FIRST AS ENCLOSURE, THEN AS ESCAPE: HEIDEGGER
AND DELEUZE ON NIETZSCHE’S RELATION TO WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY

A Dissertation in Philosophy
by
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Abstract

This dissertation lays out the two faces of Nietzsche: one looking back across post-Kantianism and the history of Western philosophy as its culminating point; the other wearing the mask of that history but fundamentally breaking with it and opening up the space of twentieth century thought. These two faces are laid out in two opposed readings of Nietzsche carried out by two of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century: Heidegger and Deleuze. For Heidegger, Nietzsche is tied to the Platonic and post-Kantian themes of the opposition between the sensible and the supersensible. The themes of art, knowledge, the body and time all bear the mark of this oppositional duality: the fixed and the fluid, the present and the passage of the present, being and becoming, the self and its overcoming. By solidifying the opposition between the sensible and the supersensible so rigorously, Nietzsche is the culmination of the history of Western metaphysics, the key moments of which culmination are Kant, Schelling, Hegel and Marx. For Deleuze, on the other hand, Nietzsche is a thinker for who overcomes the paradigm of negation and opposition in Western philosophy. On this reading, Nietzsche’s key thought is that of the influence of life upon thought: the sensible is not fundamentally opposed to the supersensible; rather, the supersensible is a way that the sensible differs from itself. Thought is neither opposed to the sensible nor identical with the sensible: it is a way in which the sensible differs from itself. However, human consciousness has a tendency to reproduce the theme of oppositional duality that has dominated Western philosophy; thus, the task of philosophy is to constantly uncover the ways in which this oppositional paradigm always covers up a creative differentiation which is irreducible to a sensible ‘origin’ and which therefore opens up radically new possibilities for thought and life.
In short, this dissertation confirms and rationalizes a common perception that Heidegger is excessively negative about Nietzsche, while Deleuze is excessively positive. It reveals the philosophical reasons for this: Heidegger emphasizes everything in Nietzsche that gathers the themes that have dominated the history of philosophy from Plato to German Idealism; Deleuze emphasizes everything in Nietzsche that breaks with precisely those themes. Heidegger reads Nietzsche as the culmination of Western metaphysics in order to establish his own place in the History of Being; Deleuze uses Nietzsche as a weapon against Heidegger’s History of Being.
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## Abbreviations

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### Works by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

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**Works by Martin Heidegger**


**Works by Nietzsche**

| BT | The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings. (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) |

**Works by Immanuel Kant**


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**Introduction**

Deleuze and Heidegger published works on Nietzsche in the early 1960’s that became paradigmatic for European philosophy; this dissertation reveals why the two books diverge so radically in their readings of Nietzsche. The broadest aim of this dissertation is to use these paradigmatic readings to uncover the philosophical project of the French philosophical generation of the 1960s, one that works through Heidegger and Nietzsche in a similar fashion. Through Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze, we will trace common trajectories and lines in the broad project of French ’60’s philosophy in order to illuminate new problems, pose old problems on a new stage and open new avenues of connection.¹

Both Deleuze and Heidegger’s readings of Nietzsche were foundational for the Nietzsche revival in France in the ‘60s and ‘70s.² They give us two very different portraits of Nietzsche, both painted upon the backdrop of nineteenth century philosophy; Heidegger binds Nietzsche to this backdrop, while Deleuze liberates him from it. We can understand this distinction between ‘binding’ and ‘liberation’ by seeing Nietzsche’s philosophy as torn between the Encounter and the Hero: on the one hand, the chance events of existence and, on the other hand, the initiative of the heroic human creator. Heidegger privileges and criticizes the Nietzschean Aristocratic Hero; Deleuze privileges and valorizes the Nietzschean Encounter of the Event. The claims being made

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¹ It will combat accounts such as Conway (Conway, 2011: 4) that suggests that the philosophies of Deleuze and Derrida are incompatible. This distinction between the philosophers is upheld in work on the reception of Nietzsche in French philosophy (Schrift, 1995).

² This is what Duncan Large has called “the extraordinary intensification of interest in Nietzsche which gripped the French intellectual scene over the period of roughly a dozen years following the publication of Heidegger’s Nietzsche in 1961 and especially Deleuze’s seminal Nietzsche et la philosophie in 1962” (Large, 1993: xi). Daniel W. Smith shares this assessment, writing that “Pierre Klossowski's Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle ranks alongside Martin Heidegger's Nietzsche and Gilles Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy as one of the most important and influential, as well as idiosyncratic, readings of Nietzsche to have appeared in Europe” (Smith, 1997: vii). Klossowski’s book was itself dedicated to Deleuze, indicating his importance in the European intellectual scene by 1969.
here are do not aim to put an end to scholarly dispute about Nietzsche’s texts; rather, they aim at illuminating the fundamental contours of the French philosophy of the 1960s.

**Conceptual stakes: opposition-resolution or opening-enclosure?**

In this introduction, we will first lay out the conceptual stakes of the dissertation, then reveal the historical significance of those concepts and finish with a summary of the chapters.

The two visions of Nietzsche we will explore hinge upon different relationships between the thinking subject and the object of thought, or between knowledge and existence. For Heidegger, Nietzsche follows the post-Kantian tradition in failing to think that which brings the thinking subject in relation to its object, a relation that would be prior to their separation. For Deleuze, on the other hand, Nietzsche *does* consider the constitution of the thinking subject that relates itself to a known object; furthermore, Nietzsche also accounts for the constitutive failure of that thinking subject to account for its own constitution.

Nietzsche views the essence of modernity through a Socratic paradigm: the attempt to encompass all appearances under a total web of knowledge, in a process undertaken by reason. However, for Nietzsche, this Socratic reasoning does not understand itself: the web of knowledge is conditioned and produced by an activity that it cannot itself account for *on its own terms*. The activity that is prior to reason’s web of knowledge undermines the claims of that ‘web’ to account for the *whole* of existence: it cannot account for its own generative activity. In a different philosophical vocabulary, we could say that self-consciousness is undermined by *its own embodiment in the world*, an embodiment that it can never account for on its own terms.

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche views the modern drive for a totality of knowledge as *in opposition* to the biological becoming of life, beginning from the opposition between the sensible
and super-sensible; he then reconciles this opposition through the thought of ‘self-overcoming.’ On this vision, human consciousness is doomed to forever oppose itself to the truth of the sensible becoming of life, an opposition that is occasionally reconciled by exceptional and heroic creators. Heidegger sees, in this Nietzsche, a philosophy in which those heroic moments of overcoming must merely ‘harmonize’ with how things are in its self-overcoming structure. Heidegger’s Heroic Nietzsche is doomed to the flux of Time, trapped in an immobile History that constantly overcomes each epoch in which it gets solidified. Similar themes surrounding the sensible-supersensible opposition are central from Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel to Freud. This dualistic opposition manifests itself through various themes in Nietzsche’s thinking, including time: impermanence/permanence; space: fluidity/fixedness; the body: overpowering/resisting; language: poetical/theoretical; thought: creating/knowing; humanity: sensuous/supersensuous; and society: genius/herd.

By beginning with the opposition of the sensible and the sensible, Nietzsche cannot account for the production of the difference between them. Nietzsche cannot account for his own thought of life as thought; thus, he falls into the same problem that he diagnosed in Western thought: its inability to account for itself on its own terms. On Deleuze’s account, Heidegger overemphasizes this Hegelian and oppositional Nietzsche because he reads him completely through his own Heideggerian terms, missing everything that Nietzsche criticizes and therefore assimilating him to it. There is, in fact, another side to Nietzsche, behind the Hegelian and oppositional mask. For Deleuze, as opposed to Heidegger, Nietzsche attempts to account for the production of the very conceptual representation that sees itself as opposed to materiality of life. Thus, for Deleuze, Nietzsche does achieve the project Heidegger himself believes to be the task of philosophy.

3 Cf. Foucault, 220.
Deleuze’s vision of Nietzsche is different from Heidegger’s because of the way he emphasizes materiality as differing or varying. The condition of any knowledge of existence is a variable materiality that remains forever ‘outside’ of thought, even after knowledge claims to have systematized and order it. Appearances do tend towards uniform and knowable homogeneity; however, they never reach a perfected state of homogeneity; this is because of a constant variation in the ordering of embodied materiality. This variation in materiality is, therefore, not merely the accidental and transitory play of indeterminate sensations prior to their conceptual ordering. Rather, it is a ‘betweenness’ that radically change the determinate beings it puts into a state of variation; it ‘affects’ those bodies, shocking them into a state of transformation that exceeds them and cannot be mastered by them. It exceeds all perceptual and conceptual orders of resemblance, and thus it cannot be ‘known’ as matter in variation. Matter, here, is the condition of the variation of the orders of conceptual knowledge and the perception of determinate objects. This materiality resembles Leibniz’s notion of force: force is necessary due to the fact the ideal orders of reason and the actual orders of perception do not resemble one another. Force is required for the realization of reason in the world of perception; it is in a constant state of variation due to the non-resemblance between reason and perception. In short, the perpetual variation of materiality is the condition of the knowledge of that materiality. The theme of the “opposition” between sensation and truth is not as important, in Nietzsche, as Heidegger thinks; instead, with Deleuze, we discover that material variation is the condition of the knowledge that opposes itself to ‘life’.

Although material variation cannot be grasped by conceptual knowledge, there is a type of thinking that acknowledges its own conditioning by materiality and its own tendency to oppose itself to matter. This modality of thought liberates materiality by constantly pointing out the ways
in which conceptual knowledge comes to enclose and conceal the variation of materiality. Between ‘conceptual’ thought and self-knowing thought, we find a type of thinking that vigilantly attempts to untangle the conceptual enclosure of material diversity. Heidegger thinks, at this point, Nietzsche sees an ‘end’ to conceptual representation and a return to the reality of life. However, for Deleuze, this thinking is a consciousness of the way in which thought and life constantly turn towards and away from one another. This non-reductive ‘living’ thought arises as follows: firstly, concepts fix down life; secondly, life does not conform to those concepts; thirdly, creative thought acknowledges that lack and creates new concepts that account for such an impossibility; finally, those new concepts, once again, give rise to new ways in which life becomes limited and fixed.

Nietzschean thinking, for Deleuze, does not imply a simple return to ‘life’ that reconciles the subject-object distinction without accounting for it, as Heidegger thinks it does. Instead, Nietzschean thought is caught between the ruse of opposition and the truth of differential, embodied and lived experience. These two paths make thought into an ethical act, always impacting bodies outside of itself. The act of thought is perilous because it always exists between two ways of relating to bodies: nihilistic representation and creative immanence. On the one hand, nihilistic representation attempts to ‘seize’ and gather the unthought, capturing and enslaving it within a strictly delimited interior territory as a self-same interiority (cf. Foucault, 1994: 328). This ‘nihilistic’ movement is named stratification, organization, representation, figuration, the speech of the “I”; it is also named the Socratic, theoretical, epistemological perspective of modernity. On the other hand, creative immanence allows for the irreducible unthinkable outside of thought and seeks to re-configure our concepts to account for the
impossibility of this capture. This is called the world of simulacra, difference, phantasms or the analogical diagram; the creative and varying world of the artist.

Creative immanence and nihilistic representation are the two paths within the human that liberate us from Man as the form of eternity that would subordinate the body to the conceptual. The two poles of thinking, transcendence and immanence, are irreducible and inescapable; transcendence returns eternally and thus demands a constant reckoning; the dogmatisms of history tend to return continually, requiring a constant prudence and new attempts at escape. Constantly varying modes of enclosure demands constantly varying modes of escape. Every ‘escape’ from transcendence to immanence engenders new dogmatisms, new worlds of representation. The loss of thought in the transcendent is inevitable. These two movements of thought have a relation to history: on the one hand, representational concepts that constitute known ’history’ are constantly returning and closing upon themselves. On the other hand, the origin of thought is an unhistorical activity in which thought differentiates itself from the entire history of thought.

**The historical importance of Deleuze’s Nietzsche and its Heideggerian framing**

Having examined the conceptual stakes of the dissertation, we will now move on to examine their historical significance. In particular, we will look at the importance of Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche in European philosophy, on the crucial but hidden role of Heidegger in that work and on Deleuze’s early philosophical education, and on the importance of Nietzsche in Deleuze’s philosophical trajectory.

Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy* is one of the earliest major statements of ‘60s French philosophy; it is a systematic expression of many key tenets of the philosophical epoch that
opens up after it. Derrida and Foucault explicitly affirm their debt to the book; it was published within a year of other important early landmarks in French philosophy: Foucault’s *History of Madness* and Derrida’s *Force and Signification*. Not only was Deleuze’s book part of the early wave of French ‘60s philosophy, it was also a major catalyst for the Nietzsche craze that enveloped French philosophy for the next two decades. It continues to provide inspiration and clarification for philosophers and commentators on Nietzsche in both the Continental and Analytic traditions. As well as shedding light on Nietzsche’s work, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* presents a condensed and wide-ranging vision of Deleuze’s own philosophical system as it emerges later in his career. It also deals with a variety of topics beyond philosophy, including religion, politics, art and science; Deleuze will not deal with such topics as explicitly until his final major work, thirty years later. Another important aspect of the book is that it marks a rare place in which Deleuze makes broad connections between traditionally recognizable philosophical concepts such as truth, life, thought and knowledge. However, the condensed and

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4 Deleuze’s 1962 *Nietzsche and Philosophy* almost coincided with the publication of Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures in 1961, lectures that Heidegger saw as an important way of presenting himself to the public after his difficult post-war period. These lectures were not published prior to Deleuze writing his book, as he cites only “Nietzsche’s Word: God Is Dead,” which had been published in the fifties.

5 Duncan Large concurs with the significance of Deleuze’s Nietzsche for Derrida, writing “We can see Deleuze’s new emphasis on a reading of Nietzsche which privileges forces and difference coming through already in Derrida’s pioneering early rebuttal of Jean Rousset’s classic 1962 structuralist study *Forme et signification*, ‘Force and Signification’, now best known as the opening essay of *Writing and Difference*, but initially published in *Critique* in 1963.20 Here we find Derrida arguing: ‘Form fascinates when one no longer has the force to understand force from within itself’ (p.4), and he concludes on a stirring and explicitly Nietzschean note, quoting from *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* and *Twilight of the Idols*, and ending with a long quotation from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*” (Large, 1993: xii).

6 Deleuze’s importance on the philosophical scene is marked by the fact that, in 1967, Deleuze is introduced by Jean Wahl as someone who needs no introduction due to his extraordinary studies in the history of philosophy: “Mr. Gilles Deleuze needs no introduction: you are no doubt familiar with his work on Hume as well as Nietzsche and Proust, and I'm sure you are all familiar with his extraordinary talent” (Deleuze, 2004: 95).

7 Cox and Richardson are two such ‘analytic’ commentators to have acknowledged a debt to Deleuze. In Christoph Cox’s reading of Nietzsche on the individual as an aggregate, for example, he notes his debt to “Deleuze's work in general” (Cox, 1999:132). John admits his perplexity with regard to much of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, but does take up the active-reactive distinction from *Nietzsche and Philosophy*: “I've been influenced by Deleuze here; indeed, these terms 'active'/reactive' are more his than Nietzsche's, who shifts freely among many different contrast pairs ('healthy'/'sick' etc.). But I think Deleuze is right that 'active'/reactive' best states the gist of the others as well. (I'm less sure how similar to his my analysis of this contrast has grown to be.)” (Richardson 1996: 39n45).
systematic nature of the book means that it is lacking in detail; the present project attempts to reconstruct many of the philosophical details and motivation.

Part of the paradigmatic importance of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* is that it moves beyond major Heideggerian ways of expressing key philosophical problems; however, the role of Heidegger in framing the book has gone largely unnoticed. We see the influence of Heidegger writ large across Deleuze’s early life; in this period, conversely, the influence of Nietzsche is less prominent than one might expect for such a famous Nietzschean. In Deleuze’s early philosophical education, Nietzsche was not so central; Sartre was his first love, and in a 1957 lecture course, Leibniz, Heidegger and Hume play a more substantive role than Nietzsche. Nietzsche is only used, from 1962 onwards, to target the dominant philosophies of Deleuze’s time; he imagines a Nietzsche untangled from the tradition of Kant and the broader post-Kantian tradition. The young Deleuze encountered Nietzsche and the post-Kantian tradition in the context of Heidegger: his first philosophical love was Sartre, who, in *Being and Nothingness*, precisely frames the Nietzschean ‘other world’ in terms of Heidegger and the phenomenological notion of appearance. Deleuze was taught the history of philosophy by thinkers bathed in phenomenology and Heidegger: Hyppolite, Vuillemin, and others. In light of this context, we

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8 Deleuze indicates this Heidegger-Nietzsche relation in his book on Foucault: “Heidegger is Nietzsche's potential [Heidegger est la possibilité de Nietzsche], but not the other way round, and Nietzsche did not see his own potential fulfilled” [Nietzsche n'a pas attendu sa propre possibilité] (Deleuze, 1988: 113).

9 “It was Nietzsche, who I read only later, who extricated me from all this. Because you just can't deal with him in the same sort of way” (Deleuze 1995: 6).

10 Robert T. Tally Jr. expresses a slightly different view to this, suggesting that already in his early work Deleuze was discovering a new way of doing philosophy; Deleuze does something “new, fresh and strange” with the history of philosophy (Tally, 2010: 15). My position is to downplay the aura of miraculousness that surrounds Deleuze’s supposed ‘genius’ and to emphasize his immersion in the philosophical problems of his milieu. To borrow one of Deleuze’s images, his singularity is that of a desert upon which various events, ideas and individuals meet.

11 The importance of Sartre is clear when Deleuze writes “We simply plunged into Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger; we threw ourselves like puppies into a scholasticism worse than that of the Middle Ages. Fortunately there was Sartre. Sartre was our Outside, he was really the breath of fresh air” (Deleuze, 2007: 13).

12 Deleuze is also indebted to figures who bring a Heideggerian perspective to the forefront of his philosophical education in the 1950s; that group is lead by Jean Beaufret, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Maurice Blanchot and Jean Wahl.
can understand why Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy* presents an imagined Nietzsche, one liberated from Heidegger and weaponized against Heidegger’s History of being. In the book, Deleuze suggests that Heidegger is the major representative of modern philosophy: a gaudy canvas of all that has ever been believed, mixing Nietzsche together with the pre-Socratics, Hegel, Christian spiritualism, phenomenology and a ‘going beyond’ of metaphysics and philosophy. By constituting this gaudy mixture, phenomenology and hermeneutics turn Nietzsche’s themes into a new conformism. Heidegger’s ‘gaudy mixture’ is the framing for *Nietzsche and Philosophy* that has gone almost unnoticed in the literature on the book; instead, Hegel has been cast as the primary figure of opposition. My reading upsets this common view that Hegel and German Idealism are the primary targets of the book.

Deleuze has, in some quarters, the reputation of a ‘creative’ philosopher who does not engage in detailed scholarly questions; however, despite appearances, Deleuze had a deep knowledge of the reception of Nietzsche, particularly in France. He was already an interlocutor, at a young age, with two of the most important French inheritors of Nietzsche: Bataille and Klossowski.

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13 “We see Marx and the Pre-Socratics, Hegel and Nietzsche, dancing hand in hand in a round in celebration of the surpassing of metaphysics and even the death of philosophy properly speaking. And it is true that Nietzsche did intend to "go beyond" metaphysics. But so did Jarry in what, invoking etymology, he called "pataphysics". We have imagined Nietzsche withdrawing his stake from a game which is not his own.” (NP: 195)

14 Deleuze noted in his 1953 review of Hyppolite’s major work *Logic and Existence* the Heideggerian overtones of his reading of Hegel. As Francois Dosse has remarked: “This rereading of Hegel was linked to Heidegger’s reception in France during this period, particularly after his 1946 *Letter on Humanism*. Deleuze agreed with Hyppolite’s definition of Being as meaning rather than as essence. “In a certain way, absolute knowledge is the closest, the most simple, it *is* there.” If ontology abandons essence, there is no second world, and by this fact, absolute knowledge cannot be distinct from empirical knowledge.” (Dosse, 2007: 119).

15 As Dosse notes, “In 1946, the French Society for Nietzsche Studies was created (and remained active until 1965) […] Deleuze was an active member of the group” (Dosse 2007: 130).

16 “When still a high-school senior, young Deleuze immediately drew attention when he arrived at Marie-Magdeleine Davy’s estate. He was at ease discussing Nietzsche with Pierre Klossowski; observers whispered, “He’ll be a new Sartre.” (Dosse, 2007: 93) “In 1943, during his final year of high school, Deleuze went with Tournier, who had been invited by de Gandillac, to an event organized by Marie-Magdeleine Davy;” many of the intellectual Parisian elite attended those events (91). “The Germanist Jacques Le Rider aptly described Nietzsche’s generally very conservative reception in prewar France. During World War II, however, things became very different: the small group around Marcel Moré, including Georges Bataille, Jean Wahl, Jean Hyppolite, and a very young Deleuze, proposed an entirely different reading of Nietzsche” (Dosse 2007: 130). Cf. Deleuze’s claim that Klossowski’s article in the late 1950’s “renewed the interpretation of Nietzsche” (DR: 312n. 19). and Foucault’s
He also had a strong grasp of the technical and scholarly aspects of Nietzsche’s reception in Germany and the more general academic scene around Nietzsche interpretation.

Once Deleuze emerged from his Heidegger-inflected education in the history of philosophy, Nietzsche took on a central role. Between the ages of 37 and 43, Deleuze had a Nietzschean phase of six years, from 1962 to 1968, in which he published important work on Nietzsche and in which he emerged as an important thinker in his own right. The publication of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in 1962 marked the opening of the philosophical floodgates: he published a substantive book almost every year for the next decade, culminating in the collaboration with Guattari in 1972. In 1965 he published a short introductory book on Nietzsche, including a biography, selected excerpts, a summary of Nietzschean characters and concepts. 1967 witnessed an important conference on Nietzsche with several of his teachers, the major figures in French philosophy, speaking; Deleuze was the coordinator of this event. When Deleuze divides his corpus into 11 sections, only one section is dedicated to a single philosopher: the section titled “Nietzschean Studies,” referring to the work of these six Nietzschean years. In 1968, those six years peaked with the publication of his major independent work of philosophy, *Difference and Repetition*; Nietzsche is arguably Deleuze’s most important philosophical ally in this book. After 1968, Deleuze publishes occasional pieces that include Nietzsche, but generally he becomes a proper name, surrounded by an already-established constellation of concepts.

We have seen the historical significance of Nietzsche in Deleuze’s trajectory and the implicit but crucial framing role that Heidegger played in Deleuze’s reception of Nietzsche; now, we can also say that Deleuze’s difficult and unexpected style of writing about Nietzsche is an attempt to

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claim in a letter to Klossowski that it was the best book of philosophy he had read, “with Nietzsche.” (cf. Smith, 1997: vii).

17 “I. From Hume to Bergson / II. Classical Studies / III. Nietzschean Studies / IV. Critical and Clinical / V. Esthetics / VI. Cinema Studies / VII. Con- temporary Studies / VIII. The Logic of Sense / IX. Anti-Oedipus / X.
liberate him from the themes in which Heidegger had enclosed him. Deleuze attempts to immobilize Nietzsche’s texts and, in doing so, produce a double from them; this immobilized double provides the systematic essentials that Deleuze wants to take from Nietzsche.\(^\text{18}\) In this double, certain themes are erased, themes that prolong the dominant image of thought in Western history of philosophy: Deleuze does this in order to extract what is genuinely new. By presenting a dense system of connections, he forces us out of overly simplistic interpretations, making us feel uneasy about them, and forcing us to constantly return to the problems raised by the texts. Nothing and no one is ever overcome in our modernity; it is not a question of making something entirely new, but of opening up the new within the old. Here, the old is Nietzsche and the history of Western philosophy. When we create we do not leave anything behind and, as such, Deleuze wants to make a synthetic system out of the entire past, but one which has a new center. The philosophical past becomes something other than the image it had of itself. In this process, Deleuze establishes a new plane, map or diagram that is affective because it lies beneath our concepts, and can never be grasped by concepts alone; it consists in a synthetic and connective systematization.\(^\text{19}\) If we take Nietzsche’s concepts without that map, they can appear fascist, nihilist or to be prophetizing doom; they speak of power, slavery, the return of the same and nihilism. Deleuze wants to correct those ‘emotional’ (affective) misunderstandings, and in doing

\(^\text{18}\) There is a widely shared belief “that Nietzsche is not as consistent as Deleuze suggests” (Winchester, 84). Despite the systematization that Deleuze operates upon Nietzsche, he was highly aware of the textual ambiguities that lay beneath this systematic presentation. In 1967, he says: “We must not forget that the Eternal Return and the Will to Power, the two most fundamental concepts in the Nietzschean corpus, are hardly introduced at all. They never did receive the extended treatment Nietzsche intended.” (Deleuze, 2004: 117).

\(^\text{19}\) The methodological approach is described by Deleuze in a 1967 talk in this way: “the most general reason why there are so many hidden things in Nietzsche and his work is methodological in nature. A thing never has only one sense. Each thing has several senses that express the forces and the becoming of forces at work in it. Still more to the point, there is no "thing," but only interpretations hidden in one another, like masks layered one on the other, or languages that include each other.” (Deleuze, 2004: 118). The multiplicity of senses is why the aphorism must be interpreted relative to the field of forces in which it is inserted in the present.
so, he wants to remove Nietzsche from a certain Heideggerian vision of the History of Western Philosophy.

**Chapter summaries**

Deleuze says that every project should have three elements: the diagnosis of an error, the proposal of a correction, and the positive invention of a concept. In this dissertation, I diagnose an error in my “Literature Review.” I correct the problem in chapters 3 and 4, and I offer a positive invention of a new problem in chapter 5. Chapters 1 and 2 present more well known conceptions (exploring, for example, difference, opposition and representation) but place them in a new light. That new light will only be fully clarified in chapter 5.

The dissertation begins with ‘transcendence’ or nihilism, in chapter 2, and ends with immanence or art in chapter 5. In between these two chapters, the dissertation displaces common misconceptions about the place of the body and affect in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. Chapters 3 and 4 correct the dogmatic image of Deleuze. I am aware that my general position is radically outside of the dogmatic image of Deleuze, and therefore this corrective work is a necessary preliminary stage to presenting the positive image of thought in chapter 5. Against the common view, Deleuze’s philosophy does not move from identity to difference. We move from difference to identity and then to the reinjection of difference into identity. This structure can be seen in Deleuze’s admiration for Heidegger’s work on language: the re-injection of a ‘dead’ language into the present language in favor of a language to come; the reinjection of difference into identity in favor of an identity that revolves around difference (ECC: 98).

In the Literature Review following this introduction, we show how the dominant reading of Deleuze and his relation to Nietzsche falls into a crude dogmatic materialism. Deleuze’s
reading of Nietzsche has been read as an “ontology of forces” that uses chance encounters between bodies to explain all action. This dogmatic materialist reading has a legitimate textual basis in Deleuze’s oeuvre, and we will examine incriminating passages in *Nietzsche and Philosophy, Difference and Repetition* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. These passages have been taken up as the basis of a whole host of readings, both in terms of theoretical ‘uses’ and scholarly, philosophical commentaries. We examine how these readings all fall into a dogmatic materialism. We will look at ethically and politically motivated critiques of this new malevolent self-enclosure of Man and we will end by re-reading the passages in Deleuze that seem to point to a dogmatic materialist reading, suggesting an alternative reading that will be developed in later chapters.

Chapter one lays out the general framework of Deleuze and Heidegger on Nietzsche. Heidegger’s initial reading of the body in Nietzsche is posed in terms which remains close to his own philosophy: the self takes up a stance in which it opens itself to beings. He moves, later, towards reading Nietzsche in a Schellingian frame, based around dualities of permanence and impermanence, overcoming-resisting and becoming-being that Nietzsche’s combines in such a way as to bring Western metaphysics to its culminating point. While Heidegger sees Nietzsche’s thought as split in two, Deleuze splits in into three major moments: will, force and phenomena. These are related to the three moments of evaluation, interpretation and ‘things.’ Deleuze sees Nietzsche as breaking with the trajectory of nineteenth century philosophy with this tripartite structure by re-activating a tension in Leibniz’s thought: the lack of resemblance between the ideal order of reasons and their realization by force in the actual world of perception.

The two general frameworks for reading Nietzsche offer competing explanations of what he sees as the basic phenomenon of human history: nihilism. Chapter two explores these
competing explanations of nihilism, beginning by framing it through what Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* calls the Socratic attempt to encompass all of existence under reason. This encompassing attempt is sustained and undermined by something which always exceeds the complete web of knowing but which it cannot account for. We put this criticism of Socratic modernity in the context of nineteenth century philosophy by revealing a similar structure in Marx’s criticisms of Hegel: self-consciousness is always undermined by its own materiality that it can never recuperate within itself. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche remains within the tradition of Hegel by ‘opposing’ the fixity of super-sensible truth to the flux of sensible nature. For Deleuze, on the other hand, Nietzsche is the key break in this tradition because the truth-appearance duality is constantly produced and yet never achieved; it relies upon a more fundamental productive activity and constantly has to fight off all excess; against Heidegger’s reading, there is no Platonic opposition between truth and productive being.

Kant’s radical separation of sensibility and the understanding offers resources to think beyond nihilism; chapter three explores how Nietzsche and Deleuze’s reading of him take up this Kantian escape route, showing how they are more Kantian than has previously been understood. A more traditional vision of Kant puts him within the history of ‘oppositional’ thinking between the supersensible Will and sensible nature that Deleuze and Heidegger see dominating the nineteenth century. A different Kant emphasizes that sensation is a source of knowledge which *differs in kind* from the understanding, a stubborn independence of sensibility that is taken up by Deleuze and Heidegger as a radically irreducible ‘outside’ of thought. For Heidegger, that ‘outside’ is betrayed by Kant because he relies on the model of the objectively present being. However, Deleuze finds in Kant’s notion of intensity a kind of differing matter of the outside that provides him with resources for interpreting Nietzsche’s claim that reality consists in quantities
of force. Kant prioritizes, however the *res extensa* or space as *partes extra partes*: the fluxing materiality of appearance is merely a kind of ‘filling’ of a homogeneous spatial frame for objects. Deleuze agrees with Kant that objects in appearance tend towards an extensive spatial uniformity; and yet, in experience itself, that uniformity never reaches its absolute point of pure homogeneity. Thus Deleuze suggests that Kant’s notion of intensity is actually the transcendental condition of the variation inherent in the experience of perception. We will end by showing how this transcendental condition of the variability of every ordering of appearance is the essence of what Nietzsche calls the ‘world-artist.’

Chapter three corrects a common misunderstanding that Deleuze and his reading of Nietzsche are based around ‘bodies’ as they are in themselves; no longer can we hold the dogmatic materialist position. This opens up the necessity of re-conceptualizing the positive place of the body in Nietzsche, one which no longer reifies material fluxes but also accounts for the specific importance of the body. Chapter four re-thinks this Nietzschean body, firstly by establishing the specific context for Nietzsche’s reading of the body as the Kantian notion that bodies and sensations and indeterminate. This becomes the post-Kantian undifferentiated abyss of the depths. Althusser shows how Marx both remains in this tradition and also points towards a new Nietzschean conception of differentiated encounter. There is one reading of Nietzsche that misses this context and reads him in terms of the struggle against the indifference of the outside. Instead of privileging oppositional struggle, Deleuze reads the Nietzschean body in terms of a betweenness as the affect that passes between combatants, making the body ‘active.’ Affect is not, as Heidegger believes, the loving carriage of the self across into beings; it is a combative shock that cannot be mastered by the self and that liberates the body from the conscious directives of the world. This liberation of the body is not a harmonious discovery of what
dogmatic materialists call ‘dynamic process;’ rather, it pushes the differential gap between thought and being further than ever.

Having corrected the misunderstanding of the body in Deleuze and his reception of Nietzsche, chapter five establishes a new relation between thought and being. The dogmatic materialist tries to provide new narratives about the body; I will show that, for Deleuze, materiality is not a thing in itself that thought could ever return to. Merely eradicating representational consciousness is not enough; we must constantly liberate thought from its self-enclosing movement. The tension between enclosure and liberation are two paths that Nietzsche lays out as the totalizing theoretical perspective of modernity and the artistic vision that accounts for its own generation. For Heidegger, this gives a culminating expression to the major theme of Western philosophy: the harmony in which thought must merely repeat an activity of being. Being is merely the variation of appearances; there is nothing ‘behind’ appearances, and so thought must merely repeat this activity of variation. The absence of absence in Nietzsche’s notion of the highest thought means that he makes presence permanent in a way that achieves the central aims of the Western metaphysics of presence. Deleuze seems to confirm this in his positing of a Nietzschean ‘noble affinity’ between thought and life; however, this affinity is one of confrontation. Thought and being endlessly turn towards and away from one another; Heidegger is wrong to suggest that Western history is one long ‘turning away’ of being. Instead, there are two paths within the human that lead out of the Man as the form of eternity: the continual return of nihilism within the actual, technological course of history and the continual poetic creation that breaks with this history. Nihilism continually liberates fragments from within itself that thought must gather anew. In this way, the dissertation ends by showing how Deleuze subverts Heidegger’s criticisms of Nietzsche and thinks a Nietzschean path beyond Heidegger himself.
This literature review outlines the dominant paradigm of thought that has overshadowed our understanding of Deleuze’s relation to Nietzsche. It is a paradigm that I will call “dogmatic materialism;” I use this name because I do not suggest a polemical ‘abandoning’ of materiality. Instead, I want to put into question the almost obsessive tendency to use terms associated with materiality in understanding Deleuze’s ontology and his relation to Nietzsche. At the heart of this dogmatic reading are many of the most famous ‘Deleuzian’ concepts: genesis, immanence, materiality, rhizome, becoming and intensity. Critiquing this dogmatic materialist position is particularly important because it has been very influential in the humanities of late, inspiring several new movements: affect theory, new materialisms, assemblage theory, vital materialism and others.

The dogmatic reading of Deleuze is materialist in the sense that it attempts to describe the generation of conscious representations from out of materiality. As such, that dogmatic materialism conceives itself as dealing with the nature of real entities that are independent of human consciousness. This materialist reading has four major inflections: philosophical, scientific, political and culture. We can now briefly summarize those inflections.

The philosophical inflection of the dominant reading believes that philosophy must carry out a genesis, returning to the origin of human consciousness in entities which are like real and

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20 Although I am suggesting there is a dogmatic image of Deleuze, many writers who espouse that dogmatic image also ‘burst out’ of it; they have produced a plethora of interesting concepts. Deleuze himself provides this idea that writers within a dogmatic tradition can also burst out of it at the same time. Despite apparently being a deep admirer of Spinoza, Deleuze himself claims that Spinoza falls into the dominant image of philosophy: he epitomizes the Cartesian dualist system. Yet, at the same time, according to Deleuze, Spinoza’s thought is bursting out on all sides from this Cartesianism.
material fluxes of difference, without any identity. The scientific inflection suggests we should carry out experiments to show that ‘difference’ is the characteristic of real entities. Deleuze is seen as taking up a pre-critical position, except that real entities in themselves are ‘differing’ rather than possessing identity like a God conceived as a self-same substance. By suggesting that real beings in themselves are defined by ‘differing,’ we gain a more efficient set of theoretical tools compared to thinking of beings in terms of identity. The third, political inflection of dogmatic materialism claims to advance beyond Derridian and Foucaultian methodologies; it suggests that to prevent any control of the differences between subjects, the best way to do that is through an ontology of differential bodies rather than criticizing texts and discourse. The final, cultural justification for the dominant reading is that it’s just “in the air:” behold the material fluxes of the hard sciences, or the material, teeming differences of contemporary art. According to this inflection, Deleuze is merely providing the metaphysics of contemporary culture as evinced by art and science.

To summarize, the dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze has at least four main justifications: the origin-genesis philosophical justification; the efficient, scientific justification; the political-subjective difference justification; the ‘metaphysics of contemporary art and science’ justification.

The present dissertation will attempt to correct the basic error at work in the dogmatic materialist paradigm; this correction is not isolated to the present project, but its seeds have already been sown in the work of Elizabeth Grosz. As she has recently written, “Deleuze is almost universally considered a materialist;” however, this materialism implies an impulse to

21 This would include readers such as Joe Hughes and Henry Somers-Hall.
22 This would be the reading of Manuel de Landa and Miguel de Beistegui.
23 This would be the reading given by, for example, Rosi Braidotti, new materialists, and
reductionism and a loss of explanatory force (Grosz, 2017: 9). For Grosz, we cannot ‘explain away’ thought as merely an emergent quality from an “order of material complexity” (11). Descartes, according to Grosz, articulated the non-spatial and non-localizable aspects of thought that “even the most sophisticated and contemporary expressions of materialism (materialisms in their genetic, cognitive or neurological forms) are unable to explain” (9). Deleuze’s own “fascination with concepts, ideas and the incorporeal” complicates an understanding of his philosophy as simply materialist (9). Grosz suggests that Deleuze is neither a materialist nor an idealist: his writings constantly address the relation between the material and the ideal without presupposing a break between them (9). Ideality must be understood on its own terms, not as the other or the binary opposite of materiality but as a directing and orienting force that inhabits materiality (12). Grosz seeks to re-orient philosophy and theory towards a new idealism: “with the rise of so-called new materialism, it is perhaps necessary to simultaneously call into being a new idealism” (13).

Not only is Grosz pointing beyond dogmatic materialism; Deleuze himself repudiates precisely the position held by many of his readers. Many ‘dogmatic materialists’ get very excited about Deleuze’s empiricism; however, Deleuze says that if you make the concrete richness of the sensible into a first principle, you are suffocating the vitality of empiricism (Deleuze, 2007: 54). The position Deleuze is criticizing sounds very much like those Deleuzians who want to show that conscious representations originate in material dynamical processes. Deleuze says that using

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24 This reductionism is precisely what haunts all those who repeat words like rhizome and becoming-animal ad nauseum.
25 Deleuze himself criticizes the cliché view of empiricism as based on the principle that the intelligible comes from the sensible.
26 Thinking may be explicable in terms of the brain, neuronal networks, or cognitive connections, but none of these has the incorporeal quality of thought” (9).
27 “Deleuze can neither be classified as a materialist nor as an idealist. His work is oriented in both directions without any assumption of a break between them. An argument could be made, although I will not present it directly.
the richness of the sensible as a first principle ends up suffocating life because such first principles do not make “things” move or animate themselves (only the poetic word at the limit of language achieves this animation of the thing). Deleuze is clear that his philosophy is not that of traditional empiricism: you cannot say that the intelligible comes from the fluxing sensible; you cannot say that everything which is of the understanding or intellect comes from the senses. Empiricism’s notion of difference is neither the difference between the sensible and the intelligible, nor between sensations and ideas, nor between experience and thought; rather, it is the difference between two different sorts of experience or idea: the idea of terms and the idea of relations.  

In this literature review, we will show how the dominant reading of Deleuze and his relation to Nietzsche falls precisely into the crude empiricism that Deleuze criticizes. First, we will see how his reading of Nietzsche has been read as an “ontology of forces” that uses chance encounters between bodies to explain all action. Next, we will see how this dogmatic materialist reading has a legitimate textual basis in Deleuze’s oeuvre, examining incriminating passages in *Nietzsche and Philosophy, Difference and Repetition* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. Next, we will outline how these passages have been taken up as the basis of a whole host of readings, both in terms of theoretical ‘uses’ of Deleuze and scholarly, philosophical commentaries. We will examine how ‘dogmatic materialism’ manifests itself in the more theoretical context of Manuel DeLanda, John Protevi, Jane Bennett and even Elizabeth Grosz. Next we will diagnose the dominant reading in the philosophical and scholarly readings of Henry Somers-Hall, Jay

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28 Empiricism’s “vital discovery” (not its first principle) is the question of *relations*, a question that is everywhere in Deleuze’s work. In Hume, there are ideas but then relations between ideas; those relations can vary without the ideas themselves varying. The variation in relations is caused by circumstances, actions and passions. The ideal relations independent from their terms and their circumstantial variation constitute a “geography” of relations, a key aspect of Deleuze’s own philosophy (Deleuze, 2007: 54).
Conway, Anne Sauvenargues, Miguel de Beistegui, Alain Badiou and Joe Hughes. We will then show how Claire Colebrook and Zakiyyah Imam Jackson have offered ethically and politically motivated critiques of this the ‘post-humanist’ paradigm of which dogmatic materialism is a part. It is, perhaps, a new regime of cliché in which the malevolent self-enclosure of Man and his fraternity reimpose their universal concepts upon all “things.” Finally, we will re-read the passages in Deleuze that seem to point to a dogmatic materialist reading. We will see that they are misleading when taken alone, and that they exist alongside a conception of thought that is much more complex than has been previously understood.

This literature review will not provide the ‘correction’ for the error it diagnoses; that will be the task of the rest of the dissertation. Using Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche as a backdrop for Deleuze’s Nietzsche will provide us with the framework for overcoming this error: Heidegger sees Nietzsche as resembling what we are calling a dogmatic materialist. In showing how Deleuze helps Nietzsche escape from Heidegger’s criticisms, we will also show how Deleuze escapes from the dogmatic materialist reading.

1. Diagnosing the Erroneous Understanding of Deleuze’s Nietzsche: Dogmatic Materialism and its origin in Deleuze’s texts

The dogmatic reading of Deleuze has both influenced and been influenced by Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, privileging what it sees as a foundational ontology of forces in Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. This ontology of forces, Jon Roffe suggests, “consists of multiplicitous forces engaged in mutual relations.”29 These relations imply encounters which are prior to individual and separable bodies; each encounter brings about changes in the bodies

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29 Roffe, 71.

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engaging in them.\textsuperscript{30} This is a materialism that breaks with atomism, mechanism or determinism; what eternally returns is not a determined atomistic mechanism, but rather chance encounters between forces. James Winchester puts this ontology of forces in terms of becoming: there is “nothing besides” everything becoming something different from itself. This world of forces in a state of becoming founds Deleuze’s attempt to “describe [and interpret] human behavior” using a “view of the physical world” (Winchester, 1994: 86). Michael Hardt also emphasizes action and behavior: Deleuze’s Nietzsche “limits our conception of agents the interplay of forces” (Hardt, 2004: 54).\textsuperscript{31} The core of Hardt’s reading of suggests that Deleuze uses the interplay of forces in Nietzsche to avoid his individualism and reactionary politics (31).\textsuperscript{32} Judith Butler sees this interplay of forces as an “arcadian vision of precultural libidinal chaos” that “poses as an ahistorical absolute” in Deleuze’s reception of Nietzsche (Butler, 1987: 215).\textsuperscript{33}

Keith Ansell-Pearson goes beyond the dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze’s Nietzsche by focusing on the bestowal of sense as opposed to merely the chance encounters of forces. Although difference of force is ‘in’ the origin it does not necessarily appear \textit{at} the origin, and therefore we face, irreducibly, the problem of sense or meaning. Thus Ansell-Pearson comes to discuss philosophy as an active mode of existence that sets free what lives, by bringing the difference in the origin to appear in the world of sense (Ansell-Pearson, 2007: 252). However, the role of ideality remains unclear in his text, as he discusses philosophy primarily as an active mode of existence, not as a specific mode of thinking. Michel Haar is another reader who focuses less on the materialist ontology of forces, and instead highlights the notion of simulacra that

\textsuperscript{30} “Every (chance) encounter brings about changes in the bodies that engage in them.” (Roffe, 75).
\textsuperscript{31} Strangely, Hardt goes on to suggest in Spinoza we find a conception of the Individual as a group of bodies, and this takes Deleuze beyond Nietzsche. Yet, we find a very similar conception of ‘a body’ in chapter two of \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, in which Spinoza emerges as an important reference point.
\textsuperscript{32} Without denying this avoidance, I would suggest that beneath the escape from individualism lies a more nuanced and profound escape from the post-Kantian theme whereby the infinite is nothing but the finite overcoming itself.
\textsuperscript{33} Of course, Butler is criticizing this ontology of forces, and I would agree with her in this criticism.
Deleuze reads into Nietzsche. Haar is primarily concerned to point out that Deleuzian simulacra does not, in fact, play a role in Nietzsche’s texts (Haar, 1996: 56). However, he primarily focuses on Deleuze’s own philosophy in *Difference and Repetition* to the detriment of his more direct statements on Nietzsche.

The fact that Roffe, Winchester, Butler and Hardt read Deleuze’s Nietzsche in terms of a materialist ontology of force emerges from misleading comments within Deleuze’s own texts. The most important text for us is *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, in which the theme of ‘origin’ plays an ambiguous role, one which encourages a dogmatic materialist interpretation. Deleuze introduces “critical philosophy” as “the referring back of all things and any kinds of origin to values” and the referring of values to something that is “their origin and determines their value” (NP: 5). This origin is “the difference in the origin, difference in the origin is hierarchy, that is to say the relation of a dominant to a dominated force, of an obeyed to an obeying will” (8). It seems that the origin of all things of any kind is a difference between forces, dominating and dominated. Genealogy itself is read, by Deleuze, in these terms: “Genealogy thus means origin or birth, but also difference or distance in the origin. Genealogy means nobility and baseness, nobility and vulgarity, nobility and decadence in the origin” (5). The theme of origins is not absent; instead, difference and distance become the origin that genealogy seeks. Again, this origin relates the problem of force: “In the beginning, at the origin, there is the difference between active and reactive forces. Action and reaction are not in a relation of succession but in one of coexistence in the origin itself” (NP: 55). The difference between active and reactive forces is “in the beginning, at the origin.” Who can blame, then, the dogmatic materialists for reading *Nietzsche and Philosophy* as a description of human action in terms of an interplay of
forces in their encounters with one another? It seems that Deleuze loudly announces such an ontology of force in the text.

As well as the theme of the origin, Deleuze makes statements that imply a reduction of all things to bodily forces, encouraging a dogmatic materialist reading. We must quote one particularly incriminating example in full:

“all reality is already quantity of force. There are nothing but quantities of force in mutual "relations of tension" (VP II 373/WP 635). […] What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces constitutes a body - whether it is chemical, biological, social or political” (NP: 40).

This quote contains the essence of how Deleuze’s Nietzsche has been read and it is a key source of the dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze’s philosophy more generally. All reality is quantity of force; there are nothing but quantities of force; what defines a body is the relation between forces; chemical, biological, social or political bodies are constituted by a relationship of force. Reality and bodies are defined and constituted by nothing but relationships of force: it is hard to read these lines in chapter two of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* without imputing to Deleuze’s Nietzsche the kind of ‘ontology of force’ that most commentators read into it.

The final misleading theme in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* is the ‘end’ of nihilism. Dogmatic materialists tend to view conceptually represented identities as merely a temporary epoch connected to the human, an epoch given the Nietzschean name of nihilism. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* Deleuze suggests “the long story of nihilism has a conclusion: the full stop where negation turns back on reactive forces themselves” (NP: 198). This implies that once
nihilism comes to an end, we can return to the origin: the differences of force that constitute the reality of bodies.\textsuperscript{34}

The misleading comments about bodies and forces in \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy} are echoed in \textit{Difference and Repetition}. We will now lay out the smorgasbord of language that leads towards a dogmatic materialist reading that privileges the intensive differences of sensible, spatial energy as the origin upon which all things rest. The “groundlessness from which everything comes” involves intensity-linkage-resonance-forced movement (DR: 283). This groundlessness of intensity is what Deleuze calls systems of pure difference, systems of simulacra: these systems “\textit{rest ultimately} upon the nature of intensive quantities” (277).\textsuperscript{35} Systems of difference from which everything comes rest ultimately on intensive materiality. These systems are the “sole origin” that relates differents to other differents; difference is the origin; even in \textit{Difference and Repetition} this origin is articulated through Nietzsche: “the eternal return is indeed the consequence of a difference which is originary, pure, synthetic and in-itself (which Nietzsche called will to power)” (148). The pure origin of difference is the groundlessness upon which everything rests; intensity is “difference in itself”. The eternal return is elaborated “within a groundlessness in which original Nature resides in its chaos, beyond the jurisdictions and laws which constitute only second nature” (265). The groundless of “original Nature” is the “origin depth” that is “space as an intensive quantity: the pure spatium” (253). Deleuze also describes this system of difference as “the totality of the system - in other words, the chaos which contains all” (146). This total chaos that contains all is the being of the

\textsuperscript{34} In chapter 5, I show how this misleading comment about the end of nihilism is corrected by Deleuze elsewhere in his corpus.

\textsuperscript{35} Page 300 of \textit{Difference and Repetition} outlines a seven-step system that seems very must like the generation of all individual things from out of the depths of intensive bodies.
The materiality of this original chaos is clear when Deleuze calls it “energy in general” (263). The materialist reading that sees in Deleuze an explanation of all things in terms of intensive and material differences seems justified by these comments.

The final major source of the dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze is *A Thousand Plateaus*. One quote that captures the essence of this reading is as follows:

there is “a life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material vitalism that doubtless exists everywhere but is ordinarily hidden or covered, rendered unrecognizable, dissociated by the hylomorphic model” (ATP: 417).

Vital materiality is, again, present as an origin that “exists everywhere” but is “hidden or covered.” The Platonic overtones of the dogmatic materialist reading emerge from this type of phrasing: there is a truth behind everything, but that truth is hidden. For materialist readers of Deleuze and Guattari, that hidden truth is the vitality of matter.

As a final, glaring example of the dogmatic materialist tendencies in Deleuze, we can look at a comment in his *Cinema* books that epitomizes so much of what is known as Deleuzianism. Deleuze writes that the death of the subject is only a “means in relation to a more profound end;” the profound end of “attaining once more the world before man, before our own dawn, the position where movement was, on the contrary, under the régime of universal variation, and where light, always propagating itself, had no need to be revealed” (Deleuze, 1986: 68). The universal variation of movement of a non-revealed light: again, a Platonic ‘hiddenness’ of truth behind appearance manifests itself in this materialism that subsists beneath the human. The “world before man” is where we find this hidden variation of movement; the dogmatic materialist thinks we must return to this origin.

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36 “Difference is intensive, indistinguishable from depth in the form of an non-extensive and non-qualified spatium, the matrix of the unequal and the different. Intensity is not the sensible but the being of the sensible, where different
2. The Dogmatic Materialist reading of Deleuze’s philosophy: theoretical uses and
scholarly commentaries

One of the most influential readers of Deleuze as a materialist is Manuel DeLanda, to whom we must now turn. For Delanda, Deleuze is a ‘realist’ philosopher with a realist ontology because he grants reality “full autonomy from the human mind,” unlike other post-modern philosophers who are non-realist (DeLanda, 2002: 2). Deleuze’s realism concerns dynamical processes: it is these processes that “give objects their identity.” The dynamical processes that give objects their identity are either material and energetic or “immanent to the world of matter and energy;” thus, material and energetic processes are ‘reality’ and they have full independence from the human mind. There are no essences or any other transcendent entity; by getting rid of these, Deleuze provides a “leaner ontology” compared with an ontology of intelligible essences. The removal of essences and transcendent entities means Deleuze’s philosophy is a good one, because it gives us more efficient explanations, according to DeLanda.

The role of philosophy, for DeLanda, is to move from the qualities and extensities of the empirically observable world back to the dynamical processes that produce that world (68). The return to dynamic processes will gives us a “more dynamic way of creating classifications;” which we do when we “design experiments” or “study phenomena” (65). Even though DeLanda explicitly differentiates this as the task of philosophy rather than science, it is unclear how observation of phenomena in experiments differs from empirical science.

37 DeLanda correctly qualifies this realism as not an ‘actualism’: Deleuze was not an ‘actualist’. He held a realist position towards the modal structure of state space (36)

38 “Getting rid of laws, as well as of essences and reified categories, can then justify the introduction of the virtual as a novel dimension of reality. In other words, while introducing virtuality may seem like an inflationary ontological move, apparently burdening a realist philosophy with a complete new set of entities, when seen as a replacement for laws and essences it actually becomes deflationary, leading to an ultimately leaner ontology” (44).
Jane Bennett is another important materialist reader of Deleuze. For Bennett, things have the power to ‘act’, to produce effects and to alter the course of events; this is what she calls, following Bruno Latour, the “thing-power” of the “actant” (Bennett, 2010: viii). However, she admits that this notion of the actant relies upon seeing echoes of “human agency” in “nonhuman nature;” the difficulties of dogmatic materialism emerge in this admission (xvi). John Protevi is another materialist reader of Deleuze who views life in terms of action; specifically, life is a creative capacity for self-organization by material systems. Protevi cites Deleuze and Guattari and writes that life is the “novel creation” of “orders, forms, and substances” (Protevi, 2012: 248). However, in the original text, life is not “novel creation;” life “disrupts” orders, forms and substance (ATP: 336). We will see why ‘disruption’ is a key word that dogmatic materialism tends to under-value in favor of words like ‘creation.’

Elizabeth Grosz has tried to read materiality in Deleuze with a more sympathetic view of ideality than the ‘new materialists’ such as DeLanda, Bennett and Protevi. Nevertheless, certain typically materialist principles still remain in a more nuanced manner. The main problem is that Grosz sees ideality in terms of the cohesion, orientation and self-expansion within materiality; the influence of Karen Barad’s ‘intra-activity’ is unmistakable in these themes: ideality and materiality are “mutually implicated,” she writes (13). Ideality opens materiality up “as a cohesive, meaningful world, a universe with a horizon of future possibilities.” Cohesion, meaning and horizon: three concepts Deleuze continually criticizes. I would suggest that Grosz remains, here, within a Bergsonian paradigm of reading Deleuze, one that Quentin Meillassoux

39 “Ideality provides the cohesion of form, the orientation or direction toward which material things tend, the capacity for the self-expansion of material things and relations into new orders” (13).

40 Richard Rorty has expressed his pragmatist-Darwinian position in terms very similar to Grosz’s; this is interesting insofar as Rorty is continually criticizing any theory that posits objects independent of human consciousness, which is the foundation of Grosz’s project. Nevertheless they both see ideality as emerging from materiality for a ‘better future’ in language that resonantes with liberal political discourse: mutual implication, shared needs and interests and so on. Perhaps it is their shared Darwinian influence that brings them to this position.
has suggested is founded upon the free choice of a living being. Again, the ‘activity’ of materiality is still privileged, as in other materialist readers of Deleuze. Although Grosz points to “a new new materialism in which ideality has a respected place,” if ideality is merely founded upon cohesion and meaning then we seem to fall into similar problems as the old new materialism (14).

We can now summarize some dogmatic materialist readings of Deleuze that present themselves as more scholarly and philosophical than the more theoretical ‘uses’ of Deleuze. Henry Somers-Hall suggests that Deleuze’s philosophy is founded upon a field of intensive individuation which ‘generates’ extensity (Somers-Hall, 116). Generation or genesis is the governing concept; he suggests that Deleuze’s philosophy resonates with Merleau-Ponty on this point. Jay Conway’s Affirmation of Philosophy frames Deleuze’s philosophy as asking: what is an entity or body? Derridean Deconstruction tries to demystify general terms and therefore exaggerates the connection between expressions and ontological commitments (Conway, 2011: 4-5).41 Anne Sauvenargues sets up a binary between ‘form’ and ‘force.’ Deleuze prefers “the play of forces to a repetition of forms;” Deleuze’s “new theory of the subject” is “located on the plane of forces and not forms” (162-3). Simondon, Sauvenargues writes, “helps [Deleuze], as always, arm the move from form to force;” in Simondonian modulation, the object is given “as an arrangement of forces, speeds, and slownesses, and not as a formed subject” (161). In these scholarly readings, we find a privileging of force, intensive individuation and bodies, confirming the dominant of the dogmatic materialist reading.

Miguel de Beistegui falls into a dogmatic materialist reading when he suggests that immanent thinking means rendering thought “immanent to” the chaotic becoming of reality, a thought that “grows from within the real, or Being” (Beistegui, 2010: 192). Although he has a
nuanced account of thought in Deleuze, it still remains subordinate to materiality: thought must merely create concepts that “map” the way chaos is being ordered at any given point. Again, thought is a subordinate mapping of material chaos and its ordering (70). It must move between “pure Chaos, in which all things originate” and the “sphere of fully individuated substances,” mapping the movement between the two (71).

Badiou is critical of Deleuze, but still remains within the dogmatic materialist reading because he sees intensity as the living power of the One; behind appearances, the living power of the One subsists. Deleuze wants us, Badiou believes, to entrust ourselves to affirmation in which ‘sense’ chooses us in a gesture unknown to ourselves (Badiou, 1997: 28). This moment of affirmation implies an “inflection of intensity whose difference is purely formal or modal, the living power of the One” (25). “Beings are all identically simulacra” insofar as they participate in this living power of the One in which differences of intensity are purely formal.42

Having summarized some theoretical and philosophical readings of Deleuze that are dogmatically materialist, we can look at one such reading in more depth: that of Joe Hughes. Hughes expressly presently himself as focusing on the generation of the ideal from out of the sensible, thus falling into precisely the type of reading we are analyzing.43 Hughes sees Deleuze’s philosophy as describing the genesis of representation: “the way in which consciousness is produced in the interactions between the body and its affections” (20).44

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41 Deleuze is “determined to keep philosophy from getting stuck in the practice of demystification” (5).
42 Badiou directly relates his critique of Deleuze to the eternal return: he cites Deleuze writing that Nietzsche “was to "realize univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal return”” (Difference and Repetition, p. 304, cited in Clamor of Being, 22).
43 Hughes sees himself as going against the dominant reading of Deleuze that emphasizes the virtual, understood as the ontological foundation of all reality, and its relation to intensity which engenders the individuated actuality of the virtual. However, I would say he maintains a deeper connection to the dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze.
44 Hughes says he describes “a general model of genesis which informs Deleuze’s thought across the rest of his career” (27).
mirrors the reading of Deleuze’s Nietzsche as explaining action based on encounters between bodily forces.

Hughes’ sees Deleuze’s ontology as having three levels. The surface (tertiary) level is that of empirical consciousness, formed by propositions, judgements and knowledge (21). As Heidegger suggests, this level in Husserl involves “self-contained and finished cognitions formulated in assertions, propositions [and] judgements” (21). The second level is a transcendental field of sense that is pre-individual and impersonal (22). The deepest and primary level is comprised of unindividuated bodies in a state of mixture, comprised of partial objects and fragments melting together (23). Hughes sees this level as equivalent to the ‘world of perception’ in Merleau-Ponty (29).

The three levels of proposition, sense and fragmented bodies can interact in two main ways: bodies can give rise to sense, which is a dynamic genesis, and sense can give rise to propositions, which is a static genesis. In the dynamic generation of sense by bodies, there are three passive syntheses. We begin, in the first synthesis, by surmounting the depths of the body through the activity of “surveying” or contemplating the affections of the body, thereby gathering (synthesizing) the fragmenting bodies and producing partial ‘zones’ or surfaces (31). In the second synthesis, we co-ordinate the partial surfaces that we surveyed, and we gather them together into a ‘complete’ and ‘full’ surface, making a ‘complete representation’ out of the partial surfaces (31). In the third synthesis, in trying to bring together that global image we actually fail; instead, we affirm that no single surface can totalize all the others and thus we affirm disjunction (33).

After the three passive syntheses, the body has not yet given rise to sense; what is necessary is another plane, the transcendental field of sense. This field is produced when we fail
to gather or organize partial surfaces into a global surface. Instead, there is a sublimation of the fragmented affects, and they become immaterial ideal elements, recovering the ‘history’ of bodily fragmentation in thought (34). Once the bodily fragments have been sublimated in thought, they are made to communicate in an event of ‘symbolization’ that establishes new relations between them, relations that never existed at the level of bodily fragmentation. The novelty of these ideal, differential relations is the freedom of thought from the affects (36). Finally, then, we have the genesis of ideal relations from out of the fragmented, partial objects of the body; this is what Hughes sees as the essence of Deleuze’s philosophy. This fits with the overall view of materialism we have been suggesting is the dogmatic image of Deleuze’s philosophy: the intelligible comes from the sensible.

There is one final stage to Hughes’ vision of Deleuze: the move from transcendental sense to the propositions that constitute consciousness; from the fragmented relations of ideality to a fixed ideality of borders and enclosures. This is what Hughes calls the static genesis in which the mind gives a “determinate form” to materiality (40). This determinate form involves the production of the proposition based on the form of the person as a stable subject, opening up the possibility of generality and concepts (logic: S is P) (112). Alongside the production of general propositions based on the form of the person, there is also the production of the form of the person and its object. The person is produced by common sense, which produces a subject that crosses different worlds but remains the same (112). In order to fix down this sameness, there is a containment or enclosure of the fragmented ideality of sense: this containment fixes down limits, ends, borders and territories in ‘sendentary’ distributions. This is how the fragmented, differential relations of the transcendental field produce the representations that
constitute consciousness. This gives us the full view of the generation of consciousness from outside bodies, showing us that Hughes falls into the ‘dogmatic materialist’ reading of Deleuze.

3. Stepping outside the human as the most human act: Dogmatic Materialism as a new regime of cliché

The dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze includes many different positions, as we have seen. Alexander Galloway has usefully categorized three types of Deleuzians, all of whom are dogmatic materialists. First, “Google” Deleuzians, who see networks everywhere; second, Carl Sagan Deleuzians who see human nature as coinciding with the nature in the diversity of the cosmos; and finally, Wet Diaper Deleuzians who see pure desire everywhere. Whether networks, the cosmos, or desire are emphasized, there is a material origin to which we humans must return. With Claire Colebrook, I would suggest that perhaps all the dogmatic materialist “counter-Cartesian, post-Cartesian or anti-Cartesian figures of living systems” are in fact ways of avoiding and repeating the gesture which reaffirms man as “a theoretical animal, a myopically and malevolently self-enclosed machine whose world he will always view as present for his own edification” (Colebrook, 2012: 193). Attempts to step outside Cartesian man are “the most Cartesian of gestures,” enabled by man’s capacity to imagine himself as viewing history as a distant panorama (193). Theory’s Deleuzian retreat into an “affirmation of life” is a way that “man might will away his own existence by becoming nothing more than an aspect of life in general” (194). Yet, life in general then gets framed by a new regime of cliché whose singular points are networks, assemblages, resonance, vitality and rhizomes. Nietzsche’s worries about modernity find a new outlet: we rely anew upon universal concepts in language, such that those who suffer from the institutions of the present are reduced
to silence; now, though, those universal concepts pretend to speak about fluxes that are unpresentable.

The worry about dogmatic materialism ignoring the malevolent self-enclosure of thought is motivated by an unspeakable suffering caused by the present; Zakiyyah Iman Jackson has articulated this as a critique of post-humanism. She writes that reason, for much post-humanist thought, remains ‘Western’ and Eurocentric; the ‘rationalities’ used to assess humanism often remain subject to the “racial, gendered and colonial hierarchies of “Reason” and its “absence”” (Jackson, 2015: 672). It leaves behind the human without transforming it: the “fraternity of Man” remains an ordering principle. In the Deleuzian post-humanist materialism, everything is seen as “immanent to” energy and matter. The very concepts used to address this energy and matter are left unquestioned; who is the ‘we’ that carries out this conceptualization? The only option, left unthought by dogmatic materialism, is a transparent reason, which could get this fluxing reality ‘right.’ After all, they suggest this is ‘reality’ as it is, fully autonomous from human thought: unquestionable. This unquestioned access to ‘reality’ means ignoring all the racial and gendered hierarchies caught up in this transparent thought of the pure fluxes of reality. The ‘ruses’ of representative thought find a new way to bind the embodied reality of those who are conscious.

What gets missed is Deleuze’s claim, so resonant with Afro Pessimism, that art “aesthetically reproduces the illusions and mystifications which make up the real essence of this civilisation […] in order that Difference may at last be expressed with a force of anger which is […] a freedom for the end of a world” (DR: 293). Art is not about intensive non-human forces; it is about a force of anger expressed through the illusions at the heart of this civilization, an anger that is freedom for the end of this world.
To look at the explicit problems in just one example of dogmatic materialism, we can look at Jane Bennett’s vital materialism that is meant to grant agency to non-human things. She admits that she ends up projecting the human concept of agency upon non-human things, but she thinks this is necessary to overcome human arrogance (Bennett, 2010: xvi). Her choice of agency as the concept to project upon things is notable: no concept has been more criticized for its Western Eurocentric humanist implications, and yet she wants to give this quality to all non-human things, even trash. Despite her attempt to ‘de-humanize’ reality, she ends up creating a monstrous re-humanization of all things. The politics we end up with in Bennett is barely different from traditional Western liberal democracies, with all the problems of that politics; now, however, it is spoken through buzzwords like ‘assemblage’ and network.

Bennett fits, here, the general tone of much Deleuzianism, as diagnosed by Andrew Culp, one which treats Deleuze as a lava lamp saint of “California Buddhism” that reduces his philosophy to “mutual appreciation of difference, openness to encounters in an entangled world, or increased capacity through synergy” (Culp, 2016: 6-7). The question which is not asked is: what about those who suffer, unspeakably, in the present from the impossibility of difference, openness and connection? It seems that, for dogmatic materialism, the sufferings caused by conceptual identities would count as merely temporary and sad contingencies that will be overcome once we think the “truth” of non-human, living, agential materiality. I suggest that the unspeakable suffering of the present is not secondary to ‘non-human reality,’ but should in fact be the motivation for thinking. Unspeakable suffering is precisely the irreducibly silent manifestation of unknowable matterality within thought; to silence it is to violate the truth.

