DENVER '76:
THE WINTER OLYMPICS AND THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN
COLORADO DURING THE LATE 1960s AND EARLY 1970s

A Dissertation in
Kinesiology
by
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ABSTRACT

On May 12, 1970, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded Denver, Colorado, the 1976 winter Olympic games. About two and half years later, on November 7, 1972, Colorado citizens voted by a three to two margin to make it a violation of Colorado’s constitution for state funds to be allocated toward the event. Colorado politicians and business leaders had spent years planning, campaigning, and traveling the globe to earn the right to host the winter sports festival. Nevertheless, with funding suddenly inaccessible, Denver’s Olympic planners were forced to rescind their invitation to “the youth of the world,” as Olympic hosts traditionally declared every four years. This dissertation delves into the political controversies surrounding the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games. Colorado’s decision to banish the Olympics was the product of a change in how Coloradans viewed economic growth, combined with broadened understandings of the political power of citizenship. A pro-growth and pro-development mindset present in early 1960s motivated Denver’s political and business leaders to initiate their bid and facilitated their overriding confidence in the notion that they had the support of a large majority of Colorado’s populace. By the beginning of the 1970s, however, the idea that growth and development were unequivocal social goods had been quieted by a diverse set of issues connected to expectations regarding individual rights. Namely, within Colorado, anxiety over the infringement of open spaces near people’s homes, objections to undue spending of taxpayer dollars, and anger that citizens had been shut out of decision-making procedures inspired various people to challenge the wisdom and morality of hosting the Olympics.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARO</td>
<td>Auraria Residents Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIEO</td>
<td>Citizens Interested in an Equitable Olympics</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Citizens for Colorado’s Future</td>
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<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>Colorado Olympic Commission</td>
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<td>DOC</td>
<td>Denver Organizing Committee</td>
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<td>DURA</td>
<td>Denver Urban Renewal Authority</td>
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<td>DRI</td>
<td>Denver Research Institute</td>
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<td>HUD</td>
<td>Department of Housing and Urban Development</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>FIS</td>
<td>International Ski Federation</td>
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<td>JBC</td>
<td>Joint Budget Committee</td>
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<td>MAPC</td>
<td>Mountain Area Protection Council</td>
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<td>POME</td>
<td>Protect Our Mountain Environment</td>
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<td>Colorado Ski Country USA</td>
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<td>SCOOC</td>
<td>Southern California Olympic Organizing Committee</td>
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<td>TRO</td>
<td>Tenants’ Rights Organization</td>
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<td>USOC</td>
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Introduction

Colorado, Growth, and Sport in Political History

In February 1973, John Jerome, a writer for Skiing magazine, turned his attention to politics. “When the votes were all counted,” Jerome recalled, “the inevitable had happened. Richard M. Nixon had been reelected President and – by about the same margin – the good people of Colorado had rejected the 1976 Denver Winter Olympics.” On May 12, 1970, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded Denver, Colorado, the right to host the 1976 winter Olympic games. However, about two and a half years later, as Jerome observed, Colorado citizens voted by a three to two margin to undermine the IOC’s decision. Indeed, on November 7, 1972, Coloradans created an amendment which made it a violation of Colorado’s constitution for state funds to be allocated toward the event.¹

By the time of the vote, anti-Olympic advocates within Colorado had already influenced Washington D.C. legislators. The United States Senate pledged $15.5 million for new Olympic facilities, but decided to make the commitment dependent on additional state support.² Thus, after November 7, 1972, when Colorado voters passed “Amendment Number Eight,” both state and federal funds became inaccessible. As a result, Colorado’s Olympic organizers were forced to rescind their invitation to “the


² Congressional Record – Senate, S 15021, 15 September 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, Denver Olympic Committee for the 1976 Winter Olympics Records, Denver Public Library, Denver, Colorado (hereafter DOC DPL).
youth of the world,” as Olympic hosts traditionally declared every four years.

Coloradans in effect dismantled Denver’s Olympic cauldron before it could even be built alongside Tokyo, Japan, which rescinded the 1940 games (after Japan invaded China during World War II), Denver became (and remains) the only other city to obtain and then relinquish the Olympics and the only one to do so through a popular vote.3

By November 1972, according to Rocky Mountain News investigative reporter Richard O’Reilly, many Colorado observers viewed the question of whether or not to host the winter games as a decision “more important to the state’s future than the election of any of the state’s political candidates.”4 As Olympic proponent and President of Denver’s Chamber of Commerce Rex Jennings declared a week before the ballot: “Great cities and great states face perhaps a half a dozen crucial decisions in their entire history. These decisions are recorded in history and dramatically affect our destiny. I believe we face such a decision in defeating Amendment No. 8 at the polls next Tuesday.”5 Denver Olympics opponent and Democratic state representative Richard Lamm agreed on Amendment Number Eight’s importance, though he anticipated a different result than Jennings. As Lamm proclaimed, passing the amendment would represent a “quiet revolution” that would turn the world of traditional politics “upside down” and reveal “new realities” for Coloradans.6 Though journalist John Jerome took a more moderate

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5 “The Olympics Story,” Transcript from Luncheon, 31 October 1972, Box 86 Folder 27, Denver Chamber of Commerce, Denver Public Library, Denver, Colorado (hereafter DCC DPL)
view, he also saw significant weight in the result of the Denver Olympics referendum. The “Denver mess,” he claimed, was “a single city microcosm of the current national political turmoil.”

This dissertation delves into the events and controversies surrounding the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games. How and why did Coloradans win and then discard the Olympics? Why did Colorado boosters set out to host the games in the first place? How were they able to do so successfully? Why did a majority of Colorado voters then become united against Denver’s Olympic plans? Furthermore, what can this event teach about the history of Colorado during the late 1960s and early 1970s? What, additionally, might it reveal about the place of sport within American society during that era?

The Politics of Growth

Colorado’s decision to banish the Olympics was the product of a change in how Coloradans viewed economic growth, combined with broadened understandings of the political power of citizenship. A pro-growth and pro-development mindset present in early 1960s motivated the state’s political and business leaders to initiate an all-out bid for the winter games. Importantly, the predominance of this pro-growth outlook facilitated the bidders’ confidence that they had the support or at least the implied consent of a large majority of Colorado’s populace. By the beginning of the 1970s, however, a diverse set of issues connected to expectations for individual rights challenged the notion that growth and development were unequivocal social goods. Namely, within Colorado, anxieties over the infringement of open spaces near people’s homes, objections to undue

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7 Jerome,”Goodbye, Denver Olympics,” 68.
spending of taxpayer dollars, and anger that citizens had been shut out of decision making procedures inspired Colorado constituents to challenge the wisdom and morality of hosting the Olympics.

The people who bid for the games wanted to use the Olympics to spur Colorado’s economy and promote fast development. Ironically, by bringing the games to the Centennial State, Colorado’s Olympic planners created a venue where an overt clash over the meaning and merits of economic expansion could take place. The controversy over the Denver Olympics represented a political issue in and of itself, but it also became a larger forum through which citizens gathered to debate how they should structure and organize their community. In supporting or objecting to the Denver Olympics, Colorado’s citizens contested more than a single sporting event.

At least since the 1970s, scholars and cultural critics of sport have argued that sport, and “physical culture” more broadly, carries the potential to become a vehicle for communicating and normalizing socially constructed knowledge. Such knowledge functions to create a sense of order, coherence, and meaning within social groups. As the anthropologist Clifford Geertz claims, messages conveyed though sport often provide a commentary “upon the whole matter of assorting human beings into fixed hierarchal

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8 Within historical literature “sport” is usually defined (implicitly and explicitly) as a structured activity with human invented rules and goals in which the rules stipulate physical skills permitted to reach the goals. Participates compete under the same conditions; the rules are understood as the means to the ends; a bureaucratic organization determines and administers the rules; and athletic feats are consistently quantified and compared, see Allan Guttmann, *From Ritual to Record: The Rise of Modern Sport* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). Feminist scholars have recommended employing an expanded notion of sport to gain a better understanding of women’s sport histories. In this light, Jennifer Hargreaves and Patricia Vertinsky define “physical culture” as “those activities where the body itself – its anatomy, its physicality, and importantly its forms of movement – is the very purpose, the raison d’etre, of the activity,” see Jennifer Hargreaves and Patricia Vertinsky, *Physical Cultural, Power and the Body* (London: Routledge, 2007), 1.
ranks and then organizing the major part of collective existence around that assortment.”

In other words, societies use sport to create culture— to express and impose ideas about gender, race, ethnicity, region, nationality, age, class, and ultimately about what has value and who should hold power. As Geertz eloquently articulated, for distinct social groups, a specific sport or sports will act as “a story they tell themselves about themselves.”

Many sport historians have applied this type of theoretical approach to historical research, investigating sport to reveal the cultural dynamics of a particular time and place.

From this perspective, sport not only reflects cultural assumptions. As a place where people go to gain clarification about the ways things are and the way things should be, sport retains the ability to become a mechanism for ideological change. In this light, the practice and consumption of sport almost always carries political ramifications.

Some people will passively consume sport. Others will consciously use it to perpetuate dominant ideas or infuse new ones. In each cases, the ways individuals participate and sometimes do not participate serves as a form of discourse that either confirms or challenges social standards and expectations. Like many other cultural productions, such as literature, music, art, and religion, sport can become a means through which ideas about the world are reproduced and contested, affirmed and undermined, echoed as well

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as overcome. Popular sporting events such as the Denver winter Olympic games are always ready and waiting to be used to advance political prerogatives.

The disputes surrounding the 1976 Denver Olympics brings this reality into sharp relief because the Denver games resulted in the most fundamental of political acts – citizens voting. It therefore becomes unusually clear how the practice of sport can be put toward political ends and interpreted as political history. The vote on the Denver Olympics referendum proved to be a vote for and against various social and cultural priorities. What was more important: national prestige or prudent spending, economic growth or natural beauty, international goodwill or the right to participate in local politics? The question of whether or not to host the Olympics in Colorado became an arena for these more expansive political debates.

It might even seem that an inquiry into the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games is more political history than sport history. There is not a single athletic performance recounted in the narrative that follows. Coloradans voted for and against the Denver Olympics, but the games themselves never took place. In many instances throughout American history, participation in sport has served as form of political activism – from Jackie Robinson’s dominance after crossing the color line into major league baseball to Billie Jean King’s dismantling of Bobby Riggs in the “Battle of the Sexes.” “There are . . . a great many things,” sport historian Jaime Schultz avers, “that can be communicated only with the body, through motion, form, and appearance, in the occupation and navigation of space.” In this regard, in certain contexts, sporting acts will carry significant political force.¹¹ Still, especially in the case of mass spectator sports such as

¹¹ Jaime Schultz, “The Physical is Political: Women’s Suffrage, Pilgrim Hikes and the Public Sphere,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 27, no. 7 (2010): 1133-1153, quotation 1149. For other
the Olympic games, as sport sociologist Varda Burstyn contends, the “culture that surrounds physical performances is as important as the physical acts preformed.” What are the expectations of and for spectators, event organizers, and the local communities where events occur? How do they conform or deviated from their roles? How do they write and re-write the messaging of a popular sports enterprise?

It is notable that each of the historical questions that this dissertation poses as well as the answers it provides are derived from actions, arguments, and meanings directly connected to the prospect of a specific elite international and commercialized sport spectacle. Within the present work, it is only in relation to such an event that broader cultural, social, and political concerns come into view. This is a cultural and political history about Colorado but it is also a history made possible by asking questions about the place of sport in society.

**Previous Scholarship on the Denver Olympics**

In a way, this account of the Denver Olympics is a “top down” history, a twentieth-century story about the decision making of white men in positions of power. The most prominent character throughout the narrative is thrice-elected Colorado Governor John A. Love. As this dissertation claims, the acquisition of the Denver Olympics indicated the dominance of the pro-growth thinking that brought Love to

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office. In contrast, the defeat of the games revealed the waning popularity of Love’s pro-growth agenda. The ways in which Love, the Denver Organizing Committee (DOC), and their supporters won the 1976 winter Olympic games and tried to retain them explains, in large part, why Colorado citizens chose to reject the event.

In 1974, with the winter games visible in Denver’s rear view mirror, political scientist Laura Lee Katz Olson wrote an excellent dissertation about the 1976 Denver Olympics in which she made this very point. Olson argues that Governor Love and Denver’s Olympic planners were able to bring the Olympics to Colorado because the event fit “in congruence with the dominant values and expectations in the state [during the early 1960s] – that of economic growth.” Olson also explains that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when environmentalists and other protesters emerged after Denver’s bid was won, Denver Olympic officials, Governor Love, and the Colorado legislature “refused to respond adequately.” Two years later, in 1976, in an essay for *Colorado Magazine*, historian Mark Foster likewise argues that the “incessant blunders” of Olympic organizers had been “the most critical factor influencing the defeat of the [Denver] games—more important even than the highly effective campaign waged by . . . opponents.” As Foster contends, “in the final analysis, the DOC was its own worst enemy.”

The arguments made in this dissertation rely on greater contextualization and make use of a significant amount of new evidence, but ultimately confirm Olson’s and

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Foster’s position. At the same time that the DOC obtain the Olympics from the IOC, they laid the groundwork for the event’s eventual expulsion.

Of course, the Denver Organizing Committee and Governor Love would not have had to surrender the 1976 winter games if it were not for various grassroots activists. A significant portion of Olson’s project centers on the activities of Colorado’s Olympic opponents. According to Olson, neither objections to high costs nor environmental concerns alone would have been able to tip the scale against the DOC’s pro-growth imperatives, but together they “had become salient enough.”15 The present analysis will expand on Olson’s interpretation by drawing attention to the importance of individual rights, which, in diverse ways, ran the gamut of anti-Olympic activism. This dissertation will also give a closer look at specific anti-Olympic advocates, situating them with more detail within broader political settings, such as the 1970s environmental movement and late 1960s to early 1970s liberal politics.

Olson and Foster produced their initial interpretations over forty years ago. No one has probed the causes and implications of the Denver Olympics controversy since then.16 Due to the fact that Olson and Foster worked from a temporal space so close to the moment of history that they examined, they were unable to reflect on long-term

15 Olson, Power, Public Policy and the Environment, quotations from iv, 265, and 247.

historical trends. This project thus offers a more nuanced and expansive view of the relationship between the Denver Olympics and the politics growth in Colorado.

Outline of Chapters

The chapters that follow are thematic, but for the sake of narrative coherence, they are also often chronological. As a result, evidence for an argument which is the focus in one chapter may arise in a more peripheral manner within separate sections. Nonetheless, each chapter’s evidence and arguments should be able to stand on their own. When considering each chapter, readers should be aware that many events, organizations, and people bear relevance to multiple topics. For analytic clarity, aspects of their stories are withheld and revealed at specific times rather than others.

The first three chapters explore the motivations of Colorado’s Olympic bidders. Chapter one briefly traces the history of the Olympics in the United States from the early 1900s through the early 1960s. The chapter then examines the social and economic context of Colorado after World War II. Popular views of the Olympic games and a pro-growth ethos in the American West after the war explain why, in the early 1960s, hosting the winter Olympics appeared so attractive to Colorado’s chief decision-makers. The second chapter examines the beginning of Denver’s bid for the 1976 Winter Olympics and reveals how the event became connected to Governor Love’s pro-growth program. The second chapter will also consider how this focus on growth led Love and the DOC to believe that they had support from a bulk of Colorado’s citizens. The third chapter considers the technical factors and practices that undergirded Denver’s bid to the IOC. This chapter will make it clear that the DOC’s bid was fraudulent and deceitful.
Certainly, the bid was indicative of the high level of assurance that Love and others possessed that most Coloradans backed or at least would consent to their Olympic efforts. The DOC’s major concern was getting an official designation to host the games from the IOC. After that, the Olympic hopefuls presumed all other obstacles – including their own dishonesty – would be easy to overcome.

Chapters four through seven probe the motives and tactics of Colorado’s Olympic opponents. Denver’s Olympic objectors held a variety of positions. Some wanted the Olympics to merely be kept out of certain parts of their state. Others were convinced that the games should banished from Colorado entirely. No one in Colorado, as far as research for this dissertation could identify, was against the Olympic movement generally. It was the Olympics coming to Colorado in one form or fashion that upset Colorado’s anti-Olympic activists. For the purpose of this dissertation, all views held in opposition to the specific plans of the DOC (rather than the Olympics in general) will be considered “anti-Olympic” views.

The first organized attempt to disrupt the plans of the DOC came from within the foothills of Jefferson County, just west of Denver. Chapters four and five concentrate on these opponents. Chapter four examines the beginning of Jefferson County’s opposition, covering events that occurred prior to the Olympics being awarded to Colorado. Chapter five analyzes Jefferson County’s advocacy from after the bid was won up to just before Colorado’s anti-Olympic referendum passed in November 1972. Together these chapters shed light on a distinct and self-interested brand of environmental activism. Jefferson County residents aimed to prevent the commercialization and growth of their towns. They did so, moreover, by arguing that they had a right to the aesthetic experiences
provided by undeveloped lands located near their homes. Notably, however, for
Jefferson County protesters, the inspiration for establishing such a right was tethered to a
desire to maintain an idealized middle- to upper-class social status.

The sixth chapter considers three additional factors that added fuel to anti-
Olympic fires. The chapter begins by examining protests coming from within Denver’s
Hispanic and black communities. These Denverites politicized the Olympics to highlight
how they had consistently been prevented from taking part in political decisions that
effected them. Chapter six also recounts how a pair of liberal Colorado policymakers
began to raise doubts about the DOC’s cost estimates and in doing so helped call into
question Governor Love’s pro-growth policies. While Hispanic and black Coloradans
argued for a right to be included in the DOC’s Olympic planning, liberal politicians
advocated for the right of citizens to determine how their tax money was spent. Chapter
six concludes by considering how, under the light of this mounting contestation, the DOC
failed to control the image of the Denver Olympics within Colorado’s public sphere.

The seventh chapter provides an analysis of a small group of young but
experienced political operatives who teamed up with Colorado’s anti-Olympic politicians
to place Amendment Number Eight on Colorado ballots. Through the Denver Olympics
these activists hoped to show a cross section of Coloradans the power and potential of
direct democratic action. These protesters wanted to slow growth, prevent reckless
spending, and protect Colorado from environmental destruction, but, more boldly, they
hoped to use the Olympics to expand civic participation in the name of liberal causes.

The eighth chapter refocuses on Colorado’s Olympic organizers, tracing their
struggles to both appease the IOC and discredit Colorado’s mushrooming anti-Olympic
uproar. When Olympic supporters belatedly realized that they could lose the winter games, they pivoted. Instead of contending that the event would grow Colorado’s economy, they argued that Coloradans had a responsibility to promote Olympic ideals, such as mutual respect and international goodwill. This strategy suggests that Denver’s Olympic proponents recognized that within Colorado the politics of growth had been altered. The prospect of growth and development did not carry the political capital that it used to.

Still, Governor Love, the DOC, and others continued to show a lack of awareness or care regarding the concerns of many of Colorado’s citizens. The concluding chapter will briefly revisit the DOC’s tactical errors and various anti-Olympic arguments. There is little doubt that the DOC and its supporters made many significant mistakes. At the same time, in the case of the Denver Olympics, the rights of Colorado citizens to protect open spaces around their homes, determine how state money is spent, and provide meaningful input in policymaking overrode desires for regional growth as well as state pride, national prestige, and even improved international relations. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, this mindset was brought into the limelight in Colorado through the 1976 winter Olympic games and yielded reverberations throughout the Centennial State and the Olympic Movement. With uncommon lucidity and precision, the fight over the Denver Olympics shows how sport and politics became inextricably linked, as they usually are.17

17 Although he does not discuss the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games, Guttmann’s central thesis in The Olympics is that the games have always been fundamentally political.
Chapter 1

The Historical Context of Pro-Growth and Pro-Olympic Policies in Colorado

In the late 1960s, during his second term in office, Colorado Governor John A. Love remembered being surprised to learn that some of his constituents opposed his long-held pro-growth agenda. Economic diversity and growth was something he had pushed successfully for years. “I was shocked to see groups emerging that opposed my goals,” Love admitted.¹ In the American West, during the early 1960s, when Love took office, spurring economic growth stood as the first priority of politicians and business leaders. World War II had motivated defense manufactures and federal bureaucracies to move to the region. When the war concluded, Western power brokers feared that if they failed to diversify local enterprises, new development would stall and the political autonomy and strength they achieved during the war years would dissipate.² From the perspective of Western policymakers, finding ways to continue to prompt growth had been and would continue to be of the utmost importance.

Meanwhile, for Western areas looking to define themselves as centers of economic activity, the Olympic games historically and culturally represented a viable promotional device. Commentators and Olympic organizers depicted the Olympics as a spectacle that could place cities like Denver, Colorado, on a road of economic and social ascendancy as well as turn lesser known winter resorts like Vail, Steamboat Springs, or


Aspen into international tourist attractions. Many believed Olympic sport would bring people and profits to the Rocky Mountain West. As such, for many Coloradans, the games represented a sign post for social progress.³

The Image of the Olympics in the United States

The history of the Olympics in the United States dates back to the turn of the twentieth-century and has consistently involved up-and-coming Western cities seeking to make their mark on national and international stages.⁴ Seven decades before the IOC bestowed the winter games on Denver, Chicago, Illinois, and St. Louis, Missouri, vied to become the first American city to host an Olympics. Railways had become the nation’s dominant mode of long-distance transportation and as a consequence Chicago strode in front of St. Louis as America’s Western industrial hub. Chicago had also been chosen over numerous other cities to host the nation’s famed 1893 World’s Fair, an event commemorating the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus’ arrival in North America. The fair showcased American art, culture, technological innovation, and other elements of imperial power. In fact, IOC president and founder Pierre de Coubertin favored Chicago as an Olympic site because of his fond memories from visiting the 1893 Columbian Exposition. The ingenuity of University of Chicago President Henry J. Harper, support from the school’s celebrity football coach Amos Alonzo Stagg, and a

³ For an example of a cities that used the Olympics in a similar way around the same time as the Denver bid, see Kevin Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 2008); Kay Schiller and Christopher Young, The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern German (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); one could make the same argument about winter resorts in Europe such as Grenoble, Innsbruck, Cortina, etc.

pledge by Chicago merchants to help fund the Olympic games solidified Chicago as the IOC’s first choice. In May 1901, the organization sent the 1904 Olympics to the Windy City.⁵

Even so, St. Louis’s promoters did not give in easily to their Chicago counterparts. St. Louis had held Western economic dominance before railroads replaced the Mississippi River as the most efficient means for transporting resources. At the start of the century, the “Gateway City,” as St. Louis was known, continued presenting its case for being the heart of America’s expanding empire. Toward this end, St. Louis advocates not only bid for the Olympics, they successfully pressed the United States Congress to fund the 1903 Louisiana Purchase Exposition. The St. Louis fair represented another year-long celebration of American exceptionalism, commemorating the centennial of Thomas Jefferson’s $15 million land acquisition from France. When construction delays forced the start date of the St. Louis fair from 1903 to 1904, however, it looked as if the Louisiana Purchase Exposition and the Chicago Olympics would be competing with each other for national and international limelight.⁶

To avoid being overshadowed, St. Louis organizers threatened to hold their own athletic events as part of their fair during the same month as the Chicago Olympics.


Since the Olympic movement had only just been “revived” in 1896, the St. Louis contests represented a legitimate challenge to the IOC’s nascent authority over international sport. When funding started to dry up in Chicago, the leader of the Amateur Athletic Union, James Edward Sullivan, began advocating for St. Louis to host the Olympics instead of the Windy City. After a series setbacks, Chicago’s Olympic organizers relented. When Chicago’s boosters informed the IOC that they would not object if the games were relocated, the IOC had little choice but to send the Olympics to St. Louis.7

The deft maneuvering of St. Louis organizers to poach the Olympics proved significant. Newspaper coverage of Olympic sports acted as free publicity for the city’s larger pageant—and for the city itself. Though few international participants made the long trip by ship to the United States, the New York Times, for instance, boasted to its nationwide readership that the “athletes competing at the track and field competition of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition revival of the Olympic games . . . are the peers of any previous aggregation of international character.”8 In truth, 525 of 617 participants were Americans (and another 41 were Canadians). Still, the paper portrayed the St. Louis Olympics as a triumph. As sport historian C. Robert Barnett claims, “the “most important boost to the [St. Louis] exhibit occurred when the opening of the fair was postponed from 1903 to 1904,” since it “enable[d] the Louisiana Purchase Exposition to steal the Olympic Games from Chicago.” As part of the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition, for a brief

7 Ibid.

moment St. Louis outshone Chicago and once again (briefly) reigned as the centerpiece of American predominance and prosperity.  

When the summer Olympics returned to the United States in 1932, the event served a similar purpose. In the 1930s, the Great Depression hit Americans hard and it struck the American West perhaps the hardest of any region. In Western states such as Colorado, laborers relied on work from coal mines and other extractive industries. Just prior to the crash of 1929, however, mining output declined dramatically. Ore, grain, and cotton became the new staples of Western economies and the Depression battered these sectors with particular force. After the crash, the funds invested to produce these commodities could no longer be recouped. As a result, seven of the top ten states with the greatest income declines during the Depression were Western states. In Colorado, between 1929 and 1933, per capita income dropped by 40%.  

Even in the midst of the Great Depression some places in the American West maintained images as beacons of hope. Indeed, the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics showcased American desires to recapture an earlier era of affluence. Even before the Depression, it became apparent to many Westerners that the example that would lead to

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financial security in the future lay with the “City of Angels.” In the 1920s, as states such as Colorado saw their economies flag, Los Angeles emerged as a new focal point for Western corporations. The city became a manufacturing hub for the aviation industry. U.S. Petroleum planned several major extraction sites nearby. Hollywood solidified its role as the hometown of the film business. The city’s banking sector grew in turn. These initiatives created a population and real estate boom. The U.S. census counted 577,000 residents in 1920, a number that grew to 1.2 million by 1930. By then, as other areas of the region began to witness their economies stagger, industrial investments and its increased population brought Los Angeles’s manufacturing output to $1.3 billion a year.¹²

Before 1932, Los Angeles remained relatively unknown compared to its East Coast counterparts.¹³ For the city’s emergent industrial and real estate oligarchy, hosting the summer Olympics represented a way to present themselves as an elite city in the developing world—just as St. Louis sought to do with the 1904 Olympics. Local residents bought into the idea, lending their support in 1925 by voting in favor of a $1 million bond issue. In 1928, Los Angeles’ inhabitants passed another bond for $1.5 million to further support the cause.¹⁴ The economy looked quite different four years later. Nevertheless, amidst comparative obscurity and the destitution of the Great

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¹⁴ Notably, the passage of these bonds represented the views of voting Los Angelinos.
Depression, the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics offered to foster economic support and public recognition.¹⁵

During the Los Angeles Olympics, desperate refugees continued to flee the Dust Bowl toward the West Coast. Some may have visited the soup kitchens operating in the shadow of Los Angeles’s new Olympic Stadium.¹⁶ Yet, rather than focusing on penniless farmers or record highs in unemployment, the American press zeroed in on the thousands of pleasure seekers who traveled by plane, train, and car to Los Angeles for sport and entertainment. As Coloradans read in the Denver Post, “American motoring tourists . . . started moving into Los Angeles for the Olympic games in caravans that smacked of the boom days in southern California less than a decade ago.” Previous travelers displayed signs reading “California or bust,” the paper asserted, “but now modern limousines and overworked flivvers of ancient vintage flaunt banners [reading] ‘Olympics or bust’ as they roll into this temporary capital of world athletes.”¹⁷ As the Colorado daily told it, in the midst of the grimmest economy in American history, the Olympics continued to pull tourists into its orbit.

Such positive reactions in the media made it clear that the Olympics were an event to be appreciated. As Olympic travelers flocked toward the new 105,000 seat Los Angeles Coliseum built near the city’s downtown area, New York Times scribe Allison Danzig depicted the stadium as “an Olympic plant that dwarfs the imagination,” outdoing

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¹⁷ “Tourists Descend on Games,” Denver Post, 29 July 1932, p. 27.
anything from ancient Greece or Rome. In a similar vein, Denver Post sport reporter C.L. Parsons boasted that “Barnum was a piker if his famous shows were to be compared with the biggest athletic show in the world – the tenth Olympic games . . . What a Spectacle!” For Parsons, the festival proved not only enamoring but enlightening. “If there is one single, solitary soul in the huge multitude that will not get the thrill of a lifetime, well, then life isn’t worth living for him,” Parsons reflected prior to the game’s opening ceremony. The ceremony itself, Parsons declared the next day, “made a lump come in your throat, tears to your eyes and sent a thrill down your spine. It was certainly great to be an American.”

Through the Olympics, Los Angeles successfully embraced an image of affluence, enthusiasm, and metropolitan optimism. Olympic athletes greeted each other at the first ever Olympic Village, while a 107-foot torch burned in the Memorial Coliseum, inaugurating two new Olympic traditions. As athletes socialized with Hollywood celebrities, over 1,250,000 spectators spent enough to leave Los Angeles with a $1.5 million surplus. The Denver Post, meanwhile, celebrated such nuances as the decision of Los Angeles’ Olympic organizers purchase of thirty separate $6,000 Swiss watches to “insure the most accurate timing possible.” As Danzig of the New York

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22 “Finest Swiss Watches To Be Used at Olympics,” Denver Post, 29 July 1932, p. 28.
professed, the “country may be in the midst of a depression, but there is no sign of it here.” C.L. Parsons likewise reiterated concluded that the Olympics had “been a tremendous show, beautifully handled and bringing out the most spectacular performances in the history of athletics.” The Los Angeles Olympics, the Denver writer avowed, was “a success in every way.” In the words of Olympic historian Alfred Senn, the “Los Angeles Games of 1932 . . . appeared to be the epitome of sport competition as an escape from the dismal realities of life and perhaps even an expression of hope for a better time.” The West Coast’s most industrialized city faced an age of misery, but through portraits painted by writers such as Danzig and Parsons, the Los Angeles Olympics represented an image of wealth, success, and security.

