Broadly speaking, much of this work can be classed into three overarching topics: ideological considerations, size considerations, and institutional considerations. For each topic I first discuss the existing literature, which is mostly focused on industrialized, parliamentary democracies. I then discuss what these theories might mean in the context of African democracies, and lay out some hypotheses that are derived from this discussion.

4.1.1 Ideological Arguments

Several of the theories that pertain to government formation focus on the ideological priorities of the potential coalition partners. The intuition is that parties with similar policy preferences are more likely to enter into coalitions together (Warwick, 1994), and that ideological diversity may also lead to more minority coalitions (Laver and Schofield, 1990). Much of the literature from Europe also focuses on the important role played by the median party (Laver and Schofield, 1990; Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Glasgow and Golder, 2015).

The application of this theoretical and empirical work on the role of ideology in the government formation process to the context of Africa's democracies is constrained by a few key factors. First, the existing scholarship on African political parties does not generally see them as programmatic in nature (Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Salih, 2003; Riedl, 2014; Young, 2014). Though some work has argued that ideological considerations do play a strategic role for African parties (Bleck and van de Walle, 2012; Elischer, 2012; Mueller, Forthcoming) it is not yet clear that parties are systematically programmatic across a cross-national sample of party systems. Second, rather than ideology in the traditional sense, many scholars of African politics discuss conflicts between the "ruling party" and "opposition parties." As I discuss in other chapters, the word "opposition" is often used merely to designate between the president's party and other parties, rather than as I use it here to describe which parties are not participating in the government at a specific time. This means that some scholarship, and certainly much of the popular discussion of politics within countries, revolves around which "opposition parties" are collaborating with the government.[3] For example, in Burkina Faso's 2016 first post-transition, democratic government, some observers discussed the participation of "opposition parties" in the coalition government alongside political elites once active in the former ruling Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) as "unnatural" (Bassolé, 2015). Though not explicitly ideological in nature, these sentiments suggest that citizens do have an underlying sense that some parties should not participate in a coalition together.

The conventional belief that ideology, as it is typically defined in other regions such as Western and Eastern Europe, is not relevant to African political parties has a somewhat predictable result: there is little cross-national empirical work on the measurement of ideology in African parties.[4] Because I am already limited by the

[3]Recall that as I have defined participation in government, an "opposition" party cannot simultaneously be participating in the government. If a party with a long history of opposing the ruling party joins a government along with the president's party, it becomes a coalition partner for the duration of its participation in the coalition government. It is not considered to be "in the opposition" if it is also a member of the governing coalition. This is consistent with all existing scholarship on government formation.

[4]Elischer (2012) codes party manifesto content in three countries for 1-4 elections after the legalization of multiparty electoral competition in Ghana Namibia, and Kenya. While all three of these countries appear in my data, the timing of their inclusion is not identical, and this does not constitute enough data for me to include it in my analyses.

number of government formation opportunities for which I have complete composition information on the government that eventually formed, I elect to focus on arguments pertaining to size and the role of incumbency, rather than examining ideology. I leave questions pertaining to the role of ideology in African government formation to future research.

4.1.2 Size Arguments

By government "size," scholars are typically referring to the parties that comprise the government. In other words, is the government single-party or a coalition? Is it a majority or minority government? As discussed earlier in this chapter, I include "majority legislatures" in my analyses in this chapter. Not only does existing literature fail to provide a theoretical reason to exclude majority legislatures, but I have already shown that single-party majority governments are prevalent in African democracies.[5]

In fact, my data for African governments show that the most common type of government is far and away the single-party majority (46% of government formation opportunities in this subset of the data). The existing scholarship from minority legislatures in Europe, which thus excludes this most common type of African government, focuses on minimal winning coalition governments (MWCs).[6] This is because MWCs are the most common type of government in the European data (32% of governments that formed (Andersson, Bergman and Ersson, 2014)). The logic underlying these MWC governments is that formateurs attempt to minimize the number of other parties in the coalition in order to minimize the loss of resources (ministerial portfolios)

[5] 15 of the 29 surplus governments in the 176 governments I identify in Chapter 2 include a single party with a legislative majority among coalition partners.

[6] Recall that a minimal winning coalition (MWC) is a government in which no party can leave the government without causing the coalition to lose majority legislative support (Riker, 1962).

to their partners. In Africa, MWCs are observed in only 7% of the governments for which I can fully identify cabinet composition. What explains this difference? If we think about minimal winning *governments*, rather than exclusively minimal winning *coalitions*, the reason for this difference becomes more clear. Single-party majority governments fall under the definition of minimal winning: After all, if the majority party were to leave the government, the government would indeed lack majority support.

Of course, a single-party majority removes the need for inter-party bargaining in order to build majority support in the legislature.[7] As a result, I expect that governments that include a potential government that is comprised of a single-party majority will be more likely to form than a government that does not include a single-party majority. This leads to the first hypothesis about which governments are more likely to form:

> **Single-party Majority Hypothesis**: A potential government is more likely to form if it is a single-party majority government.

We can also think about the ways that party size, as measured by seat share in the legislature, affects the probability that different types of government will form. For example, one might reasonably expect that a government including the largest party will be more likely to form than a government that excludes the largest party. The largest party may be too important to exclude (Glasgow and Golder, 2013), and in African democracies, the dominance of presidential parties more generally suggests that the largest party may have a privileged bargaining position. This leads to a second hypothesis regarding size arguments:

[7] Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) discuss the common pool resource effects of a "single party coalition of interests" versus a "coalition of multiple parties," which I discuss at greater length in Chapter 6. Though a single party may represent many interests, I assume that inter-party bargaining is more fraught than intra-party bargaining.

Largest Party Hypothesis: A potential government is more likely to form if it includes the largest legislative party.

Because of the differences between parliamentary and presidential democracies, I also expect that governments including the largest party should be more likely to form in parliamentary democracies than presidential democracies. This is because the president's party is a member of the government in a presidential democracy, no matter how many seats it wins. As a result, even presidential parties with a minority share of legislative seats will enter the government. In parliamentary democracies, however, the threat of a vote of no confidence makes legislative majorities more important. It follows that parties with more seats are better able to protect their position in the legislature.

4.1.3 Institutional Arguments

Scholars have focused on a variety of institutions that can affect the government formation process, including the choice of the formateur (Warwick, 1996; Glasgow, Golder and Golder, 2011; Glasgow and Golder, 2013) and the effect of incumbency (Strøm, Budge and Laver, 1994; Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Glasgow and Golder, 2015). However, the existing research has primarily focused on industrialized, parliamentary democracies.[8] Because my data on African democracies includes parliamentary and presidential democracies, I discuss how these different institutional arrangements affect the government formation process in each context.

Because the president serves a fixed term, I expect that the party of the previous president can reasonably be expected to increase the chances that the next potential

[8] As I discuss in Chapter 2, I group parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies, as is common in the existing government formation literature.

government that forms will also include the president's party. For example, if a government formation opportunity occurs between elections, it is reasonable to assume that the president's party will not exit the coalition, though other coalition partners may do so. This leads to another hypothesis regarding the role of institutions:

> **Incumbent President's Party Hypothesis**: A potential government containing the incumbent president's party is more likely to form in Africa's presidential democracies.

While I argue that potential governments containing the president's party should be more likely to form in a presidential democracy, my expectations for parliamentary democracies are much less clear. Existing research has shown that the party of the previous prime minister is no more or less likely to retain the premiership (Martin and Stevenson, 2001). More recent scholarship has suggested that the effect of previously holding the premiership on a party's chances for reentering government is affected by how the previous government ended (Glasgow and Golder, 2013, 2015). As a result, I have no strong expectations about whether governments containing the party of the previous prime ministers will be any more likely to form than those that do exclude the party of the previous prime minister.

4.2 Empirical Analysis

In order to examine support for the hypotheses described above, I first need to adjust the unit of analysis in my existing data. I am interested in examining characteristics of the government that *actually* formed, out of all the possible governments that *could* have formed. The possible number of governments at each government formation opportunity is $2^p - 1$, where p is the number of legislative parties. For example, take the case of one of the government formation opportunities in Botswana (Cabinet 4). Three parties won legislative seats: the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the Botswana National Front (BNF), and the Botswana Congress Party (BCP). Each party could form a single-party government on its own (BDP; BNF; BCP), any two could form a coalition together (BDP-BNF; BDP-BCP; BNF-BCP), or all three could go into government together (BDP-BNF-BCP). That produces a total of 7 possible governments, which is equal to $2^3 - 1$. The government that actually formed at this government formation opportunity was the single party majority government which included only the BDP.

Because this analysis requires detailed information about each party's legislative seat shares and exactly which parties with seats were in government together, I am forced to use the subset of my full 176 governments for which this information is available. This means that in this chapter there are 102 government formation opportunities – that is, there are 102 governments that actually form in this dataset. Table 4.1 lists the countries in the sample, as well as how many government formation opportunities are observed by country. The final column of Table 4.1 shows the total number of possible governments, summed across the formation opportunities by country. Because the number of possible governments at each formation opportunity is determined by the number of legislative parties that *could* have formed the governments, there is a great deal of variation in the total number of possible governments. As I show in the example above, a legislature with three parties produces seven possible governments. A legislature with 10 parties, however, produces a possible number of governments of $2^{10} - 1$, or 1,023 possible governments. The number of parties at each formation opportunity in this data ranges from two legislative parties to 23 legislative parties, which explains the variation in the total number of possible governments shown in the last column of Table 4.1 as compared to the numbers of formation opportunities.[9]

Table 4.1: Complete Composition Data, African Democracies 1990 – 2015

Country	# Formation Opportunities	Σ Possible Governments
Botswana	8	68
Burundi	5	267
Cape Verde	5	31
Comoros	2	258
Gambia	2	18
Ghana	4	108
Guinea-Bissau	6	186
Kenya	5	18,876,411
Lesotho	4	8,188
Madagascar	2	3,070
Malawi	7	801
Mali	3	2,301
Mauritius	5	219
Namibia	7	1,881
Nigeria	1	63
Sao Tome and Principe	14	146
Senegal	2	4,094
Seychelles	8	36
Sierra Leone	2	10
South Africa	6	28,922
Tunisia	1	262,143
Zambia	3	189
Total:	*102*	*19,189,410*

Note: These government formation opportunities are a subset of the 176 governments identified in Chapter 2. In order to conduct the analyses in this chapter, I needed complete information about the government's composition, as well as all party seatshares. The possible number of governments is calculated by taking $2^{(p)}-1$ where p is the number of legislative parties. This calculates all possible combinations of legislative parties that *could* have formed a government, excluding the null set.

To test empirical support for my hypotheses I use a conditional logit model. The

[9] Kenya includes a couple of government formation opportunities where the total number of legislative parties is 23. As a result, each one produces $2^{23}-1$ or 8,388,608 governments. This explains why the number of possible governments in Kenya is much higher than in the other countries listed in Table 4.1.

conditional logit model allows me to use the government formation opportunity as the unit of analysis, with every potential government included as the discrete alternatives from which the choice of government is made. That is, conditional logits allow us to examine government formation as a discrete choice, with the set of potential governments as the possible choices at each government formation opportunity. Methodologically, employing a multinomial choice framework takes into account that the probabilities of governments winning are related within a formation opportunity (Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Glasgow, Golder and Golder, 2011).[10] The equation for the conditional logit model is as follows, with the probability (P) that government j is selected out of K potential governments in the formation opportunity i:

$$P_{ij} = \frac{e^{x_{ij}\beta}}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} e^{x_{ik}\beta}} \tag{4.1}$$

In order to examine support for the hypotheses that I describe in the theory section, I run several specifications of the conditional logit. These specifications are shown Table 4.2. Models 1-3 focus on how the characteristics of parties in potential governments affect the likelihood of a particular government forming. Model 4 includes these party-level characteristics, but also examines characteristics of the potential governments as a whole. Models 1,2, and 4 are run on the full sample of 102 government formation opportunities, and Model 3 splits the sample by presidential and parliamentary democracies.

Model 1 allows me to examine support for the *Largest Party Hypothesis*. Recall that I expect potential governments to be more likely to form if they include the largest

[10]A more recent refinement is the mixed-logit, which further allows for the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives to be relaxed (Glasgow, Golder and Golder, 2011). These models are computationally more costly, however, and so I have refrained from including them at this stage.

legislative party. The results from Model 1 are consistent with my expectations: governments containing the largest legislative party are much more likely to form. I also control for seat share, however, and the results suggest that governments are *less* likely to form as they include larger parties more generally. This may appear slightly counterintuitive, but can be explained if we think about a practical example. To return to Burkina Faso's 2016 government, the second-largest party had staked its position in opposition to the largest party, which was the president's party. As a result, when the president's party failed to win a majority of seats, it did not turn to the second-largest party as a coalition partner: rather, it turned to seven smaller parties who had formed a parliamentary group under the name of "Burkindlim" (Ariotti, 2016). Because the largest party is being taken into account by the largest party variable, the coefficient on seat share means that other parties are less likely to be in successful governments as seat share increases because they are more likely to be parties that threaten the dominance of the largest party. Given the prevalence of dominant parties in African democracies, this distinction might seem unimportant. However, in more competitive party systems, this distinction between being the *largest* party and being a *large* party is a theoretically important one. For example, in Ghana's 2000 elections, the National Patriotic Party (NPP) won the presidency, as well as 100 seats in the legislature. The former ruling party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), won 92 legislative seats. Under such circumstances of "near parity and intense competition" (Lindberg and Zhou, 2009, 149), we would hardly expect to see the NPP form a coalition with its biggest rival.

Models 2 and 3 can be used to assess the empirical support for the *Incumbent President's Party Hypothesis*. Recall that I expect potential governments that contain the party of the incumbent head of government to be more likely to form than

Table 4.2: Effects of Size and Institutions on Government Formation in African Democracies (1990-2015)

	Model 1 (full)	**Model 2** (full)	**Model 3** (presidential)	**Model 3** (parliamentary)	**Model 4** (full)
Largest party	3.16***	2.97***	1.99***	3.95***	0.70
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.72)	(0.75)	(0.50)
Seat share	-2.13***	-2.49***	-2.50**	-2.51***	4.06***
	(0.64)	(0.68)	(1.09)	(0.87)	(1.25)
Previous HoG		0.76*	1.76**	-0.16	0.21
		(0.43)	(0.71)	(0.64)	(0.45)
Minority coalition					-4.05***
					(0.66)
Single-party minority					-2.06***
					(0.67)
MWC					-3.97***
					(0.65)
Surplus majority					-5.56***
					(0.50)
Formation opportunities	102	102	36	66	102
Potential governments	19,189,410	19,189,410	18,877,972	311,438	19,189,410
Log likelihood	-387.07	-385.49	-134.73	-246.90	-298.88

* indicates $p < 0.10$; ** indicates $p < 0.05$; *** indicates $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Note: All models are estimated using conditional logit models with government formation opportunities as the unit of analysis. $2^p - 1$, where p is the number of legislative parties, produces the number of potential governments at each government formation opportunity. Models 1, 2, and 4 are run on the full 102 government formation opportunity sample; Model 3 splits the sample by presidential and parliamentary democracies. Parliamentary countries are those with a vote of no confidence, including both parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies. In Model 4, single-party majority governments are held out; coefficients in the bottom half of the table are thus with respect to governments with single-party majorities.

governments that do not include the party of the incumbent head of government, but only in Africa's presidential democracies. In Model 2 I examine support for this hypothesis, but I do not separate out parliamentary and presidential democracies. In addition to demonstrating that the results from the *Largest Party Hypothesis* are robust, this model also suggests that including the party of the previous head of government (HoG) is weakly associated with increasing the likelihood that the government eventually forms. If we were to stop here, we might conclude that this is due to the strength of African leaders generally. However, executive-legislative relations are not the same in parliamentary and presidential democracies, and as the hypothesis states, I explicitly expect the previous HoG to be more important in presidential democracies than in parliamentary democracies.

In Model 3 I show the results if we split the sample by presidential and parliamentary democracies. Consistent with my expectations, governments that include the party of the previous president are significantly more likely to form in Africa's presidential democracies. Importantly, in parliamentary democracies, governments that include the party of the previous prime minister are no more or less likely to form than governments that do not include that party. This is consistent with existing scholarship that suggests that the effect of previously acting as prime minister on the likelihood of reentering the government is conditioned by how the previous government was terminated. I am hesitant to make broad claims on the basis of this model, given the limitations of my sample size. It is, however, logical that that African presidents should enjoy an advantage when new governments form – many times the party of the president is also dominant in the legislature, and it is included by definition when inter-election governments form.