As Foucault would say, it is not a question of ethics alone, but “a question of reality, without a doubt:” when voices exist which “have against them everything that is dead set on
shutting them up,” we must listen because those are the voices that bring subjectivity to life in history (Foucault, 1998: 452). The time of human beings is not one of evolution, Foucault says, but of history only because of the existence of voices who have everything against them that is set on shutting them up. Political movements with no program, no institutional voice, have been very original and creative outside great political parties, but these voiceless movements have changed the “whole lives,” “mentalities” and “attitudes” of people’s everyday lives, people with no relation to political or social movements (Foucault, 1998: 172-3). 45 The problems posed by institutionally voiceless movements are “great moral problems” posing a serious challenge to politics (Foucault, 2001: 464). The intellectual must respect the voices of the voiceless in order to “look closely, a bit beneath history” at what “cleaves” and “stirs” history, and “keep watch” behind politics at the revolts that “must unconditionally limit” politics (453).

Nevertheless, the revolts and social movements are not enough if they do not change what Foucault calls “the essential element in human life and relations:” thought (Foucault, 2001: 455-7). Thought exists beyond and before systems of discourse, often hidden but always driving “everyday behaviors.” 46 The most stupid institutions and silent habits involve thought, so things must change “where it is essential for things to change: in thought, which is the way in which humans face reality” (464). A revolt or transformation that remains in the “same mode of thought” would merely be adjusting reality of things to the same thought (455-7). Intellectual criticism is necessary in a ‘continual interplay’ with social movements and revolts, to “make conflicts more visible” and uncover the thought driving all everyday behavior. The intellectual tries to “see how far the liberation of thought can go toward making these transformations urgent

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45 “There are hundreds and thousands of people who have worked for the emergence of a certain number of problems”, those problems are “now actually before us”
46 This is “always a little thought occurring even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits.”
enough for people to want to carry them out” but also sufficiently “difficult to carry out for them to be deeply inscribed in reality.” Political reform must always have its basis as “thought working in itself.” I hope to take part in pushing the liberation of thought as far as it can go in this project, to carry out the project of “thought working in itself.” One way this project achieves this is by critiquing the dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze, and moving towards a new conception of thought. That reading precisely ignores the voices of the voiceless, bypassing them for access to matter as it is completely independently from human minds.

4. Thought with matter, not thought of matter: re-reading Deleuze’s ‘materialist’ moments

The dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze is not only ethically and politically problematic, but also ‘metaphysically’ problematic. The entire dissertation will be implicitly offering another reading of Deleuze to the metaphysics of dogmatic materialism; however, for the moment, I want to return to the texts which seem to support a materialist reading and show how the problems are much more complex. The dogmatic materialists rely on A Thousand Plateaus and its “life proper to matter” (ATP, 417). However, there is a “consciousness or thought of” this matter-flow, and a “correlate of” this consciousness that is called metal (411). This relation of consciousness to its correlate is a very phenomenological conception of thinking; indeed, Deleuze and Guattari state this thought is the “phenomenology of matter,” an ‘esprit de corps’ which is not identical with vital matter but accompanies it (411).47

This consciousness or thought of the ‘matter-flow’ is a form that is double or hybrid. It unites the “ground (sol)” on which “all becoming” occurs with the “land” on which “all progress” occurs (411, 486). Thought of the matter-flow produces communication between the bordered and sedentary territories of the

47 The metallurgist is like a phenomenologist because they “reduce” matter (in “melting down and reusing a matter”) and at the same time they liberate matter from “prepared” forms; we might say, from the given forms of the natural attitude. The metallurgical-phenomenological reduction implies a “transformation in relation to the form to be incarnated” (ATP: 411).
land with the nomadic variations of the ground: “the two are linked and give each other impetus. Nothing is ever done with” (486). It unites the rhizomic sphere of gaps, passages and openings with the State apparatuses that capture movement and impose centered and hierarchical connections upon it. It is a hybrid or twin formation, between the worlds of representational identities and metamorphosing differences; both free and captured, inseparably (415). This double thought is a new form, the ‘ingot-form’ common to both sides, passing through “all of the assemblages,” all communication between beings. This double thought is the ‘form’ of which the matter-flow is the substance (416).48

This shows that the “life proper to matter” that the dominant dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze relies upon must not be taken out of context; actually this life is the correlate of a new form of thought. In short, ‘vital matter’ is not a being which is fully autonomous from the human mind; it is not the ‘genesis’ of representation; it is the correlate of a new form of thought. The task of philosophy is not simply uncovering a smooth space of vital matter; rather, we must unite it with striated space. Expressed more poetically, the mines where metal is dug for are always in the mountains at the edge of the desert, the high places: ideality. And yet, the mine digs down from the heights to the depths; the activity of ‘mining’ puts thought in connection with matter. “Mines are a source of flow, mixture, and escape with few equivalents in history” (416). Thought is not identical and immanent to matter; it only ever thinks down from the heights to the depths, in an infinitely repeated movement.

Not only does A Thousand Plateaus reveal problems in the dominant materialist reading but Nietzsche and Philosophy does likewise. In question is, again, the classical problem of the adequacy of thought to being: Deleuze thinks Nietzsche seeks a new ‘will’, a thought which would be “adequate to the whole of life” and its “particularly” (185). However, this does not mean thinking thought as ‘immanent to’ an originary matter. Instead, this ‘will’ that is adequate

48 There is a ‘trans-form-ation’ of the form in metallurgy, there are no longer ‘several’ separated forms, just as the Figure of Bacon’s painting transverses or moves through several forms (ATP, 411).
to the whole of life “enjoys its own difference in life;” thought must *enjoy its own difference*. Deleuze sees this as overcoming the traditional conception of the suprasensible as ‘opposed to’ and alien to the sensible: a thought that suffers the pains of opposition to life (185).

Finally we can look at passages in *Difference and Repetition* which calls into question the dominant reading. Deleuze suggests a dogmatic materialism when he writes that systems of difference ‘ultimately rest’ upon intensive quantities (277). However these systems are merely “sites for the actualization of Ideas.” The components of Ideas are “projected in an ideal temporal dimension,” and ‘sense’ relies upon the variation of components in this ideal temporal dimension. “Ideas thus defined possess no actuality. They are pure virtuality” (279). Thus, the systems of difference that rest on intensive quantities are *not* the ‘origin’ of all things; they are the ‘origin’ of the differenciation of purely virtual Ideas that exist in an ideal temporal dimension. There is no pure force, free from form; rather, the problem is precisely a new form that can include within itself a heterogeneous multiplicity of forces. This relationship between form and force is one that has been explored in great depth by Derrida; my reading of Deleuze, is, therefore, much closer to Derrida than that of dogmatic materialism.

Derrida describes force in Deleuze’s Nietzsche *not* as the sensible but as the ‘differing/delaying’ of the ideal and the sensible (Derrida, 1985: 17). The virtual is always *delayed* in its actualization by intensity. The ‘dead’, subjectless field of the body (epitomized by writing) *cannot be left simply as body*; it must be made mundane, made present, brought into the self-identity of the subject.\(^49\) Pure force must be given its own form. In Nietzsche’s words, the high body cannot exist completely separated from the soul; the high body must *belong to* a powerful soul, a “self-joyous soul” that is the “parable and epitome” of the “supple persuading

\(^{49}\) Cf. Lawlor, 2002: 5.
body;” the “self-joy” of “body and soul” is what “calls itself: Virtue” (Z: Book 3, On the Three Evils: 2).

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen that the dominant reading of Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche is tainted by a broader understanding of his own philosophy, what I have called dogmatic materialism. This dogmatic materialism is a feature of many new theoretical paradigms, influenced by Deleuze and influencing his reception: new and vital materialisms, affect theory, neuro-philosophy, assemblage theory. As Elizabeth Grosz has recently shown, these new theoretical movements imply that thought is reducible to structures of materiality. Deleuze himself is critical of supposedly ‘empiricist’ philosophies based on the idea that the intelligible comes from the sensible. Yet, we saw that there were many passages in Deleuze’s work that encourage such a reading, particularly around the themes of an original differential intensity and a hidden life of materiality beneath human representations. From these misleading phrases, an entire interpretative paradigm has arise. We saw how this has fed into both important ‘theoretical’ uses of Deleuze’s philosophy and more traditional scholarly commentaries on his work. From Manuel DeLanda and Jane Bennett to Alain Badiou and Miguel de Beistegui, we diagnosed what we have called a ‘dogmatic materialism.’ This is the interpretive ‘error’ that the following project will seek to correct in our understanding of Deleuze’s relation to Nietzsche. Reading Deleuze alongside Heidegger’s criticisms of Nietzsche is essential for this project, as I believe that his criticisms have purchase upon the dogmatic materialist position.

50 I believe that the few passages obsessed over by dogmatic materialist readers of Deleuze would have been removed if he had come to know of their pernicious influence. Deleuze was himself uncomfortable with his own style and often criticized his previous books; for example, the overly classical style of Difference and Repetition, and the overly psychoanalytic Logic of Sense.
The dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze causes Heideggerians, Derrideans, Foucaultians, feminist philosophers and other people who think with the continental tradition to be wary of Deleuze’s philosophy; it makes it difficult for them to enter into the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy. I hope my project is to open Deleuze up to traditions which might, in certain ways, be wary of Deleuze’s work. I would also like to help dispel another off-putting aspect of the dogmatic materialist reading: it can seem as if Deleuze is giving us a pre-critical ontology; as if we can ‘really know’ things as intensive material forces. This can appear to be typical of the supposedly wildly implausible speculation of which continental philosophers are sometimes accused. By placing Deleuze in the post-Kantian tradition alongside Nietzsche and Heidegger, I hope to contribute to opening up his thought to historians of philosophy and analytical philosophers in a new way, by showing the philosophical rigor of his ideas.
Chapter 1

The basic coordinates of Heidegger and Deleuze’s readings of Nietzsche: from opposition to difference

This chapter maps out the basic co-ordinates within which Deleuze and Heidegger read Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s place within nineteenth century philosophy will be crucial to understanding the different approaches Heidegger and Deleuze take to his philosophy. Nietzsche is the culmination of Western philosophy, according to Heidegger, because he sets up an opposition between human consciousness and non-human becoming. It is easy to see how this oppositional thinking places Nietzsche into a nineteenth century trend moving from Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel through to Freud. Reading Nietzsche in this way is common because the atmosphere of oppositional struggle is so strong in nineteenth century thought. For this reason, I suggest that Heidegger’s reading is actually closer to our common-place perception of Nietzsche than Deleuze’s. This is quite controversial, given another common view that Heidegger radically distorts Nietzsche. If Heidegger distorts Nietzsche, it is only because he reads him within the prevalent nineteenth century thought of oppositional duality. Nietzsche is unable, on Heidegger’s view, to conceive the production of representational human consciousness because he remains trapped in the Western philosophical framework which ‘opposes’ it to the body or the sensuous.

Deleuze agrees with Heidegger that the major theme of nineteenth century philosophy is oppositional and negative dualism. However, Deleuze thinks that Nietzsche marks a rupture in nineteenth century philosophy because he reignites a Leibnizian theme: the relation between
consciousness and the unconscious is ‘differential’ as opposed to oppositional. By making this change, Deleuze saves Nietzsche from Heidegger’s major criticism. Nietzsche accounts perfectly well for the production of human consciousness, and he can do this because the relation between them is ‘differential’ rather than oppositional. Much of Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche is concerned to show how the oppositional consciousness of ressentiment and nihilism is in fact founded on a deeper instance of affirmative and productive distancing.

A key consequence of the difference between Heidegger and Deleuze concerns the status of the human. Nietzsche, famously, wants to ‘de-humanize’ the ‘becoming’ of the body; however, for Heidegger, he is forced to ‘re-humanize’ beings as a whole because the only way to ‘think’ the body is via human consciousness which is doomed to exist in eternal opposition with the body. The ‘thought of’ the non-human can only ever be posed in human terms, because we remain, irreducibly, on our side of the great oppositional divide. Therefore, on Heidegger’s view, Nietzsche’s philosophy ends up as a monstrous re-humanization of beings. Nietzsche cannot really think the non-human production of the ‘difference’ between being and beings; he is still trapped in the Western history whereby a human act is fundamentally what decides our orientation to beings. Heidegger, of course, will want to show that the human orientation to beings is itself born out of a more fundamental process in which humans are not the key actors: the history and speaking of Being. Deleuze will rise to this challenge, and show that Nietzsche does in fact account for such a non-human process. Rather than the history of Being, Deleuze will see a kind of secret affirmation, hidden beneath every nihilistic imposition of human, representational consciousness. These two different ways of reading the human emerge from the different relationships between consciousness and the body set up by Heidegger and Deleuze. The problem of the human will not be fully solved until we come to consider the question of art;
for now, it is important to note the very different conceptions of humanity to which the basic conceptual co-ordinates will lead us. Given that, we must now turn to the basic coordinates of opposition and difference.

The structure of the present chapter is as follows. First, we examine Heidegger’s early reading of the body in terms which remain close to his own philosophy and his later move towards reading Nietzsche in a Schellingian frame, based around a duality of permanence and impermanence. The resolution of this duality in the eternal return of the same is why, for Heidegger, Nietzsche’s thought is the culmination of Western metaphysics. While Heidegger focusses on dualities such as impermanence-permanence, overcoming-resisting and becoming-being, Deleuze sees three major moments: will, force and phenomena. He describes these moments through other Nietzschean concepts; for example, evaluation, interpretation and ‘things.’ The second half of the chapter will focus on explaining this general three-part framework in more detail. The following chapters will then look at the basic moments in more detail: the body; human consciousness’s denial of the body and finally, a new mode of thinking which is in contact with the body inspired by aesthetic experiences.

1. Heidegger on the Nietzschean Body: from differential opening to oppositional annihilation

This section of the chapter will look at the basic stakes of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche as a whole. It will do this by looking at the concept of the body and its two basic comportments: overcoming and resistance, or permanence and impermanence. These two conceptual poles trap Nietzsche within the history of Western philosophy, according to Heidegger; we will examine this entrapment below. First, however, we will look at Heidegger’s
first lectures of Nietzsche, in which he is much more sympathetic to Nietzsche, and sees a possible ally for his own project. The early reading focuses on the ‘opening’ of the difference between Being and being; the later reading moves more towards the opposition of the fixed and fluid, which is also an opposition between the sensuous and the supersensuous.

Heidegger’s first lecture course on Nietzsche, given in 1936-7, contains a reading of the body which brings it into close alignment with his own thought; the later lecture courses will see Heidegger distancing himself from Nietzsche. In the first course, Heidegger focuses on the ‘opening’ of the comportment of the human towards beings, as opposed to the ‘opposition’ between the human and the non-human. Heidegger speaks about Nietzsche’s notion of ‘opening’ through the concepts of the ‘rescue’ and ‘configuration’ of the sensuous (N1: 98-9). The ‘rescue’ of the sensuous occurs by opening to the multiple ‘perspectives’ of life in which things and the people “lay a claim” on us through the body (98). The perspectives of life which ‘rescue’ the sensuous are not merely corporeal, but are ‘states’ which are always already “psychical”; this is close to Heideggerian ‘states’ of mood and attunement (139). Corporeal-psychical states in which we rescue the claims of the sensuous are the “most familiar” and most “proper” to man (139). The most familiar “original” bodily state in which Dasein “hovers” is given the Nietzschean name of ‘feeling,’ which Heidegger is clearly reading through his own concept of mood or disposition. We always already have our ‘being’ in corporeal-psychical feeling because we ‘find’ ourselves in “our relationship to beings” or “things.” The ‘felt’ relation to beings “opens up” and “stays open” prior to the human coming upon it in a ‘knowing’ or conscious manner (98, 51). The open relationship in which beings claim us ‘lifts’ us “beyond ourselves” and “into beings as a whole;” we do not go beyond our selves, as humans, rather, we are taken or
lifted beyond ourselves. The human finds itself within a difference between Being and beings, as opposed to determining that relation in an action.

The discovery of the relation of the human to beings is something Heidegger himself wants to affirm, and which, after 1936-7, he sees Nietzsche as missing, instead privileging the human act as that which opens our relation to beings. In 1936, however, the Nietzschean going-beyond of the self is not an act of the self, but is an event in which the self has already been lifted beyond itself prior to coming to itself. This event of being lifted beyond the self is a felt relation to beings as a whole and thus is, at the same time, an ‘internalizing’ of beings as a whole in which my ‘relation to’ is the internal nature of my self (98). Such an open relationship to beings is how the self comes to feel itself being claiming by things through the body. In sum, feeling is the most properly human form of being claimed by things, in which we are lifted out of ourselves and find a relationship to beings which is open and remains open. Heidegger reads Nietzsche as an ally for his own thought of the opening of Dasein to beings as a whole, prior to human consciousness or action.

After his first lecture course, Heidegger’s reads the body in Nietzsche in less ‘Heideggerian’ terms; instead of a ‘feeling’ which opens and carries us over to beings, the body is now framed in terms of the oppositional duality of modes of presence and their transformation. Opening to difference has been replaced by oppositional duality as the fundamental conceptual co-ordinate.

The most basic dualistic opposition at the level of the body is between transformative chaos and fixed presence. Heidegger suggests that the ‘chaos’ of the body in Nietzsche is analogous to the ‘chaos’ of sensibility in Kant: these two forms of chaos do not negate order but
have their own type of ordering. This ‘order’ is clear in Kant insofar as space is a “form,” which gives order, and yet is irreducible to the ordering rules of the understanding, concepts. Chaos in Nietzsche is ‘urge,’ ‘flow’ or ‘animation’ which has an order which is its own and, just as in Kant, is not reducible to the order of knowledge. This ‘chaotic’ order is essentially “concealed” from knowledge because it is bodily (N3: 80). The bodily, chaotic order is the “concealment” of the richness of “becoming” from knowledge (N3: 80). Nietzsche’s exterior, non-conceptual ordering of chaos takes up the exteriority of space in Kant, as the form of the ‘outside.’ Unlike the space of the Kantian knowing subject, however, the concealed order in Nietzsche “tears away” and ‘overpowers’ every being, and is unable to be mastered. The “world” itself is this overpowering, concealing chaos, as what is nearest, immediate and constantly experienced by us as ‘bodily beings.’ We constantly experience chaos through the “receptivity” of the body (N3: 79, 82, 84). Such an immediate, overpowering experience is interpreted by Heidegger in terms of life: “bodying life,” “life as bodying,” the “vitality of life” or the livingness of life (84, 80, 89). Our body can be receptive precisely because it is “one section” of the great chaos of the world; it is a wave which “bodies forth” “in the stream of chaos” (82). This chaos in which we find ourselves is the first side of the great Nietzschean opposition that Heidegger sets up between chaos and fixity.

Heidegger’s reading of chaos in ‘opposition’ to fixity is very different from his early emphasis on ‘opening’ in Nietzsche; we see this change in emphasis clearly in the evolution between his readings of feeling in 1936-7 and then in later courses. In the later lectures, feeling is no longer an openness in which we are carried over to beings, as it was in the first lecture course;

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51 Thus the theme of the ‘comsos’ and cosmic forces in Nietzsche relates to space as the form of exteriority in Kant; it is not a return to pre-critical “things in themselves”

52 This encounter of the body with the exteriority of chaos is close to what Deleuze calls the differential forces of the cosmos in Nietzsche.
it is an overpowering and immediate experience of chaos, an experience undergone by living beings. The evolution in Heidegger’s reading of feeling begins with an openness which ‘lifts’ us beyond ourselves and moves towards a chaos which overpowers and tears beings away from themselves. This change in Heidegger’s reading of feeling is a synecdoche for the difference between Heidegger and Deleuze’s readings. Deleuze will precisely utilize the more violent language of tearing and overpowering in order to criticize Heidegger’s own language of ‘openness’ and letting-be; Heidegger, on the other hand, will use it to tie Nietzsche to the tradition of oppositional-dualistic thinking in the nineteenth century. We must now see why, for Heidegger, opposing ‘overpowering’ to fixity means Nietzsche betrays his own project of becoming. For Deleuze, the body in Nietzsche is not structured around opposition, but rather a pure difference which produces the event of presencing.

Having seen the ‘chaos’ side of the Nietzschean opposition, we must now look at the ‘fixity’ side which Heidegger thinks Nietzsche attempts to criticize, but cannot because he remains trapped in oppositional thinking which can only reverse the values of the opposition. The key to Heidegger’s reading is that chaos is doomed to operate with the ‘fixed’ or permanent beings to which it is opposed: chaos would be ‘nothing’ if it did not rely on fixed beings: the “becoming world” is nothing apart from the ‘transfiguration’ which “lifts” “beings” which have become ‘fixed’ or permanent “over and beyond” themselves to “new possibilities” (N3: 81, 87). Heidegger reads these Nietzschean possibilities as what can only be present (or permanent) if they are _not_, at the same time, absent; the possible is what must be _either_ absent or present; it cannot be both. Possibility in this sense, as reducible to a mode of presence, remains in the Kantian tradition of possibility as that which agrees with the ‘conditions’ of experience as the accord of intuition and concepts resulting in the ‘presence’ of an object: “whatever agrees with
the formal conditions of experience in accordance with intuition and concepts is possible” (A218/B266). Possibilities are modes of possible presence, while ‘transformation’ is merely the movement from old possibilities to new possibilities. Heidegger’s reading is thus structured around a fundamental dichotomy between possible presents and their transformation, which excludes the thought of the very ‘giving’ of this dichotomy itself. Heidegger, of course, will see this exclusion as precisely the reason Nietzsche remains within the basic horizon of Western metaphysics, to which we must now turn.

Heidegger’s reading of a present/absent dichotomy in Nietzsche is what leads to his famous pronouncements concerning Nietzsche as the culmination, as opposed to the overcoming, of Western metaphysics. This link to Western metaphysics arises due to Nietzsche’s elimination of the possible co-mingling of presence and absence. In Western metaphysics, the contradictory notion of the impossible is what can be both present and absent at the same time. Nietzsche eliminates this because chaos is merely opposed to presence, transfiguring old modes of presence into new ways of being present (new possibilities); we are left with the ‘presence’ received from the past and the ‘presence’ of new possibilities. The very emergence of presence itself remains unchanged. The permanence of presence means Nietzsche has eliminated any possible mingling of absence and presence, and thus brought Western metaphysics to its culmination (N3: 87). The ‘bodying chaos’ which is the immediate experience of the living being is the mere transformation of presence, which in itself would be pure absence: pure transfiguration would be ‘sheer dissolution and annihilation:’ complete absence (N3: 85). For Nietzsche to avoid pure absence, Heidegger thinks he always requires some form of presence which acts as a kind of material for transfiguration; in short, chaos or becoming requires some fixed present to “overcome” (N2: 200,
We will discuss Nietzsche’s place within Western metaphysics in general below; first, however, we can look at a specific case: Schelling.

2. The Schellingian framework of Heidegger’s Nietzsche: the opposed tendencies of productivity and product

We have seen how Heidegger reads Nietzsche in terms of a duality which is expressed in various ways: permanence-impermanence, fixity-chaos, resisting-overcoming, and so on. The next section will examine how these dualities mirror the basis of Schelling’s philosophy. I claim that Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche is usefully understood as Schellingian; this will help to distinguish Heidegger’s reading from Deleuze’s.

The following section will explore the details of Schelling’s philosophy as it relates to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. The basic duality in Schelling’s philosophy of nature arises between productivity and product. The depths of Nature are characterized by a type of becoming which is productive. However, this is not rigidly separated from the surface appearances of fixed products; Schelling is certainly not positing a rigid, cliché mind-body dualism. If the productive becoming of nature was pure, it would be mere nothingness or absolute lack of determination. Pure becoming must therefore be subject to ‘limits’ or blockages which calcify into fixed ‘products.’ Heidegger claims that if Nietzschean chaos was pure, then it would be absolute annihilation, and therefore chaos requires fixity; the resemblance to Schelling’s productivity-product relation is striking. Schelling names this duality a ‘diremption’ into two tendencies. The reason these are tendencies rather than entities is that the ‘product’ is not only a limitation of productivity; it is itself a tendency within productivity. The ‘products’ are necessary in order that the pure process of productivity has something to stop it dissolving into sheer annihilation. So,
although the limited product seems to cancel out productivity, it is actually a positive cancellation: the tendency towards ‘anti-productivity’ is itself part of productivity.

The product-productivity diremption mirrors Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche: on the one hand, a pure, chaotic transformation which would dissolve into annihilation were it to become pure; on the other hand, mere modes of present which are not at all infected with absence. Ultimately, on Heidegger’s accounting, Nietzsche and Schelling are both trapped within Western metaphysics because they are unable to think the openness in which beings ‘come to’ presence; there is either gaping annihilation or mere presence. In Deleuzian terms, Heidegger reads Nietzschean ‘chaos’ as ‘undifferentiated groundlessness.’ Deleuze himself would agree with Heidegger that this conception of an abyssal groundlessness which lacks any differentiation is present in *The Birth of Tragedy*, and is shared with Schopenhauer and Schelling. However, Deleuze thinks that Nietzsche precisely goes beyond this thought of a ‘primal unity’ of the groundless in his later thinking of the irreducible difference of force; it is this difference which marks Nietzsche’s unique place in the history of philosophy, for Deleuze. This is why we will emphasize Deleuze’s notion of difference in his reading of Nietzsche as what distinguishes his reading from Heidegger’s.

To clarify the stakes of Heidegger’s dichotomous reading of Nietzsche, between permanence and impermanence, we can look at how this dichotomy operates in Schelling’s Introduction to the Outline of a Philosophy of Nature. The dichotomy here is between two tendencies: one towards pure productivity and the other towards products which limit productivity. The ‘division’ into these two tendencies is being or nature itself. The terms Heidegger employs in his Nietzsche lectures to describe the basic permanence/impermanence dichotomy are also reflected in Schelling’s text: while Heidegger uses terms such as fixity and
transformation, being and becoming, Schelling employs product/productivity, or flow/inhibition. We see the resonances between the two texts when Schelling says that “the fact that anything should become permanent in Nature, can itself [290] only be explained by that contest of Nature against all permanence” (Schelling, 2004: 6, 290-1);63 permanence and the struggle ‘against’ permanence are precisely the basic terms of Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures. The ‘conflict’ between the production and the annihilation of ‘determinate forms’ that is central to Heidegger’s Nietzsche is also found in Schelling, in whom the basic ‘actants’ of reality “neither reduce themselves mutually to absolute formlessness, nor yet do they allow the production of a determinate and fixed form, on account of the universal conflict” (6, 301-2).64

Indeed, when Heidegger sees in Nietzsche’s eternal return the unity of the dichotomy, the permanence of impermanence, he is reading Nietzsche through terms already proposed by Schelling: “by diremption itself, the permanence of the productivity is secured” (6, 301). Just as the permanence of the impermanent is secured in ‘diremption’ for Schelling, Heidegger thinks it is secured in the eternal return for Nietzsche. We can tentatively suggest that, for Heidegger, Nietzsche’s thought moves on this Schellingian ground, with the difference that Nietzsche thinks permanence and impermanence no longer as a ‘diremption’ (entzweihung) but as ‘the same’.

In this longer passage we see very clearly the resonances with Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, in terms of the flowing, gushing, forceful, productive, active Nature which is ‘opposed’ to the limiting, punctual, resting, permanent ‘product.’ “One must, in a word, simply deny all permanence in Nature itself. One has to assume that all permanence only occurs in Nature as object, while the activity of Nature as subject continues irresistibly, and while it continually labors in opposition to all permanence. The chief problem of the philosophy of nature is not to explain the active in Nature (for, because it is its first supposition, this is quite conceivable to it), but the resting, permanent. Nature philosophy arrives at this explanation simply by virtue of the presupposition that for Nature the permanent is a limitation of its own activity. So, if this is the case, then impetuous Nature will struggle against every limitation; thereby the points of inhibition of its activity in nature as object will attain permanence. For the philosopher, the points of inhibition will be signified by products; every product of this kind will represent a determinate sphere which Nature always fills anew, and into which the stream of its force incessantly gushes.” (First Outline, 82)

Another passage in Schelling which resonates with Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche is this one: “This alternation is not something in matter, but is matter itself, and the first stage of productivity passing over into product.—Product cannot be reached except through a stoppage of this change, that is, through a third factor which fixes that change itself, and thus matter in its lowest stage—in the first power—would be an object of intuition; that change
This will only become clear later, but for now we can see the broader frame for the basic terms of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche.

We see the ‘double’ Schellingian nature of the Nietzschean body in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on life, which is split between transformation and fixity. Life is both chaos and the withstanding of chaos, and this is how Nietzsche, solves the apparent contradiction between the pure presence of the possible and the pure absence of chaos (N3: 85). This remains quite Schellingian, as we see when Schelling defines life in terms of the opposition between productive activity and receptive product: “In the opposite directions, which arise through this antithesis, lies the principle for the construction of all the phenomena of life—upon the cancellation of those opposite directions, life remains over either as absolute activity or absolute receptivity, since it is only possible as the perfect reciprocal determination of receptivity and activity” (6, 304). Life as the perfect ‘reciprocal determination’ of receptivity and activity is very close to Heidegger’s suggestion that life, for Nietzsche, is “urged” by chaos to “stand firm” in order that it can be transfigured. Life, in both Schelling and Heidegger’s Nietzsche, is therefore the point of reciprocity of permanence and impermanence.

I suggest that, on Heidegger’s terms, Nietzsche differs from Schelling because of his thought of eternal return. Heidegger’s reasoning here begins with the claim that chaos requires something stabilized in order that it has something to transfigure; however, Nietzsche cannot think of permanence or fixity in terms of beings, because, for him, everything is part of chaos. Nietzsche is forced, by the total nature of chaos, to posit chaos itself as the only thing that is permanent: the only possible ‘stability’ is that of world-encompassing chaos itself. This permanence of chaos means life can continue to have a permanence to overcome: itself. The

would be seen in rest, or in equilibrium, just as, conversely again, by the cancellation of the third factor, matter might be raised to a higher power.” (Schelling, 2004: 303).
specific type of permanent chaos is achieved, Heidegger thinks, when Nietzsche conceptualizes bodying life as the setting up of a “horizon”. The horizon is the “scope of the constant” which surrounds living beings as their ‘essence.’ However, this ‘scope’ of constancy points to chaos or becoming; no longer is there a permanence which is separated from chaos. The horizon is translucent because it is “seen through,” it is a translucent permanence through which one can see chaos. This horizon is a permanence which “stands within” a perspective, a way of seeing possible modes of permanence through their transfiguration. Such a looking ahead to new modes of permanence is the essence of life. Chaos only ‘appears’ as chaos in the light of this looking ahead to new modes of permanence, and in this sense chaos is governed by permanence on Heidegger’s reading Nietzsche, making him the culmination of Western metaphysics. In sum, a perspective is the vision which sees new modes of presence or possibilities, and thus is the way of ‘seeing’ chaos, and a horizon is a permanence established within this way of seeing chaos.

Although this seems to go beyond the Schellingian dichotomy of productivity and product, Nietzsche in fact brings this duality together as one, with presence being the dominant term; he does not carry out the Heideggerian project of thinking the ‘opening’ of the duality, and, as such, he brings Western metaphysics to its culmination.

By bringing together permanence with chaos through his notion of the living horizon, Nietzsche allows becoming to be “preserved” as “something which can never be lost,” in other words, becoming will be one with being (N2: 145). This oneness of being and becoming as permanent becoming is the eternal return of the same (N2: 127, 204). In this oneness, there is no room for absence, because it is precisely pure annihilation which is fixed down as permanent; there is no room for total and vacuous nothingness, there is no presence of something which does
not show itself; there is no opening of the present. What makes Nietzsche’s thought of the eternal return the culmination of the history of metaphysics is that it makes presence permanent; all absence is excluded. As Sean Ryan correctly surmises, on Heidegger’s view, “Nietzsche leaves no room for the nothingness of Being, which is utterly different from beings, which is nothing” (Ryan, 2011: 12).

3. Nietzsche as the culmination of Western metaphysics according to Heidegger: the opposition between presence and absence

Deleuze sees Nietzsche as a break in nineteenth century philosophy, and indeed the broader history of Western philosophy; Heidegger, on the other hand, sees Nietzsche as the ‘culmination of Western metaphysics.’ The next section explores what is at stake in Heidegger’s notion of culmination. In Heidegger’s history of Western metaphysics, what is essential about “beings as such” is that “absence” is “foreign” to presence; there is an oppositional duality between the two. The “essence” of Being lies with presence and permanence; the presencing of absence is excluded (N3: 111). Western metaphysics says that what “is,” what has being, is always present and has constant stability in that presence (59). This presence, from the ‘first beginning’ onwards, governs the essence of thinking, reason and truth: how beings are “represented as beings” must take account primarily of those beings which ‘are’ “at the same time” and “in the same respect” (111). Nietzsche remains within this tradition insofar as, for him, “life” is the “name” for Being and Being means “presencing, subsistence, permanence.”

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55 James Winchester thus distorts the central intention of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche when he claims Nietzsche remains a metaphysician because his reality “consists in a series of discrete moments turning in an endless circle. Change, in the sense of an entirely new bead (moment) from outside the circle, is excluded.” Winchester draws this incorrect conclusion by importing, on his own account, the concept of the ‘now’ from Being and Time.
56 The “eternal necessity of chaos” is the “eternal return of the same,” on Heidegger’s account.
essence of life, as we have seen, consists in “permanence” and the “urge” towards permanence (85). Life, the name for Being, is, in its occurrence, “the securing of stability” (86).

The privilege of presence can be seen in Nietzsche’s notion of time. The essence of time is that it “time goes,” and it goes by “passing;” the temporal is “that which passes away,” it is death; thus “it was” is the “fundamental trait” of time: “passing away, transiency” (N2: 224). Even that which is “to come” only comes in order “to go.” Because all of life is transiency, Nietzsche thinks of the phases of time in terms of a perpetual “now” of transiency, which we have called, above, the permanence of transfiguration: all phases merge in a “single identity” as the “same” in “one single present,” which is the permanence of chaos and transiency itself. Time thus involves a “recurrence of the same” in the “abundance” of life that is “inexhaustible” (218).

Heidegger does not think Nietzsche’s thought of eternal return is identical with other conceptions of time in Western metaphysics, but is rather the culmination of that tradition. In order to understand such culmination, we must look at how Nietzsche diverges from the early thought of that tradition. For Aristotle, because Being is permanent presence, representation must look for what is ‘at the same time’ and ‘in the same respects’. There is a threat of contradiction, for Aristotle, because man is “thoroughly capable” of affirming and denying the same thing, thus claiming the simultaneous presence and absence of a thing (N3: 111). There is a similar structure in Plato’s method of division, which traces lines of descent from confused and contradictory appearances in which presence and absence coincide, to the purity of the Idea which is permanently present. Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche differs from Plato and Aristotle because he no longer has to worry about the fall of man into contradiction; for Nietzsche, a being can only ‘be’ as “what does not contradict itself” (N3: 116). This is because ‘life’ or all beings consists in ‘granting oneself the law,’ and in this commanding of the law, beings just ‘are’ “freedom from
contradiction” or the impossibility of absence and presence co-existing (120). Simply, a being is its own granting of law, and thus the co-existence of presence and absence is impossible. By granting himself the law of the permanence of becoming, Nietzsche consummates Western metaphysics, because he fulfills the law of non-contradiction: the oneness of becoming and being excludes the possibility of simultaneous presence and absence. He therefore goes beyond Plato and Aristotle and removes any remaining trace of the presence of absence in the Western metaphysical tradition. We see this also insofar as Nietzsche goes beyond the mere ‘divergence’ or diremption of pure productivity (absence) and product (presence) in Schelling which could be seen as a remanent of their mingling, the continuation of contradiction in the tradition.

Nietzsche’s doctrine of the permanent presence of chaos brings him, for Heidegger, “closer to the essence of the Greek’s than any metaphysical thinker before him,” but he does this because he “thinks in a modern way” (N2: 204, N3: 133). The modernity of Nietzsche occurs because he “conjoins in one” both of the fundamental determinations of being that emerge from the first beginning of Western philosophy: being and becoming (Heraclitus), and being and permanence (Parmenides) (N2: 204). Heidegger concludes his first lecture course on Nietzsche, in the winter of 1937, with a thought that is at the heart of all of his ideas about Nietzsche: “Nietzsche attempts to think the original unity of the ancient opposition of Being and Becoming” (N1: 218). The exclusion of absence and the permanence of presence in Nietzsche’s thought means that the “eternal return of the totality of world becoming must be a recurrence of the same” and this explains why the eternal return is “the way in which being as a whole is” (N2: 10, 109). As Heidegger summarizes this basic conception: “in the infinitude of actual time, the only possible kind of occurrence for a finite world that is still ‘becoming’ is recurrence – the cycle” (N2: 147).
4. The Systematic Framework for Deleuze’s Reading of Force in Nietzsche: the non-oppositional difference between ‘willing’ and ‘phenomena’ (or between the virtual and the actual)

Heidegger reads Nietzsche as the culmination of oppositional-dualistic Western thought; the next section examines Deleuze’s liberation of Nietzsche from that tradition. In the simplest terms, we can say that Deleuze’s framework differs from Heidegger’s because it involves three major moments rather than two. While Heidegger focusses on dualities such as impermanence-permanence, overcoming-resisting and becoming-being, Deleuze sees three major moments: will, force and phenomena. He describes these moments through other Nietzschean concepts; for example, we could also employ the triad of evaluation, interpretation and ‘things’ or plurality, individuality and particularity. The next section will unpack this general framework. First, I give a broad interpretation of Deleuze’s philosophical system as a whole, then I look at how that is manifested in various specific contexts and terminologies: those of Difference and Repetition, Kant and Nietzsche. The section ends with the crucial context which brings everything together: the role of force in Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz’s philosophical system. This will set the framework for Deleuze’s reading of difference and bodily force in later chapters.

Deleuze’s philosophical framework differs from Heidegger’s in significant ways. Heidegger’s reading is structured around two terms, which from various dichotomies which are then resolved in diverse ways: most fundamentally, being and becoming which are united in the eternal return; then there is also chaos and fixity which are united in ‘life,’ and thought and life which are united in ‘art’ and poetry. Deleuze’s reading, on the other hand, is structured around not two but three key terms. The dominant reading does not acknowledge this triadic structure in
Deleuze; it usually focuses on a duality such as difference-identity or intensity-representation. Usually, one tends to think that identity and consciousness are somehow undermined in their integrity, so that we can ‘return’ to the origin which is difference and intensity. No doubt Deleuze does express himself in ways which could lead to precisely this conclusion. However, I think it is fundamentally misleading; instead, I argue that the ‘origin’ as difference is primarily a question of the ‘delay,’ ‘deferral’ and differing of the origin itself, forcing thought to go beyond itself. Understanding the origin as ‘differing’ already destroys Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche which centers on oppositional thinking: there is no ‘opposition’ between perceived objects and the chaos of the body; rather, there is a continual process of differing which violates and remakes the orderings of the present. The event of presence is accounted for, neither as a Heideggerian ‘opening,’ nor as a sheer opposition to absence, but as a violent differing.

Usually, Deleuze is understood as a thinker of intensity where the latter is a state of things outside of thought; my reading of Deleuze’s philosophy emphasizes, instead, the re-orientation of thought which intensity forces upon us. This framework in which re-orienting force is primary implies three major philosophical moments that have different names across Deleuze’s work; in the Nietzsche book they are 1) will, 2) force, and 3) phenomenon. So, while Heidegger’s Nietzsche implies two major terms (being/becoming), Deleuze’s implies three: will, force, phenomenon.

Force and will are, for Deleuze, the two basic conditions of any object or phenomena that we can experience. Deleuze is refiguring the Kantian theory of experience in which concepts and intuitions are ‘synthesized’ by the imagination to give rise to cognition of an object; instead of

57 Admittedly, there is a significant and unique moment in which two of these terms, force and will, come together, in an ‘intensive thought;’ this has mislead scholars into thinking there is some kind of return to intensity. However, as I will show later in the dissertation, this seeming ‘unity’ only increases the ‘difference’ between the force and will: in short, intensive thought is ‘in’ life but at the same time it affirms its ‘distance’ from the rest of life.
intuition, concept and object, we now have force, will and object. In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, and his philosophy more generally, the ‘virtual’ or ‘ideal’ will undergoes a process of actualization by material forces or intensities which give rise to individual bodies, things or phenomena. The difficulty in approaching Deleuze is: where to begin when presenting this fundamental constellation of concepts? All three parts of the system (or plane of analysis) refer to one another. For example, in the context of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, starting with forces means missing the fact that such forces are always ‘determined’ by will. This is one of the main difficulties about understanding Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche.

To understand Deleuze’s general philosophical framework, we must outline some basic and general points which distinguish force and will from one another. Force is often described as ‘particular’ by Deleuze, whereas will is described as ‘universal.’ We can say, very roughly, that forces are on the side of the embodiment, whereas the will is on the side of thought, abstraction and fiction. This will seem strange to some readers of Deleuze who want to maintain all thought is ‘immanent to’ materiality, but Deleuze is very clear: forces and will do not resemble one another, and they must not be confused with one another; such confusion would be catastrophic because it would collapse thought and being into ‘one,’ thereby putting a stop to the infinite confrontational exchange between them, and result in a primordial, transcendent equilibrium.58

In order to understand the distinction between force and will, we can take as an example some famous and more familiar examples of how these will be used: nihilism and ressentiment. The most famous and important modality of will is nihilistic will, which essentially wants to ‘deny’ life universally, and it does that through fictional abstractions. Examples of abstract fictions include the absolute being posited by religion or the philosophical and absolute concept, both of which are above and opposed to life. Life here means relations between particular
forces: negative will is, ultimately, opposed to all particularity. The forces of ressentiment essentially deny the differences of other forces which are themselves particular; for example, the moral man who is defined by the claim that the other is evil, or the priest, who ‘blames’ the body outside of the soul for all suffering. To blame another person, or even the body generally, is not identical with wishing to deny life universally; first and foremost, particular forces do not, usually, tend to deny life ‘universally’ because that implies also denying their own particularity.

The difference between reactive force and nihilism is, we will see, one of the most difficult but most important in Deleuze’s book, particularly because it is central to the problem of humanity; is man a reactive or a negative being? Deleuze will suggest that, prior to Nietzsche, humanity was said to be reactive and thus would always fail to gain freedom. This plays on the very distance between the supersensible and the sensible in Kant’s philosophy: humanity, in Kant, is reactive because individual and empirical human beings are irreducibly bound up with empirical motivations and thus can never legislate the pure moral law. Thus, the ‘particularity’ of the individual human remains, with all its empirical, particular forces. For Deleuze’s Nietzsche, the human will be said to be primarily negative: it can attain to a universality which is that of negation: negating all reactive forces. This negation will operate a kind of ‘letting-be’ of an affirmation which lies beneath all the acts of negation in history. This will be explored more in later chapters; the point here is to show that the irreducible difference between ‘will’ and ‘force’ is central to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. The problem with prior interpretations is that this distinction has been overlooked.

58 Deleuze tells us in chapter 2 of Nietzsche and Philosophy.
5. Vocabularies for expressing the fundamental framework: *Difference and Repetition, Kant and Nietzsche*

In order to understand the threefold framework of force, will and phenomenon further, we must show how it plays out in various terminologies: Deleuze’s own *Difference and Repetition*, Kantian philosophy and Nietzsche’s own work. The equivalent distinction to force and will in 1968’s *Difference and Repetition* is intensity and Ideas. In *Difference and Repetition*, intensities are not ‘particular’ but are ‘individuating.’ Deleuze refrains from using the word particularity because it is bound up with so many Kantian resonances; instead, the production of individuals will be the key process of intensity. Intensity is how a thought becomes an individual: it is the link between thought and individuation, which “is established in a field of intensity which already constitutes the sensibility of the thinking subject” (DR: 151). This notion of individuation links to ideality as Deleuze finds it in Leibniz: not as a general concept but as itself an individual, an individuality of the concept: “The genius of Leibniz was to make the concept an individual; the concept can no longer be a general idea. It is an individual notion. The concept goes all the way to the individual itself.” (Deleuze 2015a: 103).

Ideas, on the other hand, are sometimes described as the “universal” of the singular, or the ‘structure’ which determines things, a kind of precise connectivity or network prior to individuality or terms. The Kantian problematic Idea inspires this notion of an Idea as a differential unconscious of thought; specifically, it is taken up from Maimon. Kantian ‘thought’ as irreducible to knowledge also plays an important role in Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche, and although it lacks the nuances of *Difference and Repetition*, it is already a topological, spatial conception of thought.
The distinction between intensity and Ideas is foundational in *Difference and Repetition*: they reciprocally presuppose one another, but must never be confused because there is no relation of similarity or resemblance between the two. There is an affinity between them, but that affinity is a confrontational exchange which results in the perceptual world of objects of representation. That world of representation itself is a ‘new’ product, without resemblance to Ideas or intensities. Similarly, force always presupposes will and will always presupposes force, and the relationship between the two results in a phenomenon or ‘object,’ (cf. the opening of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*) but the two must never be confused. The productive difference between them is not an oppositional duality; it is productive of the world of phenomena.

In short, both force and will are necessarily combined in order for an object or phenomenon to arise, which resembles neither force, nor will; similarly, intensity and Ideas are necessarily combined in order for an individual to arise which resembles neither intensity nor Ideas. What we see here is basically a genesis of the everyday world of perception in which we represent objects to ourselves through concepts. However, what makes Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche so difficult, and what has generally eluded commentators, is that this is *not* a genesis which traces ‘conscious representations’ back to a field of differential materiality; rather, it traces the perceptual world of objects represented by concepts back to an infinite and confrontational exchange between differential ideality and materiality, which is what Deleuze ultimately calls immanence. Deleuze’s framework, here is far from the oppositional-dualistic tradition in which Heidegger reads Nietzsche; it implies a productive and violent process of differentiation.

We can grasp the basic co-ordinates of Deleuze’s thought by phrasing them in Kantian terminology. There are two tonalities to force and will: active-reactive and nihilistic-affirmative, which we can understand in Kantian terms as follows: firstly, active forces would be the melting
and fragmenting ‘matter’ corresponding to natural beauty which cannot be subsumed under the concepts of the “I.” Second, ‘reactive’ forces are like ‘sensations’ which can be subsumed under the concepts of the “I think.” Thirdly, on the side of will, there is nihilistic will which is corresponds to the purely knowing subject; and finally, affirmative will is like the Kantian Idea liberated of any fixed co-ordinates and opened to continual variation. The Idea or affirmative will implies variable ideal relations which can be linguistic, mathematical, biological and so on. By looking at the system in this Kantian way, we can see that when Deleuze describes ‘nihilistic will’ as universal, he is relating it to concepts; what he calls ‘affirmative’ will is more like a Kantian Idea: it is a problematic totality which cannot be used to synthesize appearances under a unity. A key point is that affirmation of ‘forces’ does not mean an identity with those forces; the distinction between force and will must be maintained to avoid falling into an overly simplistic ‘genesis-origin’ reading. The relation, then, between the sensible and the super-sensible is not merely oppositional, not merely difference-identity. Rather, there is an infinite process whereby the sensible and the supersensible force one another beyond themselves, and the sedimentation of this infinite process is the world of objects which are present to a subject. Instead of oppositional-duality between presence and absence which nihilistic concepts set up, and in terms of which Heidegger reads Nietzsche, there is an infinite production of presence.

Having seen the basic philosophical structures of Deleuze’s Nietzsche in *Difference and Repetition* and Kant, we can turn to their expression in the very first pages of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. A central but potentially misleading quotation is the following: “Nietzsche's concept of force is therefore that of a force which is related to another force: in this form force is called will. The will (will to power) is the differential element of force” (NP: 7). We see in this quotation all the confusions which arise around Deleuze’s philosophy: force and will are very
easily confused, as the will is nothing more than the ‘relating’ of one force to another to the extent that “in this form force is called will.” Because of this, many interpreters have not been rigorous enough in distinguishing will and force. However, we see everything summarized more clearly in the following passage: “The sense of something is its relation to the force which takes possession of it, [while] the value of something is the hierarchy of forces which are expressed in it as a complex phenomenon” (NP: 7). Sense, genealogy and interpretation concern the possession by an individual force, whereas evaluation, ‘hierarchy’ and ‘will’ concern the plural, complex relationship between forces. What is key here is to separate, on the one hand, plurality and, on the other hand, an individual force which takes possession of the plurality to give rise to a phenomena; there is no opposition between the supersensible and the sensible as Heidegger claims. Importantly, the ‘betweenness’ of hierarchy is irreducible to any individual force; this has to do with Deleuze’s interest in pure relations prior to the terms of a relation. The pure relation of will must never be confused with individual forces, and yet it this is always a risk because they are so closely related: a phenomena just “is” force and will, such that they never ‘appear’ separately. This has lead to a kind of oppositional reading of Deleuze, between the differential forces of the will and the sameness of represented phenomena.

The fundamental difference between will and force lies at the heart of Deleuze’s reading of the eternal return. Deleuze writes that “‘one’ repeats eternally, but ‘one’ now refers to the world of impersonal individualities and pre-individual singularities,” where the and is irreducible: impersonal individualities and non-individual singularities of the purely differential relations of Ideas (DR: 299). Deleuze’s ‘world’ is split into a differential two, not an oppositional two: firstly, individualities, the particular force which possesses a thing or phenomenon, which are not subjective or personal; and secondly, the hierarchical evaluations which distribute those
individuals, and those distributions are of ‘singularities’ irreducible to the particularities of universally. The will “to power” is not the same as will alone, as pure ‘hierarchy’ or evaluation; will to power expresses a perspective on the connection of will and force, without reducing one to the other. Eternal return will also express a different perspective on the relationship between will and force. This is why will to power and eternal return are the central terms of Nietzsche’s philosophy: because they connect ‘will’ and ‘force’ (power) in two different ways.

Deleuze’s distinction between force and will can be usefully clarified by drawing on Christoph Cox’s interpretation of Nietzsche which relies on a fundamental distinction between what Cox calls ‘affects’ and ‘interpretations.’ Cox suggests that affects are not themselves perspectives or interpretations; rather, ‘affects’ are only subjects in the political sense of being subjected to a hierarchy (Cox, 1999: 130). Affects themselves do not produce the hierarchy; that hierarchizing process occurs through an interpretation. Similarly, for Deleuze, forces do not determine their own relations; rather, it is always an evaluating act of will which determines that relation. Cox usefully summarizes one way of seeing this distinction between what he calls the ‘individual’ and the ‘perspective’ when he says “we always encounter perspectives within individual subjects, individual subjects are aggregates of these perspectives and their forms of life” (130).

We can analyze a specific aphorism of Nietzsche to give us an insight into the will-force distinction as Deleuze reads it. In Beyond Good and Evil 36, Nietzsche shows us the delicate and difficult nature of Deleuze’s distinction between force and will. Firstly, Nietzsche makes a distinction between will and effect, where ‘effect’ is the result of affective relations between multiple wills: Nietzsche asks whether “will does not affect will wherever 'effects' are recognized.” He then goes on to suggest that all mechanical occurrences are “will-force, will-
effects” insofar as force is active in them: the activity of forces (affective relations between wills) gives rise to mechanical occurrences which are ‘effects.’ These effects relate to what Nietzsche calls ‘efficient force:’ “determine all efficient force univocally as—will to power.” Will is not identical with will to power: will to power is the way in which affective relations between wills give rise to force-effects: it is the movement from will to power (force-effect). The world in which will acts directly upon will and results in force-effects is “the world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its 'intelligible character'—it would be 'will to power' and nothing besides.” The world of force as interior and intelligible is will to power; this is why efficient force can be determined as will to power, but only in an interior or intelligible sense. There is an irreducibly ‘exterior’ aspect of the world of force which means that force is not strictly identical with will. So, will and its ‘effects’ are not identical, and it is important they are not confused in order to understand Nietzsche and Deleuze. 59

6. The Leibnizian origin of Deleuze’s philosophical coordinates: Nietzsche’s differential unconscious as nineteenth century Leibnizianism

Deleuze reads Nietzsche differently from Heidegger because he thinks Nietzsche marks a Leibnizian break in the nineteenth century: no longer is the relation between consciousness and the unconscious oppositional, but differential. Although this break is unstated in Nietzsche and Philosophy, it is clear in the basic conceptual co-ordinates in the book. Nietzsche claims that force-effects express affective relations between wills; in his very early 1957 lectures on grounding, Deleuze sees a similar structure in Leibniz. This force-will structure is revealed

59 One way of thinking about the force-will distinction is to look to Deleuze’s reception of Kant in his work on Foucault. There, he sees “Light-being,” (the realm of objects, subjects and so on) as being like the faculty of receptivity. Although this faculty of receptivity is determinable by the ‘spontaneous’ realm of concepts (Language-being), it is not reducible to the latter, and thus there is always a kind of remainder left over. One could say the same
clearly when Deleuze says that for Leibniz “force defined in the instant is the reason for the future effect” (Deleuze 2015a: 97). Force as ‘reason for’ the future effect is very close to what we just saw in Nietzsche: ‘force-effect’ is the product of the affective relation between wills. Deleuze says that force, in Leibniz, expresses spiritual atoms, and that extended, sensible space is secondary to this expression. Descartes, on the other hand, thinks extension is substance; this, for Leibniz, is Descartes’ great mistake. Leibniz uses the concept of force to rectify Descartes’ error. For Leibniz, force (the simple) is the ‘reason of’ the extended (the compound) (101). It is necessary, in Leibniz, to ‘interpret’ extension in order to discover the ‘signs’ of force (101). This will be precisely the structure of Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy: you must interpret the sense of a phenomenon in order to discover the relation of forces to which it refers. In Leibniz, force expresses the point of views of a monad. The empirical body of the monad is force, which expresses the monad’s point of view (104). In Leibniz the consistency of the world is a convergence in God, independent of their existence; Nietzsche will break with this convergence.

Although Deleuze thinks Nietzsche shares with Leibniz the moment of differentiation between the ideal and the phenomenal, there is of course a major difference between the two. For Nietzsche, difference will be the spatio-temporal ‘outside’ which is irreducible to concepts. For Leibniz, there are only conceptual differences, differences determined by concepts; force serves to make those differences exist ‘outside’ the concept in space and time. There are three kinds of non-conceptual differences: ‘numerical’ difference is the first non-conceptual difference: a non-conceptual difference without individuality, because each number is part of a ‘set,’ an ensemble. Non-conceptual difference prior to individuality is close to what Deleuze will call intensity or

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60 This proto-transcendental argument begins with appearances and asks for the reason of it; Deleuze will use this type of argument when establishing his own concept of intensity.
force. Secondly, there are ‘spatio-temporal,’ ‘here-there’ differences: ‘this’ chair here, ‘that’ chair there. And thirdly, there are differences of figure (or extension) and movement: the figure or extension of a roof having three angles, for example. For Leibniz, these non-conceptual differences are ‘pure appearances’ which are ‘provisional’ ways of expressing conceptual difference, like ‘imperfect translations.’ Nietzsche, of course, will not see non-conceptual difference as provisional, but as inscribed, irreducibly, into the heart of thought.

Nietzsche’s Leibnizianism allows him to escape the dominant trend of nineteenth century thought by replacing the dialectical and opposition relation between consciousness and the unconscious with a differential one. Leibniz develops the differential conception in dialogue with Descartes. In Descartes, the imperfect and provisional translation of conceptual differences into non-conceptual difference occurs in bodies through movement and figure in extensive space. In Leibniz, that translation from concepts (monads) to non-conceptual differences occurs through intensive force. What makes this translation remarkable in Leibniz is that concepts are not general terms which must be translated into particulars; rather, concepts are themselves individuals, each of which has its own non-conceptual individual. “There are no two similar or identical forces” and this differentiation is why force is itself the “true” concept: it takes account of the individuality of concepts. Force, Deleuze says, is the “true concept,” which corresponds to Leibniz’s principle of indiscernibles: every non-conceptual difference also has a conceptual difference. What is important, here, is that Leibniz uses the individuality of concepts and forces to conceive of a “differential unconscious,” which Deleuze opposes to the tradition of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Freud, which implies a conflictual or oppositional unconscious.

In the tradition running from Kant to Freud, it is an oppositionality between consciousness and the unconscious which is central: the ‘two,’ the positive and the negative. It is,

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61 Deleuze develops this notion of force in 1980 in a remarkably similar way to how he describes it in 1957.
seemingly, very strange that Deleuze does not mention Nietzsche here: the ‘opposition’ between consciousness and the unconscious is one of the most famous aspects of Nietzsche’s work. Deleuze cites Nietzsche’s major forerunners, Schopenhauer and Kant, as part of the ‘oppositional’ lineage. Deleuze is aware of this common reading of Nietzsche in terms of opposition; he warns us that “a commentator on Nietzsche must, above all, avoid any kind of pretext for dialectising his thought. The pretext is nevertheless ready made. It is that of the tragic culture, thought and philosophy which runs through Nietzsche's work.” (NP: 10). The theme of tragic in Nietzsche acts as a trap by which we can easily fall into a reading which privileges dualistic strife, conflict and opposition. Deleuze, instead, wants to relate Nietzsche to Leibniz: “[Leibniz’s] influence was immediate on the German Romantic philosophers in the nineteenth century, then continues particularly with Nietzsche;” “[Leibniz] established a philosophy that will find its name in the works of another philosopher who stretches out his hand to Leibniz across the centuries, to wit Nietzsche” (Deleuze, 1980a). So, Deleuze seems to want to put Nietzsche with Leibniz, the thinker of the differential unconscious, as opposed to Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel and Freud, who are thinkers of the ‘opposition’ or conflict between consciousness and the unconscious.

Deleuze’s splitting of the history of philosophy into Leibniz-Nietzsche on the one hand and Kant-Hegel-Freud on the other is important insofar as it strongly distinguishes him from Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. Heidegger, very differently to Deleuze, will place Nietzsche into the tradition of oppositionality: he claims that the body and life in Nietzsche are torn, oppositionally, between a non-human and overpowering chaos and an anthropomorphic, limiting, ordered realm of knowledge. The problem Heidegger sees with this is that the negative relation between the two is so extreme that the overpowering chaos ends up falling back upon a newly
absolutized humanistic ordering of knowledge: even the concept of chaos, for example, is human. This oppositional contradiction defines the heart of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. By turning to Leibniz, Deleuze finds a ‘differential’ unconscious, the ‘differentials’ of consciousness which implies a ‘genesis’ of consciousness, a ‘differential’ relation between the two, saving Nietzsche from the dialectical-oppositional tradition.

What makes Nietzsche not just a Leibnizian but also a firmly post-Kantian philosopher can be seen by looking at a fundamental contradiction that Deleuze finds in Leibniz. Although he discovers a ‘differential’ unconscious, Deleuze says there is a major contradiction in Leibniz’s work that was never recognized by the latter himself; this is a contradiction that Kant will resolve, and opens up the whole problematic of nineteenth century thought. The contradiction is between the principle of indiscernibles and the principle of continuity: force (the principle of continuity) is central to this. Everything proceeds by difference which is unassignable to concepts; that is, vanishing or infinitely small differences (principle of continuity). Continuity, Deleuze says, is the reason for becoming, it is how things become, and this is what prevents conceptual difference from being assignable to all non-conceptual differences. This irreducibility of the non-conceptual to the conceptual will be central to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. At the same time that infinitely small differences are irreducible to conceptual assignment, those differences must also be assignable to concepts (principle of indiscernability). For Nietzsche, differences which are conceptually unassignable (the forces of becoming) undermine the principle that every non-conceptual difference has an assignable conceptual difference. But instead of that negativity, that ‘not’ leading to a model of ‘oppositionality’ between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, there is, in Nietzsche, a productive or differential generation of consciousness by the unconscious differences of force and will.
Kant’s relation to Leibniz is interesting for Deleuze because Kant makes spatio-temporal determinations irreducible to conceptual ones. This is a way of resolving the contradiction he sees in Leibniz’s philosophy between the principles of continuity and indiscernability. It opens up the problem of the thing-in-itself and the thought of that which is unknowable; in short, the themes at the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

7. Conclusion

To conclude, we have seen, now, why Deleuze reads Nietzsche as breaking with the nineteenth century theme of oppositional duality: he takes up Leibniz’s theme of differentiation between consciousness and the unconscious. This is how Deleuze imagines a Nietzsche liberated from Heidegger, who views him as the culmination of the oppositional-dualistic thought central to Western philosophy. The three-part structure of Deleuze’s Nietzsche allows for a process of unconscious differentiation between material intensity and differential Ideas to result in a reordered world of representation. There is no longer an oppositional struggle between the overpowering chaos of the body and the fixed representations of thought, as Heidegger had thought.

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche breaks with oppositional thinking by re-imaging Leibniz in a post-Kantian context. We must now look more closely at how Deleuze views the post-Kantian context in which Nietzsche works his break with Western philosophy; that means, understanding the whole problematic of negativity, opposition and nihilism in the Hegelian school.
Chapter 2

The nihilistic history of humanity and its secret productivity: Heidegger and Deleuze on truth and representation in Nietzsche

Heidegger and Deleuze agree that the history of Western humanity is dominated by an image of thought that privileges representational and conceptual thought in opposition to that which lies outside of thought. Nietzsche is, for Heidegger, the culmination of this tradition: supersensible truth is a fixed standard which is opposed to the flowing, chaotic becoming of the sensuous body. All Nietzsche does is reverse this opposition, privileging the sensuous: he remains stuck in oppositional Western thought. Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault move beyond Heidegger because they see Nietzsche as a break in this tradition of oppositionality. In their view, ‘truth’ is not just a fixed standard opposed to life: it is primarily a struggle within life against that which resists a produced self-sameness. Their Nietzschean insight is that truth is a productive process that emerges from life, not a fixed being opposed to life. The very image of opposition is a ruse produced by truth in its struggle against that which resists its desire to establish a rigorous self-identical interiority. Heidegger misses this ‘ruse’ in his reading of Nietzsche. His inability to think the processual ruse of truth marks an important point on which the French post-war philosophers will move beyond him, taking Nietzsche as the guiding light.

Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida’s post-Heideggerian Nietzscheanism consists in two major insights about the representational thinking which has characterized human history. The first point is that representation implies an infinite struggle to establish an impossible self-same interiority; the second point is a secret productivity or artistic act beneath that struggle for self-

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62 We see this theme in Derrida’s comments on Deleuze’s reading of force in Nietzsche: according to ‘logic itself,’ philosophy “lives in and from” la différence and yet is ‘blind’ to the “same” (même) which is not the identical (Derrida 1985, 18). Philosophical logic (the Nietzschean nihilistic theoretical perspective) represses the same of différence (Nietzschean artistic production), but in fact lives off that différence.
This is why Foucault claims that Nietzsche opens the space of contemporary thought. This chapter will explore the differing ways in which truth and representation in Nietzsche are taken up by Heidegger and then by the French philosophers of the sixties.

One of the most famous parts of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is the opposition to Hegel; I will challenge this image of Deleuze’s Nietzsche, suggesting that Heidegger is the true target of the book, and that Marx’s philosophical milieu is the true context in which Deleuze reads Nietzsche. The most vicious lines of Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche are those in which he attacks not Hegel himself, but rather those who try to assimilate Nietzsche to Hegel. Heidegger is the key philosopher who assimilates Nietzsche to Hegel; thus, I suggest the real target of the book is not Hegel himself but Heidegger. Deleuze combats Heidegger by exploring the specificities nineteenth century philosophy in new ways. He does not see Hegel himself as the primary target of Nietzsche’s philosophy; rather, it is the Hegelian factions in which Marx was embroiled that Deleuze claims are central to understanding Nietzsche. By exploring Nietzsche’s distance from the Hegelian factions, Deleuze separates him from the dominant trends of nineteenth century philosophy and thereby rescues him from Heidegger’s assimilation of him to Hegel.

The structure of the chapter is as follows: first, we will start with a well-known portrayal of the representational comportment of humanity: the Socratic attempt to encompass all of existence under reason as set out by Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy*. There is something

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63 Claire Colebrook has shown that what I call the dogmatic materialist reading of Deleuze and Nietzsche falls into this process of enclosing self-sameness. She suggests that the figures of ‘living systems’ are a way of avoiding the extent to which “man is a theoretical animal, a myopically and malevolently self-enclosed machine whose world he will always view as present for his own edification” (Colebrook, 2012: 193). I would nuance this by suggesting that the ‘self-closed’ machine is in fact a process of constant self-enclosure; this process never completes itself, but relies on the belief in the ideal possibility of completion.

64 The ‘flames’ of Nietzsche are the “light” which “may perhaps be the space of contemporary thought” (Foucault, 1994: 263).
which always exceeds the complete web of knowing, but which the theoretical perspective cannot account for. Similarly, Marx thinks the material conditions of knowledge radically exceed self-consciousness; this excess undermines Hegel’s claim that absolute self-consciousness can be ‘at home’ in its other. The very material basis of this ‘at homeness’ is subject to radical ruptures that could never be recuperated into self-consciousness. Heidegger takes this critique a step further, emphasizing the *temporal* nature of the material basis of all knowing of being. Hegel reduces time to being by setting up an opposition between absolute spirit and spatio-temporal nature. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche remains within the tradition of Hegel by ‘opposing’ the fixity of super-sensible truth to the flux of sensible nature. For Deleuze, Nietzsche is the key break in this tradition because the truth-appearance dichotomy is constantly produced, it is never achieved; it relies upon a more fundamental productive activity, and has to fight off all excess constantly. We will see how this account plays out in *Difference and Repetition* and in his writings on Nietzsche. The ‘productive’ nature of truth undermines Heidegger’s suggestion that Nietzsche maintains an opposition between truth and life.

