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RELATIVE ASSETS AND CONFORMITY IN ATTITUDES: A TEST OF BARGAINING THEORY ON NEWLY MARRIED INDONESIAN WOMEN

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ABSTRACT

The applicability of bargaining theory has been demonstrated across a variety of outcomes, including fertility, housework, migration, household spending, and healthcare, among others. Yet, the outcomes studied thus far are limited in their scope. Scholars have focused on outcomes that are couple-level (not differing between partners), behavioral, or both. Using Waves IV and V of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), I test the applicability of bargaining theory to individual-level, non-behavioral outcomes in a sample of newly married Indonesian women. I find that while relative resources replicate past literature for the behavioral outcome of healthcare, they do not predict women's conformity in attitudinal and identity measures connected to religiosity. The results highlight limitations of bargaining theory, and I discuss potential reasons why the theory does not appear to hold for attitudinal and identity measures.

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INTRODUCTION

Previous research on household decision-making states that the partner who achieves their preferences likely has more bargaining power. Using income, education, or other resources as proxies for bargaining power, a large body of research finds a positive relationship between relative resources and desired outcomes. Guided by bargaining theory, this relationship holds for fertility, housework, migration, household spending, and healthcare, among others.

Yet the research is limited in two important ways. First, the literature focuses on couple-level outcomes, such as fertility or contraception use. Bargaining theory assumes that in couple-level outcomes, each partner has a different set of preferences but will exit a bargaining exchange with the same outcome. For example, partners may differ on the number of *desired* children, but they will ultimately have the same number of children. Second, research solely examines how relative resources affect behaviors, ignoring how individuals' relative resources affect their attitudes, identities, or beliefs. What happens when these conditions are absent? Does bargaining theory hold when an outcome is not couple-level or behavioral?

In this paper, I explore if bargaining theory applies to attitudinal and identity measures. Specifically, I examine how women conform on attitudinal and identity measures related to religiosity. Although individuals often marry those similar to them on religiosity—defined as various aspects of religious activity, dedication, and beliefs—a degree of negotiation may still be necessary. When individuals negotiate religiosity, a couple-level outcome is not required and is often connected to attitudes and identities. Religiosity, therefore, serves as one example of this type of outcome.

Using Waves IV and V of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), I first attempt to replicate past findings with a behavioral outcome, if the respondent received a general check-up

in the past five years. Next, I test how relative resources affects conformity toward a spouse on five attitudinal and identity measures: 1) religiousness ("How religious are you?"), 2) greater trust toward those with the same religion, 3) objection toward different faiths living in own village, 4) objection toward different faiths living in own neighborhood, and 5) religion's influence on voting.

I find that while bargaining theory replicates for a behavioral outcome, it does not hold for attitudinal and identity measures. Similar to past studies, the more relative resources a woman possesses, the more likely she is to have received a general check-up. However, relative resources do not significantly influence conformity in attitudes and identity measures. This explores the applicability of bargaining theory to a new type of dependent variable, and I discuss reasons why the theory does not appear to hold.

BACKGROUND

Bargaining theory assumes that two individuals with different preferences must negotiate, or bargain, to gain a favorable outcome (Muthoo 2000). If an individual's preferences match a couple's decision or the outcome (i.e. "achieved preferences"), bargaining theory assumes that they have more bargaining power in the exchange (Muthoo 2001). Within couples, the spouse or partner with more bargaining power will have a greater ability to shift a decision toward his or her preferences (Muthoo 2001).

Given that a large number of factors can increase or decrease actors' ability to influence outcomes, bargaining power itself cannot be measured directly (Doss 2013). Certain proxies serve as good indicators of how much bargaining power an individual possesses, such as education or employment status, but researchers often favor measuring bargaining power through relative economic resources such as the individual's percentage of the household income, wealth, or assets.

This measure is highly context- and country-specific, as women often face social and legal restrictions in accessing household finances or participating in the labor force. An individual's percentage of the household income might accurately reflect bargaining power in westernized countries, but may not be an accurate measure in many developing regions. For example, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) use both current assets and assets at the time of marriage to study bargaining power in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa. Zhang and Chan (1999), on the other hand, measure female bargaining power in Taiwan through dowry size and bride-price.

Others use non-economic measures to capture power or agency—such as decision-making over food purchases and preparation in the Bolivian Amazon (Patel et al. 2007), gender of children in China (Li and Wu 2011), or perceptions of women's autonomy in rural India (Jeejeebhoy 2002)—because these are factors that confer or reflect higher status in a particular society. Similarly, Bloom, Wypij, and Das Gupta (2001) use freedom of movement to measure women's power and autonomy in North India. High economic and social restrictions do not mean that women do not possess any bargaining power in these countries, rather, that researchers must be creative in their measurement of that bargaining power. Outcomes, therefore, depend on the distribution of bargaining power between each partner embedded in a given social context.