Model 4 includes the party-specific characteristics that I have discussed in relation to the previous hypotheses, but also incorporates characteristics of the potential governments themselves. Recall that in the *Single-party Majority Hypothesis* I specifically argue that potential governments are more likely to form if they are single-party majority governments. This is because single-party majority governments are minimal winning governments in that they include the minimum number of parties required to achieve a legislative majority: in this case, that minimum number is one. The results in Table 4.2 include indicators for the different types of governments that can form: minority coalitions, single-party minorities, MWCs, and surplus majorities. The omitted category is single-party majority governments, meaning that the results in the bottom half of Model 4 should be interpreted with respect to single-party majority governments.[11]

If we compare the results in the top half of Model 4 to the previous columns, we can see the effects of controlling for the various types of government. After taking into account the different types of government that can form, we see that a government containing the largest party is no more likely to form than a government that does not contain the largest party. This is likely because the presence (or absence) of the largest party plays a strong role on the type of government that forms. Controlling for the government types in the bottom portion of Model 4, there is little remaining variation for this variable to capture. We also see that increasing seat share has a strong effect on the probability that a government forms when controlling for the different government types. This means that after controlling for the different types of government that can form, governments that include increasing seat shares are more likely to form than those that have smaller seat shares.

The bottom half of Model 4 shows how likely each of the types of government I described are to form, as compared to a single-party majority government's likelihood of forming. As expected, each other type of government is significantly less likely to form than a single-party government. Because single-party majority governments are minimal winning governments, it makes sense that they form more frequently than other arrangements, such as surplus coalitions that require the majority party

[11]Because single-party majority governments are the omitted category, the models in Table 4.2 Model 4 should be interpreted with respect to single-party majority governments. Including indicators for all other types leaves only the single-party majorities as the residual cases, against which we are comparing the other government types.

to share resources, or minority governments that exclude the majority party. These results can be interpreted as broadly in line with existing scholarship. In European democracies, where single-party majority governments are rare, we focus on minimal winning coalitions. However, when there are single-party majorities, perhaps it is more useful to think of minimal winning *governments*, of which MWCs are a subtype.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter examines the characteristics of parties and potential governments that affect which government ultimately forms. To do so, I draw on existing scholarship, which derives expectations about the effects of ideology, size, and institutions on the government formation process. In addition to testing these arguments for the first time in the African context, I also include legislatures in which a single party wins a majority of seats. Because of the mixture of parliamentary and presidential democracies in Africa, I consider the government formation process across democracy types, rather than focusing exclusively on parliamentary systems.

The results provide empirical support for the hypotheses that are taken from existing theories about what makes some governments more likely to form. Governments that contain the largest party are more likely to form than those that do not, and governments that include the party of the previous head of government are more likely to form than those that exclude it – but only in presidential democracies. Finally, I also show empirical evidence that suggests that single-party majority governments are more likely to form than other governments. By including these majority legislatures in my sample, I am able to investigate how they behave with respect to other types of government composition. This is particularly important in the African context, where a single party is often much larger than its competitors, and where single-party majorities occur frequently.

The arguments and empirical analyses in this chapter are only the beginning of research on the matter of which government forms. Further research is needed, especially on topics such as ideology in African party systems. Existing research from Central and Eastern Europe suggests that identifying the relevant dimension for ideology may vary across regions (Savage, 2014). While many scholars see African parties as lacking ideology in the traditional sense, some have argued that ideology simply takes on a different meaning (Bleck and van de Walle, 2012; Elischer, 2012). There is also recent research that argues that the personalization of contact between politicians and their constituents can be viewed as an adaptation to a different political norm, rather than as pure clientelism: a closer analysis of the substance of such interactions reveals that these interactions are often programmatic appeals, rather than exclusively personalistic in nature (Mueller, Forthcoming). As more research on the programmatic and ideological priorities of African parties develops, such information can also help us to better understand which potential governments are more or less likely to form.

In the next chapter I discuss what happens when parties are negotiating the formation of a coalition government. Specifically, I focus on how parties in a coalition decide to share ministerial portfolios amongst themselves. Ministerial portfolios are important both for their prestige, and for the access to government resources that they provide. I show that existing theories about partisan portfolio allocation can be used to explain how parties share portfolios in the context of African democracies. I also demonstrate that the theoretical expectations about differences between parliamentary and presidential democracies can be illustrated in the comparison of Africa's parliamentary and presidential democracies.

Chapter 5

The Partisan Allocation of Portfolios

Having discussed the government formation process in some detail, I turn to the matter of how parties in a coalition negotiating power-sharing. When political elites agree to form a partisan coalition, they are faced with an important question: How should ministerial portfolios be allocated across parties? In this chapter, I examine whether existing theories of partisan portfolio allocation can be successfully applied to Africa.

To illustrate portfolio allocation in practical terms, I return to the example from Burkina Faso. In 2015, Burkina Faso held its first democratic elections after the "popular insurrection" that led to former President Blaise Compaoré's ouster. Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, of the People's Movement for Progress (MPP) won the presidential election, and in the concurrent legislative elections, the MPP won 55 out of 127 seats. This, while a plurality of seats, was not enough to ensure majority legislative support for the president's party. Burkina Faso is semi-presidential, meaning that while the president is popularly elected to a fixed term, the prime minister is dependent upon majority support in the legislature. Kaboré named Paul Kaba Thieba, a technocrat, as his prime minister. Thieba proceeded to negotiate a coalition agreement between the MPP and an alliance of seven smaller legislative parties, whose added 14 seats meant that the government could ultimately rely on the support of a legislative majority (Ariotti, 2016). In exchange for their legislative support, members from two of these parties were appointed to ministerial portfolios.[1] This means that portfolios were allocated to three of the parties in this coalition, while five smaller parties supported the coalition, but did not receive any ministerial portfolios.

How did Thieba and these legislative parties reach an agreement on how ministerial portfolios would be shared? What determines how many ministerial portfolios will be distributed to each party? Existing literature on government formation in Europe has examined these questions in detail, in part because how portfolios are shared among parties can indicate the likely direction of government policy (Laver and Shepsle, 1996), and can influence government stability (Indridason, 2015; Golder and Thomas, 2014). However, there is almost no research on portfolio allocation in Africa, and there is nothing at all on the *partisan* allocation of ministerial portfolios. Having established that partisan coalitions are a frequent occurrence in Africa's democracies, I now examine how these partisan coalitions share power.

I use a subset of the data introduced in Chapter 2 for which I can identify the partisan affiliation of each minister in the government to examine how parties share power when they enter government together. As in previous chapters, I also incorpo-

[1] It is hardly a coincidence that the two parties that were offered ministerial portfolios are the only two parties out of the seven who fielded their own presidential nominees (and indeed it was these two former challengers who became the ministers). They were also two of the three parties that received more than one legislative seat. As I argue in Chapter 3, small parties may be more willing to accept rewards other than ministerial portfolios, meaning that it is not unusual for some parties to agree to support the government from the outside, without receiving ministerial portfolios.

rate data from European democracies. The data from European democracies allows me to illustrate the ways in which portfolio allocation behaves similarly across both Africa and Europe – and to make it clear when there are systematic differences. In line with my theoretical expectations, I find that African parties receive ministerial posts in rough proportion to the share of legislative seats they provide to the government, that formateur parties—those parties charged with forming the government—receive a greater share of portfolios in Africa than they do in Europe, and that the 'formateur bonus' with respect to portfolio allocation is greater in Africa's presidential democracies than in its parliamentary ones.

5.1 Theory

As I discussed at length in Chapter 2, governments can form as single-party governments or coalition governments. In coalition governments, leaders distribute ministerial portfolios across parties in order to obtain support. Parties value portfolios, either because of the perquisites that come with them or because of the opportunity they provide to shape policy. The perquisites of a ministerial post include personal benefits, such as prestige, a salary, a staff, an official car, and a travel budget. They can also include the ability to build and sustain systems of patronage (Tangri, 2000; Arriola, 2009; Franck and Rainer, 2012, 5-8). Ministers may be able to use their power to appoint supporters to the civil service or direct rents to their constituencies. As an example, Thomson (2000, 115) notes how "ministers of construction and town planning [in Côte d'Ivoire] frequently awarded their home towns lucrative development schemes." Ministers with strong policy preferences are often able to see their preferences realized or at least shape the policy agenda in beneficial ways.

The predominant approach in the literature to explaining partisan portfolio allocation is based on 'Gamson's Law'. According to Gamson (1961, 376), a party "will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition." Traditionally, the legislative seats that parties control are viewed as the 'resources' they contribute to a coalition and the ministerial portfolios they obtain are treated as the 'payoffs'. Thus, if two parties, A and B, with 100 and 50 legislative seats respectively, form a coalition government, then Party A will expect to get two-thirds of the ministerial portfolios $\left(\frac{100}{150} = \frac{2}{3}\right)$ and Party B will expect to get one third of them $\left(\frac{50}{150} = \frac{1}{3}\right)$. Empirical studies of European democracies have repeatedly shown support for Gamson's claim that ministerial portfolios will be allocated among cabinet parties in rough proportion to the share of seats they provide to the government's legislative majority (Warwick and Druckman, 2001). Indeed, Gamson's Law has developed a reputation as one of the strongest empirical laws in all of political science (Warwick and Druckman, 2006).

As with other studies pertaining to government formation, most existing scholarship has focused on European parliamentary democracies. I discuss these findings to help illustrate similarities and differences in the context of Africa's democracies. Studies of portfolio allocation in Europe actually note a small, but systematic, deviation from Gamson's Law. This deviation can be seen in Figure 5.1, where the government party's share of cabinet portfolios is plotted against its share of the government's legislative seats in 14 West European parliamentary democracies from 1945 to 2000. The strong positive relationship illustrated in Figure 5.1 is what the literature refers to as Gamson's Law (Laver, de Marchi and Mutlu, 2011). Note, though, the deviations from perfect proportionality. The black line indicates the scenario where portfolios are allocated in a 1:1 relationship. The circles tend to be above this line when a cabinet party is small, but below it when a cabinet party is large, indicating that smaller parties tend to be overcompensated when it comes to ministerial posts while larger parties tend to be undercompensated (Laver and Schofield, 1985; Bäck, Meier and Persson, 2009; Indridason, 2015). Country-specific regressions indicate that this pattern occurs not only on average across these fourteen countries but also

Figure 5.1: Partisan Portfolio Allocation in Western Europe, 1945-2000



Notes: The circles indicate a government party's share of cabinet portfolios and its share of the government's legislative seats. The circles are open and blue if the government party is not a formateur party and are solid red if it is a formateur party. A formateur party is the party that is charged with forming the government. Data are for 777 cabinet parties in 259 coalitions in fourteen West European parliamentary democracies from 1945 to 2000, and come from Warwick and Druckman (2006); nine coalition cabinets where the formateur was not identified are excluded. The upward sloping black line indicates the scenario where portfolios are allocated in a perfectly proportional manner.

within each one (Golder and Thomas, 2014). Although large parties are generally undercompensated, Figure 5.1 suggests that formateur parties (solid red circles) are particularly disadvantaged.

It turns out that this pattern, where formateur parties are disadvantaged when it comes to portfolio allocation, is the exact opposite of the predictions made by standard bargaining models of government formation. Existing accounts of government formation are typically based on the canonical Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model, in which three parties, none of which control a legislative majority, attempt to form a government with majority support by making alternating offers. A formateur (proposer) party, which is selected on the basis of party size, makes a proposal, comprising a distribution of portfolios and a government policy position, to the other parties.[2] All parties then vote on the formateur's proposal. If the proposal receives majority support, then the proposed government takes office. If the proposal does not receive majority support, then a new formateur is chosen and the process repeats itself. Once a proposal is accepted, the government forms and the game ends. Bargaining is costly in this model — the more rounds it takes a government to form, the less time the cabinet parties have to enjoy the perquisites of power. In effect, the 'pie' the parties are bargaining over shrinks with time. Because potential coalition partners are aware that delaying the government formation process shrinks the size of the pie, the formateur need only offer them the equivalent of the discounted goods that would be available in later bargaining rounds to get them to agree to her proposal immediately. This leaves 'extra' portfolios on the table that the formateur can keep — a 'formateur bonus'.

[2]Depending on the specific model, formateurs are chosen either in order of party size, from largest to smallest, or probabilistically, with the likelihood of selection proportional to legislative size (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989).

As Figure 5.1 illustrates, formateur parties in European parliamentary regimes, far from receiving a bonus, suffer a disadvantage. Recent work suggests that whether formateurs get more or less than their proportional share of portfolios depends on if there is a vote of no confidence (Golder and Thomas, 2014; Indridason, 2015).[3] This new research argues that the standard bargaining model of coalition formation is more applicable to presidential regimes than parliamentary ones. In a presidential regime, the formateur party (always the president's party) gets to stay in power until the end of the president's term. In contrast, the formateur party in a parliamentary regime can lose power whenever the government loses the support of a legislative majority. This is because of the parliamentary vote of no confidence, which allows a legislative majority to dismiss the government. The key feature of the vote of no confidence is that parliamentary governments must enjoy the support of a legislative majority not only to *enter* office but also to *stay* there.

Bargaining models of government formation implicitly assume that parties receive all of the benefits associated with being in power as soon as the bargaining is successfully concluded. In reality, though, cabinet parties do not receive an immediate one-time payoff when they come to power; instead, they receive their benefits over the government's lifetime. For formateurs in presidential regimes, the distinction between entering office and staying in office is largely irrelevant, as they serve a fixed

[3]Two other stories for a formateur disadvantage have been examined but found wanting. The first story focuses on the salience or importance of different ministerial portfolios. Perhaps it is the case that formateur parties receive a smaller share of ministerial portfolios but obtain the most salient or important posts. Although there is some mild evidence for this, Warwick and Druckman (2006, 635) find that "salience-weighted portfolio payoffs overwhelmingly mirror seat contributions" and that formateur parties remain undercompensated. The second story focuses on the 'lumpiness' of ministerial portfolios. Ministerial portfolios are 'lumpy' in that one cannot allocate a fraction of a ministerial post to a party to match that party's contribution of legislative seats to the government. This could conceivably lead to a situation in which small parties are overcompensated, particularly when the cabinet is small. Examining this possibility, though, Indridason (2015, 14) finds that "the discreteness of the portfolio distribution is not responsible for the observed deviations from perfect proportionality."

term. Not having the support of a legislative majority may make passing legislation more difficult, but it does not threaten the ability of the president or her party to stay in power. In such a scenario, some presidents may choose to form a coalition cabinet that controls a legislative majority to facilitate the implementation of their policy agenda. In contrast, the vote of no confidence means that formateurs in parliamentary democracies always have to worry about both government formation *and* government survival when allocating ministerial portfolios.

Governments in parliamentary democracies are unlikely to be stable if non-formateur parties have been allocated just enough portfolios to make them indifferent between joining the government and continuing with another round of bargaining, as most bargaining models of government formation predict. Coalition partners who are satisfied with their share of portfolios and policy compromises when the government first forms might recalculate how large a share they are due if conditions change during the life of the government (Lupia and Strøm, 1995). It is the possibility that coalition partners might turn against the government if they become dissatisfied with the status quo and participate in, or threaten to participate in, a vote of no confidence that creates incentives for formateur parties to allocate a higher-than predicted share of portfolios to non-formateur parties (Golder and Thomas, 2014; Indridason, 2015). In presidential regimes, the absence of the vote of no confidence means that formateur parties are not reliant on their coalition partners for their continued survival in office and, as a result, will value their contribution of legislatives seats to the government less than would be the case in parliamentary regimes. This means that non-formateur parties cannot expect the offers they receive to enter the cabinet to be as generous from presidential formateurs as from prime ministerial ones. It follows that formateur parties should receive a lower share of portfolios, relative to their legislative size, in parliamentary regimes than in presidential ones.