Furthermore, the purpose and process that led to Los Angeles’s Olympic success held important repercussions for future Olympic organizers. As sport historians Mark Dyreson and Matthew Llewellyn explain, “California bidders sought the games not for the intrinsic value of staging an international sporting competition,” as journalists such as Parsons may have made it seem. Rather, the Los Angeles Olympics was actually “a glossy addition to the most ambitious real-estate development in American history.” Dyreson and Llewellyn claim that in “their ardor to garner the games,” Los Angeles bidders “radically changed the modern Olympic movement by establishing a new

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26 Pieroth, “Los Angeles 1932.”
archetype for [Olympic bidding].” When Los Angeles entrepreneurs began vying for the Olympics at the end of World War I, the city stood far from the eyes of the aristocrats that made up the IOC. But California real-estate developers, mortgage bankers, and corporate lawyers lobbied persistently. Politicking and salesmanship became essential tasks for gaining the public relations benefits of hosting the world’s most famous international sporting event.27

In the same year as the Los Angeles summer games, the potential of the Olympics to cultivate a positive public image and to attract tourists extended to the Olympic movement’s younger winter-time iteration. Prior to 1932, Lake Placid, New York operated as a small village, secluded in the Adirondack Mountains. However, when local tourism promoter Dr. Godfrey Dewey and area residents convinced the IOC that Lake Placid should host the 1932 winter Olympics, the area became a distinguished winter resort. Americans showed much less interest in the winter Olympics and Lake Placid planners did not have the resources of Los Angeles. Nonetheless, the winter games remained a much smaller operation and Dewey attracted powerful political backing. When New York Governor and future President Franklin D. Roosevelt urged his state’s legislature to support Dewey’s bid, state decision-makers responded by passing a bill allocating $500,000 for Olympic facilities.28 Dewey also garnered support from local people living in the nearby town of North Elba. The town’s residents agreed to issue a


$200,000 bond on behalf of the winter games, an investment that would never be repaid.\textsuperscript{29}

As far as the Lake Placid Olympic Committee was concerned, the 1932 winter Olympics substantiated the notion that the games were worth the cost. As the Lake Placid Finance Committee chairman, Willis Wells, asserted, North Elba’s “expenditure was amply justified . . . our citizens are proud of their foresight.”\textsuperscript{30} Quentin Reynolds of the \textit{Denver Post} confirmed Wells’ analysis, speculating (inaccurately as it turned out) that North Elba’s “small deficit will be made up easily enough,” while adding that aside from financial issues, “when all the bills are paid, Lake Placid will still have a beautiful arena, a magnificent ski jump, and the most thrill-provoking bobsrun (sic) in the world.”\textsuperscript{31} Lake Placid inhabitants appeared to remember the 1932 games fondly. After World War II, they bid again at every chance they could to host the winter Olympics for a second time--including a bid for the 1976 winter games, when they faced off against major U.S. cities of the America West, such as Seattle, Salt Lake City, and Denver.\textsuperscript{32}

One should question how America’s first three forays into hosting the Olympics ought be remembered. Barnett, for instance, calls the 1904 Olympics “the worst in the history of the Olympic Movement” because of the lack of international participation and

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{30} “Winter Olympics Drew $96,000; Lake Placid Deficit $52,468,” \textit{New York Times}, 17 February 1932, p. 27.


\textsuperscript{32} Lake Placid bid for the Winter Olympics of 1948, 1952, 1956, and 1960 as well as hosted the Games again in 1980. For details on Lake Placid’s bid for the 1976 winter games, see Folder Lake Placid Reel 111, Avery Brundage Collection, International Olympic Committee Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter ABC IOCA)
infamously racist “anthropology days” events organized by cultural anthropologist William J. McGee. McGee recruited indigenous peoples from North America, South America, and the Philippines to compete against white Americans in order to test whether non-white people were “natural” athletes due to their “primitive” heritages.\textsuperscript{33} The Los Angeles Games could likewise be criticized as the paradigm of sport acting as an “opiate of masses,” a pacifying distraction during one of the most troubled times in American history.\textsuperscript{34} To begin questioning the economic wisdom of supporting the Olympics, one need look no further than North Elba’s balance sheet.

Still, dominant cultural narratives about the Olympics remained encouraging. Though the three cities that hosted games did so at considerable effort and cost, if future Olympic bidders assessed the games through the eyes of previous Olympic organizers and sport reporters, the struggles and expenditures of St. Louis, Los Angeles, and Lake Placid paid off as a form of regional “branding.” Through World War II, according to journalistic accounts, hosting the Olympics was an advisable endeavor.

**Growth and Autonomy in the American West**

To Denver’s future Olympic bidders, the appeal of hosting the Olympics had a lot do with the perceived opportunity to gain the kind of public exposure that St. Louis, Los Angeles, and Lake Placid achieved. Notably, for Los Angeles and Lake Placid, the spotlight functioned as a means to attract capital from outside sources. In the 1960s, this


\textsuperscript{34} For this type of Marxist interpretation of sport see Jean-Marie Brohm, *Sport, A Prison of Measured Time: Essays* (London: Ink Links Ltd., 1978).
made the Olympics especially attractive to Denver’s prospective bidders. Between the Great Depression and World War II, external capital played an essential role in the development of Colorado and the city of Denver.\textsuperscript{35} To Denver’s Olympic organizers, the Olympics represented a chance to continue economic practices that Coloradans historically depended on and embraced.

In 1932, as Los Angeles and Lake Placid basked in their Olympic glow, Denver and surrounding areas faced dire circumstances. Local services and charities exhausted their supplies. As the Depression continued, many states refused to raise taxes to offer assistance and President Herbert Hoover declined to provide federal aid. In the words of historian Richard White, the “urban and rural west shared a common economic fate: misery.”\textsuperscript{36} Pressed by the nations’ citizens and prominent senators such as Colorado’s Edward P. Costigan, Hoover finally signed the 1932 Federal Relief Act. The legislative action sent Colorado and other states federal loans to put toward public works projects.\textsuperscript{37}

When Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated Hoover months later, he vowed to expand the role of federal intervention. Roosevelt’s New Deal policies sent more money and resources to the West through relief and loans than any other sector of the country. In 1933, for example, 83% of relief funds spent within the Centennial State came from the federal government. The federal government also took over hundreds of millions of acres of land in the region in order to dam and reroute rivers. Meanwhile, western farmers received more subsidies than any other single professional group. As White describes it,

\textsuperscript{35} Evidence for this claim will be discussed and provided below.

\textsuperscript{36} White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”, 463-494, quotation from 465.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
between 1933 and 1939, “there had been a nearly wholesale retreat from laissez-faire . . . federal bureaucracies were quite literally remaking the American West.”

If the New Deal altered the situation in Colorado, World War II revolutionized it. As historian Gerald Nash argues, the New Deal moved the federal government’s attention westward, but it “did little to change . . . [the West’s] colonial mentality.” Before the war, Western businesses produced mostly raw materials, had limited manufacturing capabilities, and remained reliant on Eastern consumers. Consequently, states west of the Mississippi River remained subordinate to and dependent on politicians in Washington D.C. and business executives in the Northeast.

During World War II, this dynamic changed forever. The demand for raw materials increased substantially and military planners set up new manufacturing plants and assembly lines throughout the country. In Colorado, for example, the newly established Rocky Mountain Arsenal produced ammunition and poisonous gases, employing up to 20,000 people during the height of wartime production. The city of Denver also became home to a U.S. Maritime Commission prefabrication plant, which specialized in parts for submarine chasers. Over 100,000 people moved to Denver during the war, increasing the population by a fifth. Colorado’s overall income climbed in response. Earnings of about $617 million in 1940 soared to over $1.3 billion by 1945. For the first time in American history, Colorado and other western territories became self-sufficient. Since the Rocky Mountain region was so vast and its population still

38 Ibid., quotation from 394.
39 Nash, The American West Transformed, quotation from 5.
rather sparse, as Nash observes, Denver became “the ‘capital’ of a region 1,500 miles wide and 1,700 miles tall.”

These developments were the direct result of federal money that traveled from outside the state. To meet the requirements of winning the war, the government spent $70 billion in the American West, creating hundreds of thousands of new jobs in aircraft, shipbuilding, aluminum, steel and electronics-related industries. Overall, eight million men and women from various backgrounds moved westward. In turn, especially in cities such as Denver, service related trades such as banking, health care, food, and public education began to swell. The federal government “provided the spark,” Nash argues, “that set a pattern of other economic activities into motion.”

After the war, Western entrepreneurs and politicians worried that their emergent economic strength would abate. Thus, they moved to diversify their economies. They hoped in particular to establish reliable revenue streams independent from the defense industry. Hundreds of towns formed “development commissions” and agreed to make economic growth their primary aim. The U.S. became a world power and westerners now imagined themselves playing a key role in the nation’s future. States such as Colorado and cities such as Denver oriented themselves for further economic expansion and cultural influence, investing in housing, transportation, and the nation’s growing consumer culture. Many in Colorado thought of themselves as the nation’s new industrial leaders and innovators.

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40 Ibid., quotation from 56.
41 Ibid., quotation from 18.
Denver thrived in the new postwar economy. The city became a base for federal bureaucracies while the Cold War generated consistent military expenditures. At the same time, new corporations moved from outside of the state of Colorado into the city of Denver. The presence of an anti-union ethos, the growing population, and improved highways and air travel made Colorado’s capital more attractive than ever before. Firms such as IBM, Honeywell, Sundstrand, Ball Brothers Research, and Beech Aircraft became prominent Denver employers. As Richard White describes, the “West of cowboys, miners, and farmers was giving way to a West of lawyers, bureaucrats, and secretaries.” Uranium mining and oil production also showed huge gains in Colorado. Demand for electricity even revived the coal industry. The state’s population grew even faster during the 1950s than it did during the war.43

Thanks first to federal funding and later to local planning and corporate investments, Colorado solidified its economic and political authority. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, most residents of the region wanted to continue building on the presumed progress. For most Coloradans, when compared to the years of the Depression, the benefits of the following two decades must have appeared rather obvious. “For years,” one observer wrote of the post-war era, “‘keep Colorado growing’ was the promotional theme hawked by businessmen, politicians, and ordinary citizens.” As future Colorado Governor and Olympic bidder John A. Love remembered: “We wanted

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industrial parks, factories – all the economic growth we could get.”

After the war, Colorado’s leaders championed anything that they believed would nourish economic expansion.

The Colorado Ski Industry

If hosting the Olympics could have ignited one sector of Colorado’s economy above all others it would have been the Colorado ski industry. By the end of World War II, Colorado hurdled from an extractive economy to a service-oriented marketplace and the ski industry became one of the more noticeable features of the new commercial landscape. Previously, a lack of financial resources and Colorado’s formidable topography prevented elite large scale ski resorts from gaining a footing. However, Colorado ski resorts had a history of collaborating with local ski clubs, community organizers, journalists, a variety of local businesses, as well as federal, state, and town governments. In particular, small towns and businesses used skiing competitions and winter sports carnivals to boost local revenues in pre-war Colorado. As a Denver Post article explained as early as 1927, skiing entrepreneurs “enlisted the cooperation of every service and athletic club and every civic organization in the state in... extensive plans for making Colorado the winter sports headquarters of the world.”


46 Annie Gilbert Coleman, Ski Style: Sport and Culture and the Rockies (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2004), 73-107, quotation from 79.
Winter recreation impresarios, skiing boosters, and related businesses saw potential early on in attaining publicity through regional and national skiing events. In 1936, for instance, the *Rocky Mountain News* sponsored a “snow train” to bring spectators to Hot Sulphur Springs for an annual ski tournament and winter festival. After 7,000 people made the trip, Safeway Stores, the *Denver Post*, and Montgomery Ward decided to fund similar enterprises. By 1938, snow trains ran to areas in the Colorado Rockies such as Hot Sulphur, Aspen, Steamboat Springs, Marshal Pass, and West Portal every weekend.\(^47\)

West Portal represented a prime example of a combination of government and corporate largesse. After the area became accessible due to the construction of a new tunnel, Denver authorities raised $25,000 to clear trails and build tows by applying for a Workers Progress Administration (WPA) project and soliciting $14,000 from local businesses. Numerous ski clubs received similar types of assistance. In particular, the U.S. Forest Service and New Deal programs such as the WPA, Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and the Public Works Administration (PWA) helped clear trails, build lodges, and erect tows.\(^48\)

Even before World War II, a multitude of sources from inside and outside the state supported Colorado’s budding ski industry. Importantly, however, this broad support can be credited in part to Coloradans viewing skiing as a useful tool for promoting larger business initiatives. As skiing historian Annie Gilbert Coleman claims, holding ski competitions helped Rocky Mountain inhabitants define entire towns as

\(^{47}\) Ibid., for “snow trains” see 87-88.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., for government involvement see 89-97.
“winter playgrounds.” Municipalities such as Colorado Springs, Estes Park, Allen Park, Idaho Springs, Dillon, and Denver all hosted skiing competitions with this goal in mind. As a paradigmatic example, Aspen residents credited hosting the Southern Rocky Mountain Skiing Championships in 1938, 1939, and 1940, as well as the National Downhill and Slalom Championship in 1940, for sparking their town’s future reputation as an international leisure and recreation capital.49

Additionally, after the war an emergent national consumer culture, advanced post-war infrastructure, and new technologies fed the expansion of Colorado skiing. By 1939, the state had built just thirteen highways across the continental divide, only three of which were paved. After World War II, the construction of highways and mountain tunnels made ski areas easier to reach. Furthermore, advances in ski equipment such as metal skis, “step in” bindings, and chairlifts made skiing easier to do. Americans also had more money to spend and a motive to spend it. Cold War culture dictated that devoting money to recreation and leisure was a moral good. Such spending not only nurtured the economy, it signified the presence of individual freedom and social mobility. Consumption validated America’s capitalist system.50

Skiing became easier to learn and so did selling it. After World War II, to a greater extent than ever before, Coloradans began investing money in ski towns, while using skiing competitions to advertise their product. In 1947, for example, $250,000 worth of Aspen Ski Corporation stock enabled investors to begin constructing the state’s

49 Ibid., 74-89, quotation from 79.

first chair lift. The next year, thanks to $100,000 worth of city purchased revenue bonds, Steamboat Springs began building the world’s first double-seater to carry recreationalists onto its mountains. Colorado Governor William Lee Knous attended the inauguration of both lifts, expressing his approval of the ski industry’s new ventures. After opening its lift in 1949, Aspen then worked to gain additional recognition by hosting the 1950 World Alpine Championships. As Frank Elkins of the *New York Times* proclaimed, the championships at Aspen embodied “the finest downhill and slalom event ever seen.” By the 1950s, once secluded Colorado mining and ranching towns were turning into easily accessible recreation and leisure centers. Indeed, Aspen’s investors were on their way to owning the largest ski resort in Colorado. Given dominant desires to maintain economic power and create economic diversity most Coloradans seemed to approve of this type of sport-stimulated growth and development.

**Colorado’s Earlier Bids**

As the ski industry grew and resorts became more accessible, resort owners made attracting consumers from outside of the state of Colorado a central part of their business plan. In part due to international events such as the 1950 World Alpine Championships, by the 1955-1956 ski season, about 20% of Colorado skiers traveled from beyond the

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51 Those investors included: Chicago business man Walter Paepcke, Paul Nitze of the state department, George Berger (future President of Colorado National Bank), Denver attorney William Hodges, Colorado Springe business man Eugene Lilly, Executive Director of the Hilton Hotel chain Joseph Binns, and local shareholders such as D.R.C. “Darcy” Brown and Minot Dole.


state’s borders, contributing to around $3 million in ski industry revenue.\footnote{Gerald L. Allen, “Colorado Ski and Winter Recreation Statistics” (Manuscript, Business Research Division, Graduate School Administration, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1969), 35, Business Research Division Library Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.} Within this context, hosting the most renowned international winter sports event in the world gained even greater appeal.

By 1949, Colorado tourism promoters mustered their first attempt to host the winter Olympics. That year, a luxury hotel manager from Colorado Springs, Colorado, named William Thayer Tutt and Aspen Skiing Company founder Walter Paepcke orchestrated a proposal to host the winter games of 1956. They planned to hold events simultaneously at Tutt’s esteemed Broadmoor Hotel Resort in Colorado Springs and Paepcke’s up-and-coming ski resort in Aspen.\footnote{William Thayer Tutt to Avery Brundage, Telegraph, Circa April 1949, Reel 108 Folder VII Winter Olympic Games 1956 Bid Colorado Spring, Colo., ABC IOCA; Walter Paepcke to Avery Brundage, Telegraph, circa April 1949, Reel 108 Folder VII Winter Olympic Games 1956 Bid Colorado Spring, Colo., ABC IOCA.} Their effort gained immediate backing from Colorado’s most powerful political actors. In the spring of 1949, not long after Aspen’s first chairlift went into operation, Colorado Governor William Knous and both of Colorado’s U.S. senators sent telegrams to IOC President Avery Brundage in Rome, Italy. Brundage and the IOC were meeting to decide where the 1956 Olympics should be held. In their telegrams, all three Colorado leaders made clear their aspiration to see the 1956 winter games come to their state.\footnote{William Lee Knous to Avery Brundage, Telegraph, circa April 1949, Reel 108 Folder VII Winter Olympic Games 1956 Bid Colorado Spring, Colo., ABC IOCA; Eugene D. Millikin to Avery Brundage, Telegraph, Circa April 1949, Reel 108 Folder VII Winter Olympic Games 1956 Bid Colorado Spring, Colo., ABC IOCA; Ed C. Johnson to Avery Brundage, Telegraph, circa April 1949, Reel 108 Folder VII Winter Olympic Games 1956 Bid Colorado Spring, Colo., ABC IOCA.}
Tutt’s and Paepcke’s chances to win the 1956 winter Olympics were beyond slim. Cortina d’Ampezzo, Italy, had been vying for the event since before World War II and emerged as the IOC’s obvious choice. Additionally, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) put its weight behind another bid from Lake Placid, New York. Indeed, Lake Placid was the only U.S. bidder of which the USOC was aware. While enthusiastic about hosting the games, Tutt and Paepcke appear to have failed to pass their submission through normal channels. As Brundage wrote to Paepcke after the meeting in Rome: “While in Rome a few weeks ago, attending a meeting of the International Olympic Committee, I was suddenly and without warning deluged with a surge of telegrams from Colorado. The Governor, two Senators, various mayors and Chambers of Commerce, as well as a number of personal friends joined in extending an invitation to the Winter Olympic Games to be held in 1956.” In spite of their failure to follow protocol, Brundage claimed to have put in a good word on behalf of the Colorado boosters while at the Rome meeting. “I arranged for Colorado Springs and Aspen to obtain some valuable publicity,” Brundage wrote to Paepcke, “and, as a matter of fact, Colorado got twice as many votes as Lake Placid.” Lake Placid received one vote. The Colorado coalition earned two.

With the support of skiing entrepreneurs such as Paepcke, other Colorado business people, and influential Colorado politicians, William Thayer Tutt had begun a

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57 Avery Brundage to Walter Paepcke, Letter, 20 June 1949, Reel 108 Folder VII Winter Olympic Games 1956 Bid Colorado Spring, Colo., ABC IOCA.

58 Session of the International Olympic Committee, 21-27 April 1949, Sessions, International Olympic Committee Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter Sessions IOCA).
personal effort to host the winter Olympics that would span over the next twenty years. As soon as the results from the Rome meeting were made known, Tutt prepared to bid for future winter Olympic games. As he wrote to Brundage, “[w]e in Colorado Springs are definitely interested in obtaining the Winter Olympic games and willing to do what is necessary.” Brundage informed Tutt of the IOC’s official bidding policies and that Olympic officials would begin considering bids for the 1960 Winter Olympics around 1954 or 1955. In September of 1954, Tutt eagerly messaged Brundage again, alerting him that Colorado was ready to “make an outstanding presentation” to the IOC.

Tutt’s Broadmoor Hotel had a history of using sport as a marketing device. A wealthy silver and gold miner named Spencer Penrose built the hotel in 1918. To raise Broadmoor’s profile, Penrose turned to sport, constructing a road up nearby Pike’s Peak and then holding an automobile race to the 14,000-foot summit. Through the decades, Penrose continued to provide fresh sporting attractions, such as a new golf course, a rodeo stadium, polo fields, tennis courts, and an ice skating rink. As one Colorado Springs newspaper reporter related: “From the beginning, the Broadmoor was a


60 William Thayer Tutt to Avery Brundage, Letter, 22 June 1949, Reel 108 Folder VII Winter Olympic Games 1956 Bid Colorado Spring, Colo., ABC IOCA.


sportsmen’s paradise.” Penrose’s promotional effort worked and the Broadmoor Hotel became a well-known retreat for rich businesspeople and dignitaries.⁶³

When Penrose died in 1939, his longtime business partner Charles Tutt took over the hotel. Charles’ son William Thayer Tutt took over the role of the Broadmoor’s vice president and heir apparent.⁶⁴ When World War II ended, as William Thayer Tutted recalled, his father asked him to expand upon Penrose’s earlier schemes and turn the Broadmoor into a “sports center” that would “attract business and develop the whole community.” William Thayer Tutt took on the responsibility of using sport to improve the overall economic base of Colorado Springs.⁶⁵

Tutt responded by adding 2,000 seats to the Broadmoor’s ice skating arena and recruiting various sports events. Although unable to attract the 1956 winter Olympics, during the 1950s national and international figure skating championships, the first NCAA hockey tournament, and the Soviet Union’s first hockey match on the United States’ soil took place at the Broadmoor’s World Arena. The Hotel’s grounds also became a common venue for amateur and professional golf tournaments. Penrose planned the Broadmoor’s first invitational golf tournament in 1921 and achieved national attention when playing host to the Trans-Mississippi Tournament of 1927.⁶⁶ Tutt expanded on this

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⁶³ “The Broadmoor Colorado Springs: The Broadmoor’s Past Is Legacy of Fame and Countless Memories,” *Rangelands* 15, 5 (October 1993): 211-212; Sharon Miller, “It was the Largest Event in the Town’s History,” *Gazette Telegraph* (Colorado Springs), 29 June 1968, pp. 4C-6C; Penrose also opened a zoo and reconstructed a cog rail to carry guests to the top of Pike’s Peak.

⁶⁴ Ibid.


precedent by investing millions of dollars to enhance the Broadmoor’s courses, attracting high profile events such as the U.S. Amateur Champion of the 1959.67

Around 1951, Tutt also set his sights on building a small scale ski resort near Colorado Springs that would be linked with the Broadmoor Hotel. To do so, he hired ski enthusiast Steve Knowlton. Knowlton learned to ski growing up in Pennsylvania and competed in college at the University of New Hampshire. During World War II, he enlisted in the famed 10th Mountain “Ski Troops” Division that trained near Aspen before being sent to Europe and facing brutal combat in the Italian Alps. Afterward, along with other members of his regiment, Knowlton moved back to Colorado, hoping to make a living through skiing. Knowlton became a self-professed “ski bum,” albeit one of Olympic caliber.68 While he trained for the 1948 St. Moritz winter Olympic games, he cut trails for Paepcke’s Aspen Ski Corporation. A few years later, he opened his own restaurant in downtown Aspen.69 Yet Knowlton ultimately aimed to run and operate ski areas. He got an opportunity when the upscale Broadmoor Hotel of Colorado Springs hired him.70

In 1959, Tutt and Knowlton opened “Ski Broadmoor.” The ski resort consisted of one two-person chairlift and two ski slopes, the longest being a modest 3,000-foot-long


67 Thayer Tutt, 26, OHR SHHL.

68 For the 10th Mountain Division see Coleman, Ski Style, 97-107 and Peter Sheldon, Conquer to Climb: The Untold Story of WWII’s 10th Mountain Division Ski Troops (New York: Scribners, 2003).


run with a 600-foot vertical drop.\textsuperscript{71} Although downhill skiing events had to be held elsewhere, hosting Olympic ice skating competitions could have allowed Tutt to show off his hotel as well as his newest winter sports venture. As Tutt explained when referring to the vast investments he made in the Broadmoor’s new golf courses and other sporting facilities, such enterprises made financial sense because “[y]ou build your [hotel’s] reputation on the free publicity you get.”\textsuperscript{72} Tutt thus remained optimistic that Colorado Springs might yet become an Olympic city.

In 1954, IOC rules stipulated that cities needed their national Olympic Committee’s approval before they could make a pitch to the IOC. In 1955, with Ski Broadmoor still under construction, Tutt and Knowlton traveled together to Chicago to present a bid to the USOC to host the 1960 Winter Olympics. They once again proposed the games be held at Colorado Springs and Aspen. As the newly hired manager of the Rocky Mountain Ski Operators’ Association, Knowlton now spoke on behalf of an alliance of Colorado ski resorts, each of which promised that Colorado and its skiing facilities were willing and able to host the winter games.\textsuperscript{73}

Tutt and Knowlton lost out to an upstart ski resort from California--Squaw Valley. More specifically, they lost to New York Attorney Alexander C. Cushing and the Southern California Olympic Organizing Committee (SCOOC). In 1947, Cushing raised $400,000 to purchase 574 acres in California’s Sierra Mountains to start his own skiing complex. As sport historian Tim Ashwell recounts, when he learned in 1954 that the

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\textsuperscript{71} “Ski Country Seen from Broadmoor,” \textit{Gazette Telegraph} (Colorado Springs), 29 June 1968, p. 26C.
\textsuperscript{72} Thayer Tutt, 26.
\end{flushright}
USOC was looking to host the 1960 Winter Olympics, like Tutt and Knowlton, Cushing “saw an opportunity to promote California tourism in general and his properties in particular.”\textsuperscript{74} California’s Governor Goodwin Knight, SCOOC, and the state senator who represented Squaw Valley pushed to host the Olympics as well. SCOOC was an experienced bidder, having tried to obtain every summer Olympics since World War II.\textsuperscript{75} Moreover, when Squaw Valley’s representative in the state senate introduced legislation that promised Cushing $1 million should his Californian venue secure the games, it passed with ease. As Cushing described, given the popular reputation of the games, lawmakers “naturally couldn’t go on record saying they were against winter Olympics.”\textsuperscript{76} The legislators pledged the money, giving Squaw Valley an edge over Knowlton’s and Tutt’s Aspen-Colorado Springs proposal.\textsuperscript{77}

After receiving USOC sanction, Crushing raised $50,000 more to bring an updated bid to the IOC. His fellow investors in the Squaw Valley Development Company donated most of the funds. Cushing then traveled to the IOC’s 1955 meeting in Paris, carrying a plaster model of Squaw Valley, as Cortina d’Ampezzo bidders did six years earlier. The model valley must have pleased the IOC, as Cushing’s bid narrowly defeated Innsbruck, Austria. The 1960 Winter Olympics were coming to the United States, but not to Colorado.\textsuperscript{78}


\textsuperscript{75} Dyreson, “The Endless Olympic Bid,” 31.


\textsuperscript{77} Ashwell, “Squaw Valley,” 337-343.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
Like previous Olympics held in the United States, positive first impressions and later historical analyses provide different perspectives of 1960 Squaw Valley Winter Olympic Games. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) made the Squaw Valley games the first Olympics televised regularly throughout the United States. Walt Disney and his mammoth entertainment conglomerate orchestrated extravagant opening and closing ceremonies, while hockey players and figures skaters enjoyed the first ever artificial ice rinks in Olympic history, tended to by a brand new innovation, “the Zamboni,” which added a thin layer of moisture to smoothen the ice. Meanwhile, California newspapers provided ecstatic local reviews.  

The New York Times once again made it known that the most recent American Olympics should be “hailed . . . the best [Olympics] ever.” Olympic officials also appreciated that for the first time winter Olympic organizers held all of the games’ events in walking distance from each other. As the Denver Post reported, the president of the International Ski Federation likewise called the Squaw Valley Olympics “the best ever organized.”

Even while acknowledging some pitfalls, Colorado’s Denver Post also portrayed the 1960 Winter Olympics as an asset to California. The newspaper expressed some skepticism, pointing to the games’ $20 million price tag and a new 8,500 seat ice arena that would “do little more than stand in memory” once the Olympics concluded. Nonetheless, the Post also ensured its readers that “overall, the games were successful”

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79 Ibid.


and that “there is little doubt that . . . [Squaw Valley] will become the far west’s leading playground.” As the Denver Post asserted, “the name Squaw Valley now is as famous as Sun Valley [a posh resort in Idaho] or Lake Placid.”82 Profits tied to the post war economic boom began to fade to memories, while anxieties over how to maintain economic growth persisted. Hence Tutt and Knowlton aimed to bring the Olympics to Colorado for the very same reason as Cushing had to California. From the perspective of 1960, the two Colorado ski industry advocates seemed to have missed out on an invaluable public relations opportunity.