While scholars conceptualize bargaining power in a variety of ways, there is a generally robust set of relationships between bargaining power and outcomes across cultures and contexts; the greater an individual's bargaining power, the greater their ability to achieve their preferences on a range of decisions. Broadly, the outcomes examined thus far are couple-level, behavioral, or both. In couple-level outcomes, partners exit a bargaining exchange with the same outcome regardless of preferences. Behavioral outcomes encompass concrete actions such as fertility,

migration, contraception use, and healthcare usage, among numerous others. However, it is unclear whether bargaining theory holds across other types of outcomes, such as attitudes and identities. This paper seeks to address this gap.

Couple-level outcomes

First, much of the literature focuses on couple-level outcomes. Bargaining theory assumes that partners will have different preferences. In a couple-level outcome, partners must exit the exchange with an identical outcome, regardless of which partner is achieving their preferences. For example, unless individuals have children from previous or other partners (i.e. outside of the current household), they will have the same fertility outcome. Other examples in the literature include safer sexual behavior and contraception use (Jeejeebhoy 2002; Luke and Munshi 2011; Luke 2008), couple migration (Abraham, Auspurg, and Hinz 2010; Smits, Mulder, and Hooimeijer 2004), and household financial risk (Yilmazer and Lich 2015), among others.

Measurement of preferences and use of data are varied on couple-level outcomes, particularly with fertility. Some studies utilize fertility preferences or intentions in one wave and examine if preferences were achieved in the subsequent wave (Bauer and Kneip 2013; Rasul 2008; Testa, Cavalli, and Rosina 2011). Other scholars utilize cross-sectional data; Klawon and Tiefenthaler (2001) test the effect of resources (measured by men and women's income) on number of children and find that while increases in income lower fertility for both men and women, an increase in income for women lowers fertility more than an increase in income for men. Beyond fertility, researchers often use theory to assume preferences by group or gender. Luke et al. (2011), for example, infer stronger condom-use preference in Kenyan women than men due to higher female transmission probabilities of HIV/AIDS and lower male sexual pleasure with condom-use. Smits et al. (2004) examine long-distance migration of Dutch couples from 1977-1996 and find

that couples migrated primarily for husbands' jobs; the authors deduce that men have a stronger incentive than women to migrate rather than stay. In general, studies find that the larger an individual's bargaining power, the smaller the likelihood they will conform to their partner's preferences over their preferences.

Overall, couple-level outcomes represent a significant portion of the literature, but do not account for decisions in which couples might not be matched on the outcome. Individual-level outcomes do not require that partners exit an exchange with the same outcome. This makes individual-level outcomes conceptually different—while partners often still negotiate individual-level outcomes, it is not an "all or nothing" result. For example, while couples must inherently be identical on fertility or contraception use, bargaining theory assumes that more bargaining power will result in a more favorable balance of housework or childcare (Bittman et al. 2003; Raley, Bianchi, and Wang 2012). While partners could equally split labor or resources and be identical on these measures, they often will not.

Behavioral outcomes

Second, scholars exclusively apply bargaining theory to behaviors. In contrast to attitudes, identities, or beliefs, outcomes that measure behaviors such as fertility, contraception use, household spending, or housework are concrete and discernible. While studies have examined attitudes as exogenous or endogenous factors to the bargaining process (Bittman et al. 2003; Mabsout and van Staveren 2010; Montalvao 2009; Thebaud 2010), they have not explored how relative resources affect change in attitudes or identities themselves.

Ignoring this is a large oversight, given that individuals often conform their identities and beliefs to their partner in relationships and marriage. Research in psychology and development studies indicates that marriage is an important context for personality and identity change,

especially in early adulthood. Pals (1999) finds that processes of personality change are substantially different for women who marry and those who do not, describing marriage as a basis for "investment of identity in an intimate relational context" (p. 300). Similarly, in-depth interviews with married and cohabiting British adults show both a public and private shift in identity from "I" to "we" (Soulsby and Bennett 2017). These findings support previous research by Lopata (1973), which states that individuals often undergo "depersonalization," or a loss of self when entering into marriage.

Religiosity is just one of many examples of an outcome that is not necessarily behavioral or at the couple-level. While some forms of religiosity are behaviors, such as religious attendance, many are not, such as religious identity, religious beliefs, or level of religiousness. Individuals may often desire a partner who is similar to them on religiosity (McClendon 2016), but it is not required that partners be identical on this measure. For example, in the analytic sample only 52% of women are perfectly aligned with their spouse at Wave V on level of religiousness; the remaining 48% differ from their spouse to some degree. Given that religiosity meets these two conditions (non-behavioral and individual-level), it serves as an ideal measure for this study.