This general theoretical framework of partisan portfolio allocation has been applied successfully in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Several scholars claim that African leaders are motivated by the same concerns as other leaders when forming coalition governments (Oyugi, 2006, 74; Kadima, 2014*a*, 8). As a result, I expect that this framework can be profitably be applied to African democracies as well. In the upcoming analyses, I compare patterns of portfolio allocation in Europe with patterns of portfolio allocation in Africa. I do this to highlight how contextual, and, in particular, institutional, features of the government formation process in African democracies produce systematic, but theoretically intuitive, differences in partisan portfolio allocation. The importance of institutional context for partisan portfolio allocation has generally been overlooked in much of the existing literature. One reason for this is that scholars have typically conducted region-specific analyses in which there is limited variation when it comes to institutions. Europe, for example, is dominated by parliamentary regimes, whereas Latin America is dominated by presidential regimes. My analysis is unusual in explicitly examining cross-regional (and within regional) variation in partisan portfolio allocation.[4]

There are at least three contextual factors that would lead one to expect slightly different patterns of portfolio allocation in African democracies compared with European ones. The first, and most important, is the presence of presidential democracies in Africa. Presidential democracies are common in Africa but rare in Europe. As I discuss in Chapter 2, I expect the government formation process to be advantageous

[4] I contrast partisan portfolio allocation in Africa with partisan portfolio allocation in Europe for two reasons. The first is that the vast majority of the theoretical and empirical work on government formation and partisan portfolio allocation has historically focused on Europe. The second is that the institutional contexts in Europe and Africa are sufficiently distinct to allow me to derive clear theoretical predictions about how partisan portfolio allocation should differ across the two regions.

for formateur parties in presidential democracies due to the absence of the vote of no confidence. This implies that African formateurs will not be as generous, on average, to their coalition partners when it comes to portfolio allocation as their European counterparts.

The second is the relatively weak institutionalization of African legislatures. It is widely recognized that the typical European legislature is considerably more powerful and effective than the typical African legislature (Fish and Kroenig, 2009). This is important because legislative party leaders are in a significantly weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis the formateur when they lack effective legislative powers and when members of the legislature play only a limited role in the policy-making process. Indeed, formateurs are likely to have fewer incentives to build coalitions when the legislature is weak (Martinez-Gallardo, 2012). In line with this, Alemán and Tsebelis (2011, 23) find that non-presidential parties in Latin America are less likely to enter the cabinet when the legislature has low capacity and is poorly-institutionalized. It follows that parties in weakly-institutionalized legislatures, being less valuable to the formateur for implementing her policy agenda, can expect to receive fewer cabinet posts than in strongly-institutionalized legislatures.

The third contextual factor has to do with the relative lack of institutionalized and programmatic parties in Africa. Compared to the party systems found in the established democracies of Europe, the party systems in Africa's democracies are less institutionalized. Among other things, African party systems are characterized by higher levels of electoral volatility and party switching (Ferree, 2010; Goeke and Hartmann, 2011; Young, 2014). Leaders of weakly-institutionalized parties are likely to be at a disadvantage when it comes to bargaining with the formateur over the distribution of cabinet portfolios due to their relative lack of experience and the fact that they cannot credibly claim to provide consistent legislative support into the future. Compared to European parties, African parties also tend to be more particularistic (patronage-based) and less programmatic (policy-based) (Elischer, 2013, 19-20). This is important because, as Kellam (2015) notes, formateurs are likely to be able to get away with offering fewer ministerial portfolios to particularistic parties than to programmatic ones. Programmatic parties want to influence policy, and the most effective way to achieve this is by controlling cabinet positions. Although particularistic parties value ministerial posts as well, they also value other positions, such as lower-level government jobs for party members and supporters, or positions on boards of directors of state-owned businesses for party elites. A consequence of this is that formateurs can 'buy' the support of particularistic parties with fewer cabinet positions.

All three of these contextual factors suggest that the party managing the government formation process, the formateur party, is in a stronger bargaining position in African democracies than in European ones. This leads to the *Formateur Hypothesis*:

> **Formateur Hypothesis:** Controlling for their size, formateur parties in Africa receive a bonus when it comes to portfolio allocation. In contrast, formateur parties in Europe do not receive a bonus when it comes to portfolio allocation and may, in fact, suffer a formateur disadvantage.

The central expectation from Gamson's Law is that portfolios should be positively related to party size. As a party's share of the legislative seats increases, so does its bargaining power, and thus the share of ministerial portfolios that it can expect to receive in the government formation process. The extent to which portfolios are related to party size may well vary between African and European democracies, though. As the *Formateur Hypothesis* indicates, formateur parties in Africa should receive a bonus when it comes to portfolio allocation. It follows that non-formateur parties in Africa will not do as well as non-formateur parties in Europe. In other words, while the share of portfolios going to a non-formateur party should always increase with its share of the government's legislative seats, it should not increase *as much* for non-formateur parties in Africa compared to non-formateur parties in Europe. The fact that there are, on average, more non-formateur parties than formateur parties suggests that the relationship between party size and portfolios will be driven largely by the seats and portfolios controlled by non-formateur parties. To the extent that this is the case, it implies that the size of the positive relationship between a party's share of the government's legislative seats and its share of the portfolios should be smaller in Africa than in Europe; it should certainly not be larger. This leads to the *Party Size Hypothesis*:

> **Party Size Hypothesis:** Portfolios are positively related to a party's share of the government's legislative seats. Controlling for formateur status, this positive effect should never be larger in Africa than in Europe.

Theory also suggests that there should be clear differences in the patterns of portfolio allocation across parliamentary and presidential democracies *within* Africa. Specifically, formateurs in Africa's parliamentary democracies should receive a lower share of portfolios, controlling for their size, than formateurs in Africa's presidential democracies. Recall that this has to do with the absence of the vote of no confidence in presidential democracies. However, I do not expect formateur parties in Africa's parliamentary democracies to be as disadvantaged relative to non-formateur parties as they are in Europe. This is because formateur parties in Africa's parliamentary democracies still enjoy a stronger bargaining position relative to their European counterparts due to the weak institutionalization of African legislatures and the lack of stable, programmatic parties. This leads to the *Parliamentary Formateur Hypothesis*:

> **Parliamentary Formateur Hypothesis:** Controlling for their size, formateur parties receive a smaller share of portfolios in Africa's parliamentary democracies than in Africa's presidential democracies. Formateur parties in Africa's parliamentary democracies, though, should receive a larger share of portfolios than their counterparts in Europe's parliamentary democracies.

As always, portfolios should be positively related to a party's share of the government's legislative seats in both parliamentary and presidential democracies in Africa. However, the extent to which portfolios are related to party size is likely to vary across the two types of democracy. As previously indicated, non-formateur parties can expect to be more generously rewarded with ministerial portfolios in parliamentary democracies than in presidential ones. In effect, each seat that a non-formateur party provides to the government's legislative majority in a parliamentary democracy is likely to be rewarded with a larger number of portfolios than each seat provided by a non-formateur party in a presidential democracy. In other words, the positive relationship between party size and portfolios should, controlling for formateur status, be larger in Africa's parliamentary democracies than in Africa's presidential democracies. This leads to the *Parliamentary Party Size Hypothesis*:

> **Parliamentary Party Size Hypothesis:** Portfolios are positively related to a party's share of the government's legislative seats in both parliamentary and presidential democracies in Africa. Controlling for formateur status, this positive effect should be larger in parliamentary democracies than in presidential ones.

5.2 Empirical Analysis

In this section, I briefly describe the data employed to test these hypotheses regarding partisan portfolio allocation. I then present the model specification and discuss the results. As is described at greater length in Chapter 2, I focus on African democracies from 1990 to 2015.

In order to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, I need to go beyond the coalition governments that I have described in the previous chapters. To examine partisan portfolio allocation, I need to identify the partisan affiliation of each cabinet minister.[5] In general, it is relatively easy to obtain the names of cabinet ministers, to identify the ministries in which they are placed, and to determine whether they are male or female. Obtaining information on the partisan affiliation of *each* and *every* cabinet minister in a coalition government, though, is incredibly difficult.[6] This is because publicly accessible official documents and standard sources of political events rarely provide this information. Despite my best efforts, I was unable to collect complete information on the partisan allocation of portfolios for all of Africa's coalition governments. In many cases, it is possible to identify which parties are in the cabinet and even the number of portfolios allocated to some of the parties. The problem is that I do not have reliable information on the number of portfolios given to *all* of the cabinet parties, and so I cannot include these cases in the analyses.

Ultimately, I was able to obtain complete information on 84 cabinet parties in twenty-eight coalitions in nine African democracies: Burundi, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, and South Africa.[7]

[5]In cases where portfolios are held by ministers who are not affiliated with a political party in the legislature, I follow the existing literature and exclude these ministers from the analyses (Druckman and Roberts, 2008).

[6]Existing datasets of cabinets in African countries do not contain this information. For example, Arriola's (2009) dataset includes the raw number of cabinet ministers who are in government on an annual basis, but it does not include their partisan affiliation. Arriola and Johnson's (2014) dataset adds the proportion of men and women in each cabinet annually, but again does not include their partisan affiliation. Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi's (2015) dataset includes the ethnic identity of individual ministers, but it too does not include their partisan affiliation.

[7]In an attempt to evaluate my claim from Chapter 2 that the sample of coalition governments is

Eleven of the coalition governments formed in presidential democracies (Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi) and seventeen formed in parliamentary (Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa) or semi-presidential (Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe) democracies. As explained earlier, I will continue to refer to parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies as 'parliamentary' because they both have the vote of no confidence. In order to test the hypotheses, I also had to identify the formateur party. The formateur party is the party of the president in presidential regimes and the party of the prime minister in parliamentary regimes. Two of the parliamentary coalition cabinets (one in Guinea-Bissau and one in Sao Tome and Principe) had non-partisan prime ministers and therefore had to be dropped. This means that the final sample includes 76 cabinet parties in twenty-six coalition governments in nine African democracies. In line with the government formation literature, the unit of analysis is the cabinet-party.[8] To illustrate the basic structure of the data, Table 5.1 describes two African coalition governments, one in a presidential democracy (Kenya) and one in a parliamentary democracy (Mauritius). Formateur parties are identified with an asterisk.

The data on European governments comes from Warwick and Druckman (2006). After excluding governments without an identified formateur party, there are 777

representative of the larger population of coalition governments in African democracies, I estimated a logit model where the dependent variable was 1 if I had complete information on the partisan allocation of portfolios in a coalition government, and 0 otherwise. As independent variables, I used a country's wealth, its regime type, its level of democracy, its level of ethnic heterogeneity, and the size of the cabinet (number of ministers). None of these variables had a statistically significant effect on the probability that I had complete information on the partisan allocation of portfolios in a coalition government.

[8]Unlike studies of government formation in other regions of the world, the previous research on portfolio allocation in Africa has used the country-year as the unit of analysis (Arriola, 2009; Arriola and Johnson, 2014; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015). I prefer not to use the country-year for these analyses because doing so would not allow me to take account of the fact that cabinet parties are clustered within governments, and it would overstate the amount of information in the sample by having the same government appear multiple times.

Table 5.1: Two Examples of Coalition Governments in Africa

Cabinet Code	Country	Regime	Date In	President/ Prime Minister	Parties in Government	Seats per Party (%)	Portfolios per Party (%)
7	Kenya	Presidential	01-03-2003		1. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	59 (47.2%)	9 (36.0%)
				Kibaki	2. Democratic Party (DP)*	39 (31.2%)	12 (48.0%)
					3. Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K)	21 (16.8%)	3 (12.0%)
					4. National Party of Kenya (NPK)	6 (4.8%)	1 (4.0%)
16	Mauritius	Parliamentary	09-27-1991	Jugnauth	1. Mauritian Socialist Movement (MSM)*	29 (49.2%)	13 (52.0%)
					2. Mauritius Militant Movement (MMM)	26 (44.1%)	10 (40.0%)
					3. Democratic Labour Movement (MTD)	2 (3.4%)	1 (4.0%)
					4. Rodriguan People's Organization (ORP)	2 (3.4%)	1 (4.0%)

Note: 'Date In' refers to the date on which the cabinet was announced; if the date could not be confirmed, it is the date that the cabinet was sworn in. * indicates the party of the formateur. The percentage of seats each party contributes to the government total is shown in parentheses next to the number of legislative seats controlled by each party. The percentage of portfolios each party controls out of the total number of partisan portfolios in the cabinet is shown in parentheses next to the number of portfolios obtained by each party.

cabinet parties in 259 coalition governments in fourteen West European parliamentary democracies from 1945 through 2000. These are the observations shown earlier in Figure 5.1.

Model Specification and Results

There are two sets of hypotheses. The first has to do with partisan portfolio allocation in Africa and Europe, while the second has to do with partisan portfolio across presidential and parliamentary regimes in Africa.

5.2.1 Comparing across Regions: Africa and Europe

To test the *Formateur Hypothesis* and the *Party Size Hypotheses*, I created several measures. The dependent variable, *Portfolioshare*, is the share of ministerial portfolios controlled by a cabinet party. *Seatshare* measures the share of legislative seats that a party contributes to the total number of seats controlled by the government. *Formateur* is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if a party is the formateur party, 0 otherwise. As noted earlier, the formateur party is the party of the president in presidential regimes and the party of the prime minister in parliamentary regimes (Warwick and Druckman, 2006). *Africa* is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 when the government forms in Africa and 0 if it forms in Europe. I also created two interaction terms, *Formateur* $\times$ *Africa* and *Seatshare* $\times$ *Africa*, to test the conditional claims that the effect of formateur status and party size depends on whether the coalition government forms in Africa or Europe.

In line with existing studies of portfolio allocation, I use ordinary least squares to test our hypotheses. The exact model specification is shown in Eq. (5.1) below:

$$\text{Portfolioshare} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\text{Seatshare} + \beta_2\text{Formateur} + \beta_3\text{Africa} \\ + \beta_4\text{Seatshare} \times \text{Africa} + \beta_5\text{Formateur} \times \text{Africa} + \epsilon. \quad (5.1)$$

One might suspect that portfolios are not allocated independently across parties in a coalition and, thus, that I should employ clustered standard errors (Williams, 2000). Clustered standard errors, though, are asymptotic in the number of clusters and it is not clear that twenty-six African coalitions (or fewer in some upcoming analyses) is sufficiently large to make their use appropriate. Scholars differ on exactly how many clusters are needed to get reliable estimates. Arcenaux and Nickerson (2009, 182) state that the typical rule of thumb in the medical literature is about 20 clusters. However, Wooldridge (2003, 135) claims that problems can still arise in some situations if the number of clusters is less than 40. I choose to report robust standard errors, but note here that the results throughout are robust to the use of clustered standard errors as well as cluster-robust bootstrapped standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, 420-421).

The marginal effect of *Formateur* on *Portfolioshare* is $\beta_2 + \beta_5 Africa$. According to the *Formateur Hypothesis*, formateur parties in Europe will not receive a bonus when it comes to portfolio allocation and may suffer a formateur disadvantage. As a result, β_2 should be zero or negative. In contrast, formateur parties in Africa will receive a bonus, and hence β_5 and $\beta_2 + \beta_5$ should both be positive.

The marginal effect of *Seatshare* on *Portfolioshare* is $\beta_1 + \beta_4 Africa$. According to the *Party Size Hypothesis*, larger parties should always receive a greater share of ministerial portfolios than smaller parties irrespective of whether the government forms in Africa or Europe. As a result, β_1 and $\beta_1 + \beta_4$ should both be positive. Controlling for *formateur status*, the positive effect of *Seatshare* on *Portfolioshare* should never be larger in Africa than Europe, signifying that β_4 should be zero or negative.

The fact that all interactions are symmetric (Berry, Golder and Milton, 2012) means that my claim that the effects of *Formateur* and *Seatshare* on *Portfolioshare* depend on whether a government forms in Africa or Europe logically implies the claim that the effect of forming a government in Africa on *Portfolioshare* depends on the values of *Formateur* and *Seatshare*. The marginal effect of *Africa* on *Portfolioshare* is $\beta_3 + \beta_4 Seatshare \ + \ \beta_5 Formateur$. According to the theory, non-formateur parties in Africa should receive a lower share of portfolios at all levels of party size than non-formateur parties in Europe. As a result, $\beta_3 + \beta_4 Seatshare$ should be negative for all values of *Seatshare*. However, formateur parties in Africa should see a larger share of portfolios at all levels of party size than formateur parties in Europe. Hence, $\beta_3 + \beta_4 Seatshare \ + \ \beta_5$ should be positive for all values of *Seatshare*.