1. *Socratic Modernity: the origins of the opposition between thought and life*

A fairly straightforward and well-known way into the themes of the chapter is found in Nietzsche’s treatment of Socratic modernity in the *Birth of Tragedy*. In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, Socrates is the “first genius of decadence.” Socrates begins the philosophical strain of nihilism because he sets up an opposition between the idea and life; this ‘opposition’ is framed as a ‘judgement:’ life is judged on the terms of the idea, which is not at all worldly or empirical; this idea will justify and redeem worldly, empirical life (NP: 13-4). Life ‘in itself’ is said to be

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65 In 1933, Heidegger says that Hegel is the absolute culmination of Western philosophy; four years later, he says that Nietzsche is the culmination.
unworthy of being desired or experienced for itself (NP: 13-4). This is a shift from the pre-Socratics, for whom existence is guilty but which is judged in relation to worldly elements: fire, water and so on. Socrates sets up an opposition between life and the idea; but he is, in fact, a genius: this is a productive act.

We can see how Socratic nihilistic genius plays out in the Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche claims that the theoretical perspective essential to modernity is the attempt to weave a net across existence from which nothing can escape: an absolute knowledge. This ‘web’ of knowledge would ‘encompass’ and ‘conquer’ the entire world of appearances. It conquers appearance not through a religious being which never appears within the empirical world and does not explain that world, but through a conceptual knowledge that would include and explain the entirety of appearance. This total knowledge of all appearances promises bliss for all humans, once its project is complete: the human suffering caused by the lack of a single meaning for existence will be satisfied. Existence, and the suffering of its incomplete nature, would be ‘corrected’ by the total web of knowledge, which operates with ‘reasons’ that claim to reach down into the depths of the causes of all appearances (BT: 15: 73-4). Socrates’ death in the name of knowledge is the turning point of world history because it suggests that the project of knowing can give a meaning to existence so strong it is worth all suffering, to the point of death (BT: 15: 72). The problem is that in modernity, the infinite fragmentation of knowledge reveals that it cannot resolve the painful lack of a unified meaning. We are being lead into a vast and barren desert, such that the very project of modernity is threatened with collapse from within: it cannot fulfill its promise of bliss based on the weaving of a net of knowledge across existence (73).

From Nietzsche’s point of view, what lies beneath the promise of modernity is the search for knowledge: it is the search which has given modernity its power and has given meaning to
the lives of those who search. The search for knowledge implies an *artistic power* beneath
knowledge: a productive creativity that does not rely on any prior structure of thought or
existence.\(^{66}\) However, by staking its promise of bliss upon the completion of the circle of
knowledge, modernity cannot acknowledge that it is the search which gives it power. Socially, a
revolution is the making because only a select few are granted the right to ‘search’ in modernity,
and thus the vast masses are excluded from the artistic search: this is the crisis which lies in the
womb of modernity. This is behind Nietzsche’s famous claim that only as an aesthetic
phenomenon can existence be justified: the drive to a complete knowledge in modernity hides a
secret, which is its artistic foundations. By transforming the net of knowledge, we can spread a
“net of art” over experience (BT: 15, 75).

The role of Socrates and the origins of modern nihilism are summed up in the following
passage: “Socrates is defined by a strange reversal: while in all productive men it is instinct that
it is the creative-affirmative force, and consciousness acts critically and dissuasively, in Socrates
it is the instinct that becomes the critic and consciousness that becomes the creator” (BT: 13 p.
88). Consciousness becomes a creator in modernity, and yet it cannot acknowledge that fact
because it denies its own productivity. What a new paradigm would do is make use of the web of
consciousness spread across existence to spin a ‘creative-affirmative’ web instead.

We have seen, in the *Birth of Tragedy*, two key moments: the project of a theoretical
modernity which claims to be able to completely thread a web of knowledge across existence;
and the impossibility of that web becoming complete due to the productivity which underlies and
exceeds it. Deleuze will target this criticism against Hegel in a way that has been misunderstood.

\(^{66}\) Derrida speaks of the “Greek” foundation, which resonates with Nietzsche’s talk of the Socratic origins of
modernity. Similarly, for Derrida, the Greek foundation has a “non-foundation” “below” it, the “non-Greek” non-
foundation; this is Derridean terminology for Nietzsche’s claim here that beneath science (Greek) there is art (non-
Greek) (cf. Lawlor, 2004: 2-3).
We can show, however, that Marx’s critique of Hegel reveals the stakes of Deleuze’s polemic against Hegel in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. We must now turn to Marx’s critique.

### 2. Marx’s critique of Hegel: the material outside in excess of knowing

Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche is famous for being an attack on Hegel; what is less well known is that Deleuze sees the true target of Nietzsche’s philosophy as those of Marx: in short, the Hegelian schools. In this section, we will look at the role of Marx in the book. Deleuze says that the “habitual” target of Nietzsche’s philosophy is not Hegel but the ‘Hegelian movement;’ he makes the significance of Marx here explicit: “Like Marx he [Nietzsche] found his habitual targets there [in the Hegelian Schools]” (NP: 8). This is the first time the significance of Marx in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* has been noted in the literature on Deleuze and Nietzsche. The cliché’s about the anti-Hegel nature of Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche are misplaced. It is not Hegel himself, but rather the Young Hegelians whom Marx criticized that are the real targets of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Deleuze goes so far as to say that without seeing Nietzsche in the context of the Hegelian ‘factions’ then we can ‘barely understand’ his philosophy (NP: 8). Nietzsche’s overman is “directed against” the ‘suppression’ of alienation, a key theme in Marx’s early philosophical work on the Hegelian school. Nietzsche’s critical stance towards the suppression of alienation means that Marx’s philosophy cannot be reconciled with Nietzsche’s:

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67 The history is one closely tied up with Marx’s philosophical milieu: it is primarily Hegel, Feuerbach and Max Stirner. In a book on Nietzsche, it is strange that Deleuze would make these three philosopher’s center stage: they don’t seem to play a huge role in Nietzsche’s polemics. However, they do play a central role in Marx’s polemics. It is as if Deleuze is reading Nietzsche through Marx’s early philosophical engagement with German philosophy.

68 The significance of Marx becomes even more obvious when one considers the philosophers left out of Deleuze’s account. Instead of focusing on traditional German Idealism or Schopenhauer, Deleuze thinks that Hegel, Feuerbach and Stirner are the key targets of Nietzsche’s history of philosophical nihilism. Deleuze emphasizes these thinkers because he is reading this period of German philosophy through Marx’s lens. Although he does emphasize the role of Kant in understanding Nietzsche, he does not mention the materialist Kantian F.A. Lange who is today thought to be a major influence on Nietzsche’s reading of Kant. Neither does Deleuze discuss any of the biologists that Nietzsche was reading, and which are, today, very much in fashion in Nietzsche scholarship. Darwin does make
they are separated because of their relation to the dialectic. Indeed, Deleuze suggests, very briefly, that Marx is the final moment of nihilism, prior to Nietzsche. The significance of Marx’s philosophical milieu cannot, therefore, be overstated in understanding the context of Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche.

Marx’s reading of Hegel is useful for us insofar that he posits an irreducible outside of the knowing being; an outside in which thought can never be at home. First, we can give a short summary of how Marx reads Hegel. It begins with Kant’s Copernican revolution: we know only what we put into things; objectivity is constituted insofar as a concept within consciousness moves outside of consciousness to subordinate an intuition. In this process of synthesis the concept is alienated from self-consciousness and the intuition is alienated from its manifoldness. There are two negative moments, the alienation of consciousness and the loss of the intuition. A positive result can arise from the alienating loss when consciousness steps back and observes the process in which it loses itself: we learn what we are, we gain self-consciousness. Taken to the absolute, this cancellation of alienation (the negation of the negation) can be viewed in its own purity: Marx calls this the “sheer activity” of absolute negation as abstract thought knowing its own knowing. The idea of reaching this “sheer activity” is, for Marx, Hegel’s major error.

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69 Marx is important in the history of nineteenth century philosophy because he continues the slide towards nihilism which is present in Max Stirner. Stirner sees that property, alienation and re-appropriation (of the human) results in nihilism: the ego which is nothing (NP: 162). This is one of Marx’s major concerns, according to Deleuze: how to stop the slide of the ego into nothing. However, according to Deleuze, Marx fails to stop the slide into nihilism. This is why Marx is the final moment of dialectical philosophy, beyond Stirner. The ‘socialist’ avator is not the ‘equilibrium’ point of dialectical philosophy which stems of the nihilism of Stirner; instead, it is the last stage before the end, before the completion of nihilism. Deleuze writes: “Does Marx do anything else but mark the last stage before the end, the proletarian stage?” (NP, 162)

70 Marx calls this the loss of the object, but the Kantian term intuition is useful for clarifying the role of unknowable materiality in Marx.

71 Marx writes that this movement of self-genesis in the form of self-alienation is “the absolute, and hence final, expression of human life” in Hegel (Marx and Engels, 1978: 121).
The activity of thought knowing itself is itself open to an outside in a way which is irreducible: the activity of thought is founded upon a frail, passive and needy constitution, open to a radical shock that knowing could never fully recuperate into itself. Hegel’s claim that absolute knowing could be “at home in its other-being” is problematic for Marx because of what is implied in the homeliness: a resting in itself even in that which is outside of itself. There can be no such resting, according to Marx; but we can never know that lack of resting, we can never control it within thought, because it is constitutive of the very act of knowing. We must now look more at how Marx establishes this ‘outside’ of knowing.

Famously, Marx makes much out of the fact that the human being is a living, objective, material being. This, in itself, is banal; and yet, this banality dominates much of the discussion of Marx. In fact there is a more profound philosophical point being made here. It is not interesting that the human is a living being. What is interesting is that the knowing activity of the human being is grounded in an unknowable materiality that is essentially in excess of that knowing, and in relation to which knowledge is passive, undergoing shocks from the outside, shocks that it

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72 Marx writes: “the rich, living, sensuous, concrete activity of self-objectification is therefore reduced to its mere abstraction, absolute negativity - an abstraction which is again fixed as such and thought of as an independent activity-as sheer activity.” (Marx and Engels, 1978: 122).

73 At the end of the Logic, Marx sees “abstraction comprehending itself as abstraction knows itself to be nothing: it must abandon itself - abandon abstraction - and so it arrives at an entity which is its exact contrary - at nature.” (Marx and Engels, 1978: 122).

74 Abstract thinking as sheer activity is at home even in its other; nature, on the other hand, has something outside of itself, in its essence, on Hegel’s view. Marx will take up this essential exteriority of the natural being. The ‘at homeness’ inside itself of abstraction implies that only philosophical knowledge finds the truth of what is outside of it. Concretely, the “actual world” of morality, the family, the state etc still exist, but they are now ‘moments’ of man “which have no validity in isolation” from man (Marx and Engels, 1978: 119). Their ‘mobile’ existence is hidden in actual existence; the movement of the actual world is only “made manifest in thought, in philosophy.” For Marx, of course, the actual world of the state, civil society and the family are themselves in relations of exteriority and combat which can never be reconciled with the sheer activity of absolute self-consciousness.

75 I, as a knowing being am an object for another object “as soon as there are objects outside me, as soon as I am not alone, I am another - another reality than the object outside me. For this third object I am thus an other reality than it; that is, I am its object” (Marx and Engels, 1978: 116). I undergo the action of that object in a way which escapes all possible knowing: “To be sensuous [an object] is to suffer. Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being - and because he feels what he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential force of man energetically bent on its object”(116). The passionate stance is the one in which the knowing being feels itself to undergo action from the outside.
could never recuperate. Hegel will say: this state of knowledge outside of itself is an alienated and mistaken form of knowledge. For Marx, the materiality of knowledge means that it is open to an outside in a way which is not merely an temporary state of error but must be thought at the very essence of knowledge.\(^76\) In the context of Nietzsche’s *Birth of Tragedy*, Marx’s material ‘outside’ which grounds knowledge is called the ‘search’ for knowledge that gives knowledge its significance, unknown to the knowing being. The paradigm of knowing asserts that it could, one day, complete the circle of knowing; in fact, it cannot, because what gives it significance is the search that connects it to Dionysian materiality. Marx and Nietzsche both focus on the ‘outside’ of thought at the heart of knowledge itself, which can never be reconciled with knowledge.

In order to understand this irreducible outside that grounds the heart of knowledge, we can turn to the two major human orientations to things in Kant: knowing and doing. Kant rigorously separates the two: to confuse them leads to metaphysics, the idea I could know things in themselves; I ‘am’ a thing in itself *only* insofar as I act. The acting orientation is one in which reason is practical: here, we already see glimpses of where Marx and Nietzsche will go: they take the ‘practical’ nature of reason as implying an essential rooting in what Kant calls the mad web of forces of sensible nature. Mad, because they resist recuperation into the self-legislating law of the rational being. Furthermore, as practical, reason *is a thing in itself:* a thing, unknowable. Marx takes this nature of reason as an unknowable thing and breaks Kant’s system apart by uniting it with the *knowing* standpoint of the human. Kant rigorously separated knowing and doing, and yet at the same time presupposed a possible harmony between the two. In Marx, there

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\(^76\) Mario Tronti brings out this aspect of the unknowability of the material in his reading of Marxism: he calls it the social thing-in-itself, which we know exists but which cannot be known. He writes: “today, order to understand, we must start from the most difficult points so to explain simple things through more complex ones. As already mentioned, for a contemporary Marxist there is a point of no return in the investigation. It is this modern sphinx, this obscure enigma, this social thing-in-itself which we know exists but which cannot be known: the American working class.” (Tronti, 1972: 55). Deleuze himself suggests “In Foucault, there is an echo of Mario Tronti’s interpretation of Marxism” (Deleuze, 1988b: 144n. 26).
is no longer a harmony between knowing and doing: a ‘harm’ is done to knowing by the doing that connects it to a materiality beyond all possible knowledge. This is Marx’s break with German Idealism; the post-Kantians tend to resolve the gap between doing and knowing in favor of the knowing standpoint, and thus privilege the concept and the infinite understanding. For *objectivity* to be constituted by consciousness, however, Marx thinks the consciousness must itself *also* be in a practical relation to its *object*, unknown to consciousness itself. This unknowable practical foundation of knowledge is open to shocks that fall outside all possible knowledge.

Marx’s stance on knowledge and its constitutive outside becomes clearer insofar as we ask: how can Marx even speak about or know this unknowable outside? He seems to set up a new regime of knowing, which would be the knowing of the material; for Derrida, Marx’s “relatively stabilized knowledge” calls out to us, it calls for “questions” (Derrida, 2006: 214). Marx’s knowing of the material basis of knowledge is an attempt “to know whose body it really is,” a body which must stay in its place. This knowing of the body that stays in its place is highly questionable; for Derrida, Marx’s ’stabilized’ knowledge calls beyond itself to another comportment: thought “becomes act and body and manual experience (thought as *Handeln*, says Heidegger somewhere)” (214). Marx’s attempt to “know” the material basis of knowledge

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77 Kant himself talks about the ‘harm’ which inevitably happens when two faculties attempt to unite; the ‘harm’ which arises in poetry, for example.
78 The motivation of Althusser’s reading of Marx hinges on the nature of this knowledge; he says that the economic cannot be a given in Marx because, first of all, the *concept* of the economic must be constructed: “the economic cannot have the qualities of a given (of the immediately visible and observable, etc.), because its identification requires the concept of the structure of the economic […] its identification therefore presupposes the construction of its concept (Althusser and Balibar, 1977:183). Despite the economic concept having to be constructed, Althusser retains a strange ambiguity in his relation to knowing in Marx. On the one hand, Althusser claims that Marx breaks with all prior empiricist-idealist paradigms of knowing; and yet, at the same time, Marx apparently remains true to “effective scientific practice” and all the practices of the sciences which have achieved autonomy (184).
79 Althusser also relates Marx’s concept of knowledge to a certain Heidegger: a movement of veiling-unveiling. He says there can never be a ‘given’ except by means of a ‘giving,’ the giving being an ideology which ‘remains behind’ and which “gives us what it wants” (Althusser and Balibar, 1977: 163). The “act of giving” disappears into
seems to betray his own insight into the ‘suffering’ and overpowering that the knowing being undergoes, without any possibility of reconciliation. In knowledge, the constitutive, material outside is lost; however, we, mortals, have to know; Marx is forced into claiming knowledge of that which is impossible to know. For Derrida, mourning is the necessity of this knowing together with this losing. Mourning consists in the fact that “one has to know:” il faut le savoir (9). I want to highlight the very radical unknowability of the material which constitutes any act of knowing itself; the radical outside by which Marx moves beyond the Hegelian recuperation of being into self-consciousness.

2.1. Hegelian thought as encompassing the space of being

Nietzsche and Marx suggest that Hegel’s self-consciousness cannot tolerate a radical outside in which it would not be at home; it cannot tolerate the productive activity which grounds it; the next section will look at how this plays out in Hegel. We see Hegel’s intolerance of excess beyond knowledge in the way he resolves ambiguities in Kant’s notion of thing in itself: he cancels out the ‘beyond’ of knowledge. Kant holds that there is a “putative realm of things in themselves beyond our comprehension” (Houlgate, 2006: 137). Kant says that we cannot know things; yet objects are constituted by our knowledge. At the same time, in its role in action, reason is a thing in itself, which is irreducible to knowledge. Kant rigorously separates these two major poles of the human being: the human as a knower of objects, in which the faculties are under the leadership of the understanding; and the human as a thing which acts, under the leadership of reason. Despite claiming that these various ‘interests’ of reason must be rigorously separated, Kant stakes his entire thought on a possible harmony between them: this harmony is the given which it gives: Althusser is implying a very Heideggerian structure by which every unveiling is itself a new act of veiling.
guaranteed by the divine will which creates these two realms, and the immortality of the soul which means we will one day experience the unity of knowing and acting. There are many ambiguities here, in particular the ambiguous relation between knowing and acting. If there is indeed a harmony between our knowing activity and our activity as things in themselves, then is it not the case that the radically unknowable thing in itself loses its significance? This Kantian realm ‘beyond our comprehension’ is what Hegel will seek to cancel out.\(^{80}\)

The difference between German Idealism and both Marx and Nietzsche is epitomized by the denial of that which is beyond our comprehension. On Robert Pippin’s vision of Hegel, the categories themselves contain “all that ‘being’ could possibly be;” nothing can be judged to lie “outside” or “beyond” their range of validity (Pippin, 1989: 39-40, 98, 250 cited Houlgate, 2006: 137-8). A less Kantian reading of Hegel makes the problem even clearer. Stephen Houlgate does not think the ‘concept of the concept’ is subjective self-consciousness or reflection: it is the unfolding of the thought of being itself. On Houlgate’s account, therefore, “the concept of being turns into the concept of “concept” and […] being itself thus turns out in truth to be reason” (Houlgate, 2006: 140). Being turns out to itself be reason. Thought, on Houlgate’s account of Hegel, “opens up” the “space of being as such” (140).\(^{81}\) That which is beyond thought or reason is eliminated; the thing in itself is said to be a Kantian illusion: there can be no being which is beyond thought or incomprehensible to thought.

Hegel’s annihilation of Kant’s ‘beyond’ of thought illustrates Marx’s critique: for Marx, known objectivity requires a material activity in relation to objects which allows them to correspond to our thought. Marx does not deny that thought opens up the space of being;

\(^{80}\) Nietzsche will take up once again this ‘beyond’ from Kant.  
\(^{81}\) We see Hegel express the opening of being by thought in the following quotation: “This kind of being purely with itself is inherent in free thought, sailing off into the free, open space where there is nothing below or above us, and where we stand in solitude alone with ourselves” (Hegel, 2015: 71).
however, the ‘being’ in question is not *all* being; rather, it is material that is worked upon by the practice of the thinking being. That practical being is open to the outside in ways which knowledge can never accommodate or be ‘at home’ in. For Marx, the categories no longer contain ‘all that being could possibly be;’ there is indeed an ‘outside’ or ‘beyond,’ and yet this is unthinkable in terms of the categories of knowledge. This outside is the material condition of knowing; it is the outside which lies at the heart of thought itself, as later philosophers will put it.

Ekart Förster helps us to understand the problem which Deleuze and Heidegger will find in Hegel. The fact that the space of being is opened up by thought means that the end of philosophy signifies a “definitive closure” after which nothing else can come, for Förster: the unknowable is eliminated. As Förster puts it, “philosophical science can only shed proper light on what already exists - like the lived life the old man looks back upon” (Förster, 2012: 368). The shedding of light on what already exists: this is key to why Deleuze will criticize Hegel in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, following in the footsteps of Marx’s criticisms. As Marx’s emphasis on stepping back, observing and learning about humanity shows, Hegelian philosophy can only look back upon the past of humanity and reveal its truth. The ‘look back’ upon life presupposes a certain objective state of the world as a *condition in relation to which* the standpoint of knowing can be said to be valid, a condition of knowing. Marx claims that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* implies a kind of unknowable condition of knowing which rises “far above the Hegelian standpoint.”

By merely validating that which it looks back upon, the Hegelian standpoint implies, in Förster’s words, a “systematic exclusion of all that is genuinely new” (368). The genuinely new

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82 Marx writes that Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* “keeps steadily in view man’s *estrangement*” and “even though man appears only in the shape of mind [in Hegel], there lie concealed in it all the of elements of [philosophical] criticism already prepared and elaborated in a manner often rising far above the Hegelian standpoint.” (Marx and Engels, 1978: 111).
can be excluded because the infinite understanding is the “cause of the world:” it must merely “provide determinate content” in order to derive the “system of philosophical knowledge” (369). After the completion of philosophical history, therefore, all that is necessary is to fill out the philosophical standpoint with content and erect a system of “actual knowledge.” The ‘genuinely new’ is excluded, because everything which falls outside of the system of the infinite understanding is excluded, and thus all content is predicted by the form of the system. This position of knowing is conditioned by a specific objective or material process which is unknowable from the standpoint of knowing itself.

Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze will move against Hegel in a similar way to Marx; they will return to Kant in order to think that which is unthinkable. Heidegger will emphasize this irreducible ‘beyond’ in his 1927 reading of sensible affection in Kant. Kantian affection is like an irreducible outside of thought, which opens up the question of what gives to be thought. We might suggest that this is why Heidegger is, in a sense, more Kantian than he is Hegelian: the notion of an unthinkable outside is more prominent in Kant. This is why Deleuze and Nietzsche also tend to favor Kant over Hegel: thought no longer opens the space of being as such; being does not turn out to be reason. When thinkers after Hegel take up Kant’s thought of the unknowable, many other transformations of the Kantian philosophy are also involved. Deleuze takes his cue, in regard to the critique of the Hegelian school, from Marx and his critique of Hegel.

3. Heidegger on the opposition of truth and nature in Hegel and Nietzsche

Heidegger ties Nietzsche to Hegel because of the common oppositional duality between the sensible and the supersensible. Deleuze agrees with Heidegger on the significance of
opposition in nineteenth century philosophy. We see that oppositionality criticized by Marx:
when he criticizes Hegel’s idea that self-consciousness can be ‘at home’ even in its other-being;
sensible nature, on the other hand, always has something ‘alien’ to it. There is an opposition
between abstract thought and sensible nature because self-consciousness in itself remains at
home in its other, whereas sensible nature does not.

Marx’s problematization of Hegelian ‘at-homeness’ is echoed in Heidegger. Heidegger
suggests onto-logical being in Hegel is “being-identical-with-itself in being-other” (Heidegger,
1988: 145). Nature and time are therefore “alien” and external to the absolute and to being itself
(145). Heidegger cites Hegel claiming that nature is “opposed to” spirit as absolutely real
(145). Beyond Marx’s critique of Hegel’s ‘opposition’ of nature and absolute spirit, Heidegger
emphasizes the temporal nature of this defective nature. The absolute matter (‘ether’) of
nature in motion is space and time; this spatio-temporal absolute is an ‘alien and external
element’ to spirit; spirit is the absolutely real (145). For Hegel, time only finds its essence in
being; for Heidegger, the essence of being is time. The common critique of Hegel made by
Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze is that spatio-temporal nature is ‘alien,’ ‘external’ and
defective relative to absolute spirit. Instead, they see the alien and the external as founding any
order of knowing or spirit.

83 Heidegger is citing Hegel’s Jenerser Logik, ed. Lasson, p. 187 [GW VII, 179]. Heidegger is interestingly close to
Marx in thinking nature’s alien essence as a key moment in Hegel. The alien nature of absolute spatio-temporal
matter to absolute spirit is also key for Nietzsche and Deleuze. We might say that it is what Deleuze calls ‘force’ in
his reading of Nietzsche, or intensity in his own work. Heidegger is interestingly close to Marx in thinking nature’s
alien essence as a key moment in Hegel. The alien nature of absolute spatio-temporal matter to absolute spirit is also
key for Nietzsche and Deleuze. We might say that it is what Deleuze calls ‘force’ in his reading of Nietzsche, or
intensity in his own work.

84 Marx is more concerned with the objective realm of nature itself and its relation to humanity, risking a kind of
humanism.

85 Similarly to Heidegger, Deleuze will see in Nietzsche the essence of being lying in becoming, as opposed to spirit
as the absolutely real. However, using the word ‘essence’ here does not capture precisely the relation of being and
becoming in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, which will require a much more elaborate discussion.

86 The precise significance of this will vary, of course, but it is the central point upon which their criticism and re-
thinking of Hegel will focus.
Deleuze and Heidegger agree on the oppositional structure founding Hegel’s philosophy; however, Heidegger differs with Deleuze in that he see Nietzsche as the culmination of this traditional paradigm. Nietzsche, he suggests, conceives the essence of truth as non-changing: truth, in essence, is “petrified,” “fixed,” “constant” and “definitive,” in opposition to the multiplicity of perspectives of life (N1: 214-5). This petrification is a kind of human animality: it ‘ensconces’ itself in a “particular horizon” that fixes one perspective. This one particular horizontal perspective becomes opposed to the multiplicity of perspectives that it contains within itself (217). Truth causes beings to appear fixed and to institute a firmly established world from out the sensuous multiplicity of perspectives (214).

The fixed and petrified truth is opposed to the perspectival, for Heidegger’s Nietzsche. The perspectival is prior to any appearing at all: the multiplicity of perspectives is the condition of possibility of any fixed perspective. And yet, each individual perspective, which is truth in the human case, is necessary for the multiplicity to exist.\(^87\) Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche in terms of the duality of the fixed and the multiple re-emerges: truth retains the Platonic sense of an unchanging essence that is opposed to but necessary for the plurality of perspectives.\(^88\) Nietzsche remains in the Western philosophical model whereby truth implies a broadly ‘theoretical-scientifical’ grasp of actuality over and against sensuous multiplicity (152).\(^89\) According to Heidegger, Nietzsche does not ask the question why such fixity arose in an

\(^87\) One could compare this with the relation between being and beings in Heidegger: being is the condition of beings, but being would be no-thing without beings. There is a difference and simultaneity between them in this regard. This is similar to the one horizon/multiple perspectives relation in Nietzsche.

\(^88\) In a sense, Nietzsche agrees with Plato that “the view upon Being is exiled in the body,” but Nietzsche believes that we should not attempt to view Being in itself, but to acknowledge any fixed view upon Being is an illusion (N1: 193).

\(^89\) The ‘over and against’ is central to Heidegger’s critique of Kant and Husserl, on the notion of the object.
oppositional stance to multiplicity. He cannot know truth because he is stuck in the tradition of Western humanity, on Heidegger’s reading, because in that tradition, knowledge and cognition have dominated the way beings appear (N3: 69). Knowledge, in the Western tradition, is founded on “re-presentation” or “concept formation,” which, Heidegger thinks, have been seen as “the basic law of the occurrence of human life as such” (93). Representation imposes that which is “unified and identical” upon chaos; this unity and identity is a “setting in the sense of fixing.” The fixing of unity in representation is “established purely on itself” because it is founded upon a “subject” (103, 88, 96). What is ‘represented in advance’ by the subject is a “purpose” that contains a “directive:” knowledge and cognition are always practically purposive and never merely theoretical (99). Representation is the self-founding imposition and fixing of identities in advance; this is the “essence of knowing” in Nietzsche just as it is in the tradition of Western thought (89). Thus knowing has its essence in the occurrence of human life as representation.

The classically Western problem of representational fixity appears in Nietzsche as the transfiguration of chaos into regular forms; Heidegger calls this schematizing. Schematizing involves imposing a certain measure of “regularity” and “forms;” the fixing of identities in advance occurs through “a regularity and a rule” (71). These regularities and rules are “thought out in advance” and “sent out” to “meet” chaos (92). The regular forms of human schematization imply a “range” of “configurations” in which transfiguring chaos is forced to move in order to provide something “constant” for man (92). Thus, the schemata are like man’s ‘horizons’: they are the permanences through which we ‘see’ new modes of presence; they are not merely

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90 Heidegger will suggest that truth is not an illusory fixity, but that essence is itself variable depending on that which it is the truth of; the one is variable depending on the many that it gathers (N1: 144, 174).
stoppages upon life, but they are part of life. Thus knowing, through schematization, involves “bringing fixed things to presence,” which is what non-human life itself also achieves for Nietzsche (92).

In order for fixed rules and regularities to be thought out in advance, there must be something like an “identity” or ‘self-sameness’ into which chaos can move. However, if we only encounter chaos or transfiguration through our fluxing bodies, then no identity “exists:” it must be created. Reason is essentially the creation and invention of the positing of something “identical”, it is the “presupposing of a selfsame” or a “sameness” (95). Nietzsche remains part of Western metaphysics because he “carries out” the most extreme consequences of its ‘first beginning’ in Greek thought, insofar as he makes sameness and thus permanence central to reason. He does not carry out the “knowing of knowing”, which is a step only taken by ‘someone’ “once in thousands of years” (74).

Deleuze diverges from Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on truth and the Western tradition; we can introduce the different readings by putting them in the context of Plato. Heidegger sees himself as overcoming the ‘oppositional’ thinking of truth and appearance by going back to the ‘first beginning’ of the Greeks; however, Deleuze’s more Nietzschean reading of Plato focuses on precisely the production of truth already at work in ancient thought. For Heidegger, Plato resolves the ambiguity of a-lethia, the process of un-veiling, in favor of that which is unveiled and present. “Being” is made into “a” being in this way. Plato’s “Ideas” are the “most beingful beings” because they open up the possibility of anything being ‘a’ being (Heidegger, 2013: 72). This ‘most beingful’ being is then opposed to the beings it makes possible, and the truth-appearance opposition is secured. However, Heidegger is well aware of a movement between the opposed terms: the Ideas are never ‘grasped’ like an object can be; the
space of Ideas are only ever *traversed* by the philosopher who ‘runs through’ their connections to find their commonality (Heidegger, 2008: 202). Deleuze will go one step further: it is not just that we ‘run through’ the Ideas in a dialectical movement; the very opposition of truth-appearance is *produced* in that movement, Plato’s method of division. The method of division has a moral motivation: the elimination of simulcra which refuse to ‘participate’ in the Idea.\(^92\)

The very model of the model and the copy is set up as a process of elimination. The “exemplary similitude of an identical original” does not pre-exist, but comes into existence *as* the “the measure or test” which decides between claimants (DR: 137). Plato’s notion of myth reminds us that there is always a further grounding test to be carried out (63).\(^93\) As Deleuze puts it, every act of grounding brings a surprise, something unexpected.\(^94\) Plato’s own method of division demands “a foundation as the ground capable of making the difference;” the ground itself is meant *primarily* to make a difference; it is productive of self-sameness or absolute self-possession (62).

The “movement of learning” actually implies the production of a new distinction: the “introduction of a first time, in which we forget what we knew, since there is a second time in which we recover what we have forgotten” (110).\(^95\) Learning is a production of the first time; a production of the true which is conceived in opposition to mere appearance.

Before moving on to Deleuze’s critique of the dominant image of human thought, we must clear up a common misunderstanding about his philosophy. He is often reduced to a kind of

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\(^{91}\) Heidegger is presumably thinking of himself here.

\(^{92}\) In Plato, as opposed to the world of representation which he initiates and inaugurates, “a moral *motivation* in all its purity is avowed [in the copy/simulacra distinction]: the will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms has no motivation apart from the moral” (DR: 265)

\(^{93}\) Myth tells us that [the grounding test] always involves a further task to be performed, an enigma to be resolved

\(^{86}\) “Does not every ground lead to an unexpected surprise? Does the ground not lead to something we did not expect? The search for the ground thus brings us something else than what was expected. We can call this surprise or deception.” (Deleuze 2015a: 41).

\(^{95}\) *Derrida will also play with this introduction of the resemblance between the past and the present in his reading of Husserl, as we will see later.*
cliché anti-Platonism, where representational ‘categories’ privilege fixed, essential laws that distort the fluxes of materiality. These readers see Deleuze’s philosophy as a ‘genesis’ which would return us to the ‘origin’ of things in fluxing materiality, covered over by Platonic Ideas.\textsuperscript{96} This reading is quite Bergsonian. Bergson, before Wittgenstein, has a famous conception of ‘false problems,’ and this is interpreted as covering over ‘Life.’\textsuperscript{97} Many Deleuzians overemphasize this Bergsonian line of returning to the ‘vitality’ of matter as it really is, prior to our mistaken, human categories. This dominant reading of Deleuze’s anti-Platonism also emerges from a certain, cliché reading of Nietzsche. In fact, this reading of Deleuze seems to succumb to the problems Heidegger finds in Nietzsche: it opposes the fixity of consciousness to the materiality of the body and claims we need to abolish the distortions of the supersensible and return to networked, rhizomatic materiality in its becoming. These cliché’s miss the processual nature of conceptual representation in Deleuze, to which we will now turn.

4. Deleuze on the productive struggle to establish ideal self-sameness

The next section explores the notion of the self-identical concept as it occurs in \textit{Difference and Repetition}; this will give us a rigorous basis to then go on to look at nihilism in Deleuze’s \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}. The account I give of this critique departs from the common perception: it is \textit{not} a set of conceptual laws which are fixed or static or eternal and define the identity of a subject. What is often missed is the very fluid and processual nature of what we could generally call ‘conceptual representation’. Merely claiming to be for a philosophy of difference and against the identity-based history of philosophy covers over that history’s

\textsuperscript{96} There is a peculiar Wittgensteinian flavor to this cliché Deleuze: get rid of the false problems posed by thought, in order to return to that of which one cannot speak.

\textsuperscript{97} Deleuze does cite this critique of the false problem positively, but it is actually in light of Kant’s critique of metaphysics, not as returning to “Life” as such.
constant reckoning with difference. We will see that conceptual representation is the object of a continual and productive struggle within life against that which resists identification.

Next we will give a broad summary of Deleuze’s notion of representational nihilism; we will then deepen that summary by engaging with Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* and his reading of Nietzsche.

The basic model of nihilism is the human subject who is the gathering of a system of concepts and who’s task is to guarantee that objects conform to that system of concepts. The concepts that the subject employs to understand the world of perception *presuppose* their own guaranteed self-identity; however, conceptually oriented thinking is well aware of non-conceptual differences that threaten it and must be enclosed or banished. The primary task of the concept is therefore to set up a dividing line between its own self-identity and the non-conceptual outside which it struggles to either subsume or eradicate. This dividing line is never guaranteed, because the ideal space in which concepts exist is continually in a state of variation. However, the concept believes it can establish its own self-identity *against* a non-conceptual outside. In order to establish its own bordered interiority, the concept faces the task of making the outside *become* identical or similar to it; this is an infinite but futile struggle against its outside. The concept can never guarantee its own self-identity; as a result, that self-identity never exists: it is an ideal which is empty or nothing. There is nothing in the center; the center is missing; the concept is first and foremost a negative struggle against that which resists submission to an identity which is, in truth, nothing. Marx had already said: Hegel thinks that self-consciousness can be ‘at home’ even in that which is alien to it, through a labour of the negative. This is precisely the critique that Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida will aim at the regime of representation and the concept: a circling around a center which is empty, which therefore turns into a struggle
against that which is outside of itself. It is this productive circling that Heidegger misses in Nietzsche’s conception of knowledge; this is so because he reads Nietzsche through the lens of an oppositional duality: knowledge and life are irreducibly opposed, such that life could never be a productive force within knowledge. Here, we see that Heidegger cannot acknowledge the major Nietzschean point on which the French philosophers of the 1960s are united: knowledge is not merely a denial of material forces, but also a productive force.

We will now turn to the details of this general notion of representation in *Difference and Repetition*.

Deleuze often inveighs against the notion of ‘argument’ and ‘discussion,’ opposing them to his favored notion of ‘conversation.’ This is useful for understand the operation of conceptual representation. The argument resembles the social phenomenon of ‘mansplaining’: in spite of a supposed ‘self-identity’ of the arguing or explaining man, what is really key is to continually destroy or undermine the opponent that resists domesticating identification. This is an infinite process, because the terrain of the argument is a space of ideality that is itself in a continual process of variation. Establishing a borderline between the self-identical and that which resists is an infinite process: mansplaining never ends, in an infinite barrage of futile negativity, bad conscience and *ressentiment*.

Representation, we have seen, presupposes an identical interiority which can ‘represent’ exterior objects that resemble its own interiority; for Deleuze, this structure of thought has dominated human history. His most rigorous account of the representational nature of the human subject is given in *Difference and Repetition*. In the book, Deleuze says that the history of thought has been dominated by the ‘world of representation.’ The “dearest task” of representation “is to relate difference to the identical,” which it achieves through “reason” (or
‘sufficient reason’); reason subordinates difference to the identical (235, 273). The world of representation sets up an identical ’inside’ of the subject’s concept and an external ‘thing’ which would resemble that identical interiority (DR: 273). The human, for Deleuze, finds its ‘species’ essence in representation: the presupposition of its own internal identity and its external resemblance to things. Humanity is tied to the game of representation because its ‘species’ being is “the form of the “I” that serves as the universal principle for representation (151). Humanity, bound by the form of the I, never goes beyond the representation of things by concepts.

Deleuze conceives the human in a fairly Kantian way as a thinking subject that presupposes its ability to subordinate objects to its concepts. More specifically, the subject guarantees that its object truly conforms to its concept, as if the concept was the essence of the object: this allows the subject to presuppose that any differences in the object can be subsumed under its identity (DR: 191). Through past recollection and present recognition of objects, the “I” is the superior form of representational individuation: for any object to be ‘judged’ as being

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98 The key moment in the history of representation was when all differences outside were subordinated to the identity of the concept ‘in general;’ Deleuze calls this the propitious Greek moment; later on, the identical will not be the foundation, but will be made to reign over existence itself through the newly discovered infinite concept (DR: 29). Even when, in Hegel and Leibniz, the ‘identical’ is not the foundation, the concept is often a way of giving the identical an infinite value and making it reign over existence itself, rending identity coextensive with the whole (49).

99 The human ‘game’ in *Difference and Repetition* is said to be the practice of representation, where the concept is key: it is a game of representation and of ‘the Same’ (DR, 282, 284). The four key characteristics are conceptual identity, opposition, resemblance, and proportion. In Derridean terms, this is what Lawlor calls the “unification” of the presence of the object and the “self-presence” of the subject: this is the ‘metaphysics of presence’ (Lawlor, 2004: 2).

100 The “I” is the the “quality of human being as a species;” the “properly psychic determination of species” as opposed to merely psychic organization (DR: 257). Following his analysis of Freud, Deleuze says that the properly psychic ‘organisation’ is the “Ego,” whereas the psychic ‘species’ is the “I.” The Self is the psychic “organism” or “organization,” an organism being a matter which is constituted by the internal continuity of resemblances (257). “Explicit” forms of the ‘species’ of humanity are recognised “by means of this I”

101 The subject ensures that the object conforms to its concept by remembering prior objects and then by recognizing the object as conforming to the same concept. The ‘I think’ is the source of the elements of representation and of the unity of all the faculties: I conceive, I judge, I imagine, I remember and I perceive (DR: 138).
an individual, it must be submitted to this process of recognition and identification (276). That which is irreducibly outside of the concept-bearing subject is represented as devoid of difference. The pure outside, for representative thought, lacks differences between individuals that can be reduced to the person; those individuals reducible to the “I” are the only differences the human subject can recognize as differences (276). The “I” as ‘universal form’ of psychic life thus cancels out all differences in accordance with the common sense it presupposes is shared by all human subjects.

Rather than a static set of concepts floating in a Platonic heaven, the notion of representation in Deleuze relies upon a process of becoming: the concept constantly attempts to make the outside become identical to its own interiority. The concept institutes a very important boundary which does not pre-exist it: a boundary between the ‘inside’ of the concept and its ‘outside’ (DR: 288). However, this boundary is never guaranteed, and thus must be constantly reestablished in a negative struggle against that which resists identification. Because the boundary is never absolutely established but is the constant object of struggle, the very self-identity the concept believes itself to have is never finally established: the self-identity of the concept is a kind of empty fiction; the heart of the concept is ‘nothing’ other than the ideal of self-identity. The outside which is produced by the concept is claimed to be the “negative” of the ideal self-identity of the concept; this external negativity must be constantly ‘subordinated’ to the self-identity of the concept in a process of becoming-identical. The boundary of the interiority of the concept with the ‘non-conceptual’ outside never preexists but is the object of a

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102 Every represented individuality is therefore reducible to the personal (I) and every singularity is reducible to the individual (Self).
103 This abyss of indifference is often given names such as ‘groundlessness’ in the history of representation: in Schelling and Schopenhauer, for example.
104 In cancellation of differences is based, in Derridean terms, on what Lawlor calls the “proximity of the self to itself in its acts (subject and intuition or content)” (Lawlor, 2004: 2).
constant struggle in which the concept attempts to eliminate that which resists identification. In classic Nietzschean terminology, what we see here is a kind of ressentiment made universal: the struggle against the non-conceptual outside is the very defining feature of the concept, and any affirmation of interiority is only secondary to this oppositional struggle.

The representative concept, for Deleuze, is not essentially a cliché Platonic Idea but a struggle to reproduce itself outside of itself, with the aim of eliminating that which resists this reproduction. The concept has no positive, fixed essence, but is essentially a negative struggle to eliminate what resists identification. This is a key problem because the concept cannot exist within itself alone; it relies on being identically repeated in various non-conceptual situations. The concept relies on ‘specifying’ things as being similar to itself (DR: 271). The process of ‘specifying’ exemplars of the concept in the non-conceptual gives the concept an “existence” in cases and in times which are ‘numerically distinct’ repetitions (288). This process is not a repetition of something pre-existing but is the process in which the concept is “put outside of itself” and is given an existence in the empirical ‘hic et nunc’ (271).

4.1. The excess of ideality, Deleuze’s reading of Hegel and the material process that guarantees the concepts correspondence with its outside

An important illusion by which the concept assures its reign is that it denies its own negative struggle against the outside. Conceptual thought believes that any resistance or blockage is only temporary, and that it can be repeated outside of itself without resistance. When

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105 This self-identity, in Derridean terms, is what Lawlor calls the “proximity of the self to itself in its acts (subject and intuition or content)” (Lawlor, 2004: 2).
106 In Kantian terms, this is the synthetic process of ‘subordination;’ in Nietzschean terms, it is what Deleuze calls ‘becoming-reactive’ (DR, 115). The ‘becoming-similar’ key to the concept is close to the becoming-reactive key to knowledge in Nietzsche and Philosophy.
107 What Deleuze calls knowledge in Nietzsche and Philosophy, he calls representation in Difference and Repetition: representation is explicitly said to be “the element of knowledge.” (DR, 191).
the concept struggles against the outside, it believes that the possibilities included within the concept are merely realized in existence; it believes it has successfully made the non-conceptual become the “same” as itself, outside of itself. This whole process relies on the presupposition that space and time are ‘indifferent’ milieus which do not fundamentally resist becoming-identical to the concept. Any spatio-temporal resistance or blockage of the concept is claimed to be a temporary problem. All difference is just a predicate by which we can comprehend the concept: it implies merely different instances in which the concept occurs within space and time (211). The ‘difference’ of the outside is reduced to the possibilities of the concept which have not yet been realized: the ‘possible’ is just possibility of the ‘real,’ and the real is said to be the concept. Any ‘difference’ which is ‘outside’ the concept is then understood negatively, as that which is not-yet similar to the concept; the concept proclaims: resistance is futile! I am the truth of all that resists.

The attempt by representation to establish a self-identical interiority is undermined by the infinite variation of the relations that constitute the space of representation. The concept believes that all external resistance to its own reproduction is temporary. For Deleuze, however, resistance to the concept is essential and eternal because the ideal space in which concepts exists is characterized by a productive variation and destabilization of the border that the concept attempts to establish between itself and the outside. The common reading of Deleuze sees representation as a limitation of material fluxes which undermine it; I claim, however, that the

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108 Deleuze’s thought of ‘difference’ will restore an absolute resistance to space and time, which cannot be recuperated by the process of conceptual becoming-identical.

109 We see the two aspects of the concept, its supposed self-identity and the negation of that which lies outside it in the following quotes: “the Same or the identity of a subordinating concept, and the negative of the condition which would relate the repeated to the same, and thereby ensure the subordination” (DR: 115); “It is in the same milieu, that of representation, that difference is posited on the one hand as conceptual difference, and repetition on the other hand as difference without a concept” (303); for representation, “difference is valid, exists and is thinkable only within a pre-existing Same which understands it as conceptual difference” and “determines it by means of opposition between predicates” (302).
concept is actually a limitation and denial of the variation inherent to the relations between *Ideas*. Deleuze expresses this succinctly in his reading of Spinoza: humanity as consciousness is not, primarily, a distortion of the body; rather, consciousness is a limitation of an unconscious *thought* which can never be reduced to conceptual consciousness.\(^{110}\) It is the “excess” of unconscious thought or *Ideas* that prevents the concepts of consciousness from fully reproducing themselves outside of themselves. Concepts are *themselves* part of a process of production, they are constantly slipping away from themselves and therefore their task of establishing a guaranteed border between their interiority and the outside is doomed (220). In Deleuze’s words, concepts are part of a ‘genesis’ which is internal to ideality: this is not a genesis which ‘returns’ to materiality as many readers of Deleuze suggest, but a genesis inherent to ideality (173). Ideality at the unconscious level, beneath concepts, is a constant state of productive variation that undermines the conceptual attempt to establish an absolute interiority that could be repeated outside of itself to infinity. Concepts misuse the productive variation of unconscious ideality, turning it to their own advantage by saying: look, there is an outside which must be made identical to the interiority of the concept.\(^{111}\)

Deleuze’s critique of Hegel reveals the stakes of our discussion of representation, and an important context for the role of Hegel in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. We see Deleuze’s critique of Hegel clearly in his early 1957-8 lecture course.\(^{112}\) A ‘system’ seems to “show contempt for simple experience” and “justifies” everything that is: it gives rationality to the real, to ‘fact.’ The

\(^{110}\) “There are no fewer things in the mind that exceed our consciousness than there are things in the body that exceed our knowledge” (Deleuze, 1988: 17). This calls into question certain materialist Spinozists who seem to set up a duality between ‘materiality’ and ‘representational identities.’

\(^{111}\) The Kantian term “Idea” is useful to Deleuze in this respect because it is *essentially* in excess of concepts, irreducible to them. Of course, for Kant, the *Ideas* are mere ‘total’ conditions for concepts themselves, which have a rational necessity to them relative to possible experience of the unity of apperception (God, the soul, the world). For Deleuze, on the other hand, the *Ideas* exist in a space which is in a constant state of variation, like slices in Bergson’s cone of memory.
system “makes no appeal to any content coming from outside:” this is precisely the problem we have seen above in Marx, the lack of recognition of an outside of thought which might be constitutive of thought. Deleuze admires Hegel’s critique of method: he is not claiming to appeal to an immediately given content which could act as a beginning. However, he is also critical of Hegel’s alternative: the system without appeal to any content from the outside (Deleuze 2015a: 128). There can be nothing ‘genuinely new;’ all that is justified is that which exists already. Very concretely, Deleuze says that “without being coarse to Hegel,” systems “are often related to a totalitarian regime:” Hegel “saw a moment at which his philosophy realized itself in the Prussian regime” (131). This is where the rational is a justification of the real and all the sufferings it produces. We can see the material process that secures a correspondence between the concept and something non-conceptual in what Deleuze calls ‘good sense’ and the State.

We must take a brief look at the misunderstandings surrounding Deleuze’s critique of Hegel. Förster’s criticism that Hegel excludes the genuinely new is at the heart of Deleuze’s distaste for Hegel. Deleuze uses the phrase ‘above and opposed to life’ to refer to Hegel’s philosophy in Nietzsche and Philosophy, where life is all relation prior to terms or atomic beings. This has fueled crude discussions of the relation between Deleuze and Hegel, both from Deleuzian and Hegelian perspectives, each accusing the other of misunderstandings. Rather than being ‘above and opposed to life’ in a crude sense, the absolute idea in Hegel must not be abstract, but must “potentially contain within itself everything that is to develop out of it” (363). The reason that Deleuze uses the phrase ‘above and opposed to life’ is that the Hegelian ‘highest idea’ attempts to contain everything that will develop out of it, but Deleuze thinks that such ‘containment’ necessarily fails, in a way that is essential to the Hegelian system. Hegel believes

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112 We have the very detailed notes of a student as a record of this course, very likely to have been checked over by Deleuze.
the system can eliminate the burden of anything alien, which will then turn out to be just an *appearance* of what is alien. For Deleuze this elimination is impossible. Once Hegel’s philosophical history is complete, “philosophical consciousness” attains a standpoint which, he says, gets rid of the “semblance of being burdened with something alien, with what is only for it, and some sort of other” (#89 GW 9:62; TW 3:81, cited Förster 2012: 368). Philosophical consciousness thinks it is free of the burden of the alien and the other, it thinks it is “at home” in its other-being. In fact, for the post-Hegelian thinkers we are considering, the other-being and the alien are precisely at work, unknown, within knowing as such.

Marx says that knowledge implicitly relies upon a non-objective material process that *guarantees* that the material object of knowledge will correspond to the concept, Deleuze also sees certain forms of existence as necessary for the concept to assert its own self-identity as corresponding with an outside. The ‘self-identity’ of the concept is never reached, and therefore it can never guarantee that it can make the ‘outside’ identical to its own interiority. Fortunately, there are certain non-conceptual phenomena which have a similar project of securing a border between an outside and an inside. Deleuze calls this ‘good sense,’ in *Difference and Repetition*: a material surveillance which seeks to reduce differences to its own schemas. Later this surveillance finds a more general principle in what Deleuze and Guattari call “the State:” the struggle to establish a materially self-identical body. In Nietzschean terms this might be called ‘degenerate culture,’ a communality which takes its own laws as absolute, covering over the law of the production of laws.

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113 The relation between the concept and a certain dominant reality becomes much clearer in *A Thousand Plateaus.*

114 In Bergson, this is the habit of making habits.
4.2. The secret productivity of representational ideality in Derrida’s account of Husserl

Deleuze’s reading of the productivity in truth rather than a sheer oppositionality is emphasized in Derrida who shares Deleuze’s Nietzscheanism. Just like Deleuze’s notion of the concept, the ‘ideal object’ in Derrida makes itself appear to the remain the same in each of its repetitions. The ideal object is key to the history of representation, the epoch of the representational idea in which there is an oppositional duality between truth and appearance (Derrida, 2010: 86/66). The ideal object takes itself to exist in the place of ideality in general, which is opposed to empirical, worldly consciousness and events. Its non-ideality is deferred to infinity; it never occurs (112/86). Signs allow the ideal object to be repeated outside of themselves but also remain the same: the sign is a thing which is never an irreplaceable empirical singularity, it is the only thing which is ‘representative.’ Its form remains the same across all empirical modifications (55/43). The process of signification is this infinitely repeatable form which remains the same and allows the ideal object to move outside of itself. This makes the mundane and empirical phenomena pass into the ideality of the conceptual and universal form (83/64). In this moment of idealization, the representational sign attempts to assure a ‘self-identity’ between the present and the past. However, the ideal-being is, in truth, “nothing;” it requires the non-ideal in order to exist as something (84/65). The re-presentation of the sign is

115 The philosophical duality of ‘truth/appearance’ and the transcendence of the voice “still functions in phenomenology,” according to Derrida
116 It can be present to our gaze without any worldly synthesis because it is independent of the hic et nunc of empirical events and the acts of empirical subjectivity, even though it is always an empirical subject who ‘intends’ an ideal object (Derrida, 2010: 84/65).
117 The outside into which the ideal object passes is constituted by signs, it is still ‘in’ consciousness (Derrida, 2010: 34/27). Expression is thus the “double exiting” of sense, because it first exits to an “ideal object”, which it then “imprints” in a “sign” (34-5/27). The imprinting of sense in a sign, a second outside, is within “ideality,” but in a new “conceptual” and “universal” form (83/64). Expression is thus the ‘production’ of conceptuality and universality (from ideal objects). Thus, the “pure, teleological form” of expression is the type of proposition “S is P,” where S is an ideal object which is predicated with a conceptual and universal form (81/62).
the constant coming-into-existence of the ideal object. The illusion of self-identity is secured by privileging the model of the voice: in the voice, there is an immediacy of speaking and hearing; the ideal object being expressed is a worldly presence which is, again, an ideal object (19/16, 34/27). The listener can take the communicated idea differently; so, interior monologue is the phenomenon which provides a mode of absolute self-identity between the ideal object and its worldly expression: I speak to myself and I hear myself in the same medium. The mundane opacity of the voice of the body is immediately transformed into a pure transparency between the ideal object and its empirical expression (86/66).

In reality, the self-identity produced in the signifying process of representation is always a violation of the passage of the present and the production of a new actuality in the present. In Hegelian terms, we have the two key moments: the labour of the negative and the moment of positive ’learning.’ Derrida wants to bring out and retain the productivity which lies hidden beneath “history;” history in general is, he thinks, the history of idealization and spirit (84/65). Writing is the inauguration and completion of this process of productivity: every re-presentation of simple presence is modified in its passage through the world, and this modification cannot be brought into sameness of the ideal object. What Hegel had called the alien ’deviation’ of abstract thought into sensible nature is in fact the essence of idealization. These signs, therefore, function and repeat beyond the self-sameness of the thinking subject (104/79). The representational sign cannot acknowledge this violation and this productivity; it believes it is repeating the ideal object in its sameness. The Nietzschean point is that the ‘secret’ of representational thought is its own, unacknowledged productivity.

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118 This possibility is universal, for all ideal objects, and unlimited.
119 Representation itself, and its productive idealization of the empirical world, is guaranteed by the privileging of the voice and its interior monologue: the complicity “between idealization and the voice” is “unfailing” (83/64).
The Nietzschean inspired critiques of representation in Deleuze and Derrida have purchase upon Hegel’s philosophy. Kant maintained a ‘beyond’ of a thing in itself; Hegel eliminates this beyond, such that thought opens the space of being. The Hegelian labour of the negative implies a struggle against that which resists the incorporation into the system of the infinite understanding. In Deleuze and Derrida’s notion of representation, the concept is characterized by a struggle to guarantee its own reproducibility outside of itself and to eliminate that which opposes this identical reproduction of a self-identity. What Hegel and the history of representation cannot acknowledge is that this self-identity is necessarily a creation or production because the radical variability of ideality forecloses the possibility of establishing an absolutely self-identical ideal space. We can now move on to see how this plays out in Deleuze’s reading of the production of truth in Nietzsche.

5. Nihilism’s denial of life via fictional values used to judge life: Deleuze’s Nietzsche

The next section will show how Deleuze’s critique of the history of representation in *Difference and Repetition* informs and is informed by his reading of nihilism in Nietzsche. We will see that nihilism is a denial of material life in favor of ‘higher values’ that attempt to organize living bodies in line with these higher values. The example of Surrealist paintings of dreams shows us the pure organization of life by higher values: nothing but purely individuated forms and strictly-bordered objects organized without delay or decay. The higher values used to judge and organize life are always fictions: they are created and then posited as eternal; they do not pre-exist. In modernity, the higher values by which life is judged are characterized by postponement, such that the human being is riven by an infinite self-judgement. This self-

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120 Deleuze, similarly, says that ‘History’ is the history of representation in *Difference and Repetition*: “The history of the long error is the history of representation, the history of the icons” (DR: 301).
judgement imposed by Christianity ends up implying that no external judge is required; God thus
dies and the self-judging human being takes his place as the absolute, resulting in humanism.
The primacy of the self-judging being results in the privilege of the knowing being, the being
who can judge all of life based on laws that are opposed to unlawful life. Underneath the truthful
human being lies a forger: that which truth condemns as false is in fact a realm of fiction and
forging, a realm of generative production. By tracing these various moments in the history of
nihilism, we bring out its productivity and undermine the oppositional conception of
truth/appearance. In this way, we will see that Nietzsche does not rely upon an opposition
between truth and appearance as Heidegger suggests; rather, he thinks the production of this
duality.

Nihilism, on Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, is not a static opposition of truth-life; it is
an active denial, denigration and destruction of material differences as a whole and in a universal
sense. Deleuze uses a variety of terms to describe the ‘denial’ of life: sinking, sickening,
depreciating, nothingness and lack of value. Universality and wholeness are key to nihilism: it is
the denial of all differences between material force relations, which sets it apart from mere
reactive forces which only ever deny the differences between themselves and other particular
force relations.121 ‘Reactive’ forces tend not to deny force relations in a universal or whole sense
because they themselves are particular forces relations; that denial would imply their own
destruction. There is a fundamental tension between nihilism (the denial of life in a universal
sense) and reactive forces (the denial of particular force relations within life): the alliance

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121 “According to Nietzsche, the will has two tonalities: affirmation and negation; and forces have two qualities:
action and reaction” (ECC: 100). Reactive forces “bear” the products of nihilism, which are higher values opposed
to life; this is a summary of a most crucial aspect of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche (101).
between the two is always fragile. This is why “nihilism is always incomplete on its own,” because it can never completely destroy all forces: it requires an alliance with some living forces, “weak, diminished, reactive life.” Ultimately, this fragile alliance cannot last: pure nihilism wants the destruction of all life, no matter whether that life is reactive or active: “Life takes on a value of nil insofar as it is denied and depreciated” (NP: 148). The name of this attempt to destroy all particularity of material forces in life is the will to nothingness; Deleuze also names it a ‘combat-against,’ a ‘war’ which attempts to repel or destroy, desiring merely domination or a limited form of power (pouvoir) (ECC: 133). It is not merely combatative; it is oppositional and destructive.

Examples Deleuze gives of oppositional and destructive thinking are the cold war and all forms of imperialism structured around death, from the Romans to the fascists. The fundamental contradiction is that nihilism is the denial of life but it seems to require life in order to carry out that denial. What nihilism ends up doing is mutilating living forces by reducing them to their lowest state (133). The process of mutilation is key: the history of Western philosophy does not rest on a simple opposition between truth and appearance as Heidegger suggests; it is a continual negative struggle against that which resists.

Nihilism is not a static opposition of truth and life; instead, it relies on an active process which organizes bodies. To ‘deny’ life, nihilism organizes all beings around its own higher values. As long as nihilism has not successfully destroyed all of material life, it requires some
from of life to act on its behalf. It acts through bodies organized around its own higher values which are ‘above’ and opposed’ to those bodies. The judgement of God is “nothing other than the power to organize to infinity,” such that God’s action through bodies would be a perfectly organized actuality. The organized bodies might then be called organs: our organs themselves become both judges and judged (ECC: 130). Even “sense organs” become judges. Sense organs here might be thought in the way in which Kant criticized the empiricists: the senses tell us ‘how things are.’ God has “turned us into an organism” (131). God “steals” the non-organized body and ‘palms off’ an organized body on us through which judgements can act. In Kafka, the organized body is segmented in the office, differentiated into bailiffs, lawyers, judges, and hierarchies of bureaucrats.

At the extreme, there is a state in which bodies offer no resistance to being immediately organized by a higher value: this state lacking in material resistance is the dream. The dream imprisons life within pure forms organized around ‘higher values’ (ECC: 129). It is a pure construction of walls and the display of the organizing judgement. The dream is too ‘directed,’ too ‘governed’ by the idea; embodied beings are less governable.

Nihilism’s denigration of life as a whole does not rely on rational human beings recognizing truth as opposed to appearance; it creates fictional values separated from and opposed to material forces. The will to power is, as fiction-creating, “spirit,” always ‘above’ life (NP: 172).

Knowledge, morality and religion are the three main fictions opposed to life that nihilism uses as its tools (ECC: 101). The ‘fiction’ above life can be an absolute being, as in religion, or an absolute idea, as in ‘dogmatic’ or dialectical philosophy. The whole of life is,

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forces, but those with those tools, nihilism remains incomplete because there remains some life which is not destroyed.

125 The will to power is spirit but it is also body.
under nihilism, merely the ‘appearance’ of a more fundamental ‘fiction.’ The appearance/reality duality is the heart of the fictions of nihilism. The name for the ‘fiction-positing’ aspect of nihilism is negation: this is the essential form of nihilism which disguises itself in all others. ‘Denigration’ and denial mean giving irreducible material differences the value of unreality and appearance as over against a fictional essence, but this opposition is produced in that value-giving act. Heidegger’s reading remains incomplete when he says that Nietzsche cannot account for the production of the opposition of truth-appearance: that productive act is precisely the unthought truth of nihilism.

The higher values produced by nihilism guarantee the possibility of judgement. Judgement requires values which exist for the infinity of time, ‘preexisting criteria’ so that ‘the new’ within temporal existence or the creation of a new mode of existence cannot be apprehended or acknowledged; indeed, judgement actively prevents the emergence of the new within existence. The judgement does not originate in fellow human beings with whom we are in partnership, but by the gods, who give us ‘lots’ condemning us to bear a particular higher value and an ‘organic’ end or aim (ECC: 128). The divine becomes finite when its ends become particular, human. The particular forms and ends imposed on existence “cut” existence.

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126 “Depreciation always presupposes a fiction: it is by means of fiction that one falsifies and depreciates, it is by means of fiction that something is opposed to life. The whole of life then becomes unreal, it is represented as appearance, it takes on a value of nil in its entirety” (NP: 148). Deleuze cites Nietzsche’s Anti-Christ aphorism 15 on the opposition of dream and fiction.

127 Negation as a quality of the will to power is identical with “nihilism:” “it is always the element of depreciation that reigns, the negative as will to power, the will as will to nothingness” (NP: 171).

128 There is a type of nihilism which denies all higher values, all fictions: this is called reactive nihilism; but this denial of higher values is just a way in which fictional negation ‘disguises’ itself.

129 Judgement “presupposes preexisting criteria (higher values), criteria that exist for all time (the infinity of time), so that it can neither apprehend what is new in an existing being, nor even sense the creation of a mode of existence” (ECC: 135). Deleuze sums this up by emphasizing the creation of art: “what expert judgement, in art, could ever bear on the work to come?” (ECC: 35). The role of art is therefore seems to be important in understanding the criticism being leveled against judgement.

130 This notion of the lot is developed in relation to Plato in Difference and Repetition: “In Platonism we see clearly how the rotation of the circle and the distribution of lots, cycle and metempsychosis, form a grounding test or lottery” 288.
up into slices or territories, in a distribution of divine values across finite existence. Human beings, in their limited finitude, then come to value their own particularly \textit{over against} other particular forms and ends: the split territories of existence take themselves as absolutely valuable. The absolute value that humans assign to their limited territories of existence is a delusion: those boundaries and cuts in existence can be dismissed and cut up anew by different higher values that take hold of existence; the gods can impose new lots upon humanity (129). The human claim to a territory of existence governed by a particular value is the reason why human judgement is not false accidentally, but false essentially.\footnote{131}

A key event in Nietzsche’s account of the production of truth is Christianity. In modernity, the eternity of values presupposed by judgement are never given, so judgement is conditioned by an act of postponing: it is not a ‘higher value’ which is eternal now, but rather the infinite act of postponement is the condition of judgement itself. This is the central interest of Christianity for Nietzsche: the judgement of god no longer cuts up existence into lots; rather, the judgement of the one God occurs in an infinitely postponed day of judgement beyond human experience and comprehension.\footnote{132} Temporal existence no longer has an absolute beginning or end. Human judgement within that infinite time is never condemned as merely mistaken; instead, the possibility of falsity becomes infinite. Humanity is forced to judge itself, to divide itself and constantly risks guilt: every judgement bears upon our past acts of judgement, to infinity (ECC: 129). We punish ourselves and we are guilty to infinity; only the afterlife will provide respite from this infinite torture: our debt to God is made infinite and cannot be discharged based on

\footnote{131} Ajax is a good example of the mistaken human judgement and its replacement by a form imposed by god, Deleuze thinks
\footnote{132} The priest is defined by a desire to judge and necessity that they judge. The problem is, the judgement is precisely conditioned by an act of postponement; the priest is caught in a kind of contradiction, therefore.
fulfilling a particular higher value (ECC: 128).\footnote{Dostoyevsky’s vision of Christianity as the decision about existence helps us to understand this notion of infinity: there is nothing outside of the judgement about decision which could help us to decide; deciding must be the constant postponing of absolute decision, the constant reckoning with a proliferation of guilt and self-punishment.} Infinitely repeated judgement is the heart of modern philosophy, which is Christianity brought into a philosophical form. Even judgements of “knowledge or experience” are infinite: a judgement of knowledge is part of the infinite causal chain of the world, which is a regulative Ideal that we can never know in experience (ECC: 129).