Still, the $20 million spent on brand new first-rate facilities proved much more costly than California’s original $1 million pledge. Cushing eventually asked the state to spend $8 million to build an Olympic stadium, an Olympic Village, and a new sewage treatment plant. As Ashwell notes, at the time California “still suffered from a nagging inferiority complex” and in the eyes of Governor Goodwin Knight and his successor Edmund “Pat” Brown the Olympics represented “an unparalleled opportunity to promote” the state. As Ashwell contends, “the possibility that California might botch its opportunity and forfeit the games was unthinkable.” Consequently, California and Nevada together ended up allocating $15 million to support the events in Squaw Valley.83

As in Lake Placid in 1932, the investment did not yield the expected returns. After 1960, most of the new sport facilities went unused. Due to its substantial part in funding the Olympic facilities, California soon took ownership of Squaw Valley, but then sold the bleeding enterprise to a private corporation. By the 1970s, the business that

82 Ibid.
purchased Squaw Valley from California was bankrupt. Today most of Squaw Valley’s “white elephants” have been dismantled.84

Nevertheless, in the early 1960s, the positive publicity Squaw Valley received probably left Knowlton (who worked during the Squaw Valley Olympics as an assistant press officer) and Tutt with regrets that they failed to bring the games to Colorado. The 1932 Los Angeles summer games, the 1932 Lake Placid winter games, and the more recent 1960 Squaw Valley winter games all served as reminders that the Olympics held the potential to draw unprecedented amounts of attention. On top of this, throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, many Coloradans hoped that recreation and tourism would become the next staple of the state’s burgeoning economy, replacing a reliance on defense manufacturers. Especially to Colorado’s ski industry boosters, the state of California’s decision to fund the Squaw Valley Olympics probably appeared like a wise investment at the time.

**John Love’s Election and a Promise of Growth**

According to the Denver Organizing Committee’s legal advisor Richard Davis, not long after the Squaw Valley Olympics concluded, William Thayer Tutt again renewed his interest in hosting the winter Olympics. It became clear to Tutt, however, that a successful bid would require more money than he or other private interests were willing to put forward. As in California, a Colorado Olympics would need state and

84 Ibid.
perhaps federal backing. Thus, sometime in 1963, Tutt reached out to newly elected Colorado Governor John A. Love for help.\(^85\)

Love was easy to for Tutt to contact. Love grew up in Colorado Springs during the Great Depression, in his words, on opposite “side of the tracks” from Tutt’s Broadmoor resort. Yet, in 1951, after serving as a pilot in the Pacific during World War II and becoming a successful corporate lawyer, he moved two blocks away from the luxury hotel, joined the Broadmoor Community Church and Golf Club, and accepted a position as the Broadmoor Hotel’s legal counsel. Before being elected Colorado’s governor, Love worked from an office located inside the Broadmoor.\(^86\)

In the fall of 1962, Love faced off against Democratic Party incumbent Stephen McNichols for the governorship. Love was just forty-six years old and had never run for an elected office. As one newspaper put it, his victory in the state’s Republican primary represented “a major coup” within the party. Having gained the Republican nomination, Love followed in the footsteps of his political predecessors, predicting that by reducing taxes he could attract more corporations to Colorado, thereby ensuring the state’s needed industrial diversification. In contrast, McNichols was running for his third term in office. Known throughout the state simply as “Steve,” he argued that continuing to spend tax dollars wisely, at their present rates, remained the best route for Colorado’s economic propensity.\(^87\)

\(^85\) Olson, *Power, Public Policy and the Environment*, 90.

\(^86\) Walker, “John A. Love,” 1-59 quotation from 4; for Love’s relationship with the Broadmoor and Tutt see 20.

\(^87\) “Young Republicans Strengthened by Political Novice Love’s Win,” newspaper clipping, circa September 1962, Box 1 Folder 8, John Love Papers, Denver Public Library, Denver Colorado (hereafter JLP DPL).
Though the candidates had their differences, neither disputed the merits of economic development. Nor did either gubernatorial hopeful doubt the value of promoting out-of-state tourism to bolster Colorado’s financial health. In 1962, as part of their political platform, Colorado Republicans urged money be spent on “the most effective methods of attracting out of state visitors.” State Democrats likewise acknowledged that Colorado “has natural wonders and [a] geographic location ideal for tourists.” The Democrats therefore pledged to “continue to develop facilities and programs to foster this great industry.”88 Both parties envisioned using tourism as a means to broaden Colorado’s marketplace and lure out-of-state spending.

Love defeated Governor Stephen McNichol by convincing voters he was their best bet for growth and diversification. During his campaign, Love admitted Colorado’s financial stakes had improved under the present governor, but warned that “too much of it is based on defense and federal agencies.”89 As Love rhetorically asked in one of his campaign speeches, “what happens to a state when its main industry is defense or defense-related . . . what happens if there’s a shift in our defense posture?” The answer was so obvious Love felt no need to provide it, stating only that while “we all look forward to the day when we can live in true peace, I don’t have to tell you what will happen to the economic base in Colorado.” Love then assured constituents, if the state could be allowed to lessen the “income and inventory taxes that choke the business man to death, big and small . . . We can put Colorado back on the industrial map.” As Love

89 Morton L. Margolin, “Opponent Hits Steve on Spending Policies,” Rocky Mountain News, 15 August 1962, clipping, Box 1 Folder 7, JLP DPL.
avowed, “we can measure our progress in industries.”\textsuperscript{90} Colorado, he declared, was “a sleeping giant tied down by a skein of McNichols.” Yet, by virtue of Love’s leadership the state would witness, in Love’s words, a “decade of development,” that would “allow Colorado to take its place in the industrial sun.”\textsuperscript{91}

Shortly after Love took office he gathered a team of fellow politicians and financial titans, including William Thayer Tutt and various ski industry moguls, to begin the process of designing Denver’s bid for the 1976 winter Olympic games. When they did so, Love and his team held a certain cultural perspective and political agenda fresh in their minds. Before World War II, New Deal initiatives and corporate sponsorships buoyed winter sport competitions and festivals, which bolstered Colorado’s reputation as a seasonal getaway. Federal investments during the war and corporate relocation afterward helped the American West gain economic power and greater independence from the East. At the same time, according to popular narratives, the Olympics represented the most prestigious international sporting event in the world, appearing to be a sound promotional mechanism. If Colorado could host the Olympics, long-term improvements for the state’s infrastructure, tourism industry, and overall economy seemed an inevitable result. Love ran for office promising as much and within a year of his election he announced his intention to bring the Olympics to his state.\textsuperscript{92} Taking aim at growth and development, Love and his supporters began their successful bid for 1976 winter games.

\textsuperscript{90} John Love, Speech, circa 1962, Box 1 Folder 16, JLP DPL.

\textsuperscript{91} News Release, “Let’s Elect John Love,” 25 October 1962, Box 1 Folder 12, JLP DPL.

\textsuperscript{92} “Love Will Seek Winter Games,” \textit{Denver Post}, 27 June 1963, p. 34.
Chapter 2
Selling Colorado to the United States

On June 27, 1963, during a visit to the ski town of Steamboat Springs, newly elected Governor John A. Love announced his intention to bring the winter Olympic games to Colorado.¹ In short order, Love became the leader of a select group of high powered and closely connected politicians, business executives, and ski industry advocates. Love and his allies envisioned the Olympics as an advertising vehicle that could assist them in their effort to draw attention and money from the rest of their nation. Within the context of the post-war American West, this influential contingent viewed the Olympics as an obvious promotional opportunity. Colorado’s Olympic bidders believed the games would bring positive national as well as international exposure, out-of-state investors, and tourist dollars. As they saw it, the year 1976 represented a propitious moment for their state’s Olympic aspirations. At the bicentennial of the United States and the centennial of Colorado, the Olympic flame could add to Colorado’s churning economic boon. To the Colorado’s Olympic organizers, such a result easily warranted the support of the federal government, state administrators, and their fellow Colorado citizens.

Love’s Mission

Sworn into office in 1963, John Love’s inaugural year as governor did not go smoothly. After living up to his campaign promise to cut the state’s income tax by 15%,
layoffs by defense industry manufacturer Martin Marietta, along with an unforeseen
drought, contributed to an economic downturn.\textsuperscript{2} In response, in early 1964, Love decided
to raise the state’s sales tax and increase college tuition. In turn, political commentators
mocked the novice governor for his earlier “over-enthusiastic tax cuts.”\textsuperscript{3} One cartoonist
drew Love literally peeling the gold plates off the dome on Colorado’s capitol building to
finance the state.\textsuperscript{4} Love’s Democratic opponents likewise went on the offensive. As the
recently defeated former Governor, Stephen McNichols, declared, Love’s tuition hike
was “going to make the greatest contribution to juvenile delinquency in the history of this state.”\textsuperscript{5} Irate college students made their feelings known as well, staging sit-ins at the
capitol building, picketing Love when he visited their campuses, and, in one instance,
hanging the governor in effigy.\textsuperscript{6} By the end of Love’s first year on the job, many
observers predicted the support that brought him to office had already faded.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{2} Douglas L. Walker, Jr., “John A. Love: The Story of Colorado’s Thirty-Sixth Governor,” \textit{Historical Studies Journal} 17 (Spring 2000): 30; “Martin Co. Drops 250 Employees,” \textit{Denver Post}, 9 January 1964, p. 1. Martin Marietta laid off approximately 850 employees in the fall of 1963; Martine Marietta had been one of the footloose companies that moved into Colorado in 1950s. It quickly became one of the state’s largest employers. Overall, as one economist estimated, between 1952 and 1962, defense spending contributed to 20% of Colorado incomes.


\textsuperscript{4} “Get the Rest of that Gold Off!” circa 1963-1964, clipping, Box 5 Folder 2, JLP DPL.


To turn the tide in his favor, Love and his supporters devised a plan aimed at convincing corporations from throughout the United States to expand into Colorado. As Love later recounted, under pressure to continue Colorado’s post World War II economic upsurge, he began traveling throughout the country “trying to find any possible economic opportunity.” Following the lead of his post-war forebears, Love worked to forge “growth networks,” aligning with bankers, corporate executives, real estate interests, and labor leaders. He and his supporters hoped that such alliances would buttress and improve upon the economic development of the prior decade. They were sure that bringing diverse commercial interests toward the Rocky Mountains would create more jobs and therefore allow the reduced taxes on which Love staked his campaign. As Love and many others argued, jobs, limited taxes, and growth, equated to social prosperity.  

In May 1964, Love traveled on his first well-publicized trip meant to recruit out-of-state investors. Love, both Republican U.S. senators, and forty Colorado businesspeople journeyed to New York City on what they called a “Sell Colorado mission.” In Love’s words, the “missionary group” aimed to inform New York industrialists and corporate benefactors about “one of the greatest pieces of real estate on the surface of the globe.” As Love’s Director of the Division of Commerce remarked, “[n]ever before has an effort of this magnitude been made to promote Colorado’s great


resources.” According to the Colorado crusaders, their state was ripe for commercial and industrial development.

Love and company soon surpassed the “never before seen effort” they mounted in New York. On a similar “Sell Colorado” trip to San Francisco six months later, Love traveled with sixty-five Colorado executives at his side. In one of the expedition’s highlights, the governor spoke to Bay Area executives at a luncheon hosted by the missionaries. At the meeting, Love promised California financiers that in Colorado they would find a surplus of natural resources, a strong foundation for manufacturing plants, various modes of transportation, and an ideal location from which to send products throughout the United States. Love also pledged that new businesses would benefit from research and innovation realized at Colorado’s educational facilities, a loyal and skilled labor force, and a state government friendly towards corporate and industrial endeavors. With this information in mind, “we do hope,” Love concluded in his speech, “you will consider Colorado in your expansion planning.” Over the next two years, Love gave similar sermons during “Sell Colorado” missions in Chicago and Los Angeles. On these occasions, over one-hundred “Sell Colorado ambassadors” from the state’s


11 “Governor Heads ‘Sell Colorado’ Cost Trip,” Denver Post, 17 November 1964, clipping, Box 5 Folder 12 JLP DPL; “Gov. Love Tells Bay Area of Colorado’s Advantages,” Rocky Mountain News, circa November 1964, clipping, Box 5 Folder 12, JLP DPL. Colorado was the eight fastest growth state in the United States at the time.

business community joined Love, lending their support at their own expense. In Colorado, in the early 1960s, growth and development remained the barometer of progress. Love and a large portion of the state’s business community, meanwhile, did all they could to move the needle.

The Colorado Olympic Commission, the Ski Industry, and Selling Colorado

During the same time period, Love began to organize Colorado’s bid for the Olympics. At the end of 1964, the governor appointed a Colorado Olympic Commission (COC). In appointing COC members, Love aligned his Olympic hopes with his “Sell Colorado” campaign and, in particular, with the Colorado ski industry. The group’s six original members were Willaim Thayer Tutt, Peter Siebert, Merrill Hasting, Donald Fowler, Richard Olson, and Joseph Coors.

The members of the COC had close ties. Tutt had been trying to use the Olympics to promote Colorado Springs and the Broadmoor Hotel since the 1950s. Peter Siebert had just concluded his first year as the developer, operator, and owner of the recently opened Vail Ski Resort. Merrill Hastings, the creator, publisher, and owner of

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14 Denver Olympic Organizing Committee, Final Report, 29 December 1972, Box 1 Folder 3, DOOC SHHL.

15 Ibid; “Highlights of Denver’s Efforts to Achieve the 1976 Olympic Winter Games,” Box 1 Folder 5, DOC DPL.

the nationally distributed *Ski Magazine*, also staked his fortune on the ski industry.\(^{17}\) Both Seibert and Hasting served in the 10\(^{th}\) Mountain Division with Steve Knowlton, Tutt’s previous partner in Olympic bidding and his former Ski Broadmoor employee.\(^{18}\) In 1963, Knowlton left Ski Broadmoor to begin his tenure as the chairman of Colorado Ski Country U.S.A (SCUSA), a group of ski resort leaders and businesses that worked together to promote skiing in Colorado.\(^{19}\)

The COC and SCUSA shared contributors and agendas. By 1968, SCUSA consisted of twenty-three ski resorts and 160 allied businesses, working in concert with the state-run Colorado Visitor’s Bureau.\(^{20}\) As one SCUSA pamphlet put it, “[o]ur aim is to take every opportunity to tell the world about Colorado skiing.”\(^{21}\) Seibert and Hasting joined the Knowlton led alliance at its start.\(^{22}\) As did fellow COC member Donald Fowler. Fowler worked as an executive director at United Airlines and is credited with devising the first joint airline and ski industry projects. Fowler created ski trip packages, ski information centers at airports, skier check-in counters, and promotional ski films shown to potential travelers. Along with belonging to SCUSA at its inception, in 1968

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\(^{18}\) Knowlton, Hasting, and Seibert also each initially moved to Aspen, near Camp Hale where they trained, after the war. For Knowlton and Tutt’s earlier Olympic bid, see chapter 1.

\(^{19}\) More on this below.


\(^{21}\) Colorado Ski Country USA, Pamphlet, 1968-1969, Box 1 Folder 7, SCUSA DPL. Colorado Ski Country USA initially called themselves just Ski Country U.S.A. but soon added “Colorado” to qualify exactly what “Ski Country” the group promoted.

\(^{22}\) Board of Trustees 1968-69, Box 1 Folder 7, [Ski Country U.S.A] Records, Denver Public Library, Denver, Colorado (hereafter SCUSA DPL).
Fowler became the only non-skier to serve as the organization’s Chairman. \(^{23}\) Meanwhile, SCUSA counted Governor Love as an “honorary member.” \(^{24}\) As Love tried to sell Colorado, Colorado Ski Country U.S.A., in particular, labored to market the state’s up and coming ski towns. \(^{25}\)

The other two COC members did not have a direct connection to SCUSA, but they did have interests in seeing Colorado’s ski industry expand. Richard Olson was the president of Outdoor Industries Incorporated, a retail outlet that sold sport equipment, as well as a director of Vail Associates, and the Vice President and General Manager of the Sundstrand Corporation, a manufacturer of aerospace products. \(^{26}\) The COC held some of its earliest meetings at Sundstrand’s Denver office. \(^{27}\) Joseph Coors worked as the president of the Coors Porcelain and Brewing Companies and was a director of the Colorado Association of Commerce. While Coors appears to be the only COC member without a traceable path to skiing or tourism, his son and heir, William Coors, served on SCUSA’s board of trustees. \(^{28}\) Love essentially charged ski industry leaders with planning Colorado’s Olympic bid.

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\(^{24}\) Colorado Ski Country USA, Pamphlet, 1968-1969, Box 1 Folder 7, SCUSA DPL


\(^{27}\) Richard Olson, Colorado Olympic Commission Meeting Minutes, 12 November 1965, Folder 2 Box 48, DCC DPL.

\(^{28}\) Board of Trustees 1968-69, Box 1 Folder 7, CSUSA DPL.
As time went on, Governor Love also tethered the COC directly to his larger “Sell Colorado” initiative. When Love led a third sell Colorado mission to Chicago in 1965, every one of the original COC members except for Tutt traveled along as “ambassadors.”\(^{29}\) Furthermore, Love enlisted the president of the Colorado National Bank, Melvin Roberts, to run the COC’s budget and finance committee and Carl DeTemple, the president of the Denver City Council and an executive for the Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry, to head the COC’s site selection committee.\(^{30}\) Both Roberts and DeTemple traveled to Chicago to help sell their state. So too did Donald Magarrell and Donald F. McMahon. Magarrell served as an executive at the Colorado National Bank and headed Love’s “Sell Colorado” Committee. In 1966, he became a vice president of the COC at Melvin Roberts’ request.\(^{31}\) McMahon was the Director of Area Development for the Colorado Interstate Gas Company, but also acted as Love’s Director of Economic Development. In 1967, he became the COC’s Executive Director.\(^{32}\)

There were strong relationships between the “Sell Colorado” missions, the Colorado ski industry, and the group working to host the 1976 Olympics. Indeed, in

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\(^{29}\) Governor John A. Love’s Itinerary for Chicago “Sell Colorado Mission,” 1-4 November 1965, Folder Sell Colorado Trip Los Angeles Box 66998, JLF CSAR.


\(^{31}\) “Sell Colorado,” C.S. Free Press, 16 April 1966, clipping, Box 5 Folder 29, JLP DPL; DOOC, Final Report, DOOC SHHL.

\(^{32}\) For McMahon’s role as one of the planners for Colorado Missions see “Gov. Love Tells Bay Area of Colorado’s Advantages,” Rocky Mountain News, circa November 1964, clipping, Box 5 Folder 12, JLP DPL; “McMahon to Head Olympic Bid Drive,” Rocky Mountain News, 17 March 1967, p. 112; Final Report. All of the above mentioned Olympic organizers except for Tutt and Seibert also traveled on Love’s 1966 sell Colorado mission to Los Angeles, see “Governor John A. Love’s Itinerary for Los Angeles ‘Sell Colorado Mission,’” 23-25 May 1966, Box 66998 Folder Sell Colorado Trip Los Angeles, JLF CSAR.
1971, on a television broadcast devoted to the Denver Olympics controversy then sweeping across Colorado, Donald Magarrell was asked if the “Sell Colorado” campaign and the bid for the Olympics were related. After conceding that the “Olympics would bring tourists more than anything else,” Magarrell answered simply: “I think so.” The same people, harboring the same goals of development and growth, engineered both the “Sell Colorado” campaign and the bid for the 1976 winter games.

**Colorado Ski Country U.S.A. and the Olympics**

As Magarrell acknowledged, Love and his Olympic cohort tethered hosting the Olympics to economic growth achieved through tourism. Unsurprisingly, SCUSA offered their universal support in this effort. In 1964, as Steve Knowlton traveled the state to “tell businessmen in Denver and its surrounding community the purpose and program of Colorado Ski Country USA,” he often included discussions about the possibility of Colorado holding the Olympics. During that same year, SCUSA’s “Skier Report” radio show dedicated an entire week “to discussing the Olympics and informing the audience of the coming events.”

“The Colorado ski business is pretty healthy right now,” Knowlton boasted, “but what better way to keep it going than with the greatest winter sports show in the world.” The SCUSA Chairman expected that the winter

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34 Other Colorado business people that served as Colorado Ambassadors and later on the COC later or the DOC include: Richard Davis, William F. Robinson, and William Kostka Jr. These individuals will be discussed in more detail below.

35 Steve Knowlton, Newsletter, Colorado Ski Country USA, 1 November 1964, Box 1 Folder 2, SCUSA DPL.
Olympics would, in his words, help the ski industry “bust right out of its britches in the next few years.”

Although not a member of the COC, Steve Knowlton became a central figure at the outset of Colorado’s Olympic bid. During the 1964 Innsbruck winter games, Governor Love intended to personally present IOC leaders with invitations to Colorado. When the governor became ill just prior to his trip, Knowlton took over the duties of “coordinating, and assisting the State Department in getting . . . the letters of invitation” to Austria. Knowlton dispatched COC member Thayer Tutt as Love’s “emissary.” Tutt then handed the letters to IOC President Avery Brundage and other IOC officials in-person. The invitations came with a steer hide cover, branded with the five Olympic rings, and the names of recipients written in gold. Love’s messages proclaimed that “the State of Colorado announces her desire to host the XII Winter Olympic Games in 1976.”


37 The 1960 Squaw Valley Winter Games Skiing Events Director, Willy Schaeffler, also traveled with Tutt on behalf of Governor Love. Steve Knowlton, Newsletter, Colorado Ski Country USA, 1 February 1964, Box 1 Folder 2, SCUSA DPL; Cal Queal, “Winter Olympics 1976,” p. 62; Knowlton “spent quite a bit of time” with Denver Post reporter Cal Queal to discuss the Olympics prior to this article being published, see newsletter from 1 February 1964 cited above.

38 John Love, Letter, circa 1964,1964.01.01-1973.12.31, Candidatures of Cities, International Olympic Committee Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter CC IOCA); in 1966, Governor Love asked Knowlton to join the COC. The SCUSA membership decided that because Vail’s Peter Seibert was already on the COC, he should decline the offer. As the SCUSA Steering Committee pointed out, “[w]ith Peter Siebert on the [Olympic] commission “the ski areas are well represented,” see Colorado Ski Country USA, Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 January 1966, Box 1 Folder 17 or 18, SCUSA DPL; When Love asked Knowlton to travel on the 1966 “Sell Colorado” Mission to Los Angeles, he again declined because Seibert as well as Aspen Corporation President D.R.C. Brown were already planning to attend, see Colorado Ski Country USA, Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, 5 April 1966, Box 1 Folder 20, SCUSA DPL. As noted, Merrill Hasting and Donald Fowler were also among those that served on the COC, SCUSA, and traveled as “Sell Colorado” ambassadors.
Love’s agenda for the Olympics fit neatly within the parameters of Knowlton’s and SCUSA’s business model. In 1968, for example, SCUSA members worked to bring the 8th Interski Congress to Aspen, Colorado. Over four hundred ski instructors from forty countries attended. The event represented the second largest skiing gathering in the world, followed only by the winter games. The SCUSA board of trustees supported the event because they “expected” it to lead to “widespread national and international publicity of Colorado and skiing.”39 As SCUSA member and future COC contributor Gerald Groswold declared after the Interski took place: “allied industries both within and without the state of Colorado, were made very vividly aware of Colorado’s prominence in the ski world.”40 For SCUSA, renowned international sport events represented an ideal public relations mechanism. As Interski organizer, University of Denver ski coach, and future Denver Olympics advocate Willy Schaeffler explained, “we want to sell Colorado” to the international skiing community.41

Moreover, in the eyes of ski industry leaders, the Interski Congress not only confirmed that hosting a well-known elite sporting event could function as an effective marketing device. The sports gathering served as a stepping stone to an even greater

39 Colorado Ski Country USA, Board of Trustees Annual Meeting Minutes, 3 June 1966, Box 1 Folder 19, SCUSA DPL.

40 The head to the Arapahoe Basin Ski Resort, Laurence Jump, also agreed, asserting that thanks to the interski “a lasting benefit will show up in the next years from the image of Colorado and Denver [now engrained] upon the international visitors” who had traveled to Aspen, see Colorado Ski Country USA, Annual Meeting Minutes, 8 June 1968, Box 1 Folder 7, SCUSA DPL; Gerald Groswold was another successful Colorado businessman, who worked as a title insurance executive while serving on the board of the Winter Park Ski Resort. He also reported on the Interski Congress to the DOC “who helped make the event a success,” see Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 13 June 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DLP. Also see “Interski May Aid Denver Olympic Bid,” Denver Post, 9 April 1968, p. 31.

41 Willy Schaeffler quoted in ibid.
publicity tool. As Charlie Meyers of the *Denver Post* reported, many ski advocates thought of hosting the congress as “in the long run . . . vital . . . [for] Olympic implications.” Indeed, SCSUA sent revenue gained through the Interski to the Colorado Olympic Commission.

To many of the ski industry backers, no better means existed for attracting tourist dollars. As one SCUCA member put in 1966, “we should do everything we can to work and cooperate with such organizations as the Colorado Olympic Commission, the 8th International Ski Congress, the World Student Ski Championships, etc. since all of these are in effect, special promotions for Colorado skiing.” Knowlton recognized this as early as 1964, when he informed the SCUSA membership that of all the events and advertisements in which they took part that year, the National Alpine Championships held in Colorado’s Winter Park “gave Colorado the best press coverage of any event.”

Whenever the question of the Olympics arose at SCUSA meetings, the advocacy group provided unequivocal support. At a SCUSA board meetings in November 1966, for instance, Richard Olson, Carl TeDemple, and Merrill Hasting gave a presentation on behalf of the COC. Olson told the SCUSA board how Governor Love appointed the COC to promote Colorado nationally and internationally, with the thinking that the

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43 Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 December 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL; Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 11 July 1969, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL. Interski organizers provided $150.

44 Bob Parker to Board of Trustees, Your Letters Regarding the Future of the Ski Country USA Program, 14 December 1966, Box 1 Folder 19, SCUSA DPL.

45 Steve Knowlton, Colorado Ski Country USA Newsletter, 1 April 1964, Box 1 Folder 2, SCUSA DPL.
publicity would prove favorable to the state.\textsuperscript{46} At a separate meeting held the same day, the head of the Arapahoe Basin Ski Resort, Laurence Jump, proposed that SCUSA begin to help fund the Olympic bidders. Vail’s Marketing Director, Robert W. Park, also suggested that “SCUSA do all it can to promote this [Olympic] effort through friends, etc.”\textsuperscript{47} The bid for the 1976 Winter Olympic found devoted sponsors within this closely knit assemblage of likeminded businesspeople.

\textbf{Love’s Re-election and the Promise of Tourism}

With the support of such “Sell Colorado” champions, in June of 1966, Governor Love confidently announced his bid for re-election.\textsuperscript{48} As Love’s campaign trumpeted, he brought “129 new industries in[to] Colorado during the last four years and 119 major expansions of existing businesses.” For Love and his supporters, brokering a land acquisition deal to attract Kodak and reporting an unemployment rate as low as 3.3\% represented major victories.\textsuperscript{49} In Love’s mind, the “Sell Colorado” missions deserved much of the credit. As the governor recalled in his biography, the out-of-state sales pitches “generated” both “new industries” and “major expansion of existing business.” Thus, after running on his “Sell Colorado” record and winning re-election over

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{46} Board of Trustees – RMSAOA Combined Luncheon Meeting, 11 November 1966, Box 1 Folder 17 or 18, SCUSA, DPL.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Colorado Ski Country USA, Board of Trustees Meeting Minutes, 11 November 1966, Box 1 Folder 19, SCUSA DPL.
\item \textsuperscript{48} John A. Love, Speech Given at the Republican Assembly in Colorado Springs, 25 June 1966, Box 1 Folder 44, JLP DPL.
\item \textsuperscript{49} “Love For Colorado: Election Fact Sheet,” circa 1966, Box 1 Folder 23, JLP DPL. Love personally brokered the land acquisition deal with Kodak, see John A. Love Interview, Oral History Project, 20 March 1974, Oral History Reports, Stephen H. Hart Library, Denver, Colorado (hereafter OHR SHHL).
\end{itemize}
Democratic Lt. Governor Robert L. Knous with about 56% of the vote, Love, in his own word, became even “more involved in [the] ‘Sell Colorado’ program.”

The Olympics, meanwhile, remained a key part of Love’s plans. In a 1968 address to the Colorado General Assembly, Love conceded that income from Colorado ranching and farming had declined. Yet, the governor emphasized, the state’s third largest industry, the tourism industry, had picked up the slack. In 1967, around 6.8 million tourists spent half a billion dollars in Colorado. On top of this, the governor predicted, budding ski resorts and the prestige of the Olympic games would ensure that the upward trend would continue. “As an additional fact in this area,” Love professed, “Colorado has been chosen by the United States Olympic Committee as this nation’s nominee to host the 1976 Winter Olympics. This, in truth, does recognize the fact that we are ‘Ski Country, USA.’ and further points to major economic and recreational advances, when we do receive the world’s designation, toward which every effort will be bent.” With the USOC’s designation in-hand and the IOC’s selection still pending, Love envision the Olympics bolstering Colorado’s tourist industry.

Love’s mention of “Ski Country USA” in the 1968 speech was a direct reference to his fellow Olympic aspirants. Love’s brand and SCUSA’s became one and the same. As Love noted, at the time Denver had already won the support of the USOC. However, in 1968, the city had not yet earned the IOC’s approval. Still, Love and SCUSA worked together to use the games to elevate Colorado’s image. That year, for example, the

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51 As evidence Love reported proudly of the 22,700 new jobs added within Colorado in the past year and of 3.2% unemployment rate.