Before presenting the results from the empirical model, it is useful to first examine the data on coalition governments in Africa visually. In Figure 5.2, I plot a government party's share of cabinet portfolios against its share of the government's legislative seats using the African data. As in Figure 5.1, the solid black line indicates the scenario where portfolios are allocated in a perfectly proportional manner. Note that there is strong evidence to support Gamson's Law — portfolios are allocated in a roughly proportional manner, just as they are in Europe. The average deviation from the perfect proportionality line is just 0.064.[9] As in Europe, there is a small systematic

[9]The 1993 interim South African constitution mandated proportional portfolio allocation. Specifically, Section 88 stated that parties holding at least 20 legislative seats and which decided to participate in a national unity government were entitled to receive cabinet portfolios in proportion to the share of seats they provided to the government's legislative majority. This constitutional requirement for proportionality, which affected the 1994 South African coalition government, was removed when the new constitution came into effect in 1996. It is commonly believed that Burundi's 2005 constitution also mandates the proportional allocation of ministerial portfolios. However, this is incorrect. Article 129 states that only parties receiving 5% of the vote can enter government and

Figure 5.2: Partisan Portfolio Allocation in Africa



Note: The circles indicate a government party's share of cabinet portfolios and its share of the government's legislative seats. The circles are open and blue if the government party is not a formateur party and are solid red if it is a formateur party. Data are for 76 cabinet parties in twenty-six coalition governments in nine African democracies from 1990 through 2014. The upward sloping black line indicates the scenario where portfolios are allocated in a perfectly proportional manner. The average deviation from the perfect proportionality line is 0.064.

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that these parties are entitled to a share of ministerial portfolios at least equal to their share of legislative seats. There are two key points here. The first is that proportional portfolio allocation is not mandated. The second and more important point is that Article 129 refers to a party's share of legislative seats, not its share of the *government's* legislative seats. In practice, the proportionality of portfolio allocation in Burundi's coalition governments is lower than that found in many other coalition governments in Africa. To evaluate whether individual coalition governments, or coalition governments in particular countries, are influencing the results in our upcoming analyses, I adopted a variety of jackknife procedures. Specifically, I sequentially dropped each coalition government (and each individual country) and then reestimated the models for each of the reduced datasets. These robustness checks indicate that none of the individual coalition governments or countries are significantly influencing the results.

deviation from perfect proportionality. However, the deviation we see in Africa is quite different from the one we see in Europe. In contrast to Europe, but in line with the theoretical story, large parties in Africa tend to be overcompensated when it comes to portfolio allocation, while small parties tend to be undercompensated. This is indicated by the fact that the circles are generally above the black line when a cabinet party is large, but below it when a cabinet party is small. As predicted, Africa's formateur parties, which are shown with solid red circles, appear to be particularly advantaged.

Table 5.2: The Effect of Party Size and Formateur Status on Portfolio Allocation in Europe and Africa

Dependent Variable: Percentage of Ministerial Portfolios (*Portfolioshare*)						
	Ignore Formateur Status			Include Formateur Status		
Regressor	Combined	Europe	Africa	Combined	Europe	Africa
Seatshare	0.79**	0.79**	1.05**	0.83**	0.83**	0.86**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Formateur				-0.03**	-0.03**	0.13**
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Africa	-0.09**			-0.06**		
	(0.01)			(0.01)		
Seatshare × Africa	0.26**			0.02		
	(0.03)			(0.04)		
Formateur × Africa				0.16**		
				(0.03)		
Constant	0.07**	0.07**	-0.02	0.07**	0.07**	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.01)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.01)
Government Parties (N)	853	777	76	853	777	76
Coalition Governments	285	259	26	285	259	26
R^2	0.90	0.89	0.94	0.91	0.90	0.96

* indicates $p < 0.05$; ** indicates $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Note: Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. Results are robust to the use of standard errors clustered on the coalition government.

The results from six different models are shown in Table 5.2. The first set of three models examines the relationship between party size and portfolio allocation when I ignore the distinction between formateur and non-formateur parties. The second set of models examines the same relationship when I distinguish between formateur and non-formateur parties. Within each set of models, the first 'combined' model presents results from a fully interactive specification where the coefficients on the interaction terms allow us to determine whether the effects of the covariates on portfolio allocation are significantly *different* across Europe and Africa. To ease interpretation, the 'Europe' and 'Africa' models show results when I split the sample by region. These results indicate the effect of the covariates in the respective regions.

The results from the first three models where I ignore the formateur status of the cabinet parties suggest that the positive relationship predicted between party size and portfolio allocation is significantly greater in Africa than in Europe. This is indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on *Seatshare* × *Africa* in the combined model. Note that the coefficient on *Seatshare* is significantly less than one (perfect proportionality) in the Europe model and that the coefficient on the constant term is significantly greater than zero. This confirms the impression provided by Figure 5.1 that large parties in Europe tend to be undercompensated when it comes to portfolio allocation, while small parties tend to be overcompensated. In contrast, the coefficient on *Seatshare* is not significantly different from one in the Africa model and the coefficient on the constant term is not significantly different from zero. This suggests that parties in Africa receive cabinet portfolios in direct proportion to their share of the government's legislative seats. If one were to stop here, one would have to conclude that the pattern of portfolio allocation in Africa is much closer to the predictions of Gamson's Law than the pattern of portfolio allocation in Europe.

As I note in the theoretical argument, though, it is important to take account of the formateur status of the cabinet parties. Almost all of the large parties in African coalition governments are formateur parties. As a result, it is likely that the strong positive relationship between a party's share of the government's legislative seats and portfolio allocation is being driven by large formateur parties. Indeed, the theoretical argument predicts that the positive relationship between party size and portfolio allocation should be the same or lower in Africa than in Europe, not greater. The results from the second set of models in Table 5.2 confirm this – the coefficient on *Seatshare* × *Africa* is substantively small and statistically insignificant once I control for formateur status. This is exactly as predicted by the *Party Size Hypothesis*.

The results from the second set of models in Table 5.2 also show that the effect of formateur status on portfolio allocation is significantly different in Europe than it is in Africa. This is indicated by the statistically significant coefficient on *Formateur* × *Africa* in the combined model. The coefficient on *Formateur* in the Europe model is negative and statistically significant, confirming our impression from Figure 5.1 that European formateur parties are disadvantaged when it comes to portfolio allocation. In contrast, the coefficient on *Formateur* is positive and statistically significant in the Africa model, indicating that African formateur parties enjoy a bonus in the portfolio allocation process. These effects are substantively large. Controlling for their size, formateur parties in Africa obtain a 13 [8.0-18.1] percentage point larger share of portfolios than a non-formateur party in Africa, and a 16 [10.9-21.4] percentage point larger share than a formateur party in Europe. 95% confidence intervals are shown in square brackets. These results are exactly as predicted by the *Formateur Hypothesis*.

Recall that non-formateur parties in Africa should always receive a lower share of portfolios than their counterparts in Europe, whereas formateur parties in Africa should always receive a higher share. This is exactly what I find. As I demonstrate in the Appendix, the marginal effect of *Africa* for non-formateur parties, $\beta_3 + \beta_4 Seatshare$, is always negative across the observed range of *Seatshare* and is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for 99.5% of the sample observations. Similarly, the marginal effect of *Africa* for formateur parties, $\beta_3 + \beta_4 Seatshare + \beta_5$, is always positive across the observed range of *Seatshare* and is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for all of the sample observations.

5.2.2 Comparing within Africa: Presidential and Parliamentary Regimes

The pattern of partisan portfolio allocation should differ not only across Europe and Africa, but also across parliamentary and presidential democracies *within* Africa. To test the *Parliamentary Formateur Hypothesis* and the *Parliamentary Party Size Hypothesis*, I created some additional measures. *Parliamentary* is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the democracy is parliamentary, and 0 if it is presidential. I also created two interaction terms, *Formateur* × *Parliamentary* and *Seatshare* × *Parliamentary*, to test the conditionality of the hypotheses.

As before, I employ ordinary least squares with robust standard errors to test my hypotheses. The exact model specification is shown in Eq. (5.2) below:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Portfolioshare} = \gamma_0 &+ \gamma_1\text{Seatshare} + \gamma_2\text{Formateur} + \gamma_3\text{Parliamentary} \\ &+ \gamma_4\text{Seatshare} \times \text{Parliamentary} \\ &+ \gamma_5\text{Formateur} \times \text{Parliamentary} + \epsilon. \end{aligned} \tag{5.2}$$

The marginal effect of *Formateur* on *Portfolioshare* is $\gamma_2 + \gamma_5 Parliamentary$. According to the *Parliamentary Formateur Hypothesis*, formateur parties in Africa's presidential democracies should receive a formateur bonus when it comes to portfolio allocation. As a result, γ_2 should be positive. This formateur bonus should decline but not turn into a formateur disadvantage in Africa's parliamentary democracies. This means that γ_5 should be negative and $\gamma_2 + \gamma_5$ should be non-negative. According to the *Parliamentary Formateur Hypothesis*, it should also be the case that the formateur parties in Africa's parliamentary democracies will do better than the formateur parties in Europe's (parliamentary) democracies, $\gamma_2 + \gamma_5 > \beta_2$.

The marginal effect of *Seatshare* on *Portfolioshare* is $\gamma_1 + \gamma_4 Parliamentary$. According to the *Parliamentary Party Size Hypothesis*, larger cabinet parties, controlling for their formateur status, should always receive a greater share of ministerial portfolios than smaller cabinet parties irrespective of whether the government forms in a parliamentary or presidential democracy. As a result, γ_1 and $\gamma_1 + \gamma_4$ should both be positive. However, the positive effect of an increase in party size on portfolio allocation should be greater in parliamentary democracies. This is because formateur parties in presidential democracies do not need to reward coalition partners as generously as they would in parliamentary democracies due to the fact that they do not need to build a legislative majority to form a government. It follows that γ_4 should be positive.

Due to the inherent symmetry of interactions (Berry, Golder and Milton, 2012), my claim that the effects of *Formateur* and *Seatshare* on *Portfolioshare* depend on whether a government forms in a parliamentary or presidential democracy logically implies that the effect of forming a government in a parliamentary democracy as opposed to a presidential one on *Portfolioshare* depends on the values of *Formateur* and *Seatshare*. The marginal effect of *Parliamentary* is $\gamma_3 + \gamma_4 Seatshare + \gamma_5 Formateur$.

According to the theory, non-formateur parties should always receive more portfolios in a parliamentary democracy than in a presidential one. As a result, $\gamma_3 + \gamma_4 Seatshare$ should be positive for all values of *Seatshare*. In contrast, formateur parties should always receive fewer portfolios in a parliamentary democracy than in a presidential one. Hence, $\gamma_3 + \gamma_4 Seatshare + \gamma_5$ should be negative for all values of *Seatshare*.

The results from three different models are shown in Table 5.3. The first 'Africa' model presents results from a fully interactive specification where the coefficients on the interaction terms allow me to determine whether the effects of the covariates on portfolio allocation are significantly *different* across parliamentary and presidential democracies in Africa. To help with interpretation, the 'presidential' and 'parliamentary' models show results when I split the African sample by democracy type. In effect, the results from these two models indicate the effect of the covariates in presidential and parliamentary democracies respectively.

The results in all three models provide support for the *Parliamentary Party Size Hypothesis*. As predicted, there is always a strong positive relationship between a party's share of the government's legislative seats and portfolio allocation. This is indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on *Seatshare* in both the presidential and parliamentary models. As predicted, the coefficient on *Seatshare* $\times$ *Parliamentary* is positive and almost reaches conventional levels of statistical significance, $p < 0.13$ (two-tailed). It is also substantively large. While the share of legislative seats belonging to a non-formateur party translates into a share of ministerial portfolios at a ratio of 1 to 0.78 in presidential democracies, it translates into a share of ministerial portfolios at a ratio of 1 to 0.90 in parliamentary democracies. In effect, increases in cabinet party size lead to a much more favorable allocation of portfolios for non-formateur parties in Africa's parliamentary democracies than in its

Table 5.3: The Effect of Presidential and Parliamentary Regime Type on Portfolio Allocation in Africa

Dependent Variable: Percentage of Ministerial Portfolios (*Portfolioshare*)			
Regressor	Africa	Presidential	Parliamentary
Seatshare	0.77**	0.77**	0.90**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Formateur	0.24**	0.24**	0.06*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Parliamentary	0.02		
	(0.02)		
Seatshare × Parliamentary	0.13		
	(0.08)		
Formateur × Parliamentary	-0.19**		
	(0.05)		
Constant	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Government Parties (N)	76	31	45
Coalition Governments	26	11	15
R^2	0.97	0.97	0.97

* indicates $p < 0.05$; ** indicates $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Note: Coefficients are shown with robust standard errors in parentheses. Results are robust to the use of standard errors clustered on the coalition government.

presidential ones.

The results in all three models also provide strong support for the *Parliamentary Formateur Hypothesis*. As predicted, there is a substantively large formateur bonus in Africa's presidential democracies. This is indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on *Formateur* in the presidential model. Controlling for their size, formateur parties in Africa's presidential democracies receive a 24 [14.2, 34.7] percentage point larger share of portfolios than non-formateur parties. As before, 95% confidence intervals are shown in square brackets. Importantly, the coefficient on *Formateur × Parliamentary* is negative and statistically significant. The magnitude of this coefficient indicates that formateur parties in Africa's parliamentary democracies receive a 19 [7.8, 29.7] percentage point smaller share of portfolios than they do in its presidential ones. Substantively, these results are consistent with my claim that formateur parties in Africa's parliamentary democracies have to be more generous to their coalition partners because of their need to build a legislative majority to enter office. Previous studies have found similar results with respect to patterns in portfolio allocation across presidential and parliamentary democracies in other regions of the world (Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels, 2010; Golder and Thomas, 2014). The analyses in Table 5.3 indicate that the results reported in these other studies are robust to the African context.

Interestingly, the coefficient on *Formateur* in the parliamentary model is positive and statistically significant, indicating that although formateur parties receive a smaller share of portfolios in Africa's parliamentary democracies than in its presidential ones, they do not suffer the formateur disadvantage that we see in Europe's parliamentary democracies. This result is consistent with my claim that all African formateurs, even those in Africa's parliamentary democracies, will be advantaged in the portfolio allocation process compared with their European counterparts due to the relatively weak institutionalization of legislatures and the dearth of stable, programmatic parties in Africa.

In Figure 5.3, I summarize my findings about the relative power of the formateur party across different contexts by plotting the marginal effects of *Formateur* in European (parliamentary) democracies, African parliamentary democracies, and African presidential democracies. These marginal effects indicate the size of the 'bonus' that formateur parties receive in these various systems. The circles indicate the marginal effects, while the horizontal lines on either side show the two-tailed 95% confidence intervals. Two results stand out. First, formateur parties get a larger share of portfolios in Africa's presidential democracies than in its parliamentary ones. Second, formateur parties in Africa's parliamentary democracies do better than formateur parties in Europe's parliamentary democracies. The first result is due to the effect of the vote of no confidence on partisan portfolio allocation, while the second is due to the greater bargaining power of African formateurs, compared to European formateurs, in the government formation process.

Finally, recall that non-formateur parties should receive more portfolios in a parliamentary democracy than in a presidential one, whereas formateur parties should receive fewer. This is largely what I find. As I demonstrate in the Appendix, the marginal effect of *Parliamentary* for non-formateur parties, $\gamma_3 + \gamma_4 Seatshare$, is always positive across the observed range of *Seatshare* and is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) when *Seatshare* is greater than 0.065, which is the case for more than 74% of the non-formateur parties. The marginal effect of *Parliamentary* for formateur parties, $\gamma_3 + \gamma_4 Seatshare + \gamma_5$, is always negative, though not statistically significant, across the observed range of *Seatshare*.