Previous research indicates that individuals often conform aspects of their religiosity in relation to a partner, but this is not always performed equally. Qualitative interviews with young Israeli Jewish Orthodox couples show that transitioning to marriage creates significant change in religious identity (Shalev, Baum, and Itzhaky 2016). However, female participants more often than males described needing to adapt their religious identity to that of their partner, expressing this change on spiritual, emotional, and behavioral levels. Further qualitative research indicates that individuals who compromise on religion do so for many reasons and through a variety of strategies. Differences in lifestyles, pressures from family, and the intent to give children or future children a

religious upbringing may all contribute to the desire to form a common religious ground. Cerchiaro, Aupers, and Houtman (2015) contend that this leads to a series of distinct strategies in how couples negotiate religious affiliation. Some couples "renunciate," or abandon a shared religious space in favor of one partner making all of the decisions about religion. Other individuals convert to their partner's religion in order to create a shared identity. In a "religious pluralism" strategy, partners seek to strike a balance between their two affiliations, with both partners' religions represented in a shared space. Some couples choose to abandon religion altogether. While effective in dealing with differences, not all of these strategies result in equal concession. It is clear that individuals often adapt to suit a partner, but it remains unclear what role bargaining power may play in this process.

Based on past studies, there is reason to believe that bargaining theory may not hold when the outcome is non-behavioral and individual-level. Previous literature in gender and parenthood theorizes that shifts in attitudes and behaviors following becoming a parent are a result of social role adherence—conformity to societal pressures about the role of motherhood for women and the role of provider for men—rather than dynamics played out through bargaining processes. Katz-Wise, Preiss, and Hyde (2010) claim that despite often previously holding egalitarian attitudes, parents revert to gender-traditional attitudes after having a child. Vespa (2009) qualifies this, finding that parenthood has an egalitarian effect on gender ideologies for unmarried parents but a traditional effect for married parents. However, both studies argue that changes in gender attitudes or ideologies are the result of greater societal norms or life course events, rather than within-couple processes or dynamics.

THE PRESENT STUDY

This research seeks to address if bargaining theory holds when the outcome is neither couple-level nor behavioral. First, I attempt to replicate past literature with a behavioral outcome, testing how women's relative resources affect if they received a general check-up. The purpose of this is to demonstrate the reliability of the sample with a dependent variable established in the literature. Then, I test how relative resources affect conformity in five attitudinal and identity measures in the same sample.

For this study, I examine how and if women conform to their spouse. This comes with a variety of assumptions. First, I assume that unmarried individuals are in a non-bargaining situation and married individuals are in a bargaining situation. This is a strong assumption, given that individuals may in reality begin conforming to their partner before marriage as they discuss attitudes and identities in dating. Second, I conceptualize the individual's "baseline preference" as their attitudes and identities when they are single and the outcome as their deviation from this when they are married; my analytic sample is a sample of women who transition from single to married across two waves. Third, I assume that those who do not change (and do not conform to their spouse) on attitudes and identities from single to married achieve their preference; conversely, changing across waves to conform to a spouse implies that the individual is not achieving their preference.

Measuring mere change in attitudinal and identity measures would be an insufficient test of bargaining power and achieved preferences, as it is natural for individuals to fluctuate somewhat in religiosity across the life course (Ingersoll-Dayton, Krause, and Morgan 2002). Therefore, I examine if the respondent changed between Time 1 and Time 2 *and* if they match their spouse at Time 2. Based on these assumptions, I test if bargaining theory holds for an outcome already

demonstrated in the literature and see if the theory still holds when the outcome is neither couple-level nor behavioral.

The context of Indonesia

Indonesia is a prime location for this study. Individuals in Indonesia are generally more religious than many westernized countries, and religion is a salient and important part of many individuals' lives (Fealy and White 2008). Overall, the sample is religious, with over seventy percent self-identifying as 'religious' or 'very religious' in the latest wave (Wave V). According to the World Christian Database, over three-quarters of the country's population identify as Muslim, 12% identify as Christian, and small percentages identify as ethnoreligionist, neoreligionist, and Hindu (Johnson and Zurlo 2010). Seventy-nine percent of Catholics and Protestants in the sample participate in communal religious activities at least once per month, and 91% of Muslims in the sample pray at least once daily.

Marriages between individuals of different religious denominations are rare due to government and social restrictions. While laws do not explicitly prohibit or allow inter-religious marriages, administrative processes make it very difficult for couples to register them (Aini 2008). Survey data indicate that while most young people in Indonesia hold positive attitudes toward interfaith friendships, they do not agree with inter-religious marriages because it disagrees with their religious beliefs (Parker, Hoon, and Raihani 2014). As a result, interfaith marriage and change in affiliation are uncommon, making it more appropriate to examine other facets of religiosity.

Women in Indonesia have generally lower status compared to men in both the public and private spheres. Indonesian society is patriarchal, with under-representation of women in politics, low involvement of women in the labor market, and laws restricting unmarried women's access to contraception (Cameron, Contreras Suarez, and Pye 2015). Within families, men are the

considered the primary heads of household (Cameron et al. 2015), and this is reinforced both socially and legally. In a strongly gendered society such as Indonesia, this often results in asymmetric bargaining processes within couples. While men are free to make decisions without consulting their spouse, women must often negotiate with men to make favorable decisions (Doss 2013). Of particular interest to scholars, therefore, is how a woman's relative resources influence her outcomes in societies with strong gender norms. To my knowledge, no study has examined how relative resources influence a woman's religiosity outcomes in Indonesia.