\section*{5.1. Humanism and the truthful man as the modern tools of nihilism}

The major fiction that nihilism produces in modernity is humanism: the ‘perfect’ or total human being as the ‘bearer’ of higher values above and opposed to life. Christianity had caused judgment within existence to proliferate to infinity: the possibility of falsity and sin blossoms throughout all of human existence. This opens up the higher and heroic man who has a serious and heavy spirit, and wants to burden life and the earth with values that are above and opposed to it and that take revenge on life (ECC: 100).\footnote{Theseus is the ‘model’ of the hero who concerns himself with ‘solutions’ (not posing problems), and passing through the labyrinth, subduing Dionysus the Bull.} The higher, heavy, burdened and ascetic human claims to “carry humanity to perfection, to completion” by ‘recuperating’ “all the properties of man;” that totality of properties form the burden that the living human being must carry. The total human who judges life based on higher values takes the place of the infinitely postponed judgement of Christianity.\footnote{In recuperating all the properties of man, humanism claims to overcome alienation, to make total man a reality and thus to put man in the place of God (ECC: 100).} The human being that claims perfection is the human as a knowing being: this means the human is characterized by representational nihilism or the denial of all life outside of possible knowledge. This nihilism is the side of the “Earth” which is ‘constituted’ by making everything similar to itself: “man inhabits only the dark side of the Earth, of which he only understands the becoming-reactive which permeates and constitutes it” and thus “the history
of man is that of nihilism, negation and reaction” (NP: 198). All known and knowable values derive from “nihilism, the will to nothingness,” which is therefore not just one possible quality of the will to power, but is the will to power as it is known to humanity (172). The claim to recuperate the total human through known values is “the deepest and most dangerous mystification of humanism” (ECC: 100). The ‘principle’ of all irreducibly different forces (the will to power) “appears” in man and makes itself “known” “in” man only as nihilism (NP: 173).

This relationship between humanity, knowledge and nihilism is central: we ‘know’ only the spirit of “revenge,” a ‘spirit’ above life that wants revenge against life. (172).

Nietzsche’s ‘higher man’ is an attack on the Hegelian movement’s attempt to realize the total, perfect and complete man in the overcoming of alienation. When ‘reactive forces’ bear the fictional higher values produced by nihilism, they think they are affirming; they say that affirmation is bearing higher values. Deleuze is well aware that the higher, perfect, complete man of humanism claims to turn man into a power of “affirmations that affirms itself” (ECC: 100).

Deleuze is foreshadowing Hegelian’s who will later critique him and say: Hegel is for affirmation as well! The Hegelian affirmation implies taking on a burden of values ‘above’ and ‘opposed to’ life. The notions of affirmation and activity are distorted because they are given sense by the bearing of higher, heavier, more serious values above life.136 This implies harnessing oneself to “that which exists.” This is not merely a Hegelian mistake; it is the mistake of the ‘higher man.’ The higher man presents affirmation as burdening life with higher values;

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136 We see this in Hegel’s adaption of several classical rules governing negation which Brady Bowman summarizes as follows “(1) negation negates something; (2) negation can be applied to itself; and (3) self-referential use of negation has an affirmative result.” (Bowman, 2012: 50). The self-referential negation in Hegel does not rely on any prior term; it is not an iterative negation that negates some thing outside of it. The result of the two negations of the negative self-relation is the identity of those two; in the process of the self-negation, however, there is a difference between the negating and the negated. Therefore, identity and difference are derived from negation as absolute and autonomous.
this, Deleuze says, is the “most profound being of man;” it is not just a ‘mistake’ that could be easily done away with (ECC: 100).

When judgement becomes infinite and bears upon itself, the question of writing and history become central. This denial works by inscribing the ‘debts’ and sins of humanity in a book which is ‘autonomous’ or above humanity: a writing in which our judging of ourselves can take account of itself and become infinite, which can never stop being written. The infinite book collects signs which are dead, and thus can claim to be eternal, our eternal Owner, we its Property: ghostly, immaterial. The ‘properties’ of humanity are gathered in a single book that claims to be the Proprietor of humanity. Humanity, in its essential focus upon the values which are bestowed to it, does not realize that its debt to this dead book of signs has become an infinite task: it believes the book to be its Proprietor, and is thus condemned to “endless servitude” and the annulation of any “liberatory process” (ECC: 128). In the context of Nietzsche and Philosophy, the book of dead signs that hangs eternally over humanity is called history: and thus, nihilism, the fiction of values opposed to life, is the motor of human history. The denial of the value of all life by positing a fiction above life is constitutive of all of human history to the present, all our thoughts, feelings and evaluations. Nihilism has been the motor of culture that, in human history, has always been degenerate; degenerate culture confuses its own specific laws with the law of all laws. Human knowledge that views itself as absolute claims to lead us out of history, but is in fact the motor of history: knowledge is the modern and humanistic face of nihilism, and we must now examine why.

Nihilism that posits a fiction above life finds its most useful ally in knowledge. The higher man, the man who burdens humanity with higher values, is the ‘most extreme’
combination of “negation with reaction, of negative will with reactive force, of nihilism with bad conscience and ressentiment” (ECC: 101). Knowledge is the ‘authority’ claimed by the ‘higher’ man as his ‘labyrinth’ or forest; God and the ascetic ideal are ultimately replaced with humanism and the ideals of morality and knowledge that are disguises for the same task of denying life. Nihilism requires knowledge in order to complete itself: it desires the denial of life as a set of laws above life which govern all force relations (NP: 100). Knowledge, a set of laws which are used as a model for all of life, constitutes of the essence of human consciousness (judging phenomena based on a set of laws above life). Knowledge is the universal expression of a ‘reactive life,’ life which denies difference: knowledge is entirely moulded on this reactive life, but it goes beyond it because it is not merely a limitation of one particular force; knowledge is the limitation of all particular forces. Knowledge is thus a force within the world that also helps to deny the distance and difference between all material forces. Knowledge is not directed against a specific object: it consists in laws that act as a limiting model for all the rest of life and thought. This limiting model of laws above life assists in the denial of all forces by nihilism. Knowledge, which, as an abstract and universal model, makes all of life reactive, lays the foundation for the destruction of all reactive forces by nihilism. Negation is the known face of that which determines the relation between all material forces. The will to power “appears” in man and makes itself “known” “in” man only as the will to nothingness, or nihilism: “the will to power is spirit,” but we only “know” it as the “spirit of revenge” (NP: 172-3). All known and knowable values derive from nihilism or the will to nothingness which is therefore not just one

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137 “Negation has dominated our thought, our ways of feeling and evaluating, up to the present day. In fact it is constitutive of man. And with man the whole world sinks and sickens, the whole of life is depreciated, everything known slides towards its own nothingness.” (NP: 177).
138 “Man burdens himself, he puts on his own harness - all in the name of heroic values, in the name of man’s values” (ECC: 101).
139 The principle of the human being is knowledge, and knowledge is always a becoming-reactive (65).
possible quality of the will to power, but is the will to power as it is known to humanity (NP: 172).

Knowledge is not merely ‘bad:’ it is central to the overcoming of nihilism: we must “use the ratio for knowing to pass into its opposite” (NP: 175). The negative can be utilized by another ‘quality’ of will to power: affirmation. However, the problem of truth tends to erase the possible utilization of knowledge for affirming life.

The truthful man makes the falsity and deception of life into an error and opposes it to the truthful world. Truth is the content of the laws of knowledge, a content that believes itself free of any empirical, material and living presupposition.\textsuperscript{141} By opposing life to the truthful world, the truthful man wants life or ‘existence’ to “turn against itself,” it wants life to be “ascetic” and to reject the living force relations of the world. The truthful man makes use of the ascetic ideal; the ascetic ideal is the particular ‘means’ of the negation of life that posits abstractions.\textsuperscript{142} When truth wants life to turn against itself, it is an abstract fiction opposed to life. Behind all truth lies the fundamental will of nihilism, truth being a means of opposing life. There are three layers here: truth, which is a mask for morality, which is a mask for nihilism and religion (97). Deleuze himself wants to think “a truth” which is not against life, not based on a negative will, but is somehow affirmative of life.

Truth believes itself free of material presuppositions; this belief means it forecloses any questioning of the established material powers and combats any such critique. The truthful man opposes life because he is a man of the established powers; he fears the harm to the established

\textsuperscript{140} “Negation is only one face of the will to power, the face by which it is known to us, insofar as knowledge itself is the expression of the reactive forces” (NP: 198).
\textsuperscript{141} 104
\textsuperscript{142} The ascetic ideal is both BC and ressentiment in themselves, but it is also their expression. Even more fundamentally, the ascetic ideal is what provides the Will to Power as Negation with its ‘means’ to negate life, those means being ‘reactive forces’, which are generated by the ascetic ideal (the will to power alone is simply the
powers if truth is questioned.\textsuperscript{143} Truth is always posited by these powers insofar as they fear harm and deception, which would risk their own transformation. Out of this fear of deception and transformation they posit a truthful world above force relations. Transformation and ideas that resist participation in the truth are thus are said to be erroneous.

The final stage in showing how Nietzsche does not presuppose the truth-appearance opposition consists in revealing the forgery beneath truth. The higher, truthful man of humanism, burdened with affirming only that which exists, are in fact forgers insofar as they conceal their passion, a passion for denying life. All the ‘higher men’ are “powers of the false, a parade of forgers, as if the false necessarily referred to the false. Even the truthful man is a forger because he conceals his motives for willing the truth, his somber passion for condemning life” (ECC: 101). Truth is produced from out of what it claims to be false. The truth of the true is its production from out of the false; a production which exceeds any single instance of the true. Nietzsche does not rely on an oppositional notion of truth: he shows how this opposition is produced. The ‘falsity’ or fakery that the truthful men commit is that they conceal their true passion for denying life in various ways, which usually involve ‘fictional’ values above life. The false is already ‘inside’ the model established by the “truthful man” as much as in those labeled as the false, the forgers (ECC: 101).

The problem of the underlying productivity of truth leads us to a quiet criticism of Heidegger that Deleuze formulates relative to the transformation out of modernity and its planetary technology into an age of art.\textsuperscript{144} We must ask Heidegger: if there is a ‘production’ of truth, then surely planetary technology can be transformed into art? Deleuze’s critique turns

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\textsuperscript{143} This critique is carried out in an article comparing Heidegger to Alfred Jarry.

\textsuperscript{144} This critique is carried out in an article comparing Heidegger to Alfred Jarry.
around a difficult point in Heidegger scholarship: can the event of planetary technology ‘turn’ into an event of art? Heidegger seems to say no: we live in a time of artlessness. This “no” is central to Heidegger’s famous narrative of decline, the motivation behind the famous ‘waiting,’ not for Godot, but for a saving power. We might say Heidegger succumbs to a kind of oppositionality between planetary technology and poesis: only a God could unite them. On the other hand, Deleuze suggests that Alfred Jarry is constantly concerned with the ‘turning’ from planetary technology into art; this is the Nietzschean productivity lying beneath theoretical modernity. Heidegger cannot think this productivity because of the opposition between the presentism of planetary technology and the poesis which it inevitably covers over. Even though Deleuze does not resort to overtly critical language, there does seem to be a critique of Heidegger and a valorization of the Nietzschean point implied here. ¹⁴⁵

6. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that Heidegger and Deleuze both read Nietzsche in relation to nineteenth century philosophy, which they both read as primarily structured by an oppositional negativity between representational concepts and sensible nature. Marx introduces this theme of opposition in his critique of Hegel: at the end of Hegel’s Logic, abstract thought that thinks itself is opposed to an alien sensible nature that cannot take itself for an object. For Heidegger, such oppositional thinking characterizes the history of Western thought. Nietzsche is the culmination of this history that dominates Western metaphysics: he remains stuck in the duality of a fixed

¹⁴⁵ Despite not using critical language, the whole tone of Deleuze’s piece is clearly mocking the overly-serious way in which Heideggerians often take the thought of the ‘master.’ Indeed, Deleuze’s style is mocking the spirit of heaviness which Deleuze sees in Heidegger and which he claims we must use Nietzsche to escape from. At the same time, he explicitly says we must not refuse to take Heidegger seriously, just as we must not refuse to take Jarry seriously.
truth which is opposed to the fluxing of life. Deleuze’s own conception of oppositional thinking is different; the Platonic Ideas are not primarily beings that are opposed to sensible life. Instead, that opposition is a ‘ruse’ which hides its own production by a movement within life. Nietzsche is the first thinker to manifest that productive ruse of truth; therefore, he breaks with the nineteenth century tendency to take the opposition as primary, and opens up the space of twentieth century thought.

Heidegger and Deleuze have different conceptions of how the dominant image of oppositional thinking has operated in Western philosophy. For Heidegger, there is a beginning in the Plato and a culmination in Nietzsche. This kind of tradition can only be ‘overturned’ once in a thousand years. Presumably, Heidegger thinks he could be the figure who emerges once in a thousand years. For Deleuze, although this image of thought has been dominant, it has not been a question of a History with a beginning and an end. Despite ‘oppositional-duality’ being a dominant image, no philosopher ever establishes a pure version of it; instead, every philosophical system implies aspects which exceed it and deviates from it. For Deleuze, every great philosopher contains resources to go beyond the dominant image even when they reassert it. Hidden beneath all oppositional thinking is a creative act of productivity which cannot be reduced to, for example, a beginning in Plato; it exceeds all schemas of knowledge. Heidegger ‘return’ to an ‘other’ beginning has a more nostalgic flavor than Deleuze’s productive excess. This is witnessed in their differing attitudes to contemporary art: Heidegger laments that we live in an age of artlessness, whereas Deleuze, despite being extremely critical of dominant trends in art, makes use of a wealth of contemporary artistic production. One of the escape routes

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146; this suggests, to Heidegger, suggesting a new thinking, a thinking of another beginning; however, Nietzsche himself cannot think that beginning.

147 Specifically, Deleuze is very explicit in lamenting the poor state of dominant literature and cinema in the 1980s.
Deleuze finds hidden in the history of philosophy is Kant: the thinking of the beyond of thought.

It is to this escape route that we must now turn.
Chapter 3

The variation of sensation as a Kantian condition of experience in Nietzsche

Kant is a fascinating figure in the history of philosophy because, on the one hand, he resolves major problems in prior philosophies (empiricism and rationalism) but, on the other hand, that solution is rich with ambiguities indicating various directions for future philosophies. German Idealism takes one possible Kantian path; Nietzsche, Deleuze and Heidegger return to certain ambiguities in Kant to resolve problems raised by German Idealism. Those Idealists claims to eradicate the inconsistency of the thing in itself in Kant’s philosophy: if objects revolve around the knowledge we have of them, any remainder of the unknown makes no sense. The idea that there is an ‘unknowable’ object is inconsistent with the idea that all objects appear to a human knower. The infinite becomes the self-overcoming of the finite as opposed to a divine perfection which is distorted by the confusion of the finite. What I see in Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze is the return to Kant’s thought of the ‘unknowable’ but as maintained within the thought of objectivity and knowledge. It is no longer possible, like Hegel, to systematically show that thought opens the space of being. Thought must constantly draw the knowing subject back to the unknowability of that which remains outside the space of thought: the infinite is no longer the self-overcoming of the finite, but a productive return to the unknowable at the heart of the finite.

The chapter begins with a brief outline of a more traditional vision of Kant, one that locates him within the history of ‘oppositional’ thinking that Deleuze and Heidegger see dominating the nineteenth century. The Kantian opposition is that of the super-sensible Will over against sensible nature; this opposition finds its resolution in the perfectly rational being within sensible nature: the law-governed republic. The problems raised by this image of Kant will be
taken up by German Idealism. We will then look at another Kant, the one utilized by Deleuze and Heidegger, emphasizing that sensation is a source of knowledge which differs in kind from the understanding such that the gap between them requires a bridge, the imagination. The stubborn independence of sensibility from the understanding will be taken up by Deleuze and Heidegger as a radically irreducible ‘outside’ of thought, which can never be fully accounted for by the knowing subject, no matter what level of absoluteness their self-consciousness attains. For Heidegger, that ‘outside’ is betrayed by Kant because he relies on the model of the objectively present being of knowledge in order to think it. However, Deleuze finds in Kant’s notion of intensity a kind of differing matter of the outside that provide him with resources for interpreting Nietzsche’s claim that reality consists in quantities of force. This differentiating matter is irreducible to any schema of opposition: its only limit is a vanishing zero as opposed to an oppositional nothing or a resistant fixity.

The second half of the chapter will examine how Deleuze transforms Kant’s notion of intensity. The problem with Kant is that his notion of space remains within the tradition of what phenomenologists call the res extensa or space as partes extra partes. Thus, in Kant, the fluxing materiality of appearance is merely a kind of ‘filling’ of a homogeneous spatial frame for objects. Deleuze will reverse the direction: he will agree with Kant that objects in appearance tend towards an extensive spatial uniformity; and yet, in experience itself, that uniformity never reaches its absolute point of pure homogeneity. Thus Deleuze will suggest that Kant’s notion of intensity is actually the transcendental condition of the variation inherent in the experience of perception. We will end by showing how this transcendental condition of the variability of every ordering of appearance is the essence of what Nietzsche calls the ‘world-artist.’
As well as showing the way in which Kant provides alternative philosophical paths beyond German Idealism, there are some other important arguments this chapter will make. By examining Deleuze’s reception of Kant on intensity, we will also be making a broader argument about how to read Deleuze. The dominant reading of Deleuze suggests that bodies in themselves, independently of human consciousness, are intensive and differential.\footnote{This has become a fashionable, provocative posture, particularly after Meillassoux’s critique of Kantian ‘correlationism’ and the rise of ‘new materialisms.’} A seemingly unending stream of recent publications claim to analyze rhizomatic networks, differential systems and posthuman intensive bodies. This dominant reading is justified in many different ways: philosophically, scientifically, politically and culturally. I will argue that all the justifications given, however, beg the basic Kantian question: how do we \textit{know} that those bodies are intensively differentiating themselves, if they are independent of human consciousness? What does it mean to \textit{speak and theorize about} rhizomatic, posthuman and differential networks of bodies? I will use Kant’s influence on Deleuze to show that intensive difference is not a characteristic of bodies ‘in themselves.’ Deleuze’s philosophy cannot be understood without continually reckoning with the eternally recurring tendency of thought to establish a self-sameness which does not exist in things: the history of human thought is defined by this nihilistic denial of sensible life.\footnote{This has become a fashionable, provocative posture, particularly after Meillassoux’s critique of Kantian ‘correlationism’ and the rise of ‘new materialisms.’} Intensity is a necessary condition of the variation of objects \textit{beneath} the self-sameness towards which representational perception tends. Intensity is not a state of things that we could ever ‘know;’ that is why Deleuze calls intensity “imperceptible;” it cannot be sensed by empirical sensibility. Yet, intensity is not a thought; indeed, it can only be sensed, but it must be sensed by a ‘transcendental’ sensibility: it is the \textit{condition of} empirical sensibility. Difference is not a thing in itself; it is the groundlessness from which everything comes, as their
condition. By focussing on Kant’s notion of intensity, we will see how it is possible to conceptualize intensity without resorting to pre-critical claims about bodies ‘in themselves.’

Another reason why Kant is important in this regard is understanding the role that ‘force’ plays in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. “Force” is one of the key concepts of Nietzsche and Philosophy, and certainly one of the most famous. However, it can seem very much like a speculative piece of philosophical and interpretive invention on Deleuze’s behalf. For one thing, Kraft is not a major word in Nietzsche’s writings; moreover, it has a certain cosmic and mystical air which reinforces common misgivings about Deleuze’s way of doing philosophy. By grounding Deleuze’s reading of Nietzschean force in Kant’s notion of intensity, I hope to show the rigorous philosophical context in which Deleuze employs the notion of force. Moreover, we will see that Kant himself uses the word force in a remarkably similar way to Deleuze in his Opus Postumum, supporting the Kantian philosophical background to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. Relevant also in this respect are certain misgivings about Nietzsche himself: as Kevin Hall has remarked, many people suspect Nietzsche of flagrantly abusing Kant’s transcendental principles and positing wildly ungrounded ontological entities as direct descriptions of reality.

We will look at an important example of this, the ‘world-artist’ in The Birth of Tragedy; the Kantian background will help us to show that the world-artist is a necessary condition of the variation between worlds of appearance, rather than a mystically derived conception of the cosmos.

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149 As Claire Colebrook puts it, “man is a theoretical animal, a myopically and malevolently self-enclosed machine whose world he will always view as present for his own edification” (Colebrook, 2012: 193). Seeing intensive, rhizomatic networks everywhere might be just another stage in the history of this nihilistic self-enclosure.

150 Deleuze’s turn to Leibniz and Spinoza is not evidence of a pre-critical, yet modern and differential, “realism” in Deleuze; rather, the turn to the pre-critical thinkers must be seen in a thoroughly post-Kantian atmosphere. In his Leibniz lectures, he sees the post-Kantian turn to Leibniz not as a simple return, but as an attempt to solve problems in Kant’s system. (Cf. Deleuze 1980a)
1. The dominant Western image of thought in Kant: the sensible/super-sensible opposition and its reconciliation

In the last chapter we saw that, for Deleuze, the dominant image of Western thought presupposes an interior self-identity of the concept; however, identical interiority is only established in a constant struggle against the non-conceptual that resists identification. All philosophers are both inside this tradition and yet exceed it in certain ways. For Deleuze and Heidegger, the ambiguities in Kant’s thought provide richer possibilities than Hegelian thought. We see this insofar as Hegel cancels out the Kantian ‘thing in itself’ as that which is beyond thought; according to Robert Pippin’s reading of Hegel, the categories open up the space of everything that can possibly be. As Houlgate puts it, reason opens up the space of being. What we will be examining is this chapter is aspects of Kant’s thought which precisely remain beyond our comprehension, insofar as these Kantian concepts are used as the background upon which Deleuze and Heidegger read Nietzsche.

Before moving onto the ‘positive’ ways in which Kant thinks that which remains beyond comprehension, we must briefly outline wider context of Kant’s thought that remains within the dominant tradition of Western thinking. For Deleuze, despite Kant being a source of inspiration, he is also a thinker of negative oppositionality, at the origin of a lineage including Hegel, Schopenhauer and Freud; Deleuze sees Nietzsche’s ‘differential’ and Leibnizian thinking as breaking with this tradition. It is the sensible/supra-sensible opposition that dominates Deleuze’s book on Kant: the supra-sensible and moral world of practical reason is opposed to the mad web of forces which compose sensible nature. This opposition is evident in Kant’s lamentations about individual human beings remaining all-too-empirical, such that they we can never be sure that

151 “The concept of reflective judgement is the only way that we can make sense of Nietzsche’s extravagant claims” (Hill, 2004: 104).
they can legislate the moral law. Individual human beings can never be sure that they have acted in a moral fashion, because empirical interests are so deeply entrenched in the depths of humanity. This lack of certainty regarding moral action in sensible nature shows us the heart of negativity in Kant: the opposition between the sensible and the supersensible. This lamentation about the human resembles a kind of anti-humanism in Kant, which is the basis of his negative-oppositional thinking.

Although Kant posits a negative opposition between the sensible and the supersensible, he sees a way in which that opposition can be overcome: through aesthetic and teleological modes of comportment. Kant writes the third Critique to explore these modes of overcoming opposition, asking the question: how can human beings, so tragically ensconced in sensible nature, be inspired to legislate the moral law free from empirical motivation? Aesthetic experience is one way in which the supersensible can be presented in the sensible. However, aesthetic presentations of the supersensible are always imperfect.152 The only positive and direct presentation of the Ideas of reason in sensible nature occurs in teleological reflection upon nature. The only being within nature with its ‘final end’ or reason for existence in itself is the rational being: the supersensible is present in the sensible here (KCP: 58). However, the individual empirical human being is always suspected of being motivated by empirical interests. The only purely rational being that could realize the self-legislating moral law within sensible nature is a law-governed republic with a perfect civil constitution.153 Kant’s essay on Universal History concerns itself with seeing the signs of this rational being in sensible nature; in

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152 The sublime is a negative presentation achieved through projection, artistic genius is a secondary presentation achieved through a produced nature, beauty in nature is an indirect presentation via reflection

153 Althusser has a nice description of the special nature of the state as a sensible being, or a body which can bring sensible nature into a rational ordering: the state is “a body ‘which is not like the others’, made out of a ‘special metal’, about which we were able to form an idea by examining the ‘special’ nature of the body made up of the agents of the state: members of the armed forces, the forces responsible for maintaining public order, the police, as well as the other civil servants employed by the various administrations” (Althusser, 2006: 106).
particular, he sees those signs in ancient Greek, Roman and modern European societies. Althusser nicely sums up the legacy of Kant’s thinking in Hegel and Marx:

“Marx on the state sets out from Hegel. The state is Reason; nothing that exists is as rational as the state or superior to the state. In the state, we have the reign of the universal. The proof is the citizen, a member of the state: he is free, equal to all the others (the Sovereign included), and decides freely in all that concerns both himself and the constitution and delegation of the general will.” (Althusser, 2006: 62).

The whole question of the realization of reason in sensible nature is answered by the state. The supersensible realm of moral law is no longer opposed to the sensible in a perfectly law-governed society. However, for Kant, this society is only a projection into the future, a task to be achieved. Enlightenment is therefore a task or an attitude, not a set of rules. The task of the moral political order is overcomes the duality of the sensible and the supersensible. This opposition-resolution structure is, of course, central to Kant and to the problems posed after Kant. However, Kant is constantly struggling with ambiguities within this opposition that point to other possible paths for philosophy. An important place that we see these ambiguities is the aesthetic relation to objects: in this comportment we discover a matter which cannot be thought but which stimulates the conceptual realm to be pushed beyond itself.

Kant’s aesthetic ideas will open up a relationship of thought to a matter which cannot be conceptualized; this shows us an aspect of Kant’s thinking which will be influential on Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. Aesthetic ways of presenting the moral Ideas are imperfect according to Kant; however, for thinkers like Nietzsche and Deleuze, this imperfection is useful and

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154 Marx, of course, would discover that “the state, which was Reason in itself, led a sadly unreasonable existence - even, factually speaking, an irrational one.” (Althusser, 2006: 64).
155 The theme of the re-appropriation of alienation in a future society will, of course, resonate throughout German philosophy after Kant.
productive. Those philosophers want to move away from the Kantian regulative Ideas of God, the soul and the world, and any ‘harmony’ of the sensible with the supersensible. A presentation of those Ideas which actually fails to fully present them is interesting to later philosophers. That is not to say the notion of the Idea is rejected; rather, what is rejected is the direct presentation of those Ideas as guaranteeing the harmony of the two natures, sensible and supersensible.\footnote{In the teleological section of the third Critique, Kant rediscovers a divine will which creates the world. The aesthetic comportments do not manage to perfectly present these ideas, but that is precisely their interest for Nietzsche, Deleuze and others in their tradition.} Instead, there is a kind of movement beyond experiences of knowing which does not give us a clear destination in the Ideas of God, the world and the soul; it is more an indeterminate but productive movement beyond the stance of the knowing consciousness.\footnote{The indeterminateness of the presentation of Ideas in aesthetic experience is shown in the confusions about how one moves, in Kant, from the aesthetic to the moral. Cf. Lyotard 1994, p. 165 on this point.} What is key for us here is the kind of materiality in question in aesthetic experience: free materials of nature are unknowable and cannot be recuperating into structures of self-consciousness or knowledge. This aesthetic matter is not ‘opposed’ to the supersensible but rather its manifestation. Nevertheless, such matter does not bring to a resolution the difference between the supersensible and the sensible, being only an imperfect presentation of the Ideas of reason. What is key is that there is a matter which resists any possible knowing consciousness: this opens up the broader theme of the ‘outside’ of thought that Deleuze and Heidegger take up from Kant.

2. The outside that exceeds thought in Kant: the affective diversity of intuition

The constitutive outside of thought is not only present in Kant’s aesthetic thought, but also in the broader theme of space, which Deleuze reads as a kind of openness to that which is radically exterior to thought. The revolutionary notion of space that Kant introduces into philosophy, he suggests, is space as the form of that which “opens us” and comes to us from an
‘outside,’ as the ‘milieu’ of exteriority. Kant’s ‘form’ of space opens us to no determined “thing” or “being,” but to an x, a milieu of exteriority, implying ‘eruptions’ and ‘overflows.’

The Early Modern space of Leibniz is an enclosed space that Deleuze says remains closed inside the conceptual order of the infinite understanding in which co-existing spiritual beings or monads are made to converge upon God. Kantian space is the form of eruptions and the outside because it is emancipated from the ‘logical order’ of concepts; thus liberated from concepts, it is an aesthetic space, aesthesis indicating the radical exteriority of sensibility from concepts. Heidegger’s philosophy, Deleuze says, is a “grand song on the theme of the open” which emerges from his engagement German Romanticism, Rilke and ultimately the Kantian form of space. Deleuze thinks Heidegger was philosophically duty-bound to write a book about Kant because of this relationship between the Open and the milieu of exteriority. In short, Deleuze thinks the Kantian form of space is already a ‘romantic,’ aesthetic and even ‘existential’ notion of space.

Heidegger shares Deleuze’s enthusiasm for Kant’s thought of space as the irreducible outside. In Heidegger’s essay on “Kant’s Thesis About Being,” he suggests that the Kantian “outside” involves determinations which ‘show themselves’ in the ‘intuition’ of space and time as ‘extrinsic relations’ of things ‘as appearances’ (Heidegger, 1997: 358). This “outside” of extrinsic relations is given to us in sensuous affection as a “manifold” which is continually in turmoil or flux (Heidegger, 1997: 346). What fascinates Heidegger about Kant is that Being as

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159 This ‘irrupting’ space is clearly linking the Transcendental Aesthetic with its implications in the Kantian sublime, which Deleuze had explored in terms of an excessive exteriority in his 1978 lectures on Kant, two years prior to these remarks on the Kantian ‘outside.’
160 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze will use this Leibnizian notion of space as co-existence of spiritual beings to think about a new differential notion of ideality; however, this ideality will not converge upon a God, but rather is itself open to a radical spatial Outside.
161 Deleuze adds, in a Heideggerian vein, that poetry and philosophy exist in a open space, a kind of ‘coming to us’ from the outside.
Positing is only possible if something is “given” to our positing through the flux of sensual affection from out of the extrinsic relations of the “outside.” This outside of extrinsic relations is close to Deleuze’s own reading of Kantian space as the milieu of exteriority that acts as the ‘form’ for that which comes to us from the outside. We will see it also prefigures Deleuze’s notion of intensity and force as the irreducible ‘outside’ of sensation and thought.\(^{162}\)

The significance of Kantian finitude, for Heidegger, is that every act of conceptual knowing must return, again and again, to the flux of sensual affection. Positing is the kernel of Kant’s thesis on Being, according to Heidegger: it joins the both the ‘outside’ of sensuous affection and the ‘inside’ of the unity of apperception. The joining of the outside and inside allows us to posit an object as that which is “standing” over against us but is no longer in flux, and is thus ‘brought to a stand.’ Such ‘positing’ of an object is the ‘joining’ of the “determinable” (matter or the ‘outside’ given as sensuous affection), and the “determining,” (form or the “inside” of concepts arising out of the unity of apperception) (Heidegger, 1998: 359).\(^{163}\) Such ‘joining’ can never be presupposed as already achieved in Kant, and so positing an object always implies an affection, an outside, which remains to be joined to the concepts of the understanding.\(^{164}\) Thinking, therefore, is irreducibly related to affection by the senses and is, as such, ‘ensconced’ in human subjectivity which is essentially affected by sensibility; such affection is what Heidegger calls finitude (350).\(^{165}\) Heidegger’s notions of finitude and Being are thus closely related to the sensuous affection from the outside that he finds in Kant.

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\(^{162}\) This influences the irreducible ‘difference’ of intensity which remains hidden beneath all sensations.

\(^{163}\) This determination of a thing from out of the understanding relates to its qualitas-quantitas, which relates closely to Deleuze’s notion of extensive quantity and quality in *Difference and Repetition*.

\(^{164}\) There is, of course, no ideality or sensible reality in which the outside and the inside could be presupposed as joined.

\(^{165}\) To be very clear, we can see here that Heidegger’s notion of Being which is *not a being* is closely related to the sensuous affection of intuition in Kant; in short, Being is closely related to the existential openness of the materiality of the body. However, Heidegger is wary of the linguistic associations with words such as the body and materiality, and thus his language is pared down to Being.
Important concepts in Heidegger’s own philosophy such as the ‘givenness’ and letting-be of Being emerge in relation to the Kantian sensuous givenness of the outside. The ‘givenness’ of affection in Kant is central to what is “most worthy of thought” for Heidegger, namely, that Being ‘cannot be’ as a being, and yet it is “given.” There is a kind of negativity within Being itself relative to ‘beings;’ being is given but “is not” a being (Heidegger, 1998: 362). Deleuze will also use a Heideggerian phrase to describe intensity as that which is ‘given to be thought’ (DR: 227). This ‘givenness’ of Being which is not a being, is Heidegger’s rethinking of the Kantian the givenness of the affective flux of sensation which is not yet brought to a stand as an object. For Heidegger, the ‘giving’ of Being, which is the flux of sensuous affection in Kant, becomes a ‘letting be’ or a ‘granting’ of presence, which is not merely “being” but is “there,” with a spatio-temporal specificity. “There” is presence, there, in a sense which is irreducible to concepts of the understanding, the same irreducibility as Kantian sensuous affection.

Heidegger suggests that we ‘open’ our selves - the inside of ourselves, the unity of apperception and its concepts - through the utterance of language which ‘comes’ to us, in which being ‘brings itself’ to language as what is thought-worthy for thinking; that is, the givenness of being which is not a being (Heidegger, 1998: 362). In short, the givenness of the “outside” through affection in Kant becomes, for Heidegger, the “givenness” of Being which is not a being.

A fundamental difference between Heidegger and Deleuze is visible through their readings of Kantian space: Deleuze highlights the spatial outside as the form of eruptions, whereas Heidegger will emphasize givenness, granting and letting-be. Deleuze will criticize

\[^{166}\text{Deleuze’s own proclamation that difference is that which can never be thought, but which is also the “highest” thought is close to Heidegger’s ‘worthiness of thought’ of the giving of being which never “is” (Cf. DR chapter 4, the discussion of ‘good sense’). Deleuze even discusses this ‘highest’ thought in relation to a discussion of givenness and the giving of the given, which is what difference achieves. Heidegger’s question about the ‘giving’ of being concerns the ‘whence’ of the giving, the ‘to whom’ of the gift and the ‘manner’ of the giving; Deleuze himself will answer the ‘whence’ in terms of difference, the ‘manner’ of giving in terms of a violent shock to thought, and the ‘to whom’ in terms of the one who no longer thinks representationally, the ‘spiritual automaton,’ the seer.}\]
Heidegger for retaining a kind of “eros” between being and thought in his metaphors of the gift and giving, that Deleuze himself will replace with a kind of violence or eruption between thought and being, clearly under the influence of Nietzsche. Such an eruptive space, as opposed to an ‘open’ space, is the context in which Deleuze will develop his reading of Nietzsche on the body and force.

Heidegger’s reading of Kant on finitude is often positive, and yet in Being and Time we see how he fits Kant into his vision of Western philosophy: the dichotomies of truth/appearance and permanent/impermanent are central. This concerns Heidegger’s reading of real beings and their change in Kant: there is a dichotomy of change and permanence, in which ‘change’ is ultimately the change of beings which are present; thus presence is the dominant value. Heidegger suggests that “change” and “persistence” belong “equiprimordially” to the nature of Kantian time; these are precisely the terms Heidegger employs ten years later in his Nietzsche lectures. Heidegger even describes the Kantian ‘manifold’ of intuition in terms of “beings that are changing,” ultimately calling it an ‘objectively present thing.’ A “persisting thing” or “beings that are permanent” are said to be the condition of possibility of change in ‘me;’ in short, the ‘changing’ of inner sense is guaranteed by the ‘persisting’ of something ‘outside’ of me. The presence of objects is primary in relation to change (Heidegger, 2010: 204). This is precisely the same conceptual foundation on which Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche is based: chaos or transformation is opposed to modes of presence, of which it is only the transformation; there is no ‘giving’ of presence from out of absence.

Heidegger thinks Kant misses the always already existing ‘difference and connection’ between permanence and change. According to Heidegger, Kant grounds his refutation of idealism in a time that is experienced “in me” and that is the basis for the ‘leap’ to permanent

\footnote{167 Cf. the famous footnote in Difference and Repetition on Heidegger and eros.}
beings outside of me (Heidegger, 2010: 204). What Kant presupposes in this ‘leap’ is the “difference” between the ‘in me’ and the ‘outside of me’ and the “connection” of these two; the “whole of the difference and connection of the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’” is presupposed by Kant (Heidegger, 2010: 197). For Heidegger, prior to the presupposition that the external world is objectively present, Dasein has the “a priori” of its constitution of being in the mode of being of care (206). In short, as “a being,” Dasein is “always already in a world” (206). This mode of always already being in a world is what will later become the ‘opening’ of presence, and is precisely what is lacking when Nietzsche maintains a dichotomy between presence and its transformation. Deleuze, on the other hand, will invoke the ‘overpowering’ and tearing quality of Nietzschean force in order to critique any such ‘opening’ which he will suggest ‘folds’ the conceptual and the sensible too quickly. What is necessary is to remain with the teeming of force in the gap between the two. Kantian intensity gives us resources to grasp the importance Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche; that reading breaks with Heidegger who reads the body in Nietzsche as undifferentiated and negative chaos.

We are going to look at Kant’s notion of intensity because it allows Deleuze to circumvent Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche on the body. The fundamental question, here, concerns the nature of the ‘nothing,’ of pure groundlessness, of the abyss. Heidegger’s critique of Nietzschean ‘overpowering’ focuses on chaos, which is the “eternal flux of all things” and which “Nietzsche […] along with the tradition in general, falsely took to be a kind of notion such as Heraclitus might have had. We do better to call the notion pseudo-Heraclitean” (N2: 91). So, Nietzsche’s notion of chaos binds him to the tradition, firstly because it is a ‘false’ Heraclitean notion of flux. The ‘falsity’ here lies in a form of radical exclusion: unity and form are “excluded ab initio” from chaos; exclusivity implying a kind of rigid dichotomy which is there ‘from the
In Nietzsche this radical ‘exclusion’ is not just of unity and form but most generally of “anthropomorphisms,” which includes all “order, articulation, beauty, and wisdom” (92). As such, “nothing” can be ‘asserted of beings as a whole; here, Nietzsche “tries to grasp the Absolute as purely as possible by holding at a distance all ‘relative’ determinations,” which are relative to human being (94-5). The key problem in Nietzsche, Heidegger thinks, and the one that links him to the “tradition” is that he “fails to liberate himself from the transmitted sense of chaos as something that lacks order and lawfulness,” lack being the key word here (91).

Heidegger thinks that the key refrain in Nietzsche’s writings is ‘let us guard against!’ with the emphasis on ‘against;’ let us be sure to exclude all human traits from chaos (93). As long as the exclusion of all humanization from the ‘ground’ or chaos is incomplete, we find ourselves in a situation of deification and a moral Creator-God. The radical exclusion at work here means that, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche is positing “a negative theology without the Christian God” (95). Heidegger says: aren’t Nietzsche words for chaos, “force, finitude, endlessness, Becoming, space, time” just humanizations which therefore ‘scuttle’ his concept of chaos (95)? Is all we can say “nothing”? But is “the nothing” not the most human of all humanizations? Chaos, Nietzsche says, has one key trait: necessity, not order. What is necessary is the exclusion of chaos from order, where chaos is a kind of ‘negative theology’ of becoming which radically lacks and excludes any deification of knowledge, articulation, morality or a Creator-God. In short, Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche is that chaos is thought as exclusionary, negative, and lacking.

168 The German Idealist overtones of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche are unmistakable here, with the language of the Absolute and ‘relative’ determination.
169 Heidegger is also very critical of readings of Nietzsche in terms of ‘naturalism’, ‘materialism’ and Matter, seeing these as humanizations of beings which contradict Nietzsche’s basic principles.
170 Heidegger breaks off his analysis at this point, leaving the reader hanging in relation to the significance of necessity. However, the basic point is clear.
Heidegger sees the ‘ground’ of all things in Nietzsche in terms of exclusion, negation, and lack. Deleuze will read Nietzsche in terms of Kantian intensive magnitude, because those magnitudes are precisely not ‘exclusive’ or negating of any other ‘thing,’ and are therefore a way of thinking the “groundlessness from which everything comes” without it being purely negative, oppositional and exclusionary. Heidegger sees himself overcoming Nietzsche and Western philosophy by thinking chaos as a ‘yawning’ which opens wide or gapes as a “self-opening” and therefore does not ‘lack’ or exclude order and law, but precisely ‘opens’ them up (91). Kantian intensity will allow Deleuze to think groundlessness (force) in Nietzsche not as an undifferentiated abyss but as a positively differentiated body that does not “open” to thought in a Heideggerian manner, but which continually forces thought beyond itself, forcing thought to continually confront its own groundlessness. In short, Kantian ‘intensive magnitude’ provides Deleuze with a lens through which to read material reality in Nietzsche in such a way that it is not subject to Heidegger’s critique of it as sheer, undifferentiated annihiliation.

Heidegger sees change in Kant as merely the change of that which remains present and the same; Deleuze, on the other hand, sees Kantian intuition as an order of difference that is irreducible to the constitution of objectivity by consciousness. In his writings and lectures on Kant, the concept of diversity is used as the major characteristic to describe sensibility prior to its synthesis with a concept. Making diversity such a central characteristic of sensibility, space and time is a strong interpretive move in reading Kant; other interpretations make immediacy, receptivity, passivity, givenness and affection at least as important as diversity. However, whilst Deleuze does account for other those other concepts in Kant, his emphasis upon diversity reveals

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171 Deleuze contextualizes his reading of Nietzsche in terms of the reproduction of diversity in post-Kantian philosophy; this focus on diversity marks his reception of Kant more generally, and is important in his own development of concepts of difference and intensity. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze will persistently make
his interest in difference and the importance of the Kantian transcendental aesthetic in thinking difference. In his 1978 lectures, he says “what appears is always diverse, an apparition is always an apparition of diversity: the red rose, a smell, a colour etc. So what appears is, by nature, diverse. […] To feel means solely: to receive a sensible diversity, to apprehend a sensible diversity.” Whilst the apparition of diversity is what he calls ‘empirical’ diversity, “the diversity of space itself or of time itself will be a priori diversity. Diversity of space. Diversity of time. The a priori diversity of space and of time constitute the forms of presentation.”

In these a priori diversities, there is no specific unity which is given; synthesis consists in limiting “a” diversity “in” space and in time, and a diversity of space and time “themselves”, in order to say: it begins, it ends, etc…. (Deleuze 1978). In his 1963 book, we also see diversity as the central concept in Deleuze’s reading of both sensibility and the a priori forms of intuition: “sensibility as such” is characterized primarily by diversity (alongside passivity), and space and time “themselves” are said to be “pure a priori” diversities, above all else (KCP: 8). These diversities contain no unity; unity is, for Deleuze, the central feature of the Kantian concept; indeed, he uses diversity to mark the difference between the order of the concept and the spatio-temporal order. Deleuze’s reading of the ‘a priori’ forms of space and time as a priori diversities will be important in understanding how he posits an a priori notion of differences in intensity without falling into a pre-Kantian, dogmatic position which describes intensity as ‘how things are in themselves.’

clear that diversity is not difference, precisely because diversity is given to sensation, whereas ‘intensity’ will be the condition of any sensation. As we will see below, this stems from Deleuze’s critique of extensity in Kant.

172 Kant lecture 1. Cf. also Kant lecture 3, where Deleuze repeats almost the same formulations regarding diversity:
3. Kant and Deleuze on intensity: summary

The Kantian notion of the forms of intuition as forms of pure, irreducible and explosive exteriority to the understanding is useful because it is a way of thinking that which remains beyond thought. That outside, for Heidegger remains somewhat subordinate to the presence of objects; it lacks its own type of differentiation; it relies on modes of presence to gain determinacy. In Deleuze, that outside has its own kind of variation and differentiation; this is the basis for his reading of Nietzsche in terms of difference. This mode of differentiation and variation outside of thought is taken from Kant’s notion of intensive magnitude. This will help to undercut Heidegger’s reading of the chaotic body in Nietzsche as sheer, undifferentiated annihilation; for Heidegger, Nietzschean ‘becoming’ or chaos would be pure annihilation if it did not have a fixity to overcome. Heidegger paints Heraclitus’ thought of ‘impermanence’ as always having been treated, in Western metaphysics, as a mere negative, a pale shadow of permanence (N2: 91). For Heidegger’s Nietzsche, ‘becoming’ without fixity is pure annihilation and thus must be given ‘being’ and permanence. Heidegger is wrong here, Deleuze suggests, because becoming is not pure annihilation but has its own form of differentiation. To think this ‘becoming’ which is not merely the becoming of something fixed, Deleuze looks to Kant’s notion of intensity, which is relative to a “Zero” as ‘opposed’ to a ‘unity.’ Kant’s thought of intensity provides Deleuze with a way of thinking a fluctuation of reality which is not merely the transformation of a being which is present, neither undifferentiated nor a pure abyss; it is, rather, a non-objective, non-present flowing matter of “the real.”

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173 The relation of limitation to diversity here mirrors the way in which reactive forces will ‘limit’ the pure difference of active forces in Nietzsche and Philosophy.
174 As de Beistegui puts it, the essence of being is ‘the movement’ of essence as such or the “eventfulness of every event,” whereas the essences of antiquity “are equated with being of a thing precisely as the negation of the becoming or the eventuality that is implicated in the thing, which is then relegated to the status of contingency, accident” (Beistegui, 2004: 114).
We can give a brief summary of Kant and Deleuze on intensity, before we move into the details of this concept. We can begin with a short thought-experiment. Imagine an object as it appears to your sense organs, perhaps your eye, prior to ‘knowing’ what the object ‘is’ or having a determinable concept for it; the rectangle of a screen, for example. For Kant, the sensible quality of this appearance resembles other sensible qualities that “I” can have as a perceiving subject: the sensible qualities resemble one another because they form part of an extensive space. At a point of ideal extremity, I could divide this extensive space up into geometrical parts which would be perfectly identical. These sensible qualities which appear also have a kind of intensive quality to them, but this intensity is like a secondary ‘filling’ of the more primal geometrical resemblances. The intensity of the sensation can be more or less and so it is fundamentally quantitative. For Kant, the intensity of the sensation is continually varying: it has to be continually varying, because otherwise my sensations in the world would become wooden and static. The temporal flow of experience is continuous and there are no ‘jumps’ or gaps in it, such that there can never be a pure experience of the perfectly geometrical space in which appearances all resemble one another.

The intensity of sensation in Kant can be related to Deleuze’s interest in his notion of diversity or difference. Beatrice Longuenesse shows how intensive magnitude is central to Kant’s notion of diversity; this connection is central to Deleuze’s philosophy. Like Deleuze, Longuenesse suggests that the manifoldness of space and time as forms is more “fundamental” than the manifold of empirical sensations (Longuenesse, 2000: 38). That fundamental

175 Deleuze here makes good on Heidegger’s suggestion that Nietzsche’s ‘ordering’ of becoming which is concealed by knowledge
176 Sensation here taken as qualitatively indeterminate, as opposed to conceptually determinate and thus as objective.
manifold of form is ‘grounded’ in intensive magnitude\(^{177}\); Deleuze himself takes this to mean that intensity is the “condition of that which appears” or the “sufficient reason of all phenomena” (DR: 245).\(^{178}\) Similarly, intensive magnitude, for Longuenesse’s Kant, is the “condition” for the further determination of the ‘form’ of time itself: it is the condition of that which appears (303). The form of time is a unity; it cannot have any gaps. Intensive quantity is a condition of the unity of time because it fills every possible gap in the matter which appears in time; it fills all of time because it is a continual transition between reality and the ‘zero’ point of reality.\(^{179}\) Kant’s argument begins from the unity of time, which means that between any two ‘instants’ there must be a time-magnitude which acts as a continuity for time (Longuenesse, 2000: 315).

A key rule of Kant’s philosophy is that no empirical content of the objects of experience can be posited \textit{a priori}; however, intensive magnitude is a rare exception.\(^{180}\) Because the matter

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\(^{177}\) Diversity is central to intensity Prior to the ‘form’ of time there is a ‘positing’ “in” time which “allows reality to be thought as intensive magnitude” (Longuenesse, 2000: 302). Intensive magnitude is different to ‘extensive’ magnitude, which is the shapes and positions of appearances in space and time, which is extensive magnitude) (313). Kant, in his Lectures on Metaphysics, suggests that extensive magnitude is a magnitude ‘in which’ there is a manifold, whilst “intensive magnitude” “grounds” a manifold (Kant, \textit{Met. Herder} (1762-64), Ak. XXVTI-I, 22., cited Longuenesse, 313). It is this ‘grounding’ of the manifold in extensive magnitudes of sensation that Deleuze is interested in with his notion of intensity. The ‘grounding’ of intensive quantity is its ‘positing’ of something else a given number of times; on the other hand, extensive quantity is ‘grounded’ because it is something which is itself posited a given number of times. Prior to the ‘form’ of time there is a ‘positing’ “in” time which “allows reality to be thought as intensive magnitude” (302). Intensive magnitude is different to ‘extensive’ magnitude, which is the shapes and positions of appearances in space and time, which is extensive magnitude) (313). Kant, in his Lectures on Metaphysics, suggests that extensive magnitude is a magnitude ‘in which’ there is a manifold, whilst “intensive magnitude” “grounds” a manifold (\textit{Met. Herder} (1762-64), Ak. XXVTI-I, 22., cited Longuenesse, 313). It is this ‘grounding’ of the manifold in extensive magnitudes of sensation that Deleuze is interested in with his notion of intensity. The ‘grounding’ of intensive quantity is its ‘positing’ of something else a given number of times; on the other hand, extensive quantity is ‘grounded’ because it is something which is itself posited a given number of times.\(^{178}\)

“Disparity - in other words, difference or intensity (difference of intensity) - is the sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of that which appears.” (DR: 222). This is what Deleuze emphasizes in \textit{Difference and Repetition}, although he will make other changes such that, ultimately, intensive quantity is something like pure intuition itself, as the condition of any sensation. We see this Kantian emphasis when

\(^{179}\) (A143/B82-83). Intensive magnitude is thus the pure ‘between’ of any individual instants of time, making continuity possible; we can already see how Kantian intensity might resonate with Deleuze’s concern to think of time (becoming) as a pure between without instants, or as a pure relationality without terms.

\(^{180}\) Longuenesse admits that Kant’s notion of intensive quantity as ‘the real itself’ can appear to be just a “convenient fiction of the imagination” (Longuenesse, 2000: 313). However, it is important to note the rigorously transcendental necessity for positing the real of appearances as intensive magnitude. Whether the real \textit{actually does empirically} vary is something which transcendental philosophy can say nothing about, because the causes of
that continuously varies in time is the condition for the unity of time as a form, the intensive magnitude of reality can be posited transcendentally as an *a priori* aspect of matter.\textsuperscript{181} The ‘real’ within appearances must be represented *a priori* as being composed of magnitudes susceptible to continuous variation, such that there are no ‘gaps’ in appearance.\textsuperscript{182} Reality can thus be ‘constructed’ *a priori* “as varying” and “can be asserted *a priori*, as a universal principle” (315).\textsuperscript{183}

Longuenesse gives a useful summary of the reasoning behind Kant’s assertion of the continuity of *reality* as intensive magnitude:

“(1) there is unity of experience only if there is unity of empirically real time; (2) there is unity of time only if there is continuity of (empirically real) time; (3) there is continuity of (empirically real) time only if there is continuity of change; (4) there is continuity of change only if reality itself is a continuous intensive magnitude.” (Longuenesse, 2000: 316).

In short, the unified ‘form’ of time necessitates *a priori* claims about the ‘matter’ of appearances as varying continuously through time. Longuenesse admits this is giving a strong ‘priority’ to form over matter in reading Kant; however, this priority of form is precisely why the alteration are only given empirically (315). Kant is cautious about saying nothing about ‘actual’ or empirical change as a continuous magnitude: he is doing transcendental philosophy.

\textsuperscript{181} We see this confirmed in Kant’s Anticipations of Perception, when he writes that “of magnitudes in general we can know *a priori* only a single quality, namely, that of continuity, and that in all quality (the real in appearances) we can know *a priori* nothing save their intensive quantity, namely that they have a degree. Everything else has to be left to experience” (A 176/B218, cited Longuenesse, 2000: 315).

\textsuperscript{182} This is why, as Longuenesse says, the ‘matter of appearances’ must be presupposed to have properties (continuous variation) imparted to it by the form of intuition (the unity of time) (Longuenesse, 2000: 316).

\textsuperscript{183} When Heidegger criticizes Kant, in *Being and Time*, for presupposing objectively present beings to ground his notion of “real” change, we see that this is certainly not the most obvious reading of ‘reality’ in Kant; the continuous variation of intensive magnitudes is the matter of the real, and these are precisely not ‘objectively present beings, but are rather fluxing, temporal magnitudes. Furthermore, this continuous variation is not like Heidegger’s reading of Nietzschean chaos, an undifferentiated abyss which would exhaust itself in annihilation if there was no ‘limit’ or present. Thus, when Deleuze takes up the notion of intensity from the post-Kantian tradition, we can see that he is laying the groundwork for undercutting certain the Heideggerian critique of Nietzsche as thinking merely the dichotomy between presence and its sheer absence.
real of appearances is “a priori representable as susceptible of continuous variation through time” (315).

Intensive magnitudes are the real matter of appearances but they also characterize the awareness or apprehension we have of the temporal flux of perceptions (313, 303).184 These intensive sensations do not ground ‘knowledge’ of intensity; they are merely sensation, prior to conceptually constituted objectivity.

The ‘zero’ which is fundamental to intensive magnitude is not absence: it is the transition from empirical consciousness to a consciousness of the transcendental forms of space and time.185 The zero point of ‘nothingness’ is the vanishing of empirical consciousness which is replaced by a merely formal a priori consciousness of the manifold in space and time. The 0 point of empirical consciousness is in fact a transition to a formal consciousness of space and time (B208). Kant uses the word “pure intuition” to discuss the intensive magnitude = 0, a phrase Deleuze uses to describe his notion of ‘intensity.’186 Deleuze will use this ‘zero’ as a way of thinking difference as prior to contradiction or negation, writing: “there are no reports of null frequencies, no effectively null potentials, no absolutely null pressure, as though on a line with logarithmic graduations where zero lies at the end of an infinite series of smaller and smaller fractions […] intensity affirms even the lowest; it makes the lowest an object of affirmation” (DR: 234). The only a priori ‘reality’ of matter is the intensive magnitude that falls to an

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184 Such successive awareness of the flux of perceptions gives us immediate access to the "real of appearances," but these sensations are, of course, not determinate objects of conceptual consciousness; they are, rather, indeterminate (Longuennesse, 2000: 321). The indeterminacy here is key, because, of course, we cannot have an ‘adequate,’ ‘true’ or determinate cognition of quantity unless we arrive a judgement, which implies the understanding and therefore goes beyond the immediacy of sensation. This will be important when we come to see the post-Kantian reception of intensity.

185 It is not the absence of an empirical or psychological state (a perception or conscious sensation). The existence of empty space and empty time cannot be proved by the absence of empirical sensation.

186 Interestingly Joe Hughes suggests that, in Anti-Oedipus, the 0 point of intensity is the pure form of time in which the body loses materiality, and he claims this is an important difference from Kant; however, as we have seen, the 0 point in Kant is also something like the ‘pure form of time,’ the vanishing of the empirical into the transcendental.
infinitely vanishing zero; this undermines Heidegger’s reading of ‘reality’ in Kant as the variation of an objective being. Reality as intensive magnitude is not, as Heidegger claims, an objectively present being.187

Deleuze’s use of Nietzsche’s word ‘force’ to think intensive magnitude is already prefigured in Kant’s later, so-called ‘post-critical’ period. Kant wonders how the concept of the ether can be applied ‘objectively’ to experience. The ‘principles’ that Kant lays out for possible application of the categories in experience (in the ‘axioms’ of intuition and the ‘anticipations’ of perception) correspond to what Hall calls the “moving forces of matter.” The subject anticipates a priori its own ‘affection’ “by the moving forces of matter” which ‘generate’ “extensive magnitudes in space and intensive magnitudes in time” (Hall, 2015: 136). This generation of intensive magnitudes by the ‘moving forces of matter’ anticipates Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche in many respects. We must now turn to what separates Kant from Nietzsche, on Deleuze’s reading.

Deleuze says in the Nietzsche book that the problem of difference emerges from the Kantian and post-Kantian question: how is diversity reproduced? For Kant, the law of the reproduction of the diverse manifold of intuition can only be encountered in the unity of apperception. So, although ‘appearances’ in their manifold are not yet unified by a concept and the unity of apperception, they contain in themselves the possibility of such unification. However, this unification is what Deleuze calls the ‘miracle of knowledge,’ the correspondence

“In the third synthesis, however, the body without organs seems to lose its materiality. It becomes intensity = 0, the pure form of time” (Hughes, 2011: 76).

187 Furthermore, Kant makes some of his most important remarks about intensive magnitude in the Transcendental Schematism, which is precisely the section Heidegger will mark out as being the central key to Kant’s philosophy in his 1929 book on Kant. Hermann Cohen also reads the schematism and the imagination as the keys to the Kantian philosophy; however, he focuses precisely on intensive magnitude as its fundamental concept, whereas Heidegger does not. This is what Deleuze will take up from Hermann Cohen and will use in understanding Nietzsche’s conception of the body in a way which goes beyond Heidegger’s dichotomy between the permanent and the impermanent.
between spatio-temporal determinations and conceptual determinations. This ‘miracle’ of knowledge, in search of which Kant constructs a whole system, will be questioned in its miraculous nature by post-Kantian thinkers.

One Kantian answer to the question of the reproduction of diversity will come from neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen, and it is an answer which will influence Deleuze’s own rethinking of Kantianism. Cohen makes Kant’s notion of intensive magnitude central to his reading of Kant because it grounds the unity of the sensible and the conceptual: it bridges the miraculous Kantian gap between the understanding and the sensibility. However, this relies upon gaining knowledge of intensive magnitude through mathematized science and differential equations which can conceptualize the flux of temporal matter. Deleuze’s interest in Nietzsche is that he retains the unknowability of intensity: Cohen ends up with a kind of positivism which collapses the distinction between intuition and sensibility in favor of what Jules Vuillemin calls a divine mathematics.

4. The transcendental argumentation for the concept of force in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche: the irreducible variation of appearances

Having laid out Kant’s notion of intensity, we must see how it informs Deleuze’s own philosophical framework for reading Nietzsche. It is often implied that Deleuze’s concept of intensity is a description of ‘things in themselves,’ real bodies, independent of human consciousness. By looking at the Kantian framework, we will see that this is wrong; Deleuze’s concept of intensive difference is grounded in a transcendental argument about the variation in the order of appearances.

188 “Kant constructed his whole system of new concepts to get to that point” where “despite everything we were able to establish a correspondence between spatio-temporal determinations and conceptual determinations, and
The next section begins by looking at Deleuze’s criticisms of Kant on intensity and how they are similar to phenomenological critiques of the \textit{res extensa}. Next, we will look at Deleuze’s transcendental argument for differences of intensity: it is the irreducible difference beneath the order of resemblances of sensible qualities for the thinking “I.” Finally, we will look at a famously controversial and seemingly illegitimate forerunner of this concept in Nietzsche: the “world-artist” in \textit{The Birth of Tragedy}. It will be shown that this is not a naively pre-Kantian assertion that Being is, in actual fact, an artist; rather, it is a transcendental argument about the irreducible variation in the order of appearances. This will lay the philosophical groundwork for a more detail analysis of Deleuze’s reading of force in Nietzsche in the following chapter.

\textbf{4.1 Deleuze on Kantian intensity, beyond sheer annihilation}

Although Deleuze is influenced by Kant’s notion of intensity, he also criticize’s Kant’s reduction of intensity to ‘geometrical’ extensity which covers it over. The essence of Deleuze’s critique of Kant on intensity is that the latter thinks space and time in terms of ‘geometrical extension’ and makes intensive quantity merely the matter which ‘fills’ this spatio-temporal extensity (DR: 231). The representation of the extensive ‘parts’ therefore precedes the representation of the whole in an intuition for Kant (DR: 231). Deleuze notes that Kant does speak about another mode of bodily difference, recognizing an internal difference between certain types of chemical (enantiomorphic) bodies; however, Deleuze is critical of the way in which this bodily difference refers only to “an external relation with extensity as a whole in the form of extensive magnitude” (DR: 231). This reduction of intensity to geometrical extension is confirmed in Longuenesse’s reading of Kant. Longuenesse suggests that Kant legitimately and transcendentally argues for pure intuition as a ‘primitive, undefinable quality’ which is a

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that’s the sort of miracle of knowledge” (Deleuze, 1978b).
\end{quote}
continuous and an infinite magnitude in which divisions can be iterated indefinitely and that is larger than any determinate spatial magnitude. However, she thinks Kant overstepped his transcendental argument when he suggested that the features of the pure intuition of space conform to Euclidean geometry (Longuenesse, 2000: 291). It is the reduction of intensity to this Euclidean extensity that Deleuze finds problematic in Kant’s notion of intensity.

Deleuze’s concern with extensity and intensity can seem somewhat arcane; however, by looking at a remark in Heidegger’s book on Kant, we can see that Deleuze is in fact taking up, in a complex way, the famous Heideggerian critique of the Cartesian *res extensa* and *universalis mathesis*. Kant’s extensive notion of space is clear in Heidegger’s reading, when he suggests that the nature of space as magnitude does not mean ‘such and such an extent,’ but rather “means extensiveness, which first makes such and such an extent (“quantities”) possible” (Heidegger, 1997: 32-3/46). Extensiveness is the nature of space itself, and it is this extensiveness that makes quantity possible, according to Heidegger; this is precisely the privilege of extensity in Kant that Deleuze wants to critique. Indeed, although Deleuze does not signal it explicitly himself, his concern with intensity is very close to Heidegger’s famous attempt to overcome the *res extensa* which reigned in philosophy from Descartes to Husserl. As Jacques Taminaux has pointed out, Husserl takes up a German tradition which makes of the body what Descartes had made of the mind, the “*res extensa*, which is offered *partes extra partes* to the resolutive-compositive method described in the *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* and in *The Discourse on Method*” (Taminaux, 2004: 12). Husserl’s notion of the body is part of the empiricist tradition beginning with Hobbes’s decision to

“discard the Cartesian dualism of two finite substances—*res cogitans* and *res extensa*—and to preserve one substance only, matter, and consequently to envisage the life of the mind as a
system of elements that are the subjective effects of material motions and that are themselves linked together by diverse motions” (Taminiaux, 2004: 12).

Jules Vuillemin, in the book which Deleuze praises so highly, makes a very similar point regarding Heidegger’s break with Husserl: Heidegger was breaking with the remnants of a conception of space which seemed to privilege geometric extensity, a remnant of Cartesian res extensa (Vuillemin, 1952: 229). Deleuze’s relation to this Heideggerian critique of extensity is clear, insofar as, for the former, extensive quantity always covers over and cancels out a more fundamental ‘intensive’ quantity which characterizes the ‘depths’ of space. Thus, when Kant privileges extensity over intensity, he fundamentally distorts the nature of the latter.

Deleuze’s critique of the privilege of extensity in Kant is not only indebted to the Heideggerian critique of Cartesian res extensa but is also closely connected to Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the Cartesian thought of the body partes exta partes. As Jenny Slatman has described it, for Merleau-Ponty the Cartesian model leads to the representation of a space “without hiding places” in which things exist “partes extra partes” (Slatman, 2010: 204). Merleau-Ponty’s critique of this model is also an attempt to move beyond certain residues of Cartesianism in Husserl; as Tamineaux has suggested, “Descartes’ distinction” is “between the body as a selfless entity submitted partes extra partes to an endless exteriority and the cogito as an entity essentially present to itself, whatever the diversity of its cogitata” (Tamineaux, 2004: 18). Tamineaux sees in Husserl’s sixth Cartesian Meditation the remnants of such a partes extra partes notion of the body insofar as sensible intuition is said to be governed by the dispersion of an a posteriori reception of a “hyletic flow of sense-data” which differs radically from the meaning-bestowing categorial intuition (18). This extra notion of space which is a selfless and endlessly exterior entity is also the mode of space Deleuze is critiquing in Kant. Furthermore,
Deleuze’s own privileging of intensity will be similar to Merleau-Ponty’s “iconic” space in which things “encroach upon each other” (Merleau-Ponty, 1971: 173). However, there will be important differences, as we will come to see.

We can summarize the difference between Deleuze and Kant on intensity as follows: Kant argues for the intensive nature of reality in order to account for the formal ‘unity’ of time, a unity which is extensive and geometrical; Deleuze, on the other hand, will argue for the intensive nature of space on almost the opposite grounds, using it to account for the fact that we never actually reach a perceptual state which is homogeneously and finally extensive and geometrical. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, this argument accounting for the lack of a homogeneously extensive field is phrased in terms of the post-Kantian problem of the ‘reproduction of diversity.’ We will discuss this problem further below, in relation to the agreement of the diversity of intuition with the unity of apperception.

Deleuze’s critique of Kant on intensity is illuminated by examining the relation between intensity and extensity in Plato. Whereas Kant sees intensity as merely filling extensity, in Plato’s Timeus Deleuze finds extensity as merely an equalization of the divisible; the divisible only forms a ‘nature in itself’ by first of all including the unequal (intensity) (DR: 238): “the divisible is defined as that which bears in itself the unequal” (233). It is only “the indivisible (the Same or the One)” which seeks to impose an equality upon the divisible (233). This equalization by the Same or the One occurs when God equalizes the divisible in an “extension” which is “the extension of the Soul of the world.” However, what Deleuze always highlight in Plato is that the threat of difference is never fully neutralized by identity; in this case, the deepest layer of the divisible, “the unequal still rumbles in intensity. This is of little consequence to God, for he fills the entire expanse of the soul with the extensity of bodies and their qualities. He covers
everything. Nevertheless, he dances upon a volcano.” (233-4). The problem with Kant’s notion of extensity is that there is no insinuation of the threat of differential intensity: Kantian extensity does not ‘dance upon a volcano,’ but is merely filled with the intensive which is only justified by the unity of pure intuition which is extensive in nature.