5.2.3 Party, Ethnicity or Both?

The theoretical framework I have presented in this chapter focuses on the standard legislative bargaining incentives that have been central to the government formation literature to date. However, there is a possible alternative approach to explaining portfolio allocation. In a recent article, Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015, 465), hereafter FRT, argue that "political power [cabinet portfolios] is allocated proportionally to population shares across ethnic groups" in Africa. This is done to ward

Figure 5.3: Formateur Bonus in Europe and Africa



Note: The circles indicate the marginal effects of formateur status on portfolio share in European (parliamentary) democracies, African parliamentary democracies, and African presidential democracies. The estimated coefficients are drawn from the 'Europe' model that 'includes formateur status' in Table 5.2 and the 'presidential' and 'parliamentary' models in Table 5.3. The horizontal lines on either side of the point estimates are two-tailed 95% confidence intervals.

off "revolutions from outsiders and coup threats from insiders" (465). While Arriola (2009) argues that African leaders can increase the *size* of the cabinet to enlarge their ethnic patronage coalition and so ward off coup threats, FRT (2015) focus on how the *distribution* of cabinet portfolios across ethnic groups can help African leaders retain power.[10]

[10] Arriola (2009) shows that larger cabinets are associated with a lower risk of coups. However, he cannot demonstrate that this is due to the inclusion of more ethnic groups in the cabinet as his data does not include information on a government's ethnic makeup. FRT (2015), and their

The government formation literature, as I have discussed, typically focuses on the political parties that make it into the cabinet. However, Franck and Rainer (2012), who describe the underlying data in FRT (2015), argue that it is more appropriate in Africa to focus on the ethnic groups that make it into the cabinet. This is because "African politics [...] can be parceled into ethnic issues and demands" (10) and because African parties "cutting across ethnic lines [...] are rare" (11). In effect, they claim that African politics is about ethnicity and that African party systems are simply a reflection of a country's underlying ethnic composition. If this is true, one might wonder whether my results with respect to proportional *partisan* portfolio allocation in Africa are simply capturing a more fundamental pattern of proportional *ethnic group* portfolio allocation. As I now demonstrate, this is not the case.

FRT's (2015) decision to focus on ethnic groups instead of parties is in part driven by their interest in studying power-sharing in both democracies *and* dictatorships in Africa. Their decision makes sense in authoritarian regimes, where parties may be severely limited, or absent altogether (Gandhi, 2008). One may reasonably expect authoritarian leaders to be motivated to maintain support in the larger population via ethnic linkages, given the relative weakness of party structures. However, in democracies, such as those directly addressed in this dissertation, the failure of FRT's (2015) argument to account for the importance of legislative incentives is problematic. As I have shown in previous chapters, partisan coalitions form frequently. Absent legislative incentives to build political support via partisan coalitions, it is less clear why we should see them form so regularly.

I argue that while a useful shorthand in some cases, African politics cannot be reduced to ethnicity. Ethnicity is not politically salient across Africa. As constructivist

underlying data paper (Franck and Rainer, 2012), provide the first dataset to contain information on the ethnicity of ministers in Africa.

theories of identity formation make clear, whether attributes such as ethnicity are politicized or not is context dependent (Laitin, 1992; Chandra, 2004; Chandra and Boulet, 2012).[11] As an example, Posner (2004*b*) shows how the size and geographic dispersion of ethnic groups interact with electoral institutions to explain why the ethnic distinction between Chewas and Tumbukas is politicized in Malawi but not in Zambia. Empirically, there is considerable variation in the degree of ethnic voting in Africa, both across countries and within countries over time (Ferree, 2010; Basedau and Stroh, 2012; Harding, 2015). In addition to ethnicity, scholars have shown that African politics is shaped by the urban-rural cleavage (Nugent, 1999), economic factors (Kimenyi and Romero, 2008; Posner, 2005), political competition (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010), and incumbent performance (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005; Carlson, 2015) among other things.

The extent to which African parties are 'ethnic' also shows considerable variation across countries (Elischer, 2013). In a study of 41 parties in 13 countries, Cheeseman and Ford (2007) show that only 8 can be considered 'ethnic' under Horowitz's (1985) seminal definition of an ethnic party. Criticizing the literature's excessive focus on parties in Anglophone Africa, particularly those in Ghana and Zambia, Basedau and Stroh (2012) examine parties in four Francophone countries. They find that "'ethnic parties' in the strict sense are virtually absent" (5). They also find no evidence of 'ethnic congress parties' — parties that are based on a coalition, alliance, or federation of ethnic political parties or machines (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, 184). The

[11] Constructivist theories indicate not only that contextual factors help determine whether ethnicity is politicized, but also which ethnic groups (Franck and Rainer, 2012) and which ethnic attributes are politicized across time (Laitin and Posner, 2001). It is important therefore not simply to enumerate the number of different ethnic groups in a country as FRT (2015) do, but to enumerate *politically-relevant* ethnic groups over time (Posner, 2004*a*). Since ethnic groups can be identified at different levels of aggregation (Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003), it is also incumbent on scholars wishing to link ethnicity to political outcomes to theorize about the appropriate level of aggregation or to show that their results are robust to different levels of aggregation.

Figure 5.4: Ethnic Group Size and Portfolio Allocation in Africa, 1960-2004



Note: The circles indicate the annual share of cabinet portfolios going to an ethnic group as well as the ethnic group's share of the population. The circles are red if the ethnic group matches that of the country's leader, and blue otherwise. There are 11,029 blue circles and 720 red circles, for a total of 11,749 observations. Data are for fifteen Africa countries (democracies and dictatorships) from 1960 or independence to 2004. The upward sloping black line indicates the scenario where cabinet portfolios are allocated to ethnic groups in perfect proportion to their population size.

existence of 'dominant parties' in many ethnically heterogeneous African countries also runs counter to the idea that African parties are always ethnic. This is because these parties win a far greater share of the votes than the share of the population comprised by even the largest ethnic group.

As this discussion indicates, there is little reason to believe that the pattern of *partisan* portfolio allocation that I find in my sample of Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone African democracies simply reflects an underlying pattern of *ethnic* *group* portfolio allocation. My argument is bolstered by the actual data used in FRT (2015). In Figure 5.4, I use FRT's data to plot an ethnic group's annual share of cabinet portfolios against its share of the total population in the 15 countries (democracies and dicatorships) used in their study: Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Kenya, and Uganda. The circles are red if the ethnic group matches that of the country's leader, and blue otherwise.[12] The black line indicates the scenario where cabinet portfolios are allocated to ethnic groups in perfect proportion to their population size.[13] FRT (2015, 472) argue that the data generally follow the line of perfect proportionality, indicating that "cabinet allocations tend to closely match population shares with cabinet post shares." They also argue that there is a positive premium for the leader's ethnic group that is "comparable to formateur advantages in [Europe's] parliamentary democracies" (467).[14]

While I also find that cabinet portfolios are allocated in a roughly proportional manner, it is important to recognize that these proportional relationships are quite different. The proportional relationship in FRT (2015) is with respect to ethnic group size in the population. Critically, my proportional relationship is *not* with respect to a

[12]There is a total of 11,749 observations (11,029 blue circles and 720 red circles), 5,263 of which are for ethnic groups that receive no ministerial portfolios. The reason why there are so many observations despite the sample including only fifteen countries is that FRT (2015) calculate the share of portfolios controlled by an ethnic group on an *annual* basis and not on a *government* basis. Indeed, FRT (2015) never provide a coding rule for when a new government forms. This means that the same 'cabinet' can repeatedly appear in the dataset multiple times. With no way to identify individual governments, it becomes impossible to take account of the fact that cabinet posts are not distributed independently within governments.

[13]Figure 5.4 is equivalent to Figure 2 in FRT (2015, 475), except that it also includes information on the ethnic groups associated with country leaders (red circles) and it extends both axes beyond 0.5.

[14]Although there is a positive premium for the leader's ethnic group in the FRT data, it is incorrect to say that it is equivalent to formateur advantages in Europe's parliamentary democracies. This is because, as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.3, as well as Table 5.3, there tends to be a formateur *disadvantage* in Europe's parliamentary democracies (Warwick and Druckman, 2006; Laver, de Marchi and Mutlu, 2011; Golder and Thomas, 2014).

party's legislative size, which reflects their support in the population, but with respect to the share of seats that each cabinet party contributes to the share of seats controlled by the government. To illustrate, suppose we have a coalition government comprising party A with 30% of the legislative seats and party B with 20% of the legislative seats. Proportional partisan portfolio allocation means allocating 60% of the portfolios to party A and 40% to party B. If African parties rarely cross ethnic lines as Franck and Rainer (2012) claim, then it is difficult to see how this pattern of partisan portfolio allocation would automatically flow from the proportional allocation of portfolios across ethnic groups in the population. And if African parties do cross ethnic lines, then achieving a proportional allocation of portfolios across ethnic groups does not necessarily require the proportional allocation of portfolios across cabinet parties.

Ultimately, I believe that the proportionality relationship that I have demonstrated is conceptually and empirically distinct from the one in FRT (2015). Taken together, the two sets of results suggest that African leaders allocate cabinet portfolios in a roughly proportional manner across both ethnic groups *and* cabinet parties (not legislative parties). That they might do this should not be surprising given that they are likely to want to build support both inside and outside of the legislature. There is no reason to believe that leaders wish to achieve proportionality along only one dimension. It is documented, for example, that Italian governments allocated ministerial portfolios in the early post-war period in such a way that they achieved proportionality across both parties and geographic areas (Golden, 2003, 197).

There are at least two reasons to believe that the empirical evidence is slightly more consistent with the party portfolio allocation story than the ethnic group portfolio allocation story. A close look at Figure 5.4 reveals tall 'vertical columns' of observations. These columns occur because the share of portfolios that an ethnic group receives varies considerably over time even though its size remains constant. This suggests that the extent to which portfolios are allocated in proportion to ethnic group size varies over time. My data reveal no such temporal variation in the extent to which portfolios are allocated in proportion to cabinet party size. More significant, though, is the fact that the ethnic group portfolio allocation story cannot explain why I observe such big differences across parliamentary and presidential regimes in Africa. Recall that, in line with my theoretical expectations, I found a larger formateur bonus in Africa's presidential democracies than in its parliamentary ones. This difference had to do with the existence of the vote of no confidence in parliamentary democracies. The fact that the theoretical model proposed by FRT (2015, 467) "revolves around nonlegislative incentives" means that it cannot account for this difference, a difference that has been observed in other regions of the world.

5.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I seek to contribute to the nascent literature on African coalition governments by looking at whether existing theory about the partisan allocation of portfolios can be successfully applied to African democracies. In line with Gamson's Law, I find that parties in Africa receive ministerial portfolios in rough proportion to their share of the government's legislative seats. In fact, the support for Gamson's Law is slightly stronger in Africa than it is in Europe. The claim that the partisan identity of ministers does not matter in Africa is hard to reconcile with this pattern of portfolio allocation.

As expected, formateur parties in Africa do better when it comes to portfolio allocation than they do in Europe. This difference can be traced to the fact that weakly-institutionalized legislatures and unstable, particularistic parties provide African formateurs with more bargaining leverage than their European counterparts. It also has to do with the fact that there are more presidential democracies in Africa than in Europe. Leaders in parliamentary democracies have to be more generous to their coalition partners than leaders in presidential democracies due to the fact that they need to build a legislative majority in order to enter, and stay in, office. As predicted, I also find that the bonus enjoyed by formateur parties is greater in Africa's presidential democracies than in its parliamentary ones.

Overall, I find differences in the patterns of partisan portfolio allocation between Africa and Europe. However, these differences are exactly what theory predicts I should find given the institutional and political context of government formation processes in African democracies. My results indicate that existing theories of portfolio allocation, developed and tested in other regions of the world, apply equally well to Africa. I also demonstrate that these differences can also be observed in how portfolios are allocated across presidential and parliamentary democracies *within* Africa. This indicates that political institutions do play a role in African politics, and that even powerful leaders in Africa can find themselves constrained by legislative dynamics. In the following chapter, I examine what parties sharing ministerial portfolios means for observable outcomes of government behavior, such as overall levels of government spending.

Chapter 6

Government Type and Public Spending

The previous chapters have all focused on understanding which parties get into the government, and once there, how they share power. This chapter begins to examine the effects of government composition on outcomes that have direct implications for citizens: levels of government spending. Since Roubini and Sachs (1989*a*,*b*) first published their influential examination of coalitions and budget outcomes in industrialized democracies, a number of scholars have focused on better understanding the political, institutional, and ideological determinants of government spending. These studies have broadly concluded that political institutions, such as government composition, play a role in determining government spending in the world's advanced industrialized democracies. Given the variety in types of government that we now know exists in Africa's democracies, another important question we can examine is *how does government composition affect the size of the public sector in African countries?*

In this chapter I argue that coalition governments in African countries should spend more than single-party governments. To explain this logic, I draw on existing research about the ways parties represent the interests of their constituents when they are in government – in the context of a single party, or as a coalition of multiple parties. This argument is rooted in the ways that voters hold parties accountable for both the distribution of public goods, and also for managing the budget responsibly. Coalitions might spend more because each member party has its own constituency holding it accountable for specific priorities, and coalition partners are able to externalize the effect of these pressures on overall spending. Conversely, a single-party government is responsible to a single constituency, and is not able to externalize the effects of overspending.

I also examine support for a related argument about the effect of government composition, which focuses on the number of ministers in government rather than the number of parties. Some scholars have argued that increasing the number of ministers has a more substantial effect on increasing government spending than increasing the number of parties does. Because I am interested in government composition and its effects more broadly, I examine support for both of these arguments in the African data.

In the preceding chapters, I have examined the differences between single-party and coalition governments, as well as when they form and how they affect the allocation of ministerial portfolios. I have not, however, taken a normative stance on whether coalitions are "good" or "bad." I have been careful to separate my interest in what causes them to form and how that affects other dynamics from any argument about how often they *should* form. However, if partisan coalitions have negative side effects, we may reasonably ask whether the benefits of coalition government are enough to outweigh any potential costs. While some level of government spending is necessary in order to ensure that salaries and benefits are paid to employees, that government functions, and that public goods are provided, fiscal responsibility also requires restraint and prioritization. To the extent that it is features of government composition that drive levels of government spending rather than characteristics of the population or needs of the citizens more broadly, it could be the case that partisan coalitions create pressures to overspend in problematic ways.

In this chapter I begin to examine whether there is preliminary evidence that partisan coalitions affect levels of government spending. As in the previous chapters, there is very little research on this topic as it relates to government types that focuses on African democracies specifically. I begin by discussing the existing research. I then discuss what this implies in the context of democratic African politics, and examine empirical support for the hypotheses. I find that there is weak evidence to suggest that the number of spending ministers and the number of times a government turns over in a given year affect budget implementation, but I do not find evidence that government composition has a strong effect on the creation of the budget itself. The most important determinants of the budget itself appear to be the previous budget and the economy's performance at the time the budget is drafted.

6.1 Theory

What determines levels of government spending? Existing scholarship has argued that the composition of the government affects government spending because of the way that parties and coalitions of parties internalize the costs and responsibilities of increased spending. I argue that coalition governments in African democracies should spend more than single-party governments. I begin by discussing existing literature on government spending, focusing on the common pool resource problem that underpins the argument that coalitions should spend more than single party governments. I then discuss how existing scholarship on African politics fits into this theory. Finally, I derive two hypotheses that can be tested empirically in the next section.

Scholars have argued that higher spending by coalition governments is the result of changes to party accountability that occur when parties share responsibility for outcomes. Parties have different support constituencies, meaning that they have different groups whose support they must retain through demonstrable attention to group priorities. When many constituencies are represented within a single party, all costs and benefits are internalized by that party, and the party is accountable for all decisions. In a multiparty coalition of constituencies, however, each party is held responsible to their respective constituency for some subset of policy outcomes, but costs are shared by *all* parties in the coalition. This produces a situation which many describe as a *common pool resource problem* (CPR). A CPR is understood to occur whenever:

> "politicians consider the benefits and costs of their decisions on their constituencies only. In a budgeting situation, they do not internalize the full tax implications of their decisions and they request more spending [...] this leads to larger deficits than if they had considered the full burden" (Hallerberg and Marier, 2004, 572).[1]

We can think of this problem as one that affects both individual politicians and their parties. Each party is responsible to its own constituency, and so has an incentive to maximize spending in the domains that matter to its constituents. Because they are

[1]Common pool resource problems are discussed at greater length in Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) and Ostrom (1990), as well as summarized in Hallerberg and Marier (2004) and Wehner (2010).

focused only on maximizing the items of interest to their constituents, they are not focused on the overall levels of spending that result from all parties in government behaving in this way. Although they would like to claim responsibility for the benefits accruing to their constituents, they should prefer to deflect responsibility for increased spending. As a result, the party in question will attempt to shirk responsibility for deficit spending by blaming others in government for overspending – in domains that are of less interest to its own constituents. This logic implies that the more parties that enter a government together, the greater the number of constituencies to whom the government is distinctly accountable. At the same time, blame for overspending can be deflected to—or shared with—other parties in the government. As a result of this CPR problem, overall government spending is expected to increase (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006)

The generalizability of this existing research is limited, however, by its near-exclusive focus on industrialized democracies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Roubini and Sachs, 1989*b*,*a*; De Haan, Sturm and Beekhuis, 1999; Volkerink and de Haan, 2001; Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Ricciuti, 2004; Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006; Martin and Vanberg, 2013; Indridason and Bowler, 2014).[2] Because there has been little attention to government composition in African democracies, the effect government composition has on government spending has received almost no attention in existing scholarship. Very recent work by LeVan and Assenov (2015) is an exceptional case, and in their focus on African

[2]Currently there are 35 members of the OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. Despite the relatively recent ratification of some members (such as Chile and Israel in 2010), membership remains predominantly European, and there are no African countries in the OECD.

cabinets, the authors find that while increasing the number of ministries is associated with budget surpluses, changing from a single party to a coalition government had no consistent effect.