DATA and METHODS

Data for these analyses come from Waves IV and V of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). The IFLS is a longitudinal household survey that samples individuals living in 13 of the 27 Indonesian provinces. At Wave I, it was representative to 83% of the national population. Wave I was collected in 1993-1994, originally surveying over 7,000 households. The IFLS1 (Wave I) interviewed the household head, their spouse, two randomly selected children of the head and spouse, a member age 50 or older and their spouse, and a member age 15 to 49 and their spouse. The IFLS2 attempted to re-interview all original IFLS1 participants. If participants formed new households, the "split-off" households were interviewed as well. Each successive wave has continued in this fashion. Data are collected in approximately 4-7 year increments. Wave IV was collected in 2007-2008 and includes over 13,500 households. Wave V, the latest wave, was collected in 2014-2015 and includes over 16,200 households.

Sample

I began with a sample of 24,239 adult respondents who were interviewed in both Wave IV and Wave V. This includes all marital statuses (single, married, divorced, widowed, separated, and cohabiting), but excludes six respondents who changed sex across waves and 157 married

participants without a partner present in the household at Wave V. For all models, the unit of analysis is the individual. I kept only female participants who were single[1] in Wave IV and married[2] in Wave V in the analytic sample (*N* = 1,275). There were no homosexual marriages in Wave IV, therefore I did not need to exclude any participants on this criterion. One of the dependent variables asks, "Did you receive a general check-up in the last five years?" Therefore, I kept only participants who had been married in the last five years. This brought the final analytic sample size to 1,048.

Women in the full sample (*N* = 12,935) were compared to the analytic sample (*N* = 1,048 women). Samples did not differ on percentage having received a general check-up, percentage of the couple's assets, hours worked, spouse's hours worked, or urban/rural status. The samples differ in three ways. First, unsurprisingly, the analytic sample is notably younger than the full sample by an average of 18.1 years, and their spouses are an average of 16.81 years younger. Second, the analytic sample has fewer children at Wave V than the full sample. Twenty-five percent are childless in the analytic sample, compared to only 9% without children in the full sample. Third, the analytic sample has a higher level of education than the full sample. While female respondents in the full sample average 7.44 years of education, respondents in the analytic sample average 11.80 years of education. Likewise, spouses in the full sample are less educated than spouses in the analytic sample (8.18 years and 11.18 years, respectively). These differences in education are likely due to cohort changes. Since 1960, Indonesia has undergone significant drops in fertility rates, decreasing from a total fertility rate (TFR) of 5.0 in 1960 to 2.5 in 2015 (The World Bank). Numerous studies indicate a generally negative correlation between education and fertility (Breierova and Duflo 2004; Kim 2010; Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008), and shifts in education and

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[1] Those who are single in the dataset are "not yet married."
[2] Analyses were not run on cohabiting individuals because only seven participants were cohabiting at Wave V.

fertility are reflective of Indonesia’s recent progression through demographic transitions (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006).

Measures

Dependent Variable

The first dependent variable in this study is “received a general check-up” (Model 1). In all waves, respondents were asked, “Have you received a general check-up in the last five years?”

The next set of dependent variables measure conformity toward a partner on attitudinal and identity measures (Models 2-6). **Religiousness**. Respondents and their spouses were asked, “How religious are you?” in both waves. Response options were “Not religious,” “Somewhat religious,” “Religious/Rather religious,” and “Very religious.” **Trust**. In each wave, respondents and spouses were asked to respond to the statement, “Taking into account the diversity of religions in the village, I trust people with the same religion as mine more.” Response options were “Strongly agree,” “Agree,” “Disagree,” and “Strongly disagree.” **Objection (village)**. In both waves, respondents and their spouse were asked, “How would you feel if someone of a different faith lived in your village?” Response options were “Strongly object,” “Object,” “No objection,” and “No objection at all.” **Objection (neighborhood)**. Using the same response options, respondents and their spouse were asked their degree of objection to the following in both waves: “How would you feel if someone from a different faith from you lived in your neighborhood?” **Religion’s influence on voting**. Finally, in both waves, respondents and spouses were asked, “In an election, having a candidate with the same religion as yours makes it [...] to vote for him/her.” Response options included “Very likely,” “Somewhat likely,” “Neither more or less likely,” “Somewhat unlikely,” or “Very unlikely.” Conformity in these measures is measured as a multinomial outcome capturing both change between Wave IV and Wave V and if the respondent matches their spouse’s

level at Wave V. The outcome options are: 1) did not change across waves/does not match spouse at Wave V, 2) did not change/matches spouse, 3) changed/does not match spouse, and 4) changed/matches spouse. The same format is used to measure conformity in all five outcomes.

Independent Variable

The primary independent variable for all models is relative resources, measured in Wave V. Following Beegle et al.'s (2001) study on relative resources and Indonesian women's use of prenatal care as a guide, percentage of the couple's assets is used as a proxy for bargaining power. Both previous literature and focus groups for the IFLS show that share of assets is an appropriate measure of bargaining power in marriage in Indonesia. Questions on assets were added to the IFLS in Wave II specifically to measure bargaining power, and focus groups conducted by the IFLS indicate that individuals generally agree that control over economic resources plays a key role in decision-making. Qualitative studies on Indonesian couples indicate that both men and women bring respective assets to marriages, and if those marriages dissolve they retain ownership of their possessions. Furthermore, any assets brought in through women's employment remain under her control (Hart 1978; Wolf 1992).