52 “Text of Love Address to General Assembly,” Denver Post, 9 January 1968, p. 44.
Colorado Visitor’s Bureau released a guidebook showcasing Colorado ski resorts. On its back cover a full page advertisement invited its readers to come “[e]njoy the ski country that beckons the world to the’76 Winter Games.” To certain Coloradans, even before they had actually been awarded the mass sports spectacle, simply the idea of hosting the Olympics held advertising value.

The Formation of the Denver Organizing Committee

To lift that value to its fullest potential, in 1966, Colorado’s Olympic planners chose Denver to be their host city. Denver’s Mayor, Thomas Currrigan, informed the USOC on June 23, 1966, and shortly thereafter established the existence of the Denver Organizing Committee. The creation of the DOC exemplifies a principle that Colorado Olympic organizers followed obstinately – namely, manipulate appearances however necessary to please IOC officials.

In April 1967, the USOC was eight months away from selecting which American city should bid for the winter Olympics on their behalf. Around that time, Mayor Currrigan firmed up the individuals who would constitute his “new” organization. They had familiar faces. Advised by Merrill Hastings, Currrigan selected Donald McMahon as DOC Chairman. Within the eighteen-person group, he also included Richard Olson,

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53 “Colorado Visitors Bureau, “1968-69 [C]olorado skiing: resorts, lodges, services, transportation,” circa 1968, Records, Box 1 Folder 1, SCUSA DPL. As SCUSA Chairman Bob Parker described in June 1969: “Our relationship with the Colorado Visitor’s Bureau couldn’t be better,” see Colorado Ski Country USA, Annual Meeting Minutes, 8 June 1968, Box 1 Folder 7, SCUSA DPL.

54 “Highlights of Denver’s Efforts to achieve the 1976 Olympic Winter Games,” Box 1 Folder 5, DOC DPL.

55 This point will be taken up in greater detail in the following chapter.
Donald Magarrell, Donald Fowler, Peter Siebert, Carl DeTemple, and Merrill Hastings himself.⁵⁶ Olson, meanwhile, took McMahon’s place as head of the COC, while Magarrell continued as COC Vice Chairman. Hastings, Fowler, Seibert, and USOC member Clifford Buck served on both bodies as well.⁵⁷

What exactly separated the COC and DOC? They had, at least at first, literally the same members. An internal document written in 1968 by the COC’s and DOC’s legal counsel Richard Davis – approved by Love and Currigan – reveals that the two groups were basically the same entity.⁵⁸ As Davis explained, the COC was created by Governor

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⁵⁶ Thomas Currigan to United States Olympics Committee, Letter, 1 December 1966, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL; Office of the Mayor, Press Release, 31 March 1967, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL; “Mayor Names Bid Committee,” Rocky Mountain News, 1 April 1967, clipping, Folder 25 Box 99, WMP DPL; An undated note suggests Hastings actually selected the DOC members, which Currigan officially appointed, see Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL. A letter between Currigan and McMahon confirms Hastings and Currigan met to discuss each DOC member, see Thomas Currigan to Donald McMahon, Letter, 24 March 1967, Folder 22 Box 99 WMP DPL. Other original DOC members included: Robert O’Donnell (President of Harmon, O’Donnell, & Henninger Associates Inc.), F. George Robinson (President of Robinson Brick & Tile), Charles Snuckler (President of Alameda National Bank), Walter Hellmich (Chairman of the Colorado Council of Arts & Humanities), Russ Writer (Manager of Writer’s Manor), Robert Pringle (Vice President of Mountain States Telephone Company), and James H. Smith (Former Under Secretary of the Navy).

Richard Davis (a Senior Partner at Davis, Graham, and Stubbs) also took on the role as the DOC’s legal advisor and eventually became a member. In October 1967, Currigan appointed three more individuals the DOC, just prior to the USOC selection: William Greim (USOC Director), David Nordwall (U.S. Forest Service Forester), and William R. Haigler (Vice President of the U.S. Figure Staking Association), see Denver Organizing Committee, Press Release, 25 October 1967, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL. In March 1968, four more individual were appointed by Currigan: Thomas Hidlt Jr. (Vice President of Bosworth, Sullivan, & Co., an investment company), David V. Dunklee (Denver attorney), and Rollin D. Barnard (President of Midland Federal Savings and Loan Association), and Robert S. McCollum (Vice Chancellor of Denver University), see “Business Leaders On Olympic Team,” Rocky Mountain News, 22 March 1968, p. 90. Also see Office of the Mayor, DOC, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL. In September 1969, three more individual joined the DOC Board of directors: Palmer Hoyt (Denver Post Editor), Jack Foster (Rocky Mountain News Editor), and Wally Schirra (NASA astronaut), see Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 11 September 1969, Folder 9 Box 100, WMP DPL.

⁵⁷ Office of the Mayor, Press Release, 31 March 1967, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL. Buck replaced Tutt on the COC. Tutt step down after becoming the President of the International Hockey Federation.

⁵⁸ Currigan stated that Davis’s memorandum “is totally acceptable to me,” see Thomas Currigan to Richard Olson, Letter, 6 June 1968, Folder 1 Box 100, WMP DPL. Love likewise stated the “memorandum...is certainly acceptable,” see John A. Love to Richard Davis, Letter, 10 June 1968, Folder 1 Box 100. The DOC unanimously ratified the document on 11 July 1968, see Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 11 July 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL. The COC unanimously agreed to the memorandums ratification on 20 August 1968, see Richard M. Torrisi, Colorado Olympic Commission Meeting Minutes, 20 August 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL. Though no author takes
Love “to provide a continuing vehicle for the conduct of activities on behalf of the State directed toward bringing the Winter Olympics to Colorado.” The COC was thus financed by Colorado, charged with “promoting Colorado as host,” and “conducting the games if the bid were successful.” However, because IOC rules stipulated that a city and not a state must host the games, the COC designated Denver.\footnote{With regard to Olympic hosts, the IOC refused to recognize governmental bodies larger than cities to avoid nationalism. Cities hosted the Olympics, not states or nations.} Furthermore, according to the IOC, as Davis described, there must be “a direct relationship” between the IOC and the host city. That city was the governmental body that had to present Denver’s bid as well as potentially overseeing the Olympics. In short, to satisfy IOC guidelines, Mayor Curigan formed the DOC to undertake the duties with which the COC was already tasked.\footnote{“COLORADO OLYMPIC COMMISION / DENVER OLYMPIC COMMITTEE: Definition and Allocation of Responsibilities and Duties,” circa May-June 1968, Folder 1 Box 100, WMP DPL.}

As Davis’ memorandum explains, “preparation and submission of the bid to the USOC [in 1967] was a joint undertaking.” Both commission and committee contributed. Nonetheless, “due to IOC rules . . . most operating functions were transferred to the DOC.” In fact, at this point, “the funds of the COC were made available to DOC.” The DOC became “paramount,” even though, according to Davis, “the successful presentation of the bid, as well as staging the games [in the future], must be an all-out State effort.” As Davis observed, the “DOC must represent . . . Denver as the bidder,” but
“manifestly, the two groups must be harmonious, must work closely together, must coordinate activities, [though] must not compete or duplicate.”61

Davis’s COC / DOC recommendation then closed with three particularly telling suggestions. First, Davis advised that an additional COC representative join the DOC and vice versa. Secondly, he submitted that “[a]ll physical properties and equipment of the COC be transferred or loaned to the DOC.” Finally, Davis advocated that the two groups “staff and maintain one office used by both.”62 This intimate design indicates that the DOC was really an extension of the COC, with many of the same members, driven by the same motivation, to grow and develop Colorado.

On paper responsibilities were allocated. The COC was the “[o]fficial agency of the State Government,” responsible for obtaining state support, supervising state agencies, and communicating with state officials generally. The DOC was the “[o]fficial agency of Denver,” accountable for preparing and presenting the bid to the IOC. But in these respects, both organizations were supposed to assist each other.63 To ensure the appearance of independent outfits, Donald Maggarrell, George Robinson, Donald Fowler, and Merrill Hastings each eventually resigned from the COC.64 Yet, as COC meeting minutes from January 1969 acknowledged, “[b]ecause the affairs of the COC and DOC are so interdependent, it was agreed that the membership of the commission would attend

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Donald Magarrell to John A. Love, Letter, 13 March 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL; George F. Robinson to John A. Love, Letter, 13 March 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL; Donald Fowler to Richard H. Olson, Letter, 13 March 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL; Merrill Hastings to John A. Love, Letter, 13 March 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL.
meetings of the DOC on the second Thursday of every month.” On top of this, the COC also agreed to “schedule its meetings as necessary immediately preceding the DOC Board meetings.” In effect, the COC and DOC functioned as two divisions within the same Olympic Organizing Committee.

The Colorado Olympics

The initial formation of a Colorado Olympic Commission and not a Denver Organizing Committee (or Denver Olympic Commission) points to a significant change that took place regarding Colorado’s Olympic plans. Colorado’s bidders originally intended for their entire state to host the games. It was, after all, meant to be a promotion for the state as a whole. The 1964 letters that Thayer Tutt carried to Innsbruck had read that the “home of Aspen, Vail, Steamboat Springs, and the Famous Broadmoor Hotel [of] Colorado is the greatest wintersports (sic) center in America.” Love and his backers proposed to hold the 1976 Colorado Olympics. In 1965, the COC began informing the USOC of the details of their pending bid. In doing so, they located events hundreds of miles apart. The COC provided graphs of average snow depths attributed to “seven” unspecified “major areas.” These areas probably included Aspen, Steamboat Springs, Winter Park, Vail, and Crested Butte, locations which, as the COC noted, had “major completion experience.” Between 1950 and 1965, each of these ski resorts hosted either Nordic or alpine contests. Most explicitly, the COC slated ski jumping for a site that had hosted national championships.

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65 Colorado Olympic Commission Meeting Minutes, 9 January 1969, Box 1 Folder 100, WMP DPL

for fifty years – an obvious reference to the Howelson Hill ski jumping complex in Steamboat Springs. Thus, the COC pledged to place “the most distant areas less than 200 miles [apart] on high speed highways.” The furthest event site was probably at Crested Butte, a resort 228 miles from Denver, but only 199 miles from Colorado Springs. Those two cities were the likely bases of operation. As planners noted, two major areas comprising 1.5 million persons offered “logistical and technical support for the Games, as well as a potential audience for all events.”

In 1965, William Thayer Tutt’s desire to see Olympic events at the Broadmoor Hotel was still viewed by the COC as a legitimate possibility.

Early on, it was the consensus amongst Colorado’s Olympic backers that such a format represented Colorado’s best chance to win the right to host the winter games. In February 1964, Cal Queal (who became a SCUSA board of trustee a few years later) reported for the Denver Post that “[e]xpert observers say Colorado would have to ‘farm out’ the various Olympic events from Denver, rather than stage all at a single mountain location.”

Around that time, Steven Knowlton alerted SCUSA members that he “spent quite a bit of time with Cal Queal of the Denver Post, who is doing a long article on Ski Country and the State’s invitation for the Olympics.” It was probably Knowlton who

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67 “Ski Colorado: Bid for the Winter Olympics,” Circa 1965, Folder 23 Box 99, WMP DPL. While this document is not dated, it includes letters from Thomas Currrigan (and others) to John Love, all written between May and June 1965. Additionally, at a later 1965 COC meeting, the commission discussed finding locations for a separate “Alpine Village, and necessary ski base camps in the mountains,” indicating their intentions to hold skiing events at diverse locations some distance from Denver, see Richard Olson, Colorado Olympic Commission Meeting Minutes, 12 November 1965, DCC DPL. Steamboat Spring is about 155 miles from Denver; Aspen is about 160 miles from Denver. The capital letters are from the source.


69 Steve Knowlton, Colorado Ski Country USA Newsletter, 1 November 1964, Box 1 Folder 2, SCUSA DPL.
told Queal in 1964 that Alpine events should be held at either Aspen or Vail, Nordic events at either Steamboat Springs or Crested Butte, and ice skating events in Denver. Other ski area operators confirmed the merits of this setup. As the President of the Aspen Skiing Corporation, D.R.C. Brown explained, “Aspen could probably handle part of the competition. If Aspen is to take the whole thing, I’d be strictly against it.”

Vail owner and COC member Peter Seibert similarly told the SCUSA board of trustees in April of 1966: “We need to sell a spread-out concept as no one ski area can feasibly accommodate all events.”

In the eyes of the IOC, however, this “spread-out concept” was a weakness. As documents collected by Denver’s mayor show, the recently christened DOC became aware that the IOC felt “[a]ll facilities should be grouped as close together as possible.” In fact, IOC rules stated, “events must all take place in or as near as possible to the city chosen and preferably at or near the main stadium. The city chosen cannot share its privilege with another.” Either Denver or Colorado Springs would have to host. It could not be both. Nor could Colorado as a whole serve as the Olympic venue.

Concurrently, this predicament produced yet another shortcoming. To bring events closer together, the DOC would have to build a number of new facilities. As the DOC

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71 Colorado Ski Country USA, Board of Trustees Annual Meeting Minutes, 27 April 1966, Box 1 Folder 19, SCUSA DPL.

72 Site Selection Committee, Memo, circa 1966, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL.

73 “From the Olympic Rules: Useful Information for the Press,” Extract, Folder 23 Box 99, WMP DPL.
realized, the IOC was also “more impressed by cities that have the required facilities [already in place] at the time they make their presentation.”

In the fall of 1967, the DOC began the process of adapting to this circumstance. When members of the USOC traveled to Colorado to inspect potential event locations, they visited the town of Evergreen in Jefferson County, about twenty minutes west of downtown Denver. Evergreen would become the proposed site for the Nordic events. However, USOC inspectors also stopped further away at Vail, presumably where alpine events were still likely to be held. This, of course, represented a defect in the Colorado proposal. As Newbold Black, chairman of the U.S. Olympic Site Selection Committee lamented: “Denver is where Denver is and the mountains are where the mountains are.”

Vail was just too far away and there did not appear to be any remedy to that situation.

The Appearance of Support

By the time the DOC presented their official bid to the USOC in December of 1967 – and subsequently to the IOC in May of 1970 – they found ways to rectify the problem of dispersed event locations. They would simply do what Black assumed impossible. The DOC, at least on paper, moved the location of the mountains. The details involved in doing so will be discussed in-depth in the following chapter. Before delving into these specifics, it is worth considering the context that made such plans continue to seem acceptable from the perspectives of Colorado’s Olympic organizers.

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74 Site Selection Committee, Memo, circa 1966, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL.

In the early 1960s, a desire for economic diversification and growth and the reputation of the Olympics made hosting the games in Colorado attractive to the state’s leaders. On top of this, although the DOC ran into the challenges that scattered event sites posed, much of what they witnessed happening around them (and amongst themselves) throughout the decade lent credence to the notion that the majority of Coloradans wanted to host the Olympics too. Though the need to hold the games in a single location presented a real barrier, the DOC felt assured that they could and should persevere in their attempt to win the right to host the games.

To strengthen the confidence of Love, the COC, and DOC, a cross-section of politicians voiced their approval for holding the Olympics in the Centennial State. In 1965, the mayors of Colorado Springs and Denver wrote to Governor Love to make their enthusiasm for being Olympic hosts known. “I wish to pledge the support of our great city to your endeavor of bringing the Olympics to Colorado,” Denver’s Democratic Mayor, Thomas Currigan, informed John Love. After the COC determined Denver should be Colorado’s official entry, Colorado representatives in Washington D.C. wrote to Currigan with similar sentiments. “[T]his effort on the part of the State of Colorado and the City of Denver has my wholehearted support,” penned Republican Senator Gordon Allott; “I pledge to the State and to the City of Denver every constructive effort open to me, as a United States Senator, to further this effort in support of this bid.”

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76 See chapter one.


78 Gordon Allott to Thomas G. Currigan, Letter, 11 April 1967, Box 1 Folder 1, DOC DPL.
Fellow Republican Senator Peter H. Dominick and GOP Congressman Donald G. Brotzman, as well as House Democrats Wayne N. Aspinall, Frank E. Evans, and Byron Rogers all echoed Allott’s pro-Olympic attitude.79

More locally, the Colorado State Legislature formally expressed their encouragement. In 1967, the Colorado House unanimously passed House Joint Resolution 1032, “extending an invitation to have the Olympic Games of 1976 in Denver.” The resolution assured Colorado Olympic organizers that they would receive the “support and assistance of the citizens of this state for the successful holding” of the winter games. Around the same time, Colorado Senate Bill 179 backed up these words by appropriating $25,000 for the COC.80 Then, in 1969, the City and County of Denver allocated $75,000 for the DOC to be put toward their IOC bid. The state additionally sent $150,000 to the COC (which they then passed on to the DOC) for the same cause.81

Furthermore, in 1968, when Mayor Currigan reached out to Democratic Vice President (and presidential candidate) Hubert H. Humphrey to ask for federal funds to help the DOC prepare its presentation to the IOC, Humphrey also replied in the affirmative.82 A few months later, Richard Nixon defeated Humphrey to become

79 Peter H. Dominick to Thomas G. Currigan, Letter, 24 April 1967, Box 1 Folder 1, DOC DPL; Wayne N. Aspinall to Thomas G. Currigan, Letter, 11 April 1967, Box 1 Folder 1, DOC DPL; Donald G. Brotzman to Thomas G. Currigan, Letter, 9 May 1967, Box 1 Folder 1, DOC DPL; Frank E. Evans to Thomas G. Currigan, Letter, 19 April 1967, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL; Byron Rodgers to Thomas G. Currigan, Letter, 10 April 1967, Box 1 Folder 1, DOC DPL.

80 Colorado General Assembly, H.J. Res. 1032, 46th General Assembly, 1st Session, 1967. Though this resolution has been misplaced at the Colorado State Archives and Records, a copy can be found at Box 99 Folder 26, WMP DPL; Colorado General Assembly, S.B. 179, 46th General Assembly, 1st Session, 1967, CSAR.

81 Agreement, 15 January 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL. Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 15 August 1969, Box 8 Folder 100, WMP DPL.

82 Tom Currigan to Hubert H. Humphrey, Letter, 6 September 1968, Box 100 Folder 1, WMP DPL; Hubert H. Humphrey to Thomas Currigan, Letter, 16 September 1968, Folder 1 Box 100, WMP DPL.
President, but the DOC did not need to worry. “You may be sure,” Nixon penned to Currigan’s successor, William McNichols, “that the Denver Olympic Committee will receive full cooperation from my office and from other agencies of the Federal Government for your effort to present the International Olympic Committee Denver’s singular qualification for the role of host to the 1976 Winter Olympic Games.”

Policymakers at all levels reinforced the idea of that 1976 Winter Olympics should be brought to Denver.

The Colorado business community lent assistance to the DOC as well, often through financial donations. Between 1968 and 1970, the DOC reported receiving over $200,000 in private contributions. When collecting funds to support their bid to the IOC, about half the DOC’s $336,000 income came by this route. In 1968, the DOC collected over $30,000 alone from a $100 per plate “men only” fund raising dinner that reportedly attracted “dignitaries” and several hundred business executives. Often, specific donations called for public DOC acknowledgement, such as $5,000 from the Central Bank & Trust Company and $10,000 from the Denver Clearing House Association.

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83 Richard Nixon to W.H. McNichols, Letter 4 August 1968, Folder 1 Box 101, WMP DPL.

84 Olson, Power, Public Policy and the Environment, p. 210-213; Olson shows that many such contributors had direct links to the COC or DOC.

85 W.J. Stadler Jr. to Thomas Currigan, Letter, 28 March 1968, Folder 1 Box 100, WMP DPL; Chet Nelson, “Olympic Bid Gets Big Shot in Arm,” Rocky Mountain News, 19 March 1969, p. 48; “Lowell Thomas to Speak at Denver Olympic Dinner,” Rocky Mountain News, 10 March 1968, clipping, Folder 25 Box 99, WMP DOC; Barley Key, “Cherry Hills Fete Keys Olympic Bid,” Rocky Mountain News, 3 March 1968, p. 56. Native Colorado Olympic figure skater and gold medalist Peggy Flemming was the only woman invited to the event. She did not attend. Steve Knowlton also helped organized the event.

The DOC also received various additional in-kind donations. In December 1967, for example, when Governor Love, Mayor Curriag, and Merrill Hastings traveled to New York City to present their bid to the USOC, they traveled for free on the Gates Rubber Company’s private jet.\textsuperscript{87}

COC and DOC members were well-connected to political and business circles. In the growth centered post-war era, the Olympic organizers likely expected to receive substantial support from their own quarters. However, as in previous eras, Colorado’s print media also continued to express upbeat views about the Olympics. As Denver Post journalist Cal Queal characterized it in 1964, “Gov. John Love has launched an international mission that could bring one of the world’s greatest sports attractions to Colorado.” Queal insisted that “Colorado has the raw material and the know-how to stage a first class Olympiad . . . the finest Olympics in history.”\textsuperscript{88} In 1966, an unnamed

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\textsuperscript{87} Donald F. McMahon to USOC Presentation Team, Letter, Re: Flight Schedule, 8 December 1967, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL. Recent DOC member and USOC official Willard Greim\textsuperscript{e} also traveled on this flight. Richard Olson and Clifford Buck were included on the return flight. The Public Service Company and Gates Rubber together provided helicopters to carry members of the International Skiing Federation to potential venues during visits, see “Olympics in Colorado?” Denver Post, 30 October 1968, p. 92; The Jeep Corporation donate a Jeep for COC to use starring in 1966, see Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 1 March 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL. When International Sport Federation inspectors visited potential event location in October 1968, Hertz and Kumpf Lincon-Mercery Company provided two vehicles each, and Davis Brothers incorporated donated liquor for a reception, see George F. Robinson to John C. Davis, Letter, 1 November 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL; George F. Robinson to Florian Barth, Letter, 1 November 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL; George F. Robinson to Jim Schorsch, Letter, 1 November 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL. IBM provided the DOC goods and services, see Donald F. McMahon to R. J. Whalen, Letter, 5 February 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL. In April 1970, Trans World Airlines flew a group of “European sportswriters” to Denver from Jackson, Wyoming, where the World Championship of Skiing just took place. As DOC meeting minutes put it, [g]ood European press immediately preceding Amsterdam could assist Denver in winning the support of uncommitted IOC members,” see Richard Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 March 1970, Folder Box, WMP DPL.
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sports writer from the *Rocky Mountain News* reflected on Colorado’s Olympics chances with similar optimism, while writing from the perspective of all Coloradoans. “We boast the best snow in the nation – and the world,” the journalist wrote, we “would like to be the [w]orld’s winter showcase. We’re keeping our skies crossed.”\(^89\) When the 1968 winter Olympic games took place in Grenoble, France, *Denver Post* sport reporter Jim Graham more artfully averred, even “on our black and white set, the spectacle of the finest winter sports athletes from 38 nations in the colorful parade sent shivers down my spine . . . I wish every man, woman, and child in Colorado could envision through the magic of a time machine the 1976 Winter Olympics here in our own Centennial State.”\(^90\)

According to the Denver media, the sooner the Olympics reached Colorado the better.

That Denver newspapers accepted the virtues of hosting the Olympics games without critique became particularly clear when Love, Currigan, and other DOC members traveled to the 1968 Grenoble winter Olympics to, in Currigan’s words, “lobby” for Denver to become a future Olympic host.\(^91\) When they did so, *Rocky Mountain News* journalist Alan Cunningham sanctioned their Olympic crusade. “You might expect criticism when the mayor and the governor set out for a junket to France in the midst of frenzied city and state business,” Cunningham commented. “But Gov. Love and Mayor

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\(^89\) “Winter Olympics for Colorado,” *Rocky Mountain News*, 16 December 1966, clipping, Folder 25 Box 99, WMP DPL.


\(^91\) John Morehead, “Olympic Pitch Set by Denver,” *Denver Post*, 11 January 1968, p. 28; also see “Coloradans Carry Bid for Olympics to Grenoble,” clipping, 31 January 1968, Folder 25 Box 99, WMP DPL. As Love described the Grenoble trip: “We’re going to try and get the 1976 Winter Olympics for Colorado. That’s the purpose of this trip,” see “Coloradans Carry Bid for Olympics to Grenoble” cited above.
Currigan will have the blessings of most of their constituents when they depart on separate flights Wednesday for Grenoble.” As Cunningham reasoned, when Currigan and Love got to France, they would be “[t]rying to persuade members of the International Olympic Committee that the site for the 12th winter games eight years from now should be Colorado.” Cunningham then repeated a questionable DOC projection that the Olympics “could mean a $150 million bounty for the state.”92 The Rocky Mountain News’ sports section editor, Chet Nelson, likewise affirmed during the 1968 Grenoble Olympics that “the benefits” of holding the Olympics in Colorado “will last long into the future.”93

After watching the 1968 Mexico City summer games, the editor of Evergreen, Colorado’s Canyon Courier, Owen K. Ball, voiced these feelings as well. Some of the earliest and strongest opposition to the DOC’s plan came from within Evergreen. However, in October of 1968, Ball announced that the “mere fact that the International Olympic Committee is considering bringing the 1976 winter games to this area gives me a good feeling all over.” As Ball proclaimed, “I’m really not much [for] plodding around in snow on a cold winter day, but if the Olympics come here I’m going to be there watching those 90-meter jumps, and as many other events as possible.”94

These writers followed in the steps of earlier journalists. Instead of offering a critical examination to the DOC’s plans and actions, they bought in completely to tales of

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92 Alan Cunningham, “Love, Currigan, Flying to Olympic Site,” Rocky Mountain News, 31 January 1968, clipping. Folder 25 Box 99, WMP DPL. This projection will be examined further in the following chapter.


94 Owen K. Ball, “Ball Points,” Canyon Courier, 31 October 1968, clipping. Folder 6 Box 6, MAPC JCA.
social prestige and images of grandeur associated with the winter games. Such perspectives extended up the chain of command at both the Denver Post and Rocky Mountain News. Before Denver’s bid to the IOC was submitted, the editors of the two papers became DOC members.\textsuperscript{95} Within the Colorado popular press, dominant narratives about the benefits of the Olympics continued to go largely unquestioned. Indeed, when the DOC left for Amsterdam in May 1970 to present their proposal to the IOC, the Denver Post promised its readership that the “1976 Winter Games would be a definite plus for the Denver area” and asserted we “wish the Denver committee well and hope theirs is a successful trip.”\textsuperscript{96}

The DOC’s Confidence

While the media replayed positive accounts of Denver’s Olympic prospects, politicians and businesspeople offered their aid, all validating the motives of the DOC and making the Olympic boosters comfortable enough to assume (or at least express the assumption) that they had broad support among the Colorado populace. As Governor Love told USOC member Amos R. Little Jr. in 1965: “Our citizens stand ready to do everything possible to see that our proud state is well prepared to represent the United States in an outstanding fashion should they be selected” to host the Olympics.\textsuperscript{97} Mayor Curigan of Denver likewise vowed: “The sincere intention of this City [to host the

\textsuperscript{95} Denver Olympic Committee Roster, Folder 23 Box 99, WMP DPL; William H. McNichols Jr. to Palmer Hoyt, 22 July 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL; Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 11 September 1969, Folder 9 Box 100, WMP DPL. Palmer Hoyt was the editor of the Denver Post; Jack Foster was the editor of the Rocky Mountain News.

\textsuperscript{96} Bick Lucas, “Good Luck, Denver, On Winter Olympics,” 3 May 1970, clipping, Folder 2 Box 6, MAPC JCA.

\textsuperscript{97} John A. Love to Amos R. Little Jr., Letter, circa 1965, Box 6, Folder 1976, POME SHHL.
Olympics] has the wholehearted support of the people of Colorado.”

In what proved a tremendous irony, while in Grenoble, Curri\n\n\ngan even assured the international press that “I don’t look to any serious opposition whatsoever from the citizens of Denver and Colorado.” Curri\n\ngan added that the people of Colorado “are determined to spend whatever would be necessary to make a very successful Winter Olympics.”

As Curri\n\ngan’s quotation implies, Colorado organizers had at least some inkling that the games would be quite expensive. “We’d need a lot of money,” warned D.R.C. Brown in 1964, “both from the state and federal government.” In 1967, a study commissioned by the COC similarly concluded that “Colorado would need substantial Federal financial support in order to stage the 1976 Winter Olympic Games,” as well as funding from state, local, and private sources. By the time Curri\n\ngan established the DOC in 1967, Olympic planners knew full well that federal and state dollars were a prerequisite.

The Olympic planners did not seem perturbed. In fact, the same COC commissioned study confidently – though vaguely – attested that the “dollars needed to balance the total budget are expected.” The COC and DOC anticipated that they would receive the funding they needed. In 1968, after returning from Grenoble, where an

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98 Thomas Curri\n\ngan to Douglas F. Roby, Letter, 9 November 1966, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL; this letter was actually written by Merrill G. Hasting, see Merrill G. Hastings to Thomas Curri\n\ngan, Letter, 8 November 1966, Folder 22 Box 99, WMP DPL.

99 Curri\n\ngan quoted in “Curri\n\ngan Optimistic Over ’76 Games,” Denver Post, 8 February 1968, p. 61.


101 Theodore D. Browne, Preliminary Estimate of Costs, Revenues, and Economic Impact Associated with Staging the 1976 Winter Olympic Games in Colorado, 4 January 1967, vi, Box 1 Folder 2, DOC DPL. The DRI report specified that the DOC would need local, state, federal, and private funding.