The work by LeVan and Assenov (2015) represents an important first examination of the link between government composition and budgetary outcomes but it also underscores a second feature of the existing literature.[3] LeVan and Assenov (2015) focus primarily on how government composition affects budget surpluses and deficits, seeing expenditure merely as a proxy for levels of patronage spending. Although they join many scholars in studying budget balances (Volkerink and de Haan, 2001; Woo, 2003; Hallerberg and Marier, 2004), and still others who examined expenditures in comparison with budget balances (Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Ricciuti, 2004; Wehner, 2010), these outcomes do not perfectly map onto the logic of CPR problems. As Martin and Vanberg (2013) note, the theoretical story favors a focus on government expenditures, because adding parties to a coalition increases pressure within the government to spend on areas of interest to multiple constituencies. These "less efficient bargains" (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006) within government spending suggest that the primary effect of adding more parties to government should be an increase in government spending, while any effects on budget deficits and surpluses are secondary effects (Martin and Vanberg, 2013, 954).

Of course, the pressure for governments to spend on areas prioritized by their constituencies relies on the principle that individual parties are accountable to the constituencies that elect them. This improvement upon existing theory can largely be credited to work by Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006), which differs from previous studies of the determinants of government spending by explicitly considering the

[3] There are several other differences between the analysis presented in LeVan and Assenov (2015) and in this chapter; these are discussed at greater length in the "Empirics" section of this chapter.

electoral sources of variation in party preferences, and thus taking party systems into account. The fact that most scholarship has focused on industrialized democracies of the OECD means that comparatively well-institutionalized parties have been taken for granted, and the idea that parties are at least partially accountable to voters is uncontroversial.

Evaluating the generalizability of existing theories requires me to think explicitly about how contextual features of African politics may affect the relationship between government composition and spending. As discussed at length in previous chapters, there is a great deal of existing work suggesting that African political parties are weak (Fomunyoh, 2001; Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Erdmann, 2004; Hyden, 2011), and that party system institutionalization is not as well developed across Africa as it is elsewhere in the world (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Manning, 2005; Lindberg, 2007). Because there is very little research on the partisan composition of governments, few have considered the possibility that the composition of the government may be affecting things like overall levels of government spending.

In order to understand the CPR problem as it exists in African governments, it is important to better understand how African political parties themselves behave, since it is these parties who comprise any government that forms. While some scholars have questioned the extent to which African parties really behave as "ethnic parties" (Basedau and Stroh, 2012; Elischer, 2013), there is a broad literature that sees them as primarily ethnic in nature and dominated by webs of clientelistic relations (Horowitz, 1985; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Manning, 2005; Ferree, 2010). Most scholars agree that at the least parties are inadequate aggregators of preferences, and others have gone farther in describing them as unrepresentative and transient (Fomunyoh, 2001; van de Walle and Butler, 1999; Randall and Svåsand, 2002; van de Walle, 2003).[4] The existing literature on African party system institutionalization paints a similarly disappointing picture of African political parties as a whole (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 2007).

As previously stated, the logic of the CPR problem requires parties to be at least somewhat accountable to their constituents. Given these critiques of African political parties, is it possible to see them as accountable to their constituents? I argue that despite the unfavorable descriptions of African political parties, the idea that parties are vertically accountable to constituents is strengthened by the perceived "shortcomings" of African parties. To the extent that parties are personalistic vehicles designed primarily to funnel resources from party leadership to particular segments of society, it is reasonable to expect that these constituencies are indeed paying attention to what they receive, and thus able to maintain some degree of accountability (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005; Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2012; Carlson, 2015).

Some have argued that citizens need both clarity of responsibility and the ability to access spending data to evaluate whether the government, and its constituent parties, did as promised (McKie and van de Walle, 2010). However, in the absence of information on spending data, voters may also rely on the "relative distribution" of goods to themselves (as opposed to others) in order to decide whether to vote for a challenger or the incumbent (Carlson, Forthcoming). In addition to voters' use of relative distribution to evaluate whether a party did as it promised, the comparatively

[4]Relatedly, many criticize African political parties for lacking party platforms. Manning (2005) and Elischer (2013) both note that African parties are less likely to explicitly discuss programmatic goals because broad goals like better health, education, etc. are shared by all parties and do not permit differentiation, and high foreign aid dependency limits the available alternatives. This perspective is shared by Bleck and van de Walle (2012), who argue that incumbent parties use valence issues to rally support, while opposition parties are more likely to take a divisive position on an issue.

high fluidity of African party systems also suggests that parties that fail to deliver can be undercut by the emergence of new parties. While some scholarship argues that excessive legislative volatility can break down party accountability to voters (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005; Ferree, 2010), it also implies that challenger parties can more easily form in response to voter dissatisfaction.[5] This means that party leaders, such as ministers appointed to a coalition government, have incentives to appeal to their constituents by demanding prioritization of spending in their domains.

As discussed in earlier chapters, there is evidence that general theories of government formation can be adapted to the African context (Ariotti and Golder, 2018), and coalition governments are becoming an increasingly important feature of many African governments (Kadima, 2014*b*). The fact that African political parties may rely on entrenched clientelistic relations more than parties in other regions of the world only serves to emphasize the possibility that voters pay attention to whether parties deliver the goods that they promise during election season – even if their means for evaluating these promises may rely on flawed information, such as relative distribution. As a result, I argue that coalition governments should spend more than single-party governments in Africa democracies. As existing work from OECD countries has found, increasing the number of parties in government results in each party prioritizing the support of its constituency and pushing for higher spending in the domains of interest to its voters. As different parties appeal to different constituencies, the result is a common pool resource problem, in which the costs of increased government spending are externalized. The reliance of most African parties on par-

[5]Indeed, as both scholars note, there is a delicate balance between enough volatility to maintain competitiveness, and an excess which breaks down party accountability to voters (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005; Ferree, 2010). Note, however, that the ease with which parties may form does not necessarily suggest that voters will flock to new parties in large enough numbers to upset incumbents. Indeed, this is evidenced by the fragmentation of opposition parties in many African countries, and frequently results in a failure of opposition movements to coordinate in meaningful ways.

ticularistic appeals to their constituencies should only reinforce the accountability mechanism that underpins the CPR story. This argument leads to a clear hypothesis regarding the effect of government composition on government spending in African countries:

> **Coalition Hypothesis:** Coalition governments have higher levels of government spending than single-party governments.

While the scholarship tying government composition to budgets and budgetary outcomes generally agrees that the composition of the government matters for spending levels, there is less consensus about which dimension of government composition matters. As discussed, many scholars argue that it is the number of *parties* in government that drives budget outcomes (Roubini and Sachs, 1989*a*,*b*; De Haan, Sturm and Beekhuis, 1999; Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006). However, others find that the number of *ministers* has a more robust effect on budget outcomes (Volkerink and de Haan, 2001; Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009; Wehner, 2010).[6] In his study of African leaders and their patronage coalitions, Arriola (2009) argues that as the number of ministers increases, more ethnic groups are being co-opted into the government. If the number of ministers is indeed a proxy for incorporating more ethnic groups, or constituencies, into government, then we might reasonably expect that the number of ministers is another way of capturing relevant information about government composition.

The mechanism by which increasing the number of ministers leads to increased government spending is compatible with the CPR problem described before. Recall

[6]It is worth noting here that the number of parties in government and the number of ministers are not independent of one another. Indridason and Bowler (2014) find that more parties in government increases cabinet size, as does an increase in legislature size, but a broader ideological span between government parties reduces cabinet size.

that the CPR problem results when parties are focused only on their constituents' interests. If each minister similarly focuses only on how much their ministry can spend and externalizes the costs of higher overall spending, the CPR problem can also arise. This leads me to a second hypothesis that focuses on the number of ministers rather than the number of parties in government:

> **Minister Hypothesis:** Increasing the number of ministers is associated with higher levels of government spending

6.2 Empirical Analysis

As discussed in the theory section, it is only recently that coalition governments in African countries have begun to receive empirical attention. The data in this chapter is slightly different in structure from the data presented in the previous chapters, as it relies on the country-year as the unit of analysis, rather than the government. This is because spending data is most commonly available at the yearly level, as a result of the annual budget formation process. However, the sample is otherwise determined in the same way: A country is considered African if it is a member of the African Union, and I focus on democracies in the time period ranging from 1990 to 2015.

My decision to focus on democracies is one of the major ways in which this work is distinguishable from LeVan and Assenov (2015). LeVan and Assenov (2015) explicitly note their preference for the Banks (2001) data in order to maximize the range of their study back as far as the 1970s. This means that a number of country-years included in their analysis are coded as authoritarian.[7] The ability of authoritarian regimes

[7] Instead of restricting the sample to democracies, they control for "liberal democracy" using the Freedom House scale, as well as "executive constraints" on power from the Database of Political Institutions. They also include a separate indicator in their models for whether the regime is single-party, and another indicator for whether the regime is a civilian dictatorship.

to limit party competition affects both government formation processes and voters' ability to hold parties accountable. Because my theoretical story about the CPR logic of government spending relies on constituents having the ability to hold parties accountable and vote for alternatives to the incumbent, including authoritarian regimes would be inappropriate.

Government Spending

In keeping with the existing scholarship and this theoretical story, I expect that increased government expenditure is the result of the CPR logic, rather than secondary outcomes on budget deficits and surpluses.[8] The dependent variable is thus government spending, or the size of the public sector. Data on government expenditures is taken from the World Bank. The measure of government spending used is the *general government final consumption expenditure,* as a percentage of GDP. It includes "all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation" (*World Development Indicators*, 2017).[9]

My theoretical story relies on the fact that different parties appeal to different constituencies. As a result, some might argue that disaggregated spending data that could be linked to specific party platforms might be more appropriate to test this

[8]This is another way in which my work differs from the analysis presented by LeVan and Assenov (2015). In their study, LeVan and Assenov (2015) do look at government expenditures, but see them as a measure of patronage spending. I am interested in understanding the effect of government composition on government spending, and although expenditure likely captures some elements of patronage spending, I am less interested in that possible dynamic in this chapter. Because my argument is about the role of government composition on overall spending, the inclusion of possible patronage spending in the general expenditure data is not problematic.

[9]The variable is "general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)." See `http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.GOVT.ZS` for more information and metadata.

argument. Realistically, this would necessitate a massive amount of information: not only would it require detail about which parties relied on which types of spending to please constituents, but it would also require much more fine-grained budgetary information than is generally available for many countries. Such difficulties in linking parties to specific areas of spending have been noted by scholars focusing on the OECD, where data is generally more widely available than in the developing world (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006). These issues would be further compounded by having to determine spending priorities by party cross-nationally, which would call for additional types of information. As a result I use this general measure of overall spending, focusing on the larger implications of the CPR problem for aggregate spending.

The countries that are both coded as democratic and for which spending data are available are shown in Table 6.1. There are a total of 16 countries that experience two or more years of democracy.[10] As previously noted, the unit of analysis in this chapter is the country-year, because government spending is generally approved in the form of an annual budget. The countries coded as democracies with available spending data produce a cumulative total of 186 country-years. The sample size is somewhat limited by the availability of spending data.

Measuring Government Size

Although there is a general consensus that political institutions, like government composition, have an effect on budget outcomes, there has been considerably less agreement about the most theoretically appropriate means of operationalizing these political institutions. Early work focused on classifying government by type of coali-

[10] The Gambia and Burkina Faso are coded as democratic but have spending data available for only one year each. They are thus not included in this table or the analysis as a result of modeling considerations.

Table 6.1: Countries in sample

Country	Years
Benin	2001-2013
Botswana	1990-1996, 2006-2014
Cape Verde	2007-2009, 2012
Ghana	2001-2011
Kenya	2002-2015
Lesotho	2007-2013
Liberia	2006-2008, 2010-2013
Madagascar	2000-2008, 2014
Malawi	2009-2015
Mali	2000-2011
Mauritius	1990-2014
Namibia	1991-1992, 1999-2015
Senegal	2000-2001, 2009-2015
Sierra Leone	2007-2014
South Africa	1994-2015
Zambia	2010-2011
$n = 16$	*country-years* $= 186$

tion or single party arrangement (Roubini and Sachs, 1989*a*,*b*), while others argued instead that "size fragmentation" could be better measured using the number of cabinet ministers or the number of coalition partners in government together (Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002). Some further argued that not all ministers have "spending" preferences – but even those scholars focusing exclusively on 'spending ministers' have not been in complete agreement about which ministers should be counted (Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Wehner, 2010).

I take few different approaches to understanding how different features of government composition affect levels of government spending. First, I distinguish between single-party governments and partisan coalition governments. As the names indicate, a single-party government is a government where all of the cabinet positions are held by a single party. In contrast, a partisan coalition government is one in which multiple parties hold positions in the cabinet. As discussed more extensively in Chapter 2, I define partisan coalition governments as those in which multiple parties, with legislative representation, share full-rank ministerial positions in the cabinet.[11] Although Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) examine how increasing the number of parties in government affects the levels of overall spending, the available data on African government composition does not always allow me to determine this information.[12] As a result, I am only able to examine differences between single-party and coalition governments, rather than a measure of the effect of additional parties *within* coalition governments on government spending.

The data on governments presents an additional hurdle for the analysis, as budgets are passed annually, but new governments can (and often do) form at any time.[13] A single year may contain multiple governments, or a single government may last for multiple years. This means that to code a government as a single-party or coalition for country-years is a somewhat crude measure of actual government composition across time. To best leverage the information I have at the government level into the country-year format used in this chapter, I operationalize the presence of a government coalition as the number of months in that country-year that a government is coded as a coalition. For example, if a coalition government formed in January 2002 and

[11]Note that this means a government in which all full-rank ministerial positions are held by a single party is not considered a coalition, even if some deputy or assistant ministers are members of another party. It also means that as least two of the parties in government must possess legislative seats in order to be counted as a coalition. Small parties that lack legislative seats are not, on their own, enough to constitute a coalition partnership by my criteria.

[12]This occurs for a variety of reasons, including the inability to determine seat shares attributable to each party, extensive references to a coalition government that includes one major party and a collection of "smaller support parties," etc. These limitations are discussed in Ariotti and Golder (2018).

[13]As is standard in the government formation literature, I code a new government as forming when there has been an election, a change in the identity of the head of the government, a change in the cabinet's partisan composition, or the government resigns (Müller and Strøm, 2000). For more on the data and coding of African governments, see Chapter 2.

ended in March 2003, and a single-party government formed in April 2003 and lasted into 2004, then the country would have the number of months in a coalition coded as 12 in 2002, and 3 in 2003. While imperfect, this operationalization allows me to approximate the degree to which a government coalition may have influenced spending in a given year.

A second approach to understanding government composition has been the number of ministers in the cabinet. I use two different measures: one which focuses on counting ministerial portfolios in the cabinet, and is more inclusive; and a second, which attempts to replicate the criteria for "spending ministers" as described by Wehner (2010). The inclusive definition includes actors, such as presidents and prime ministers holding additional portfolio responsibilities, who might otherwise be excluded from counts of ministers. For example, in Malawi in 2011, the President is also the Minister of Statutory Corporations, Civil Service Administration, National Relief and Disaster Management.[14] The definition for spending ministers is much more narrow, emphasizing what Wehner sees as ministers "who are most likely to externalize a large share of the cost of their actions" (Wehner, 2010, 638). He defines spending ministers as all full-rank cabinet ministers, *excepting*:

> "the chief executive (prime minister, president, or chancellor) and his or her deputies, finance ministers (including budget ministers, ministers of the economy and the treasury) and attached ministers, as well as any minister who is directly attached to the chief executive or who is subordinate to a portfolio for which a representative minister already exists, such as associate ministers, assistant ministers, minister delegates, ministers in other ministries, and parliamentary secretaries" (Wehner, 2010, 637).