Respondents were asked a series of questions on possession of thirteen items. For each item, respondents were asked, "What is the total value of [asset] at present?" and "You told me that members of this household own ____% of the [asset]. Of that ____%, how much is owned by you? How much is owned by your spouse?" Values of assets were measured in rupiah. Percent owned by the respondent ranged from 0 to 100. Eight assets were less common, with anywhere from 4% to 30% of respondents owning the item. Five assets were more common among respondents, ranging from 50% to 98% owning the item. These assets (house, vehicle, appliances, jewelry, and furniture/utensils) directly align with the five assets used in Beegle et al. (2001). To

obtain an overall measure of women's relative resources, I calculated the value of the woman's percentage of the couple's assets and divided it by the total value of couple's assets.

$$\frac{(\text{Value of Asset}_1 * \text{Woman's }\%_1)+(\text{Value of Asset}_2 * \text{Woman's }\%_2)\ldots+(\text{Value of Asset}_n * \text{Woman's }\%_n)}{\text{Total value of Woman's assets} + \text{Total value of Man's assets}}$$

This created a self-weighting measure of relative resources, with larger or more important assets (such as the house) counting more toward the woman's overall percentage of couple's assets than smaller or less important household assets (such as jewelry). Over 66% of respondents did not possess all five assets.

While it is more common to use percentage of the overall household assets as a proxy for bargaining power, I use percentage of the couple's assets—the respondent and her spouse—as a proxy due to the analytic sample. In most instances in the literature, household assets and couple's assets are synonymous. However, descriptives indicate that a particularly high percentage of my analytic sample did not collectively own a majority of the household assets. That is, the sum of the wife's assets and husband's assets was less than 50% of the total household assets. One third of the analytic sample did not collectively own a majority. This lack of majority ownership is over two times as prevalent in the analytic sample as the full sample, and is likely due to the younger age of the analytic sample.

Control Variables

To predict having received a general check-up, I include controls for both respondent and spousal characteristics. Educational attainment and spouse's educational attainment are measured in years, ranging from none to 18+ (graduated from university). Employment and spouse's employment are continuous measures noting number of hours worked last week. Age and spouse's age are continuous and measured in years. Two transformations are included to account for the

skewness of the age variables: $1/(\text{Age}^2)$ and $1/(\text{Spouse's Age}^2)$. Finally, geography is included as a dichotomous variable: urban vs. rural. All controls are measured at Wave V. [3]

I include the same controls to predict conformity in attitudinal and identity measures, with an additional dichotomous variable measuring if the participant has children. All controls are measured in Wave V, and all variables are measured identically to Model 1.

Analytic strategy

To account for missing data in my analytic sample, I imputed missing values using multiple imputation. I generated fifteen imputations using chained equations in the statistical package Stata. The largest amount of missingness on any variable was 30.04%, on the variable measuring if the participant changed and matched their spouse at Wave V on religiousness.

In this paper, I conducted two sets of analyses. First, I tested that the sample replicates past literature in a zero-sum outcome. Using logistic regression, I tested how relative resources affect if the respondent received a general check-up in the past five years. Then, using the same analytic sample, I tested if bargaining theory replicates in attitudinal and identity measures. Using multinomial logistic regression, I tested how relative resources affect conformity. Did not change/does not match spouse is set as the reference outcome in Models 2-6. Of particular interest are comparisons between did not change/does not match and changed/matches. These represent the least conforming and most conforming to a spouse, respectively. If bargaining theory holds, percent of the couple's assets will positively affect having received a general check-up and negatively affect conformity in attitudinal and identity measures.

[3] Note: It is not possible to control for partner characteristics at Wave IV. All respondents are single in Wave IV, and their partner does not enter the dataset until Wave V.

RESULTS

A demographic overview of participants and their spouses' characteristics is included in Table 1. Although women have slightly more education than their husbands, they work less than half as many hours per week. They are about three and half years younger than their spouses. On average, respondents own about 43% of the couple's assets, and about three-quarters have children. A majority live in urban areas. Non-emergency medical care is uncommon, with only 7.5% of women in the analytic sample reporting having received a general check-up in the past five years.

It should be noted that matching vs. not matching a spouse can only detect complete conformity. However, not only do a large portion of women change on attitudinal and identity measures across waves, but a large portion identically match the level of their spouse at Wave V. Of those who change on attitudes and identities, a significant portion change to match their spouse exactly. Descriptives on attitudinal and identity measures are presented in Table 2.