102 Ibid. There will be a more analysis of the DRI study in the following chapter.
estimated $224 million had been spent on the games, Governor Love thus guaranteed to
his constituents: “Of course, Colorado can expect some federal money to help finance the
Olympics.” Part of the DOC’s directive from Mayor Currigan included applying for
state and federal dollars and acquiring such funds remained a constant topic of
conversation at DOC meetings.

The extent of the apparent support already received, the general approval of and
focus on growth after World War II, the history of federal investment in the American
West, and popular views of the Olympics within American culture enabled the DOC to
settle into a sense of certainty that they would somehow obtain the required finances.
They were sure if they could just get the IOC to send the Olympics their way, everything
else would work itself out. Problems related to the dispersal of event locations would be
remedied. Funding would appear. On the whole, gaining public support to host the
Olympics within the United States and in Colorado was not foreseen as a genuine
obstacle. To reach their Olympic dreams, the real challenge in the eyes of Colorado’s
political and business leaders was convincing the International Olympic Committee that
Denver was the best venue for advancing the Olympic movement. To conquer this
hurdle, the DOC and their supports left no stone unturned.

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104 Thomas Currigan to Donald McMahon, Letter, 22 August 1968, Folder 1 Box 100, WMP DPL; Currigan specified that he hope to obtain federal “funds for planning and construction of certain facilities (such facilities include a speed skating complex and a ski jumping complex).” For discussions at DOC meetings, see, for example, Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 9 May 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL; Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 29 March 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL; Richard M. Davis Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 11 July 1969, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL.
Chapter 3
Selling Denver to the International Olympic Committee

Confident that they had support throughout Colorado’s corridors of power and influence, the DOC set its sights on winning over the people who actually decided where the Olympics should be held – the members of International Olympic Committee. In this effort, the DOC constructed a bid that they knew would appease IOC officials. It was also a bid that the DOC knew would be untenable in practice. To win approval from the IOC, the DOC lied in their publications, internal practices, and their formal proposals to host the 1976 winter Olympics.

By 1967, the DOC started producing booklets, newsletters, bulletins, and press releases to illustrate their plan. To convince USOC and then IOC members to vote in their favor, they distributed this literature all over the world. As Denver’s mayor put it, DOC members traveled on “selling jobs” to USOC and IOC meetings, international sport federation events and conferences, and to the 1968 Mexico City and 1968 Grenoble Olympics.¹ An interrogation of the sources the DOC disseminated reveals a plan where the proximity of events, the costs of building new facilities, and the potential for after-use all represented an ideal bid in the IOC’s eyes. Much of what the DOC described, however, remained impossible to bring to fruition.

Colorado’s bidders assumed that any barriers that arose after winning the right to host the Olympics would be minor compared to the challenges of getting the event into

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the Centennial State in the first place. From this perspective, Denver’s endeavor to host the Olympics reveals two important conclusions concerning politics in Colorado at the time. For one, the primary political prerogative of the state’s leaders remained steady and very strong. Into the 1970s, they wanted, above all else, to continue to develop and grow the state’s economy. At the same time, the boldness of the DOC indicates that Colorado’s powerbrokers possessed a firm conviction that their authority to act on behalf of Colorado remained undisputed.

**The Nordic Events in Evergreen**

The first change the DOC made to placate the IOC was relocating the Nordic events, most likely from Steamboat Springs to the town of Indian Hills, only sixteen miles west of Denver. Behind this decision was the newest head of the DOC Site Selection Committee, George F. Robinson, president of the Colorado based Robinson Brick and Tile Company.² In 1967, in response to a questionnaire provided by the USOC, the DOC reported that Indian Hills, would “lend itself to the development of a complete Nordic skiing complex including cross country, jumping, and biathlon events, with the probability of the luge and the bobsled events localized in the same area.”³ The

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² Robinson replaced Peter Siebert when Siebert stepped down from his DOC post to focus on managing Vail. It was at least a coincidence that Seibert resigned around the same time the DOC decided to move events closer to the city, as Vail was now out of the running as an Olympic host, see Peter Seibert to Thomas Currigan, Letter, 2 May 1967, Folder 22 Box 88, WMP DPL.

³ Denver Organizing Committee, Denver Organizing Committee’s Response to Questionnaire for Bid Cites, circa 1967, 5-8, Folder 1 Box 1, DOC DPL. Though this document is not dated is was produced after the Denver Research Instituted published its report on the Denver Olympics in January 1967 and after the USOC selected Denver as the United States bid city in December 1967. On May 31, 1967, McMahon wrote to Currigan to tell him the DOC had submitted the “questionnaire to bidding cities” to the USOC, see Donald McMahon to Thomas Currigan, Letter, 31 May 1967, Folder 1 Box 100, WMP DPL. The DOC included a similar description of Indian Hills in their official bid book to the USOC, see Denver, Colorado, USA, 1976, XII Olympic Winter Games (1967) 11, Denver Public Library, Denver, Colorado (hereafter DPL).
snow conditions in the Indian Hills area “are adequate,” the DOC told the USOC. In its official bid book to the USOC, the DOC explained further that “snow cover during the game’s period is usually two feet in depth.” The DOC also promised room to “accommodate 20,000 people” as spectators. The location, Denver’s Olympic planners asserted, even “consists of a natural bowl to allow for the development of a stadium concept . . . and space for parking.” According to the DOC, the conditions in and around Indian Hills were more than suitable. Indeed, they sounded superb.

Around 1968, due to complaints by residents living in Indian Hills related fears of overcrowding and congestion, the DOC decided to move the proposed Nordic events a few minutes further west to the town of Evergreen. At an August 1968 meeting, Robinson reported Mountain Park terrain in the region, owned by the city of Denver, had been examined by Nordic specialist Sven Wiik and it looked even better than the land in Indian Hills. In November of 1968, the DOC thus released a promotional bulletin announcing the “Evergreen area is a major recreation site for Denverites . . . dotted with

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4 Denver, Colorado, USA, 1976, XII Olympic Winter Games (1967), DPL.

5 Denver Organizing Committee, Denver Organizing Committee’s Response to Questionnaire for Bid Cites, circa 1967, 5-8; this description can also be found in Denver, Colorado, USA, 1976, XII Olympic Winter Games (1967), 11-13, though parking accommodations were increased from 20,000 to 25,000 people.

6 Ibid. For the bobsled, luge, and ski jump, the DOC additionally placed the annual “[a]verage snowfall” at “94.9 inches,” with the average temperature at 27.8 degrees Fahrenheit. Furthermore, an estimated maximum cost of $1.4 million would be covered by a “private developer [of the] area.” For all the events, the DOC added, the “after-use possibilities of the area are extensive.”

7 Richard Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 8 August 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL.
Denver Mountain Parks and at one of these the jumping, cross country, biathlon, bobsled and luge events will be scheduled.”

At the 1969 International Ski Federation (FIS) Congress in Barcelona, Spain, the DOC presented studies done in Evergreen by FIS members confirming these claims. Cross-country specialist Vladimir Pacl reported that the “proposed [cross country] tails meet Olympic standards” and “can already be considered as excellent.” Miloslav Belonozki of the FIS Ski Jumping Committee viewed Evergreen by helicopter and affirmed “the area chosen for the construction of a 70 and 90 meter ski jump is very good.” The DOC then released a May 1969 bulletin, meant for international sport administrators, claiming that because Evergreen Lake freezes in the winter, it could be used “for icing a luge course.” With such factors in mind, in May 1970, the DOC officially proposed to the IOC that Nordic events, bobsled, luge, and ski jumping be scheduled for Evergreen.

The DOC’s plan for the Nordic events, ski jumping, bobsled and luge obscured one main factual problem. Evergreen’s winter temperatures were too warm and its snow accumulation was too low to support the winter sport contests. About a year before submitting their May 1970 bid to the IOC, DOC officials circulated a document titled

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8 Committee of Candidature for the XII Winter Olympic Games, International Bulletin, 1 November 1968, Box 1 Folder 2, DOC DPL.

9 Denver U.S. Candidate for the XII Winter Olympic Games, Proposed Nordic and Alpine Sites: Prepared for International Ski Federation Congress 1969, presented 18-25 1969 May, Box 3 Folder 33, POME SHHL.


“Denver’s Competition.” The internal evaluation assessed the strengths and weakness of all of the cities bidding for the 1976 Winter Olympics. The appraisal included details about Denver and listed as one of the city’s few weaknesses: “Evergreen weather.” As the “confidential” DOC evaluation stressed, however, “this negative is not known and will not be discussed.” The message seemed to be that if IOC decision-makers did not know about the flaw, it was, for all practical purposes, not really an obstacle. Nevertheless, Evergreen’s climate was an issue of which the DOC was well aware.

Indeed, on April 21, 1970, the assistant to the DOC president, James B. Cotter, received the results of a “climatological” study about Evergreen commissioned by the DOC and submitted by Colorado State University Professor Lewis O. Grant. Grant’s investigation elucidated Evergreen’s drawbacks. As Grant concluded, due to warm weather there was only a “46% chance of one or more inches of snow on the ground in February,” when the games were to be held. Moreover, Grant explained, there was only a “15% chance of five or more inches, and a 4% chance of 10 or more inches.” In other words, Grant wrote, “you could expect some snow on the ground on approximately half of the days of the month and 5 inches or more on about four days.” When reports surfaced after the DOC bid proved successful that the average temperature in Evergreen in February over the last nine years had been 47.7 degrees Fahrenheit, Coloradans were


13 Lewis O. Grant to James B. Cotter, Letter, 21 April 1970, Box 2 Folder 27, DOC DPL. Even after a usually large snowfall, Grant added, a sudden bout of mild weather would “quickly remove all snow cover over essentially the entire Evergreen area.” The DOC decided to invest in meteorology studies in August of 1969 to “(1) to substantiate the DOC’s presentation material, and (2) to counteract any adverse publicity that might be directed at the DOC,” see Richard M Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 15 August 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL.
left wondering how the DOC did not know about or reveal Evergreen’s temperate climate sooner.\textsuperscript{14}

By the end of 1970, DOC Technical Director Ted Farwell began looking for solutions to this predicament. The DOC hired Farewell after the bid to the IOC had been conceived and he expressed disapproval concerning the Nordic sites as early as January 1970.\textsuperscript{15} He was also a three-time Olympian who competed in cross country skiing and previously worked for a company called Sno-Engineering that evaluated potential winter sport facilities.\textsuperscript{16} One of the first things Farwell did to resolve the DOC’s Evergreen problem was confer with Lewis Grant. Together they agreed that “the Evergreen site may be classified as technically acceptable for cross-country events,” but only under certain conditions. First, the “entire 55 miles of trails must be covered with machine snow.” Second, “[t]rails must maximize slopes that are protected from the sun.” Third, “where south slopes are used” and fall under more intense sun light “artificial shade must protect the snow surface.” Finally, “[r]aces must be scheduled in the early morning,” preferably before 10 a.m. when it became too warm and the artificial snow began to melt.\textsuperscript{17} By Olympic standards, the measures needed to make Evergreen viable speak to how unrealistic DOC’s proposal was.


\textsuperscript{15}Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 11 January 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, Mountain Area Protection Council Records, Jefferson County Archives, Golden Colorado (hereafter MAPC JCA).


\textsuperscript{17}Ted Farwell to Lewis Grant, Letter, 3 December 1970, Box 2 Folder 2, DPL DOC
After inquiring with C. Allison Merrill, a fellow American on the FIS, Farwell came to the conclusion that using artificial snow would not work. As Merrill told him, the federation “would be very much concerned” about the prospect.\textsuperscript{18} Importantly, if the FIS would not accept artificial snow, neither would the IOC. The DOC placed the Nordic events in Evergreen to appease the International Olympic Committee. It soon looked as if they would have to move the events for the same reason. At the start of 1971, Farwell met with ski officials at an IOC conference in Sapporo, Japan, to discuss his options. By March of 1971 the DOC decided to abort the idea of cross country skiing in Evergreen.\textsuperscript{19} As Farewell reported at a DOC meeting, “the Technical Division has great misgivings concerning the running of a World Championship with no natural snow. We have therefore ceased further study in detail of the site and are concentrating on acceptable alternatives.”\textsuperscript{20}

When this decision was made George Robinson provided the chairperson of the FIS Cross Country Committee a slightly different explanation. He mentioned the weather problem, but Robinson also emphasized that “it would be desirable to move the cross country events to another location,” because “the people in Evergreen . . . have raised many public objections.”\textsuperscript{21} Like the people in Indian Hills earlier, many Evergreen locals did not want to play host to the Olympics.\textsuperscript{22} Yet, there is strong evidence that

\textsuperscript{18} Ted Farwell to C. Allison Merrill, Letter, 3 December 1970, Box 1 Folder 18, DOC DPL; C. Allison Merrill to Ted Farwell, Letter, 9 December 1970, Box 1 Folder 18, DPL DOC.


\textsuperscript{20} Technical Division to General Secretary and Manager Public Affairs, Report no. 2, 8 March 1971, Box 2 Folder 2, DOC DPL.

\textsuperscript{21} George F. Robinson to Vladimír Pacl, Letter, 1 March 1971, Box 2 Folder 27, DOC DPL.

\textsuperscript{22} See chapter 4 and 5.
Robinson was using the Olympic protesters as an excuse to avoid acknowledging a more embarrassing fact. He planned an Olympic skiing event at a location where there would probably be very little snow.

Indeed, the DOC tried to get the FIS to come around to using machine-made snow covered by tarps to create shade.\textsuperscript{23} The organizers also considered hauling snow into Evergreen from other areas. Then, even after they decided to move cross-country skiing events elsewhere, the DOC still planned to hold bobsled events in none other than Indian Hills, where objections to the presence of any Olympic competition continued to fester.\textsuperscript{24} Later the DOC seriously considered keeping the ski jumping within Jefferson County as well, which many Jefferson County residents (many from Indian Hills and Evergreen) likewise opposed.\textsuperscript{25} As Ted Farwell relayed in April 1971, the “major reason that we are making this reevaluation of Evergreen is for the competitors.”\textsuperscript{26} If the DOC responded in any consistent manner to the desires of Jefferson County inhabitants it was with a lack of concern for their point of view.

When the DOC officially backed out of holding cross-country races in Evergreen, Colorado’s lieutenant governor and longtime COC and DOC contributor, John Vanderhoof, bluntly discounted Evergreen’s opposition, characterizing it as “hysteria.”

\textsuperscript{23} Richard O’Reilly, “The Olympics and Colorado: Snags Arise in Olympic Site Selection, 3\textsuperscript{rd} of a series” \textit{Rocky Mountain News}, 6 April 1971 p. 8, 22.

\textsuperscript{24} Technical Division to the DOC Executive Committee, Report No. 1, 14 January 1971, Box 2 Folder 2, DOC DPL.

\textsuperscript{25} “DOC Delays Selection of Event Sites,” \textit{Denver Post}, 7 April 1972, p. 3; see chapters 3 and 4.

\textsuperscript{26} Farwell quoted in Richard O’Reilly, “The Olympics and Colorado: Snags Arise in Olympic Site Selection, 3\textsuperscript{rd} of a series.”
As Vanderhoof admitted, “[p]icking Evergreen probably was a mistake,” but only because “[i]t’s quite obvious there isn’t a helluva (sic) lot of snow.” The only reason the DOC planned the events in Evergreen in the first place, Vanderhoof conceded, was that the “DOC had to meet all of the International Olympic Committee criteria.” DOC Public Affairs Director Norm C. Brown underscored that it was the IOC that dictated the DOC’s position. Even after Evergreen was publicly deemed ill-suited as an Olympic venue, Brown vowed “we will stick with these [locations] if the IOC tells us to.”

**The Downhill Events at Mount Sniktua**

If moving Nordic events to Jefferson County made the DOC look naive, the DOC’s decisions regarding alpine competitions exposed them as outright deceptive. When the DOC responded to the 1967 USOC questionnaire, they did not commit to a site for downhill and slalom skiing. Instead, they pointed out multiple options. Along with Vail and Copper Mountain, the “Loveland Basin-Sniktua Complex” was on the DOC’s radar. Vail was an eighty-six-mile drive from Denver. Copper Mountain was closer, at about fifty-five-miles from the city. The Loveland Basin Ski Resort and the undeveloped Mount Sniktua were closest, only about forty-two miles by car. Though they had not made a final choice the DOC assured the USOC that their Alpine Site Selection Committee “studied all [three] potential sites in detail.” Each presumably was a suitable alternative.

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29 Denver Organizing Committee, Denver Organizing Committee’s Response to Questionnaire for Bid Cites, circa 1967, 1-5, Folder 1 Box 1, DOC DPL.
Shortly before making their official pitch to the USOC, the DOC decided on Loveland Basin and Mount Sniktua. As the DOC’s description in their 1967 USOC bid book read, “suitable terrain and snow conditions, the free flow of traffic and the availability of large spectator areas are prime qualifications for this site.” The “area,” according to the bid book, had “an average snow depth over 60 inches” during the time which the 1976 winter Olympic games were to take place.\(^{30}\) Like Indian Hills and Evergreen, the DOC depicted Loveland Basin and Mount Sniktua as more than appropriate for the Olympics.

Tellingly, two separate accounts later claimed that USOC Skiing Committee Chairman Malcom McLane pushed hard for Loveland Basin and Sniktua because of their proximity to Denver. He believed they were the DOC’s only chance at convincing the IOC to back the Denver bid.\(^{31}\) According to Merrill Hastings, McLane shared his opinion just two weeks before Denver’s official presentation to the USOC. In response, the DOC hurriedly changed its proposal to what McLane advised.\(^{32}\) In a 1973 interview with political scientist Laura Olson, DOC secretary Sidney Cornwall recalled that Hastings, in fact, forced the decision in favor of the closer locations.\(^{33}\) Site selection committee leader

\(^{30}\) Denver, Colorado, USA, 1976, XII Olympic Winter Games (1967), 6-7, DPL.

\(^{31}\) “Long Road ’76,” *Colorado Magazine*, November-December 1970, 11-16, 102-107; Richard O’Reilly, “The Olympics and Colorado, 1st of a series: Olympics—good or bad in Colorado?” *Rocky Mountain News*, April 4 1971, p. 1, 5, 8; In the “Long Road to ’76 McLane is quoted as telling the DOC: “I don’t think you’ll win the nod in New York next month if you don’t switch the downhill races from Vail to some place closer to Denver. The distance is just too great, and that national committee knows that in the final analysis the international body won’t accept such a remote competition site . . . Take my advice and change the plan.”

\(^{32}\) O’Reilly, “The Olympics and Colorado, 1st of a Series: Olympics—Good or Bad in Colorado?”

\(^{33}\) Olson, *Power, Public Policy and the Environment*, 104.
George Robinson also claimed the responsibility for the Loveland Basin-Sniktua selection lay with pressure exerted by Hastings.\textsuperscript{34}

However it occurred, as Ted Farwell described in his own 1973 retrospective essay, at the time of the USOC selection, “the effort [of the DOC] was simply to come up with something that the IOC would approve” and Mt. Sniktua was considered the best site within the right distance.\textsuperscript{35} As Farwell admitted, the “DOC made no analysis of whether it [Sniktua] would be a worthwhile public ski area” after the Olympics were held.\textsuperscript{36} As it turned out, in all likelihood, the detailed studies the DOC described to the USOC in 1967 that portrayed Sniktua as suitable for Olympic competitions had never been conducted.\textsuperscript{37} Still, Loveland Basin and Sniktua ended up in the DOC proposal to the USOC.

Later, in a November 1968 promotional bulletin, the DOC implicitly misrepresented Sniktua when they celebrated Denver’s reputation for “U.S. winter sports activity . . . within minutes driving distance of some of the world’s greatest ski areas – Winter Park, Loveland Basin, Vail, Aspen, Snowmass, Mt. Werner to name a few.” Although Loveland was about a sixty minute drive, Aspen, Snowmass, and Mt. Werner were hours away. Meanwhile, Mount Sniktua had little to do with Colorado’s growing

\textsuperscript{34} Richard O’Reilly, “The Olympics and Colorado: Olympic Alpine Conflict Brewing, 4\textsuperscript{th} of a series” Rocky Mountain News, 7 April 1971, p. 6, 8, 18.

\textsuperscript{35} Farwell quotation from David Sumber and Ted Farwell, “The Olympic Bubble, Colorado Rocky Mountain West, January/February 1973, 28. Farwell’s analysis that Sniktua was merely the best site at the right distance comes from Technical Division to the DOC Executive Committee, Report No. 1, 14 January 1971, Box 2 Folder 2, DOC DPL.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37} Evidence for this claim is provided below.
reputation as “Ski Country U.S.A.” It was not even developed. Yet by picking it as Olympic venue and then portraying ideal skiing conditions within an hour of Denver, the DOC passed the mountain off as if it contributed to Colorado’s status a tourist destination for ski enthusiasts.38

In that same bulletin, the Olympic organizers perhaps revealed some doubts about Sniktua’s viability, noting that Copper Mountain would serve as a back-up facility during the 1976 winter games.39 In a DOC’s report submitted at the 1969 FIS Congress, the Olympic organizers again pointed out that Copper Mountain and “many other excellent areas . . . could meet the requirements of alpine competition.” In the same 1969 document, however, the DOC expressed certainty in Sniktua. “Mt. Sniktua provides more than the required minimum vertical drop plus the terrain features necessary for outstanding downhill competitive events for both men and women,” the DOC’s report promised. Events would start “in a bowl-like location, which will assure plenty of snow,” while a “ridge which is to the west acts like a gigantic snow fence and contributes to the snow deposit,” the DOC claimed. “[T]his downhill will be one of the finest modern courses” and “because of its excellent location, Mt. Sniktua can be developed into a major recreational skiing area by developing necessary trails for the beginner and intermediate skier,” the DOC added.40

38 Committee of Candidature for the XII Winter Olympic Games, International Bulletin, 1 November 1968, Box 1 Folder 2, DOC DPL. Copper was also listed as a back-up facility in the DOC’s 1967 proposal to the USOC, see Denver, Colorado, USA, 1976, XII Olympic Winter Games (1967), 8-9, DPL.

39 Ibid.

40 Denver U.S. Candidate for the XII Winter Olympic Games, Proposed Nordic and Alpine Sites: Prepared for International Ski Federation Congress 1969, presented 18-25 1969 May, Box 3 Folder 33, POME SHHL.
For their part, FIS inspectors who visited the site in October of 1968 agreed that the “proposed terrains qualify,” though they noted that “it will be necessary . . . to make detailed studies, before actual preparation begins.” This proved good enough for the IOC. In the DOC’s bid book to the International Olympics Committee, presented in May 1970, Denver’s Olympic organizers offered Loveland Basin as host to slalom contests and Sniktua as the location for downhill competitions – sites which the DOC affirmed “have always had abundant snow fall . . . matchless for alpine events.”

Due to strong winds and an extremely steep grade pretty much everything the DOC claimed about Sniktua in their bid books to the UOSC and IOC was untrue. As Ted Farwell told his fellow Olympic organizers six months after the DOC had been awarded the Olympics, he had recently been informed by a forest service representative that “use of Mt. Sniktua” for the Olympics “is not the best in the eyes of land managers” because the “wind and general weather conditions are marginal.”

Indicating the lack of research done prior to submitting their Olympic bids, in January 1971, George Robinson suggested to the DOC Site Selection Committee begin to “study the Loveland-Sniktua site in detail.” Around that time Farwell came to the conclusion that at the very least “the Sniktua-Loveland site will not show Colorado at its best.”

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41 Ibid.

42 Book One, Denver: The City, Denver: United States candidate for the XII Winter Olympic Games, 1976 (May 1970), 17, Bid Books, IOCA.

43 Ted Farwell to F. George Robinson, Donald F. Magarrel, and Norman C. Brown, Letter, 24 November 1970, Box 2 Folder 2, DOC DPL; Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 18 March, 1971, Box 1 Folder 10, DOC DPL.

44 Denver Olympic Committee Site Selection Meeting, Agenda, 4 January 1971, Box 2 Folder 15, DOC DPL.

45 Technical Division to the DOC Executive Committee, Report No. 1, 14 January 1971, Box 2 Folder 2, DOC DPL.
March of 1971, DOC leaders still seemed to consider Sniktua a genuine option, as they moved forward with a more in-depth investigation of the mountain’s terrain.46

The DOC-commissioned study of Sniktua was completed in the spring of 1971 by Farwell’s former employer, Sno-Engineer. Afterward, the company’s vice president, Joseph Cushing Jr., informed Farwell of the results. As Cushing described, there was a “distinct possibility that wind erosion . . . could be sufficiently damaging to ski trails [so] that a competition might conceivably have to be postponed, at any given time during the winter months.” Furthermore, Cushing explained, “physical features . . . seriously restrict its [Sniktua’s] use for commercial development.” Indeed, an “overabundance of steep grades” and a “complete lack of terrain with grades that are suitable for the pure intermediate ability level [skier]” led Cushing to recommend “the development of Mt. Skniktua for skiing, either commercially or competitively, be abandoned.”47 In the fall of 1971, Farwell broke the news to the rest of the DOC. As he reported, no site that met the “technical criteria” for downhill skiing existed “within a 90 minute drive of Denver.”48

The DOC thus reached the same realization that they had with the Nordic events. They would have to relocate the alpine competitions too.

In the case of Sniktua, the DOC once again knowingly deceived the USOC and IOC. In the spring of 1971, Rocky Mountain News investigative journalist Richard

46 Donald F. Magarrell, Executive Council, 25 February 1971, Box 1 Folder 26, DOC DPL; Technical Division to General Secretary and Manager of Public Affairs, Report no. 2, 8 March 1971, Box 2 Folder 2, DOC DPL.

47 Joseph Cushing, Jr. to Theodore Farwell, letter, 11 June 1971, Box 2 Folder 37, DOC DPL; Sno-Engineering Inc., “Preliminary Site Evaluation: Mount Sniktua,” Spring 1971, Box 2 Folder 37, DOC DPL.

48 Technical Director to DOC Executive Council, Inter-Office Memo, Subject: Sport Site Reevaluation – General Alpine Site, 1 November 1971, Box 2 Folder 37, DPL DOC.
O’Reilly visited the DOC’s office where he was given permission to look through their files. There he found a picture of Sniktua that looked very much like the picture shown in the DOC’s bid books, except with much less snow on it. When O’Reilly showed the photo to a DOC representative, the reporter was told that the DOC airbrushed snow onto the mountain to improve their chances to host the Olympics.49 In fact, the same list that had mentioned Evergreen’s problematic weather as a “weakness” also made note of the “[w]ind on the upper sections of Mt. Sniktua.” This tidbit too was classified as “not known and not to be discussed.”50

In February 1973, four months after Denver returned the Olympics to the IOC, Malcom McLane confirmed his role in and defended his reasoning for the Sniktua selection. When asked if he recommended the mountain, he rhetorically responded: “they [the DOC] got the bid, didn’t they?”51 Regarding the alpine events, John Vanderhoof acknowledged as early as January 1971 that the DOC had been “pressed for time, so they lied a bit.”52 McLane seemed to defend the lie on pragmatic grounds. In April 1968, after the USOC chose Denver as the United States’ representative to bid for the Olympics, DOC meeting minutes state that the group “agreed to retain the present

49 Richard O’Reilly, interview with author, Pasadena, California, 1 June 2016, notes and recording in the author’s possession; Also O’Reilly, “The Olympics and Colorado, 1st of a series: Olympics Good or Bad in Colorado?”


51 McLane quoted in John Jerome, “Goodbye, Denver Olympics: The Initial Bid Was a Fraud but No one Believed that Colorado wouldn’t go Along,” Skiing, February 1973, 69.

sites for all events so that the presentation of the IOC bid can progress without further confusion or delay.” Nevertheless, DOC Director of Ski Events and University of Denver ski coach Willy Schaeffler conveyed what was probably a more accurate explanation for what the DOC was thinking. “I have always felt confident,” Schaeffler explained in the spring of 1971, “we could get the permission of the IOC and the USOC for switching to better sites than those proposed.” DOC members surmised that after they earned the games though surreptitious means, they would be able to relocate events to more suitable locations. The new sites would be further from the Olympic Village in Denver, at a distance that the IOC members would not have supported originally. The DOC gambled that after the IOC awarded the 1976 winter games to Denver, the organization would not backtrack on its decision.

The Olympic Village at the University of Denver

The Olympic Village itself represents another example of DOC misrepresentation. As with the alpine events, in their response to the USOC’s 1967 questionnaire, the DOC

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53 Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 17 April 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL.

54 Scheaffler quoted in Richard O’Reilly, “The Olympics and Colorado: Olympic Alpine Conflict Brewing, 4th of a series” Rocky Mountain News, 7 April 1971 p. 6, 8, 18; Scheaffler played an important role in the Sniktua selection. According to George Robinson, when FIS inspectors visited Sniktua, Scheaffler’s “explanation during the walk down [the mountain] . . . was a real clincher in the technical vein.” As Robinson told Scheaffler, “I know that they [the FIS inspectors] relied and were convinced by your presentation,” see George F. Robinson to Willy Schaeffler, letter, 1 November 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL.

55 Although cognizant of IOC preferences, relocation was the strategy Ted Farewell decided to take. “Let us seek a compromise with the IOC . . . that allows us to maximize values associated with the snow related sports in exchange for some slight shifting of the ‘togetherness’ concept,” he proposed to the DOC in November 1971, see Technical Director to DOC Executive Council, Inter-Office Memo, Subject: Sport Site Reevaluation – General Alpine Site, 1 November 1971, Box 2 Folder 37, DPL DOC.
had not yet established where they would house athletes and coaches. All the DOC promised at the time was “to provide a complete Olympic Village complex in the metropolitan Denver area that will be close to the Nordic, Bobsled, Luge, and Skating event sites.”  