[14]The president was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Malawi Defence Force and Police Service. It is not unusual for presidents to hold other ministerial portfolios, especially the Minister of Defense. This is also true of Prime Ministers, Vice Presidents, and Deputy Prime Ministers, although it varies by country and also within countries across time. Detailed coding notes are included with this dataset documenting who was or was not included in such counts.

In order to code the number of ministers and the number of spending ministers, I rely on the cabinet listings taken at approximately one-year intervals and recorded in annual volumes of *Africa South of the Sahara*. This encyclopedic reference allows me to count ministerial portfolios according to the titles officially on record. There is a general sense that the number of ministers in African cabinets is increasing over time (Arriola, 2009; LeVan and Assenov, 2015). As Figure 6.1 shows, this is true, on average, if we compare snapshots of 1990 to 2015. However, this summary view of the trend masks a great deal of irregular variation occurring in African cabinets over time.

The number of ministerial positions that are excluded using Wehner (2010)'s definition of spending ministers does not have a consistent effect, although it might initially seem as though it would merely shift the total up or down by a fixed number in each country. The fact that ministerial portfolios are frequently combined, split apart, and recombined means that the number of portfolios excluded as "non-spending" is not a fixed number.[15] Most of these changes occur across countries, but there is some movement within countries over time as well. While previous studies have relied on ministerial counts, focusing on those with a greater ability to externalize the costs of higher spending is a helpful way of addressing the CPR mechanism. I run models using both types of count; the results are substantively similar.

[15]For example, some countries have a separate Minister of Finance and Minister of the Economy; others combine these roles as a single portfolio. Others have norms of assigning portfolios to the President and Vice President, all of which is excluded in the spending minister count.

Figure 6.1: Total Ministerial Portfolios by Country, 1990-2015



Note: The total number of ministerial portfolios for each country in the data is shown for each year that the country appears in the country-year dataset. Data on the number of ministers was coded using volumes of *Africa South of the Sahara*.

Controls

I include controls to address other possible sources of variation in levels of government spending. I control for the number of governments that formed in a single year. Instability, as proxied by rapid turnover in governments, could affect levels of government spending if budget priorities are changing along with the government composition. I also control for the effective number of legislative parties (ENLP), which is frequently used as a measure of fragmentation in the legislature. As I illustrate in Chapter 3, partisan coalition governments are not equally likely at all levels of ENLP.[16] Controlling for ENLP allows me to take into account, indirectly, institutional features such as electoral rules that influence which parties are in the legislature, and therefore which parties are available to be members of any potential government.

Finally, I include several controls to capture general socioeconomic conditions that could affect levels of government spending in a given year. I include total population and the dependency ratio as controls, which provide measures of the population's overall age structure.[17] I also control for GDP per capita and unemployment, which could affect the government's willingness to spend more. Existing research also suggests that trade openness is correlated with government spending, where governments in more open economies tend to spend more. The summary statistics for all of the variables in the analyses are shown in Table 6.2.

[16] Recall that the probability of a coalition forming in Africa first increases, then decreases across increasing values of the ENLP. The probability of a coalition forming increases until ENLP = 4.76 before beginning to decline.

[17] The dependency ratio is the population aged 0-14 and over 65 relative to the "working age" population (15-64). The dependency ratio provides an indication of the age structure of a country's population and trends in its social needs (`https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/General/GlossaryDemographicTerms.aspx`).

Table 6.2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Government spending (% of GDP)	16.91	5.91	6.94	38.41
Months coalition	5.61	5.79	0	12
Total ministers	22.96	5.44	10	38
Spending ministers	21.13	5.20	9	35
Governments formed in year	1.32	0.53	1	4
ENLP	2.81	1.59	1.19	8.34
GDP per capita (1000s of constant 2010 USD)	3.04	2.66	0.29	9.16
Trade openness (% of GDP)	85.28	36.62	38.58	311.36
Total unemployment (% of labor force)	12.26	8.52	0.69	37.60
Dependency ratio	75.11	16.84	40.80	99.98
Total population (1000s)	14789.33	16166.92	486.44	55011.98

Note: Expenditures are displayed as a percent of GDP. GDP per capita is expressed in 1000s of constant 2010 USD. Unemployment is expressed as the share of the workforce that is without work but seeking employment. The dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents (< 15 or > 64 to working age population, calculated as a proportion of dependents per 100 working age population. Trade openness is expressed as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. Population is expressed in thousands. Data for all economic indicators from the *World Development Indicators* (2017).

6.2.1 Model Specification and Results

Existing work considers seriously the empirical implications of modeling the budgetary process. This is most evident in discussions of the importance of lagging the covariates and the dependent variable. Both Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) and Martin and Vanberg (2013) estimate autoregressive distributed lag models (ADL). This approach raises questions about whether past, present, or both values of the covariates should be included. Best practice, in the absence of theoretically motivated expectations, is to include past and present values of the covariates, as well as a lagged dependent variable (Martin and Vanberg, 2013). Empirical work finds that most of the effects of government composition appear to matter more at the point when the budget was passed, as opposed to when it was implemented (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006, 261).[18] Theoretically speaking, the lags of covariates, such as socioeconomic

[18] This finding is corroborated by Martin and Vanberg (2013).

variables, are important because the budget is created for year t in year $t-1$. This means that the context of the budget creation for year t are the conditions at time $t-1$. The lag of the dependent variable is important because budgets are not created out of thin air – most often, the starting point of the budget for year t is the budget that was approved in year $t-1$. I have no firm expectations regarding the role of these socioeconomic variables. While the state of the economy in $t-1$ is foremost in the government's collective mind as it develops the budget, it is also possible that the values of these variables at time t may also affect implementation of the budget (Martin and Vanberg, 2013).

Existing work relies on OLS models with panel-corrected standard errors, and also panel-corrected standard errors with country fixed effects (Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006; Martin and Vanberg, 2013). Including country fixed effects allows us to focus on the variation within countries, rather than across them. This is of substantive interest, given that the theory makes arguments about the effect that moving from a single-party to coalition government within a single country has on government spending. It does, however, pose some problems for my analysis, as many countries have limited time series data available. Given that I am interested in testing the generalizability of CPR theories of government spending in the context of African democracies, I elect to base my modeling strategy on these existing studies. This differs from the empirical strategy employed by LeVan and Assenov (2015), but allows me to compare my work more directly to existing scholarship on this topic in other regions.[19]

[19]LeVan and Assenov (2015) employ OLS estimates with panel-corrected standard errors, but they do not include any lags or country fixed effects. They argue that this strategy is appropriate because the data contain fewer years than cross-sectional cases. As previously discussed, they also include data from both democracies and autocracies. For the key political variables they include the raw count of ministries (not specifically designating "spending" ministers as in other existing work), and a binary indicator for whether there was a coalition taken from the Banks (2001) data (though it is not clear, based on the codebook for the Banks data, what exactly this variable captures). Their control variables include: whether a country was formerly a British colony, religious and

My approach thus includes as covariates the lagged dependent variable (government spending at time $t-1$), as well as both current and one-year lags of all other independent variables. The dependent variable is government spending in time t. Recall that I use one-year lags for all covariates because a budget for time t is passed during time $t-1$. For the model including the months that a government was a coalition in a given year as the main independent variable of interest (months coalition), the results are shown in Table 6.3. Model 1 reports the results for current and lagged values of the dependent and independent variables with panel corrected standard errors. Model 2 reports these same results, with the addition of country fixed effects. The presence of more legislative parties in government (as measured by a partisan coalition vs. a single-party government) does not appear to have a systematic effect on levels of government spending in either of the models shown in Table 6.3.

I next rerun the same models, with one-year lagged and current values of the covariates and a lagged dependent variable, in Table 6.4. Models 1 and 3 are run with panel-corrected standard errors, while Models 2 and 4 include panel-corrected standard errors and country fixed effects. In Models 1 and 2, I show the results when we use the total number of cabinet ministers as the main dimension of government composition of interest. There is no evidence that the total number of ministers in the year the budget was passed (lagged values) has any effect on government spending, but there is some weak evidence to suggest that the total number of ministers in the year the budget is implemented may lead to an increase in government spending. In Models 3 and 4 I focus on the effect of increasing the number of spending ministers. Recall that "spending ministers" are those most likely to externalize the costs of

ethnic fractionalization, logged population, the rate of GDP growth, oil rent, contraints on executive authority (from the Database of Political Institutions), liberal democracy (taken from Freedom House), an indicator for civilian regimes, and an indicator for single-party regimes.

Table 6.3: Government Composition and Government Spending: Parties in government

	Model 1 (PCSEs)	Model 2 (PCSEs w/FE)
Lagged		
Months coalition	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Gov'ts in year	-0.10	0.01
	(0.18)	(0.18)
ENLP	0.23	0.03
	(0.26)	(0.26)
GDP per capita	1.92**	2.00***
	(0.94)	(0.77)
Unemployment	0.05	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Trade openness	0.005	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dependency ratio	0.26	0.28
	(0.25)	(0.37)
Total population	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gov't spending	0.90***	0.62***
	(0.05)	(0.08)
Current		
Months coalition	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Gov'ts in year	0.27*	0.29*
	(0.16)	(0.16)
ENLP	-0.08	-0.12
	(0.28)	(0.28)
GDP per capita	-1.74*	-1.54**
	(0.92)	(0.75)
Unemployment	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Trade openness	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dependency ratio	-0.22	-0.14
	(0.25)	(0.39)
Total population	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-3.68	-9.42**
	(2.29)	(3.67)
Observations	159	159

* indicates $p < 0.10$; ** indicates $p < 0.05$; *** indicates $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Note: One-year lagged values for covariates and the dependent variable, government spending. Population is in 1000s, GDP per capita is also reported in 1000s of 2010 constant USD. The dependency ratio is reported as a proportion of dependents per 100 working age population. Trade openness is expressed as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP.

their desire to increase spending in their own ministry. These results suggest that the number of spending ministers at the time budgets are passed (lagged values) is less important than the number of spending ministers during the year the budget is implemented.

On the whole, the results presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide some evidence that in African democracies, the composition of the government during budget implementation has a stronger effect on overall spending than the composition of the government at the time the budget is passed (one year prior). This is in contrast to the results from Europe, where the strongest effects are in the year the budget is passed, with the implementation covariates proving far less important. The results presented in this section suggest that, although the data is limited, there is some evidence to suggest that concerns about the potential negative effects of CPR problems on government spending in African democracies are unwarranted. In any event, there is no evidence of a particularly strong relationship between government composition and government spending, although there is some evidence to suggest that it is the number of spending ministers, rather than the number of parties in government, that leads to higher spending during budget implementation.

If we consider the results of the control variables in tandem, it would appear that features like government composition and government stability (measured as the number of new governments forming during a single year) matter most for how a budget is implemented – while it is the previous budget and GDP per capita that are the most important factors in actually determining the budget. It may be that in these less consolidated democracies, budgets are used as signaling devices to constituents and donors, but budget implementation is really where CPR pressures are felt most strongly. Although this data is limited by a relatively short time-series and

Table 6.4: Government Composition and Government Spending: Minister counts

	Model 1 (PCSEs)	Model 2 (PCSEs w/FE)	Model 3 (PCSEs)	Model 4 (PCSEs w/FE)
Lagged				
Total ministers	-0.06	-0.07		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Spending ministers			-0.07*	-0.08
			(0.05)	(0.05)
Gov'ts in year	-0.19	-0.06	-0.20	-0.06
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
ENLP	0.13	-0.12	0.13	-0.12
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.26)
GDP per capita	1.97**	1.85**	1.94**	1.82**
	(0.92)	(0.75)	(0.91)	(0.75)
Unemployment	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Trade openness	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dependency ratio	0.28	0.30	0.30	0.27
	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.27)	(0.36)
Total population	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gov't spending	0.90***	0.62***	0.90***	0.62***
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Current				
Total ministers	0.07	0.10**		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Spending ministers			0.08*	0.10**
			(0.05)	(0.04)
Gov'ts in year	0.29*	0.36**	0.29*	0.36**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
ENLP	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.28)
GDP per capita	-1.79**	-1.40*	-1.76**	-1.38*
	(0.90)	(0.74)	(0.89)	(0.74)
Unemployment	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Trade openness	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dependency ratio	-0.25	-0.14	-0.26	-0.12
	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.27)	(0.38)
Total population	-0.0001	0.001	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-4.01*	-10.94***	-4.09*	-10.78***
	(2.24)	(4.06)	(2.26)	(4.02)
Observations	159	159	159	159

* indicates $p < 0.10$; ** indicates $p < 0.05$; *** indicates $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

Note: One-year lagged values for covariates and the dependent variable, government spending. Population is in 1000s, GDP per capita is also reported in 1000s of 2010 constant USD. The dependency ratio is reported as a proportion of dependents per 100 working age population. Trade openness is expressed as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP.

data missingness, it does provide a starting point for scholars interested in further examining how the composition of African governments can influence the creation and implementation of the budget. As African democracies continue to develop and consolidate, government composition may become more influential in the budget creation process, as we see in more consolidated democracies elsewhere. In any event, the fact that the number of parties in government does not appear to dramatically increase levels of government spending suggests that those concerned about potential negative budget outcomes resulting from partisan coalition governments may instead prefer to focus on reducing the number of spending ministers.

6.3 Conclusion

Transparency in government spending plays an important role in developing political institutions, which is particularly relevant in countries where state resources have often been the source of patronage politics. The publication of data on government spending allows the government to show what it has done for citizens, and makes it more difficult to hide unequal distributions of public goods. A better understanding of the relationship between government composition and public sector spending is key to understanding how political institutions influence political outcomes. It is particularly important in the context of developing countries, where spending decisions have major consequences for both citizens and development.

Scholars have recently begun to consider African governments as tools for building partisan support in the legislature, focusing on the role that executive-legislative relations play in determining who gets into government and how many ministerial portfolios are allocated to each party that joins a government coalition (Ariotti and

Golder, 2018). Existing work in Europe and Latin America suggests that government composition plays a role in determining levels of government spending, but the relatively limited research on government composition in Africa means that little is known about the relationship between government composition and spending. In this chapter I focus on the common pool resource (CPR) problems that cause parties and politicians to push for increased spending on the issues they care about, while externalizing the costs of increased overall spending. Specifically, I examine support for the argument that government composition affects government spending, and find that there is no evidence to suggest that coalitions spend more than single party governments. However, there is some evidence to suggest that higher numbers of spending ministers do result in increased spending. These results suggest that concerns about the potential negative effects of partisan coalitions in African democracies, at least with regards to levels of government spending, may be unfounded.

International efforts to produce documents pertaining to government spending frequently focus on the publication of budgetary reports, but often fail to seriously evaluate the substantive content of such documents with respect to whether the data provided actually permits any form of transparent analysis (de Renzio and Simson, 2013). Despite these limitations, the available data does permit a first cut at understanding the relationship between government composition and government size. As African democracies become more consolidated, I expect that the differences shown here between the budget creation process and the budget implementation process should begin to shrink. In weakly consolidated democracies with weakly institutionalized parties, it may well be the case that the creation of a budget is seen as less important than the implementation – for voters with low information and limited budgetary transparency, implementation is both more important and easier to observe.

While this chapter is constrained by the data availability, it draws attention to a number of new questions for future scholars to investigate. For example, little is known about the interaction of government composition and the budget rules in African democracies. Existing scholarship from industrialized democracies suggests that while there is a tendency for more parties or ministers to raise spending, these can be effectively mitigated by changes to budgeting processes or the centralization of budget authority (Hallerberg and Marier, 2004; Martin and Vanberg, 2013). Given the current popularity of increased decentralization, more research into the politics of the budget is necessary.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Although the literature on government formation is one of the largest in political science, there is almost no research on government formation in Africa. Arriola (2009, 1349) writes that "little is actually known about the determinants of cabinets – one of the few observable representations of the coalitions built by African leaders." Kapa and Shale (2014, 94) claim that "[w]hereas political party coalitions and alliances have been widely discussed in Western Europe and other regions [. . .], little research has been done into the value of these phenomena and why they form in Africa." Finally, Kadima and Owuor (2014, 174) state that the "study of pre-electoral alliances and coalition governments in Africa is in its infancy." As these scholars all note, government formation processes, and their effects, have largely been neglected by scholars of African politics.