Interestingly, several aspects of Kant’s notion of intensive magnitude find direct resonance in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Joe Hughes has made a similar connection between intensity in Kant and *Anti-Oedipus*, writing:

“The same notions are at work in both the Deleuzian and Kantian systems, but with one major qualification. Kant moves from the pure forms of time and space as intensity = 0 to the material real of sensation which fills the forms of intuition to varying degrees. But Deleuze and Guattari, it would seem, begin with the material real: the body without organs (Hughes, 2011: 76).

Hughes here confirms the difference between Kant and Deleuze that we have already seen: Deleuze wants intensity to be prior to extensity. Beyond Hughes’ general comparison of the notion of intensity, however, we see, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, a remarkable resemblance between Kant’s notion of intensive magnitude and Deleuze and Guattari’s famous claim that matter is ‘intense.’ Deleuze and Guattari describe this matter as “more immediate, more fluid, and more ardent than bodies or words” (ATP: 109). The immediacy of this matter is Kantian insofar as it is ‘anticipated’ prior to all perception of individuated ‘bodies’ as objects; its fluidity is Kantian insofar as Kant describes intensive magnitudes as ‘fluid’ or ‘fluxing’ magnitudes. An important aspect of intense matter, for Deleuze and Guattari, is ‘continuous variation:’ precisely the characteristic Kant is looking for in order to show how appearances might be able to fit into the unity of time without implying any instants or ‘gaps.’ This continuous variation, Deleuze and
Guattari say, is the “absolute deterritorialization” of the plane of consistency; absolute, here, they tell us, does not mean undifferentiated. Deleuze, in *Difference and Repetition*, critiqued Schelling, Schopenhauer and early Nietzsche for thinking absolute groundlessness as lacking in differences. Instead, the “absolute” nature of continuous variation implies ‘infinitely small’ differences “constituted in a single matter,” “a single liberated matter that contains no figures, is deliberately unformed.” This is Kantian insofar as Kant refers to differential calculus to think the infinitely small in intensive magnitudes that would be irreducible to a ‘now’ point or a break in continuity. This continuity without breaks must surely be why Deleuze and Guattari can say that intensive matter serves as “content” for a ‘limitless’ corporeality. Thus, Kant and Deleuze and Guattari have notions of intensity which imply the following: continuity, variation, limitlessness, lack of individual borders, infinitesimally differential quantities, fluxing temporality.

5. **Deleuze’s transcendental argument for force or intensity: not a description of ‘real’ bodies or things in themselves**

The Post-Kantian problem of synthesis is, according to Deleuze, the ‘reproduction of diversity;’ he responds to that problem by reversing Kant’s notion of intensity. Instead of asking, like Kant, how is the continuity of the unity of time possible? Deleuze asks: qualities in themselves would tend to a final homogenous state, and yet we continually perceive a

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189 Deleuze and Guattari also say intensity serves as the incorporeal power for expression; this incorporeal nature of matter goes beyond our discussion of Kant, and will have to do with the ‘placing in variation’ of the variables of language. This will only be accounted for in relation to thought and art: as Deleuze and Guattari even say here, “Gestures and things, voices and sounds, are caught up in the same "opera," swept away by the same shifting effects of stammering, vibrato, tremolo, and overspilling” (ATP: 109). The ‘double’ nature of intensive matter here will have to do with the double nature of the eternal return, which turns out to be ‘one;’ the oneness occurs in the specific thought which makes intensive materiality return, as opposed to covering it over, which is the activity of nihilism or representation.
differentiation of qualities which never ends; how is this continual differentiation of qualities possible? As he puts it in the Nietzsche book: how is the reproduction of diversity possible?

How is it that diversity is reproduced? The dominant reading of Deleuze claims that difference is the nature of real entities, independent of human consciousness; I will be challenging this dominant reading. One inflection of the dominant reading is that philosophy must carry out a genesis, returning to the origin of human consciousness in these entities which are like real and material fluxes of difference, without any identity.\textsuperscript{190} Another way the dominant reading manifests itself is by suggesting we should carry out experiments to show that ‘difference’ is the characteristic of real entities.\textsuperscript{191} The dominant reading of ‘differing things in themselves’ has at least four main justifications: the origin-genesis philosophical justification; the efficient, scientific justification; the political-subjective difference justification; the ‘metaphysics of contemporary art and science’ justification. I suggest all are mistaken because they do not provide adequate justification for how we know that things in themselves are really ‘differing.’ I suggest that we cannot know difference as difference in the way we know empirical things: Deleuze’s argument for difference is a transcendental argument about the conditions of perception.

We will now give a brief summary of Deleuze’s reinterpretation of Kantian intensity to show how he does not posit difference as a pre-critical ‘thing in itself.’ Deleuze retains Kant’s notion that intensity is a continuous variation of greater and lesser quantity, but he no longer says that this is the mere ‘filling’ of an appearing object which resembles other appearances because they are fundamentally parts of a geometrical and extensive space. Instead, the fluctuating matter of appearances is primary because it prevents the resemblances between sensible qualities from

\textsuperscript{190} This would include readers such as Joe Hughes and Henry Somers-Hall.
\textsuperscript{191} This would be the reading of Manuel de Landa and Miguel de Beistegui.
ever reaching the ideal point of finished, unchanging order. Deleuze builds on Kant’s point that appearances always have a kind of fluctuation because of the continuous temporality of intuitions; however, he says that this very point undermines Kant’s claims that space is fundamentally extended and geometrical. The problem is one of teleology. If space was really extended and geometrical, then we would have to, at some point, come to experience that extended space in a finished state. Kant can point to teleology to say: well, the finished state of perfectly extended space is like a regulative ideal. Through Nietzsche, Deleuze says: given that time is infinite, if such a regulative ideal is possible, it would have occurred by now. But, given that the present is in a state of passage and variation as opposed to a finished order of resemblances, we have to say that such passage and variation is irreducible; it is not a merely accidental state which will one day be overcome. Now the problem is reversed: yes, Deleuze agree that there is a tendency towards an ordered and extended space of resemblances between appearances. However, this tendency never reaches a finished state. The principle of intensity is the ‘reason’ or condition of this lack of completion in the order of sensible qualities. It is not something we directly perceive; it is the ‘reason’ of variation in the order of sensible qualities. The primacy of resemblance and variation is reversed by Deleuze: variation is the condition of resemblance, as opposed to resemblance being the foundation of intensive variation. This shows that intensity in Deleuze is precisely not ‘how things really are’ independent of all human consciousness, as it is often taken. Rather, it is the transcendental condition of the variation of qualities as sensed by the thinking human subject.

Deleuze’s argument for intensity does not presuppose that we have divine access to the pure flux of matter in itself, as the dominant reading implies; rather, Deleuze begins from our everyday world of perception and the objects that resemble one another within it. Our perception
of objects relies on there being resemblances between the qualities we sense in different objects. For example, the color green in one object must resemble the color green in another object; this is a fundamental ‘order of resemblances’ which is key to perception. Deleuze thinks that this order of resemblances has been underestimated, and we have overestimated their differences: “qualities have much more stability, immobility and generality than is often admitted. They are orders of resemblance” (DR: 238). Differences of quality are not fundamental to the world of perception; they lie within a more fundamental order of resemblance which allows us to compare objects with one another. The sensible qualities of objects fill an extensity; extensity implies a quantitative destination or final homogenization such that objects can resemble other objects in perception (239). Such a finality of perception is not an error, as some readers of Deleuze suggest; this is not a temporary and erroneous state caused by representational thought that just needs to unpicked in order to return to the real fluxes of matter independent of human errors. This finality is the “extensive quantity,” the res extensa inherent in spatial perception that indicates “quantitative destination or finality” (DR: 232). The question will be: how come this extensive space never reaches an absolutely geometrical finality?

Deleuze’s notion of differences of intensity is not a description of matter in itself; it is the transcendental condition for the variation of any order of resemblance within perception. Transcendental difference is necessary to explain why the tendency towards perceptual finality exists at the same time as the differentiation of the perceptual world of extensive qualities that never reaches a state of finality.193 We do not know this difference; what we do know is that

192 This is not an explicit argument in Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche, but it is the only way of justifying his arguments about force and the body. It is almost made explicit in Deleuze’s reading of ‘becoming’ in Nietzsche, in which he emphasizes that the world of force has not reached an equilibrium state. The concept of force is meant to account for the fact that the world has not reached an equilibrium state. This is a precursor of the argument about the condition of possibility of differentiation within perception in Difference and Repetition.
193 Levi Bryant has made a similar point, that Deleuze’s notion of intensity seeks to account for the ‘genesis’ of discontinuous spaces; however, Bryant’s notion of genesis is misleading in that it implies genesis in some really
there is a “passage” from one order of sensible qualities which to another order. In the passage between perceptual orders, a non-qualitative difference intervenes. We do not know that which is ‘behind’ the passage; all we know is that it produces “shocks of difference, distances, a whole play of conjunctions and disjunctions, a whole depth” (DR: 238). Depth is always the depth of a surface, implying that difference is not a set of entities independent of superficial human perceptions; difference is a transcendental condition, the depth of the surface. Shock can only occur to that which tends towards calm homogeneity: difference as shock is the condition for the variation of perceptual resemblances. Without the non-qualitative differences of intensity underlying qualitative difference, the movement from one quality to another would just be a process of “uniformization” resulting in the death of all differences of quality, because qualities only exist within orders of resemblance.

We can see how the problem of transcendental difference plays out in Nietzsche by looking at Richardson’s interpretation. Richardson is concerned, like us, with a system of resemblances and its variation. Firstly, he emphasizes that Nietzsche’s conception of forces means that a change in a ‘part’ can change the ‘whole;’ this “precise shade” of green can cause a change in the ‘whole’ of the perception of an apple (Richardson, 1996: 87). The ‘whole’ perception of the apple described by Richardson is, in the language of Difference and Repetition, the order of resemblances for sensible qualities: each quality of the apple must partake in an existing ‘object’ which could be conceptualized; in truth, Deleuze’s argument is more transcendental, and that is why Deleuze speaks of “transcendental sensibility” as opposed to ‘genetic’ sensibility. The relevant passage in Bryant is as follows: “Here we also see a critique of Kant implicitly unfolding. Rather than treating space as a homogeneous field of a priori intuition, Deleuze seeks to account for the genesis of spaces or extensities that are discontinuous with one another.” (Bryant, 2008: 224).

194 This experience of ‘shock’ is what Derrida calls an intuition of the indefiniteness of the totality of time. We can never, in the empirical and lived present, have an actual intuition of the totality of time, just as we can never have an empirical sensation of the condition of variation of the order of sensation; it is what Derrida calls the “inaccessible limit to every intuition.” However, despite being inaccessible, we do experience shocks which alert us in an indeterminate way to the totality of time, or the differential variation which conditions every present. As Derrida puts it, writing against Heidegger, there is never a pure experience of originary temporality, only an eternally
order of resemblances with all the other qualities of the apple. In Richardson’s language, a change in a ‘part’ of the apple, in one precise shade of green, can cause a change in the whole; in Deleuze’s words, in the order of resemblance which structures the qualities of the apple. The order of resemblances which unite the sensible qualities of the apple never reaches the state of a homogeneous or final system of resemblances within perception; we never ‘see’ the apple as “the” perfect, finished apple. The reason for this change in the whole order of qualitative resemblances is what Richardson calls force; Deleuze calls it intensity in *Difference and Repetition*.

As a ‘transcendental sensibility,’ we can never have an empirical sensation of intensity: intensity is the very condition of possibility of differentiation between orders of resemblance within empirical sensation. Deleuze justifies his notion of intensity by asking a transcendental question: what is the necessary condition of the differentiation of qualities and extensities within perception? The transcendental aspect of the argument is often overlooked, but it is absolutely necessary because *empirically*, Deleuze continually emphasizes, *we cannot have any perception or sensation of intensity*. We can only posit intensity as a transcendentally necessary condition. At the same time, intensity is not merely an abstraction or condition, just as space and time are conditions but are not concepts in Kant. Just as for Kant, space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition *which are also themselves intuitions*, Deleuze thinks that intensity is the *transcendental condition* of all sensibility and thus *cannot* itself be empirically sensed. And yet, intensity is also that which *can only be sensed*. This paradoxical position of intensity is why Deleuze uses the concept of depth to discuss it: intensity is always there *behind* or covered up by every sensation, recurring movement towards that originary temporality. In Deleuzian terms, the differential variability of intensity is empirical *imperceptible*, and yet at the same time is that which *must* be sensed. Cf. Lawlor, 2004: 85.
like the ‘depth’ of every perception. We can now understand why Deleuze uses the strange notion of “transcendental sensibility:” he wants to account for the condition of possibility of sensibility. He accounts for sensibility not by moving to a transcendental unity of apperception as in Kant, but rather by positing a differentiation which lies within the intensity which is concealed beneath every sensation.

We can now understand Deleuze’s famous notion of difference more precisely. He tells us that difference is not that which is ‘sensed’ but that which ‘gives’ and ‘creates’ diversity “to be sensed” (DR: 227). Difference in itself is intensity, which makes possible the diversity that is given to sensation and which itself accounts for the differentiation of qualities in the perceptual world. In his 1978 lectures, Deleuze emphasizes the ‘diversity’ of intuition in Kant against the ‘unity’ of the concept, and thus we can say that intensity conceived as the giving of diversity, in Difference and Repetition, is Deleuze’s radicalization of the sensibility in Kant (DR: 226-7). Difference is the “absolutely different from thought” which nevertheless “gives” to be thought (227). The Heideggerian tone Deleuze uses here is not accidental: he echoes Heidegger’s claim that what is most worthy of thought is precisely the givenness of affection in Kant’s thesis on being, the ‘giving’ of receptivity. Thus, we can see that Deleuze’s concept of difference is certainly not a pre-critical ontology of how ‘things in themselves’ materially are; rather, it is a transcendental concept related to the possibility of givenness that differentiates itself over time rather than stabilizing itself in a final system of extensive space.

In Richardson’s reading of Nietzsche, we see how easy it is to mistake intensity for the ‘extensity’ through which we perceive sensible objects. Richardson accepts many of Nietzsche’s

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195 Deleuze talks about sensory distortion as a way of grasping intensity independently of sensible qualities in extended space: certain drug and physical experiences such as vertigo: “the harrowing character of intensity, however weak, restores its true meaning: not the anticipation of perception but the proper limit of sensibility from the point of view of a transcendent exercise” (DR: 327).
individual arguments about becoming and the continuum that prevents boundaries being draw
around beings. However, he says that he cannot accept Nietzsche’s arguments taken as a whole,
because, despite the ‘imprecise’ borders between beings, he thinks that we can still allow that
there are ‘conceptual’ types with ‘clear’ cases. Thus, for Richardson, “the things of our everyday
views [...] exist and endure,” and we can allow for Nietzsche’s arguments just by including the
imprecision of borders into our view of ‘things’ (Richardson, 1994: 99). Richardson is attentive,
here, to many of the ambiguities in post-Kantian philosophy that Deleuze wants to bring out and
contest: what Kant and those after him tend to do is make intensity merely something
‘secondary’ to extensity. They do not deny intensity, but they relegate it to a position in which it
merely ‘fills’ out a more fundamental account of extensive quantities and the qualities of things.

But, for Deleuze, despite the post-Kantian push to emphasize the ‘differentiation’ of sensible
qualities, which is the direction in which Richardson is heading, what is missed is that sensible
qualities rely on an order of resemblances which refer to the system of the I and the self of the
being which is ‘sensing.’ This order of resemblances of sensible qualities cannot, in itself,
account for the continual differentiation of qualities, or for the imprecise borders between things
as Richardson puts it; therefore, we have to posit that there is a more fundamental process of
pure differentiation, which is why he makes intensive quantities primary to the extensive realm
of empirical sensibility. In short, Deleuze is not at all saying that Richardson and the post-
Kantian focus on the differentiation of qualities is wrong; on the contrary, he is revealing the
condition of possibility of the very differentiation of qualities they highlight.
6. The variation of force as the world-artist in *The Birth of Tragedy*

Deleuze’s transcendental argument for intensive difference plays out in Nietzsche’s early work, *The Birth of Tragedy*. In particular, we will now examine one of the more controversial and seemingly untenable concepts in Nietzsche’s work: the idea that nature is a ‘world-artist.’ Even defenders of Nietzsche have suggested that this is just fantastical speculation. However, there is a rigorous transcendental argument for the world-artist that is meant to resolve certain problems in the Kantian and Schopenhauerian ways of thinking about will.

A major philosophical problem, prior to Nietzsche, is: how does the will, which is interior and non-sensible, come to have an effect in sensible reality, given that the supersensible is *not identical* with the sensible?\(^{196}\) In Kant, this is the sensible expression of the supersensible law: the ‘freedom’ of the will consists in the fact that an effect is *caused* from outside the series of natural causes in the world. However, this free cause poses a new problem: how can such a freely caused effect be manifested? The third *Critique* investigates this problem: how can the supersensible Ideas of practical reason can ever be presented in sensible nature? The ‘perfect’ mode of presentation is the human being as the ‘end’ of nature; however, this seems to pose the problem even more intensely: where do we find the human being as pure end in itself? Kant is lead to invent a ‘universal history’ which discovers signs of the self-legislating end of existence in certain forms of political constitution. The perfect republican state is how the free will manifests itself in sensible nature. Schopenhauer asks a similar question: why is it that the will, which is pure unity, moves outside of itself to the plurality of individuals in the world of representation? This expression of the will in the objective world is the fundamental

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\(^{196}\) Leibniz employs the notion of force to solve precisely this problem: how do the monads (wills) express themselves within the extensive space?
contradiction of existence, and thus it cannot be ‘reasoned’ about; all we can do is tranquilize the will by turning it against itself. Art and philosophy achieve this tranquilization.

Nietzsche solves the problem of the manifestation of the will in a different way to Schopenhauer and Kant. He does not resort to seeing the signs, in universal history, of the emergence of a perfectly rational republic; nor does he resort to the self-tranquilization of the will in art and philosophy. Instead, he remains with the world of appearances as closely as possible in order to find its ‘condition.’ Nietzsche begins with the world of appearance insofar as it appears.\footnote{197} The shadow world of partially intelligible forms and images finds a pure expression in Apollo’s world of dreams, in which limited individual forms are pure. Nietzsche asks a similar question to Deleuze: yes, there is a tendency to purely limited forms in the shadow-world of empirical experience and yet somehow, that ‘shadow’ world, and even the Apollinian world of pure form, undergoes variation or productive generation. How is it that these two worlds of appearance still undergo variation, even though they tend towards the purely limited, finished forms of the dream? Nietzsche posits that this ‘variation’ must have its own principle; this is not to go ‘beyond’ appearances, but is to posit the condition of variation of appearances as its own transcendental principle. This is what Nietzsche calls the “world-artist.” The world-artist does not exist like a pre-Kantian principle of divine unity beyond the confused perception of sensible reality.\footnote{198} The world-artist is, rather, the mere condition of the variation of appearances; in a sense, it plays a very limited role: it does not dictate the ‘content’ of appearances; it merely gives us the reason for their variation or ‘generation.’ This solves the problem of Schopenhauer’s

\footnote{197} this is the partially intelligible world of shadows in \textit{The Birth of Tragedy}.\footnote{198} Kant himself ends up posting a divine will which created the world, at the end of the third critique. This divine will is not a thing in itself which could be known; it is a regulative Idea which acts as a condition which is no wider than what it conditions. The divine intentionality is meant to be a condition which guarantees that the Ideas of practical reason (will) can possibly be manifested in sensible nature. The world-artist in Nietzsche’s fulfills a similar function: it is not like a being or a human being which exists ‘behind’ appearances. It is a condition which accounts for the variation of appearances.
philosophy in a very new way: Schopenhauer just had to say that there was a contradiction between the will and its various modes of objective representation; thus, all we can do is tranquilize the will to prevent its objectification. Nietzsche’s break with Schopenhauer lies in the ‘artistic’ property he gives to the will: this allows him to account for the variation of appearances in a way which was a source of constant pain for Schopenhauer. The latter could only envisage tranquilization as the ultimate aim of existence; for Nietzsche, art is no longer about tranquilization: the will is itself generative and ‘artistic.’ The highest forms of human creation allow us to ‘repeat’ the activity of the will within the world of representation. This is unthinkable to Schopenhauer, for whom the will is the mere striving force of desire that constitutively lacks any objective satisfaction, and thus is not ‘generative’ or ‘artistic’ in the way it is for Nietzsche. So, by thinking will as nothing more than the condition of variation of appearances, Nietzsche resolves the problem of how the unpresentable will can be presented within sensible appearances which had haunted both Kant and Schopenhauer. It is this argument from variation which Deleuze uses to read Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘becoming’ of the body that he takes up in his own concept of intensity.

7. Conclusion

The account of the variation of the order of appearance helps to see how Deleuze’s account differs from Heidegger’s. Heidegger suggests that Nietzsche maintains an overly rigid relation of negation between the ‘non-human’ will and the anthropomorphic world of representation. Thus, for Heidegger, he remains tied to the oppositional dualisms of Kant, Schopenhauer and Schelling. However, the conception of the will as ‘world-artist’ precisely is

199 Although Nietzsche, famously, criticizes his early book for being expressed in a manner which was too Kantian and Schopenhauerian, we can, here, say
meant to overcome such rigid oppositionality: the will is nothing ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ of appearances; it is nothing more than the condition of their variation and generation. The world-artist is not ‘opposed’ to the world of appearance: it is the principle of their re-creation in every moment. The generative movement of the world artist itself produces the Socratic moment of modernity in which life is opposed to a higher idea. Heidegger criticizes Nietzsche for being unable to think the production of the opposition of the sensible and the supersensible; however, this is precisely what we see in the notion of the world-artist. This productive differentiation is what Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche brings out.\textsuperscript{200} The next chapter will examine the reading of Nietzsche on the body that this productive difference opens up for Deleuze.

At the beginning of the chapter, we saw how Kant opens up a way of thinking that which is irreducibly outside of thought for Deleuze and Heidegger. While Heidegger critiques Kant’s notion of ‘reality’ for relying on the model of objectively present beings, Deleuze finds a non-objective conception of reality in Kant’s thought of intensive magnitude. This is a continuously varying flux of the matter of appearances, which can be known \textit{a priori} and yet does not claim to be a knowing of things in themselves. Deleuze takes up this \textit{a priori} intensity of matter as the condition for the variation of the order resemblances which ground our perception of objects. Deleuzian intensive difference is therefore not a description of real beings as they are independent of human consciousness, as it is often read. Instead, it is a way of explaining that perceptual objects have a tendency towards a uniform ordering in space, and yet they never reach that uniformity. As such, we can never empirically know or sense intensity, for Deleuze, but we \textit{must} transcendentally posit it as the condition of variation of orders of perception. We saw how this notion of transcendental condition helps to explain why Nietzsche’s ‘world-artist’ is not a

\textsuperscript{200} Heidegger downplays the theme of productivity in favor of Nietzsche’s more polemical, later writings where there seems to be a more extreme division between the chaotic, non-human body and the human world of knowledge.
bizarre fiction of how things really are, but a rigorously constructed response to the problem of
the variation of worlds of appearance. The next chapter will elucidate the details of how Deleuze
reads Nietzsche’s notion of the body in the light of our Kantian findings.
Chapter 4

The body as differential and exterior condition of thinking: undoing the dogmatic materialist interpretation of Deleuze’s Nietzsche

Typically, Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is understood as an ontology of chaotic, affective forces of the living body; those forces are said to be the ‘genesis’ or origin of consciousness and thought. This chapter will problematize this common dogmatic materialist interpretation, suggesting that instead of origin and genesis, the body is in an irreducible combat with thought such that the body remains exterior and different. The upshot of this is that thought does not find its genesis or origin in its outside; instead, thought has a relation to its outside that is in fact at the heart of thought itself, such that the genesis of thought is a specific act of thinking. The new image of thought will be explored in the following chapter. In the sense that thinking, for Deleuze, does not come from sensation, the present chapter is deflationary: it shows that the dogmatic materialist reading has taken the traditional conception of empiricism and applied it to Deleuze, therefore overemphasizing the themes of affect and force in his philosophy. The role of this chapter, then, is to offer a corrective to the common misconception by re-establishing the proper context of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, specifically looking at the role of the body in nineteenth century philosophy. By doing this, we will understand the true aim of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche on the body that is not to demonstrate the genesis of thinking but rather to combat the notion of the body as undifferentiated and therefore susceptible to the determinations of thinking. In this way, we will show that the key concepts of the body are not genesis and origin but rather violent affect, difference and exteriority in relation to thought.

To illustrate the purpose of this chapter, we can examine a comment Deleuze makes in a 1957 lecture course; he says:
“Does not every ground lead to an unexpected surprise? Does the ground not lead to something we did not expect? The search for the ground thus brings us something else than what was expected. We can call this surprise or deception” (Deleuze 2015a: 41).

The point of this chapter is to emphasize that the body in Nietzsche is just surprise or deception, it is not the act of grounding. Reading Deleuze’s Nietzsche as a thinker of ‘forces’ alone does not solve the central problem of philosophy, which is the problem of grounding. Instead, what is required is a notion of grounding that itself includes its own surprise deception within itself; that will be the task of the chapter following this one. Instead, the present chapter deals with the deceptive surprise of the body relative to the act of grounding: exterior to and different from that act, but not its genesis or origin.

The chapter begins by examining the conception of the body as undifferentiated that Nietzsche overcomes according to Deleuze. We see a paradigm of this in Kant’s notion of sensibility as indeterminate and we examine the legacy of this indifference in the abyssal depths of Nature in Schelling, Schopenhauer and the early Nietzsche. Marx sits both within and without of this tradition, and is thus a useful midway point to seeing the radical invention of Nietzsche. Althusser exposes these two sides of Marx: firstly, the atomic, contingent encounter and secondly, the Revolution that ends history. One reading of Nietzsche emphasizes a violent struggle undertaken by an ordering and internalizing power against the indifference of bodies that resist that ordering. Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche on the body is directed against this classical political model of oppositional struggle; instead, a fragmenting ‘combat-between’ is the new model of the body that Deleuze finds in Nietzsche.

‘Betweenness’ is what characterizes the importance of affect for Deleuze’s Nietzsche, and thus we move from combat-between to active affect of the body. For Heidegger the Nietzschean
affect is ‘between’ the self that is carried over beyond itself into its place among beings, in a kind of *philia* between the human being and its world. Deleuze, on the hand, emphasizes the combative nature of the affective between: we are shocked and shaken out of our selves by the multiplicity of the senses that cannot be mastered by thought. The senses become ‘active’ in this shock, but not by joining the self with its world; rather, they shockingly and surprisingly liberate themselves from the directives of the world and its conscious purposes. The body becomes active only insofar as the flesh falls from the ordering principle of the bones. Heidegger’s reading of affect as a joining of self and world mirrors Derrida’s privilege of the Cartesian dream that pins itself to present perception. Deleuze’s focus on the shocking fall away of the flesh, on the other hand, mirrors the Cartesian madness in which the affective body *resists* the rationality of the subject secured through the example of dreaming. This affective resistance transforms and deforms present perception, opening up an other scene.

Deleuze’s violent and combative notion in which affect tears us away from the world develops the *difference* between the self and its world as opposed to joining them. This leads us to the fundamental concept of the body as field of forces that are eternally differing from themselves and from any rule of thought.

1. **The context for Nietzsche’s novelty in thinking the body: the sensible as indeterminate and undifferentiated**

Our re-reading of Deleuze’s Nietzsche involves moving away from the dogmatic materialist reading of the body as an ontology of forces from which all other phenomena emerge. In order to show the significance of the body in Deleuze’s Nietzsche, we must establish the notion of the body he overcomes: the body as indeterminate and undifferentiated. The next
section will lay out that polemical context, taking Kant as an exemplary thinker of the
indeterminate nature of sensation and then examining the rethinking of indifference as the
undifferentiated abyss in Schelling and Nietzsche.

The importance, for Deleuze, of Nietzsche’s notion of differential force lies in moving
away from conceiving the material depths as a primordial unity or undifferentiated abyss which
would be reducible to conceptual differences. An undifferentiated abyss is like a state of the
world where all qualities would be undifferentiated, and Deleuze tells us this would be
“identity,” a “position of equilibrium,” and a return of the same, the similar or the equal.
Philosophically, this identity of an undifferentiated abyss is used to represent ‘groundlessness’ in
philosophers such as Leibniz and Hegel, what Deleuze calls philosophers of ‘infinite
representation’. However, in these philosophies the undifferentiated abyss becomes a “universal”
lack of difference and an “indifferent black nothingness” or an “indeterminate animal in which
everything is dissolved” (DR: 299, 28). This “indifference of space and time” is what the
differences between objects fall into when they are represented by the same concept (24). The
purely indeterminate “remains below” concepts and therefore can never ‘rise’ up and rupture
them (28). An undifferentiated abyss is, furthermore, unable to account for the differentiation of
qualities within perception: the undifferentiated remains a type of homogenized stasis. Derrida
agrees that the philosophy of indifference is the primary context for Nietzsche’s thought, which
is, he says, a critique of philosophy as “active indifference to difference;” this indifference
implies the repression of difference. (Derrida, 1985: 17, emphasis added).

Heidegger is also worried about the problem of indifference. For him, chaos should not
be mere lack of order. He sees in both Kant and Nietzsche conceptions of the sensible as chaotic
that retain a certain kind of order irreducible to the order of knowledge (N3: 78). The order of the
turmoil of sensations would, in Deleuze’s terms, be called the *differentiation* irreducible to the conceptual. However, Heidegger thinks that both Kant and Nietzsche fail to truly think the ‘order’ of chaotic sensation; instead, they revert back to seeing it as a negative, as a lack of order relative to conceptual knowledge. Thus, they remain in the dominant tradition of Western philosophy. Deleuze will agree with Heidegger about Kant, but not about Nietzsche. We can now turn to the indifference of sensation in Kant.

Thinking sensation as ‘undifferentiated’ allows for concepts to be imposed upon indifference, as the only source of order; this betrays what Deleuze sees as a key Kantian finding: spatio-temporal determinations are *irreducible* to conceptual determinations[^1]. The irreducibility of the spatio-temporal to the conceptual is what drives his reading of differential forces in Nietzsche: these forces are *in principle* irreducible to conceptual differences and to any perceptive quality that would homogenize the field of perception and make it, in principle, subsumable under concepts. Deleuze’s attempt to keep open the Kantian gap between concepts and sensation also motivates his critique of phenomenology. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty suggest that, beyond the given opposition between consciousness and its object, there is not intentionality; beneath this distinction lies Being or flesh. Being or flesh are a non-conscious way of ‘gathering’ the world and knowledge or consciousness; for example, Heidegger’s event of appropriation in which man and Being are given to one another in their belonging together. This is no longer intentional consciousness, and yet it is a bridging of the Kantian gap between the conceptual and the sensual. For Deleuze, the only ‘unity’ will be a movement of infinite deferral and delay between the two. Despite asserting the difference in nature between the sensibility and the understanding, Kant himself constructs a system to bridge that difference in a new way. One
way he bridges the gap between sensation and concept is the undifferentiated nature of sensation, to which we must now turn.

Although Deleuze finds resources in Kant’s notion of intensive magnitude for thinking an irreducible difference which remains outside of thought, the sensations of the Kantian subject fall into the tradition he sees Nietzsche as moving beyond. The problem with empirical sensation in Kant is that it is indeterminate; sensations require synthesis with a concept to gain determinacy. Prior to being taken as a manifold, there is only a “qualitative manifold” which is present in an “undifferentiated” way in what Kant calls the synopsis of our sensible intuition (Longuenesse, 2000: 37). Longuenesse says the importance of the undifferentiated and indeterminate nature of sensation is to avoid thinking of the immediate given as a collection of sensory atoms. For Kant, sensation is indeterminate in that it is not atomic; however, this is the dichotomy that Deleuze thinks Nietzsche will overcome: there is a kind of differentiation which relies neither upon conceptual determination nor atomic materiality. Kant remains with the tradition of philosophers who conceive that which is outside of the concept in negative terms, with a focus on indeterminacy and a lack of differentiation. Despite Deleuze finding resources for thinking difference in Kant, the latter ultimately believes there is never a true “diversity” within sensation, in the strong sense that Deleuze is looking for. Instead of diversity, there is only

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201 In his courses from 1978 and 1980, Deleuze is constantly concerned to highlight how Leibniz thinks that spatio-temporal determinations are reducible to conceptual determinations, but that what marks out Kant’s distinctive contribution is to show that they are irreducible to one another.

202 As Longuenesse puts it, “what Kant considers as immediately given is not a manifold of sensory atoms, but indeterminate empirical intuitions” (Longuenesse, 37).

203 German Idealist philosophers tend to follow the duality of Kant here, implying that being can either be conceptually determined or radically indeterminate nothingness. We will see this in the case of Schelling in more depth: the duality of indeterminate productivity and determinate products.

204 The resources for thinking diversity lie in the forms of space and time; as Longuenesse points out, there is a “more fundamental manifold, a "pure form" of manifoldness” lying in the forms of space and time (Longuenesse, 38).
indeterminacy; what Deleuze wants is a strong diversity, a mode of differentiation which is not merely indifference or indeterminateness.

Nietzsche is important for Deleuze because he does not conceive Nature as sheer indifference, like a night in which all the cows are black; Schelling is an important member of this tradition. Nature, for Schelling, is an “original diremption” or antithesis between a process of infinite productivity and a limiting ’product.’ (Schelling 2004: 6: IV, 288). The infinite productivity, in a pure state, completely lacks determination: nothing is distinguishable and all limiting ‘products’ are dissolved and indivisible within it (6: IV, 289). As lacking in determination and dissolving all limitation, Nature is “one” process of which the individual ‘products’ are fragments (5: 281). Nature in its absolute unlimitedness is being ‘itself’ as opposed to any individual being: the ‘parts’ of this indifferent process of Nature are not really distinguishable; they are more like forces of acting, so Schelling calls them called ‘intensities.’

For Deleuze, Schelling’s productive process of Nature which lacks limiting determination or distinction is the “ultimate, external illusion of representation,” that Nietzsche will break with (DR: 277). The lack of difference in groundlessness is the ultimate ‘illusion’ of representation

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205 The original antithesis never itself appears as a product or phenomenon.
206 Originally, in Nature there is nothing distinguishable; all products are, so to speak, still in solution and indivisible in the universal productivity. It is only when retarding points are given that they are thrown off and advance out of the universal identity” (6, IV, 289).
207 John Sallis has shown how Hegel’s notion of space as pure exteriority is also ‘indifferent’ insofar as it is an abstract container that is ‘filled’ with things (Sallis, Lecture “Outer Space,” Collegium Phenomenologicum, July 2017). It is this indifference of the containing space that Deleuze sees Nietzsche as going beyond.
208 Schelling also calls them ‘actants,’ to distinguish them from atoms. Deleuze’s notion of intensity is interesting because it is characterized by pure difference as opposed to Schellingian indifference.
209 For Schelling, one quality can only be ‘distinguished’ from another “in a third product” which the initial qualities continue to ‘form’ and ‘maintain’ (6, IV, 292).
210 Deleuze clearly has Hegel’s critique of Schelling in mind here; he writes “Hegel criticized Schelling for having surrounded himself with an indifferent night in which all cows are black.” (DR, 277). However, Deleuze also finds positive philosophical resources in Schelling: Deleuze writes:
because it means that the conceptual determinations can impose themselves upon indifference and claim this imposition as necessary. The necessity of the concept is justified by claiming concepts greater differentiation and determinateness to indeterminate being so that it does not exhaust itself in sheer nothingness. Without the ‘struggle’ of groundlessness with determinate or fixed forms, it would be reduced to “absolute formlessness” (Schelling, 2004: 301-2). Absolute formlessness is one of the ‘poles’ of the process of Nature, the other being determinate, fixed form. Heidegger will read Nietzsche in precisely these dualistic terms: overcoming/resistance, impermanence/permanence and so on.²¹¹ For Deleuze, Nietzsche will show that groundlessness already swarms with differences and does not require concepts to impose them (DR: 277). However, in his early work, Nietzsche does remain somewhat within the paradigm of Schopenhauer and Schelling; thus, we can now turn to this early thought of absolutely indifferent groundlessness.

The problem with Schelling, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy is that groundlessness lacks all individuality, singularity and ultimately difference (DR: 276). The Birth of Tragedy’s Schopenhauerian notion of a primordial unity of the depths is precisely the type of notion that the differentiating force of the will to power attempts overcome. As Deleuze writes in the Logic of Sense: “Always extraordinary are the moments in which philosophy makes the Abyss (Sans fond) speak and finds the mystical language of its wrath, its formlessness, and its

“of these two philosophers [Schelling and Hegel], it is Schelling who brings difference out of the night of the Identical, and with finer, more varied and more terrifying flashes of lightning than those of contradiction: with progressivity.” (190). This is the fact that the product in Schelling is a positive cancellation of productivity; anti-productivity is itself positively productive.

²¹¹ The necessity of a limited product in order to prevent pure productivity from exhausting itself is also analogous to Heidegger’s argument that life in Nietzsche is necessarily divided into a ‘overpowering’ and a fixity which resists that overpowering. Without a resisting fixity, overpowering would exhaust itself in pure annihilation.
blindness: Boehme, Schelling, Schopenhauer. Nietzsche was in the beginning one of them, a disciple of Schopenhauer, in *The Birth of Tragedy* he allowed the groundless Dionysus to speak, contrasting him to the divine individuation of Apollo, and to the human character of Socrates as well.” Contradiction and its resolution still dominates as the model of the *The Birth of Tragedy*: the groundless Dionysus in contradiction with the divine individuation of Apollo (NP: 11). The contradiction of the primal unity with its shattering individuation is badly resolved by Socrates, who flees into an Apolloian idea, but well resolved by the lyrical poet and possibly a future ‘musical Socrates,’ who provide a individuated vision of contradiction itself.

The undifferentiated conception of the body in the post-Kantian tradition is continued by Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*. For Deleuze, Nietzsche moves beyond that tradition by criticizing the unity of the will in Schopenhauer. On Deleuze’s brief reading of Schopenhauer, the will is identical in all its manifestations. When we realize that we, in our tragically shattered state, are one with this will, we are lead to deny the will. Denial of the will is the only resolution of the contradiction between individuation and the unitary will (NP: 7). By criticizing the necessary denial the unitary will, Nietzsche later discovers the world of singularities he calls the will to power (LS: 106-7).

2. Marx’s differentiated matter: the overpowering of the outside

Kant, Schelling and early Nietzsche have an undifferentiated notion of the body; Marx, on the other hand, thinks a ‘overpowering’ of the material that is irreducible to the enclosure of thinking, and points towards a philosophy of encounter between differentiated atoms. In the next section we will see how Deleuze reads Nietzschean bodily forces in the context of Marx, before turning to Althusser to clarify the material encounter in Marx.
Marx’s notion of materialism suggests a way of thinking materiality in a differentiated manner, a materiality that knowledge cannot take as an object without itself being threatened by transformation. Discussing Nietzsche’s notion of bodily force in Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze explicitly relates it to Marx’s early dissertation on atomism (NP: 6). He cites Marx’s claim that ‘atoms’ can only relate to other atoms, and they have no other object than themselves; there is no possible ‘being at home in the other.’ This notion of the atom is similar to how Deleuze reads force in Nietzsche and Foucault: force can only relate to force, forces are primarily relational as opposed to being like ‘building blocks’ of knowable objects. The problem of thinking in terms of ‘atoms’ is that we inevitably fall into making the term or entity prior to the relation; ‘force’ is a better concept for prioritizing the relational nature of materiality.

Marx’s notion of the ‘differentiated’ matter occurs in relation to the ‘outside’ of the knowing being; this is why Deleuze is interested in Marx’s notion of the atom. Marx is interested in that which founds the knowing subject: the external, natural world as something that is outside the knowing human essence, something that is not the property of that human and threatens to overpower it. As Althusser puts it, Marx “never entertained any illusions about the ‘omnipotence of ideas’, including his own” (Althusser, 2006: 47). The human is split between activity and passivity: on the one hand, humanity has natural and active powers of life that exist as impulses, tendencies or abilities. On the other hand, the human is a passive being who suffers because it undergoes the effects of exterior objects in a way which it cannot account for in knowledge or its comportment to the world. It has needs for certain indispensable objects, but those objects are independent of the human and humanity does not possess them (115). Passivity is irreducible to human, active tendencies: our active abilities are only abilities relative to objects which
themselves work upon us from outside.\footnote{Marx gives the following beautiful expression of the reciprocity of the knowing being with its outside: “The sun is the \textit{object} of the plant - an indispensable object to it, confirming its life - just as the plant is an object of the sun, being an \textit{expression} of the life - awakening power of the sun, of the sun's \textit{objective} essential power” (116).} That includes the knowing nature of humanity: the objects of knowledge themselves work upon the knowing being from outside in an unknown way. \textit{In order} to be active and productive, man \textit{needs} objects over which he has no control. This is the significance of the seemingly banal conception of humanity as real, sensuous, natural and living as opposed to abstractions of self-consciousness. Marx’s point is not simply that humanity has natural needs and is not just a knowing being; that is a banality that Hegel can easily account for. It is that every possible knowing position implies a radically exterior material objects which constantly threaten to overpower and transform the entire structure of knowing.\footnote{Marx gives the following beautiful expression of the reciprocity of the knowing being with its outside: “The sun is the \textit{object} of the plant - an indispensable object to it, confirming its life - just as the plant is an object of the sun, being an \textit{expression} of the life - awakening power of the sun, of the sun's \textit{objective} essential power” (116).} This threatening ‘outside’ implies a type of object or materiality which is radically different to thought and cannot be subsumed beneath it.

The overpowering ‘outside’ of the knowing subject is, for Marx, always \textit{other} than the knowing subject and therefore materiality is fundamentally \textit{relational} and differentiated. There is neither a reduction to an atomic sensation nor a sheer, undifferentiated matter. The human knower is dependent upon an \textit{other}; Marx even prefigures Deleuze’s favorite line from Rimbaud: “as soon as there are objects outside me, as soon as I am not \textit{alone}, I am \textit{another - another reality} than the object outside me” (Marx and Engels, 1978: 116). This thought of the \textit{other} reality, the \textit{other} object is key: objectivity is irreducible to the knowing subject and irreducible to any atomic object, therefore there is a certain kind of difference essence to matter. Marx pushes this to the point where the “I” is not only a subject but also an object: “for this third object I am thus an \textit{other reality} than it; that is, I am \textit{its} object” (116). Difference is primary over any stance of the self-same interiority of the knowing subject. The system of nature implies externality: objects are
outside of me, and I suffer because of that. There is no ‘state of nature’ in which I or any being is perfectly “at home,” not even self-consciousness. Marx is important in this respect by thinking the relational and differential nature of all objective and natural materiality, prior to any possible order of knowledge.  

3. The swerving encounter of the world: Althusser on Marx’s materialism

Marx’s work is ambiguously poised between humanism and something beyond humanism, pointing in the direction of Nietzsche; this point of difference is perhaps why Marx is important to Deleuze’s vision of Nietzsche. To understand this point of diffraction, we can turn to Althusser, who perfectly expresses the two sides of Marx which concern us.

Althusser is known as an almost fanatical Marxist; yet, late in his life, he confesses a fascinating proximity to Deleuze. In a fantastical, semi-autobiographical piece, Althusser says his ideal figure, the materialist philosopher, reads Deleuze, Kant, Hegel, Spinoza, Heidegger, Kirkegaard, Derrida and so on; not only is Deleuze mentioned explicitly as an influence, but Spinoza and other influences are famously Deleuzian touchstones. Althusser’s materialist philosopher not only reads Deleuze, but ends by attaining the level of “Nietzsche’s superman” and gains an “understanding of the eternal return: viz., that everything is repeated and exists only through differential repetition.” (Althusser, 2006: 291).

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213 This is the significance of Marx’s statement that “to be sensuous [an object] is to suffer. Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being - and because he feels what he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential force of man energetically bent on its object”(116).
214 Marx’s proof for this was discussed earlier. Marx thinks when we establish an object, we do not fall from our pure state of activity in consciousness; rather, in order that consciousness can constitute object, it must have a prior objective basis itself. Thus, all knowing beings are fundamentally objective, natural beings. Man makes world-history only as himself an objective, natural being in the world (115).
215 He “reads the Hindus and the Chinese (Zen), as well as Machiavelli, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Cavailles, Canguilhem, Vuillemin, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, and so on” and “becomes a quasi-professional materialist philosopher - not that horror, a dialectical materialist, but an aleatory materialist.” (291)
216 Althusser puts Nietzsche in the small number of classical non-religious philosophers: “There are not many of them, of these non-apologetic, truly non-religious philosophies in the history of philosophy: among the great
concerns is implicit but clearly central here: difference and repetition is the title of Deleuze’s most famous book.\textsuperscript{217} To read Nietzsche’s eternal return through differential repetition clearly signals a proximity to Deleuze on Althusser’s part.\textsuperscript{218} Even more explicitly, Althusser elucidates his own philosophy of the encounter which he says have become familiar to us “from Nietzsche to Deleuze and Derrida, from English empiricism (Deleuze) to (with Derrida’s help) Heidegger” (189).\textsuperscript{219} It is remarkably useful for our purposes to see that Althusser, the thinker who shows how Marx breaks with Hegel, cites Deleuze, Nietzsche and Heidegger as crucial philosophers of the encounter.\textsuperscript{220} Althusser says he wants to translate their disguised concepts of the encounter into plainer language (189). Althusser even directly cites Deleuze and Guattari at a key point in his exposition of how his understanding of capitalism differs from traditional Marxists. He writes that the encounter between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, through which capitalism emerged, “might not have ‘taken hold’, and \textit{a fortiori}, ‘the encounter might not have taken place’” (Althusser, 2006: 199).\textsuperscript{221}

As well as the useful proximity to Deleuze, Althusser is explicit about bringing out certain tendencies in Marx that remain faithful to the Deleuzian tradition of the encounter. Althusser thinks that Marx’s work contains theoretical dead-ends, contradictions and gaps, the philosophers, I can see only Epicurus, Spinoza (who is admirable), Marx, when he is properly understood, and Nietzsche” (218).

\textsuperscript{217} Althusser explicitly cites Deleuze’s notion of the primacy of the positive over the negative, crucial in thinking beyond Hegel, which is what Althusser had sought to do: “the materialism of the encounter is contained in the thesis of the primacy of positivity over negativity (Deleuze)” (189).

\textsuperscript{218} Spinoza is also key to the wisdom attained by the materialist philosopher. After reading Deleuze, Derrida, Heidegger and others, he “attains the level of classical wisdom, Spinoza’s third kind of ‘knowledge’, Nietzsche’s superman, and an understanding of the eternal return: viz., that everything is repeated and exists only through differential repetition.” (Althusser, Encounter, Portrait of the Materialist Philosopher, 291).

\textsuperscript{219} Relevant to our project is a letter in 1984 in which Althusser says “I’m reading some Nietzsche, whom I didn’t know well at all; that’s all I do.” (Letter 5 to Fernanda Narvarro) In an affectionate letter showing his interest in contemporary French thought, Althusser writes that “Derrida has just brought out a short book called \textit{Oto autobiographies}; it has to do with the ear (oto). I’m to receive a copy. Some say it’s very good, others that it’s no good at all.” (Althusser, Encounter, Letters to Fernanda Narvarro, 1, 215).

\textsuperscript{220} Althusser speaks about Heidegger’s notion of ‘es gibt,’ of which he has always “made abundant use in my essays until now, although this has not always been noticed” (189).
largest of which is the gap of *philosophy*. Althusser says that in the 1960s he wanted to bring out the philosophy implicit in Marx’s work, to make it thinkable by turning mere clues into a coherent philosophy. He admits later in life that this was a fabrication; in a Deleuzian spirit, the fabrication was not external but was bringing out implicit rationalities from Marx’s texts.

Even the famous materialism of Marx is, for Althusser, just a way of talking about the contingent encounter of things upon which a world arises; he references Heidegger’s move beyond the classical idealist/materialist divide in this regard. Althusser will help us to see the strands in Marx which move in the direction of Nietzsche and those which remain tied to Hegel. This will help us to see where Deleuze finds Nietzsche’s novelty in terms of thinking about material difference in terms of nineteenth century philosophy.

The reading of Marx that Althusser gives is one related to Deleuze and Nietzsche because they are all in a hidden tradition, that of the materialist encounter. Just as Deleuze admires Marx’s thinking of the atom for its relationality, Althusser takes up the ancient materialism of the atom prior to the formation of the world. However, unlike classical atomistic materialism,
Althusser emphasizes that the infinity of atoms only have reality and existence because of what he calls “the encounter” through the swerve or the clinamen (Althusser, 2006: 169). The parallel fall of the atom swerves in the smallest way, and we cannot know how or where that swerve occurs; this unknowable swerve is the source of the encounter. In Democritus, we find that the atom is “hooked,” as Althusser puts it: the hook implies that the atoms are interlocked one to the next, eternally and irrevocably. It is, Althusser writes, “the smallest deviation possible’, that is, the assignable nothingness of all swerve” (191).

The unknowable swerve which gives atoms their reality in turn gives rise to an encounter between atoms. In the “world” without being or history” there only occurrences, in the impersonal sense of the French *il y advient* and the German *es gibt*. ‘There are’ encounters. The encounter occurs radically outside of knowledge, in a time and space which we can never know. The encounter does not create the reality of the world, but confers reality upon the atoms which are at the basis of the world. The encounter is not a ‘brief encounter’ but a lasting encounter which becomes the basis for reality, necessity, Meaning and reason: this is the origin of any world (Althusser, 2006: 169).

After the unknowable swerve in the infinite atoms to the encounter of those atoms, those encounters come together in the birth of a world. There is no single will or intentionality which brings encounters together; rather, they pile up or agglomerate in a chain reaction. The world

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226 Epicurus tells us that, before the formation of the world, an infinity of atoms were falling parallel to each other in the void. They still are. (168)  
227 The clinamen is an infinitesimal *swerve*, ‘as small as possible’; ‘no one knows where, or when, or how’ it occurs,10or what causes an atom to ‘swerve’ from its vertical fall in the void, and, breaking the parallelism in an almost negligible way at one point, induce *an encounter* with the atom next to it” (169)  
228 “in Democritus, and perhaps even in Epicurus, the atoms are, or are described as, ‘hooked’, that is, susceptible of interlocking one after the other, from all eternity, irrevocably, for ever.” (192)  
229 In order for swerve to give rise to an encounter from which a world is born, that encounter must last; it must be, not a ‘brief encounter’, but a lasting encounter, which then becomes the basis for all reality, all necessity, all Meaning and all reason. But the encounter can also not last; then there is no world. (169)  
230 “from encounter to encounter, a pile-up and the birth of a world - that is to say, of the agglomeration of atoms induced, in a chain reaction, by the initial swerve and encounter.” (169)
is an effect of this piling up or agglomeration, an effect of the “aleatory encounter of the atoms.”
The world is the fact in which the reign of Reason and Necessity is established. Thus, the knowing being and all discourse about the world is in “second place” compared to the aleatory swerve of the atom in the void (Althusser, 2006: 192). For Althusser, Heidegger’s philosophy opens the prospect of a transcendental contingency of the world and the meaning of the world: the opening of Being, beyond which there is nothing to think. The world is, Althusser says, a ‘gift’ we have been given which opens up in its contingency, in a being-in-the-world that “commands all meaning” (170). The world is, therefore, a contingent event established by the swerve, the encounter and the agglomeration of those encounters, given to us beyond all possible discourse or knowledge about the world.

Deleuze admires Marx’s notion of the atom and connects it to Nietzsche’s conception of force; we can now see the Marxist elaboration of the relational and material atom in Althusser. Most importantly, Althusser suggests that the capitalist mode of production arises from an aleatory encounter between the capitalist and the proletarian. This encounter becomes an accomplished fact which induces stable relationships; those stable relationships can be studied such that they yield laws, but in themselves they have no essence outside of the aleatory encounter on which they are based (Althusser, 2006: 197).

231 "it is necessary that the world exist, and, prior to that, that the atoms exist, a situation which puts discourse on the world for ever in second place, and also puts in second place (not first, as Aristotle claimed) the philosophy of Being” (192)
232 Heidegger’s philosophy ‘‘opens up’ a prospect that restores a kind of transcendental contingency of the world, into which we are ‘thrown’, and of the meaning of the world, which in turn points to the opening up of Being, the original urge of Being, its ‘destining’, beyond which there is nothing to seek or to think. Thus the world is a ‘gift’ that we have been given, the ‘fact of the fact [fait défait]’ that we have not chosen, and it ‘opens up’ before us in the facticity of its contingency, and even beyond this facticity, in what is not merely an observation, but a ‘being-in-the-world’ that commands all possible Meaning.”
233 “In untold passages, Marx - this is certainly no accident - explains that the capitalist mode of production arose from the ‘encounter’ between ‘the owners of money’64 and the proletarian stripped of everything but his labour-power. ‘It so happens’ that this encounter took place, and ‘took hold’, which means that it did not come undone as soon as it came about, but lasted, and became an accomplished fact, the accomplished fact of this encounter,
‘combination’ of elements that exist in a ‘floating’ state in history prior to their combination in an encounter. The means of production is composed of famous Marxist elements including “productive forces, means of production, those who possess the means of production, producers with or without means, nature, men, etc.” These elements are submitted to the domination of a totality, and thus an act of domination is a mode of production such as capitalism: it dominates over its elements, and acts as an apparently established center of reference (202). In the capitalist mode of production, the “structure of exploitation” is imposed on all the elements; for example, “the process of exploitation, the exploitation of workers stripped of the means of production, the monopoly of the means of production in the hands of the capitalist class, and so forth” (203). The totality does not pre-exist the elements: each element (the proletariat, nature, the workers) has its own history, without end, without teleology or organic unity.

The crucial Marxist example of a totality that dominates an encounter is the capitalist mode that arises in primitive accumulation. The process of primitive accumulation is a historical phenomenon in which the means of production is expropriated from an entire rural population, occurring famously in Great Britain (Althusser, 2006: 199). This process had a cause which was ‘diverted’ from any aim such that we cannot know it. The originary diversion of primitive accumulation reveals a non-teleology that lies at the origins of capitalism, such that capitalism has to continuously repeat it. The aleatory process occurs today, and Althusser says that the most striking examples are in the “Third World” but that it continues in, for example, France. Indeed, it is a contingent process that all capitalist and capitalist-socialist modes of production have to permanently repeat in order to survive.

inducing stable relationships and a necessity the study of which yields ‘laws’ —tendential laws, of course: the laws of the development of the capitalist mode of production” (197)
The contingent and infinitely repeated process of capture in capitalism is hidden by the apparatus of the State; what is essential, however, is the conflictual and irreducible differences between forces. The aleatory encounter at the basis of all modes of production implies a conflictual difference of force that is very close to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche in terms of force differentials.\(^{234}\) Class struggle is a struggle of differentially powerful forces\(^{235}\); however, the state transforms the excess force of the dominant class into a stabilization of all forces. The appearance of rational stabilization in the state is thus the result of a conflictual difference (Althusser, 2006: 109).\(^{236}\) The state is the suppression of the differences of force of class struggle; this is a concealing of the ‘hinterland’ of conflictual difference and the excess of the dominant force. The state forges a body for itself from out of the subjugated bodies of the dominated class by moulding the human bodies like a metal (112-3).\(^{237}\) These moulded human bodies are used to hide the differences of force that lie beneath the stabilization that the State pretends to enact.

\(^{234}\) “Force and Violence are relative, not absolute concepts; that Force designates the Force of the one who has the greater force, and Violence, the Violence of the one who is the more violent; and that Force and Violence consequently designate a conflictual difference, where, amid difference and conflict, it is the one who possesses the greater force who represents Force, and is therefore Force, and the one who is the more violent who represents Violence, and is therefore Violence.”(Encounter, 109) (see note 120!! For conflictual difference)

\(^{235}\) Class struggle, where one class is powerful and violent only because it is the dominant class, in other words, exercises its force and violence upon another class (which is also a force) that it must, in a never-ending struggle, hold in check if it is to maintain the upper hand over it. (109)

\(^{236}\) The relatively stable resultant (reproduced in its stability by the state) of this confrontation of forces (balance of forces is an accountant’s notion, because it is static) is that what counts is the dynamic excess of force maintained by the dominant class in the class struggle. It is this excess of conflictual force, real or potential, which constitutes energy A, which is subsequently transformed into power by the state-machine: transformed into right, laws and norms. (109)

On the appearance of stabilization, Althusser writes: “the Force of the dominant class, which does not even appear as what it is- the excess of its own force over the force of the dominated classes— but as Force tout court. And it is this Force or Violence which is subsequently trans formed into power by the state-machine.” (109)

\(^{237}\) The question of the organic and organized body is key here, as it is for Deleuze: “the body of the state, for as long as its organization—that is, its ostensible natural Junctions together with their ostensible ‘natural’ division - is not called into question, will end up absorbing all the orders and transforming them into red tape in which even revolutionaries and the revolution will end up drowning.” (117)
4. Marx’s denial of the outside of the human: Revolution as the unveiling of true humanity

We are reading Althusser because he brings out the two sides of Marx; so far, we have seen the side which points towards Nietzsche. The philosophy of encounter breaks with the ‘undifferentiated’ conception of sensibility in Kant and the indeterminacy of the abyss in Schelling and Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy. Instead, there is a conception of the overpowering outside of materiality in Marx, which is irreducible to knowing. This overpowering outside consists, according to Althusser, in the swerve or infinitely unknowable difference between material atoms, which gain reality only in their encounter with one another. All knowledge and reason within a world is based on an agglomeration of those elements, and thus it can never return to the event which gives rise to it; it cannot know its own conditions. In Marx, this agglomeration of elements occurs as a mode of production; the capitalist mode of production is constituted by an aleatory ‘encounter’ between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Beneath the capitalist mode of production is an irreducible and conflictual difference of force. We must now see the other side of Marx, the side of nineteenth century that Nietzsche breaks with according to Deleuze. By seeing these two sides, we can see the stakes of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s place in the history of philosophy.

We must now see the teleological and Hegelian remnants in Marx which Nietzsche will abandon, on Deleuze’s view. Althusser admits that Marx lacks an explicit philosophy, and that his interpretative work had to fill in many gaps and dead ends. Not only were there gaps in Marx’s work; he was torn between two philosophical currents: Althusser’s preferred current of
the Encounter and another current, the historical necessity of the Revolution.\textsuperscript{238} Althusser calls the necessity of the Revolution the “bad philosophy” of Marx and Engels, which sustains an “impossible, unthinkable philosophy of history.” This impossible philosophy is the one which is most famous in Western Marxism; one which makes the ‘human’ central. Althusser gives us a useful slogan by which to think this strand of Marx: “Let us unite, and tomorrow ... the International will be the human race.” (Althusser, 2006: 213, emphasis in the original). The International, ‘united,’ will be the human race. The working-class becomes the expression of the “full development of the human essence” and the Revolution that manifests this essence will be the “End of Time” (213). The end of time in the full development of the human essence: this is the bad philosophy, the vulgar ideology of the working-class that Althusser opposes in Marx. It is also what Deleuze sees Nietzsche as overcoming in nineteenth century philosophy: the overman is targeted not against Hegel’s direct writings, but against all post-Hegelian notions of the full development of the human essence.\textsuperscript{239} By distinguishing between the themes of Encounter and Revolution in Marx, Althusser helps us to understand why Deleuze sees this ‘full development of humanity’ as so problematic.

Althusser helps us to see why Marx is the last stage in the history of nihilism in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy. The ‘fantasy’ of Marx is thinking that the reproduction of the proletariat is the same as comprehending its production. For Althusser, the production of the proletariat is, in essence, a chance Encounter between non-teleological elements; Marx’s Revolutionary thinking tends to cover over the chance aspect and instead to begin from the

\textsuperscript{238} Marx is not the perfect materialist in Althusser’s eyes: “Marx was constrained to think within a horizon torn between the aleatory of the Encounter and the necessity of the Revolution” (188).

\textsuperscript{239} “the Overman is directed against the dialectical conception of man, and transvaluation is directed against the dialectic of appropriation or the suppression of alienation” (NP: 8).
proletariat as it exists today; the aim is merely its reproduction.\textsuperscript{240} All beings would then be put in service of the proletariat; one remains within what Althusser calls the “accomplished fact” of the world and its reasons and necessities; one covers over the process of “becoming-accomplished” in which the world is caught (Althusser, 2006: 200). This helps us to understand why Marx might be the last stage of nihilism: all of life is denied in favor of one aspect of that which exists; all of life is weighed down with the burden of a higher value, the mythical working class. And yet, this ‘higher value’ \textit{at the same time} does \textit{not} exist as universal essence: it will only be revealed with the full development of the human essence at the End of Time. All of life is denied in favor of \textit{a higher value which does not exist}, or is nothing: Nietzsche’s theme of the will to nothingness is exemplified here.

By focussing on reproducing the proletariat \textit{as it exists} instead of thinking the chance encounter of its production, Althusser thinks Marx relies upon a bad philosophy of history. When Marx and Engels see the proletariat as the ‘product of’ big industry, Althusser thinks they are covering over the “aleatory logic of the encounter” which produces the mass of impoverished and expropriated human beings (Althusser, 2006: 198).\textsuperscript{241} The ‘necessary production’ of the proletariat by big industry implies a conception of the mode of production that Althusser calls “essentialistic and philosophical” in the sense of a philosophy which sees history as a progression towards the present as its essence (198). History is therefore confined to a teleological ‘whole’ that “endlessly reproduces its own elements” and results in a meshing of all the elements in a whole (200). The structure of history then precedes all elements that it

\textsuperscript{240} Althusser writes that “Marxist scholars untiringly rehearse Marx’s fantasy, thinking the \textit{reproduction} of the proletariat in the mistaken belief that they are thinking its production” (199).

\textsuperscript{241} “When Marx and Engels say that the proletariat is ‘the product of big industry’, they utter a very great piece of nonsense, positioning themselves within the logic of the accomplished fact of the reproduction of the proletariat on an extended scale, not the aleatory logic of the ‘encounter’ which produces (rather than reproduces), as the proletariat, this mass of impoverished, expropriated human beings as one of the elements making up the mode of
reproduces to reproduce itself. The bourgeoisie is seen as destined to unify all the other elements in a capitalist totality as a dialectical negation of the Feudal system. For Althusser, on the contrary, the bourgeoisie is one ‘floating’ element among others in history who do not ‘negate’ the Feudal system, but rather ‘crown’ it in its perfection.\(^{242}\) By focussing on the teleological negation of the feudal system by the bourgeoisie, Marx falls away from his philosophy of the Encounter and into a conception that Althusser calls “totalitarian, teleological and philosophical” in the bad sense (200).

The result of Marx’s tendency to fall into a dialectical and teleological position that sees the proletariat revolution as the full development of the human essence is to overestimate the role of human action in shaping history. A humanist-historicist reading of Marx appears to produce the “greatest theoretical advantages” because all knowledge is reduced to historical social relations that are productive and therefore human relations. History is, on this reading, a merely ‘human’ phenomenon, since men have ‘made’ all of history. (Althusser, 1977: 139).\(^{243}\) On the one hand, humans are merely ‘actors’ or objects on the historical stage with its productive, political and social relations; and yet, on the other hand, humans are the subjects who make history, because ideological and social relations are nothing but human relations (140). This humanistic-teleological aspect of Marx means that even the most intimate faculties of humanity production. In the process, Marx and Engels shift from the first conception of the mode of production, an historicaleatory conception, to a second, which is essentialistic and philosophical” (198).

\(^{242}\) I would claim the contradiction within Marx’s philosophy actually comes out within Althusser’s own philosophy. In the glossary of the English translation to Reading Capital, we read that “the ideology of a socialist society may be a humanism, a proletarian ‘class humanism”’ (314). \(^{1}\) Yes, the human is torn apart by class relations, such that there can be no universalist and humanist Marxism; and yet: a humanism of the proletariat re-inserts itself into Althusser’s thinking. Althusser makes a note saying that the proletarian “class humanism” is “an expression I obviously use in a provisional, half- critical sense.” (314). This hesitation in Althusser’s texts is a revealing and important moment.

\(^{243}\) This humanist-historicist version of Marx is the most famous vision of Marx we have today; as Althusser had said, “Is there anyone today who does not invoke this historicist humanism, in the genuine belief that he is appealing to Marx, whereas such an ideology takes us away from Marx?” (140). Althusser notes that humanist-historicist themes are not to be completely politically condemned: “Even today, this 'humanism' and 'historicism' find genuinely revolutionary echoes in the political struggles waged by the people of the Third World to conquer and defend their political independence and set out on the socialist road.” (141)
(seeing, hearing, memory, reason, etc) are historically produced in a way that is determined by humans themselves. This, once again, begins with a specific world and covers over the chance relations of encounter which produce that world, according to Althusser.²⁴⁴

It is here that we can see why Deleuze criticizes Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to re-found Marxism on an inter-subjective basis: as Althusser shows, a subjective basis for Marxist thought only falls once again into the tradition of humanistic and teleological philosophies. It is this reduction of all existence to a ‘humanity’ that will not exist until the Revolution at the end of time that shows us why Deleuze thinks that Marx marks the final step in the history of nihilism prior to Nietzsche.²⁴⁵ All existing beings are denied in favor of an empty higher ideal which is in fact modeled on certain aspects of one particular aspect of existence: the proletariat. All of existence is weighed down with the burden of that which exists empirically, with all of its suffering and limitation; this marks the final stage of nihilism.