Six weeks before the USOC’s official selection, however, USOC President Douglas Roby warned publicly that this answer was too vague. Finding a precise site for the Olympic Village, Roby counselled, was another important benchmark for making Denver’s case that it was the United States’ best chance at swaying the IOC.  

When the time came for their official 1967 presentation to the USOC, the DOC once again found a quick solution. As the 1967 DOC bid book announced, “the Board of Trustees of the University of Denver has granted use of university residence facilities,” with “a capacity well above the 2,500 beds required.” The Colorado press and DOC bulletins confirmed that the University of Denver dorms were to become Olympic dwellings. As a 1968 magazine, *Colorado: Rocky Mountain West*, claimed, Denver organizers “received the unqualified pledge of the University of Denver to provide three student resident halls.” A later bulletin even noted that “the school’s trustees are able to

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56 Denver Organizing Committee, “Denver Organizing Committee’s Response to Questionnaire for Bid Cites,” circa 1967, 59, Box 1 Folder 1, DOC DPL; Colorado School of Mines, Metropolitan State College, Arapahoe Junior College, and the Lower Field and Fitzsimon Hospital military installations were listed as possibilities.


58 Denver, Colorado, USA, 1976, XII Olympic Winter Games (1967), 17, DPL.

59 “Olympics: Denver Organizing Committee for the XII Olympics,” *Colorado: Rocky Mountain West*, Mid-Winter 1968, p. 27. It is probable that this article was written by a DOC member or someone in close contact with the group. Many of the same pictures used the DOC’s 1967 bid book accompanied the piece. A DOC bulletin released around the same time also made the same assertion, see Committee of Candidature for the XII Winter Olympic Games, International Bulletin, 1 November 1968, Box 1 Folder 2, DOC DPL.
assure the Denver Committee that the 9,000 students enrolled at the University of Denver would be [put] on a special vacation” during the Olympics games to make space available for Olympic athletes.\(^{60}\) Thus the DOC’s May 1970 proposal to the IOC read that the “University of Denver has guaranteed its modern student residence halls for the Olympic Village”\(^{61}\)

The problem was that no such guarantee was ever made. As the minutes of an April 1968 DOC meeting acknowledged, “while the University of Denver is mentioned as the site of the Olympic Village in the Denver Olympic Committee presentation . . . the Board of Trustees has never given formal approval.”\(^{62}\) A March 1971 letter from University of Denver Chancellor Maurice Mitchell to Donald Magarrell reveals what happened. As Mitchell remembered, in 1967, University of Denver Board of Trustee member and Colorado Olympic Commission leader Richard Olson asked his fellow trustees to “make an informal and non-binding offer” for the “possible use of the housing facilities at the University of Denver.” The trustee approved this proposition. Moreover, although “non-binding,” the trustees agreed that the school’s facilities “might be included in a proposal to be submitted to the International Olympic Committee.” The school agreed in theory to the idea of its dorms being used for the Olympics and permitted the DOC to convey to the IOC that a deal had been finalized. Nonetheless, the University of

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\(^{60}\) Denver U.S. Candidate for the XII Winter Olympic Games 1976, International Bulletin, circa 1969, Folder 26 Box 99 WMP DPL.


\(^{62}\) Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 17 April 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL.
Denver carried no official obligation. As Mitchell emphasized to Magarrell, the “Board was told [in 1967] that it would not be held to this commitment.”

In 1971, Mitchell assured Magarrell in the same letter that the University of Denver’s Board of Trustees “is willing to consider the conditions under which facilities at the University of Denver might be made available.” The DOC and the school soon engage in further negotiations. In exchange for allowing the use of their dorms the university requested the DOC fund a new 68,500 square-foot health center and a new 111,000 square-foot student center at total estimated cost of $7,392,500. The DOC would also have pay for the removal and return of student belongings before and after the games, room and board for Olympic athletes, cleaning fees, and insurance coverage for the facilities being used. Although the DOC continued to tell the IOC otherwise, the University of Denver’s demands proved to be too steep for Denver’s Olympic planners. No agreement between the DOC and the university was ever settled. Furthermore, a little over a month before the 1972 anti-Olympic referendum passed, Chancellor Mitchell openly expressed doubts that his school would be able to dislocate so many students and their belongings just to make room for winter Olympians, regardless of what the DOC might be able to offer. Had the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games taken place, it is unclear where the Olympic Village would have been.

63 Maurice Mitchell to Don Magarrell, Letter, 12 March 1971, Box 2 Folder 13, DOC DPL.
64 Ibid.
65 Maurice B. Mitchell to Robert J. Pringle, Letter, 3 August 1971, Box 67053, JLF CSAR; Agreement Between the University of Denver (Colorado Seminary) and the Denver Organizing Committee XII Winter Olympic Games 1976, Box 67503, JLP SCAR.
The Costs and Benefits

Of all the DOC’s untruths, perhaps the most politically significant concerned how much the Olympics would cost and how much Colorado would benefit. In early 1966, the DOC commissioned the Denver Research Institute (DRI), associated with the University of Denver, to ascertain an “estimate of the costs and revenues of staging the 1976 Winter Games in Colorado” and “to examine the associated impacts on the economy of the State.” The DRI published its findings in January of 1967. As the report’s lead author, business consultant Theodore D. Browne, confessed, “[c]onsiderable personal judgment was required . . . because of the early timing of the study.” As Browne made clear in his introduction, the “estimates in the report must be considered quite rough, ‘ball park,’ in nature . . . [since] sites for various Olympic events are not yet selected.”

Based on data from previous winter games, the DRI concluded that the construction of Olympic facilities would cost between $5,825,000 and $9,675,000 and that “over 80% of these facilities appear to have good to very good after-use potential.” Additionally, “preparation, planning, and staging costs” would come to between $5 and

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68 Theodore D. Browne, Preliminary Estimate of Costs, Revenues, and Economic Impact Associated with Staging the 1976 Winter Olympic Games in Colorado, 4 January 1967, iii, Box 1 Folder 2, DOC DPL. The study’s method was described as such: “Three Primary information sources were utilized . . . [1] review of final reports from prior Winter Olympic Games and from proposals to stage the 1968 and 1972 Games . . . [especially] the experience of Squaw Valley, California (1960), Innsbruck, Austria (1964), and Grenoble, France (1968) . . . [2] [c]orrespondence [that] helped to clarify the construction costs of various facilities . . . [and] [3] personal interviews . . . with knowledgeable people in California, Colorado, Nevada, and New York” (iii).

69 This is quoted directly from the DOC’s 1967 bid book to the USOC. See, Denver, Colorado, USA, 1976, XII Olympic Winter Games (1967), 6, DPL.
The DRI estimated that revenues from admissions, television, and other sources would equate to between $6.4 and $8.9 million. That left an immediate “ball park” operating margin ranging from negative $2,272,000 to positive $2,877,000.\textsuperscript{70}

Notably, however, the DRI also found that revenue from sales, income, and gas taxes, as well as “considerable spending” by recreationalists and tourists, meant that the long-term “economic impact of the 1976 Winter Olympics on Colorado would appear to be sizable.” In particular, the DRI pointed to added jobs, income from concessions, and money gained from property taxes on new sport complexes. Beyond this, the DRI also accounted for “intangible benefits” that “have value even though they escape measure.” These “values,” the report asserted, would be born from the presence of new recreation centers and “the widespread values to Colorado received from advertising.” Though the DRI determined it imprudent to “assign a specific dollar impact value” to these assets, researchers were confident enough to conclude that “the intangible values will be significant to the State.” Overall, the “benefits accrued, both tangible and intangible [from the Olympics], should remain for years,” the DRI determined.\textsuperscript{71} Though tentative, the DRI report ultimately confirmed DOC assumptions about the consequences of hosting the Olympics.

The DOC nonetheless manipulated the DRI’s provisional findings and then advertised them as if they were certainties. In its answers to the 1967 USOC questionnaire, the DOC counted only immediate construction costs (ignoring preparation, preparation.

\textsuperscript{70} Browne, Preliminary Estimate of Costs, Revenues, and Economic Impact Associated with Staging the 1976 Winter Olympic Games in Colorado, DOC DPL; Browne first provides these number on p. v, but goes into much more detail regarding how the DRI reached them throughout the report.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, quotations from 36; for a detailed look at DRI’s analysis of “tangible” and “intangible” benefits see 29-36.
planning, and staging costs) so that they could claim that the games’ price tag would reach at maximum only $10 million. The DOC emphatically added that these costs “will no doubt be defrayed through a combination of public and private financing.” The DRI predicted that the DOC could recoup its expenses. Still, the DOC provided an elusive description of how this would be accomplished. As the DOC pronounced in their bid to the USOC, the “intelligent blending of aid from public sources with the private investment sector will provide a very satisfactory financing matrix.”

Neither the DRI nor the DOC identified precisely what such a “matrix” would entail.

More blatantly, the DOC distorted the DRI’s projections regarding federal funding. In fact, the DRI report did not provide an estimate for how much federal money the DOC should expect. The report merely included information regarding previous games, such as the 1960 Squaw Valley Olympics, where United States government contributed $3.5 million. Curiously, in their bid to the USOC, the DOC appropriated the number of $3.5 million, citing it as the “anticipated” revenue that they would receive from the federal government. The DRI made no indication that the DOC should expect the numbers from Squaw Valley to be replicated.

Rather, the research group claimed that for the 1976 Olympics in Denver “the level of Federal financial participation in the 1960 events would have to be expanded.” The DRI observed that “Colorado would need substantial Federal financial support” to

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72 Denver Organizing Committee, “Denver Organizing Committee’s Response to Questionnaire for Bid Cites,” circa 1967, 76, Folder 1 Box 1, DOC DPL. This line about a financing matrix was repeated in Denver, Colorado, USA, 1976, XII Olympic Winter Games (1967), 45, DPL.

73 Browne, Preliminary Estimate of Costs, Revenues, and Economic Impact Associated with Staging the 1976 Winter Olympic Games in Colorado, DOC DPL
stage the 1976 Olympics, more, in fact, than Squaw Valley received sixteen years prior.\footnote{Ibid.} Amongst themselves, leading up to their bid to the IOC, the DOC admitted the subject of federal funding was unclear. As DOC members observed in April of 1969, the “entire Washington picture is still clouded by uncertainty about who will have prime responsibility for Federal action on Olympic appropriations.” The DOC assumed money was coming from Washington, but they did not know exactly from where or how much.\footnote{Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 17 April 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL.}

As early as 1968, Denver organizers went beyond anything that could be tied to the DRI’s analysis. That year, the DOC raised its cost estimate to between $17 and $20 million, but launched their potential revenues into the stratosphere. “Estimates indicated that monetary benefits to Denver from the 1976 Games could total $150 to $200 million,” a DOC press released exclaimed.\footnote{“Information for Immediate Release,” 18 September 1968, Box 1 Folder 36, DOC DPL.} At the end of 1969, when three DOC members presented their case for hosting the Olympics to the Denver Chamber of Commerce, the price tag for the games dropped to $14 million, while the $150 to $250 million Denver stood to gain remained intact.\footnote{Charles Meyers, “Denver’s Olympic Bid Pay Off, DOC says,” Denver Post, 13 December 1969, p. 10.} It remains unclear how these numbers were derived. Notably, the $150 to $250 million projection was not an attempt to quantify the immeasurable. On top of the enlarged figures, the 1968 bulletin added that “intangible benefits will continue for years.”\footnote{“Information for Immediate Release,” 18 September 1968, Box 1 Folder 36, DOC DPL.}
In their 1970 bid book to the IOC, the DOC did not provide a specific estimate for costs or revenues but they noted that “from the standpoint of costs, eighty percent of all event and support facilities needed for the 1976 Winter Olympics already exist in Denver.” As a result, the DOC explained, “the city does not face the almost overwhelming costs that usually accompany the Olympics.” Denver’s Mayor Tom Curri...
the study.”

Added to this confusion was the reality that the Nordic events, downhill races, and potentially the Olympic Village would have to be relocated. At the time Denver was awarded the Olympics, nobody knew or could even adequately estimate what the ultimate expense for the event would be.

Even so, prior to May 1970, the DOC knew that the Olympic games would not be as economically fruitful as the DRI originally supposed. One facility that the DOC needed to build to host the Olympics was a 400-meter speed skating oval. In 1969, the DOC hired the Ahrendt Engineering Company to provide an appraisal of potential costs and revenues for the facility. As James Cotter told DOC members in May 1969, Ahrendt Engineering concluded that to consider the facility planned for Denver “a self-amortizing facility will be true only if (1) a major portion of the investment does not have to be repaid and (2) the utilization by the public is excellent. Either or both of these conditions are uncertain at best.” Consequently, “financing,” Cotter explained, “could prove to be a difficult problem.”

In short, building the facility only made economic sense if the DOC did not have to pay for the majority of its construction and the public made significant use of it after the Olympics were over. If the public failed to use the facility, operating costs alone would run the rink into red.

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83 Richard M. Torrisi to Denver Olympic Committee, Letter, Re: Speed Skating Rink, 19 June 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL. Ahrendt Engineering was probably the most qualified company to do the study, as they designed hundreds of ice rinks and constructed the only rink in the United States (located in West Allis, Wisconsin) comparable to what the DOC envisioned.
84 J.B. Cotter to T. Hildt, Jr., D.F. Magarrell, F.G. Robinson, R.J. Pringle, G.F. Grosiwold, A. Zirkel, P.J. Gallavan, K. Dybevik, W. Kostka, Jr., Letter, Re: Speed Skating/Hockey Complex Proposal Ahrendt Engineering Co., 8 May 1969, Box 2 Folder 12, DOC DPL; Ahrendt Engineering’s analysis is located with the Cotter letter in Box 2 Folder 12, DOC DPL. However, its cover page is labeled “Denver Olympic Village for the Denver Organizing Committee for the 1976 Winter Olympics, Inc.”
This is a revealing example, because of all the new facilities the DOC proposed to build a speed skating rink near downtown Denver was probably the best bet for public consumption. In contrast, a ski jump, luge, or bobsled course located in the foothills would have drawn much less interest. Not only would such facilities be more expensive for individuals to use. They also required a much more esoteric set of skills.  

In 1970, for example, the only bobsled course that existed in the United States was the one built for the Lake Placid winter games of 1932. Bobsledding was not a popular sport amongst Americans.

Denver’s Olympic organizers were aware that specific facilities such as a ski jump, luge, or bobsled run were not good investments. Indeed, Colorado Governor John Love admitted to a group of concerned residents living in Evergreen, Colorado, that Denver’s Olympic luge course would probably be dismantled once the Olympics were over, since there would be no one to use it. Furthermore, Denver’s Mayor, William McNichols, later advised the DOC that his city would only take ownership of the bobsled run and ski jump if it also received control over the new speed skating rink because “skating may have to bail out the other two.”

Meanwhile, United States Ski Association President Charles T. Gibson informed the DOC that although building a ski

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85 For example, the 1967 DRI study judged “the after-use of a luge run as being limited,” see Browne, Preliminary Estimate of Costs, Revenues, and Economic Impact Associated with Staging the 1976 Winter Olympic Games in Colorado, 14, DOC DPL; Facing the bobsled luge’s lack of financial return, the DOC attempted to have the event removed for the 1976 winter games. See "Sledding Dropped from 1976 Games," New York Times, 25 August 1972, p. 23.

86 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Conversation w/Gov. Love, 23 April 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA.

87 Denver Olympic Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 22 December 1971,” Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL.
jump near Denver would be more profitable during the Olympics, the need for artificial
snow would make the facility “economically infeasible” in the long-term. The DOC
knew that hosting the winter Olympics would not be as profitable as they made it seem.

“A Mass Selling Approach”

The DOC seemed to be, for all intents and purposes, completely focused on
winning the votes of IOC members, rather than constructing a realistic bid. This level of
commitment went beyond their contrived proposal. After gaining USOC backing at the
end of 1967, a memorandum sent from DOC President Donald McMahon’s current
assistant, Richard Torrisi, to DOC officials described the next “phase” of the DOC’s
mission. “The peculiar nature of this task,” Torrisi advised, “requires a mass selling
approach in order to reach by indirect means.” A number of examples point to the
“peculiar” and “indirect” methods DOC members employed.

In 1966, Merrill Hastings and Donald Magarrell traveled to Rome, Italy, where the IOC met to determine who would host the 1972 winter Olympics. Magarrell
provided a summary of the trip for fellow COC member Richard Olson. As Magarrell
described, he and Hastings aimed to “represent” the COC (the DOC had not been created
yet) “in specific moves and activities which would announce and advance Colorado’s
intention to apply for the 1976 Winter Olympic Games.” The number one thing
Magarrell listed as part of this agenda was to “[a]ssist, if possible, those applicants for the

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88 Charles T. Gibson to Marvin Crawford, Letter, 3 January 1972, Box 2 Folder 16, DOC DPL.
89 Richard M. Torrisi, Olympic Designation – Phase II, 31 March 1968, Folder 1 Box 100, WMP DPL.
'72 Games who could be politically advantageous to Colorado in ’76.’” As Hastings more readily admitted in an interview with scholar Laura Olson, the COC members went to Rome to “help Japan’s bid.”

Sapporo, Japan, was one of two top contenders for the 1972 winter Olympics. The other was Banff, Canada. The Coloradans knew that the IOC preferred not to hold the Olympics in the same hemisphere in consecutive Olympiads. Hence Hastings and Magarrell intended to assist Sapporo however they could in order to prevent the games from coming to North America in 1972. With this aim in mind, Hasting obtained a confidential copy of Canada’s bid book and shared it with Japan’s organizing committee, hoping to give Sapporo an advantage. As he told Olson, “I didn’t steal it; I just got it.”

A 1970 account of Hasting and Magarrell’s maneuvers in Rome, published in *Colorado Magazine*, depicted these events in detail, noting that soon after the Sapporo contingent received the Canadian bid book “[s]tories began to appear in the Rome press citing Sapporo’s specific advantages over Banff.” Although Magarrell did not mention Banff’s bid book specifically in his account, he confirmed that he and Hastings met with the Japanese group “to offer assistance to their bid, and to present helpful information.”

The COC attempted to manipulate the IOC selection process to keep Denver in the running for the 1976 winter Olympics and the effort appeared to pay off. The IOC chose

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90 Donald F. Magarrell to Richard Olson, Letter, 2 May 1966, Folder 23, Box 99, WMP DPL.


92 Ibid.

93 “Long Road ’76,” *Colorado Magazine*, November-December 1970, 11-16, 102-107, quotation from 14; the author of this article was explicit about Magarrell and Hastings intention to help Japan and stop Canada (as well Salt Lake City) from winning the 1972 Winter Olympics.

94 Donald F. Magarrell to Richard Olson, Letter, 2 May 1966, Folder 23, Box 99, WMP DPL.
Sapporo with thirty-two out of sixty-one votes on the first ballot – one more than the majority the city needed.95

A few years later, Colorado bidders put “indirect” tactics to use once more. They invited every member of the IOC and their wives to visit Denver during the 1969 World Ice Skating World Championship held at William Thayer Tutt’s Broadmoor Hotel in Colorado Springs. Twenty-six of seventy International Olympic Committee members took them up on the offer, receiving first class airfare and a week’s worth of accommodations at Denver’s Browne Palace Hotel.96 While in Colorado, along with attending the figure skating championship, IOC members toured nearby foothills (including Evergreen) by car and took a “site seeing” trip by air over the Rocky Mountains. The DOC also treated their guests to a concert by the Denver Symphony and a reception at the governor’s mansion, hosted by Governor Love.97 The DOC budgeted $75,000 for the IOC members’ Colorado excursion.98

Hosting the IOC contingent in such a manner was what DOC members described as a “commonly accepted practice,” but one that “has to be done very carefully.”99 They knew not allow themselves to be seen as attempting to induce IOC votes. “This visitation

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95 64th Session of the International Olympic Committee, 24-30 April, Sessions, IOCA; Banff came in a distant second with 16 votes.

96 International Olympic Committee Guests, Box 8 Folder 100, WMP DPL; Thomas G. Curragan and William H. McNichols Jr. to Reginald S. Alexander, Letter, 23 December 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL. Rooms at the Broadmoor were sold out.

97 Schedule of Planned Activities for International Olympic Committee Visit, 25 February – 4 March 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL.

98 Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 17 April 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL.

99 Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 14 November 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL.
will not be a site inspection per se,” Merrill Hastings described in a DOC memorandum, since that “would not be in keeping with Olympic protocol practices. The intent of the visit is simply to acquaint the members of the IOC with Denver.”\(^\text{100}\) In minutes from a December 1968 DOC meeting, the DOC’s legal counsel, Richard Davis, put it more bluntly. DOC members agreed “not to give the impression to the IOC that the DOC is trying to influence the membership.”\(^\text{101}\) The qualifications that the visit was not technically a site inspection (because that would be against the rules) and that the DOC should not appear to be trying to sway IOC voters signaled that this was precisely what the DOC was doing. Indeed, at the very same December 1968 DOC meeting, “the DOC agreed . . . this effort [to host IOC members] is the most significant effort Denver could make” to enhance the city’s Olympic prospects.\(^\text{102}\)

A number of IOC members could not attend the World Ice Skating Championships, but found time to visit Denver at the DOC’s expense on separate occasions. When doing so, the DOC treated them to a schedule similar to that of the IOC members who visited earlier.\(^\text{103}\) For example, though Norwegian Jan Staubo did not make the trip to the figure skating contest, he took the DOC up on a follow-up offer to

\(^{100}\) Merrill G. Hastings, Jr. to All DOC Directors, Memorandum, 26 December 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL.

\(^{101}\) Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 December 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL.

\(^{102}\) Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 December 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL.

visit Colorado in March 1970.\footnote{William McNichols, Jr. to Jan Saubo, Letter, 23 January 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.} Prior to his arrival, the DOC stated more clearly than ever before what they hoped would result from Staubo’s sojourn. “Mr. Staubo is an influential member of the IOC,” the DOC’s meeting minutes proclaimed, “his visit to Denver is viewed as being important to the success of our effort to secure Scandinavian support for Denver.”\footnote{Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 March 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.} The DOC became aware that certain IOC members voted in “blocs” and they viewed Staubo as the key to getting one such alliance on their side.\footnote{For a discussion and verification of various voting blocs see Donald Magarrell to DOC office, Letter, 10 June 1969, Folder 9 Box 100, WMP DPL.}

Indicating further that the DOC knew they were violating IOC rules, Denver’s Olympic bidders tried to conceal that they were the ones behind the IOC visits. They did so by having invitations sent from the mayor’s office. This was done, a DOC staffers explained, to “avoid any charges of commercialism.”\footnote{Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 December 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL.} The mayor’s office additionally disseminated a “confidential” letter directing members of the press that “no mention” of Denver’s Olympic bid should be made to the IOC guests. Mayor Currigan himself confirmed that the DOC drew up this directive as well, which warned that “controversial subjects would be extremely detrimental and possibly deadly to Denver’s bid.” The letter included a section entitled “Basic Ground Rules,” where the DOC directed journalists: “Do not print or broadcast comments by the IOC about Denver’s bid if they should
volunteer comments.**108 Through explicit censorship the DOC sought to hide the real purpose of their hospitality.

IOC President Avery Brundage saw the IOC visits for what they were, though he expressed more concern regarding IOC’s behavior than the DOC’s transgressions. “These invitations involving very considerable expense are most embarrassing,” Brundage wrote to IOC Vice President, Lord Michael Killanin, “[u]nfortunately these are the not the only gifts that have been accepted. Some may have even been solicited.”109 The DOC seems to have been right to think that giving “gifts” to IOC members was common.110 After all, the DOC did not hide their intentions from Brundage. He was invited to travel first class to Denver and stay in the Brown Palace as well.111 Indeed, to protect the IOC’s image, it was Brundage who advised the DOC to instruct the press to avoid discussing Denver’s bid with IOC members.112

As Brundage made note, there was reason to suspect that the DOC not only offered favors, but that they responded to requests. One example involved FIS president and IOC member Marc Holder. Holder’s opinion was important to the DOC. Not only

108 John G. Griffin to William H. McNichols, Letter, 20 February 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL; John G. Griffin to William H. McNichols, Letter, 24 February 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL. Currigan confirmed that the DOC drew up the confidential letter, see William H. Currigan to John G. Griffin, Letter, 21 February 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL.


110 Brundage was dishonest about his lack of policing. While he had been aware about of the DOC’s invitations since February 1969, he told Killanin in September: “Your letter of August 26th was the first I have heard of the supplementary invitations from Denver.”

111 Thomas Currigan to Avery Brundage, 23 December 1968, Folder XII Winter Games-1976-Denver, Colorado Bid, Reel 110, ABC IOCA.

would he cast a vote on who should host the 1976 winter Olympics, but he was the leader of the organization that needed to approve the DOC’s highly questionable Nordic and alpine skiing venues before the rest of the IOC would even consider them. As the DOC noted at a March 1968 meeting, “Mr. Holder can be of significant help to the DOC considering [the] technical problems involved in scheduling both the [a]lpine and Nordic events for the 1976 Olympics.”¹¹³

At first glance, it appears to be a mystery as to how expert FIS inspectors ever approved Evergreen and Mount Sniktua as Olympic sites. The FIS sanctioned the two locations largely with flying colors. At the end of October 1968, twenty FIS inspectors led by Marc Holder visited the Denver area. They examined Evergreen on the Monday, October 28, and flew to the top of Mount Sniktua and walked down one of its proposed alpine courses the following Tuesday. There was little snow little at either location. Weather during the Sniktua observation reportedly reached sixty-two degrees Fahrenheit.¹¹⁴ Based on pictures of the inspection published in the Denver Post, the views FIS members witnessed on the mountain were relatively barren.¹¹⁵ Likewise, pictures from Evergreen’s local paper, the Canyon Courier, showed the FIS members observing a snow-less Evergreen golf course.¹¹⁶ Yet, the FIS members responded to both

¹¹³ Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Minutes, 1 March 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL.


¹¹⁶ “Olympic Committee looks over site,” Canyon Courier, 31 October 1968, clipping, Folder 6 Box 6, MAPC JCA.
sites with enthusiasm. As Marc Holder told the *Denver Post*, “[y]ou have absolutely perfect courses everywhere”\(^\text{117}\)

These inspectors were specialists in examining Nordic and alpine terrain. Given the limitations of the Nordic and alpine sites they observed in Colorado, the mere fact of the FIS’s approval raises suspicious. However, there are additional makers pointing toward foul-play. As letters from FIS members confirm, though it was not required of them, the DOC paid for the inspector’s travel expenses.\(^\text{118}\) Furthermore, as FIS inspector Bjorn Kjellstrom added in a note to DOC President Donald McMahon: “Your committee certainly succeed very well to combine a serious ‘first inspection’ of possible Olympic sites with the most pleasant social arrangements and very interesting and enjoyable sights seeing.” The DOC treated the FIS purveyors to more than just technical observations. Curiously, in his letter to McMahon and another to Richard Torissi, Kjellstrom consistently puts the word “inspection” in quotation marks. Perhaps he implied the terms it held an ulterior meaning.\(^\text{119}\)

Although there is no hard evidence that Kjellstrom received kickbacks, the previous points supplement a stronger case against the FIS’s most important member. On later dates, Marc Holder would go out of his way to assist the DOC. At the 1969 FIS Meeting in Barcelona, where FIS inspectors gave approval for the Denver sites, Holder

\(^{117}\) Holder quoted in Meyers, “Proposed Olympics Please FIS Inspecting Unit,” p. 87.

\(^{118}\) Bjorn Kjellstrom to Richard Torissi, Letter, 8 November 1968, Box 100 Folder 4, WMP DPL; Graham S. Anderson to Merrill G. Hastings, Jr., Letter, 1 November 1968, Box 100 Folder 4, WMP DPL; Al Merrill to Richard Torissi, Letter, 5 November 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL.

\(^{119}\) Bjorn Kjellstrom to Donald McMahon, Letter, 12 November 1968, Box 100 Folder 4, WMP DPL. As Kjellstrom told it, each of the event locations he witnessed Denver “could be development into an excellent site,” see Ski Industry Advisor to Ski Writers, Letter, Subject: Press Conference for F.I.S. Officials, 13 November 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL.
helped Governor Love get into the FIS’s Executive Council meeting. This was a favor he did not provide representatives from other Olympic bid cities attending the FIS gathering. In fact, Holder requested Love’s attendance be kept “confidential.”

Additionally, when James Cotter traveled to the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland, to submit the DOC’s official application to host the Olympics, Holder was in attendance. As Cotter recounted, when IOC member Raymond Gafner asked “several questions about Denver’s climate” Holder “promptly volunteered to answer,” indicating that Holder was either confident in the veracity of Denver’s proposal or willingly perpetuated the DOC’s deceit. Holder was a man of his word. After he left Denver in 1968, he had indeed promised Richard M. Torrisi that the FIS “shall do whatever possible to help your case.”

On top of this, when reporting on the happenings of 1969 IOC meeting in Warsaw, Poland, Donald Magarrell directly referenced what appear to be an inducement for the FIS President. In recounting a breakfast meeting with Holder, Magarrell noted to his fellow DOC members: “We still have some commitment to Marc Holder to give a summer golf visitation to [the] USA. This was promised by Hastings during [the] FIS visit [of October 1968] to Denver.” As Magarrell added, “I promised Holder we could contact him (Holder) regarding what can be arranged. This may present some difficulties but [I] will seek assistance and suggestions.” The mention of possible “difficulties”

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120 George F. Robinson, Report from Barcelona – FIS Conference, 18-25 May 1969, Folder 9 Box 100, WMP DPL.