Table 3 includes results from the multivariate analyses. Model 1 shows results for a behavioral outcome (received a general check-up), and Models 2-6 show results for attitudinal and

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Women, Variables of Interest

	Mean (SE)/Percentage
Received a general check-up in the last five years, Wave V	7.50%
Percent of the couple's assets at Wave V	43.22 (1.42)
Years of education at Wave V	11.80 (.15)
Hours worked last week at Wave V	20.41 (.87)
Age at Wave V	27.42 (.18)
Has children at Wave V	74.74%
Geography	
Rural	39.79%
Urban	60.21%
Spouse's years of education at Wave V	11.18 (.17)
Spouse's hours worked last week at Wave V	42.76 (.93)
Spouse's age at Wave V	30.92 (.24)

Based on weighted, unimputed data

identity outcomes. Results from Model 1 replicate previous literature; the relationship between percentage of the couple's assets and received a general check-up is positive and significant (b = .01, $p < .05$). This means that with each increase in the percentage of the couple's assets, a woman's odds of having received a general check-up are raised by 1%. Complimenting previous findings which state that women with more bargaining power are more likely to use prenatal care (Beegle et al. 2001), receive antenatal care, and use safe delivery care (Bloom et al. 2001), women with more bargaining power are also more likely to have received a general check-up. This shows that bargaining theory holds for a behavioral outcome in the analytic sample. In line with past research, Model 1 also indicates that years of schooling and urban residence have positive, significant relationships with having received a general check-up (b = .10, $p < .05$ and b = .90, $p < .01$, respectively).

In Models 2-6, particular attention is paid to the coefficient for changed/matches because it represents the most conformity relative to the reference outcome, did not change/does not match. These models exhibit non-significant relationships between relative resources and conformity in religiousness, trust, objection to someone of a different faith living in village, objection to someone of a different faith living in neighborhood, and religion's influence on voting. Overall, the results indicate that relative resources do not predict conformity in attitudinal and identity measures.

Analyses were initially run on only those married in the last years (N = 1,048) to match the analytic sample used in Model 1. To test for robustness, Models 2-6 were rerun on all women single in Wave IV and married in Wave V (N = 1,275). This includes any woman married since the previous wave. While this changed the significance level of a few control variables, none of the conformity coefficients (changes/matches) became significant. Together, the results indicate that bargaining theory does not appear to hold for attitudinal and identity measures.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Women, Attitudinal and Identity Measures

	Percentage
Religiousness	
Did not change/Does not match	22.15
Did not change/Matches	37.42
Changed/Does not match	25.44
Changed/Matches	14.99
Greater trust toward those with same religion	
Did not change/Does not match	12.96
Did not change/Matches	15.44
Changed/Does not match	36.59
Changed/Matches	35.01
Objection to different faith in village	
Did not change/Does not match	14.62
Did not change/Matches	19.38
Changed/Does not match	25.75
Changed/Matches	40.25
Objection to different faith in neighborhood	
Did not change/Does not match	17.42
Did not change/Matches	46.41
Changed/Does not match	21.83
Changed/Matches	14.34
Religion's influence on voting	
Did not change/Does not match	18.64
Did not change/Matches	20.18
Changed/Does not match	33.30
Changed/Matches	27.88

Based on weighted, unimputed data

Additional analyses were performed with alternative variables and analytic samples to check for robustness. First, I tested if the models' fit is improved using all 13 assets in the construction of the relative resources variable. For all but one of the models, the BIC value is lower when using only five assets, however, the differences in BIC values are minimal (see Table A1 in the Appendix). The 5-asset variable was used in the final models for consistency with Beegle et al.'s (2001) paper. Finally, robustness checks were conducted to test if Models 2-6 varied using

the participant's education and employment[4] at Wave IV instead of Wave V. No notable changes occur to the models.

[4] The births/children module in the IFLS, which was used to create the dichotomous "has children" variable, was only asked to married women. Therefore, there is no measure of if the respondent has children at Wave IV. However, having children at Wave IV is likely to be very uncommon as fertility is largely contained to marriage in Indonesia.

Table 3: Logistic regression on received general check-up and Multinomial logistic regressions on attitudinal and identity measures, beta coefficients