Scholars of comparative politics who focus on Africa tend to ignore executive-legislative dynamics entirely, even in Africa's democracies. Research has examined conflict, voting behavior, corruption, and to a growing extent political parties, but rarely do they examine legislatures or government cabinets.[1] Anecdotally, some scholars of African politics claim that the number of democracies in Africa is trivial, or that there are no government coalitions. As I explain in Chapter 2, by standard measures of democracy, I find that post-1990s, 25 African countries are coded as democracies for some or all of that time. Of the 176 governments I identify over that same period, 86 are partisan coalitions. Failing to update our understanding of African politics to reflect the evolution of political institutions in new, and newly-institutionalizing, democracies means overlooking important political processes that are typically examined in detail by scholars in other regions.

I respond to those authors who note how little we know about governments in African democracies, as well as to the scholars who have not recognized the importance of studying governments in the first place, by collecting original data on government composition in African democracies. This allows us, for the first time, to systematically examine what types of governments form, as well as assess how well existing theory is able to explain *when* different types of governments form. I begin by demonstrating that contrary to conventional wisdom, partisan coalition governments form frequently in African democracies of all types – partisan coalitions can be found both in Africa's parliamentary *and* presidential democracies. Nearly half of the governments I identify in African democracies are, in fact, partisan coalitions. For 102 of the total number of 176 governments that I identify, I am also able to describe the type of government based on the party composition in detail. This allows me to illustrate the variation in African governments, including single-party minorities and coalitions, as well as single-party majorities, minimal winning coalitions, and surplus coalitions.

[1] There are some scholars who call for increased attention to legislatures; see Barkan (2008), Barkan (2009*a*), Opalo (2017) and Collord (2018).

Having established that these partisan coalitions are not only common, but also important sources of variation, I then examine the determinants of coalition formation. I specifically focus on how the composition of the legislature affects whether a partisan coalition government forms. I find that single-party majority governments predictably reduce the probability of a coalition forming, but that the relationship between the complexity of the legislative environment and the probability of a coalition government forming is quadratic. As the legislature moves from a single-party majority to intermediate levels of complexity, partisan coalitions become more likely. However, when legislatures are highly complex, party indiscipline and particularism make the formation of a coalition lower in African democracies. I contrast this finding with Europe's more institutionalized party systems, showing that there is no decline in the probability of a coalition forming even in Europe's most complex legislatures.

By demonstrating that coalitions do exist in African democracies, and that they form at different rates in response to characteristics of the legislature, I show that executive-legislative dynamics can affect how political leaders consolidate support. Despite the strength of African presidents vis-à-vis other political institutions, they are not immune to the strategic calculations about building elite support that scholars have shown are important in other regions, such as Europe and Latin America. This finding is particularly important because scholarship on African politics frequently treats political institutions as if they are unable to constrain the leader's behavior in meaningful ways. I have shown evidence that even powerful leaders in African democracies can be affected by institutional considerations. In particular, legislatures are important political arenas in African democracies, and they deserve greater scholarly attention.

I have also provided evidence that which government forms, out of all the possible governments, can be studied empirically. The likelihood that a potential government forms is affected by the combination of the parties it includes, as well as by the characteristics of those component parties. A better understanding of which parties are more likely to be a part of the government, as well as which governments are themselves more likely, is an important part of understanding how executive-legislative relations operate in African democracies. I show that governments containing a single-party majority are more likely to form than other governments. This differs from existing research, which typically only examines "minority legislatures" and excludes single-party majority legislatures from both the theoretical and empirical discussion. By including these "majority legislatures," I empirically test arguments about which governments form without systematically excluding some cases from the sample. These majority legislature cases are particularly relevant in African democracies, where they occur frequently, and where single-parties with legislative majorities frequently decide to build surplus coalitions. I also show that governments containing the largest party are more likely to form than those that do not, and that in presidential democracies, governments that include the previous head of government are more likely to form.

Having shown that coalitions are common and that they form in response to legislative considerations, I also examine how power is shared by the parties that enter into coalitions together. The idea of power-sharing is familiar to many scholars of African politics, although it is frequently mentioned in conjunction with responses to previous civil conflicts and/or electoral violence, or the need to appease different ethno-regional blocs in a given country. I have shown that instead of seeing power-sharing exclusively as a response to ethnic heterogeneity, it can also be used as a means to consolidate support among political parties. The use of coalitions of political parties to build legislative support has been extensively studied in the context of European parliamentary democracies, and partisan coalitions are well-known to scholars of government formation more generally.

I am interested in cases in which this institutional power-sharing takes the form of partisan portfolio allocation. Portfolio allocation across parties in government together in Africa behaves similarly to patterns of portfolio allocation in Europe, and the systematic differences that we observe can be explained by theories that address the nature of executive-legislative relations in different types of democracies. The formation of partisan coalition governments allows multiple parties to share ministerial responsibilities, which enables leaders to build up legislative support while also allowing other parties access to important resources. Both parties and leaders have incentives to coordinate these arrangements, as they can be a fruitful arrangement for all those involved.

While much of this dissertation deals with different aspects of the government formation process, I also examine what different types of governments mean for the citizens in countries where they form. Existing scholarship on government composition and overall government spending suggests that coalition governments spend more than single-party governments; similar arguments are made about increasing the number of ministers. This tendency is attributed to a common-pool resource problem, in which each party or minister internalizes only the spending that matters to their constituents or ministry, while externalizing the overall increasing costs to the other parties or ministers in the government with them. Although the data that is available for African democracies is limited and there are many methodological considerations to address, preliminary evidence suggests that coalition governments do not spend more than single-party governments. The apparent lack of relationship between government composition and overall government spending is somewhat reassuring in the context of African democracies, where limited resources still plague many governments. While some may worry that partisan coalitions are merely a way to increase patronage payouts to political elites and thus result in highly problematic increases in spending, this chapter provides room for some cautious optimism. Though partisan coalitions may bring their own problems, they at least do not appear to be generating massive increases in overall government expenditures.

That existing theories of executive-legislative relations find support in African democracies means that African political institutions matter for the outcomes that we observe. This is particularly important for our understanding of broad questions about how political institutions evolve over time, and particularly how institutions affect democratization. Because I focus on government formation in democracies, I can examine how variation in the types of governments that form and how they operate affects democratic consolidation, as well as how executive-legislative relations are evolving in the context of party systems becoming more institutionalized. Because political parties are the link between citizens and their government, they are a key part of understanding African politics. While parties are often seen exclusively as vehicles for personal gain and patronage, we also need to recognize that institutional incentives shape their behavior. These institutional incentives are likely to grow more and more relevant, as parties become more institutionalized and legislatures play a more effective role in the governing process.

The theoretical and empirical discussions that I have presented in the previous chapters also serve as reminders that context matters. While we can build upon existing theories to explain institutional relations in African democracies, we must also take into account the features of African political systems that can affect the government formation process. I examine how African government formation is both similar to and different from the same processes that we observe in European democracies. I find that when we account for implicit assumptions in the existing literature, much of what we observe is consistent with scholarship from outside of Africa. My results suggest that scholars of democratic African politics should pay more attention to the government formation process, and to executive-legislative relations more broadly.

Although I discuss it at various points in the preceding chapters, ethnicity is not the main focus of this dissertation. While the few existing studies of government composition in Africa have tended to focus on the ethnic considerations that drive increases in cabinet size or portfolio allocation across ethnic groups in relation to their relative sizes in the population, I have focused on the institutional and partisan processes that drive these decisions. Studies of African politics have been dominated by discussions of ethnicity for some time now, and I argue that this tendency has contributed to the widespread failure to consider institutional explanations for political processes on the continent. Scholars have acknowledged that the political relevance of ethnicity varies; however, this acknowledgement has largely failed to translate into a reconsideration of theoretical explanations for political processes. While I acknowledge that ethnicity undoubtedly plays a role in some of the countries that figure in my data on African governments, I argue that institutional considerations are also important. I leave the matter of tying institutional explanations to ethnic arguments to future research.

My findings also speak to the tendency to consider African politics separately from much of the other scholarship from other regions, and from comparative politics more broadly. While there are many contextual features of African politics that can systematically affect our hypothesized relationships, this is not a reason to throw away all existing theory as irrelevant. Instead, this dissertation shows that we can build on existing theory, taking into account what we know about African politics, and examining where implicit assumptions about political processes are not realistic in a new context. This allows us to examine to what extent the underlying mechanisms behave in ways that are similar to other regions, and in what ways we see outcomes diverge. Proceeding in this manner allows us to link the scholarship on African politics into broader discussions about a claim's generalizability, and allows us to test the limits of broad theoretical arguments.

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Appendix

A.1 Chapter 5

A.1.1 Marginal Effect of *Africa* on *Portfolioshare*

The results in Table 5.2 provided strong support for my *Party Size Hypothesis* and my *Formateur Hypothesis*. To fully evaluate the conditional theory underlying these hypotheses, though, it is necessary to recognize the inherent symmetry of interaction models (Berry, Golder and Milton, 2012). This means that I also need to evaluate the marginal effect of *Africa* on *Portfolioshare*. In the main text, I reported that this marginal effect was exactly as predicted, providing full support for the conditional theory. However, I did not go into too much detail and directed the interested reader to the Appendix for a more in depth analysis.

The marginal effect of *Africa* on *Portfolioshare* is $\beta_3 + \beta_4 Seatshare + \beta_5 Formateur$. According to my theory, non-formateur parties in Africa should always receive a lower share of portfolios than their counterparts in Europe, whereas formateur parties in Africa should always receive a higher share. In Figure A.1, I plot the marginal effects of *Africa* for non-formateur parties (top) and for formateur parties (bottom) across the observed range of *Seatshare* for each type of cabinet party using the results from the 'combined' model that 'includes formateur status' in Table 5.2. The observed range of *Seatshare* for non-formateur parties is 0.003 to 0.728. For formateur parties, it is 0.043 to 0.990. The dashed red lines indicate two-tailed 95% confidence intervals. To help readers better assess the evidence in these marginal effect plots, I overlay a histogram indicating the percentage of cabinet parties at the different values of *Seatshare*.

As predicted, panel (a) shows that the marginal effect of *Africa* is always negative for non-formateur parties. This negative effect is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$, two-tailed) so long as *Seatshare* is less than 0.668. Only three non-formateur parties out of 568 have a seatshare larger than this. As indicated in the main text, this means that the negative effect of *Africa* for non-formateur parties is statistically significant for 99.5% of the sample observations.

As predicted, panel (b) shows that the marginal effect of *Africa* is always positive for formateur parties. This positive effect is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$, two-tailed) over the entire observed range of *Seatshare*. As indicated in the main text, this means that the positive effect of *Africa* for formateur parties is statistically significant for all of the sample observations.

Figure A.1: The Marginal Effect of *Africa* on *Portfolioshare* for Non-Formateur and Formateur Parties



(b) Formateur Parties



Note: The panels in Figure A.1 are based on the results in the 'combined' model that 'includes formateur status' in Table 5.2. The thick solid black lines show the marginal effects of *Africa* on *Portfolioshare* for non-formateur parties (top panel) and formateur parties (bottom panel) across the observed range of *Seatshare*. The observed range of *Seatshare* for non-formateur parties is 0.003 to 0.728. For formateur parties, it is 0.043 to 0.990. The dashed red lines represent two-tailed 95% confidence intervals. The black vertical axis on the left pertains to the magnitude of the marginal effects, while the light grey vertical axis on the right pertains to the histograms and indicates the percentage of non-formateur/formateur cabinet parties in the sample at different values of *Seatshare*.

A.1.2 Marginal Effect of *Parliamentary* on *Portfolioshare*

The results in Table 5.3 provided strong support for the *Parliamentary Party Size Hypothesis* and the *Parliamentary Formateur Hypothesis*. To fully evaluate the conditional theory underlying these hypotheses, though, it is necessary to recognize the inherent symmetry of interaction models (Berry, Golder and Milton, 2012). This means that I also need to evaluate the marginal effect of *Parliamentary* on *Portfolioshare*. In the main text, I reported that this marginal effect was largely in line with my predictions. However, I did not go into too much detail and directed the interested reader to the Appendix for a more in-depth analysis.

The marginal effect of *Parliamentary* is $\gamma_3 + \gamma_4 Seatshare + \gamma_5 Formateur$. According to my theory, non-formateur parties should always receive more portfolios in a parliamentary democracy than in a presidential one, whereas formateur parties should always receive fewer. In Figure A.2, I plot the marginal effects of *Parliamentary* for non-formateur parties (top) and for formateur parties (bottom) across the observed range of *Seatshare* for each type of cabinet party using the results from the 'Africa' model in Table 5.3. The observed range of *Seatshare* for non-formateur parties is 0.003 to 0.520. For formateur parties, it is 0.312 to 0.990. The dashed red lines indicate two-tailed 95% confidence intervals. To help readers better assess the evidence in these marginal effect plots, I overlay a histogram indicating the percentage of cabinet parties at the different values of *Seatshare*. Below the histogram, I use a rugplot to show the individual values of *Seatshare* for the 50 non-formateur parties and the 26 formateur parties.

As predicted, panel (a) shows that the marginal effect of *Parliamentary* is always positive for non-formateur parties. This positive effect is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$, two-tailed) so long as *Seatshare* is greater than 0.065. As indicated in the main text, this means that the positive effect of *Parliamentary* for non-formateur parties is statistically significant for 74% of the sample observations.

As predicted, panel (b) shows that the marginal effect of *Parliamentary* is always negative for formateur parties. The marginal effect of *Parliamentary* for formateur parties is statistically significant when *Seatshare* is less than 0.303, but there are no formateur parties whose value for *Seatshare* is this small. In effect, the marginal effect of *Parliamentary* for formateur parties always has the correct sign; that this effect is not statistically significant is not that surprising given the small number of observations.

Figure A.2: The Marginal Effect of *Parliamentary* on *Portfolioshare* for Non-Formateur and Formateur Parties





Note: The panels in Figure A.2 are based on the results in the 'Africa' model in Table 5.3. The thick solid black lines show the marginal effects of *Parliamentary* on *Portfolioshare* for non-formateur parties (top panel) and formateur parties (bottom panel) across the observed range of *Seatshare*. The observed range of *Seatshare* for non-formateur parties is 0.003 to 0.520. For formateur parties, it is 0.312 to 0.990. The dashed red lines represent two-tailed 95% confidence intervals. The black vertical axis on the left pertains to the magnitude of the marginal effects, while the light grey vertical axis on the right pertains to the histograms and indicates the percentage of cabinet parties in the sample at different values of *Seatshare*. Below the histograms are rugplots showing the individual *Seatshare* values for the non-formateur and formateur parties.

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Vita

Academic Experience

Assistant Professor, Department of International Affairs, *University of Georgia*, Fall 2018-

Instructor, *The Pennsylvania State University*, Summer 2018

Visiting Fellow at the Center for Geographic Analysis, *Harvard University*, Summer 2013

Education

Ph.D. Political Science, *The Pennsylvania State University*, 2018

M.A. Political Science, *The Pennsylvania State University*, 2013

B.A. Political Science and Geography, *Binghamton University*, 2009

African Flagship Languages Initiative, University of Florida, *Beginner Wolof Certificate*, 2016

Cours de Civilisation Française de la Sorbonne, *Advanced French Certificate*, 2008

Selected Publications

1. Margaret H. Ariotti & Sona N. Golder. 2018. "Partisan portfolio allocation in African democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(3): 341-379.
2. Ariotti, Margaret. 2016. "Burkina Faso's 2015 Presidential and Legislative Elections." *Electoral Studies* 44(December): 445-448.
3. McNulty, John, Conor Dowling, & Margaret H. Ariotti. 2009. "Driving Saints to Sin: How Increasing the Difficulty of Voting Dissuades Even the Most Motivated Voters'' *Political Analysis* 17(4): 435-455.

Selected Awards

2016-2017 David L. Boren Fellowship, National Security Education Program

2016-2017 Graduate Student International Research Award, The Graduate School, Pennsylvania State University

2015-2016 Outstanding Political Science Graduate Student Award, Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University

2015-2016 Royal Air Maroc-African Studies Association Student Travel Award

2015-2016 Africana Research Center Research Grant, Pennsylvania State University

2015-2016 RGSO Dissertation Support Grant, College of Liberal Arts, Pennsylvania State University

2015-2016 African Studies Program Dickerson Endowment Grant, Pennsylvania State University

2015-2016 Program in Comparative Politics Fellowship (PiCP), Pennsylvania State University

2015 Africana Reseach Center Humanities Dissertation Fellowship, Pennsylvania State University

2015 Political Science Graduate Research Fellowship, Pennsylvania State University