121 James B. Cotter to William H. McNichols, Jr., DOC Executive Board, Normand C. Brown, and William Kostka Jr., Letter Re: Official Denver Application Presentation, Lausanne, Switzerland, 7 January 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.

122 Marc Holder to Richard M. Torrisi, Letter, 6 November 1968, Box 66195, JLF CSAR.
seemed to signify the challenge of keeping such a “promise” from public view. The DOC’s record of deception and, in particular, Hasting’s willingness to subvert IOC rules, provides additional evidence to buttress the claim that the “commitment” to provide Holder “a summer golf visitation” was a bribe.\footnote{Donald Magarrell to DOC office, Letter, 10 June 1969, Folder 9 Box 100, WMP DPL; Excluded from the passage quoted above is also a reference to an additional aspect of Holder’s promised golf trip. After crediting Hasting for making the initial arrangement, Maggarell added, “Marc has chosen the boy: Toni Horning, who is 13 years old and already a good golfer.” It is unclear what exactly to make of this odd addendum, other than that when Holder and Hasting made their deal, Holder had requested unnamed boy be allowed to travel with him. Additionally, Cotter later reported, using his own curious quotation marks that Holder “does expect to be able to come to Denver in March to ‘look things over again.’” Perhaps the quotation marks indicated an ulterior meaning, such as Holder’s promised golf outing, see James B. Cotter to William H. McNichols, Jr., DOC Executive Board, Normand C. Brown, and William Kostka Jr., Letter Re: Official Denver Application Presentation, Lausanne, Switzerland, 7 January 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.}

The DOC did everything and anything that they believed would help improve their chances to attain the right to host Olympics. In the two years leading up to the IOC selection meeting, DOC members traveled throughout the globe, soliciting IOC votes in Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Austria, France, Italy, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Germany, Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Columbia, Venezuela, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, and as DOC meeting minutes vaguely described, “Africa.”\footnote{Robert S. McCollum went to Korea and Japan, see William H. McNichols to William J. Porter, 9 September 1969, Folder 9 Box 110, WMP DPL. After a 1969 National Olympic Committees (NOC) meeting in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, DOC representatives traveled to Luxembourg, Austria, France, Italy, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, and Germany, see Richard M. Davis, DOC Meeting Minutes, 13 November 1969, Folder 9 Box 100, WMP DPL. Donald Maggarell and Robert Pringle visited Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Chile (every “South American” country with an IOC member), see Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 February 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL; Donald Maggarell to William H. McNichols Jr., Letter, 25 January 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DOC. Clifford Buck and Thomas Currigan went to “Africa,” see Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 11 December 1969, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL. Richard Olson traveled to Australia, New Zealand, and the “Far East,” see Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 15 January 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.} Months before the May 1970 IOC selection, the DOC sent representatives to hand deliver their bid books to IOC members.
Books that were not hand delivered were sent through the U.S. state department and delivered by a “diplomatic pouch.”\textsuperscript{125} DOC truly embraced an all-out “mass selling approach,” one which often included underhanded maneuvers.

\textbf{The DOC in Amsterdam}

From May 7 to 16 of 1970, the IOC met in Amsterdam, Netherlands. On the IOC agenda was the selection of the site for the 1976 Winter Olympics. Including Governor Love, DOC members, and many of their spouses, twenty-five Coloradans attended the gathering.\textsuperscript{126} Most of them flew across the Atlantic together on a plane donated by King Resources, a Denver-based oil and gas distributor. According to the DOC’s “Final Report,” the DOC spent had $750,000 up to that point to convince the IOC that the 1976 winter Olympics should be Colorado’s.\textsuperscript{127}

DOC member and Denver marketing guru William Kostka and his company, Kostka Associates, designed the DOC’s bid books, oversaw the production of a complementary film, designed a promotional display, and wrote the script for the DOC’s oral presentation to the International Olympic Committee.\textsuperscript{128} Former Denver mayor

\begin{footnotes}
\item[125] Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 15 January 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.
\item[126] “Denver Delegation,” booklet, 69 Session International Olympic Committee Amsterdam, May 1970, Box 1 Folder 7, DOC DPL 262.
\item[127] Denver Olympic Organizing Committee, Final Report, 29 December 1972, Box 1 Folder 3, DOOC SHHL.
\end{footnotes}
Thomas Currigan described the bid books to *Rocky Mountain News* editor Jack Foster as “the finest pieces of publicity material ever assembled and printed on Denver and our surrounding area.” Much of that “publicity material” was inaccurate. Along with their misleading bid books, the DOC’s fourteen-minute film showed slalom and down-hill skiing taking place at Vail, followed by descriptions of Loveland Basin and Mount Sniktua, with the airbrushed photograph of Sniktua included. When the Nordic events and the “Evergreen area” had their turn, Kostka pictured an unidentifiable location, carpeted with snow and surrounded by jagged mountains. It was not Evergreen’s golf course. Kostka also represented ski-jumping, bobsledding and lugeing with clips from previous winter Olympics. He ordered the footage from Grenoble in order to complete his visual showcase.

Just as audacious, Kostka’s “display” weighed 4000 pounds and measured fourteen by twenty-six feet. It included photos of various Olympic events and areas of Denver, maps of the proposed sites, a continuous slide show, a model of the city and surrounding areas, and a model speed-skating oval built by the Ahrendt Corporation.

The oral presentation, meanwhile, included familiar promises. Donald McMahon recently stepped down as the DOC president to take a job in New York City, leaving new

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129 William H. McNichols to Jack Foster, Letter, 3 April 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.

130 Unimark & Summit Productions, *The Denver Olympic Story*, AV Box 21, DCC DPL. The Denver Public Library has digitized and post the film on Denver Public Library Western History / Genealogy youtube channel. See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRybd-l2too> Aspects of the film that deserve more attention include depiction of pioneer, cowboy, and Native American mythology.

131 William Kostka, Jr. to DOC Board of Directors, Letter Re: Marketing Activities, 15 January 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.

132 Denver Olympic Organizing Committee, Final Report, DOOC SHHL.
DOC president Robert Pringle to make the presentation. Pringle told the IOC “80% of the cost has been met by existing facilities” and therefore the games would cost the DOC only $14 million. Pringle even add a new wrinkle, asserting that “[e]xperts have advised that we could stage the Olympic Games in 12 to 18 months if need be.” With 1976 still six years away, the bluff was a reliable one.

By a vote of thirty-nine to thirty on the IOC’s third ballot, the IOC selected Denver over Sion, Switzerland. It must have been gratifying for the DOC. When William Kostka passed away in 2015, he was remembered by the Denver Post as a “Denver PR legend.” He spun controversial topics such an underground nuclear bomb detonation in Rio Blanco County, the creation of the Auraria Metro City College that displaced over 200 households, and Denver’s Skyline Urban Renewal Project that required dismantling historic structures, among other politically-charged issues. Still, according to his family and friends, “Kostka’s proudest moment . . . was being part of the Denver team that won the bid for the 1976 Winter Olympics.” The Colorado bidders, building on Kostka’s marketing expertise, confidently sold the most powerful international sports organization in the world a Rolls-Royce with nothing under the hood. As a result, they had, for the time being, brought the greatest winter sports event in the

133 Donald McMahon to William McNichols, Letter, 1 August 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL.

134 Denver Committee of Candidature, Amsterdam, Netherlands, Script, Presented on 10 May 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.


world to Colorado. They would obviously have to make some technical changes but, they assumed, Colorado’s image would nevertheless soon reap momentous public relations rewards.

As Denver’s former mayor, Tom Currigan, claimed, the DOC had been “interested in just seventy-three people in the whole world” – the seventy-three members of the IOC. In comparison, Denver’s band of Olympic hopefuls paid minimal attention to citizens living in Colorado or Denver. The IOC “could vote,” Currigan explained, “Denverites couldn’t.” Overlooking Coloradans was, in the eye of the DOC, not a risky thing to do. They believed Colorado’s citizens would surely consent to becoming Olympic hosts. Colorado’s powerbrokers spent hundreds of thousands of dollars, traveled the world, and exploited guileful and dishonest strategies to surmount any obstacle that stood in their way. What the DOC did not foresee and continually failed to realize was that during the seven years that they bid for the Olympics, many Coloradans changed their perspectives regarding the growth and development that the Olympics were meant to foster. The DOC sold Denver to the IOC in a remarkable fashion, but they had yet to sell the Olympics to Colorado. Compared to seducing the IOC, that tasked proved much more difficult.

137 Thomas Currigan quoted in Denver Olympic Organizing Committee, Final Report, DOOC SHHL.
Chapter 4

The Beginning of Jefferson County’s Environmentalist Revolt

In December 1971, in an article entitled “Their New Alps: The Coming Despoliation of Colorado,” Ski Magazine essayist Morten Lund expressed a point of view that the DOC had not anticipated. “Colorado, psychologically, is somewhere back in the 1920s,” Lund declared; “[i]t believes that the frontier is out there somewhere, still open; it doesn’t know . . . that its back is against the wall.” In truth, Lund explained, the Centennial State “is undergoing traumatic exploitation . . . Colorado’s mountains have been penetrated, riddled, [and] dug out mercilessly—[with] no thought for anything but a fast buck.” Lund believed Colorado had become overdeveloped and the destruction of the state’s natural beauty and resources was the result. As an exemplar of Colorado’s greed, naivety, and malaise, Lund pointed to an impeding event he claimed epitomized these unwelcome trends – the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games.1

The first concerted effort to disrupt the plans of Denver’s Olympic organizers echoed Lund’s contention. Beginning in the late 1960s, even before Denver captured the 1976 winter games, Colorado residents living in the foothills of Jefferson County, just west of Denver, began to express fears that the Olympics would spur excessive development and exploitation, bringing an influx of new residents, tourists, and commercialization that would do irreparable environmental damage to the region. The DOC and its supporters wanted to use the Olympics to “Sell Colorado.” Yet, as one

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Olympic opponent from Jefferson County described to the DOC in June of 1972:
“Colorado has been oversold.”2

The Jefferson County coalition that challenged the DOC’s agenda did so through a particular brand of environmental advocacy connected to notions of aesthetic value and individual rights. For Colorado’s budding foothill environmentalists, these concerns proved to be largely restricted to their immediate surroundings within Jefferson County. To prevent the development of sport facilities and halt a pending intrusion of people, protesters were willing to compromise with Olympic organizers. Their goal was not to prevent the Olympics from coming to Colorado altogether. It was primarily to protect the aesthetic experiences that the areas directly near their homes provided.

Dissent in Indian Hills

Anti-Olympic environmental activism in Jefferson County, Colorado, first emerged in the town of Indian Hills. According to one account, local residents learned through a 1967 article published in the Skier’s Gazette that the DOC intended to hold cross country skiing, the biathlon, and ski jumping events in and around their community.3 In another telling, residents discovered the DOC’s plans after witnessing strangers, who turned out to be DOC surveyors, studying their properties.4 By the end 1967, in addition to the Nordic contests, the inhabitants of Indian Hills found out that the

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2 Stoepplewreth quoted in Douglas Bradley, “Olympic Foes Voice Concerns,” 29 June 1972, clipping, Folder 4 Box 6, MAPC JCA.

3 Cheryl Hayes, Dear Earth (Denver Colorado), April 1971, 1 No. 1: 7-11.

4 Katz Olson, Power, Public Policy and the Environment, 106.
Olympic planners hoped to build bobsled and luge courses within minutes of their residencies as well.\(^5\)

The area around Indian Hills changed significantly in the years following World War II. Located in at the foothills of Colorado’s Front Range, the town stands at the easternmost section of the Rocky Mountains. The mountains stretch north to south, just west of metropolitan Denver. In 1970, Indian Hills was about a twenty-five-mile drive from the city. Although close to Denver, the town itself remained relatively undeveloped. Still, between 1950 and 1970, Colorado’s population grew from 1.3 million to 2.2 million residents. As the population of Denver rose, more affluent inhabitants started to move beyond the city’s borders.\(^6\) Thus, Colorado historian Carl Abbott observes, “Denver increasingly became an island of old people, poor people, and minority groups surrounded by a suburban sea of middle-class white families.”\(^7\) While Denver’s population increased by 100,000 between 1950 and 1970, the population of the city’s surrounding environs surged by 560,000. Indeed, from 1950 to 1965, Jefferson County’s population increased from 55,686 to 127,520 occupants. It had become the fastest-growing county in the fifth fastest growing-state in the entire nation.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) According to the DOC bid book meant to sway the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), Indian Hills was an ideal setting for Olympic events, see chapter 3.


\(^8\) This data comes from Denver SMSA, “Populations by County, Denver SMSA 1900 to 2000,” cited in Maynard B. Barrows and Gairald H. Garrett, “Mountain Area Planning Council: Report of Land Use and Zoning,” 13 March 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC JCA.
While many in Colorado historically recognized this type of growth as a sign of progress, by the late 1960s many Jefferson County residents began to argue for institutional controls to limit land use and suburban sprawl. In the case of the Denver Olympics, the efforts of one Jefferson County inhabitant stood out. In early 1968, at sixty-four years-old, Vance Dittman was a year from retiring as a law professor at the University of Denver. He had lived the past twenty years of his life with his wife Catherine in Indian Hills on fifty acres of property.\(^9\) When Vance and three fellow University of Denver professors, all living in Indian Hills, heard of the DOC’s plans, they galvanized a group of twenty-seven townspeople who together voiced their objection to the winter games being held in their town.\(^10\)

In February 1968, Vance Dittman met with the chairman of the DOC’s Nordic Events Subcommittee, Gerald Groswold. Groswold described Dittman as a “concerned, perhaps irate, landowner” with questions that “were perfectly logical.”\(^11\) Dittman was confident in his cause, which from the beginning centered on preventing changes that would undermined the aesthetic experience of his home. Around six weeks after the 1968 Grenoble Winter Olympics concluded, Dittman sent a note to Grenoble’s mayor, asking for pictures so that he could assess the extent of the damage done to the French Alps. “There is what I believe to be,” Dittman wrote to the Frenchmen, “a well-grounded fear that the unnecessary [Olympic] construction work will destroy a great deal of natural

\(^9\) Vance R. Dittman, Statement Made At Meeting of MAPC and DOC, 11 June 1970, Box 5 Folder 50, POME SHHL.

\(^10\) The Denver professors were law instructors Vance R. Dittman and Alan Merson, business management scholar George Varadam, and philosophy professor Francis Brush, see note cards in Folder 64 Box 6 SHHL POME.

\(^11\) Gerald Groswold to George Robinson, Letter, 14 February 1968, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL.
beauty in the area.” The first question Dittman sought to answer was how much aesthetic destruction the Olympics entailed.

The disapproval voiced by Dittman and others remained centered on a desire to protect areas immediately adjacent to their residences from construction and the rabble of tourist and recreationalists. For example, the DOC had initially planned a jumping complex in the vicinity of Independence Mountain, within an area called Pence Park, which bordered Dittman’s property. Upon learning of this proposal Dittman and others wrote to the DOC, ardently pointing out that “[w]inter facilities now provided by Denver at Pence Park has shown that people park [their cars] on the highway, in spite of signs forbidding this . . . and on the side roads which residents of the area must use.” Hence, Dittman and his neighbors claimed, the “inconvenience to private home owners by the winter-long use of [new Olympic] facilities will also be great . . . [and] there can be no doubt that those who wish to use them will have slight regard for the rights of those of us who live here.” On top of this, the Indian Hills contingent added, “[s]anitary facilities, warming houses, restaurants or lunch bars, and perhaps more undesirable businesses would be essential to the operation of a ski jump. We now have nothing of the sort in our community and their presence would markedly change the whole environment of our residential area, which,” Dittman and his cohort exclaimed, “residents wish to keep residential.”

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12 Vance R. Dittman to Office of the Mayor (Grenoble France), Letter, 25 March 1968, Folder Unmarked Box 6, SHHL POME.

13 Vance R. Dittman, George Vardaman, Emil G. Gadeken, and Lyman C. Sourwin to Richard Torrisi, Letter, 8 August 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL.
In 1968, it would probably be incorrect to categorize the arguments presented by
Dittman and his neighbors as solely or even primarily “environmentalist.” That spring,
Dittman and twenty-six Indian Hills’ cosigners sent a missive to Colorado governor John
A. Love, Denver mayor Thomas G. Curriigan, and five other Denver Olympics officials.
They identified themselves foremost “as property owners [who] cannot give approval to .
. . encroachment of our land . . . [and] invasion of our privacy.” Such “an invasion,” the
residents contended, “will necessarily destroy the natural beauty of the area . . . [and]
invite the presence of large crowds of people in a quiet residential” neighborhood.
However, the Indian Hills protesters deemed “the attendant noise and litter” unacceptable
mainly because as homeowners they “made substantial and expensive improvements in
the form of year round dwellings.”

As Dittman reiterated in a separate letter to Colorado Olympic Commission leader Richard Olson, “the development here . . .
includes first class all season residences of substantial value. . . I am sure that none of you
wish to change the nature of an established environment or to be a means of decreasing
property values of those of us who have substantial investments here.”

Holding the Olympics in Indian Hills was inappropriate, the residents claimed, because of the
negative effect the games would have on the value of their considerable personal
property.

From the start, Dittman and his neighbors defended a well-off, well-designed, and
well-maintained community – an “established environment” as they put it. They hoped
to halt the increasing possibility of economic devaluation through transformational

14 Vance R. Dittman to John A. Love, Thomas G. Curriigan, Richard Torrisi, George Robinson, Don
McMahon, Merrill G. Hasting, Jr., Gerald Groswold, Letter, 1 June 1968, Box 2 Folder 23, POME SHHL.
15 Vance R. Dittman to Richard Olson, Letter, 15 August 1968, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL.
growth. At the same time, the initial Indian Hills campaign to block Olympic
development occurred two years prior to the emergence of a national environmental
movement, a development sparked by the first “Earth Day,” held in April of 1970. As
historian Adam Rome notes, though select groups already turned their attentions to
environmental issues before the nationwide event, the phase “environmental movement”
did not exist.\textsuperscript{16} In the late 1960s, though “natural beauty” concerned Dittman and his
fellow Indians Hills townspeople, the legal and social construction of property rights and
references to monetary worth were the most obvious rhetorical resources available in the
fight to protect their town from Olympic encroachment.

In the eyes of the DOC, new sport facilities that would decrease property values
represented a legitimate grievance. Less than a month after the Indian Hills residents
registered their first objections, Groswold notified Dittman that the DOC had begun to
assess alternative event locations. As Groswold told Dittman, the DOC identified two
new possible scenarios for the Nordic events. In one scenario, cross-country skiing
would still be held in Indian Hills but with modifications to avoid impacting private
property. In the second option, the long distance skiing contests would be placed near a
golf course in the town of Evergreen, a few miles northwest.\textsuperscript{17}

Dittman replied to Groswold’s first suggestion critically, explaining that the
“possibility of relocating the [cross-country] trails [within Indian Hills] to get them off
private property seems remote.” Dittman, however, expressed enthusiasm about the

\textsuperscript{16} Adam Rome, \textit{The Genius of Earth Day: How a 1970 Teach-in Unexpectedly Made the First Green

\textsuperscript{17} Gerald F. Groswold to Mr. and Mrs. Vance R. Dittman, Letter 5 July 1968, Box 6 Folder 60, SHHL
POME.
prospect of moving the events to Evergreen. He even made sure that Groswold was aware that “considerable interest is being shown in constructing a new [highway] route . . . which will pass very close to the [Evergreen Golf Course] Club House.” According to Dittman, this “would solve the very real and troublesome problem [present in Indian Hills] of providing adequate access.” Dittman and Groswold apparently discussed a third option for cross-country skiing as well – an area “near the Hiwan Country Club and Evergreen Junior High School.” Dittman also found this location to be acceptable. “I would urge that this site be incorporated into your planning,” Dittman counseled.  

Dittman’s stance on Olympic events near Evergreen would eventually change. But before considering how and why this happened, Dittman’s correspondence with DOC officials deserves greater attention. Dittman and most Indian Hills inhabitants were not against the Olympics being held in Colorado or in Denver. As the original letter sent from Indian Hills residents to the Colorado’s political leaders and DOC officials proclaimed in its opening paragraph: “We share the wishes and hopes of the DOC that the 1976 Olympics will come to the Denver area. We realize the economic and other benefits to the state and to the city which will result from the presence of these events here, and we, as citizens of Colorado, have a stake in this too.”  

In the spring of 1968, when the Indian Hills townsfolk sent this message, they did not oppose economic expansion achieved through hosting the winter games. The Indian Hills’ protesters just

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18 Vance R. Dittman to Gerald F. Groswold, Letter, 11 July 1968, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL. The county club and high school were between three to five miles northwest of downtown Evergreen.

19 Vance R. Dittman to John A. Love, Thomas G. Currrigan, Richard Torrisi, George Robinson, Don McMahon, Merrill G. Hasting, Jr., Gerald Groswold, Letter, 1 June 1968, Box 2 Folder 23, POME SHHL.
did not want to see that expansion spread toward the confines of their “established” abode.

This stance became especially evident toward the end of the summer of 1968, when the assistant to the DOC president, Richard M. Torrisi, wrote to Dittman to update him on DOC decision making. Torrisi promised Dittman that “many men are working at some considerable and unavoidable expense to find a better solution to the location of the Nordic events.” Yet, Torrisi added, until a change is made “it is necessary for reasons, which I am sure you can appreciate, for us to continue to list the Indian Hills area for those events.” The “reasons” or reason that Torrisi referred to was that Indian Hills remained a key part of the proposal that the DOC counted on to win the right to host Olympics. Jefferson County’s proximity to Denver appealed greatly to IOC voters. Moreover, for Denver to obtain the event, the plan that the DOC presented to IOC members had to remain consistent with what was reported in public. Since Torrisi knew that Dittman wanted the Olympic bid to be successful, he felt no inhibitions about making sure the Indian Hills advocate was aware of the DOC’s predicament. “I am sure,” Torrisi remarked in his letter to Dittman, “that you, as a citizen of Colorado . . . share with us [the DOC] the desire to bring the XIIth Winter Olympic Games here.”

Dittman understood and respected the DOC’s position. As he clarified in his reply to Torrisi, “I can assure you that none of us [in Indian Hills] are in any way opposed to the Olympics or to Denver’s getting them.” Rather, Dittman continued, “it is their whereabouts that concern us.” Dittman and his neighbors thus agreed to quiet

20 Richard M. Torrisi to Vance R. Dittman, Letter, 21 August 1968, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL.

21 Vance R. Dittman to Richard M. Torrisi, Letter, 24 August 1968, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL. In this letter, Dittman again suggests that the DOC look into Bergan Park, which is a six-mile drive north of
their contestation, even though their town was still listed on paper as an Olympic venue. They assumed the events would eventually be moved. Dittman and others would repeated many times that they only opposed the games being held in a certain places, not to the Olympics in Colorado generally.

Dittman’s willingness to work with the DOC and his endorsement of Olympic events in Evergreen reveals the extent to which he and his neighbors actually objected to the DOC’s plans. By August 1968, as Denver Olympic organizers acknowledged, “[d]ue to the negative reaction from some residents” in Indian Hills the DOC planners proceeded to investigate new event locations in the Evergreen area. Dittman did not appear to have any problem with this solution. Dittman, moreover, had the confidence of the people of Indian Hills. The first Indian Hills meeting about the Olympics took place at the Dittman household and Vance Dittman worked as the front-man for the group from then on. The DOC also presumed Dittman’s authority. When the Olympic organizers wrote to all of the original twenty-seven Indian Hills objectors, notifying them of their newly devised plans for the Nordic, bobsled, and luge events, they assured their readers that they had met face-to-face with Vance Dittman and that he supported to the new proposal.

Evergreen, right near Genesee Mountain, a location to which POME would later object. It was also about a twelve-mile drive to Indian Hills.

22 Richard Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 8 August 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL.

23 When the Evergreen based Mountain Area Planning Council (MAPC) began to take interest in the Olympics issue, they even turn to Dittman to work of their behalf, appointing him the “chairman” of the “Olympic situation,” see Pat. M. O’Hara (President of MAPC) to Vance R. Dittman, Letter, 14 October 1968, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL.

24 Richard M, Torrisi to Vance Dittman, Letter, 27 September 1968, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL.
In the same letter, written in September of 1968, the DOC explained their plan. They would leave the bobsled run on Independence Mountain, about five miles from Indian Hills, but promised the event would remain on public land. The luge would be moved to O’Fallon Park, essentially next door to Independence. Meanwhile, cross country skiing, the biathlon, and ski-jumping would be transferred away from Indian Hills to an unspecified location. According to the DOC, they went “over this plan in some detail with Mr. Dittman” and he “seemed to be in complete agreement.” Given Dittman’s previous communications, as well as the DOC’s reference that they discussed their new plans with him in detail, it seems reasonable to think that Dittman knew or should have deduced that Evergreen was the revised location for the Nordic events.25

The major objection of Dittman and his fellow Indian Hills occupants was to the presence of congestion on the streets where they drove each day and to the over-commercialization of the neighborhood in which they lived. They believed that the DOC had “no more right to commit a nuisance” of this kind than any other of the town’s inhabitants, because doing so threatened the quiet and rural cultural setting where they chose to make their homes.26 In the fall of 1968, however, Dittman and his neighbors did not view Olympic events held in the nearby town of Evergreen as constituting a similar

25 Richard M, Torrisi to Vance Dittman, Letter, 27 September 1968, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL. In this letter Torrisi notes the areas the DOC studied, including: “the Stapleton Drive area, a site above Bergan Park, the entire areas of Swede Gulch, Berrian Mountain, and a site located above the club house at the Evergreen gold course.” When it came to the cross country, biathlon, and jumping events, however, the Torrisi simple explained they would be moved to “another area.” In fact, according to DOC meeting minutes, even before the September 1968 letter was sent, the DOC had decided to move “Nordic and jumping events to the Evergreen area because of the problems in Indian Hills,” see Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 September 1968, Folder 4 Box 100, WMP DPL.

26 Vance R. Dittman, George Vardaman, Emil G. Gadeken, and Lyman C. Sourwin to Richard Torrisi, Letter, 8 August 1968, Folder 3 Box 100, WMP DPL.
violation. In that case, Dittman’s “rights” to the aesthetic aspects of his secluded “residential” milieu would not be, he believed, equivalently disrupted.

**Evergreen and the Mountain Area Planning Council: Rights and Tactics**

When the DOC shifted the location of the Nordic events, Evergreen townspeople expressed many of the same objections as Indian Hills residents. In 1967, in response to rapid growth in the area, Evergreen inhabitants created an organization called the Mountain Area Planning Council (MAPC) “to serve as a coordinating structure for organizations and individuals in promoting the orderly planning and development” of the Jefferson County foothills. At its outset, the MAPC’s primary activities included slowing down highway construction and subdivision development. The MAPC, for example, did not want the highway that Dittman referred in his letter to Groswold to come too close to Evergreen’s downtown area. As one MAPC member, Harry Fontius III, put it, if constructed too close to Evergreen’s business district, the highway would cause “needless destruction of mountain beauty.”

Even before the DOC relocated the Olympic sites, Evergreen residents were, like those in Indian Hills, worried about preserving the aesthetic values of their town. Some even placed such concerns ahead of attracting customers to their town’s economic center.

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27 Mountain Area Planning Council, By-Laws, 14 March 1968, Folder 4 Box 1, MAPC JCA.

28 Fontius quoted in “Evergreen Protests Plan to Build Bypass Highway,” *Rocky Mountain News*, 20 June 1968, p. 61; also see Ibid; Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 23 September 1968, Folder 22 Box 1, MAPC JCA; “Evergreen Road Issue Heats Up,” *Denver Post*, circa 1968, clipping, Folder 6 Box 6, MAPC JCA.
During the summer of 1968, MAPC members followed closely “what the Indian Hills group was trying to do” with regard to the Olympic games.\textsuperscript{29} Then, in the beginning of 1969, the MAPC learned of the DOC’s revised proposal for the Nordic events. At first, the MAPC reacted with caution, choosing “to make an effort to determine whether or not cultivating the Olympics in the area is desirable.”\textsuperscript{30} To the Planning Council, the consequences of hosting the Olympic events seemed uncertain and so their stance toward the games remained initially undecided. In February of 1969, the organization began to draw up a list of questions for the DOC, concerning how many people, cars, and parking lots would be involved. They also wondered about changes in roads, sanitation facilities, and the viability of requisite waters sources.\textsuperscript{31} Finally, in March of 1969, the MAPC invited DOC representatives to an “open forum” where they and other townspeople planned to pose their queries. By this time, the DOC recognized that the MAPC replaced Indian Hills residents as the group “who now seems to be most concerned with our plans.” Nonetheless, the Olympic organizers did not feel compelled to respond to the MAPC.\textsuperscript{32} No one from the DOC attended the group’s open forum.

For the DOC, that decision turned out to be a mistake. The March 1969 gathering represents the first time that outright dissent to the Olympics appeared in MAPC’s meeting minutes. As the group’s secretary, Dale Patterson, announced: “Because the

\textsuperscript{29} Mountain Area Protection Council Meeting Minutes, 21 May 1967, Folder 21 Box 1, MAPC JCA.

\textsuperscript{30} Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 13 January 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC JCA.

\textsuperscript{31} Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 17 February 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC JCA.