	Model 1	*Model 2*			*Model 3*			*Model 4*			*Model 5*			*Model 6*		
	Received general check-up in last 5 years	Conformity in Religiousness[a]			Conformity in Trust[b]			Conformity in Objection (village)[c]			Conformity in Objection (neighborhood)[d]			Conformity in Religion's influence on voting[e]		
		DM[f]	CD[f]	CM[f]	DM	CD	CM	DM	CD	CM	DM	CD	CM	DM	CD	CM
Percentage of couple's assets	.010*	.005	-.001	.001	.002	.009^{+}	.008	-.002	-.001	-.001	.006	.00002	.006	-.006	-.001	-.008^{+}
	(.005)	(.004)	(.005)	(.005)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)	(.006)	(.006)	(.005)	(.004)	(.005)
Years of schooling	.100*	.062^{+}	.044	-.003	-.010	-.008	-.014	.090	.043	.068	.021	-.076	-.014	.056	.032	-.009
	(.047)	(.037)	(.042)	(.045)	(.054)	(.050)	(.044)	(.050)	(.047)	(.045)	(.047)	(.055)	(.053)	(.042)	(.039)	(.039)
Hours worked last week	.006	-.001	.001	-.004	-.004	.002	-.005	.007	-.001	-.001	-.003	-.007	-.009	.003	-.003	-.002
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.006)	(.007)	(.006)	(.005)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.006)	(.006)	(.005)	(.005)
Age	.004	-.047	-.114	-.030	-.010	-.017	.074	.070	-.038	-.007	.144	.090	.083	-.057	-.032	-.035
	(.092)	(.082)	(.102)	(.101)	(.104)	(.098)	(.087)	(.103)	(.101)	(.085)	(.116)	(.123)	(.141)	(.084)	(.076)	(.090)
1/Age^2	114.6	-565.4	-1128.2	-195.8	9.49	-73.2	623.0	1143.1	-12.0	93.0	1396.3	905.2	767.8	-519.9	-339.8	-276.5
	(1106.7)	(966.8)	(1126.5)	(1134.6)	(1209.9)	(1112.3)	(1016.8)	(1227.4)	(1144.2)	(972.0)	(1267.9)	(1319.3)	(1513.6)	(983.2)	(902.8)	(1039.8)
Children *(0: No, 1: Yes)*		-.745*	-.497^{+}	-.042	.396	.155	.404	.079	-.130	-.148	-.134	-.538	.039	-.024	.285	-.138
		(.351)	(.294)	(.340)	(.410)	(.319)	(.324)	(.421)	(.388)	(.358)	(.349)	(.378)	(.402)	(.305)	(.320)	(.293)
Spouse's years of schooling	.040	-.014	-.114**	-.056	-.044	-.062	-.040	.064	.007	.018	.023	.035	.035	.038	-.029	.004
	(.046)	(.038)	(.039)	(.044)	(.059)	(.050)	(.053)	(.060)	(.047)	(.050)	(.046)	(.059)	(.058)	(.042)	(.041)	(.040)
Spouse's hours worked last week	-.012	-.010^{+}	-.012^{+}	-.004	-.004	-.006	-.006	-.003	.004	.003	-.003	-.004	.002	-.006	.001	-.001
	(.009)	(.006)	(.006)	(.007)	(.008)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.007)	(.006)	(.006)	(.007)	(.008)	(.007)	(.005)	(.006)
Spouse's age	.032	-.007	. 006	-.023	.023	-.038	-.056	-.047	-.006	.005	.012	.049	.037	.017	.005	-.059
	(.041)	(.054)	(.054)	(.063)	(.048)	(.062)	(.064)	(.068)	(.061)	(.051)	(.067)	(.072)	(.077)	(.048)	(.049)	(.063)
1/Spouse's age^2	277.8	-342.9	-149.3	-162.1	523.3	-108.7	-209.4	-435.1	-203.8	-1.43	27.7	340.4	507.0	162.8	371.2	-109.8
	(723.2)	(695.0)	(653.8)	(763.4)	(769.2)	(888.0)	(833.3)	(1088.8)	(915.3)	(764.2)	(982.6)	(1006.4)	(1009.7)	(740.7)	(732.3)	(876.3)
Urban *(Ref: Rural)*	.904**	-.245	-.218	.451	-.544	-.220	-.626*	.418	.069	.302	.032	-.176	-.245	-.544^{+}	-.380	-.521^{+}
	(.351)	(.284)	(.306)	(.359)	(.362)	(.302)	(.315)	(.300)	(.294)	(.260)	(.271)	(.327)	(.347)	(.300)	(.254)	(.264)
	N=1,048	*N*=1,048			*N*=1,048			*N*=1,048			*N*=1,048			*N*=1,048		

***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$ $^{+}p < .10$

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Results based on weighted, imputed data.

[a]"How religious are you?" [b]Greater trust toward those with same religion [c]Objection to someone of a different faith living in village [d]Objection to someone of a different faith living in neighborhood [e]Having a candidate with the same religion influences likelihood of voting for him/her.

[f]DM = **D**id not change, **M**atches spouse; CD = **C**hanged, **D**oes not match spouse; CM = **C**hanged, **M**atches spouse; Reference outcome: Did not change, Does not match spouse

DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS

According to bargaining theory, women with more bargaining power will be more likely to achieve their preferences (Doss 2013; Muthoo 2001). Relative resources are commonly used as a proxy for bargaining power, and studies show that individuals with more relative resources are more likely to obtain favorable or desired outcomes (for examples see Beegle et al. 2001; Klawon and Tiefenthaler 2001; Luke et al. 2011; Yilmazer and Lich 2015). Previous research has demonstrated this with a variety of outcomes, however, all of these outcomes are either at the couple-level, behavioral, or both. Given that individuals often compromise their identities, beliefs, and attitudes in relationships and marriage (Lopata 1973; Pals 1999; Soulsby and Bennett 2017), it is important that research explore how relative resources affect individual-level, non-behavioral outcomes.