We can confirm Althusser’s view of the teleological and diadical aspects of Marx’s philosophy by looking at what he finds valuable in Hegel. Marx appreciates that Hegel conceives labour as “man’s act of self-genesis - conceives man’s relation to himself as an alien being and the manifesting of himself as an alien being to be the coming-to-be of species-consciousness and

²⁴⁴ For Althusser, relations of production are not reducible to human relations. Furthermore, relations of production and political and ideological social relations are irreducible to any anthropology, or any inter-subjectivity (180). “The true ‘subjects’ are these definers and distributors: the relations of production (and political and ideological social relations). But since these are ‘relations’, they cannot be thought within the category subject. And if by chance anyone proposes to reduce these relations of production to relations between men, i.e., ‘human relations’, he is violating Marx’s thought, for so long as we apply a truly critical reading to some of his rare ambiguous formulations, Marx shows in the greatest depth that the relations of production (and political and ideological social relations) are irreducible to any anthropological inter-subjectivity -- since they only combine agents and objects in a specific structure of the distribution of relations, places and functions, occupied and ‘supported’ by objects and agents of production.” (180)
²⁴⁵ We see this tension between the revelation and the otherness of the perfect human in Derrida’s reading of Marx. Lawlor points out the Nietzschean influence of this reading of Marx when Derrida writes in Specters of Marx, Derrida “there where a man, a certain determinate concept of man, is completed, there the pure humanity of man, of the other man and of man as other begins or finally has the chance of heralding itself - of promising itself. In an apparently inhuman or a-human fashion” (SM 125/74, cited Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl, 225). The ‘pure humanity’
species-life” (Marx and Engels, 1978: 121). The human self-relation is clearly central here; this is precisely the aspect of Marx’s thought that Althusser sees as pointing towards a teleological conception in which history is merely a movement to the complete realization of the human essence as self-produced. On Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, this is nihilistic because everything which does not conform to this human self-production is denied any value and, ultimately, because the Revolution only comes at the End of Time, anything within time is denied value; that is, all existing beings are denied value, as existence is essentially temporal.

Allen Wood brings out the humanistic and teleological aspects of Marx that Deleuze sees Nietzsche as moving away from. For Wood, each human being is conscious of engaging in a “mode of life which is specifically human, however much it may differ from the lives of other human beings” (Wood, 2004: 20). This is a non-epistemological ‘species’ self-consciousness at the heart of Marx’s philosophy. Such self-consciousness explains why certain Hegelian teleological aspects are imported into the materialism of Marx. The ‘organic wholeness’ of social structures that Wood sees in Marx are guaranteed by this teleological species self-consciousness: all structures should reflect this self-consciousness and will thus gain an organic wholeness. All the structures of capitalism, Wood suggests, are organically connected for Marx in a development which is moving towards the unveiling of what Althusser called the full development of the human essence in the species consciousness of humanity. The possibility of such a complete unveiling of the human essence is what Nietzsche will contest.

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246 On reading about the consciousness of a ‘specifically human’ mode of life, we must recall Althusser’s cutting remark about humanist readings of Marx: “It is child's play to reduce Capital to an ethical inspiration, whether or no one relies on the radical anthropology of the 1844 Manuscripts” (Reading Capital, 139).
247 “To say of social structures, for instance, that they are organic wholes is to recommend that they be studied teleologically” (219).
248 As Wood puts it, Marx “supposes that the material is structured dialectically, that the economic structure of capitalism is a hierarchy of ‘forms of development’ connected organically by an ‘inner bond’” (Wood, 224).
The reason Nietzsche contests Marx’s teleological unveiling of the human essence is that it implies the denial or negation of life as a whole. In this case, what is denied is all life that does not harmonize with the materiality of the human being. For Marx, this life is all objectivity under capitalism, which appears under the commodity form; all of ‘life’ must, therefore, be denied in favor of the human essence that is not within life, but which will arise after the Revolution. The specific claim Marx makes is that, under Communism, nature will be humanized. Wood thinks this humanization is metaphorical, hyperbolic and an exaggeration (Wood, 2004: 177); what Marx really means is that he is looking forward to a time when “nature can be more fully harmonized with human needs.” Wood looks forward to a type of ‘harmony’ between humanity and nature such that the two form an organic totality without any need for a transcendent spirit or God (178). Although Wood thinks that this harmony is not as hyperbolic as Marx’s proclaimed humanization of nature, I would suggest is equally as problematic, and reveals precisely the trend of nineteenth century philosophy that Deleuze sees Nietzsche as overcoming. By conceiving a nature which is “more fully harmonized with human needs” we have a philosophy which puts the human at the center of nature. When Marx says that communism will imply the humanization of nature, it is not far from Wood’s interpretation in terms of ‘harmonizing’ nature to meet human needs. This reveals the nihilistic side of Marx that Deleuze brings out in Nietzsche and Philosophy: seeking to ‘harmonize’ nature to human needs implies the denial of all life in favor of ‘human needs,’ an empty higher value which will only be unveiled after the Revolution.
5. Reading Nietzsche’s body as violent struggle against resistance and Deleuze’s critique of oppositional struggle

In the next section, we will examine a key debate about how to read Nietzsche. This reading relates to Marx in that it involves the political ramifications of Nietzsche’s concepts of the body. One of Nietzsche’s early claims about socialism helps reveal this role of violence in his thought: socialism does not go far enough because it only sees property relations as founded on violence. In fact, Nietzsche claims, all of culture is founded on violence (HH: 452). The next section will be about the role of violence and related political metaphors in Nietzsche’s thinking about the body.

I claim that the philosophy of the Encounter that Althusser sees in aspects of Marx holds the key to the philosophical importance of Nietzsche for Deleuze. The next section will explore the way in which Deleuze’s emphasis on force as ‘encounter’ is put into question by some readers of Nietzsche who privilege political metaphors of domination. For some readers, it seems that Nietzsche faces the same problem as Marx in an even more extreme way: just as Marx privileges one political aspect of humanity (the proletariat) as the culmination of humanity, Nietzsche privileges those who are dominant in society (the aristocratic ‘great men’) as the aim of history. So, although Nietzsche overcomes a certain tendency to humanism in Marx, perhaps his emphasis on the violence of all culture leads to an even more entrenched abstract valorization of a certain part of humanity as the goal of history. This line of thought might suggest that whereas Marx’s philosophy vacillates between the Proletariat Revolution and the Chance Encounter, Nietzsche’s philosophy vacillates between the Aristocratic Revolution and the Chance Encounter. Deleuze will argue that the two aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy are reconcilable in favor of the Encounter, and the next section will examine why.
John Richardson reads force primarily in terms of domination, as opposed to thinking it as the physical variation of matter. Domination and obeying are the major context here: Richardson takes the obeying/obeyed relation as primary. Force is always aimed towards a ‘goal’ of domination and can thus be read as the ‘balance of power:’ force implies the political subordination of weaker forces by certain tribes, or the struggle of a people against external, threatening forces (Richardson, 1996: 45, 54, 58). Political subordination and the balance of political power is the explanatory context for ‘force’ here. Christoph Cox also emphasizes the political metaphors; he reads the quantitative nature of the body in terms of the political structure: it is “a hierarchy of organs, tissues, and cells, each of which has a particular role and function” (130). The unity of the body is relative to a political structure, aristocracy or oligarchy. Quantity is therefore about political domination: if you dominate politically, you have a greater quantity of power. Deleuze reads quantity primarily in terms of its differential variability, focusing on differential calculus, which undermines oppositional readings of quantity in terms of the high as opposed to the low. Richardson and Cox emphasize the higher and the lower because they privilege the political language Nietzsche uses to talk about the body. We will see, below, how Deleuze interprets this language differently, distinguishing between different types of ‘combat:’ oppositional and differential.

The difference between Deleuze and Richardson in understanding ‘force’ can be seen by the latter’s emphasis upon oppositionality. Certain opposed forces are central to Nietzsche’s notion of the overman: primarily sickness/health and active/reactive. The “interinvolvement” of these opposites is, according to Richardson, ‘difference:’ to be clear, opposition is prior to difference here (Richardson, 1996: 137). Because opposition and its reconciliation are privileged, political opposition and struggle are also valorized: the opposition between forces is a
classical conception of political struggle. This opposition also implies two beings which are clearly distinguished enough to be opposed. Despite acknowledging the importance of becoming in Nietzsche, Richardson criticizes him for making ‘beings’ multiply throughout his ontology. The ‘forces’ Nietzsche posits are ‘beings’ at an infinitesimally small level, and so Nietzsche fails to achieve his aim of thinking pure becoming (88). These oppositional force-beings are “what constant change occurs between” and thus Nietzsche “seems to multiply them infinitely: every precise, momentary condition is now a being in its own right” (88). This supports Richardson’s emphasis upon the political metaphors: Nietzsche’s ‘power ontology’ emphasizes forces as ‘units’ which struggle against one another like non-human ‘intentionalities’ trying to ‘overcome’ their present (85).

Another commentator, Cox, also sees oppositional struggle as a fundamental feature of force. He conflates ‘difference of quantity’ with struggle and oppositionality, suggesting that “each affect is always engaged in a struggle with other affects” (Cox, 1999: 129). However, he justifies this emphasis upon struggle with a quotation which does not in fact emphasize opposition but rather merely tension: “dynamic quanta in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their 'effect' upon the same” (WP 635, Cox’s emphasis). Deleuze will see in these dynamic and relational quanta something different from oppositional struggle, whereas Cox imports the notion of struggle into these differences of quantity. We can now turn to Deleuze’s alternative model of force, inspired by the tradition of intensive quantities as exemplified by Kant.

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249 Deleuze reverses this order: difference is prior to opposition.
250 I would suggest that Deleuze admits this theme is present in Nietzsche, when he suggests that the theme of ‘self-overcoming’ so central to Hegel also persists in Nietzsche (cf. Leibniz lecture 4, 1980). However, Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is an ‘imagined’ one, removed from this theme of self-overcoming.
In the next section, I will show that Deleuze reads the theme of ‘domination’ in Nietzsche differently to other commentators; underlying this difference of interpretation is the Kantian thought of intensive and varying matter, which allows Deleuze to avoid a reading of domination in terms of an oppositional struggle between distinct beings. We have seen Richardson and Cox read struggle, combat and domination in an oppositional way. Heidegger also reads Nietzsche in terms of opposition dualities; struggle being one of these dualities. Deleuze, on the other hand, makes a distinction between two modes of combat: combat-between and combat-against. What most commentators focus on is the more familiar notion, which Deleuze calls combat-against. Combat-against is a will to destroy or repel that which opposes or resists. This destructive oppositionality is a key aspect of the ‘will to nothingness.’ Commentators such as Richardson and Cox, in their focus on oppositional struggle, generalize this theme throughout Nietzsche’s thinking of struggle, whereas for Deleuze, combat-against is limited to the will to nothingness. The will to nothingness is, Deleuze admits, central to Nietzsche’s writings because it has dominated the history of thought in Western humanity; however, there is another modality of combat, to which we must now turn.

6. Re-thinking combat not as oppositional but as an event ‘between’ combatants

As opposed to other commentators who prioritize the “against,” Deleuze thinks there is a more fundamental combat “between.” However, this ‘between’ is much more ambiguous than the ‘against;’ it is not a common notion in our daily lives, and it is not common in the history of philosophy; for Deleuze, thinking the ‘between’ is part of “Nietzsche’s greatness,” one of his

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251 A “war as a combat-against” is ultimately a will to destruction and nothingness (CC, THDWJ, 133). This combat-against tries to “destroy or repel a force” (CC, THDWJ, 132). The readings of Cox and Richardson seem echoed in the themes of repelling that which opposes.
major innovations. The following section will explore this notion. It is one of the most difficult aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy, and one which is not widely understood. What is important to bear in mind is that it is meant to target the kind of reading given by Heidegger in which the body is a constant struggle between a fixed body and an overpowering chaos which takes that body beyond itself. Instead, there will be a confrontational exchange between two modes of bodily mixture, fragmenting and whole, between which an affect arises.

The major innovation Deleuze sees in Nietzsche revolves around one of his most famous concepts: debt. Debt here is not meant in conventional terms: debt is not limited to the monetary economic sphere nor ‘emotional’ or social obligations. The broader notion of debt is an event in which something passes between an unequal debtor and creditor, such that both parties undergo a change of state. The new state that is created ‘inside’ both finite beings based on the passage between them is an affect. The passage between unequal forces transforms the interiority of both forces, a new comportment. The body has no essential aspect outside of this transformation: it is inscribed on the body as a mark or sign that reveals in the flesh the structure of debt. This inscription upon the body is an ‘ancient order’ of ‘justice,’ a “system of cruelty” which is opposed to the oppositionality of judgement. The debt-credit confrontation which creates a new affect ‘between’ the parties merges both defense and verdict.

The transformational exchange that marks and affects unequal bodies implies a more fundamental partnership between existing beings. It is not the will of an ideal or fully developed

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252 “Nietzsche’s greatness” lies in having shown the primacy of the debt of the promise in all exchange (THDWJ, 127).
253 In this exchange, certain “forces” pass between the ‘parties’ or ‘parts,’ provoking a “change of state” which creates something new in the parties (THDWJ, 127).
254 Deleuze is explicitly reading Nietzsche in confrontation with Mauss and Levi-Strauss here; Nietzsche goes where they hesitate to go. This is a “writing of blood and life” in Artaud, the writing in bodies of Kafka’s “The Penal Colony.”
255 Deleuze references the philosophy of Anaximander on this point, who he also references in the introduction to Nietzsche and Philosophy. The tragedy of Aeschylus is also mentioned.
humanity to destroy everything which resists it; it is a partnership between finite beings. That partnership is *confrontational*: it implies an irreducible inequality, and it is across this distance of inequality that there is a debt. There is a *reciprocity* across the inequality, but that reciprocity is asymmetrical. The asymmetry implied here lies in the fact that a body can both *affect* and *be affected*: it is both open to the outside *and at the same time* vulnerable to that outside.\textsuperscript{256} The body is nothing *outside* this affect-affecting structure: there is no “body” which could be “opposed” to another body prior to this reciprocity: Deleuze calls this a “block” of finite beings who circulate in a territory.\textsuperscript{257} There is no secure, self-same body prior to the ancient order of affect in which something passes between bodies: there is no “one” body who is the absolute creditor; every body is ambiguously both creditor and debtor. In sum, Deleuze writes, the “system of cruelty expresses the finite relations of the body with the forces that affect it.” What is key here is an unequal relationship of affect and affecting that is irreducible to oppositional struggle; instead, bodies are blocks of unequal, confrontational and reciprocal partnerships.\textsuperscript{258}

Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche in terms of a ‘combat-between’ can be understood through Foucault’s more well-known reception of Nietzsche. Foucault claims that every mark of identity partakes in a play of dominations; marks are continually being violently imposed on differential relations of force in competing ways. All dominations are ultimately deformations occurring through a violently imposed system of marks, and this is why the subject is the

\textsuperscript{256} This formula for ‘force’ is central to the Foucault book as well as Deleuze’s work on affect in Spinoza, which is first established in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* in 1962.

\textsuperscript{257} The finite number of beings who are in confrontational debt-credit relation form a ‘block’ which ‘circulates’ in a territory; it is as if the territory is defined by this circulation of debt (THDWJ, 128).

\textsuperscript{258} We can understand this in the famous Derridean distinction between oppositional terms and the *différence* between those terms. As Lawlor has put it, Derrida wants to think a dialectic which is not ‘oppositional’, alternation, antinomy or duality; nevertheless, there can still be a kind of contradiction or negation defined in terms of ‘nothing,’ a mixture, complication, implication, or contamination: that which cannot be ‘conceived’ as belonging to ‘one thing’ is *necessarily* part of it: there is ‘nothing’ separating the two (Lawlor, 2002: 84).
principle of dominations, on Foucault’s reading.\textsuperscript{259} Foucault gives a little-known reading of Nietzsche’s will to power in these terms: the will to power is the infinite development of the violent imposition of repeatable marks of identity upon differential forces.\textsuperscript{260} “The development of humanity” has been a series of violent and clandestine appropriations of systems of rules in order to bend them to a new will. Humanity, Foucault famously writes, “installs each of its violences” in a “system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.”\textsuperscript{261} Humanity risks “perishing” from this passion for knowledge, because the multiplication of systems of identity threaten one another in their claims to truth; ‘humanity’ as a species has understood itself as being founded on some kind of truth. Similarly to Deleuze, domination is not the opposition of one power to another in Foucault; it is the constantly repeated imposition of systems of marks upon the body. The violent imposition of marks upon bodies is how Deleuze reads the fundamental meaning of debt in Nietzsche: there are not radically individual bodies in this play of dominations because what passes between the parties transforms them affectively.

The notion of bodily violence between a debtor and creditor which is not oppositional can be understood by looking at the fundamental notion of the body in Deleuze’s \textit{The Logic of Sense}. There, the structure of bodies is double: the fragmenting body and the melting body. The beginning of every ‘thing’ starts out in an abyss comprised of these two modes of mixture: fragmenting apart or melting together.\textsuperscript{262} The split between these two modes of bodily mixture is

\textsuperscript{259} Lectures on Will to Know, 223 n.41. This is from a summary the editors give of some aspects of a lecture given at the College de France which diverge from a very similar lecture given at McGill University, on which much of the present exposition of Nietzsche is based.

\textsuperscript{260} Nietzsche, Genealogy, 378

\textsuperscript{261} Nietzsche, Genealogy, 378

\textsuperscript{262} LS, 27, 188-9. In Proust and Signs, there is also a notion of the fragment as ‘sealed vessel’ which does not correspond to the field it exists within: it cannot be adapted to other fragments (2000: 123). Yet the fragments do communicate in affirming the distance between one another in a ‘resonance’ which is not a uniting (2000: 126, 129). It is a distance which in \textit{Difference and Repetition} Deleuze will say characterizes the ‘intensive depths’ of the body in perception (235).
Deleuze’s definition of schizophrenia: “the schizophrenic split.”\(^{263}\) The fragmented body involves ‘partial’ objects, ‘pieces’, ‘bits’, ‘hard and solid fragments’, that ‘change’, ‘whirl about’, ‘explode’, fragment, ‘detach’ and ‘break up’ in sequences.\(^{264}\) The ‘whole’ body is an ‘undifferentiated plenitude,’ “liquid, fluid and perfect” that is complete and lacks parts or organs;\(^{265}\) it is the liquid body that ‘melts’ and ‘welds;’ it involves blocks ‘fused together’ that ‘coexist’\(^{266}\). The fragmenting body makes the melting body ‘suffer’ by fragmenting it in an active attack, whereas the melting body ‘reacts to’ the fragmenting body and defends itself passively.\(^{267}\) The fragmenting attack and the melting defense is like the relation between the confrontational exchange between the unequal debtor and the creditor that produces an affect in the passage between the two parties. Thus, we see how Deleuze’s reading of debt in Nietzsche is very much the way in which bodies begin; in the *The Logic of Sense*, the body can never be organized like language or the metaphysical and ideal surface of thought. The ‘debt’ in Nietzsche cannot be said to be constituted within consciousness.\(^{268}\) As Nietzsche says, the buyer-seller exchange in the marketplace is the very *origin* of thought; it does not exist *within* thought (GM: 2, 8). Similarly, on Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, consciousness is an *expression* of the mixture of dominations in the body (NP: 39).

In *The Logic of Sense* the theme of force comes out in relation to Nietzsche and the depths of the body. Deleuze writes that “the encased depths strike Nietzsche as the real orientation of philosophy.” (LS: 18, 129). These encased depths are the “forces” of a life which is an “abyss” lying under every foundation. The forces of the depths are essential to

\(^{263}\) LS, 27, 192
\(^{264}\) LS, 27, 188-9. These are also, in psychoanalytic vocabulary, ‘internal objects’
\(^{265}\) Neither a mouth for language or anus for excretion.
\(^{266}\) LS, 27, 188-9. The bodies without organs are also said to be ‘words without articulation’
\(^{267}\) LS, 27, 192.
\(^{268}\) Because there is a relation of active fragmenting and passive melting in the two mixtures,. The schizophrenic split between fragmentation and melting means that ‘thought’ as an organized surface cannot arise at this level.
“schizophrenia” which is said to be the “beginning” just as difference in force is the “origin” in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. This is an “absolute depth,” in which there are two types of mixture, irreducible to one another: fragments and a whole body. In Nietzschean terms, this is shown when “Dionysus holds out to us his two faces, his open and lacerated body, and his impassible organless head: Dionysus dismembered, but also Dionysus the impenetrable.” (LS: 18, 129). The two aspects of affecting-attacking and affected-defensive are temporally varying mixtures rather than individuals or beings.

Deleuze’s conception of matter as fragmenting and melting mixtures occurs in his engagement with Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgement*. In Kant’s aesthetics, there is a ‘content’ or ‘primary matter’ that escapes from conceptual grasp. The ‘primary matter’ is, Deleuze writes, a “fluid substance, the oldest state of matter,” one part of which ‘separates’ while the rest ‘solidifies.’ Kant calls this the ‘matter’ of free beauties, a “free formation of nature” that is a “fluid at rest;” this contradictory combination of fluidity and rest occurs because a part of it is in a state of ‘separation’ or evaporation and another part is in a state of “solidification” in a determinate shape. The foundational nature of this fluid matter is clear when Kant writes that “both the plants as well as animal bodies are formed from fluid nutritive matter that has formed itself in a state of rest;” even the body of the animal is formed “freely” in relation with laws of the “affinity of matter.” These words of Kant are echoed in a passage about the ‘depths’ of the body in *The Logic of Sense*: there are “two mixtures: one is made of hard and solid fragments

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269 KCP, 53.
270 “By a free formation of nature, however, I understand that by which, from a fluid at rest, as a result of the evaporation or separation of a part of it (sometimes merely of the caloric), the rest assumes upon solidification a determinate shape or fabric (figure or texture)” .. “where there is a specific difference in the matter, [the shape or figure] is different, but if the matter is the same is exactly the same.” (CJ, 58, 5:348/222). On free beauties: flowers are “beauties in themselves,” because we do not have a determinate concept for them, and so, similarly, “designs a la grecque, foliage for borders or on wallpaper, etc., signify nothing by themselves: they do not represent anything, no object under a determinate concept, and are free beauties.” (CJ, S 16, 5:229/114.
271 CJ, 58, 5:349/223.
which change; the other is liquid, fluid and perfect, without parts or alteration because it has the
property of melting and welding.”272 The primary matter of aesthetic experience that is fluid at
rest, is therefore an important influence of Deleuze’s rethinking of the notion of opposition in
Nietzsche. Instead of reading the Nietzschean body in terms of fixity and overcoming, as
Heidegger does, Deleuze reads it in terms of fragmenting and melting.

The confrontational exchange between the ‘melting’ debtor and the ‘fragmenting’ creditor
is Deleuze’s way of thinking the body in a manner that does not oppose two unities; we can see
how this relates specifically to his book Nietzsche and Philosophy. Firstly, “every thing is
referred to a force” and is, indeed, nothing other than the play of domination between a plurality
of forces (NP: 22). The ‘thing’ here is a phenomenon, sign or symptom that finds its meaning
[sens] in a force that dominates over other forces (3).273 The domination here is not oppositional
because something passes between all the forces involved, transforming them affectively. In
short, the ‘thing’ is nothing other than this passage between forces; the ‘thing’ or body does not
exist outside of the play of domination. In more well-known Nietzsche terms, every ‘thing’ is an
interpretation, where interpretation is not fundamentally an act of consciousness but the violent
play of forces that produces an affect in those forces. Klossowski confirms this confrontation of
forces as interpretation, writing that the impulses “confront and interpret each other through their
fluctuations of intensity and, at the level of organized beings, through gestures” (Klossowski,

7. Heidegger on affect as ‘philia’ between self and world

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272 LS, 27, 188-9 Cf. also the opposition between partial objects and pieces subject to fragmentation and the
organism without parts or the body without organs which is a “liquid whole.”
To understand the affective ‘between’ of the body in Nietzsche, we can look at two visions of it in Heidegger and Deleuze. On Heidegger’s reading, there is a ‘philia’ between the self and its world, in which affect transports us over into beings as a whole. For Deleuze, on the other hand, there is not a philia but a violent shock in which the world falls away with the body and thought is sent into a kind of mad activity.

In order to understand how Deleuze’s notion of combat differs from the ‘oppositional’ reading, we can compare his reading of affect in Nietzsche with that of Heidegger. Affect, on Heidegger’s reading, forms the essential novelty of Nietzsche’s notion of will. Will as affect implies both a self and that which is “beyond oneself:” the affect is like a turbulent seizure of the self by that which is beyond the self. In this turbulent going-beyond of the self, we fall apart or are ‘beside’ ourselves: self-mastery is a manner of being beyond ourself and of losing the self. This is Nietzsche’s novelty, according to Heidegger: in tradition willing, we remain together with ourselves, whereas for Nietzsche, we do not (N1: 46). Will as affect is an affirmation of this seizure of the self. What we must highlight is how Heidegger reads Nietzsche in terms of a distinction between the self and that which is beyond the self: the unified feeling in which we usually exist, is distinguished from that which seizes us from the outside. Although we are carried beyond the self in affect, we are not carried away from the self; indeed, “oneself” means what first of all wants to “become what it is,” for Heidegger (136).\(^\text{274}\) We can summarize this by saying there is the unified self, the movement beyond or beside the self and then the self gathered in the multiplicity of its relationships with beings (52). In that gathering, we discover the way

\[\text{Interpretation determines the sense of something by determining the thing’s “relation to the force which takes possession of it,” or by “articulating” the sense of a sign (8, 31). “To interpret is to determine the force which gives sense to a thing” (54).}\]

\[\text{I would suggest that the reading of will as affect is almost analogous to Heidegger’s famous ‘moment of vision’ in Being and Time. Dasein’s decision to stand resolutely out amongst the possibilities of its existence is very similar to the will to say yes to the multiplicity of beings into which affect thrusts and lifts you.}\]
that things lay claim on the self prior to any knowing and we are lifted beyond into beings as a whole.

We can make the distinction between Deleuze and Heidegger clearer by putting it in terms of Althusser’s philosophy of the encounter, which is influenced by both of them. Althusser appreciates the thought of the *es gibt* in Heidegger, the contingency that constitutes the world prior to the Necessity, Knowing, Reason and Meaning that are always part of the World itself. The world is based upon the transcendental contingency of the ‘opening’ of Being, beyond all possible knowing discourse about the world. Crucially, Heidegger thinks that the Conscious Cartesian Knower presumes that a self-legislating human act founds the world and covers over the contingent encounter of Being on which that founding is based. Instead, the world is ‘given’ to a pre-ontological understanding, prior to the knowing subject; there is an event in which the human and Being are appropriated to one another. In thinking of this giving, there is a kind of violent shock to the Conscious Cartesian Knower; and yet there is a kind of philaia or analogy between the pre-ontological human and Being.275 Here, the “same” comprises the difference between the “world” and the contingent encounter: for Heidegger, the Same includes this ontological difference and does not exclude difference like ‘identity’ does.276 In Heidegger’s words, the Same is the “belonging together” of what differs through a “gathering” (DR: 66, citing Heidegger “Poetically Man Dwells...” pp.218-219). Affect, in Nietzsche, would be this belonging together of what differs through a gathering of the self that is carried over to that

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275 Deleuze suggests, in *Difference and Repetition*, that Heidegger retains a “philia” or “analogy” or homology between thought and what thought thinks (321 n.11).

276 Deleuze criticizes Heidegger because he “retains the primacy of the Same” (DR, 321 n.11). Whilst Heidegger thinks that the Same is meant to include and comprehend difference, on Deleuze’s reading it is not sufficient to merely differentiate and oppose the Same to the Identical in order to comprehend difference. Deleuze does not reject the concept of the Same; however, rather than the Same including the Different, he says that the Same revolves around the Different. He also admits this seems like a small linguistic change, but suggests that it signals a major upheaval in the concept of difference.
which is beyond it; the self is ‘beside’ itself (it is different) but not ‘away’ from itself (it is the Same).\footnote{We see here one justification for Deleuze’s claim, in \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, that Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche “is closer to his own thought than that of Nietzsche’s” and consequently neglects to criticize “everything Nietzsche fought against” (NP, 220 n. 31). In other words, it retains a primacy of the Same over the Different.}

Deleuze does not think that the contingent encounter that opens a world is given to the human in a pre-ontological manner; instead, this opening is always violent and the loving gift of the world in which we dwell together is infinitely deferred. Affect is the deferral and differing of the pre-ontological analogy between Being and thought. Thus, affect does not lift the self beyond itself into a dwelling amongst beings. Affect is, quite on the contrary, the impossibility of that dwelling, the delay and deferral of that dwelling. There is no \textit{philia} beneath the violence done to the Cartesian Knowing Subject; rather, there is a constant deferral of such \textit{philia} through the repeated violation of the Cartesian Knower. Hence the more famous movement of Foucault and Derrida to target the ‘ontic,’ to struggle in the midst of Knowledge, as opposed to ‘listening’ to how Being has Historically been gifted beneath knowledge.\footnote{More precisely, as Lawlor points out, Heidegger’s thought of the truth of being attempts to reduce ontological distance, to have being close by; however, being is necessarily only ever spoken in ‘ontic’ metaphors (Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl, 40, citing Derrida, MP, 157/131). The ontological proximity cannot be present to us without an ontic metaphor.}

Deleuze’s notion of affect is targeted at Heidegger’s claim that the self is carried beyond itself and yet is carried over to a new kind of dwelling with beings. There can be no ‘event of appropriation’ between Man and being, because affect-force is the infinite delaying and deferring of that moment of gathering. For Heidegger, the event of appropriation is guaranteed by the “jointure” of justice; for Derrida, the delay of the jointure occurs by prioritizing Levinasian justice as the relation to the other.\footnote{We see here one justification for Deleuze’s claim, in \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, that Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche “is closer to his own thought than that of Nietzsche’s” and consequently neglects to criticize “everything Nietzsche fought against” (NP, 220 n. 31). In other words, it retains a primacy of the Same over the Different.}

Affect and force, in Deleuze, foreclose the possibility of “folding” the clearing light of things onto the Language in which man is transported across to things; the folding-clearing is foreclosed by the Derridean-Levinasian relation to the other. Even
though Heidegger’s event is prior to all consciousness and beyond the self, Deleuze’s reading of affect precisely delays being lifting us into a ‘joining’ relationship with beings. The Heideggerian question “demands a response that makes a sense (which was implicit in the question itself) visible” whereas Nietzschean affect, for Deleuze, is the infinite deferral of that response that makes sense.\textsuperscript{280} Heideggerian affect that ‘lifts us’ out across into beings relies on an implicit, existentially shared world; instead, Deleuze’s reading of affect implies a difference from thought that cannot be bridged and does not ‘lift us’ out to an implied and shared world. We see this in the Foucault book: Deleuze contrasts ‘force’ with Heidegger’s folding. Force implies an irreducible and constantly repeated battle of distances, whereas Heidegger’s fold implies that every Seeing also gives us some Saying.\textsuperscript{281}

\textbf{8. Affect as temporal variation in the encounter between combatants}

Deleuze criticizes Heidegger for folding our seeing and our saying too quickly; affect does not carry us across into beings, rather, it is a way in which our perception is put into a state of temporal variation that undoes my spatial world. Sensation always implies multiple levels and connections that cannot be subsumed under the rule of a thought category. Affect is the temporal variation of those levels such that there is no original state of sensation in which thought could be said to hear the truth of being. Deleuze’s new reading of affect will be explored in the next section.

\textsuperscript{279} Cf. Lawlor, 224.
\textsuperscript{280} Cf. Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl, 216.
\textsuperscript{281} This also relates to Deleuze’s critique of Heidegger’s notion of pre-ontological understanding that is developed in \textit{Being and Time}. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze suggests that the pre-ontological understanding shows the way in which Heidegger remains in the Western philosophical tendency to suggest a \textit{philia} between thought and being, prior to all consciousness. Instead of the loving gift, Deleuze will emphasize the thematic of violence between thought and being.
Affect is about a variation in my power of existing, and this is the truth of perception. Perceiving is becoming, for Deleuze: the ability to perceive more and more things that were at first not perceived and were imperceptible. I abandon the phenomenological world of spatial perspectives and solid objects. I become the “human of the temporal perspective” and now time itself acts as perspective, not “I,” “I” no longer ‘intend’ the object; rather, it is time that acts, it is time that provides the perspective. The temporal perception of more and more of the imperceptible is the “true” perspective whereas space always implies “false perspectives.” However, the temporal perspective requires the ability to perceive that which does not let itself be perceived at first; this is the transcendental aspect of Deleuze’s argument, beginning from perception as we experience it, as an “I” who intends objects in space. Spinozan affect concerns this, for Deleuze: attaining a temporal perspective rather than a spatial one. Although we begin with a concept, a representation in itself through which we intend objects in space, my power to exist is “eminently variable” and this variability is the temporal perspective. Perceiving what is formaless implies singular variations in the potentiality [puissance] to exist.

The human, in *Difference and Repetition*, is characterized by representation; however, representations are not ‘bad:’ they can contribute to the affective and temporal nature of perception. Deleuze says that representations can also make my existence vary and “there are always representations.”282 There is no problem with concepts as long as you join them to all you have seen; that is, in the language of *Difference and Repetition*, ‘bringing difference into the concept.’ Join the concept, the representation in itself, to all you have seen, all that is not in the concept, and this is the form of the true. A representation which is not a concept, but one which makes my existence vary is an affect; a representation which makes me able to perceive a greater

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282 Deleuze is not thinking affects as they exist independently of representations, as some readers seem to imply.
number of things is a ‘percept.’ This is the domain, not of truth but of ‘power,’ *puissance*. Power as “ethical” as opposed to moral; we no longer need the moral, instead, we have the ethical.

A key reason that Deleuze thinks Nietzschean struggle is not ‘oppositional’ is that an ‘affect’ *passes between* the parties and transforms them both. The next section will be concerned with Deleuze’s reading of affect in Nietzsche. In the more classical conception of struggle, the two beings are opposed, and then there is either destruction or a reconciliation: typically between individual human person who can say “I.” In the non-oppositional model, there is a transformation inside both bodies as a result of the confrontation. The type of body in question here is not a body of well-defined and limited entities organized around a unifying principle: it is no longer possible to say “I.” Rather, it is a body of uncertain zones, planes or sections; the thresholds between these zones are inscribed by the confrontation of parts upon it. Imperceptible forces, forces unknowable by any higher value, ‘seize’ bodies in this confrontation in which thresholds are established. This unknowable force is the force of affect that transforms the body from the inside, making those bodies ‘become’ something other than what they were. Although this resembles Deleuze and Guattari’s own conception of the body without organs, Deleuze suggests that making or finding a body without organs “had already been Nietzsche’s project: to define the body in its becoming, in its intensity, as the power to affect or be affected, that is, as Will to Power” (ECC: 131).

To help us understand the affective and confrontational transformation of the borders upon bodies, we can turn to Deleuze’s distinction between sensation and affect in his book about the eminent Nietzschean painter Francis Bacon. Sensation is the action of forces *upon* the body that arises when a wave of sensation *inside* the body meets with Forces which act from *outside*

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283 For example, Deleuze references Mrs. Dalloway’s line that she will never again say “I.” Cours Vincennes, 13/12/1983
In the *meeting* ‘between’ an internal bodily ‘wave’ and exterior forces a sensation appears: this is like the meeting between debtor and creditor, always unequal and transformative (49). Sensation is “coagulated” or accumulated like calcium: it operates at several different levels, orders, or domains, between a touch, an odor, a noise (42). All the sense organs are affected in such a way that there is an “existential” and ‘pathetic’ communication between the different levels of sensation, in a “common exercise” of all the organs at once that is the “original unity of the senses.”

The several different orders of a sensation imply an envelopment and synthesis of different levels and organs of sensation.

Some would say that sensation is reducible to movement, implying an *end* or *purpose* that would be directed by consciousness or the will. This kind of sensation resembles the Kantian sensation of a knowable object for an “I.” Yet, for Deleuze, sensation is not reducible to movement; movement is explained by sensation and the elastic multiplicity of the levels of sensation (FB: 45). At most, one could say that the levels of sensation imply a ‘movement on the spot’ or a “spasm” in Bacon that bears witness to the action of “invisible forces” on the body; this movement of spasm would then be nothing but the reaction of conscious will to invisible forces to which the conscious will cannot react, but can only spasm (45).

The wave of sensation caused by the encounter of forces with the body is like a chain of affect: an affect is never the sensation of a unified object, it is a wave or chain inside the body. Affect is the ‘process’ in which forces come into relation; each force can be affected or has a capacity for being affected by other forces. This means that the ‘difference’ between forces is ‘affective,’ it is part of a process of affect, as opposed to being determined by a knowable exterior object. The capacity for being affected relies upon a chain of affects which are in a

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284 (THDWJ, 131)

285 Paintings such as Bacon’s makes this unity visible in the “multisensorial figure” (46)
process of becoming; there is no fixed point at which relations between forces could be
determined; possession and possessing is always undecidable. The capacity for being affected is
not passivity; it is affectivity or sensation. This affective process of differentiation is like a
differential sensibility or a sensibility of difference (NP: 63).

The language and terminology are remarkably similar between the *Nietzsche* book and
the *Bacon* book, despite the 20 years separating them: in both, we can say that a force
encountered by the body causes a wave or chain of affect through the differential sensations that
compose the body in a processual and transient manner. In the 1962 *Nietzsche and Philosophy*,
the relations between embodying forces are determined by how each is “affected” by the others
(NP: 62). The will to power is manifested in a “capacity for being affected” that achieves the
production of differences between forces. Thus, the more “ways a body can be affected” the
more force it has, just as perception is a question of being able to perceive more things and to
‘vary’ your power of existing (62). This capacity for being affected is not passive, but is an
“affectivity, a sensibility, a sensation” (62). The capacity for being affected allows us to return to
the notion of domination: a dominant force is one which compels obedience because it can
perceive more things by varying its own potentialities of existence: a force has affectivity if it
“compels the obedience of inferior forces” (63).

The notion of affect at play here is also found in *A Thousand Plateaus*. A body is defined
by the material elements belonging to it under relations of “movement and rest” and the
“intensive affects” it is capable of a given “power” (ATP: 260). These relations of movement and
affect constitute a “mode of individuation;” they are how bodies come to be individuated (ATP:
261).\(^{286}\) Affect is always an “active discharge of emotion, the counterattack” like a “weapon,”

\(^{286}\) What Deleuze and Guattari call *hacceity*. The emphasis on speed and affect as the two key aspects defining a
body is visible in the following quotation: “This is not an analogy, or a product of the imagination, but a composi-
linking to the violence and domination of force-relations in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*: it is this violence of the affect that characterizes the “war machine” in *A Thousand Plateaus* (400). Thus, a body without organs, they tell us, is known only by the composition of its affects and how they can destroy or be destroyed by another body, to compose a “more powerful body” or to exchange actions and passions (257). This destruction and composition of a more powerful body is precisely the structure of forces that we see in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. ‘Life’ must be understood in terms of the temporal variation of powers of existence: the “unique plane of life” is “the infinity of the modifications that are part of one another;” the infinity of modifications is the ‘affecting-affected’ duality of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (276). This plane is “a fixed plane, upon which things are distinguished from one another only by speed and slowness” (276).

9. Affect as active liberation of the body from thought: madness as an example of this liberation

Affective transformation is strongly associated with the notion of activity in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. ‘Active’ force is a very famous Deleuzian term, being taken up as a new thinking of ‘agency,’ most prominently by Rosi Braidotti. However, the meaning of ‘activity’ plays an extremely variable role in Deleuze’s thought and each of his books places it in a new light. Zourabichvili is, I think, correct to suggest that Deleuze is always looking to ‘rupture’ ‘action,’ action being taken here to imply goals, purposes and ends related to a self-identical subject. I would say, more specifically, that ‘activity’ in the Bacon book is the best illustration of the concept of active force in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*: activity is a ‘fall’ through the various

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287 Deleuze “puts action in crisis, and conceives action only from out of such a state of crisis. He wants rhythm in action” (Zourabichvili:130). Derrida has also noted how activity in Deleuze’s Nietzsche is primarily defined as an
levels of sensation down to the very ground of intensity, which equals 0, or is empty of any object or sensation, and is therefore pure intensity. The reason Deleuze uses the word ‘fall’ to describe the development of sensation is because the development of sensation is a plurality which can only be represented by being approximated to a negation which is equal to 0. Kant finds the principle of this fall, intensity, when he defines it as a magnitude of plurality that can only be represented by its approximation to negation = 0 apprehended in the instant. What is “active” is that which descends and falls, but not in space; it is the ‘fall’ like the passage through the difference of levels within sensation. Sensation develops itself by falling actively from one level to another; falling is, more comprehensibly, “development.” The fall “affirms” the difference in level as such, at the heart of sensation; it is the “movement” that is most interior to sensation, it is ‘the clinamen.’ The fall is what is most living in sensation: the sensation experiences itself as living in this fall that occurs with an “active rhythm.”

In the book *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, active forces play a variety of roles, but the most important concept is transformation, dominance and the affirmation of difference. Active forces take hold of a body through transformation and imposing forms, which mean it is “noble” and characterized by “energy”. There are three main types of transformative forming force: 1) they can be a dominant force, 2) they can go to the limit of what it can do, and 3) and they can affirm their difference from other forces. By making the difference between itself and other forces an

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288 Althusser also relates the fall to material activity and the chance at the foundation of the world: “Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist” (Wittgenstein):53 the world is every thing that ‘falls’, everything that ‘comes about [advient], ‘everything that is the case’ —by case, let us understand casus: at once occurrence and chance, that which comes about in the mode of the unforeseeable, and yet of being.” (Althusser, Encounter, 190).

289 This is the problem of “intensity,” which links to *Difference and Repetition*; thus ‘sensation’ is thereby related to intensity.

290 This is why section 2 is called “Distinction of Forces”.

291 Deleuze summarizes active forces as follows: “Active force is: 1) plastic, dominant and subjugating force; 2) force which goes to the limit of what it can do; 3) force which affirms its difference, which makes its difference an object of enjoyment and affirmation” (61).
object of “affirmation,” the active force “affirms its difference” in quantity from other forces and thereby “goes to the limit of its consequences” (NP: 55, 56, 66). Active forces go to the limit of self-transformation and make their difference from other forces into an object of affirmation and enjoyment.\(^{292}\) Affirmation is the affirmation of difference between the affirming force and other forces.

We do not ‘know’ what a body can do, because ‘doing’ or activity are not in the nature of consciousness. Active forces, by their nature, escape consciousness, and are unconscious. Deleuze repeats the claim about the unconsciousness of active forces multiple times. The active forces make a self from the body (NP: 66); here, the notion of self must be linked to the passive or larval selves in *Difference and Repetition*, as opposed to referring to a kind of Kantian or Schopenhauerian unified, willing self. Appropriating and dominating are the forms of active forces that means imposing and creating forms. This is strange because intensities do not impose forms; however, they give rise to individuals, which could be considered similar to formed beings. Lamarck is admired by Nietzsche for presenting a plastic force, or a force of metamorphosis. Active force is energy capable of transforming itself, the ‘dionysiac power.’

One way of understanding the wider philosophical implications of affect here is to think about the relation of the body and thought in Descartes’ account of madness. Just as in madness, a true affect means that I am longer in possession of my body. By looking at Foucault’s conception of his differences from Derrida on this question of the body in Descartes we can stage a proxy war for the difference between Heidegger and Deleuze on Nietzsche.

Heidegger reads affect as my being carried beyond the self to a world with which I am gathered; Deleuze reads it as precisely a shock that dislocates the self from the world in which it was previously gathered. This difference is analogous to the difference between Foucault and

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Derrida on the question of madness and dreams: madness is “the entirely other” that “deforms and transforms: it gives rise to another scene,” as opposed to the dream that merely “doubles” the “scene where I am” and “pins itself onto present perception” (Foucault, 1998: 399). The ‘entirely other’ scene that transforms and deforms is the full implication of Deleuze’s reading of affect; for Heidegger, affect retains the world to which I am taken, just as dreams merely double the scene where I am and are pinned to present perception.

The status of the body in this debate also helps us to clarify the importance of affect. My body is the vivid and the near, the system of actuality of this present moment, this precise instant; it is not the body ‘in general’ (408). The body and its actuality resists “in fact” the meditation of the rational subject who ‘wills’ or desires the truth: place, gesture, sensation, in short, affect resist. Madmen are completely deluded as to what constitutes their actuality. The madmen are exemplars of the “illusion of the senses;” the madman receives all falsities into his beliefs (414). This belief in illusion makes it impossible to effect in oneself the generalized or universalized doubt that constitute the rationally meditating Cartesian subject (407).

Derrida shows that the philosopher goes directly to “calling into question the “totality of beingness”;” Foucault wants to undermine this privilege of the philosopher. Speaking of the totality of beingness, Foucault is implicitly criticizing the Heideggerian undertones of Derrida’s reading (411). Madness calls into question the Derridean-Heideggerian approach because it is in excess of the totality of beingness (414). Derrida upholds the philosophical subject as a voluntary, controlled master who never lets himself be surprised (414). He therefore gives a “limitless sovereignty” to the master’s voice and restates the text indefinitely (416). He does this

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293 They are actually naked, but they believe themselves dressed, they are actually poor but believe themselves to be kings (409)
294 For some people, madness can be a revealer of truth; for Descartes, the actuality resists the exercise of rational meditation too strongly and thus can never reveal truth (409).
by saying there is nothing “outside” the text but that, at the same time, the “sense of being” and the “reserve of the origin” is said in the silences and erasures of the text (416).

The madman receives all falsities into his beliefs, while the rational subject takes great care not to receive any falsity into his belief, secured through the example of dreaming (415). In madness, you take your “self” to be what it is “not” because you believe in illusions and fantasies due to the medical status of a brain gorged with vapor (402). The madman does not consider the falsity of his belief; he merely believes in falsity; the meditating subject considers the falsity that he postulates. The dream, on the other hand, is pinned to the present moment and does not provide a transformation of the scene. The difference between the Derridean dream and Foucaultian madness marks the separation of Deleuze and Heidegger on Nietzschean affect.

10. The irreducible difference of the body from thought

Affect is a temporal variation in perception that is irreducible to thought; this irreducibility is a radical difference between thought and sensation. We must now examine this famous notion of difference more closely. This next section will combat a common misconception about Deleuze’s Nietzsche: Difference is not a state of ‘things in themselves’ in their fluxing vitality; it is not some state of things that must be thought. The ‘dogmatic materialism’ that posits an ontology of forces misses the relation of difference to thought. Difference is the difference of being from thought, the constant differing of sensations from concepts. The next section will explore what Deleuze sees as Nietzsche’s notion of difference;

295 Dreaming allows the search for truth to be rationally carried out; one can continue to meditate with validity, with qualification, excluding “everything that is not manifest truth” (410).

296 Madmen are juridically disqualified by Descartes, but medically described. The description and the disqualification rely on different discourses, and this is significant for Foucault; Descartes switches registers when he wants to philosophically exclude the madmen from assisting in the search for rational truth (409).
this will show why the undifferentiated notion of the body in Kant and German Idealism is the background to Nietzsche’s novel thought of the body.

Forces are quantitative in the differential sense of quantity: a quantity is only what is in its difference from to other quantities; it is purely relational, there is no absolute ‘unit’ of measure. Deleuze is employing quantity here in relation to the history of number that differs from, for example, Husserl’s early notion of number. For Husserl, as Jacques Taminaux reads it, the origin of number is a mental act of “collectively binding together” that derives from the psychological “penchant for unification” (Taminaux, 2004: 14). Deleuze will see this binding as secondary to and derivative of the inequality which is bound. There is a basic inequality that is retained in relation to the “next-lowest” type of number; for example, fractions contain an irreducible lack of equality between the two parts of the fraction and the whole; ‘irrational’ numbers contain an irreducible inequality in relation to fractions. Every number, Deleuze claims, contains a “difference of quantity which cannot properly be cancelled” (DR: 232). This is the ‘original’ nature of number or quantity; there is a secondary nature of number that is ‘extensive’ and that cancels out the differences, based on a common unit of measure.

Difference is the origin of number, for Deleuze, and this is why force-relations are themselves quantitative. There can be no equalizable measure between force-quantities: each time a force ‘appropriates’ other forces, the measure itself is different; each time a measurement is made, the measure changes (NP: 42-3). Abstract measures of quantity tend towards an “identification” and “equalization” (43). We can never know quantity abstractly, in itself, and thus we have no objective measure like a spatial measurement, a principle or a law by which to measure all quantities, other than the principle of their difference and the differentiation of the

297 Cf. Kant’s notion of intensive quantity.
measure of force itself. Indeed, encounters of force quantities are the concrete parts of chance that are ‘strangers to all law,’ implying their irreducibility to thought and concepts, just as Kantian spatial determinations are irreducible to conceptual ones.

Deleuze himself notes the seeming paradox here: all forces are reducible to the numerical and quantitative scale; and yet, a purely quantitative determination of forces is abstract, incomplete, ambiguous. The reason for this is that forces are inseparable from their quantity but also from their relations to other forces, which means they are inseparable from their difference in quantity. What principally interests Nietzsche, according to Deleuze, is the irreducibility of the difference of quantity to equality, and quality itself is that which is unequalizable or impossible to cancel out within difference of quantity.

Forces are irreducibly different from one another; they are multiple, but not the multiple as a degraded form of the one, or the multiple of things which are themselves ‘one.’ Instead, forces form a “substantive multiplicity:” they cannot be reduced to the unity of one force or one phenomena, and there is no ‘field’ upon which forces act; rather, forces are the field itself (NP: 40). The field is not a ‘ground’ relative to a figure; it is not an ‘overcoming’ of a finitude. This is why the body is “composed of a plurality of irreducible forces” (42). The basic form of intensity is the field, in which everything communicates in a confused and unclear way with everything else. We can see this in the case of a white wall: all the parts of the wall communicate insofar as you perceive them as white, but when you try to consciously try to identify a relation between them, that relation is unclear. This ‘field’ of intensity is like the spatial depth that makes it

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298 This builds on Deleuze’s wider reading of time in the history of philosophy: in Greek philosophy up to Kant, time was measured by something outside of it; for example, the unfolding of divine reason or the movement of the cosmic entities. After Kant, there is no ‘measure’ of time; time alone is the unmeasurable measure. The form of change is the only non-changing aspect of existence.

299 Cf. the famous examples of the left and the right hand, and the definition of an equilateral triangle using the exterior concept of the perpendicular line.
possible to perceive a single object. This field is not external to the intensities communicating across their differences. Although the spatial depth of intensity can never be consciously perceived as an object like a brick might be, you can have a kind of non-cognitive, strange experience of intensity when you look at a white wall. This is why Deleuze can say that intensity occurs within what he calls “pure intuition,” that pure intuition of the spatial field of depth. The spatial field of depth is nothing other than the differences between elements of the field.

In Deleuze’s book on Foucault, he writes that forces are inseparable from “their distances from one another” (Deleuze, 1988: 71, see also 72). Forces are essentially material distances, but they are also in perpetual ‘variation’ in the Foucault book; by noting this connection, we can suggest that in the Cinema books, the word ‘force’ is replaced by that of the image: “everything, that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions: this is universal variation” (Deleuze, 1986: 58). Indeed, whilst the body is the ‘unity’ of a multiplicity of forces in the Nietzsche book, Deleuze draws on Bergson in Cinema 1 to suggest that “my body is an image” (58). This emphasis on distance and variation is, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, summed up in the idea that “the origin is the difference in the origin” and in “distance being the differential element included in each force and by which each is related to others” (NP: 6, 7). Variation and difference thus define a kind of basic materiality of the universe, which in Nietzsche and Philosophy and Foucault is named ‘force’, and in the Cinema books is named ‘image’.

11. The exteriority of the body from thought: the cosmos as the unknowable outside

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300 “The original depth, by contrast, is indeed space as a whole, but space as an intensive quantity: the pure spatium” (220). “Space as pure intuition or spatium is an intensive quantity” (221).
The next section will enrich the notion of bodies as in an affective and unequal combat-exchange by focussing on the way those bodies are constituted by their relations with other bodies outside of themselves. Heidegger reads the body in Nietzsche as a finite individual being that attempts to overcome external resistance; there is an opposition between the finite being and the resistant outside. Instead, Deleuze reads the body as essentially constituted by its relations with bodies outside of itself.

One way to begin to think about exteriority is to think about a force from the outside: a force is like a shock, something unexpected and unknown that cannot be sensed as a unified object. Deleuze uses the word force to characterize the body in Nietzsche. The word ‘force’ is a strange one, but this notion of the unknown shock points to the rigorous philosophical justification behind it. Deleuze is trying to find a concept of exteriority which would neither indicate a perceptible object, nor ‘things in themselves’, nor a subjective sensation, but rather the condition of all externality of phenomena amongst themselves, prior to all sensation. Although it seems like a strange, pre-critical conception of how ‘things’ are (as, for example, Judith Butler suggests, Butler, 1987: 215), it is actually a transcendentally motivated notion of the outside.\(^{303}\) This is clear in the use of the word ‘force’ in his book on the painter Francis Bacon: force is that which comes to us from outside and produces a sensation. We cannot conceptualize those forces or find a principle of reason which would account for them\(^{304}\): we experience the outside as a force. It is this irreducibly exterior force that we will explore in the following section.

\(^{301}\) In the text, Deleuze writes: “space as pure intuition or spatium is an intensive quantity” (221). Intensive quantity is the essence of intensity, so for our purposes we can say that intensity exists only within pure intuition. This notion of ‘pure intuition’ in Difference and Repetition has not received much attention in the literature.

\(^{302}\) In “in-itself of the image” is “matter”

\(^{303}\) Cf. Heidegger’s reading of the outside in Kant as the relations of exteriority between things as appearances among themselves.

\(^{304}\) This is the path Maimon tries to take by accounting for space and time by appealing to a Leibnizian infinite understanding, and Deleuze precisely criticizes him for doing so, preferring to retain Kant’s radical splitting of the subject between space-time and conceptuality. Cf. Daniella Voss’s article on Deleuze and Maimon.
Deleuze’s reading of the radical exteriority of the body in Nietzsche brings it into line with the exteriority of space in Kant. According to Deleuze, Kantian space is the form of that which “opens us” and comes to us from an ‘outside,’ as the ‘milieu’ of exteriority; it opens us to no determined “thing” or “being,” but to an x, a milieu of exteriority, implying ‘eruptions’ and ‘overflows.’\(^{305}\) This opening to an eruptive and overflowing exteriority is possible because space is emancipated from the ‘logical order’ of concepts; thus liberated from concepts, it is an aesthetic space, aesthesis indicating the radical exteriority of sensibility from concepts. Heidegger, similarly, suggesting that the Kantian space of the “outside” is composed of extrinsic relations given to us in sensuous affection as a “manifold” which is continually in turmoil or flux (Heidegger, 1997: 346). What fascinates Heidegger about Kant is that Being as positing is only possible if something is “given” to our positing through the flux of sensual affection from out of the extrinsic relations of the “outside.” Thinking, after Kant, is irreducibly related to affection by the senses and is, as such, ‘ensconced’ in human subjectivity that is essentially affected by sensibility; such affection is what Heidegger calls finitude (350).\(^{306}\) It is this excessive, overflowing outside of thought that is the context for Deleuze’s reading of the exteriority of relations of force in Nietzsche.

Force is exterior to both the sensations of the knowing subject and the concepts of the understanding; firstly, we can look at its exteriority to thought or consciousness. Force is exterior to thought (Ideas) and concepts. It is an essential aspect of force or intensity that it cannot be ‘thought.’\(^{307}\) Deleuze’s reading of Kant already points in the direction of intensity: the free

\(^{305}\) Cf. Deleuze, Leibniz Lecture 4, 1980.

\(^{306}\) To be very clear, we can see here that Heidegger’s notion of Being which is not a being is closely related to the sensuous affection of intuition in Kant; in short, Being is closely related to the existential openness of the materiality of the body. However, Heidegger is wary of the linguistic associations with words such as the body and materiality, and thus his language is pared down to Being.

\(^{307}\) Understanding this point relies on specifying exactly what concepts and thought are; a question which will occupy us later.
matter of the beautiful forces the conceptual understanding beyond itself. In the Nietzschean context, Klossowski calls this the suffering of thought: “In the intensity of pain or pleasure, and especially in voluptuousness, the 'person' disappears for a moment, and what remains of consciousness at that point is strictly limited to the corporeal symptom that its very structure inverts” (Klossowski, 1997: 28). The ‘force’ of a pain or pleasure is ‘exterior’ to conceptual consciousness, such that it can cause the thinking ‘person’ to disappear, leaving only the corporeal impulses at the basis of consciousness. The chaos of the impulses is prior to the self-representation of being, in Klossowski’s terms; the outside can never be gathered by any kind of interiority. 308 “Evil and suffering” are the result of the irreducibility of “the body’s multiplicity, with its millions of vague impulses” to the interpretive “stubbornness of the meaning bestowed on it by the brain” (33). The radical inability of thought to gather together the multiplicity of the body means that, for Nietzsche, “the act of thinking became identical with suffering, and suffering with thinking” (23).

We see this blinding of thought by the multiplicity of the body in Kant. Intensity in Kant is greater insofar as it inhibits representations; as Longuenesse writes, “a representation is "more or less intense" according to the multiplicity of representations it inhibits; a very great pain makes one deaf and blind toward any other representation” (Longuenesse, 2000: 320). The body’s intensive fluctuations inhibit representations because they are irreducible to conceptual determinations. Sensation, as Longuenesse reads it, is “our only source of cognition of the intensive magnitude of the real of appearances.” What this means is that we cannot apply quantitative “determination” or measure to the sensation of intensity: these rely on determining

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308 Chaos, the key term in Klossowski’s reading of Nietzsche is “a state prior to this self-fabulation” at the heart of being (Klossowski, 139).
‘extensive’ magnitude, which in turn requires synthesis in relationship to the unity of apperception and its conceptual understanding (Longuenesse, 2000: 320).

Although Kant has a productive and important notion of intensity for Deleuze, there is, ultimately, a primacy given to the subject in Kant. It can seem that the subject is also central to Nietzsche’s thinking of intensive force. Deleuze is naturally concerned by occasions when Nietzsche seems to talk about how ‘we’ human beings ‘feel’ forces and seems to slip into a kind of anthropomorphism; he suggests, however, that the “Nietzschean principle” is that there is a “subjectivity of the universe” that is no longer anthropomorphic but “cosmic” (NP: 44). This is a rigorous attempt to do justice to Kantian space as the form of that which comes from outside: that which is truly outside the subject is the cosmos, but as such it is unknowable. A useful way to understand this is to appeal to Deleuze’s talk of intensity as the limit of sensation; that is to say, force (or intensity) is not something which we could positively conceptualize; rather, it is a kind of concept of limit. This thought of the outside of thought is why the theme of the impossibility of thinking is so important to Deleuze. We can now see how this plays out in Nietzsche.

The fact that the force of the outside is not reducible to a thinking subject is clear from aphorism 20 in the third essay of the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche writes that “every great feeling” that is “discharged suddenly” has the capacity to “tear the human soul loose from its moorings” (GM: 3, 20). This action of ‘tearing’ the soul from its moorings implies that which is

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309 Maimon breaks this rule because he wants to progress to the limits of experience by “continually pushing forward in infinite thought,” whereas, as Daniella Voss points out, Deleuze invokes a violent encounter with the “highest object of sensibility, that is, ‘the sublime’” which “obtrudes itself upon our sense and forces us to think” (Voss, The Concepts of Difference and Intensive Magnitude 83).

310 The language of the world of chaos of forces is also very close to Heidegger’s account of the body in Nietzsche, which he relates to the Kantian notion of intuition.

311 This is why projects such as, DeLanda’s, to discover a conceptual system which would account for material differentiation, completely miss the philosophical significance of Deleuze’s notion of intensity: it is about thinking the outside of the conceptual (or “bringing difference into the concept”), not trying conceptualizing the outside.
beyond a simple sensation of consciousness; it is irreducible to a potentially knowable sensation. The reference to ‘great feelings’ beyond the specifically human soul is also important here: these affects are ultimately exterior not just to the ideality of the human but also to the Kantian form of space as that which corresponds to the unity of apperception. ‘Great feelings’ alert us to something radically exterior to the human knower, visible also in the way in which Kantian space is taken up by the romantics as an “excessive” outside.

What is important here is the transcendental nature of Nietzsche’s argument: he is not positing a pre-critical framework of ‘cosmic’ forces, but rather an explanation of the condition of possibility of the tearing loose of the human soul from its moorings. My argument here is compounded when we read Nietzsche’s famous lines about the body as commander: “Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise man – he is called self. He lives in your body, he is your body” (Z: Book 1, On the Despisers of the Body). The most important words for my argument here are ‘behind’ and ‘unknown:’ the impossibility of ‘knowing’ these forces suggests we are not in the realm of pre-critical things in themselves or objects of knowledge in the Kantian sense. The word ‘behind’ suggests the transcendental nature of the argument: the ‘commander,’ or wise man that ‘lives’ in your body is behind your feelings, in the sense of ‘who’ is behind this action, accounting for the action. This transcendental aspect is further confirmed when Nietzsche calls the body a “great reason,” the body is the reason for spirit and sense. The body as self ‘seeks’ with the eyes of senses and listens with the spirit, that is to say, it is the “great reason” of the spirit and the senses: this is not

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312 The ‘tearing loose’ from its moorings by a great feeling can be related to the crack-up or the blow from outside in A Thousand Plateaus. Despite the influence of the book on those who want to escape ‘the human’ and get to ‘matter,’ we see the central position the human still occupies in the book in this notion of the crack up, and the tearing loose of the human soul.

313 The ‘transcendental’ nature of Nietzsche’s argument about the body is similar to Schopenhauer’s arguments for the will. He moves from inner experiences of motivation and striving to a Will which explains those phenomena.
an empirical description of objects, it is a transcendental claim about the reason for the empirical. Just as Nietzsche talks about great feelings that tear the soul loose from its moorings, Deleuze talks about intensity in terms of harrowing experiences that take us to the limit of sensibility in a transcendental sense: vertigo or pharmacodynamic experiences reveal the transcendental difference that lies behind the sensations of the knowing subject (DR: 327).

The relationality inherent in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche on force is a precursor to his later notion of assemblage. Indeed, Nietzsche himself talks about the ‘arrangement’ between forces that results in a union between forces, just as Deleuze sees the assemblage as the minimal form of real unity. This is also true insofar as the assemblage has two sides, the side of words and the side of things; similarly, an ‘arrangement’ of forces that results in an individual phenomenon is always determined by a ‘will’ that is radically different in nature from force and is like a power of abstraction. Thus, there are two sides of every phenomenon, the force (body) and the will (‘thought’).

Christoph Cox suggests that forces are not mini-intentional units, but rather tendencies or directions; what is key here is the kind of external relation which is constitutive of force. Force as affect is, for Cox, the “primitive” “bottom floor” in Nietzsche’s multilevel theory of subjectivity (Cox, 1999: 127). However, Nietzsche does not conceive of forces as ‘entities’ or “atomic, singular, and unified” and they cannot have “perspectives and interpretations” in the way other commentators such as Richardson thinks they can (Richardson, 1996: 128). Nietzsche

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The key Kantian insight is always beginning from appearances within experience, as opposed to beginning with a principle of explanation, of which appearances would then be merely a distortion.

314 “The point of sensory distortion is often to grasp intensity independently of extensity or prior to the qualities in which it is developed. A pedagogy of the senses, which forms an integral part of ‘transcendentalism’, is directed towards this aim. Pharmacodynamic experiences or physical experiences such as vertigo approach the same result: they reveal to us that difference in itself, that depth in itself or that intensity in itself at the original moment at which it is neither qualified nor extended. At this point, the harrowing character of intensity, however weak, restores its true meaning: not the anticipation of perception but the proper limit of sensibility from the point of view of a transcendent exercise” (DR, 327).
thinks of forces in terms of the "force-points" posited by Boscovich that are not ‘particles’ or ‘atoms’ of matter; instead they are “temporary dams or accumulations,” related to tendencies and directions (128). Just as in Deleuze’s account of Nietzsche these directional tendencies are purely relational: they “relate one state to another,” as “the state between two states—what Nietzsche describes as "the state 'towards which ' [der Zustand, von dem weg]" or "the state 'away from which ' [der Zustand, zu dem hin]" (BGE 19)” (Cox, 1999: 128).

12. Conclusion

To conclude, we can look at the importance of our reading by examining the dual nature of affirming, split between thought and force. Often, ‘affirmation’ is seen in a dogmatic materialist way: affirmation is the affirmation of the the things in themselves that are the genesis of thought, independently of the mind. I claim that the affective forces of the body are not the origin or genesis of thought in Deleuze. Affirmation is not merely the affirmation of the body; instead, there are ‘two’ affirmations in both Nietzsche and Philosophy and Difference and Repetition. The first affirmation is that of the field of intensive and affective forces; the second is a problem that arises within thought itself and redistributes the co-ordinates of our unconscious diagrammatic landscape. The important point is that affirmation is not merely related to the body, on Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche; affirmation is split between bodies and thinking. This reduces the importance of the body as it is usually taken. I do not claim the body has no importance; instead, I have used this chapter to show the true significance of the body on Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. I have emphasized the body not as genetic origin of thought, but as violently differentiating itself from thought, as asserting its irreducible exteriority in a manner that shocks thought.
The real place of the body in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is not as the genesis of thinking but as a response to the notion of sensation and materiality as undifferentiated. As Derrida writes about Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche, it is a critique of “philosophy as active indifference to difference” that represses of difference (Derrida, 1985: 17). We saw how this played out in Kant, Schelling and Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*. Marx has something of this notion also in what Althusser calls his ‘Revolutionary’ thinking that posits an overcoming of all sensible difference in the realization of the perfect human. However, Marx also points towards Nietzsche in his thought of the ‘encounter’ as a contingent event that founds the Order of the world.