To address this gap, the present study attempts to replicate past literature with a behavioral healthcare outcome and examines how bargaining theory applies to five attitudinal and identity outcomes: 1) religiousness ("How religious are you?"), 2) greater trust toward those with the same religion, 3) objection toward different faiths living in own village, 4) objection toward different faiths living in own neighborhood, and 5) religion's influence on voting. I choose attitudes and identities connected to religiosity because religiosity is both individual-level and often non-behavioral. Unlike measures such as fertility or contraception use where couples must make a mutual decision or be identical on an outcome, religiosity does not require that partners exit an exchange with the same outcome. Furthermore, certain facets of religiosity are non-behavioral, such as level of religiousness.

I find that the theory is replicated with the behavioral outcome among newly married Indonesian women. Relative resources positively influence having received a general check-up.

However, the theory does not appear to hold when the outcome is individual-level and non-behavioral. Relative resources do not significantly influence conformity in attitudinal and identity measures connected to religiosity, and the results underscore possible limitations of bargaining theory.

These findings lend support to the hypothesis that conformity in non-behavioral, individual-level outcomes may be better predicted by broader social norms or specific life course events than by bargaining power. This is important to the study of gender in Indonesia because it indicates that certain processes of attitude and identity formation in newly-married couples appear to be independent of relative power, despite being embedded in a highly patriarchal context. However, this sample cannot definitively rule out the possibility of bargaining processes occurring in conformity in all attitudes and identities. The results lack support for bargaining theory for several possible reasons, which I discuss in this section.

First, religiosity may not be a domain where couples bargain. If this is the case, bargaining power will not matter for the outcome, and relative resources will not predict conformity in attitudes and identities connected to religiosity. For example, couples in Indonesia may automatically gravitate closer toward the woman's preference without bargaining because religion is highly connected to raising children and women are seen as the primary child-rearers (Afiyanti and Solberg 2015; Uecker, Mayrl, and Stroope 2016). Alternatively, couples may still negotiate religiosity, but power may not a key factor in this process.

Second, women in Indonesia may have little objection to conforming to their spouse on attitudinal and identity measures connected to religiosity. Bargaining theory assumes that while individuals' behavior or attitudes may change, preferences are fixed. However, women in Indonesia may actually be changing their preferences over time, conforming to their partner. Both

the religious and gender context of Indonesia may influence women to more readily change their preferences. Muslim households in Indonesia place a strong emphasis on gender roles (Wieringa 2015). The Muslim-majority context in Indonesia thus creates overall norms in which men are expected to be heads of households and women are expected to take on a subordinate role. These ideologies seep into many boarder social and legal restrictions, and Indonesia's gender stratified society gives men higher social status and prestige (Cameron et al. 2015). Overall, this may cause men to be more static in their preferences over time.

Third, this study has notable data limitations. The sample is a select group in terms of age and life course stage, and newly married individuals may not experience these processes the same as a more general group of married individuals. Beyond the sample, it is possible that the attitudinal and identity measures are not capturing the most accurate measure of a respondent's preference. Ideally, questions would be asked before the couple begins dating as well as directly prior to when a woman marries. While it is also possible that relative assets are not a good measure of bargaining power, I have demonstrated that this sample replicates past literature with a behavioral outcome. Finally, the most notable limitation of this study is the lack of spousal information at Wave IV. It is likely that the respondent's spouse is also fluctuating in attitudes and identities across waves, but I am not able to directly measure this. Despite these data limitations, to my knowledge this is the first study to apply bargaining theory to attitudinal and identity measures. This fills an important gap in previous literature and has significant implications for other studies.

This study warrants further research in the application of bargaining theory. In particular, scholars should consider how relative resources influence changes in religious affiliation after marriage. Prior literature has theorized about religious switching to a partner's affiliation (Greeley 1972; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark 2005), but to my knowledge no formal tests have been

conducted on this process. As a result, it is also unknown the role that power plays in religious switching after marriage. In Indonesia, religious switching to match a spouse will likely occur before marriage rather than after. Due to the legal restrictions surrounding intermarriage, individuals will often convert in order to avoid administrative hoops (Aini 2008). However, partners seeking to intermarry is a relatively small percentage of the population (Parker et al. 2014), and studying this process is unfortunately not feasible with the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). While future research should explore religious switching in Indonesia, it should also consider this process outside of an Indonesian context.

Finally, the analyses here have considered a limited set of attitudinal and identity dependent variables. Although relative resources did not predict conformity in measures connected to religiosity with the sample, it is possible they still predict conformity in other attitudinal or identity measures. Future studies should explore if religiosity is an exception, or if couples do not bargain over attitudinal and identity measures at all. In particular, researchers should explore if outcomes such as politics, ethnic identity, or gender attitudes follow these same patterns.

APPENDIX

Table A1: BIC values

	5-assets variable	13-assets variable
Model 1: Received general check-up in last 5 years	316.328	318.052
Model 2: Conformity in religiousness	1530.663	1534.347
Model 3: Conformity in trust	1497.814	1500.516
Model 4: Conformity in objection (village)	1503.858	1505.441
Model 5: Conformity in objection (neighborhood)	1385.982	1386.151
Model 6: Conformity in religion's influence on voting	1546.685	1544.509

Weighted, unimputed models

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