One misunderstanding of Nietzsche sees the contingent event in terms of an oppositional structure between an ordering force and an oppressive outside. Deleuze, on the other hand, sees Nietzschean combat in terms of an affect that is created ‘between’ the combatants. This ‘between’ emphasizes the affective violence and that is irreducibly different from any of the partners involved in combat, shocking them out of themselves. Differential, violent and exterior affect characterize the body’s relation to thought as opposed to genesis and origin. Derrida has emphasized this: difference of force in Deleuze’s Nietzsche is not identical with the sensible or with intuition; rather, it is the “different and deferred, differing-deferring” relation between the intelligible concept and the sensible intuition (Derrida, 1985: 17).

The deflationary reading of the body in Deleuze’s Nietzsche means that the ‘basis’ of that reading does not lie in intensive materiality; instead, it lies in a new relation of thought to the outside. Derrida articulates an important point: one must not attempt to articulate the “thought of” force, but rather refer to force as the “other of” language, without which language would not
be what it is (Derrida, 1980: 27). Force, Derrida writes, is the “finitude of thought itself in its relationship to Being.” Similarly, immanence in Deleuze is does not mean thought is ‘immanent to’ matter or that matter is the genesis or origin of thought. Immanence indicates an infinite confrontation between thought and being. It is this confrontation that we will turn to in the next chapter.

Foucault shows why merely thinking the fleeting differences of the body is not enough. The fleeting present of the ‘flaneur’ in Baudelaire is insufficient to characterize the attitude of modernity. What is necessary is to give the fleeting present a kind of duration or even eternity, through a style of existence which, with Foucault and Baudelaire, we can call the ‘dandy:’ “To be modern is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration: what Baudelaire, in the vocabulary of his day, calls dandyisme” (Foucault, 1998b: 311). Speaking of dandies and the elaboration of a style of existence, we can characterize the insufficiency of merely contingent becoming in terms of Deleuze’s reading of Bacon:

“Bacon is asked if anyone at all, such as his cleaning woman, would be capable of making random marks or not. And this time, the complex response is that, yes, the cleaning woman could do it in principle, abstractly; but she could not do it in fact, because she would not know how to utilize this chance or how to manipulate it. It is in the manipulation, in the reaction of the manual marks on the visual whole, that chance becomes pictorial or is integrated into the act of painting” (FB: 95).

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315 In Derrida’s article “Force and Signification,” the notions of ‘force’ and ‘value’ seem to be almost foundational, echoing the fundamental notions of force and value-bestowing will in Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche, published the year before.
316 As Klossowski puts it, the body is mute, and that muteness means it is open to enclosure by thought, but also that thought must taken that muteness into itself, not merely take it as an object: “Thanks to the body’s muteness, we appropriate the body for ourselves in order to remain upright” (Klossowski, 1997: 31).
That is to say, random chance sensations, “traits [chance marks] and color-patches” are not enough: “they must be reinjected into the visual whole” (101). The chance marks of the pure sensibility are not enough alone; they must be made consistent. The “accident” becomes durable in this way: chance and necessity are brought together, the fleeting moment is given its own form of eternity (126).

The question we are faced with, then is the question of art. Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche confirms the inadequacy of the body alone and the necessity of art. Art does not passively accept becoming; it *dwells upon* them and sees them with clarity; it “takes Becoming up into itself” (N1: 69, 135). The taking up and dwelling on Becoming implies a “creation of the highest order” (220). It is to this creation that the next chapter will turn.
Chapter 5

Deleuze and Heidegger beyond nihilism: the confrontational affinity of thought and being in Nietzsche

Prior chapters have laid out the error in reading Deleuze and Nietzsche and have proposed corrections: materiality is not a ‘thing in itself’ that thought must somehow return to. Instead, the material variation of the ordering of appearance is a transcendental condition of any appearance. However, merely telling new stories about that transcendental condition is not enough; the contingency of the body and its exteriority from thought are not enough. As much as Deleuze admires Zen and Abstract Expressionism, merely eradicating representational consciousness is not enough. The nihilistic self-enclosing movement of thought is infinitely adept at capturing that which lies outside of it. What is necessary is a conception of thought that somehow accounts for the constant need for liberation from this self-enclosing movement.

This chapter deals with the most central but difficult aspects of Heidegger, Deleuze and their readings of Nietzsche. It is the heart of my creative and positive contribution to mapping the unthought landscape of French 1960s philosophy. As such, it deals with topics that are less familiar than the previous chapters. In order to mitigate the difficulty of these topics, I frame the chapter with more a well-established historical context, the two paths of thought that Nietzsche lays out in The Birth of Tragedy: the theoretical, Socratic totalization of modernity, and the artistic vision of thought that accounts for its own generation. These are what Foucault calls, citing Nietzsche, the two sides of thought’s ethical activity upon its outside: enclosure and liberation (Foucault, 1994: 328).

317 This chapter deals with what even Deleuze admits are “the most obscure parts of Nietzsche’s philosophy and forms an almost esoteric element on the doctrine of the eternal return” (NP: 69).
318 The unspoken landscape is Deleuze calls the “cry” of a philosophy posed in its basic problem and hidden beneath its conceptual ‘song’ of melodic and harmonic connections (Deleuze 1980a).
After laying out the basic problems of *The Birth of Tragedy*, I show how this plays into Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche as the culmination of Western philosophy. Simply, the human artist creates a vision of the fundamental process of generation, a vision that re-creates and repeats the action of primal being, allowing us to become conscious of the generation of consciousness. For Heidegger, this repeats the fundamental thought of Western philosophy: a ‘harmony’ between thought and being, in which thought merely repeats an activity of being. In the case of Nietzsche, the poetic overcoming of everyday consciousness is merely a mirror of the self-overcoming activity of life. This self-overcoming is merely the re-configuration of modes of presence; everything is appearance and its variation; there is no absence or concealment. Heidegger thinks Nietzschean art makes presence and showing permanent, successfully completing the basic thrust of the Western metaphysics of presence that has dominated it since its first beginning. This is how Nietzsche completes nihilism: he makes the nihilistic lack of permanence into a monstrous new permanence. According to Deleuze, these themes are present in Nietzsche, but merely as a hangover from the Romantic and German Idealist post-Kantian theme of self-overcoming. Instead, Deleuze extracts a very different and almost opposite Nietzsche, emphasizing the fragment and its Whole as opposed to the self, its world and its overcoming.

After laying out Heidegger’s criticism of ‘harmony’ in Nietzsche, I show how it seems to have purchase upon the heart of Deleuze’s uptake of Nietzsche in the centrality of a ‘noble affinity’ between life and thought. Nevertheless, this ‘noble affinity’ is not a simplistic harmony; rather it implies a confrontation or smashing of limitations. This is necessary because the confrontation with nihilism is not a single act that would break history into two parts; rather,

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319 I deal with *The Birth of Tragedy* for a similar reason: it’s framework is clear and well-known, providing a solid foundation for the more difficult explorations in Deleuze.
nihilism continually recurs, and thus we must confront it over and over again: thought and being endlessly turn towards and away from one another. Nevertheless, this is ambiguous in Deleuze’s early reading of Nietzsche; I go on to show how Deleuze moves away from the connotations of moving ‘outside’ and ‘above’ the human in an ‘end’ of nihilism towards a notion of two paths that lie within the human and that can liberate us from Man as the form of eternity. These two paths imply, on the one hand, a continual return of nihilism within the actual, technological course of history, and, on the other hand, a continual poetic creation that breaks with and escapes from that nihilistic history in a positive manner. There is no grand movement of overcoming in which the Individual Heroic Genius destroys the world of nihilism and founds a new poetic world. Rather, nihilism continually liberates fragments within itself in an unthinking manner; the task of thinking is to gather those fragments in a Whole. To lay out this conception of the fragmenting Whole, I examine Deleuze’s writings on Foucault, Francis Bacon and Kostas Axelos. In conclusion, I show how Deleuze subverts Heidegger’s criticisms of Nietzsche and thinks a Nietzschean path beyond Heidegger himself.

1. The generation of worlds of appearance and the Socratic theoretical perspective

in The Birth of Tragedy

The Birth of Tragedy is useful for us as a common basis for the divergent readings of Deleuze and Heidegger in relation to the confrontational harmony of thought and being in Nietzsche. In the next section, we will explore the basic ontology of The Birth of Tragedy: firstly, the partial world of everyday appearances; secondly, the world of pure form and finally the Dionysian depths which generates those worlds. Modernity is defined by the attempt to encapsulate appearances within an ideal form, concealing the generation of appearing worlds.
We will explore this concealment before moving onto the fundamental question of the poetic vision of a form that reveals its own generation in the depths. Deleuze and Heidegger give two different readings of the relation between poetic thought and the living depths: is it a relation of designation and harmony, or one of confrontation?

The basic conception of reality in the Birth of Tragedy involves three worlds: firstly, nature as the world-artist that never appears as an image; secondly, the everyday, waking human world of partial and confused images and appearances; and thirdly, the dream world of pure and individuated forms of images and appearances.\textsuperscript{320} The ‘aim’ of the book is to bring the world-artist into the everyday human world by producing a human image that would carry out the activity of the world-artist.

The everyday world is the daylight, waking world of partial images and appearances in which human beings are trapped.\textsuperscript{321} This is what Nietzsche calls the world in general, empirical existence, ‘our’ reality, and the daylight world.\textsuperscript{322} It is a representation (Vorstellung) composed of images and forms that are only partial, never complete, and never fully intelligible.\textsuperscript{323} We are ‘trapped’ within the world of images because we can never move outside of it and see it as a whole. This trap is not due to the ‘natural attitude’ or average everydayness of consciousness; it is the lie of a specific culture which tricks us into living with its specific world of appearances.\textsuperscript{324}

\textsuperscript{320} Nietzsche’s names for the basic aspects of reality emerge from his encounter with Schopenhauer: the ‘thing in itself’ is, for Nietzsche, nature itself is an ‘image-less’ world-artist; what Schopenhauer calls the world of representation is, in Nietzsche, the world of appearances or images.

\textsuperscript{321} This is Nietzsche’s take on the theme of appearance in philosophy, from the Platonic distortion of Ideas by sensations to the Kantian ‘phenomena’ behind which there are only ever conditions.

\textsuperscript{322} The “world in general” and “empirical existence” and “our reality” is a “representation” (Vorstellung) (BT, 4, 26)\textsuperscript{323} the “partially intelligible reality of the daylight world” (BT, 1, 15)

\textsuperscript{323} the “partially intelligible reality of the daylight world” (BT, 1, 15)

\textsuperscript{324} Culture specifically tricks people of higher understanding; it makes us keep on living, despite the eternal contradiction, are: the first trick is the Socratic pleasure in understanding through limited concepts; the second trick is the artistic or Hellenic captivation by beauty; and the third trick is the tragic or Buddha illusion that life ‘flows on’ beneath appearances, unbroken, whereas in fact the ‘primal unity’ is continually shattered by appearance (BT, 18, 85).
A ‘purified’ version of the appearances of everyday empirical existence exists in dreams; here, appearances are no longer partial but pure and individuated, vision-like and untainted by material embodiment. This is like the purified representation of everyday appearance, or the “appearance of appearance.”\(^\text{325}\) There is a respect for law-like limits and limited individuals here, such that forms appear pure in their delimited nature.\(^\text{326}\) There is a kind of pure light and luminosity of form, as in the vision like world of dreams, Apollo and surrealist painting.\(^\text{327}\)

As well as the everyday, partially intelligible world of images and their purification in fantasy and dream, there is the innermost, primordial ground (\textit{das Ur-Eine}) of humanity and nature, the eternal core of things or the genuine truth of nature (BT: 1: 17)\(^\text{328}\). This ground is attained through a unity between humanity and nature that are usually separate. The unity is not that of an object but a process: the artistic power of the world-artist (BT: 1: 18; 8: 41-2).\(^\text{329}\) The world-artist is not ‘another world’ ‘behind’ the other worlds of appearance as cause or reason; rather, it is the principle of their variation.\(^\text{330}\) It is eternal insofar as the variation of orders of

\(^{325}\) The “luminous one”, the god of “light”, the “inner world of fantasy” – the “perfection of dream-states”, not the “partially intelligible reality of the daylight world” (BT: 1, 15)

\(^{326}\) This world of appearances exists based upon the \textit{principium individuationis} like Schopenhauer’s world of representation.

\(^{327}\) Apollo is the “deification of the \textit{principium individuationis}” in which the “goal of the primordial unity” comes about, i.e. the release and redemption of the primordial unity in semblance – the law of Apollo is “respect for the limits of the individual”, or “measure in the Hellenic sense” (BT, 4, 26-7). In dreaming “all forms speak to us”, “nothing is indifferent”, and there is no “mediation” of figures necessary (i.e. no logical, abstract reasoning) (BT, 1, 15).

\(^{328}\) This is also the “overwhelming feeling of unity which leads men back to the heart of nature” – the lives of these fictitious creatures “remain eternally the same” (BT, 7, 39). It is also explicitly said to be the “thing-in-itself”

\(^{329}\) See also the “primordial unity” (BT, 6, 36)

\(^{330}\) The difference from Schopenhauer and Kant is visible insofar as the \textit{thing-in-itself} is the world-artist, not just reason or the will. The primal artistic unity of man and nature is not separate from appearances; the thing in itself not the cause or source of appearance as it is in Kant and Schopenhauer, but is rather the \textit{creation of those} appearances. The relation between the thing in itself and appearance is, of course, extremely complicated in Kant and Schopenhauer; but there does seem to be at least a notion of thing in itself as ‘substrate’ and appearance as ‘phenomenon’ in terms of cause and effect in both. This is perhaps the deepest philosophical target of Nietzsche’s constant struggle against the notion of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. The Kantian and Schopenhauerian target of these critiques is clear insofar as it tends to be couched in terms of a critique of ‘free will’ and the ‘moral subject’, both deeply bound up with the notion of the ‘noumenon’ in Kant and Schopenhauer. However, one could also say that the notion of ‘creation’ of appearance in Nietzsche is not so far from the legislative role of the moral legislator in Kant. This would have to be pursued further, in order to make the distinction between the two more precise.
appearance is eternal. Although the focus in *The Birth of Tragedy* is on unity, in the fourth *Untimely Meditation* it is clear that the conflictual heart of being is in fact a conflict between a diversity of individuals, demands, desires and passions of humans and nature (UM: 9; 242-4).

There is a conflict between the process of artistic variation of orders of appearance and those orders themselves. The world of appearance is constituted by individual images and forms whereas the process of generation of worlds is ‘unified’ without being visible in images and forms; it is a contradiction between images and the imageless, the primordial ground (*das Ur-Eine*) and the individuated. The primal unity is shattered by individuality, and that tearing is painful and destructive. The dream world of surrealist painters are defined by strong lines, an almost haptic space of clear borders; these clearly bordered forms are anathema to the primal unity of the world of the world artist.

We have seen the basic ontology of *The Birth of Tragedy* is composed of fragmented and everyday appearances, pure forms and the unthought and material generation of those appearances. Modernity tends to conceal the material generation to the benefit of purely individuated form, a concealing we must now examine. Consciousness has a tendency to presuppose the truth of the present world of appearances in which it finds itself; in doing so, it tends to privilege the dream world of pure form over the deeper creative variation of worlds.\(^{331}\) This tendency to privilege the present world leads to a kind of despair or pessimism once higher levels of consciousness are developed that ask about the reason for this world: if worlds of appearance vary, what is there to say that the meanings of this world are of any essential and reasoned value? To stave off depression and pessimism when no meaning is found, cultures

\(^{331}\) In Plato for example, “the Apolline tendency disguises itself as logical schematism” (BT: 14: 69). This tendency to favor the Apolline over the Dionysian was begun by Euripides; but even Euripides was just a mask for the Socratic triumph of the Apolline (BT: 12: 61). After this betrayal of Dionysus, one only has “copied and masked” speeches and passions (BT: 10: 54).
develop illusions that delude people into thinking they can heal the eternal wound of existence that is caused by the contradiction between the variation of worlds and the seemingly reified status of the present world. The people of these illusions “find infinite contentment in the world as it exists.” The infinite contentment with the present that is generated by cultural illusions stems off depression and pessimism that might otherwise occur. Two other forms of illusion are those of the beautiful (being caught in the mystery of the origin) and the Buddhistic illusion that the oneness of life flows on beneath this world of appearances (BT: 18: 85). The cultural trap that defines modernity is the Socratic illusion.

The Socratic perspective gives meaning to a single, limited world of appearances by privileging the Apollonian over the Dionysian. It suggests that it can correct and heal the ‘contradiction’ between the present world of appearances and the generation of new worlds by discovering a reason deep in the abyss of being. It discovers this ‘reason’ not by positing a transcendent and religious being ‘behind’ appearances, but positing a principle that explains the totality of appearances (BT: 15: 73-4). It weaves a net across existing appearances, conquering them by giving them a principle or reason. By producing a justification for existence that covers every possible appearance in the present world, the theoretical perspective aims to bring bliss, because the pain that comes with the collapse of a world is evaded. The unveiling that is achieved by the Socratic reason is expected to be one that lasts and succeeds. However, the ‘veil’ used to unveil the truth is merely one specific veil; the theoretical perspective cannot accept that there are other possible worlds of appearance, other modes of veiling of the truth (BT: 15: 72). Thinking it has grasped the whole, it has merely grasped one possible modality of the whole. All

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332 The “delusion that [one] can thereby heal the eternal wound of existence” (BT: 18: 85).
333 The ‘correction’ is actually a denial of the power of the Dionysian; a power which causes suffering in the present world due to the painful generation of a new world of appearances, such that the old world collapses.
of life is conquered by Socrates: no individual value within life is worth substituting for reason, to the point of death (BT: 15: 74).

The Socratic justification that captures the totality of appearances and covers up the Dionysian generation of worlds was the turning point in world history. It initiated the global greed for knowledge that has formed the vast pyramid of knowledge we have today, creating a network of thought that stretches over the modern globe (BT: 15: 17, 18: 86).

Another way of expressing the Socratic perspective is that in modernity there is a tyranny of universal concepts due to language attempting to encompass all of thought. Those universal concepts become despotic, forcing humanity to go where it does not want to go. They become separated from the variation of embodied needs and suffering. Convention and customs are dominated by universal concepts and thus prevent us from even admitting our suffering to ourselves (RWB: 5: 219). Instead, the perversity of modernity comes to triumph: the ruling power of the soul becomes those who deal in money as a business, leading to a concern only with the profitable moment and not with eternity (RWB: 6: 219). Theories and artistic production become subordinated to propelling the “great economy and power machine” or in the “defense and exculpation of the present” (RWB: 6: 220). The conventional and universal despotism of language creates a new suffering: the impossibility of communicating suffering.

334 Myth can also be used instead of reason; the primary aspect of the theoretical, knowing perspective is to capture the totality of appearances inside a human justification (whether mythical or reasonable), such that no appearance escapes its grasp.
335 This is a more nuanced way of putting the point about the Socratic perspective attempting to justify the totality of appearances.
336 RWB, 5, 215
337 “Nowadays, the crudest and most evil forces, the egoism of the money-makers and the military despots, hold sway over almost everything on earth”; in the hands of money makers and military despots, the state makes an attempt to organize everything from out of itself, by binding and constraining hostile forces, in order to gain ‘idolatry’; “the revolution is absolutely unavoidable, and it will be the atomistic revolution: but what are the smallest indivisible basic constituents of human society?” (SAE, 4, 150).
338 An interesting example of a theory merely propelling the economy and power machine or the present is that “students of animal behavior” try to represent violent and revengefulness between states and people as unalterable laws of nature (RWB, 6, 20). Clearly this is a dig a social Darwinian theories and those related to it.
The decline of language covers all of what is called civilization, according to Nietzsche (RWB: 5: 214).

2. The poetic vision of the generation of appearance in *The Birth of Tragedy*

Modernity is defined by the attempt to capture all appearances and thought under general concepts, thereby concealing the variable generation of worlds of appearance. On the other hand, a certain form of artistic creation can bring us a world of appearances which is a vision of the generation of such worlds. This process of generative creation operates within the Socratic and theoretical perspective of modernity, only that perspective cannot see its own generation. When the lyrical poet brings us a vision of the generation of worlds, it also repeats that generative activity; this will open up a discussion of Heidegger’s criticism that poetic thought, in Nietzsche, merely ‘designates’ being by repeating its activity. Deleuze will give us a different reading: the poet’s vision breaks with all prior concepts and sensations, implying an infinite confrontation between thought and being. The next section, then, will contextualize the Heidegger-Deleuze debate by laying out the question of art and the vision of the world-artist in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

Socratic modernity denies the generative power that gives it energy and that gives energy to its search for a justification for the totality of appearances. That search is infinite because the world of appearances shifts and does not submit itself to total capture. Underneath the epochal attempt to enclose all appearances within a single justification using reason or myth, there is the generative power of the world artist. Even the attempt to deny the destructive and generative power of primordial being is itself a product of that generative being (BT: 15: 72). Every world of images, even a world that denies its own created nature, is generated by the depths of
nature. Art makes visible the createdness of every world of images and produces a world of images that carries out the generative action of the imageless. The conceptual and imagistic vision of the generation of worlds of appearance can be called Dionysian wisdom.

Dionysian wisdom is a symbolic expression of the imageless: it makes visible the imageless generative force that undoes every world of appearance. It is in language that we see this imaging of the imageless most clearly. Language, in its essence, refers to phenomena; it symbolizes external, surface phenomena, images and concepts within the world of appearances (BT: 6: 36). Phenomena are merely ‘likenesses’ that resemble the generative power of nature but also cover it over insofar as that likeness remains external to the generative power. Language refers to those surface phenomena by gathering many phenomena under one symbol. Such symbolization of surface phenomena can never exhaust the generative power of nature.

The importance of language, in symbolizing the generation of worlds, can be seen by comparing it with music. Music is an imageless symbolization of the creative and productive depths of the world-artist; it is a ‘primary’ signification that emerges directly from the depths of the imageless. Music essentially evades conceptualization or the conceptual. Language, on the other hand, deals directly with images and concepts. Therefore, a ‘musical’ language can make visible to consciousness that which is beyond all concept and all image. It is a secondary symbolization of the imageless production of images. Music is itself an imageless symbolic expression of the Dionysian. Language is in a more superficial relation between consciousness and things; despite and because of this superficiality, language has a special place in making visible the invisible.

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339 It is the search for knowledge that actually gives meaning to the life of the theoretical perspective of modernity.
340 In the experience of Dionysiac music, the state, society and all divisions between human beings in civilization give way; this break down of division leads to a feeling of unity taking us back to the primal unity at the heart of nature (BT: 7: 39).
It is important to note that valorizing beautiful art alone is an illusion; beautiful art ensnares us in art’s seductive veil of beauty, remaining at the surface level of the symbolic and of images (BT: 18: 85). Mere entertainment and distraction actually traps us within the world of the present and does not re-create the imageless activity of the depths of nature.\footnote{This is perhaps why Nietzsche turns against his early ‘artists metaphysics’ in his middle period.}

Lyrical poetry, contrary to conceptual language, expresses the feelings and emotions of the interior in a musical way. It provides a symbolic substitute for the concrete activity of the world-artist that unchains symbols from the general concepts that they usually express. Poetic metaphor is an image that does not refer to the phenomenal likeness of things but substitutes for an action, recreating the concrete activity of the figure of the world-artist (BT: 7: 43).\footnote{The ‘figure’ is described by Nietzsche as a living person, not directly the figure of the world-artist; however, he elsewhere adds that the lyric poet takes himself as the object of all his poetry, except his “I” is now merged with the world-artist (due to the production of a world of appearances).} The symbol is usually dead and static; the poetic symbol, however, recreates the living action of the generative power of each world of images and symbols. The symbol turns back upon its own generation, taking its own birth as an object.\footnote{In a sense, there is no ‘reference’ to an external object, because the musical language, within itself, carries out the activity of the world-artist.} By taking the generation of images and concepts as such as an object, it is not just one or another symbol that is displaced; instead, the ‘entire body’ is symbolized and ‘all’ symbolic powers are unchained, in the manifestation of the activity of the world-artist itself (BT: 2: 21).\footnote{Cf. BT: 2: 21. Here Nietzsche calls the symbolizing of the symbol-less the inspiration of words by music} A whole world of images, symbols and appearances is produced by the lyric poet, but a world in its production, inspired by the primal generation of worlds. This world is always a creation because it must go beyond the images of the surface that are usually lifeless symbols; it uses those lifeless symbols to produce an image of the imageless. The created world of images is a new illusion. This production will vary infinitely, given the infinite variation of the surface; it therefore requires a constantly renewed symbolization.
This activity manifests a vision of the world-artist that transforms the image and concepts of human consciousness; it is the individuated perfection that does not destroy the generation of worlds of appearance but perfects it by making it bodily and objective. The Apollonian world of purely individuated form no longer shatters the Dionysian but is an image of the Dionysian world, a dream image radiating out of the primal generative ground.  

These poetic and symbolic powers unchained from general concepts release the human being from individual consciousness. The genius merges with the world-artist in the creative act of producing artistic works, and only in this act of production does knowledge of the essence of being arise. The subject of true being, the world-artist, celebrates its redemption from the limited world of appearances in the musical language of the poet. We see the vision of the poet as an object: the subjective process of the world-artist creating beings is brought before our eyes. The images are only objectified images of the poet themselves; the ‘moving center’ of the world becomes the “I” of the poet. This human and individuated vision of the generation of individuation is the only “I” that truly exists, eternally resting in the ground of things (BT: 5:31).

Poetic expression is nature as world-artist moving through the individuated consciousness of humanity. The satyr is the original image of mankind in which the sufferings of the god are repeated, insofar as the generative ground of nature is necessarily betrayed by a world of

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345 The Dionysiac satyr “sees a new vision outside himself which is the Apolline perfection of his state” and the chorus “discharges itself over and over again in an Apolline world of images.” In this new vision the primal ground of tragedy “radiates” the “vision” of a “dream-appearance” which is an “objectification” of it which is “the breaking-asunder of the individual and its becoming one with the primal being itself.” This vision is “not Apolline release and redemption in semblance” but is the “Apolline embodiment of Dionysiac insights and effects” (BT: 7: 44).

346 “During the act of artistic procreation” the “genius” “merges fully with that original artist of the world;” the genius only “knows” anything about the “eternal essence of art” when he merges with the “original artist of the world” in “artistic procreation” (BT: 5: 33).

347 The ‘reference’ to the contradiction by the images of the lyric poet is sort of like a reference to “exceeding” in Heidegger, where you don’t ‘exceed’ phenomena towards anything (towards nothing, as in Heidegger); you exceed towards the world-creator, which you only do by precisely creating a world of images or appearance anew.
appearances. We see ourselves in this image and we become liberated from the narrow confines of humanly individuated consciousness.

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, the focus is on presenting an image of the activity of the world-artist as a living process. In the *Untimely Meditations*, this becomes producing a language of surging feeling and the nobility of the passions, bestowing a body upon the subjectivity of the cosmos. This new language transforms the clumsy, non-musical and conceptual natural language into a language of image and feeling (UM: RWB: 9: 237). Communicating ‘inner’ experience occurs through a system of thought that makes visible a succession of actions, events and sufferings as opposed to gathering multiple phenomena under one concept (9: 236). This is a system of thought that draws together the events of the senses: hearing, seeing and feeling. As the system of thinking that gathers sensible events, ‘drama’ is the sensualization of spirit and the spiritualization of the senses: fundamental events are made sensible and visible through conscious acts of will in words. Art makes visible the invisible primordial activity of nature, making nature discharge the forces of the earth in a conscious revelation (7: 223). The primordial rhythmic music of nature seeks not only words but a whole culture, even in a new morality and a new state (5: 217). The will of nature is given a body and a “new visible world” arises (9: 239). Melody and feeling become image and concept when a dream apparition of music and language is condensed into the human form of images and concepts (7: 226). The movement from the audible to the visible is not a simple analogy; an irreducible difference remains between musical feeling and linguistic concepts and images (7: 223).

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348 He resembles something which can “turn its eyes around and look at itself” and he is “at one and the same time subject and object” [because humans are themselves the ‘object’ of the world-artist; humans are appearances] – he is “simultaneously poet, actor and spectator” (BT, 5, 33)

349 This zone of indiscernability between the spirit and the senses mirrors very closely what Deleuze emphasizes in Kant’s notion of art; it is what Deleuze calls immanence, later in his life.
The musical language of the lyric power can give rise to a Dionysiac wisdom that would go against the nature of the human being that encloses itself within a single individuated world. Instead, the human being plunges into the most sacred orders of nature, those of destruction. The nature that produced the human as a self-enclosing being is outdone by a new kind of knowledge.\(^{350}\) The human being as lyric poet “holds existence and its limits in his hands” (BT: 9: 48). This is the most glorious wisdom of life itself (RWB: 7: 226).\(^{351}\)

It is necessary to emphasize the essential lack present in linguistic expression. Each poetical expression of the imageless generation of worlds risks falling back into the usual tendency of language to act merely as a general concept. There is a tendency for language to congeal into universal concepts, even artistic and poetic language.\(^{352}\) Therefore, when the artwork carries out the activity of the world-artist, it contains its own failure or self-cancellation within itself, and thus must include within itself a call to future creators to re-create that imageless activity.

We can now stop and summarize the general system we have discovered in Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*. ‘Reality’ has three aspects: the dream world of pure form, the formless generation of form, and the everyday world of forms that are confused and partial because they are mixed with the formless. Modernity is defined by the Socratic attempt to justify the present world of appearances by claiming to justify the totality of appearances through reason or, if

\(^{350}\) In a strange way, this is a ‘truly’ human culture; what Nietzsche will later call the culture of the overman, the higher form of all that is. Nature is “forced to reveal her secrets” by “victorious resistance” to nature via “some unnatural event.” The same man who “solves the riddle of nature” in this unnatural event must “destroy the most sacred orders of nature,” e.g. Oedipus. “Dionysiac wisdom” is therefore an “unnatural abomination,” and whoever “plunges nature into the abyss of destruction by what he knows” must also “experience the dissolution of nature” “in his own person,” in other words, the dissolution of individuation in consciousness. In “raising himself” to the heights, “man” “achieves his own culture” and “compels the gods to ally themselves with him;” in “his very own wisdom”, man “holds existence and its limits in his hands” (BT: 9: 48).

\(^{351}\) Poetry is thus the unvarnished expression of truth because it carries out the act of imageless nature (BT: 8: 41-2).

\(^{352}\) As Deleuze puts it in *What is Philosophy?*, every immanent thought has a tendency to get lost in the fog of transcendence (WP: 49).
necessary, myth. Nietzsche’s project is, rather, the creation of a world of images and concepts that symbolizes their own contingent generation as opposed to their own justification.

There are various possible human relationships to the imageless generation of worlds of appearance. In conceptual language, we symbolize the surface of appearances in an individuated and fragmented way, isolated from the production of images in the depths of nature. In states of intoxication, we experience the collapse of fragmented individuation and experience an embodied, temporary unity with the depths of nature. Music is an imageless symbolization that unites us with the generative depths in a more lasting manner. Musical language symbolizes, in images and concepts, the action that generates images and concepts, providing us with an enduring vision of the birth of appearance. In this enduring and conscious vision of world-generation, the human being is ‘reconciled’ with other humans and with nature as part of a divine community (BT: 1: 18). Humanity itself becomes a work of art, beyond itself, divine. Art redirects the repulsive meaninglessness of each limited human world of appearance into representations we can live with, because we witness the possibility of partaking in the variation of worlds (BT: 7: 40). This is Dionysiac wisdom: no longer a Socratic and modern drive to justify all appearances in the present world, but the symbolic vision of the generation of appearances.

To enrich the somewhat limited terms of The Birth of Tragedy, we can turn to Nietzsche’s expansion of its ideas in the Untimely Meditations. The lyrical poet turns the human symbolic world of images and concepts back upon its own generation and destruction. In this cultural

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353 Dionysiac excitement is able to “transmit to an entire mass of people” the “artistic gift” of “seeing themselves surrounded” by a “crowd of spirits” with which they “know themselves to be inwardly one” (BT: 7: 43).
354 This is an important point on with The Birth of Tragedy breaks with Schopenhauer: art is not denial or tranquilization of the will.
355 The Untimely Meditations are crucial in this respect because they retain the more systematic or metaphysical approach of The Birth of Tragedy, but point in a number of very different directions. After Nietzsche’s crisis around
embodiment of the generative powers of nature, culture acts as the “perfection” of nature; it is not separate from nature, but rather is nature’s completion. Nietzsche’s early work contains a strangely ambiguous relationship to the concept of nature. Nature, on the one hand, has produced human consciousness as a movement of self-enclosure within the present world of images and concepts; in this sense, nature has failed to realize its intentions (UM: SAE: 6: 162). However, nature, on the other hand, presses beyond this self-enclosing movement of consciousness. Thus, the highest culture is both the ‘destruction’ of nature (as limiting) and the perfection of nature (as self-overcoming) (SAE: 5: 160).

Philosophy is the self-enlightenment of nature: it looks back upon nature and makes the generation of worlds visible in a metaphysical ‘picture’. The philosopher could present a non-conceptual system through concepts, and thereby appeal to the theoretical human being, achieving a kind of musical Socraticism. It would speak a non-conceptual form of thought using concepts (UM: RWB: 9: 236).

Art gives value and meaning to the experiments of nature. In the saint, something from beyond the self moves across into our own being. Nature is transfigured in these experiences, whereas in the human consciousness nature is essentially individuated and limited to its own small goals. The artist, saint and philosopher take the figures of nature into themselves and in this way transfigure nature, making it complete (UM: SAE: 5: 158-9). Precious fragments are scattered across humanity, “marvelous beginnings” beneath the separating force of the ego; fragments that allow us to go beyond the separations of consciousness and the ego that define humanity (UM: SAE: 6: 162).

1876, he abandoned the entire framework, making it much more difficult to connect the middle period works back to The Birth of Tragedy.
The philosopher, saint and artist are brought into a community in these experiences that perfect nature. This is not the work of any one individual, nation or limited part of humanity, but is a kind of treasure accumulated across all the various parts of humanity (UM: SAE: 4: 150). This community occurs through the development of stylistic traditions, not simply the content of specific art works. A stylistic tradition becomes inscribed in the souls of human beings, transforming the relations between all things, like a new emotional diagram or landscape. This is how the art-work of the future is preserved; not through worldly things, but in a stylistic way of combining those things.

3. The harmony between art and chaos in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche

The poet transfigures the everyday world of images and concepts in order to reveal the generation of worlds that is concealed by the theoretical perspective of modernity; this ‘revealing’ is subject to Heidegger’s most important critique of Nietzsche. The poet ‘overcomes’ the everyday significations of language and this ‘overcoming’ allows the human to ‘correspond’ to the activity of life: the activity of life is defined by an ‘overcoming’ of that which resists through fixity. Heidegger thinks this correspondence or harmony condemns Nietzsche to merely intensify the most important theme of Western metaphysics: the ‘harmony’ between thought and being, such that being ‘shows itself’ to thought. If the artist is merely the re-configuration of modes of presence, then there is nothing which does not show itself; presence is made permanent, and Plato’s attempt to participate in that which remains self-same is achieved in a more successful and dangerous manner. The next section will first look at Heidegger’s more sympathetic early reading of Nietzsche on art before turning to the central critique of ‘harmony’ in Nietzsche.
Heidegger’s earlier reading of Nietzsche on art is quite sympathetic in comparison to where he moves later. Rapture lifts us into an open relationship with beings that are highly differentiated as we are open to “everything” (N1: 100). We are fully borne along to every being that makes a claim upon us; beauty is what determines our transportation into being (113). We are drawn to major features that were not part of our relation to beings previously; these are forms (118-9). Form *displays* a relation to being that never existed previously, making the essence of being publicly present; this display places being itself, as relation to beings, into the open (119).  

That which lacks Being and lacks permanence is brought under a law of being, such that art is the law that frees form (218, 130). In beauty, Being displays itself in a new relationship to beings. This establishes a relationship to beings that does not yet exist, bringing forth beings themselves (69). Becoming-form is like idealization in which the multiplicity of beings we encounter through embodiment are allowed to stand in themselves, fixed (119).

Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on art becomes much more critical after the first year of lectures. He sees in Nietzsche a problematic view that takes language as an agglomeration of words used to designate familiar things. This ‘word-designation-thing’ model opens up a crude dilemma of humanization in which either we impose our words upon things or ‘de-humanization’ is carried out using words, and therefore re-humanizes things further.

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356 For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s conception of the essence of beings is bound up with a ‘public’ presentation, which ultimately is determined by a unified people and their utilization of things for merely practical, calculative usage.

357 The essence of what Nietzsche calls the “grand style” consists in the will to this Being which wills to be Becoming (135). The letting be of Becoming is the “will to power” and “creation of the highest order” (218).

358 Willing itself essentially wills relationships to beings which go beyond our pre-existent relationship to beings, and so we discover the will most ‘brightly’ in art, the law that the displaying of relationships to beings must be unconstrained by past relationships (52, 69). Art is the “supreme configuration” of the will to power in this sense (72).

359 This oscillation between de- and re-humanization explains, for Heidegger, why Nietzsche can, in his middle period, be so concerned with dehumanizing nature and renaturalizing humanity, whilst in his later period he appears to completely reverse this formula and attempt to the most supreme humanization of all beings (105) As Heidegger puts it, both humanization and dehumanization “demand” one another, when they are thought within the superficial interpretation of language as words which ‘designate’ things (105).
Poetic language might not seem to designate particular things directly; it might seem to avoid humanizing things. However, Heidegger thinks that in Nietzsche, poetic language ‘conforms’ to things, in order to ‘correctly understand’ them in a representational and humanizing way (N3: 53). However, poetic designation is the ‘most difficult’ thing, as opposed to the idle chatter of everyday language that is easy but does not designate things. The key thing is the way (the ‘how’) of designating things, as opposed to the ‘what.’ Typically the self designates beings in its everyday environment through the language of everyday calculation and idle chat. The ‘how’ of poetic designation is, on the contrary, a transformation of everyday language through a singular, poetizing, and musical language (58). In this poetizing one becomes silent and speaks alone with the soul, speaking sparsely in veiled communication so that genuine silence prevails in the midst of idle chatter (60, 15). This veiled communication takes the form of unprecedented questions that forces others into an overcoming of the idle chat that had previously constituted the self (N2: 68, 126, 58).

Heidegger is critical of the necessity of ‘designating’ life through a poetic transformation of thought because it reproduces the dominant thought of the Western metaphysics of presence. Poetic speech transfigures the permanence of the idle chat of the self, making transfiguration so difficult to avoid and so necessary to reproduce that it becomes permanent: the transfiguration of permanence itself becomes permanent. This poetizing questioning is the way in which language ‘designates’ life, because it mirrors the structure of life: fixing down a horizon in which beings are transfigured (N2: 53). We see the same structure here that governs Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche: an opposition between Being (the permanence of the self and its idle chat) and becoming (the impermanence of creative transfiguration) that is ‘resolved’ in the Being of

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360 There is always a struggle between these two modes of language, the poetical and the everyday. (61)
361 This is the same structure as the eternal return.
becoming (poetic questioning that necessitates further creative questioning). Opposition and the resolution of opposition are central here and tie Nietzsche to the unspoken dogmas of Platonic and post-Kantian thinking.

The will to power’s supreme configuration is justice; justice is the ground of truth in the sense of homoiosis or harmony between humanity and chaos (153). This harmony is also the reciprocal relationship between the two major modes of truth: knowledge and art. Knowledge is the self-enclosure of humanity: it is fixation as the first, erroneous but necessary mode of truth (128). Fixation as the establishment of a horizon makes identity and self-sameness into the ground of permanence (123). Art is the second mode of truth, the connection of humanity to chaos: it re-presents or permanentizes chaos, in which representational thought harmonizes with and assimilates itself to chaos (140).\textsuperscript{362} In this harmonizing, there is a stabilizing perspective but one that sees chaos as a range of possibilities (128). The ground of the possibility of truth is the poetizing presupposition of a horizon that is the unity of a schema that fixes what beingness means (139).

The poetizing is necessary to proclaim the thought about thought; it is a communicating that shines the light of being on all things in the form of an event that takes vision beyond all personal experience (60, 13). It allows us to face the decision about our orientation to beings by installing us amongst beings but retaining a distance that allows us to decide upon our circumstances (11, 22).\textsuperscript{363} This intrinsic or inner force connects us to chaos as that bodily overpowering force; the silent decision of thought also overpowers all prior relationships to beings.

\textsuperscript{362} This harmony with becoming is essentially art (N3: 128).

\textsuperscript{363} In thought a “decision” is made about the “circumstances” men and women will adopt, which can include “foodstuffs”, “locality” and “social order” (N3: 22).
We can now point out ways in which Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche is legitimate in terms of *The Birth of Tragedy*. Heidegger’s central criticism of Nietzsche revolves around the artistic poetizing that makes the transfiguration of presence permanent. There is some truth to this: in *The Birth of Tragedy*, the lyric poet attempts to *repeat* or recreate the generative action of the world-artist, such that we have a vision of that world-artist; Nietzsche is certainly concerned here with questions of eternity. Is this the permanence of the transfiguration of presence as Heidegger thinks? The invisible generation of worlds of images and concepts is, in a sense, eternal.

Poetry brings us eternity by ‘designating’ (in Heidegger’s sense) the movement of the invisible generation of worlds of appearance; this designation is not achieved through the question of the essence or what, but of the ‘how,’ or the kind of language in question. Nietzsche does seem to hold what Heidegger calls the ‘designating’ notion of language, one based on a ‘harmony’ between the activity of the world-artist and its ‘re-creation’ by the poet. The satyr, the visible and human embodiment of the world-artist, is “born of a longing for what is original and nature;” in this satyr lies “nature, as yet untouched by knowledge, with the bolts of culture closed” (BT: 8: 41). This vision is an “artistic imitation of that natural phenomenon” of the “geniuses of nature” that are satyrs (BT: 8: 42). The ‘imitation’ here is re-affirmed in the notion that a genuine poetic metaphor is not a rhetorical figure but is a “substitute” for something else, for the action of a living person, a living play, speaking other spirits and souls. Heidegger’s diagnosis of a traditionally Western ‘harmony’ between thought and being in Nietzsche seem confirmed in this regard.
4. Heidegger’s alternative to Nietzsche: the abandonment of beings in the History of being

Heidegger wants to think beyond Nietzschean ‘harmony’ towards the theme of abandoning across the history of Being. By thinking Nietzsche’s abandonment of that which conceals itself, Heidegger hopes to reawaken a sense of Being’s abandonment over Western history. The next section examines Heidegger’s alternative to what he sees as Nietzschean ‘harmony;’ first, we will ask how Heidegger’s criticisms of Nietzsche have purchase upon the common reading of Deleuze, the dogmatic materialist reading. After that, we look at the culmination of Being’s historical abandonment in Nietzsche and provide a picture of Heidegger’s own History of Being, before turning to Deleuze’s alternative Nietzsche.

Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche gets to the core of a major ambiguity not only in Nietzsche’s thought but also in Deleuze and his reception of Nietzsche. The idea that thought must ‘conform’ to the living activity of the world is reflected in Judith Butler’s critical reading of Deleuze’s Nietzscheanism: reality is a chaos of libidinal forces, and the problem of thinking is to clear away the illusion of identity and return to these forces. We see this in the common reading that suggests Deleuze’s philosophy is an attempt to show the ‘origin’ or genesis of intellectual representations from out of fluxing intensive materiality. Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche is precisely aimed at these kinds of readings that constitute what I call dogmatic materialism. Heidegger’s criticism of a kind of “harmony” between the human and chaos in Nietzsche’s thinking must be taken seriously because it acts as a critique of many contemporary theorists who take up Deleuze’s thought. We see this confirmed in one of the best inheritors of the philosophies of Deleuze and Nietzsche: Elizabeth Grosz. She writes that ideality and materiality are “mutually implicated” and that ideality opens materiality up “as a cohesive, meaningful
world, a universe with a horizon of future possibilities” (Grosz 2017: 13). The ‘mutual
implication’ of ideality and materiality in a ‘cohesive’ and meaningful world is precisely what
Heidegger criticizes in Nietzsche, insofar as it reinforces the classical Western theme of
‘harmony’ between thinking and being.

We can now turn to look at Nietzsche’s place within Heidegger’s own History of Being.
Nietzsche marks the ‘overshadowing’ of Being by beings for Heidegger; this overshadowing
must be seen relative to the ‘first beginning’ in ancient Greece. For the pre-Socratic Greeks, there
is an opposition between ‘showing’ and total and vacuous ‘nothingness’ that never shows itself
(58). For post-Platonic Greeks, Being must show itself: it is self-showing. The Platonic
opposition then arises between ‘good’ appearances that correspond to the Idea, and bad simulacra
that do not (29). What ‘is’ shows itself is offers up an aspect to us; there is no possibility of
anything that does not show itself. From pre-Platonic showing/not showing, we move to Platonic
good/bad showing (resemblance/simulacra, true world/apparent world) (112). Being could never
be derived in terms of any being at hand: it must show itself as ‘idea.’

Truth is the representation of chaos in Nietzsche, making chaos permanent through art;
this permanence secures the Western metaphysics of presence. Chaos is the constant
transfiguration of presence into new modes of presence; this transfiguration is made permanent,
such that there is no room for absence or total non-showing of nothingness. Everything is
appearance and its variation; there is no ‘other world,’ but also nothing that does not show itself.
Chaos is not outside presence, but merely its variation. In Plato, there are appearances that do not
resemble permanent presence; in Nietzsche, both art and knowledge imply presence, whether it
be the fixation or transformation of presence. There is nothing but presence and its
transfiguration, in Nietzsche, and Being as non-showing is overshadowed by beings. Western
thought reaches its abandoned culmination.\footnote{The Greek conception of Being laid out here is the “beginning of Western thought”, and Nietzsche’s metaphysics has a historical connection to it. Nietzsche “comes closer to the essence of the Greek’s than any metaphysical thinker before him” but he also “thinks in a modern way.” (133)} Heidegger quotes Nietzsche’s own words on this point: “art and knowledge in their reciprocity bring about the full securing of permanence of the animate [chaos] as such” (N3: 140). They are both the assimilation of human life to chaos, excluding all absence.

Heidegger’s understanding of the modern age emerges from understanding the ruling words, word-structure and writing of Nietzsche’s metaphysical statements (N3: 4). These words leave a “trace” in the history of Being such that all beings turn around the single thought of the thinker. This ruling occurs in a silence, removed from everyday calculations, such that thinkers ‘found’ that which is never visible; the truth they found in philosophical speech never becomes an image.\footnote{This is what Heidegger calls the presupposition of Western philosophy to Nietzsche; however, it might be put in question by another interpretation of Nietzsche, most proximately through the imagistic character of his writing. In short, perhaps the very notion of the invisible truth behind images ties Heidegger to a Platonic tradition with which Nietzsche breaks.} Nietzsche’s ruling words are those of becoming and life, which puts the metaphysical permanence of presence beyond question (N3: 157). Because of this Nietzsche was unable to discern the historical roots of presence in non-presence; there is no confrontation with the first beginning of the Greeks and the exclusion of that which does not show itself (141, 113).\footnote{By not discerning the historical roots of the question of truth, Nietzsche retains the “traditional” and seemingly “most natural essential determination of truth” (126-7).}

By comprehending Nietzsche’s culmination of the Western metaphysics of presence, Heidegger sees himself as carrying out the task of discerning the historical roots of that tradition. Heidegger ‘knows’ the modern ‘overshadowing’ of Being by beings in Nietzsche’s absolutization of presence in becoming and life. The overshadowing of Being by beings \textit{derives from being itself}, and therefore, by thinking with Nietzsche, Heidegger is thinking Being’s own abandoning...
of beings. Nietzsche displaces the human into its nonessence by dissolving the “relation to beings as such;” yet, this turning into the ground as a closure and abyss rests upon the very truth of Being. The very closing off, in Nietzsche, of a thinking that would be commemorative and recall Being is an event that, for Heidegger, is crucial to comprehending modernity (157, 155). Although the abandoning of Being may seem harmless at first, one day the catastrophe will be there. By comprehending the modern closing off of commemorative thinking, Heidegger alerts us to the responsibility of thinking the “other commencement” (112).

Deleuze is critical of Heidegger’s reliance upon the History of Being as a principle; we can now outline some tensions in the History of Being that reveal themselves in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. A basic distinction orients Heidegger’s reading: on the one hand, there are superficial and actual historical situations, whereas on the other hand, there are deep historical-metaphysical decisions. According to Heidegger, reading philosophers through surface situations flattens out that thought in favor of a worldly interest; historical inquiry into what is going on can never allow us to experience an event and would therefore be an ‘unfounded violence’ of thinking (8). Surface historical events are merely consequences that speak a concealed history and they have no “control” over their “ground” (56). It does not matter if a text serves or hates Germany, because neither changes the concealed and deep history of Being. The present ‘stage’ in the entire history of the planet is grounded in a decision it did not make (6). Deep beneath the surface events of the planet, there is a profound decision with a metaphysics that predetermines the age (8).

Foucault and Derrida, as part of their debt to Heidegger, have explored the tensions in this duality of the historical surfaces and the metaphysical depths; we see these tensions already in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. He states his own explicit motivation in terms that seem to
fall on the side of actual-historical phenomena: the West has sunk to the level of “trade interests and entertainments,” “propaganda wars” and the “pomp and circumstance” in which life makes itself known (91, 56). These “palpable manifestations in the very foreground of our lives” ‘speak the depths’ of the modern abyss of Being. The “dominion of technology” and the “susceptibility to superstition” are other seemingly ‘superficial’ motivations in Heidegger’s History of Being. Heidegger even specifies that he is talking about “Western” man as opposed to a member of an “African tribe” (69). These are apparently superficial actualities on own Heidegger’s terms, far from speaking the metaphysical words of Being; and yet their place in the text is undeniably not accidental or merely decorative. The “propaganda wars” and the “African tribe” point to deep motivations in Heidegger’s lectures. By calling on historical-concrete phenomena as motivating moments in his supposedly ‘deep’ History of the decisions of Being, Heidegger seems to be implicated in what Foucault calls the “simultaneously promising and threatening proximity” to “empirical analyses of man” that haunts phenomenology (Foucault, 1994: 326).\(^{367}\)

5. Problematizing Heidegger’s Nietzsche: poetic harmony as perpetual rupture

Heidegger thinks that the History of being is characterized by abandonment; Nietzsche’s ‘harmony’ between the artist and chaotic life is the culmination of that History. In the next section we will call Heidegger’s reading into question before turning to Deleuze’s alternative view of Nietzsche. We will suggest that the human artist is not merely ‘repeating’ the activity of the world-artist in order to ‘harmonize’ with it, but that the artistic act must also be that activity in a radically unprecedented way. This new productive activity is in combat with all prior worlds of appearance and the unthought processes of generation beneath them, such that there is only

\(^{367}\) The Order of Things, 326
ever a confrontational harmony between the poetic vision and all worlds that came before. We will see how Deleuze develops this confrontational harmony in the final part of the chapter.

Having seen the ways in which Heidegger’s reading is confirmed by *The Birth of Tragedy*, we can now point out ways in which the text problematizes his reading. The most important point is that the production of images that makes visible the activity of the world-artist is not only a ‘designating’ of the activity of life. It is not an ‘external’ designation of some ‘other’ thing, in the way that my concept of pencil designates the object pencil outside of me on my desk. On the contrary: the vision ‘of’ the activity of the world-artist must itself *be* that activity in an embodied and objective sense. The difference between the poetic vision and the imageless activity is *not* one of external designation and harmony, in the way Heidegger thinks; the difference is one of images and of the imageless. Both undertake the same activity, in different spheres. Here, Heidegger might respond: exactly! The same activity is occurring, such that there is an eternal return of the same, and what poetic thought must do is merely ‘harmonize’ with that activity. The traditional Western vision of a ‘harmony’ of thinking and being is in play in this harmony, meaning that Nietzsche cannot think the Historical abandonment of beings by Being. To understand how Nietzsche does not fall into that kind of harmony, we can turn to the origin of the Western thought of harmony according to Heidegger: Plato.

Heidegger’s reading of Plato shows why he thinks Nietzsche fits into the same tradition. For Heidegger, the Platonic Idea is the being with the maximum beingness; we participate in the Ideas by running through them in thought. Similarly, in Nietzsche, Heidegger implies that the world-artist pre-exists and then the poet ‘harmonizes’ with that activity.

A very different reading of Plato is suggested by Deleuze and Derrida that shows up Heidegger’s blind spot in his reading of Nietzsche. Plato’s self-same Idea is not a heavenly being
that pre-exists; rather, it is only achieved through the glimpse that we gain in the very movement of the dialectic. The Idea is only achieved by working through the confusion of sensation, selecting the images that participate in the Idea.\(^{368}\) This production of the eternal is analogous to the way in which immortality for mortal beings is only achieved through the honoring of the memory of the dead. Plato is highly aware that we are not divine beings, and thus we have no way of achieving self-sameness without continually producing and re-producing it.\(^{369}\)

In Nietzsche, similarly to Plato, the eternal activity of the world-artist is not a divine eternity, but rather one that is produced in the activity of the mortal poet. So, the poet does not merely harmonize with the “same” activity of the world-artist, as if the world artist were a mythical human being living in the core of the world. The variation of worlds of appearance is not a pre-existing activity; it is one that we achieve. This is a primary source of the theme of ‘anti-nature’ in Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s difference from Plato is that we do not produce a self-same Idea in running through the appearances of this world; rather, we produce nothing other than the variation of the world of appearance. Plato’s act of breaking with this world in order to transcend to the self-same is taken up, but what is now self-same in Nietzsche is nothing other than the act of breaking, and with it the act of transformation.

Foucault helps us to understand this essence of art that does not ‘harmonize’ with a ‘positive’ life-force outside of thought, but which turns the act of breaking with this world of appearance into a new essence. Art, he says in his last lecture course, is a mode of Cynical life that makes visible the truth as nothing other than scandal (Foucault, 2012: 187-8). Not a ‘break’

\(^{368}\) Plato says that the good is ‘the brightest of what is’ (Rep. 518c-d). In Moore’s words, “the good is the real visible” (Moore, 72). The visibility of the good has to do with the image: good images are where the good is manifested. This is why the maker of bad images is so dangerous, and this danger leads to the fundamental essence of ethics.

\(^{369}\) “Everything mortal is preserved, not by remaining entirely the same for ever, which is the mark of the divine, but by leaving behind another new thing of the same kind in the place of what is growing old and passing away. By this
with the cave of opinion in favor of the true Sunlight of Ideas; rather, a break that produces truth as the scandal of the break. In Deleuzian terms, ‘escape’ and ‘flight’ are no longer negative terms, but positive; the scandalous break becomes the truth. Art gives a form to an existence that breaks with every other form and bestows the value of the true life upon this form of existence. What is true is nothing other than the scandalous act of exposing and violently reducing existence to the barbaric breaking that lies beneath it. This possibility of breaking with all culture is precisely what every culture tends to repress, and therefore it is inevitably a scandalous refusal of and aggression towards the consensus of culture, social norms, values and canons. The form of the true is now the rejection and refusal of the rules governing all preceding action that lays bare the ‘barbaric’ truth beneath every culture. In this sense, the true is no longer the self-same Idea; the true gives duration and form to that which breaks with the true. This helps us to understand why Nietzschean art is not merely a ‘harmony’ with the living activity of overpowering.

Although Nietzsche says the Greek satyr is the image of cultureless nature, it is not an image of the cliché pre-evolutionary ape; in fact it is the “original image of mankind, the expression of man’s highest and strongest stirrings” (BT: 8: 41). It is not a romantic vision of non-human nature that is primary, but rather “the chorus of satyrs is first and foremost a vision of the Dionysiac mass, just as the world of the stage is in turn a vision of this chorus of satyrs” (BT: 8: 42). It is the transformation of the human being that is central to the poetic vision of the generation of worlds, not a mystical and non-human world-artist. The world-artist is known and exists only as the transformation of that knowing being and its own existence. This mirrors the role of nature in Kantian art: nature acts through the knowing subject, but that nature is ‘known’

only insofar as the latter becomes passive and sees itself transformed. The key phenomenon of
‘drama’ is the experience of “seeing oneself transformed before one’s eyes and acting as if one
had really entered another body, another character” (BT: 8: 43). This is an experience of real
self-transformation that does not contain reference to an external life-force with which one
would be in conformity or in harmony. The chorus become “timeless” insofar as they have
“completely forgotten their civic past and their social position;” they are now “living outside
every social sphere.” This forgetting and transformative movement outside of social spheres is
not merely a move to some positive truth of nature; the transformation itself, the step outside and
nothing more, is the positivity of Dionysian knowledge.

Heidegger’s suggestion that the transformation ‘mirrors’ a nature outside of it emphasizes
certain parts of Nietzsche’s text and misses these aspects that problematize his own suggestion.
How do we “know” the world-artist? Not through conformity or harmony with its activity;
rather, through the continual break with this world of appearances in which we live. There is
truly no ‘other’ world, not even a primal ‘life’ of becoming with which our thought must
conform. The becoming of life is only important insofar as it transforms our thought from the
inside; it is this transformation of the inside of thought that grounds Nietzsche’s conception, not
a miraculous intellectual intuition of a divine cosmic power. Heidegger himself highlights this
aspect of Nietzsche’s work: Nietzsche creates questions that have never been asked and that push
us to go beyond all our previous conceptions and sensations, and this questioning brings
‘becoming’ into being. This is precisely the point: the activity of becoming is not the “same” as
previously existing life, but is precisely thought’s own transformation of the world of
appearances.
Some might say this is a rabid idealism: it might seem like only thought is important now. In fact it is a radically humble materialism; no longer do we proclaim that outside of thought there lie dynamical processes that everyone else has missed and that we must now tell stories about. Instead, we take seriously the unknown nature of that which lies outside of thought, and make central the transformation of thought such that it takes account of this unknown. What does pre-exist is thought’s continual reckoning with this unknown; Deleuze, for example, admires Plato for his acute awareness of the threat of images that do not resemble the self-same Idea to any degree (what Deleuze calls simulacra or difference). One of way of putting this is that thought is destined to re-present or repeat; but how does one re-present with a difference that is unknown by thought? This is, of course, the problem of Deleuze, to whom we can turn to clarify and resolve the problems raised by Heidegger.

6. The confrontational affinity between thought and life in Deleuze’s Nietzsche

Having seen Heidegger’s criticism of harmony in Nietzsche and his alternative thinking of abandonment, we can now turn to Deleuze’s reading of the ‘noble affinity’ between life and thought in Nietzsche. We will see that what Heidegger views as harmony is in fact confrontational. The abandonment of being is accounted for by Nietzsche, but as an infinite confrontation between thought and being; this will lead us to the problem of the infinite and inevitable return of nihilism, representation and identity.

The notion of ‘harmony’ that Heidegger criticizes in Nietzsche is visible in Deleuze’s own philosophy; we must now turn to examine whether his philosophy is open to Heidegger’s critique, or whether he provides a reading of Nietzsche that escapes that critique.

First and foremost, the notion of a ‘harmony’ between thought and life that Heidegger criticizes in Nietzsche is present at the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze is highly sensitive
to the problem of harmony that Heidegger is in interested in: the problem of an accord between thought and being or between the supersensible and the sensible is the major concept that orients his view of pre- and post-Kantian philosophy. In *Difference and Repetition*, the harmony of the faculties is a central concept.

In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, we see ‘harmony’ at the core of Deleuze’s reading in the ‘noble affinity’ between thought and life; however Deleuze reads this noble affinity in a way that escapes from Heidegger’s criticism. A ‘noble affinity’ between thought and life is the “essence of art” on Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, and art “realizes the whole of [Nietzsche’s] programme” (NP: 101, 185). Like Heidegger’s reading, this ‘noble affinity’ does not consist in a “correspondence” between a word (or a meaning) and a thing (or an object). Like Heidegger’s reading, the ‘noble affinity’ at the heart of Nietzsche’s entire programme consists in an activity or a doing. Unlike Heidegger’s reading, this noble affinity *does not* imply that thought must mirror the ‘same’ activity as being or life; nevertheless, the problem of sameness and difference does haunt Deleuze on this question, just as it haunts Nietzsche and Heidegger.

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370 In *Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, the theme of the harmony of the faculties is central. Overcoming ‘pre-established harmony’ in Leibniz and Hume is one of the main innovations of Kantian philosophy, for Deleuze. Human finitude means that objects are necessarily made to submit to “us,” as opposed to their being a pre-established harmony between subject and object (KCP, 69). However, Deleuze also criticizes Kant for re-establishing another type of harmony: does Kant “not once again come up with the idea of harmony, simply transposed to the level of faculties of the subject which differ in nature”? (KCP, 22). In discussing the possibility of knowledge, Deleuze diagnoses a “a free mutual harmony of all the faculties” as the ground of the life of knowledge, in which the relation between the faculties is unfree (KCP: 67). Elsewhere, Deleuze notes that the free harmony of the faculties in beauty *makes it possible* for one faculty to be determining (as happens in morality and knowledge) (KCP: 49).

371 The Cogito “is the identity of the Self in the ‘I think’ which grounds the harmony of all the faculties and their agreement on the form of a supposed Same object” (DR: 133).

372 The importance of art is also explicit in a 1967 interview Deleuze gives on Nietzsche: “The ultimate authority is creation, it is art: or rather, art represents the absence and the impossibility of an ultimate authority.” (Deleuze, 2004: 129). This is because it is where the ‘noble affinity’ occurs: “the thinker thus expresses the noble affinity of thought and life: life making thought active, thought making life affirmative.” (NP: 101). We see a similar conception of art as ‘unity’ of life and thought in Deleuze’s work on cinema, except he expresses it in terms of ‘man and nature:’ the essence of art par excellence is the “perceptible and sensual unity of nature and man” because it is time regained (C2: 97).

373 There are no cliché heavenly, Platonic dogs in which ‘real’ living dogs participate.
The key notion around which Deleuze’s ‘noble affinity’ turns is what I will call a *confrontational exchange* between thought and being.\(^{374}\) In this confrontational exchange, on the one hand, life *goes beyond* the limits set to it by knowledge and on the other hand thought goes beyond the limits that ‘reactive’ life fixes for it (NP: 101).\(^{375}\) The ‘noble affinity’ of thought and being is the ‘going beyond’ of fixed limits, but those limits are different on either side. Heidegger’s concern about harmony is confirmed in Deleuze’s affirmation of a sameness of activity here: life and thought, Deleuze writes, “go in the same direction, carrying each other along, smashing restrictions, matching each other step for step” (NP: 101).\(^{376}\) The *same direction*, ‘matching’ each other: Heidegger’s critique echoes in Deleuze’s reception of Nietzsche.

In order to grasp the ‘same’ activity that brings thought and life into a noble affinity, we can turn to Deleuze’s other books. Thought has a necessary relation to something unthought, to that which cannot be conceptualized, and Deleuze calls this unthought within thought the plane or map of immanence.\(^{377}\) This plane consists in an “incessant” or “perpetual exchange” of infinite movements between thought and being, in which they turn both towards and away from one another. Deleuze writes “it is in this sense that thinking and being are said to be one and the

\(^{374}\) There are several terms we could use for this relation of thought and being; none is ideal to capture this strange relation, one that expresses something very subtly but crucially different from every other concept in the history of Western thinking. Moreover, Deleuze is not consistent with his terms, and particularly on this central point of his philosophy. He ends up calling it “immanence,” but I believe that using such a word is close to meaningless for us today, and certainly highly misleading, after it has been so misused.

\(^{375}\) The “essence of art” is the noble affinity of thought and life, in which “life goes beyond the limit that knowledge fixes for it, but thought goes beyond the limits that [reactive] life fixes for it” (NP: 101).

\(^{376}\) It involves a “thought that would **lead life to the limit of what it can do,**” which means ‘affirming’ life, “discovering, inventing new possibilities of life.” Life and thought would “go in the same direction, carrying each other along, smashing restrictions, matching each other step for step, in a burst of unparalleled creativity” (NP, 101).

\(^{377}\) The plane of immanence “the nonthought within thought” because it is irreducible to conceptual determination, it “is not a concept that is or can be thought” (WP: 59, 37). Similarly, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, post-Nietzschean “Cosmos philosophy” is said to be defined by a ‘material thought’ that ‘captures’ forces that resist being thought: “modern philosophy tends to elaborate a **material of thought** in order to **capture** forces that are **not thinkable in themselves.** This is Cosmos philosophy, after the manner of Nietzsche” (ATP: 342). Previously, in romantic
same” and the infinite variation of the plane means it is “single” and a “One-All” (WP: 38). The ‘one,’ the ‘same,’ the ‘single:’ here is the meaning of the noble affinity in Nietzsche and here is what Heidegger sees as the culmination of Western thought. Deleuze is not shy about this inheritance: he knows he is situating himself in proximity to the Greek conceptions when he writes the terms Thought and Nature as 

Nous and Physis.

Despite proximity to the central themes of Western philosophy, Deleuze’s exchange between thought and being is not as harmonious as Heidegger thinks; it has confrontation at its core. Every time thought thinks being, being turns away from thought and a new movement is launched; every time being approaches thought, thought turns away and again the infinite movement is relaunched (WP: 42). This turning away is not passive and separating: it implies an aggressive confrontation or challenge. Such a turning and challenging is not foreign to Heidegger and Nietzsche; indeed, Deleuze cites them in relation to it (ATP: 124-5). In their readings of Oedipus, Deleuze finds a line of ‘wandering’ that is not simply death or nothingness but an infinite ‘separation’ and postponement of the relation between thought and being, the glorification of Passion or passivity as an undecidable, perpetual exchange between the two. There is no precise “line,” but an irreducibly secret and concealed limit between them. The positivity of this wandering is like the positivity of the Cynical style of existence in Foucault: not breaking with the world in favor of a true essence beyond it, but producing truth as nothing more than the infinite activity of breaking with all prior norms, values and rules (Foucault, 2012: 187-

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378 The infinite movements between thought and being “turn back on themselves in incessant exchange” (WP: 42)
379 Force, Derrida writes in a very close way to Deleuze’s immanence, is the “finitude of thought itself in its relationship to Being” (Derrida, 1980: 27).
380 Deleuze and Guattari cite French Heideggerian Jean Beaufret’s commentary on Hölderlin as one source of inspiration for the theme of the double turning away (ATP: 529 n.18).
There is a harmony at work, but not with any ‘external’ criterion such as that which remains the same in itself across time; rather, the harmony is that of the continual break between thought and being, a break with all known ideas and all known actions.

We see this ‘turning away’ of being and thought at the heart of Deleuze’s own philosophy *Difference and Repetition*, in what he calls intensity and Ideas. Deleuze’s empiricism is not about the genesis of representation from out of sensation; rather it is about a new conception of relations without terms (Deleuze, 2007: REFERENCE DIALOGUES). In *Difference and Repetition*, he outlines that there are two types of relations that must not be confused: these form the essence of the ideal and the material. On the side of the ideal, there are “differential relations” which occur in the “reciprocal synthesis of the Idea;” on the side of the material, there are “relations of intensity” which occur in “the asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible” (DR: 244; emphasis added). Deleuze signals the significance of these forms of relations when he relates them to his central concept of difference: “a whole flow of exchange occurs between intensity and Ideas, as though between two corresponding figures of difference.”

Deleuze is well aware that the concept of correspondence he uses here has played a central role in the relation between thought and being in Western philosophy; he repeats the word shortly after. We must take this ‘correspondence’ as a sign of the importance of this passage. A ‘flow of exchange’ occurs between intensity and Ideas, and this exchange is their correspondence. Two more commonly known words for this process are the virtual and its actualization; unfortunately, these two are often confused. Instead, we must acknowledge that the virtual and its actualization are in a constant process of confrontational exchange. What must always be borne in mind are the strict

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*381 We see this Foucaultian themes echoed in an interview Deleuze gave, where he summarizes the importance of the artistic will to power that Nietzsche discovered. The artistic will to power is a set of “self-relations that allows us to resist, to elude power, to turn life or death against power […] optional rules that make existence a work of art, rules at once ethical and aesthetic that constitute ways of existing or styles of life” (Doubts About the Imaginary, 122).*
differences between three cornerstones of Deleuze’s philosophy: the virtual, the actualization of the virtual, and the actual.\(^{382}\) The difficulty in reading Deleuze is precisely the infinite exchange between the three; the fact that they are neither separate nor identical in any existing being.\(^{383}\) The “correspondence” between relations of intensity and differential relations is one of “exchange,” “affinity,” “continuation,” “echo,” but it is one that implies confrontation (DR: 244-5).\(^{384}\) Deleuze’s notion of confrontational harmony is required because of a very difficult and badly understood part of his philosophy: the infinite return of a representational world of identity.

7. The inevitable return of the nihilistic error of representation

Deleuze reads the ‘noble affinity’ in Nietzsche as confrontational, implying a mutual smashing of the limits that thought and life set on one another; the reason this is important is that there is no ‘return’ to the pure matter of life, but rather every time thought ‘thinks’ being a new mode of nihilism is necessarily emitted as an illusory fog. This means that the smashing of limits must be infinitely resumed. In the next section, we will explore this little-understood aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy that transforms how we understand him and his relation to Nietzsche.

This ‘confrontation’ between thought and being is eternal because every time thought breaks all the limits life sets on it, new limits inevitably fix themselves. Every time the ‘noble affinity’ between life and thought achieved it is also betrayed. This is one of the most difficult

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Negotiations, 98). Ethical-aesthetic rules that allow us to relates to ourselves in ways that turn against power: this is part of the infinite turning away of thought and being.

\(^{382}\) For example, the virtual is “unaware of the individual,” whereas the actualization of the virtual “plays upon the individual” (DR: 246-7).

\(^{383}\) Cf. the article “The Virtual and the Actual” for a condensed summary of this; the virtual and the actual never exist in a pure state.

\(^{384}\) This exchange between intensity and Ideas is also linked to Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz, and the relations between the conceptual and the non-conceptual; cf. Deleuze 1980a for more on this.
and overlooked but also crucial points in Deleuze’s philosophy.\textsuperscript{385} A slightly less abstract approach the problem comes by going through painting. Deleuze likes Francis Bacon because he brings the Figure into painting, as opposed to, for example, abstract expressionists like Jackson Pollock who remain at the level of the chaotic, chance marks of sensation. Francis Bacon tries to bring those chaotic and chance marks back into the ‘visual ensemble.’ That ensemble is the figurative world of cliché’s that impose their truth upon us, investing the brain and the eye before we see anything; the clichés of figuration or representation are what we see (FB: 19).

Bacon attempted to inject chance marks of sensation into the ensemble of figurative cliché that imposes itself upon the eye; the result of this injection is of a different nature to the figurative, and Deleuze calls it the Figure. However, the Figure always essentially risks remaining figurative and representing something by becoming confused with the figurative (91). Even though the Figure and the figurative differ in kind, there is an internal relation between the two. Something of the cliché always remains in the Figure: it cannot be eliminated, it ‘haunts’ the Figure. Francis Bacon was explicitly haunted by this: he continually worried that his paintings would be taken as scenes of horror, terror or other figurative clichés. Nevertheless, this risk is internal to his project, the risk of reinjecting sensation back into the figurative clichés that fill our brains and eyes. The struggle is, therefore, perpetually recommenced. This is why the themes of “escape” and “flight” are made into positive concepts in Deleuze: it is not an escape to a pure world of desire, it is an escape from the figurative that always returns, without end. To be very clear, figuration or representation is not wrong or evil; the problem is remaining merely figurative and claiming that the figurative reigns over sight and over painting (19). This is quite

\textsuperscript{385}This is why, at the end of Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze gets wrapped up in complex formulations which try to emphasize that negating the nihilistic history of humanity is just as necessary as affirmation, that the two are inseparable. Deleuze says that the “supreme disguise” of Dionysus is to subject his ‘products’ to conditions that those products surpass (NP: 193). This is extremely opaque, but in What is Philosophy? we see that ‘history’ is
different to the typical dogmatic materialist view of Deleuze that sees the world of figurative identities as merely a mistake in history; rather, it is perhaps the crowning feature of history, as we will see later.

The problem of the return of ‘representation’ and figuration gets to the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy, including the relationship between difference and identity. Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche is that the ‘harmony’ between the human and chaos ties him to the history of Western philosophy and the privilege of identity over difference. Deleuze is also centrally concerned with these questions. In *Difference and Repetition*, he does not reject identity and being, as it is often thought; instead, he wants to think the being and identity of becoming, the resemblance “said of” the disparate; he wants to conceive the same on the basis of difference (DR: 31, 241, 41). This identity revolves around difference and such a revolving can be achieved by giving difference its own concept (31). Previously, difference has been subordinated to the identity of the concept; beings have been differentiated according to concepts “in general already understood as identical” (40). This general theme of the ‘being of becoming’ in Deleuze is difficult but somewhat well known. What is less well known is how this produces an inevitable illusion of identity that falls into the error of representation that has haunted the history of Western philosophy and privileges identity.

Our understanding of Deleuze is often distorted by overly-general polemics about the “human” and the “post-human,” as if there could be an ‘end’ of the illusions of the human; in fact, Deleuze does not see such an easy end to the problems of representation and identity that are inevitably produced by any philosophy of difference.

always the condition for becoming that is itself unconditional. I would suggest that this is the implication of the ‘disguise’ of Dionysus in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. 258
The risk, for painters like Francis Bacon, of falling from the Figure to the figurative is mirrored in Deleuze’s philosophy: injecting difference into identity essentially produces an illusory identity that is taken as the ‘aim’ of difference. Deleuze says that systems of difference (the eternal return) engenders, produces and simulates identity and resemblance as “fictions” (DR: 126). It does this in order to ‘delight’ in itself and to ‘admire’ itself. Pure difference must distinguish itself from something, and that thing is identity; yet, identity does not distinguish itself from difference, it conceives itself as giving the law to difference (28).\textsuperscript{386} Difference therefore affirms itself in the inevitable illusion of identity, as another level of difference; it doubles its self-affirmation through identity. It surrounds itself not with a self-same identity but an illusory image of identity, resemblance and negativity.\textsuperscript{387} The problematic influence of the illusion is that identity appearances to be the aim or end of difference; identity is projected back onto originary difference as if it was the aim all along (DR: 128). This fictional and final identity is not just a temporary “human” mistake that we could overcome, but is, rather, the inevitable illusion of systems of difference (DR: 126).

The inevitable illusion created by any ‘noble affinity’ of life and thought is not identical with the ‘error’ of representation but has an internal relation to it. The “ontological repetition” of art or the eternal return, the fundamental aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy, produces the illusion of a physical or psychical identity (DR: 293). This illusion of identity is not the same as the ‘error’ of representation, an error which believes it possible to enclose the truth of all beings within a relationship to these identities, making them foundational. The ‘illusion’ of identity and the

\textsuperscript{386} Deleuze takes something of this ‘positive cancellation’ from Schelling. Schelling brings difference ‘out of the night’ according to Deleuze; this is because the ‘product,’ which is differentially determined, has the appearance of separation and limitation but is in fact a necessary moment of the process of productivity; the distinctions of the product are not merely secondary, negative shadows of an undifferentiated abyss of productivity. The product seems to separate itself off and take itself as complete ‘empirical infinity,’ but in fact, taken from the perspective of productivity, this limitation and separation is itself part of the pure productivity of Nature.
‘error’ or representation are different in kind but representation constantly profits off the illusion, seeking to use it for its own advantage. On the side of the body, the surveillance of ‘good sense’ takes advantage of the illusion to cancel out differences in intensity; on the side of the mind, ‘concepts’ profit from the identity produced by differential Ideas to cancel out the variations of ideality. The world of representation constantly takes advantage of the inevitable illusion of identity to re-establish itself; the risk of falling into that error is unceasing.388

The beatitude of old-age that is suffused throughout What Is Philosophy? allows Deleuze to express the illusion that we are trying to bring out with much more clarity than in his youthful texts. “The plane is surrounded by illusions. These are not abstract misinterpretations or just external pressures but rather thought's mirages [...] It is indeed necessary, in part at least, that illusions arise from the plane itself, like vapors from a pond” (WP: 49). The list of illusions is “infinite” because the ways thought falls into illusion is always changing. The illusion that comes before all others, however, is that of transcendence; the illusion of a self-identical being or concept that grounds the being and truth of all other beings; what Difference and Repetition names representation.389 “Thought cannot stop itself from interpreting immanence as immanent to something [...] then transcendence is inevitably reintroduced.”390 Each new thought has to claim that it is the only map of immanence, the thought that is in a noble affinity with life. The inevitable illusion of transcendence and the other illusions associated with it “resonate or

387 The “illusion” which is produced by the eternal return is an “image of identity” and resemblance as though it were the “end” of the different and the disparate (301).
388 The key quote is as follows: “beyond physical repetition and psychic or metaphysical repetition, an ontological repetition? The role of the latter would not be to suppress the other two but, on the one hand, to distribute difference to them (in the form of difference drawn off or included); and, on the other hand, to produce the illusion by which they are affected while nevertheless preventing them from developing the related error into which they fall. In a certain sense, the ultimate repetition, the ultimate theatre, therefore encompasses everything; while in another sense it destroys everything; and in yet another sense selects among everything” (DR: 293).
389 This has a connection to the shame that entered into philosophy with Heidegger, a shame that Deleuze says was not accidental to philosophy but necessary. The necessity of this shame is that all concepts include a “gray zone and indiscernibility” where for a moment the combatants on the ground are confused (WP: 108-9)
reverberate and form a thick fog” around any thought that forms a ‘noble affinity’ with life (immanence). Every philosophy has holes in its ‘map’ of immanence because it lets in the fogs of illusion that surround it, in which the philosopher is in danger of losing herself (WP: 51).

We can see how the inevitable fog of transcendence or identity plays out in other readers of Nietzsche: Foucault and Derrida. Deleuze says that immanent thought that attains a noble affinity with life inevitably falls into illusion because it must take itself as ‘the’ map of immanence. Systems of difference affirm themselves by producing an illusory image of identity, but this image has a tendency to fall into the error of self-sameness that characterizes the history of representation. In Foucault’s lectures on Nietzsche, he says that truth erases its own violent imposition of a system of identities upon differential and embodied relations (Foucault, LWK, 218). The will to power gives us a truth without truth, a truth that itself erases the erasure of violence and thus makes its own violence present and visible (219). The eternal return of differences violently exposes the violence of all systems of knowledge, including its own.

We can invoke Derrida to support the necessary return of systems of representation. He says that the truthful truth involves a violence against the violence of the present, but this new form of violence does not delude itself into thinking it could “reappropriate the negativity” of its own violence; it makes itself visible, and does not claim to be returning to the origin of an “other beginning” (Derrida, 1980: 62). Also in Derridean terms, we could say that the absent dispersion of writing requires that it be taken up in the living presence of speech, and it is this moment of speech that risks the inevitable illusions of representation. In Deleuze’s terms, a truthful truth of speech would risk the violence of transcendence, yet it would make that violence as visible as possible. Deleuze himself is clear that a purely immanent thought is impossible; Deleuze is part

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390 The major moments of the illusion of transcendence in the history of philosophy are: “the great Object of contemplation, the Subject of reflection, or the Other subject of communication” (WP: 51).
of a similar project to Foucault and Derrida when he makes visible the inevitable fall into illusion and error.

I have been exploring the necessity of the illusions of transcendence and identity in order to rebuff Heidegger’s criticism that Nietzsche relies upon ‘harmony’ between thought and life which makes him the culmination of Western thinking. Instead, I have suggested that in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche there is something like an eternally recommenced movement of thought towards and away from being, such that the ‘noble affinity’ between life and thought is not a simple harmony but also involves an essential moment of confrontation. The confrontation must always be taken up again because each moment of affinity always falls into the illusion of transcendence in which thought inadvertently separates itself from life.

Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche does touch on the necessity of illusion that I have been attempting to make visible. We see this in the communication of the thought of thoughts, the eternal return; in order to think this thought, we must communicate it in a poetic and veiled manner. The ‘how’ of language is prioritized over the content of what is spoken about. The reason for the fall into illusion is that humanity cannot live on poetry alone; it “needs” sensuous and immediate imagery. Humanity requires the illusion of semblance that occurs in the symbolic and sensuous images represented by Zarathustra’s animals. These animals invoke the highest thought in empty talk, jabbering and merely playing with words; in this empty play of semblances, being is concealed (N3: 52). Humanity requires these seductive empty words to exist in its everydayness.

Heidegger thinks Nietzsche is aware of the necessity of the empty semblances of idle chat that accompany every presentation of thought. Zarathustra eventually comes to terms with the fall of thought into idle chatter. The concealment of idle chat must always accompany the “true
proclamation” of the thought of thought (N3: 60). Zarathustra comes to takes joy in their necessity, despite knowing they are illusory (53). The problem with the animals is that they are not aware that the semblances are illusory; they take them to be true (56). However, this illusion always risks passing into the error of the animals. The law of being and the essence of the tragic is the “struggle” between two modes of language: the poetical and the everyday (61). Silence prevails not through absolute aloofness from the everyday, but through veiling itself among the illusions of idle chat against which it struggles and that inevitably recurs.

8. Nihilism as the motor of history

Nihilistic representational thinking is a necessary risk of all thought such that it is the motor of history in Deleuze’s Nietzsche. We will see how Deleuze changes his relation to nihilistic history: in 1962, he thinks it can end, whereas by the 1980s he says nothing is ever overcome, and therefore nihilism continually returns. In the next section, we will look at the problem of history in more depth, before turning to the related problem of the end of the human as the nihilistic animal.

A Nietzschean ‘harmony’ between human thought and chaos might arise if the nihilistic history of humanity could come to an end; the way the end of history is treated by Heidegger and Deleuze is important to understanding their readings of Nietzsche. We will look now at Deleuze’s treatment of history in Nietzsche. The motor of history is nihilism; that is, the tendency of thought to represent a transcendent truth as that which could enclose within itself all

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391 Perhaps this error is stupidity, the animality within the human. That is why philosophy, Deleuze says in Nietzsche and Philosophy, is that which harms stupidity. Stupidity is an inevitable fog that rises from the pond of living thought.
other beings.\textsuperscript{392} Hegel, Deleuze suggests, sees the human being as being essentially reactive: it cannot escape from nihilism; self-consciousness necessarily alienates itself from sensible nature in order to close the circle of self-consciousness. Following Hegel, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy} suggests that nihilism is the element and meaning of history as such and the transcendental principle of our way thinking\textsuperscript{393}. Nietzsche’s struggle against nihilism, however, will mean the “end of history as the history of man” (NP: 36).

Deleuze justifies his claim that Nietzsche will achieve the end of history as the history of man by examining the history of nihilism; we can give a condensed version of that history here. The first stage of nihilism (negative nihilism) means the positing of universal values such that ‘reactive’ forces triumph in their project of denying the difference of forces outside of them (NP: 174). Secondly, those difference-denying forces, which are particular, deny the universal values that helped them deny other forces (reactive nihilism). Thirdly, there are no more universal values, and so the reactive human beings fall into despair and wants to fade away passively (passive nihilism). Finally, a new inclination for active self-destruction develops, in which the difference-denying particular forces of the earth destroy themselves.

This history of nihilism, culminating in the self-destruction of reactive forces, is the key point of ambiguity in Deleuze’s reading; to put the problem as clearly as possible, this history seems to indicate an “end” to nihilism, and that “end” would, it seems, ‘return’ thought to a harmony with the being of becoming, with Dionysian joy and affirmation, of continual going beyond. Deleuze even indicates this ‘end’ of history himself: “the history of man is that of

\textsuperscript{392} Derrida claims something similar one year after Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche. He writes, implicitly referring to Nietzsche, that “the difference between Dionysus and Apollo, between ardor and structure, cannot be erased in history, for it is not in history. It too, in an unexpected sense, is an original structure, the opening of history, historicity itself” (Derrida, 1980: 28). Nihilism and its underpinning by difference just is the motor of history.

\textsuperscript{393} “Nihilism” is a “type”, in that it is the “element of history as such, the motor of universal history, the famous "historical meaning" or "meaning of history";” a “type” determines “the genealogical element of our thought, the transcendental principle of our way of thinking” (NP: 36).
nihilism, negation and reaction. But the long story of nihilism has a conclusion: the full stop where negation turns back on reactive forces themselves” (NP: 198). This is an isolated statement in Deleuze; I think it shows him struggling with an aspect of Nietzsche’s thought that he cannot avoid but which he wants to minimize. This is what Alain Badiou has called the event in which life moves against nothingness and “breaks the history of the world in two” (Badiou, 2001: 6). This ‘breaking’ of history in two is anathema to Deleuzian philosophy, and yet the “end” of nihilism clearly commits his reading of Nietzsche to something like it.

Instead of an absolute ‘end’ to the history of nihilism, the rest of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche indicates the necessity of continually breaking with nihilism. The transmutation away from nihilism seems to be a continually achieved process of freeing ourselves from negation in which we also change in nature, but not to discover a final truth in line with being (NP: 70-1). Instead, the fault line of going beyond nihilism moves around the difference between knowledge and thought. The will to power has two sides: nihilism is the ‘known’ side of the will to power, it ‘is’ the will to power as known (172). The other side of the will to power is thought in the Kantian sense: it is unknown, it can never be an object of cognitive experience, it is that which is essentially unknown; thought is a will that is adequate to the “whole” of life (175, 185).394 Put in these terms, an absolute ‘end’ or completion of nihilism seems absurd: what would it be to ‘overcome’ knowledge completely? Instead, the sovereign affirmation beyond nihilism is “inseparable from the destruction of all known values, it turns this destruction into a total destruction” (176). Affirmation395 is inseparable from destruction; what would it be to be ‘beyond’ this destruction if nihilism can be over, resigned to the past? Instead, an immense

394 Note the use of the term ‘adequacy’, again falling into what Heidegger sees as the tradition trope of the ‘adequacy’ of thought to being.
negation becomes a servant of affirmation, in the power of affirming, both preceding and following affirmation (176): “affirmation would never be real or complete if it were not preceded and followed by the negative” (179). Complete affirmation requires negation to precede and follow it; what would a world beyond nihilism look like? There would be nothing left to negate or destroy. This leads to a strange situation where unconditional affirmation ‘free from’ negation requires the negation of all known values as its pre-condition (192).

Although Deleuze cannot avoid giving the impression that the history nihilism can be completed and come to an end, his use of the notion of the untimely confirms our suspicion that the destruction of nihilism is a perpetually recommenced task. Deleuze writes that there is a “succession of philosophers” which is “not an eternal sequence of sages” with the eternity of the sky, but nor is there “a historical sequence” of philosophers with the historicity of the earth (107). This ’succession’ of philosophers and their concepts that is neither historical nor eternal is untimely: “philosophy always untimely, untimely at every epoch” (107). *Every epoch*: this implies no ‘end’ of the history of nihilism as the history of man.

On the problem of whether the history of nihilism has an end, Deleuze clearly privileges the early, open minded Nietzsche over the doom-prophet of the later Nietzsche. He loves to cite Nietzsche’s lines in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* about ideas as spears thrown from one thinker to another and thinkers as comets in the sky (Nietzsche, 2012: 30). Indeed, although Deleuze says, in an interview, that the untimely “is never reducible to the political-

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395 This necessity of destruction is, in Derridean terms, because form can never fully organize force: writing cannot be thoroughly Dionysiac, never fully of the dance, but it is necessary to ‘descend’ and work in order to engrave new Tables to carry to the valleys (Derrida, 1980: 29).
396 REFERENCE end of my article on Cinema - history
397 In a 1967 interview, Deleuze confirms the significance of the untimely in positioning Nietzsche beyond prior post-Kantian philosophy. He suggests that the theme of the untimely breaks with dialectical philosophy which understands history as the singular element of upheaval (Deleuze, 2004: 129).
historical element,” he also says that “when the people struggle for their liberation, there is always a coincidence of poetic acts and historical events or political actions, the glorious incarnation of something sublime or untimely” (Deleuze, 2004: 130).\(^{399}\) There is no ‘end’ to history; even more, historical events can coincide with poetic acts and give rise to the untimely. Destruction is constantly necessary to give way to the untimely; there is no breaking of history in two, in Deleuze’s reception of Nietzsche.

### 9. Beyond nihilism: can we move outside of the human?

In order for there to be any relation between thought and being, there must also be a perpetual negation of nihilistic tendencies that eternally return within human thought. The problem posed by this is: can we move outside the human as the nihilistic being? First we will look at a change in Deleuze’s terms, from the ‘outside’ of the human to the paths ‘within’ and beyond the human. What this ‘inside’ of the human will lead us to is the question of a new form; the problem is not the end of nihilism in history, but the invention of a new form that would not be the form of Eternity.

We have seen an ambiguity in Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche: on the one hand, there is the implication of the ‘end’ of the history of nihilism, an end that would indicate a possible ‘harmony’ between the chaos of becoming and the artistic creation of thought; this seems to succumb to Heidegger’s critique of harmony. On the other hand, history is drive by nihilism and it must therefore be continually negated.

\(^{398}\) “The very reason they [the Greeks] got so far is that they knew how to pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where others had left it.” Deleuze cites this in *Nietzsche and Philosophy, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* and elsewhere [REFERENCE]

\(^{399}\) The coincidence of the poetic and the historical remind us of “Nietzsche's imperatives “which puts one over on Marx — an artistic joy that comes to coincide with historical struggle” (Deleuze, 2004: 130).
The two sides of Deleuze’s ambiguity about nihilism are manifested clearly in two different readings of the Overman: one at the start of Deleuze’s career, in 1962’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, the other towards the end of his career, quarter of a century later in 1987’s *Foucault*. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze writes that “affirmation is only manifested above man, outside man, in the Overman which it produces and in the unknown that it brings with it” (177). Affirmation produces an Overman that is “above” and “outside” man in “the unknown.” This fuels the post-humanist dogmatic Deleuzians who see ‘man’ as a formation that we must break with and leave behind, echoing Badiou’s idea that Nietzsche wants to break the history of the world in two: the human and the post-human.

The ‘above’ and ‘outside’ comments seem to be erased twenty five years later. Deleuze writes, in 1987, that a “total misinterpretation” of Foucault and Nietzsche is to suggest that they see “real man transcending himself and becoming, they hoped, a superman” (F: 88). This is not about man ‘transcending’ to a superman outside of himself; the connotations of ‘transcending’ man that haunted Deleuze’s 1962 reading are strongly rejected. “As Foucault would say, the superman is much less than the disappearance of living men, and much more than a change of concept: it is the advent of a new form” (F: 132). This new form, which is not about living men nor about the concept of man, involves the regrouping of a ‘dispersion’ of forces as dispersed; for example, a form in which an unlimited number of grammatical constructions are superimposed upon one another in modern literature (131). Deleuze asks: is “this unlimited finity or superfold not what Nietzsche had already designated with the name of eternal return?” (131).

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400 A similarly misleading notion of ‘difference in nature’ from man also occurs in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*: “We should not think of Nietzsche's over-man as simply a raising of the stakes: he differs in nature from man, from the ego.” (NP: 163)

401 This echoes other developments in Deleuze’s thought. In the 1960s the emphasis on the Overman as the ‘outside’ of the human is echoed in the theme of the discovery of differential essences outside of thought; the aim is a thought ‘without’ image. After the 1960s, the focus moves towards the Overman as liberating forces within the human and
Deleuze’s comments about this gathering dispersion of the eternal return of the “new form” composed from ‘within’ man are very brief. To understand them, we can turn to his work on Francis Bacon, in which the problem is precisely a form in which the eternity of time is a “uniting-separating.”

The form that comes after Man would not be one of eternity; however, the problem of form necessary poses the problem of duration or permanence beyond mere accidental variation. In *Francis Bacon*, Deleuze discusses the common task of the arts as rendering life or time sensible; this occurs through a “uniting-separating” that is the eternity of time, in concert with the ‘variation of the body’ that is the changing force of time (FB: 63). To bring these two aspects together, the variation of accidents must become the essence and the law. Bacon achieves the essentialization of the accident when heterogeneous elements in the actual are brought into a unity that is not a figurative cliché of eternity but is, rather, the possibility of *unlimited connection* (FB: 120). In this unlimited and unmediated connection of heterogeneous and sensible elements on a finite plane, we see the ‘new form:’ the Figure in which several forms are seized or gathered together, irreducible to any single form: “*the limbs or fragments* of the lacerated Dionysus” (NP, 30). What had seemed arbitrary and accidental in appearance is made to coagulate and raised up to a single flow and Figure (FB: 150/160). All figurative and formal links must disappear in this Figure; it cannot rely on any prior mode of figuration and unification. The accident is given permanence in this dispersion-gathering, in what we can call a language (gathering connection) of bodies (the accidental) (126).

The uniting-separating Figure that facilitates the unlimited and unmediated connection of heterogeneous sensible elements is the “new form” that comes after man. Deleuze’s 1962 the production of differential essences within thought; this leads to a focus on the creation of a new image of thought. For an extended discussion of this change in Deleuze’s thinking, see Barker, 2016: 109.
Overman, produced outside and above humanity, is no more; instead, the form of eternity is replaced by the form of unlimited connection of finite elements, the Figure. Deleuze’s 1962 claim that the history of nihilism has an end, a conclusion or a full stop is quite definitively rejected in 1987: in relation to the problem of the ‘diagram’ by which humanity is transformed by the outside, Deleuze says “nothing ends, since nothing has begun, but everything is transformed” (F: 89). The transformation of everything is clear in the notion of the Figure: all forms are brought into a previously unknown combination that changes their nature: “Nietzsche said that man imprisoned life, but the superman is what frees life within man himself, to the benefit of another form” (130). What frees life within man himself is the Figure in which an unlimited number of connections are made possible between sensible elements. The ‘form of eternity’ “is a form of imprisonment for man;” instead, the Figure is the “composition of a new form” that opens man to the outside, that produces the higher form of all things, what Nietzsche called the superman (F: 91-2, 130). “What resistance extracts from this revered old man, as Nietzsche put it, is the forces of a life that is larger, more active, more affirmative and richer in possibilities” (F: 92). The extraction of a richer force does not go ‘outside,’ ‘above’ or transcend man; it occurs through a new form in which life “within” man is liberated: “for Foucault as much as for Nietzsche, it is in man himself that we must look for the set of forces and functions which resist the death of man” (F: 93). It is “in man himself” we look for forces; our looking occurs through a new form.

402 Setting free and releasing is the key aspect of this new form, in a similar mode to Heidegger’s Gelassenheit: to affirm is “to release, to set free what lives”, “to create new values which are those of life, which make life light and active. There is creation, properly speaking, only insofar as we make use of excess in order to invent new forms of life” (NP: 185).

403 “What new form will emerge that is neither God nor Man? This is the correct place for the problem which Nietzsche called ‘the superman’” (F: 130). “What is the superman? It is the formal compound of the forces within man and these new forces” (132). It is “a code that can capture fragments from other codes.”
10. Two Nietzsches: from overcoming the self to gathering the fragmenting Whole

The new form that moves beyond Man as the form of eternity gathers heterogeneous fragments; however, Deleuze admits that Nietzsche also succumbs to earlier conceptions of the human as a perpetual overcoming of the self. The next section will look at these two Nietzsche’s, allowing us to pinpoint the precise difference between Heidegger and Deleuze’s visions of Nietzsche. Ultimately, Deleuze will go beyond Heidegger by thinking the fragmentary and chance events of existence in Nietzsche; we will see this by examining his response to Heideggerian-Nietzschean philosopher Kostas Axelos. Before that, we will look at the trends from German Idealism and Romanticism that Deleuze indicates stretch into Nietzsche.

We can see Deleuze’s distance from a certain vision of Nietzsche by looking at explicit comments makes in 1980 that link Nietzsche back to the tradition of post-Kantian philosophy. When Deleuze claims, in 1987, that ‘nothing ends everything is transformed,’ he is moving away from his 1962 claim in the Nietzsche book that nihilism has a conclusion or full stop. In 1980, we almost see this become clear; Deleuze links Nietzsche to the theme of “self-overcoming” that he thinks characterizes post-Kantian philosophy: the act of the finite ego constitutes the world as it appears.404 This self-overcoming is implicated in Marx and Hegel’s way of conceiving the whole as totalization: as a process of becoming that gathers its moments on the one hand, and surpasses them on the other hand (Deleuze, 2004: 159).405 The gathering occurs in Hölderlin and Novalis through the creation of a world by the genius; its surpassing occurs in destruction: the artist or philosopher as God “proposes to create the equivalent of a world” (Deleuze 1980a). The themes of both the Romantic genius and the German Idealist unity as the process of gathering-

404 “The notion of self-overcoming [auto- dépassement] begins to be developed in philosophy. It will traverse all of Hegel and will reach into Nietzsche. The infinite is no longer separable from an act of overcoming finitude because only finitude can overcome itself.”
surpassing reach into Nietzsche, according to Deleuze in 1980. Yet, you would not be able to tell this from the rest of his comments on Nietzsche, which seem dedicated to painting a very different picture of post-Kantianism. The brief comments Deleuze makes in 1980 about self-overcoming seem to echo Heidegger’s criticism of Nietzsche: the movement of fixity and overpowering is the unity that brings together the two basic categories of Western philosophy, being and becoming.

Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on nihilism fits precisely that lineage of German Idealism and Romanticism that Deleuze thinks modern philosophy has avoided by following Nietzsche’s path. Heidegger sees Nietzsche’s problem as the transfiguration of history; such a transfiguration is achieved by looking back upon our given endowment in order to establish a “resonance of the whole” (N2: 182). This ‘looking back’ on the whole is the cyclical ‘recurrence of the whole’ but it occurs at a particular time: modernity, with a neediness that constitutes its nihilism (147). Nihilism is both an evental experience of prior history and the “fundamental development of history as such,” in which we have no endowment and everything is alike, such that the weight of all things melts away (172-4, 183). However, the awareness of our lack of endowment opens up the fundamental nature of creation and the requirement of creating something so seemingly permanent that it forces future thinkers to create anew. The only thing, however, that can be created as permanent is the very lack of endowment that Nietzsche calls becoming. Creation should achieve the permanence of becoming, such that it achieves a monstrously difficult permanence to overcome in the future.

The thought of eternal return achieves a new permanence because it “fixates beings themselves” “as permanent;” it determines “how the world essentially is” as the “chaos of

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405 Deleuze also describes what Heidegger sees as unity in Nietzsche, however he sees it as Platonic: “the action of a unity principle ordering chaos” (Deleuze, 2004: 159).
perpetual Becoming,” holding fast becoming in the true (128-9, 126). This transforms the human “stance” towards beings and requires that we transpose ourselves into the moment of decision in which we confront our own nihilistic state of lack (129, 183). This thought integrates the becoming of the eternal return into the “circle of beings as a whole” and creates afresh our relation to beings (139). Heidegger is, here, planting Nietzsche directly into the philosophical lineage that Deleuze removes him from. The recreation of the human stance or relation to beings as a gathering-separating process mirrors precisely the themes of self-overcoming that Deleuze sees in post-Kantian Romanticism and Idealism. Thus, we see that Deleuze and Heidegger both see an important philosophical moment in the nineteenth century theme of self-overcoming. However, they go beyond that theme in different ways: Heidegger ties Nietzsche to it and thereby thinks the abandonment of Being in history, whereas Deleuze takes up another Nietzschean theme: that of the fragment.

The vision of Nietzsche that Deleuze opens up is one disconnected from German Idealism and the Romantics; it also goes beyond Heidegger. We see the confrontation between Nietzsche and Heidegger in Deleuze’s 1964 comments on a Heideggerian philosopher who he sees as twisting away from the master: Kostas Axelos.406 Rather than viewing Nietzschean unity as a self-overcoming process of gathering and surpassing, the whole is now “being in the process of becoming the fragmentary and fragmented totality” (Deleuze, 2004: 76). Being is, yes, a process of becoming, just as in Hegel, Marx and Heidegger’s Nietzsche, but it is no longer a finitude and its process of surpassing; it is a fragmentary and fragmented totality.407 The “sum” of all fragments or the whole is “always open,” and this open and fragmented whole is what

406 Deleuze links Axelos with Jarry and Heidegger not only in 1964, but also in 1970: “With Axelos, the overcoming of metaphysics rediscovers the sense that Jarry had given it in” (Deleuze, 2004: 161).
407 Deleuze mocks Heideggerianism but expresses this new totality in their language: “In the jargon of specialists: Being is the epiphenomenon of all beings [étants] and must be thought by the new thinker, who is an
thought must “make up.” The whole never completes itself; there is an open dialogue between the fragment and the whole, such that all previous wholes must be subtracted in order to produce a newly fragmented totality (75). Deleuze signals the Nietzschean provenance of this fragmented totality when he brings in Dionysus: “No other totality than that of Dionysos, but Dionysos dismembered” (75). The open totality of the fragmented whole must continually be re-thought in an infinite dialogue that subtracts the prior whole and releases a new configuration of fragmentation.

The fragmenting totality is the side of Nietzsche that goes beyond Idealism, Romanticism and Heidegger; this also gives us insight into Deleuze’s notion that the Overman arises “within” the human. In this 1964 article, Deleuze retains the language of the “end” of nihilism, which must “go all the way” such that the ‘last’ human ‘perishes’ (Deleuze, 2004: 74). These themes play into Heidegger’s criticism of Nietzsche’s ‘overcoming’ of nihilism in favor of a harmony of art with the chaos of life. Despite these flavors in Deleuze’s text, he no longer discusses the Overman as something ‘outside’ and ‘above’ the human. Instead, the ‘other’ than human is a force “at work inside human subjectivity,” “hiding” in it; this mirrors the 1987 critique of interpretations which see the Overman as ‘transcending’ the human. The force ‘inside’ the human has “two paths:” on the one hand, actual history and technology; on the other hand, “the poetic creation of fantastic imaginary machines” (74). Nihilistic and technical history; poetic, epiphenomenon of humankind” (76). The thinker must think all beings as the ‘epiphenomenon’ of humankind; the problem of wholeness is central.

This sum of all fragments is inspired in part of by Spinoza’s thinking of the specific infinity of the modes, irreducible to reason; a key principle of the modes being the unity of diversity. The immediate infinite mode “comprises an infinity of actual parts inseparable from one another” (Deleuze, 1988: 92). This infinity of actual and inseparable parts resembles what Deleuze calls the unlimited finity in Foucault (F: 131), the eternal return in Nietzsche and the rhythmic possibility of unlimited connection between heterogeneous elements in Francis Bacon (FB: 120).

The role of poetry as the invention of machines outside of nihilistic history resonates with Derrida’s claim about writing as the descent of meaning outside itself within itself (Derrida, 1980: 29). Form and force are irreducible to one another, just as nihilism and the body are irreducible to one another. Poetry and writing express this irreducibility from within thought.
creative art: two paths beyond the human, *not* nihilism as that which is ‘overcome’ in favor of art.  

What does the fragmented totality have to do with the two paths inside the human, technological history and poetic creation? This brings us back to the problem of nihilism. Deleuze emphasizes in a 1970 article on Axelos: “it’s not about stopping the process,” it’s not about “overcoming nihilism” (Deleuze, 158). The “nothing” that nihilism cannot think is the “end of the world” that “de-totalizes” its own movement, kindling local fires of fragments that already overcome nihilism, and are in fact the ‘self-overcoming’ of nihilism. *Within* the human there is, on the nihilistic path of technological history, an unthought de-totalization that kindles fragments that overcome nihilism in its ever-new emergences. Nihilism does not have a full stop or end as Deleuze had suggested in 1962; now, the catchphrase is: “ever to begin, against and again” (158). Thought no longer occurs between a Heideggerian point of departure and an arrival or between Being and beings; rather, it devours the two terms that had contained it, and it continually passes through assignable terms (159). We no longer have to wait with Heidegger for the Gods to save us; instead, the planetary gesture that liberates a new totality of fragments is the gesture “from where the salvation of philosophy can now come” (Deleuze, 2004: 161).

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410 “This something "other" [than the human] is conceived as a force already at work in human subjectivity, but hiding in it, and also destroying it. (cf. Rimbaud's "Something thinks me.") The action of this force follows two paths: the path of actual his- tory and the development of technology, and the path of poetry and the poetic creation of fantastic imaginary machines” (74).

411 In 1957, Deleuze expresses the unthought release of fragments by nihilism in terms of the philosophical problem of grounding. Every ground leads to an “unexpected surprise” or deception. The ground and the surprise are, therefore, two ways of philosophically expressing the two paths that lead us out of Man as the form of eternity (Deleuze 2015a: 41).

412 In *What is Philosophy?* it is clear Deleuze has Heidegger in mind when he speaks of the origin and the destination: Greek philosophy is, on Deleuze’s reading of Heidegger, “an origin and thus as the point of departure of a history internal to the West, such that *philosophy necessarily becomes indistinguishable from its own history*” (WP: 95).

413 In Derrida’s words, the “break” with the systems of metaphysical opposition is not a nostalgic return. Rather, we must use the strengths of the field of metaphysics against itself to “produce a force” which spreads throughout the entire system, ‘un-limiting’ that system and fissuring it (Derrida, 1980: 20).
The two paths of nihilism and the fragments it liberates is a very strange combination. Deleuze says that nihilism as the leveling of beings to the unidimensional has the “most bizarre effect:” to liberate the fragments of an “unthought no-thing” that is a “multidimensional play” (160). This bizarre effect of nihilism as liberating is really what separates his thought of Nietzsche from both Heidegger’s Nietzsche and Heidegger’s own philosophy. Nihilism as ‘flattening’ is not only liberating but is also revitalizing, it gives rise to the “raw play” of all the dimensions of elementary forces as a “counter-power” (160). This counter-power of multidimensional play is not itself thought by nihilism; nihilism is “self-overcome” only in the sense we think that play “as a Whole.” The most important clarification of this Whole is that its “parts” do not presuppose it as a “fragmented totality.” The parts of the Whole do not presuppose a fragmented totality; rather, the whole is a “river” that carries partial objects and varies the distances between those objects; it is the carriage of fragments and their variation (160). The whole is not a prior fragmented totality but is “one” with the unforeseen course of a fissuring in every direction. Deleuze sees this as “a new relation with the Outside, which is the object of thought today,” one that he finds in Blanchot (160). Heideggerian being and truth are replaced, in this fissuring, by errancy (161).

11. From Heidegger’s History of Being to Deleuze’s machinic-poetic turning

Deleuze reinterprets nihilism in terms of a flattening of being that also unthinkingly liberates and revitalizes fragmented elements in a multidimensional play. These ‘two paths’ lie ‘within’ the human and point the way towards a new form that can liberate us from Man as the form of eternity. This unendingly open dialogue between the Whole and the Fragment is

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414 The parts are not formed or pre-figured in a logical development or organic evolution; nor does the whole presuppose a “lost unity” (160). These are clearly conceptions of the Whole in Marx, Hegel, other German Idealists,
Deleuze’s way of reading Nietzsche beyond post-Kantian philosophy up to Heidegger. We must now make it explicit why this goes beyond Heidegger’s History of Being.

Heidegger’s history of Being begins with the pre-Socratic opposition between vacuous nothingness and self-showing; it culminates with Nietzsche in which there is only self-showing in two forms: the fixed and the transitory. This is summed up as follows: “art and knowledge in their reciprocity bring about the full securing of permanence of the animate [chaos] as such” (N3: 140). Nietzsche’s words (becoming and life) put the permanence of presence beyond doubt, and thereby displace the human into its non-essence, dissolving any relation to beings. Being thereby turns into the ‘abyss’ as a closure, a turning that rests on the truth of Being. This abandoning of beings by Beings should act as an alert to us that we have a responsibility to think the “other” commencement (112).

Deleuze describes this History of being as an “analytic and necessary principle” that links philosophy to Greece; thus, for Heidegger, “it is enough to resume [the Greeks’] movement in an initiating, recommencing repetition” (WP: 95). On Deleuze’s reading, Being “continually turns away when it turns toward, and the history of Being or of the earth is the history of its turning away.” By recommencing the Greeks’ movement, we think the origin of the turning away that is the principle of the history of Being.

Robert Bernasconi’s reading of Heidegger on history both confirms and problematizes Deleuze’s reading of Heidegger. The theme of recommencement is clear: that which remains unsaid in what is said is the language of the first beginning “remembered,” or an “echo” of “the beginning of Western thinking” (Bernasconi, 1989: 63). We hear the silence of this unsaid echo when we recognize the history of Being. However, to complicate Deleuze’s reading, we must add that what we hear in the concealing of the first beginning is something never before heard;
rather than hearing what Parmenides heard, we hear “the speaking of language itself” (25). What we hear is the “oldest of the old,” but that is not a historical time; rather, it is language itself. In a 1993 article on Heidegger that is more nuanced than his reading in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze acknowledges the ancient silence of language itself: between the ancient language, the present language and the new one being formed by the poetic thinker, “there are intervals and empty space” that are filled with “immense visions:” the “unveiling of Heidegger’s world” (98). In these immense visions that emerge from the oldest of the old, Heidegger brings us to the “limit of language” that is “the Thing in its muteness - vision” (98).

Despite Deleuze recognizing that Heidegger does not simply ‘repeat’ the first beginning but rather listens to the silences at the limit of language, he puts the emphasis on Heidegger as a creator of a new language as opposed to merely a listener to ancient silences. Bernasconi confirms this distinction between creating and listening. Even though metaphysical language already speaks non-metaphysically, Heidegger’s task is one of recognizing this speaking “through remembrance” (92). The categories of remembrance and recognition are still privileged over ‘creation’ and the new language in Heidegger. The importance of this is that, according to Deleuze, Heidegger fails to appreciate “the transition from the technological to the Poetic” that Jarry, Nietzsche and Axelos do (97). The non-metaphysical is not discovered by merely recognizing the silences in a remembrance of the first beginning; it is liberated and

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415 Foucault criticizes Derrida in a way which mirrors our Deleuzian explication of Heidegger here. Derrida claims there is nothing outside the text, the ‘sense of being’ and the reserve of the origin is said in the silences and erasures of the text (Foucault, 1998: 416). By locating the sense of being in silence and erasure, Derrida continues a tradition that gives limitless sovereignty to the master’s voice and restates the text indefinitely, culminating a problematic tradition of Western thought. This seems close to the suggestion that Heidegger wants us to recall the non-metaphysical silences left within the traces of metaphysical language of the first beginning.

416 Deleuze admits that Heidegger comes very close to these two paths in thinking the “transition from science to art, in this reversion of science into art.” He does think the two paths within the human when the technical being makes the ground appear and the poetic being brings into being a groundless world (96). However, Jarry ensures the transition from the machine to the Poetic in a way Heidegger does not. Axelos takes Heidegger down that route of the two paths of technology that liberates the poetry of the fragment.
revitalized as the unthought of the technological history of nihilism. The ‘two lines’ within the human (technology and poetry), that Deleuze had pointed out in 1970, recur in 1993. On the one hand the “technical machine” gathers atomic elements of beings and on the other hand the “poetic sign” deploys the possibilities of Being that, gathered, constitute “the thing” at the limit of language (96). No longer a recognition and remembrance; rather, two lines, historical technology and poetic creation, that liberate us from Man as the form of eternity.

12. Conclusion

We can conclude by summarizing the themes of Deleuze’s escape from Heidegger’s criticism of Nietzsche; firstly, we can look at what Heidegger’s criticism entails and how aspects of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche admit and remain open to that criticism. Heidegger sees Nietzsche as ‘overcoming nihilism’ through an artistic conception of human thought that would be in harmony with the chaos of becoming. This would end the nihilistic ‘fixation’ of the truth that reduces all beings to the same measure and covers over becoming. However, for Heidegger, the ‘harmony’ in play would just make ‘presence’ and its transfiguration permanent, therefore securing the culmination of the history of Western philosophy that has privileged presence and self-showing over absence and concealing. Deleuze admits that this side of Nietzsche exists as a hangover from the post-Kantian theme of self-overcoming: the fixations or gatherings of the self are surpassed or overcome, and the ‘unity’ of the Whole consists in just this process of fixation-surpassing, whether as the destruction and founding of a world by a creative genius (Romanticism) or as a logical-organic world-process (German Idealism and Marx). The self-overcoming theme in Nietzsche privileges what Klossowski calls the “creative initiative of the

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417 “The technical machine makes virtual lines emerge, which bring together the atomic components of beings, whereas the poetic sign deploys all the possibilities or capabilities of Being that, when brought together in their
individual” and makes the non-human depend upon the willing of the human (Klossowski, 1997: 148). Human creative initiative is what, according to Badiou’s interpretation of Nietzsche, will break the history of the world into two, bringing nihilism to an end. Deleuze’s early reading of Nietzsche, therefore, retains traces of the theme of an ‘end’ or conclusion of nihilism that would occur ‘outside’ or ‘above’ the human. Heidegger’s critique of this ‘self-overcoming’ Nietzsche is valid; however, there is another Nietzsche, one that Deleuze ‘liberates’ from the history of Western philosophy upon which Heidegger places him as the crown.

The Nietzsche that Deleuze rescues from the dogmatic image of Western philosophy does not see nihilism as coming to a single ’end;’ instead, there is a constant necessity for the negation of that which is known. On this reading, the ‘affirmation’ in which thought enters into a ‘noble affinity’ with the living ‘unknown’ is inseparable from a critique of all known values. Nihilism has no full stop: there is no ‘pure’ self-overcoming that gathers and destroys worlds. It is from within the fragments continually unleashed by nihilism that affirmation occurs. Yet the ‘Whole’ that gathers the new fragments inevitably emits a new ’fog’ of transcendence which is why the dialogue between the fragment and the Whole is unending and must be kept open. This Whole that is just the river of fragments is gathered in thought; this thought is the new form that arises within the human and liberates us from Man as the form of eternity. Such a Whole-Thought is the overman as the higher form of everything that is. It is the Figure that shatters all figurative connections and rhythmically gathers heterogeneous forms. This continual shattering-gathering river of fragmentation lies ‘between’ thought and being, replacing the Heideggerian historical decline in which Being ‘turns away’ from the first beginning. Deleuze’s Nietzschean immanence is an infinite weaving of turning towards and away between thought and being; thought turns towards the fragmenting river of being that it gathers and then falls into transcendence, turning
away once again. This is the Nietzsche that Klossowski says prioritizes the chance events of existence that are productive independently of the willing of humans (Klossowski, 1997: 148). This Nietzsche breaks with the dogmatic image of Western philosophy in the Romantics, German Idealists and Heidegger.

According to Klossowski, Nietzsche ends up putting human creative initiative in place of the chance events of existence and by doing so “he is suppressing the crucial point of his thought.” In this chapter, we have shown how Heidegger emphasizes the self-overcoming Nietzsche of ‘human creative initiative’ that gathers all the major themes of Western thought. Deleuze liberates the fragmenting Nietzsche of the chance events of existence in order to move beyond the dogmatic image of Western thought and beyond Heidegger.
Conclusion

Two paths beyond Nietzsche; two paths beyond nihilism

This project has attempted to map out some of the key contours marking the common terrain of 1960s French philosophy; we have isolated some of the key tenets of that philosophy by unpacking Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. One major task of the dissertation has been diagnosing and untangling an error in understanding Deleuze’s Nietzsche, an error that I have called dogmatic materialism. Untangling Deleuze’s Nietzsche from this error, I hope to have shown that Foucault and Derrida take up Nietzschean themes in a similar way to Deleuze. This work indicates that the difference between a Derridean-Foucaultian critique founded on ‘signs’ and a Deleuzian ontology of ‘bodies’ is misplaced; I hope to expand on these indications in future work. Heidegger’s reception of Nietzsche offers a radically different side of Nietzsche to the French philosophers, one that views him as continuous with the major themes of post-Kantian romanticism and German Idealism. These two sides of Nietzsche clarify the fundamental stakes of the legacy left to us by the French philosophy of the 1960s today, opening up the philosophical problems left to us by recent European philosophy.

The ‘error’ diagnosed by this dissertation was that of ‘dogmatic materialism’ which has been very influential across disciplines and has strongly marked our understanding of Deleuze. This dogmatic materialism posits that conscious representations are generated from out of material, real and bodily beings that are independent of the human mind. Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is read in this light as an ontology of forces that posits chance encounters between bodies as the origin of all action. I claim that this reading of Deleuze is a new mode of universal conceptual representation that attempts to gather all beings within itself: underneath appearances, *everything* is *really* dynamical process of matter. In short, dogmatic materialism is a new mode
of the nihilistic self-enclosure of man, as Claire Colebrook has suggested. My main claim in this
dissertation is that Deleuze’s philosophy accounts for the return of nihilism; for the return of
modes of thinking that separate themselves from the variations that constitute them. The real
insight Deleuze takes up from Nietzsche is that thought must think its own unthinkable processes
of variation in relation to the outside and its constant attempts to enclose that outside. By
claiming that material, real bodies really are dynamical processes, we fall back into all the
hubristic and anthropocentric difficulties of thought that great philosophers have been trying to
overcome since Plato.

My proposal for thinking beyond dogmatic materialism is to think the constant
confrontational interweaving between two paths within and beyond Man as the form of eternity.
Instead of “thinking about” material bodies, thought must think its relation to an outside which is
always its own; this relation can be either liberating or enclosing, and these are the two paths
beyond Man as the form of eternity. Firstly, the continual return of nihilism within the actual
course of history; secondly, the continual poetic creation that breaks with that nihilism. We must
hold irreducibly open a dialogue between these two paths: on the one hand, nihilism continually
liberates fragments that thought must turn into a Whole that is nothing but those fragments in a
river of fragmentation. Yet on the other hand, that ‘river’ necessarily gives off a fog of
transcendence, in which thought takes itself as thinking of some thing outside of itself, such as
material fluxes in becoming, “Being” or the logical categories of the thinking subject. We must
acknowledge that thought and being continually and infinitely turn towards and away from one
another; this is the only possible sense we can give to the Nietzschean noble affinity of life and
thought if we do not want to return to a simplistic Platonic dualism which merely valorizes
fluxing becoming over fixed being.
The value of Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche lies in warning us against the position of dogmatic materialism. That critique is aimed at the Nietzsche of the self and its overcoming, acting as the culmination of the Western metaphysics of presence. This is the Nietzsche in which the whole of nature is monstrously re-humanized because all we have is our own creative founding and destroying of a world; all that exists are modes of presence and their re-configuration. Dogmatic materialism seems to fall into a similar position when it claims that all there really is a flat ontology in which objects are in a ‘democracy’ with one another, and in relation to which all we would need to do is tell new stories about the ‘intra-action’ between the human and non-human. This flat equality is precisely what Heidegger is worried about in Nietzsche: we fall for the myth that there is no absence and that everything shows itself as itself. Instead, Deleuze’s real Nietzschean insight is that material and human intra-action is constantly violated by the turning away of being from thought and thought’s incessant turn away from being. This turning is not a contingent, sad epoch of the human in history; it is the very movement of human history itself. Yes, “Man as the form of eternity” is a face drawn in the sand of time, destined to wash away; real, living humans, and the real concepts of humanity that enclose all things are not so easily done away with. The post of post-humanism is the most human of gestures.

Chapter five laid out the positive new problem of nihilism-creation laid out above; chapter four corrected the dogmatic materialist understanding of the body, rethinking it as the difference between sensation and thought, not as the object of thought. Affect is precisely the production of a new event between thought and the body, one that shocks thought out of its conceptual and pre-existing habits. This radical differentiation between thought and its outside is targeted against the post-Kantian conception that sensation is ‘indifferent’ and thus requires the
differentiating power of thought to gain order. By establishing this context, we see that the Nietzschean notion of affect in Deleuze is not meant to be what we ‘think about;’ it cannot be a foundation for a theory or philosophy in the way it is for dogmatic materialists. Instead, it forces us to think the ‘two paths’ of nihilism and creation in which thought turns towards and away from being.

To support the claim that we must not think ‘of’ bodily fluxes but think their ‘outsideness’ from thought, chapter three turned to the influence of Kant on Deleuze’s Nietzsche. Kant is demonized as reducing all beings to the human; yet his radical separation of the sensibility and the understanding as the two sources of knowledge that differ in kind points us towards an outside of thought within thought. In Kant’s thought of intensive magnitude as the variation of real appearances, we find a notion of variable matter not in a dogmatic materialist frame but as a condition of experience. We cannot know intensity as a condition, and yet we can think it as necessary for thought. This shows that when Deleuze sees Nietzsche as claiming that all reality is quantity of force, he is not claiming this is how ‘things in themselves’ are independently of all thinking. He is taking issue with the post-Kantian framework for thinking variation that privileges a homogeneous spatial frame, that puts the extensive first and sees intensive variations as a mere filling for that extensive frame.

Having corrected the error of dogmatic materialism, we can see that the role of nihilism is Deleuze’s Nietzsche is much more important than previously thought. The affirmation of life can only be thought as the other side of an escape from nihilistic self-enclosure. This puts our analysis of nihilism in chapter two in a new light; we can now appreciate why nihilism is the motor of human history: every time thought turns immanently towards being or life, the fog of transcendence rises once more. For Deleuze, nihilism that posits a truth behind appearance is
never fully achieved because it is merely the fog released by the productive and fragmenting river of immanence. Therefore, nihilism is itself a constantly produced struggle to enclose the fragments that constantly threaten to escape. This reading of nihilism upsets the dogmatic materialist position that sees conceptual representation as a temporary illusion of the human as something we could ‘overcome.’ Heidegger suggests that this way of thinking about nihilism actually falls back into the Platonic tradition of truth as fixity and the body as becoming; thus he criticizes Nietzsche’s thought of nihilism as merely opposing the fixed super-sensible to the fluxing sensible. By showing, in chapter two, how Deleuze opens up another reading of nihilism, we also showed how he does not fall into the dogmatic materialism position we tend to associate him with.

We can now understand why the general framework laid out in chapter one was so important. Heidegger reads Nietzsche through the traditional dualities of permanence and impermanence, overcoming-resisting and becoming-being. Deleuze, on the other hand, is interested in how there is a continually open dialogue between the ‘will’ as thought and knowledge with the phenomena. Intensive forces are not meant to form an ‘ontological’ foundation of all beings, but rather keep open the relation between actual historical phenomena and the creative poetic escape from them. There is no single overcoming of history in the thought of Eternal Return; there is a constantly recommenced struggle to escape from a nihilism that itself returns as the fog emitted by each attempted escape.

In this project, we have achieved the three elements of a book that Deleuze sets out: we diagnosed the error of dogmatic materialism that thinks ‘of’ the body; we corrected this by re-reading the body as the irreducible and unthinkable outside of thought; we proposed a new
concept of ‘two paths’ within and beyond Man as the form of eternity, consisting in an open
dialogue between the Whole of nihilism and the fragment of creation.

Thinking about future philosophy and our inheritance from French philosophy, it is
important to note the significantly different cultural atmosphere of our present. Deleuze said he
appreciated being a teacher in a lycée in the 1950s because he was treated like the village idiot
and could therefore say anything; the post-war optimistic spirit of freedom tolerated creative
exploration. 1968 and the ensuing decade was, similarly, a period of experimentation in which
French philosophers were permitted to indulge in experimental forms of writing and thinking.
From around 1980, Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault seemed to bring a new sobriety to their
philosophy. In his 1989 filmed interviews, Deleuze said he was worried that the university was
becoming a place geared merely towards the economic market and not towards research. The
sobriety and the difficult environment faced by French philosophers after 1980 indicates the way
we have to approach philosophy today, and the way their legacy must be taken up. The history of
philosophy cannot be abandoned in the way Deleuzians want. Perhaps today is more important
than ever to see philosophy and its history as a terrain of struggle against the nihilistic self-
enclosure of the human.

In the future, I would like to bring together chapters two and five to provide a positive
vision of philosophy, of the open dialogue between nihilism and poetic creative flight. I would
also like to show how this philosophy exists across the works of Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida.
This would would continue to unify Deleuze’s works on Bacon, Foucault and Axelos, to clarify
to an overall philosophy that seeks to establish unlimited connections between a continually
fragmenting river of beings. This river of fragmentation differs from Heidegger’s history of
Being in which there is only the turning away and the attempt to make Being ‘turn towards’
thought by ‘recognizing’ the turning away and hope a god will save us. For Deleuze, the turning
towards and away between being and thought is infinite and continually occurring; we must
think the unthought fragmentations beneath the turning away that characterizes the nihilism of
the present. In Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*, the ‘two paths’ that lead us out of
the human are the “plane of organization” and the “plane of consistency;” “life” is the
coexistence of these two plane. These two paths resemble what Foucault calls the two modes
of thought that Nietzsche grasps as continually recurring: the enslaving capture of the outside
and the liberating acknowledgment of thought’s exteriority. I would also show how these two
paths are at work in Foucault and Derrida, building on connections already established earlier in
the dissertation. Future work would show how Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault move beyond
Heidegger in similar ways, and make the ‘turning away’ of Being into a continually recurring
and undecidable event.

A related project would would the two paths of nihilistic enslavement and poetic
liberation through Kant. Specifically these paths appear in Kantian philosophy as the moral ‘free
cause’ realized in artistic production and the necessity of continual breaking with empirical
humanity that perpetual encloses itself within conceptual thought. The moral legislator
introduces a free cause into the chain of natural causes, breaking with all natural, empirical
causality. The individual empirical human being cannot achieve this insofar as they are tied to
empirical consciousness, with its essential self-interest. Kant’s moral law is a break wth all
empirical forms of law; all empirical desire. Lyotard, in his *Lessons on the Sublime*, has brought
out this aspect of the Kantian moral law: it humiliates and shames the empirical ego. This ethical

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418 So when Deleuze talks, mysteriously, about liberating the living forces ‘within’ man, he is not talking about
biology but rather about the two paths that he has been laying out over the course of his career; two paths that relate
to a new form, beyond Man as the form of eternity.
move beyond the empirical turns into a politics in order to be realized within the empirical: it is the task of a future republican society in which law is self-legislated by the members.

For Nietzsche, European conceptions of ‘society’ based around law essentially fall back upon specific laws, such that Kant’s moral self-legislation that breaks with all empirical law cannot be realized by the society he envisages. Instead, Kant’s aesthetics point towards a notion of ‘breaking’ with all prior law that realizes the self-legislating ideal of the moral law. The true artist breaks with all prior forms of experience, all conceptuality and all intuitions of nature. The artist produces an intuition that cannot be grasped other than in the production of a new work that once again breaks with all prior norms, values and laws. In the aesthetic breaking or scandalizing, we find a law that breaks with all laws, and thus realizes the Kantian moral ‘free cause’ in the natural chain of causality. The necessity of production for the re-production of the art work is a call for continual self-legislation, and a new way of thinking society that does not rely on a distinction between governing and governed. Here we see one of the two paths beyond Man as the form of eternity: poetizing liberation.

There is also a kind of return of nihilistic representation in Kant’s notion of artistic production. The art work created by the Kantian genius can only be communicated through a new kind of concept. That concept, however, is always misunderstood by those who receive it; it is received in terms of a new set of rules and laws that are followed, instead of calling for new breaks with all rule and law. This is what I would call the inevitable return of nihilistic representation, in a Nietzschean vein. New creative acts must be acts of breaking or scandalizing of what had been taken for the truth of art.

I would like to articulate these Kantian relations between ethics, aesthetics and politics at the heart of Foucault’s notion of the Cynical mode of existence. Foucault sees the two paths
within the human as the ethical activity of thought: its liberation and enslavement of the outside. I believe that the Cynical mode of existence as a scandalous ‘break’ with all norms, laws and rules is one of these two paths, but one that can never be taken alone. The break is only a break with the world of norm and law that continually recurs and attempts to enclose beings (Foucault, 2012: 187-8). The Cynical mode of existence must be like the Kantian moral law: it must realize a free cause within the chain of sensible nature that also breaks with that nature. This positive breaking is the mode of existence Foucault finds in the violent reductions of modern art and the militant style of existence in the 19th century. In order to carry out this ‘breaking’ in a thorough manner, intellectuals must constantly attempt to liberate thought such that people within society are no longer able to act in the way they used to without hesitating. Even once this liberation has occurred, new regimes of opinion and cliché will form, giving rise to new problems within the social field. Social movements and revolts are signs of these new problems, but signs that do not have an inherent meaning. The meaning of those new problematic signs must be gauged by intellectuals, who must once again seek to liberate thought from its enclosure within the smallest habits of daily life. In this way, Foucault sees the Cynical intellectual in line with the Kantian artist who breaks with the continually recurring fall into the empirical norm and law.

419 We see this Foucaultian themes echoed in an interview Deleuze gave, where he summarizes the importance of the artistic will to power that Nietzsche discovered. The artistic will to power is a set of “self-relations that allows us to resist, to elude power, to turn life or death against power […] optional rules that make existence a work of art, rules at once ethical and aesthetic that constitute ways of existing or styles of life” (Deleuze 1995: 98). Ethical-aesthetic rules that allow us to relates to ourselves in ways that turn against power: this is part of the infinite turning away of thought and being.

420 These voiceless movements have changed the “whole lives,” “mentaliites” and “attitudes” of people’s everyday lives, people with no relation to political or social movements (Foucault, 2001: 172-3). “There are hundreds and thousands of people who have worked for the emergence of a certain number of problems”, those problems are “now actually before us”

421 “The essential element in human life and relations” is thought (Foucault, 2001: 455-7). The most stupid institutions and silent habits involve thought, so things must change “where it is essential for things to change: in thought, which is the way in which humans face reality” (Power, To Punish is the most difficult thing there is, 464).
To extend the perpetual tension between enslavement and liberation, I propose to examine it in the work of a historian-philosopher who explicitly revisits Foucault’s themes: Saidiya Hartman. Hartman’s book *Scenes of Subjection* is about the problems of freedom and slavery in the political context of nineteenth century America. Her work reveals how the ruses of power or nihilism recur in new ways even when there seems to be a moment of ‘liberation.’ Her forthcoming work on aesthetic modes of liberation by enslaved people will be of use in thinking the poetic escape from that continually reproduced nihilism of enslavement. The political person of the ‘free slave’ also forms a central position in Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*, as a contradictory moment in which a certain enclosing violence is made visible.

By looking at the relations of ethics, politics and aesthetics in Kant, Foucault and Hartman, I hope to enrich my concept of the infinite confrontation between thought and being and the corresponding ‘two paths’ of poetic creation and nihilism that I have attempted to outline in this dissertation. This new work would show that the historical contours of 1960s French philosophy I have outlined in the present dissertation can bear fruit for more concrete problems that we face today.
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