\textsuperscript{32} Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 20 March 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL.
holding of the Olympics promises to be detrimental to the land and the people of the Mountain Area, and because the planners of the events have not consulted the local people of the Mountain Area, and because the Olympic Committee had not seen fit to provide satisfactory answers to thoughtful questions, I move that the MAPC go on record as being opposed to the holding of any Olympic events in the area embraced by the Council." 33

While damage to the landscape of Jefferson County was an important issue, it appears that just as decisive for Patterson was that Denver’s Olympic organizers simply ignored the legitimacy of local people’s points of view. An initial vote following Patterson’s denunciation showed fifty out of fifty-two MAPC members agreed it was time to go on record as opposed the 1976 winter Olympics taking place in the confines of Evergreen and surrounding communities. The Jefferson County assemblage remained committed to democracy and due process. Thus, though anti-Olympic sentiments were clearly mounting, they ultimately decided that before taking a formal stance, they should have answers to their questions, as well as account for the opinions of their larger community. At the March meeting, the MAPC took no official stance. 34

At the same March 1969 open forum, however, anxious for more information and left to talk amongst themselves, attendees drew up a more extensive list of questions to submit to absent DOC members. 35 The updated questionnaire further implicated a kinship with Indian Hills. Those in attendance at the MAPC meeting worried foremost

33 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 13 March 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC JCA.

34 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 8 April 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC.

35 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 13 March 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC.
about an invasion of particular people. “Hippies have taken over Aspen and Taos, and have already discovered Evergreen. With Olympic notoriety, what is to prevent Evergreen from becoming a hippie capital and a mountain slum area?” the MAPC asked the DOC. The MAPC’s leadership justified their blunt questioning by explaining that if the Olympics are situated in Evergreen, “[i]nstead of the thousands of people we now have, we will have tens of thousands – on a permanent basis.” Just as Dittman wished to keep his residential area residential, the MAPC predicted that the “Olympics will drastically and permanently alter the total community environment” of Evergreen. The middle- to upper-class residents of the MAPC did not want to find themselves living in a congested haven for that attracted urban tourists and countercultural travelers.

In May 1969, the MAPC finally met with and submitted their questions to DOC members. In doing so, they also developed some more sophisticated environmentalist perspective. Indian Hills opponents spoke of the removal of trees and the loss of “natural beauty.” MAPC similarly asked the DOC to justify the removal of specific objects such as mountain gulches intended to make room for highways and parking lots. Yet, the Planning Council also then went further, calling attention to unanticipated ecological consequences. For example, noting the pending influx of people, they asked how the DOC planned to ensure clean water and sewage maintenance, noting that Olympic crowds would strain their town’s sanitation system. Tons of people would have

36 Mountain Area Planning Council, Introduction to the May 8, 1969 Questions to DOC, Folder 23 Box 1, MAPC JCA; Mountain Area Protection Council, Summary of Questions, 8 May 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC JCA.

37 Mountain Area Protection Council, Summary of Questions, 8 May 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC.

38 “Civic Leaders Briefed on ’76 Olympics,” Canyon Courier, 8 May 1969, clipping, Folder 6 Box 6, MAPC JCA.
to go to the bathroom. “What,” the MAPC asked the DOC, “do you plan to do with all this massive fecal matter.”

Most notably, however, these questions had to be answered, the MAPC explained, because “Evergreen residents were not consulted” regarding Olympic event locations in the first place. “Before committing the Evergreen area to the Olympics, did you call an open, public meeting of Evergreen people? If not, why not?” the MAPC badgered DOC officials. As Dale Patterson had indicated, Planning Council members felt the procedures of representative democracy, so important to them, had been squelched. In this light, the MAPC baited the Olympic planners, inquiring: “Since the total environment and total community will be affected, and since Evergreen residents were not consulted in any open decision making, and since residents may still feel convinced that the Olympics here means permanent devastation . . . do you agree that we have a right to oppose the Olympics being held in our area?” Do we have, the MAPC basically asked, a democratic right to decide if we want to host the winter games in the vicinity of our homes? Through this inquiry, the MAPC exposed what would become a central tenet to Colorado’s growing anti-Olympic environmental movement. The group viewed aesthetic “devastation” generated against their will, within the general environs of their properties, as a subversion of their rights as citizens.

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39 Mountain Area Protection Council, Summary of Questions, 8 May 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC JCA.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., other question that MAPC asked concerned water sources, transportation, parking lots, and other facilities for spectators, the dimensions and after-use potential of new sport facilities, as well as whether the DOC gave Evergreen’s snowfall figures to the IOC.
In taking such a stance, Jefferson County’s residents became a part of a larger “rights revolution” that spread across the United States in the 1960s. Local people fighting for black civil rights in the South had inspired women’s rights, gay rights, Chicano rights, Native American rights, and other rights-based movements that emerged throughout the United States.42 As environmental scholar James Longhurst claims, concerns about the negative environmental effects of industry and development had been present in the nation since the Progressive Era. It was the use of an “active definition of citizenship” that made late 1960s and 1970s environmental activism unique and distinguished it from previous movements. As Longhurst argues, the 1970s “‘green revolution’ on the national level, was built upon the ‘rights revolution’ that preceded and accompanied it [at the local level], equipping small, local citizen groups [like MAPC] with knowledge of legal rights, media tactics, organization models, and [effective] rhetorical approaches.”43 Well-off and privileged environmental advocates thus appropriated a discourse vital to the empowerment of oppressed groups.

One such rhetorical and media savvy tactic employed by the MAPC included polling the people of Evergreen to see if they wanted to host the winter Olympics and then threatening to share their findings with the IOC. In mid-May, after finally submitting their questions to the DOC, the MAPC polled 3,065 Evergreen households through the mail. By September 1969, they counted all the responses, finding that 61% of those who filled out the ballot and returned it did not want to have Olympic events in


43 James Longhurst, Citizen Environmentalists (Medford MA: Tufts University Press, 2010) quotations from xvi, x, xi.
Evergreen. The MACP then released these results to local and statewide media outlets.

This poll did not only raise awareness of the MAPC’s resistance to hosting Olympic events, it eventually gave them leverage over the DOC. After receiving the MACP’s barrage of questions in early May, the DOC hired public relations specialist William Kostka to devise what assistant to the DOC President James B. Cotter described as a “program for offsetting the opposition we have received.” Pointing directly to the MAPC in this regard, Cotter explained that “[t]his type of aggression is needed to offset the negative influences of a number of Mountain Area Planning Council Members and represents an approach which may have further application in handling local opposition to some of our other Olympic ideas.”

Rather than listen to the MAPC, the DOC decided to drown them out. Kostka’s basic strategy was to create a new community group in Evergreen called “Evergreen Citizens for the 1976 Winter Olympics.” The pro-Olympics association was headed by businessman and Evergreen resident Jack Rouse, who presented himself as a “liaison between the DOC and the Evergreen community.” As Rouse asserted, his group

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44 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 2 September 1969, Folder 23 Box 1, MAPC. 1,032 people returned the ballot 392 or 38% favored the Olympics, 630 or 61% opposed the Olympics, 4 households were divided and 6 were undecided or 1%.

45 “MAPC reports result of survey on Olympics,” Canyon Courier, 11 September 1969, clipping Folder 6 Box 6, MAPC JCA; “Olympic Plan Response Chilly,” Denver Post, 17 September 1969, clipping, Folder 6 Box 6, MAPC JCA.

46 J.B. Cotter to DOC Executive Board, W. Kostka, Jr., N.C. Brown, J.W. Rouse, G.F. Groswild, W.S. Law, R.H. Olson, R.S. McCollum, P.J. Gallavan, K. Dybevik, Letter, 4 June 1969, Folder 9 Box 100, WMP DPL. Cotter also noted in this letter that Kostka’s plan “has been reviewed and approved by D.F. McMahon, N.C. Brown, and G.F. Groswild.” Also see, Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 19 June 1969, Folder 8 Box 100, WMP DPL.

47 Bill Kostka Jr. to Jim Cotter, Letter Re: Evergreen, 2 June 1969, Folder 9 Box 100, WMP DPL.
“view[ed] the staging of the cross country, biathlon, jumping, and luge events in the Evergreen area as an excellent opportunity to vastly improve our recreational facilities.”

Rouse further claimed that “participating with the DOC efforts” – through Evergreen Citizens for the 1976 Winter Olympics – “will give the members of this community a voice in the planning of these improvements.”48 Part of Rouse’s job was to drum up support for the DOC. Yet, more significantly, Kostka attempted to replace the MAPC as the main advocacy group speaking on behalf of the interests of Evergreen citizens. Unlike with earlier protesters from Indian Hills, the DOC showed no intention of entering into a dialogue and seeking to compromise with the Planning Council’s membership.

In response, in November 1969, the MAPC again flexed its muscle, sending a letter to DOC Present Robert Pringle, alerting him of their intention to “disseminate the information we have to newspapers, Governor Love, and so on, and as a last resort the IOC.” Since the MAPC’s poll data had already been published in the Colorado press and Love was an avid supporter of the DOC, it was likely the mention of the IOC that struck a nerve. Indeed, the DOC reached out to the MAPC a few days later, at last agreeing to meet and try to find common ground.49 When Pringle and MAPC leaders gathered on November 25, 1969, the DOC president reported that Denver’s bid to the IOC could not be changed prior to the IOC meeting in Amsterdam. The bid books had already been sent to the printing press and Pringle wanted to avoid “general confusion . . . which would hurt the United States.” Pringle acknowledged, nevertheless, that event locations could

48 “Evergreen Olympics Group Being Formed,” 17 July 1969, clipping, Box 6 Folder 6, MAPC JCA.

49 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 10 November 1969, Folder 23 Box 1, MAPC JCA.
be changed after the IOC awarded the Olympics to Denver. He also invited one MAPC member to serve on the DOC’s Board of Directors and assured the Evergreen residents that he realized “holding events where they are not wanted is unwise and defeats the prime purpose of the Games.”

For a few months, tensions subsided. But by March of 1970, after serving as a DOC board member, MAPC President Bob Behrens reported to his membership that within the DOC there was still a “lack of cooperation” with regard to Evergreen’s concerns. With the IOC meeting in Amsterdam less than two months away, the MAPC advised Behrens to make his feelings known to Pringle. After hearing from Behrens, Pringle responded with a resolution, vowing to give the MAPC’s interests more attention. The resolution failed to reach the MAPC’s standards of acceptance. It did not promise for certain all Olympic events would eventually be removed from Jefferson County.

At this point, without telling the DOC, MAPC member Robert O. Reddish shrewdly sent a letter to the IOC on the group’s behalf, alerting the Olympic leaders of the MAPC survey that showed over 60% of Evergreen respondents opposed having the games in their area. Should the winter Olympic games be placed in Evergreen, Reddish

50 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Executive Board Meeting Minutes, 25 November 1969, Folder 23 Box 1, MAPC JCA.

51 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 9 March 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA; Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 March 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.

52 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 13 April 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA.
warned, “they will meet a very strong hostility.” In addition, Reddish also made clear that the odds of there being snow on the ground during the winter was “most uncertain.”

Meanwhile, Behrens told Pringle the only acceptable solution from the DOC would be a written statement “that the Nordic events will not be held in the Evergreen area.” In turn, the DOC made a counter-offer, pledging to remove the ski jumping competitions.

The MAPC then retorted that they would “support the Denver bid and cooperate with the DOC” only if the DOC promised to move the luge and bobsled as well. In an apparent concession, the Planning Council was willing to permit cross country skiing in Evergreen. Stuck at this impasse, on April 20, 1970, with the IOC selection in Amsterdam now weeks away, the MAPC threatened again to send the results of their poll (which they had actually already sent) to the IOC unless they received “concrete evidence that the [Olympic] events will not be held here [in Jefferson County],

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54 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 13 April 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA.

55 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 15 April 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA.
on the basis that this is the way the people of Evergreen feel.” The MAPC even set a
deadline of May 2, 1970.\textsuperscript{56}

Once again, to the MAPC, the simple presence of a majority opinion was
justification for their anti-Olympic stance. At the same time, for the DOC, it was also,
one again, the threat of the MACP reaching out to IOC that moved them to action.
Pringle, Denver Mayor William McNichols, and Colorado Governor John Love quickly
arranged to meet with the MAPC’s Executive Board on April 23, 1970, just three days
after receiving the MAPC ultimatum. At the meeting, Pringle, McNichols, and Love
repeated to MAPC leaders that Denver’s Olympic bid could not be altered. They also
refused to make any written promises regarding changes to event locations. Love,
however, told MAPC that they were correct to think the ski jumps would be an
unattractive structure. He also acknowledged that the bobsled course would be useless
and probably removed after the games were over. Love even admitted he preferred the
cross country events be moved to Steamboat Springs. Still, the governor refused to
provide anything other than verbal assurances that the Olympic events would be
relocated.\textsuperscript{57} At the conclusion of the meeting, the MAPC settled for being allowed to
rewrite Pringle’s earlier resolution in their own words, which Pringle, McNichols, and
Love agreed to accept as long as its existence was not made public until after Denver was
awarded the Olympics from the IOC.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 20 April 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA.

\textsuperscript{57} Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Conversation w/Gov. Love, 23 April 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA.

\textsuperscript{58} Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 11 May 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA.
Jefferson County’s Last Compromise

In the resolution, Pringle pledged that “in the event of a successful bid, the Denver Olympic Committee will make a complete and thorough study and review of its present plans.” Accordingly, environmental well-being and citizen concerns would be recognized in the reassessment. “Based upon factual data of a scientific nature related to the environment and of complete public opinion data,” the DOC president assured, “the propriety and advisability to holding any or several Olympic events in the Evergreen area will be reevaluated.” Stressing the importance of cultural concerns, the reevaluation sought to “give particular emphasis to residential and recreational characteristics of the community.” In return, however, protesters in Evergreen, like those in Indian Hills before them, agreed not to say anything about the DOC’s commitment to revisit event locations, lest it derail Denver’s chances to host the Olympics.59

Just like Indian Hills protesters before them, MAPC leaders were not set on keeping the Olympics from Colorado completely. They viewed the last minute resolution as a strategic maneuver that they hoped would be enough to simply keep the Olympics out of their foothills community. Vance Dittman of Indian Hills expressed the perspective of many Jefferson County resident when he later explained to Avery Brundage, “we would have protested before the award of the Games at Amsterdam, but for the fact that the DOC gave repeated assurances that the naming of these sites was only for the purpose of the bid and that good business required reevaluation – indeed,”

Dittman implored, “that it was expected by the IOC that a reevaluation would be made – and that hence we needed to have no apprehension about these sites [in Jefferson County] being final.”60 Jefferson County inhabitants knew the DOC offered areas near their homes as Olympic venues, but going into the May 1970 bid in Amsterdam, they appeared to believe that the eventual relocation of these contests was a formality.

A few weeks after the MAPC and the DOC agreed to their new resolution, the IOC awarded the 1976 winter Olympic games to Denver – without serious interruption from opposition groups. Yet, Indian Hills residents and MAPC members in Evergreen remained focused on protecting their property rights and preserving their town’s secluded setting. The Jefferson County advocates placed faith in the DOC and Colorado’s political leadership, trusting that they would soon move the Nordic events elsewhere. However, after the DOC returned from Europe, with the Olympics now officially slated for Denver and the Nordic event still planned for Evergreen, Jefferson County’s grassroots activists quickly become much more impatient and uncompromising.

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60 Vance R. Dittman to Avery Brundage, Letter, 6 November 1971, Box 1 Folder 16, POME SHHL.
Chapter 5
The Aesthetic Rights of Middle Class Citizenship

When the DOC bid proved successful in May of 1970, citizens of Jefferson County began to organize with greater urgency. On June 4, 1970, the MAPC published an invitation in Evergreen’s local *Canyon Courier*, calling for another open forum regarding the Olympics. As part of this press release, the MAPC included a full copy of the April 1970 resolution signed by DOC President Robert Pringle.¹ The day of the meeting, June 11, 1970, the *Canyon Courier* promoted the MAPC gathering by publishing a map of Evergreen on its front-page that showcased the DOC’s intended layout of Olympic events. As the paper’s headline read: “Have your say, Olympics hearing Thursday.”² That evening, an estimated 700 people crammed into the Evergreen High School gymnasium to share their thoughts with DOC representatives in attendance.³ “I think we have the largest space in town . . . [but] it doesn’t look like it’s large enough,” announced the current MAPC president, Doug Jones.⁴

At that meeting, it would become clear that in the minds of Jefferson County residents a lot was at stake. Most Jefferson County inhabitants were well-off white

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⁴ Tape of June 11, 1970 MAPC Meeting – Side 1, MAPC JCA.
middle-class suburbanites. They wanted to preserve clean air and water, prevent erosion, protect trees and wildlife, and maintain the ecosystems in which they lived. At the same time, however, these physical features became desirable, in part because of the social status that they conferred.5

As environmental historian Andrew Hurley argues, “middle-class environmentalism . . . emerged out of the effort to protect those physical features of residential life . . . that had become central components of [white] middle-class identity.” Thus, Hurley claims, “middle-class activists saw environmental protection as a means of sustaining the suburban ideal.”6 Likewise, Jefferson County’s suburban dwellers aimed

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5 Although there was a torrent of environmental activism and legislation in the 1970s, historians are unclear on the source of environmentalism as a social movement. As Environmental historian Ted Steinberg puts it, though 1970s environmentalism represented “one of the most dramatic and significant reform movements in American History . . . [but] we may never know what caused [it].” In a more recent assessment of the “state of the field” of environmental history, historian Paul Sutter likewise contends “historians have only given us a partial portrait of postwar environmentalism as a movement.” A possible reason for this lack of clarity may reside in the presumption that diverse “environmental” agendas should be thought of as fundamentally interconnected. Samuel Hays claims that the environmental movement occurred in stages, with the loss of open space for recreation and leisure leading to concerns over pollution and health. Adam Rome argues, moreover, that opposition to tract housing reveals how one stage led to another. However, it might be, at times, misleading to view each “stage” as a varied version of the same environmentalist movement or ideology. Sutter notes that beyond “the freighted and now thoroughly problematized [concept of] ‘nature’ . . . the encompassing and surprisingly under theorized ‘environment’” remains a thorny issue. As Sutter explains, environmental ideals are equally constructed – there are “varieties of environmental knowledge.” This epistemological posture has led to new historical interpretations of “nature” in history and a comparable critical understanding of the malleability of counts as “environmental” might be helpful. In other words, viewing the meaning of “environmental” as culturally and socially contingent may reveal how reforms and advocacy in the name of environmentalism have had less to do with the so-called “environment” and more to do with other socially and culturally driven motives – such as achieving a class centered social status. See Ted Steinberg, Down to Earth: Nature’s Role in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Paul Sutter, “The World With Us: The State of American Environmental History,” Journal of American History (June 2013): 94-119; Samuel Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United State, 1955-1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of Environmentalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

6 Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Race, Class, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indian, 1945-1980, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1995), 46-76, quotations from 47, 75; Hurley analysis is centered on the suburban town of Miller, outside of Gary, Indiana. Also see Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside. Rome shows how neither the reckless consumption of resources nor the risk of waste polluted water effectively motivated suburbanites to environmentalist action. Instead, the loss of the aesthetically valued open spaces in the countryside inspired people to protect their surroundings. Rome
to prevent growth in order to preserve aesthetically pleasing surroundings that solidified a certain, class-centered, social standing. Consequently, the tension between the DOC’s Olympic plans and Jefferson County environmentalists’ “aesthetic rights” was not necessarily born from a disagreement over what the physical effects of the 1976 Denver winter Olympics might be. Rather, the struggle between Jefferson County “environmentalists” and DOC powerbrokers derived from conflicting interpretations over what such changes meant. The two groups held much different visions for the future infrastructure of the foothills areas west of Denver.

The MAPC’s Open Forum

To preserve the feelings of the people of Jefferson County, the MAPC recorded their meeting on June 11, 1970. DOC President Robert Pringle, DOC member Gerald Groswold, and the head of the DOC Site Selection Committee George Robinson attended. Forty-four people can be heard on the MAPC recording, which holds the first two hours and forty minutes of the three hour gathering. According to newspaper accounts, around 50 people ended up speaking. About eighty percent of Jefferson County residents audible on the recording declared explicit opposition to Olympic events being held in the Evergreen area.7

Jefferson County residents cited numerous reasons for opposing the Nordic events in Evergreen. Many pointed to practical concerns, such as the fact that there would probably not be enough snow and that there would not be enough water for artificial snow making. Jefferson County wells had water supply problems already, residents claimed. Many of the speakers expressed anxiety about a lack of means for transporting large crowds of spectators. Others commented that the luge, bobsled, and ski jump would become “white elephants” with little after-use potential. Some conveyed alarm over the prospect of raised taxes due to construction and maintenance costs.⁸

Many Jefferson County inhabitants also cited concerns about environmental damage. Phil Kilpatrick of the Evergreen Naturalists noted that the DOC planned to cover a stream called Bear Creek to make room for a ski jump landing and that this would destroy the creek’s ecology. A woman who identified herself as Mrs. Mousy of the Evergreen Garden Club made a similar assessment, attesting that the “Club views the proposed events as a distinct threat to the natural environment of this area.” Mousy continued, “buildings, luge and bobsled runs, cross country ski trails, ski jumps, parking lots, and new highways cannot but harm and for the most part eliminate trees, shrubs, and wildflowers, which in themselves are important to the point of being irreplaceable and are also vital to the existence of . . . wildlife.” Some residents additionally wondered if excesses waste and inferior sewage facilities would harm Evergreen’s water sources. Others noted the potential for soil erosion.⁹

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⁸ Tape of June 11, 1970 MAPC Meeting – Side 1, MAPC JCA.
⁹ Ibid.
However, perhaps the dominant theme expressed by Evergreen’s inhabitants was that the Olympics would ruin the relaxed and private ethos of surrounding areas. Bud Ferris of the North Turkey Creek Homeowners Association affirmed that his group was not against the Olympics per se, but objected to the games being held in Evergreen because they would cause the town to lose its “charm.” “We just don’t want the Olympics to be in the middle of our garden,” Ferris professed. John Estey of Evergreen reiterated this point of view. “One of the reasons I chose to live in Evergreen was because of the fresh mountain air, meadows, the flowers, the trees, being able to get away from some of the cities congestion . . . These kinds of things, as a resident of Evergreen are very very important,” he contended. According to Estey, “the congestion caused by the Olympics would be completely incompatible with why I chose and I’m sure many of you chose to live in Evergreen.”

Ron Worl, President of the El Pinal Improvement Association, noted that the people he represented were anywhere from “violently opposed to enthusiastically for” the Olympics. Yet, there was one thing on which everyone agreed. Worl avowed that the “Front Range west of Denver is unique . . . special consideration has to be given to the future development of this area so that it maintains its present aesthetic value.” Emile Gadeken of the Indian Hills Improvement Association concurred: “To destroy the character of this quiet non-commercial beautiful residential area would be destructive, expensive, and ridiculous.” Along with ecological well-being, Jefferson County’s Olympic opponents aimed to prevent commercial developments and thus maintain the

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10 Ibid.
11 Tape of June 11, 1970 MAPC Meeting – Side 2, MAPC JCA.
aesthetic qualities of their seclude mountain towns.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, as the MAPC’s current president, Doug Jones, acknowledged just before the MAPC’s June 1970 meeting, much of the areas objections came “strictly from an e[a]sthetic point of view.”\textsuperscript{13}

By taking this position, residents not only opposed the Olympics – they opposed the marketing and growth of a particular portion of their state. As a result, they pitted themselves against Governor Love’s “Sell Colorado” initiative. As George Vardaman of Indian Hills explained at the forum: “To come to the heart of the matter, Evergreen and Indian Hills are beautiful residential communities not mountain tourist traps and most of the residents of these communities have no desire to live in tourist traps. We happen to like it the way it is. We are frankly indignant at the prospect of being used by real estate promoters, speculators and quick buck artists.” Tom Powell of Evergreen connected the goals of Denver’s Olympic bid to “Selling Colorado” as well. He admitted “Denver and its surrounding mountain areas and its salesmen, headed by Mr. Pringle, deserve a really big pat on the back for winning the Winter Olympics. I think it is a really big shot in the arm for Colorado.” However, Powell continued, the “shot . . . should not be given indiscriminately because of possible serious allergic reactions.” Growth was good for other parts of the state, but, according to Powell, not for his abode in the Evergreen foothills. As Powell asserted, “[f]or me the life blood of Evergreen, which is the reason I live here, consists of a number of factors,” including “its relative isolation, its serene mountain living atmosphere that for the most part is not commercialized, [and] its

\textsuperscript{12} Tape of June 11, 1970 MAPC Meeting – Side 1, MAPC JCA.

\textsuperscript{13} Jones quoted in Todd Phipers, “Evergreen Icy to Ski Jump Plan,” \textit{Denver Post}, 7 June 1970, clipping. Folder 6 Box 6, MAPC JCA.
beauty.” Although Powell viewed the Olympics as “basically a good thing,” the games were “incompatible” his “ideas of Evergreen.”

When resident Stan Deever stood to announce that he opposed the Olympics in Evergreen he carried with him a copy of the *Wall Street Journal*. He claimed the paper provided evidence of a “larger aspect of this problem.” As Deever described, the journal contained an ad paid for by “the people in our state government trying to sell Colorado to industry.” The promotion depicted Colorado as “‘choice country for a growing boy or a growing business’ . . . [and] one of the drawing cards used in this ad,” Deever highlighted, “is the selection of Denver as the United States’ candidate for the Olympics.” Thus, Deever reasoned, the “Olympics is only a part of the desire by a powerful group of persons for an increased exploitation and commercialization in this area . . . If the residents around here want to protect the quality of life that’s now possible,” Deever advised, “they’re going to have to organize much more effectively than is presently the case.” Jefferson County residents clearly saw the Olympics as an extension of Governor John Love’s pro-growth policies, which they did not wish to see expand into their communities. The DOC’s plans for Evergreen became an issue through which Jefferson County citizens could now make it known loud and clear that they believed Love’s agenda had limits.

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14 Tape of June 11, 1970 MAPC Meeting – Side 2, MAPC JCA
15 Ibid.
Becoming Environmentalists

To stop commercial development within Jefferson County, Evergreen and Indian Hills inhabitants relied on environmentalist arguments. Shortly after the MAPC forum, Vance Dittman returned to become the driving force of this movement. At the June meeting, he and his wife Catherine both stood to renew their demand that the Nordic events be moved. Vance Dittman based his refurbished opposition on the logic that more roads and more people meant more police, infrastructure, and maintenance costs, which would in turn require increased taxes for residents who never agreed to host Olympic events in the first place. Catherine Dittman took the more environmentalist approach, arguing that the DOC proposal for the bobsled run “will destroy aspen groves, meadows and big pines which were growing when the Declaration of Independence was signed.”

For the Dittmans, the bobsled run and luge course became central issues. Neither event was scheduled for where the Dittmans and their fellow Indian Hills residents consented to only two years earlier. Instead of Independence Mountain and O’Fallon Park, the DOC planned to build both Olympics structures in and around Pence Park. As Vance Dittman noted in his statement at the MAPC forum, although Pence Park was located adjacent to O’Fallon Park, the bobsled run would now run near a portion of his fifty-acre property. A week and a half later, Vance Dittman wrote to Robert Pringle, alleging the DOC acted in bad faith. As he told the DOC President, the bobsled run and

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16 Vance R. Dittman, Statement Made at Meeting of MAPC and DOC, June 11, 1970,” Box 5 Folder 50 POME SHHL.
17 Catherine Dittman, Statement Made at Meeting of MAPC and DOC, June 11 1970, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL.
The Dittmans agreed to the DOC’s revised plans in 1968. Then they changed their minds in 1970, after learning Olympic events would come much closer to their land than they had anticipated. The changes to the bobsled and luge may have been viewed as small ones by the DOC, but the Dittmans considered them draconian. In his communication with Pringle, Vance Dittman went so far as to deny what seems to have been a part of their prior consensus, complaining that “it was understood that they [the Nordic events] would be moved out of the area entirely.” As Dittman declared, a “short move to Evergreen hardly satisfies this understanding.”

When the DOC changed the layout of events so that the Olympics came closer to their property, the Dittmans changed their perspective on the games being held in Evergreen.

By this point, the MAPC already established a new level of environmental consciousness within the debate. Vance Dittman heard this much of thinking during the June 1970 MAPC forum. Furthermore, after Denver won its bid, Dittman exchanged notes with another University of Denver faculty member who spelled out specific ecological consequences connected to hosting the Olympics in Evergreen. Biologist Moras L. Shubert correctly noted that due to temperatures reaching an average high of above forty-five degrees Fahrenheit during the two weeks in which the Olympics were planned, there would not be enough snow for cross-country events (as many Evergreen residents already realized). Nor would it be cold enough to hold the bobsled and luge

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18 Vance R. Dittman to Robert Pringle, Letter, 22 June 1970, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL.
19 Ibid.
competitions without extensive and expensive refrigeration systems. Shubert reasoned that the warm weather meant the DOC could not obtain enough water to ice the luge and bobsled and cover cross country courses artificially. Doing so, Shubert claimed, would “endanger the whole ecological nature of the area.”

When the DOC asked the Denver Research Institute to study their current plans and make organizational recommendations, Vance Dittman wrote to the DRI to confirm proper deliberations were underway. Dittman began by rehashing old terrain, advising the DRI that “[w]e hope . . . you will consider the feasibility of locating events . . . not only from the standpoint of the events themselves, but also from the standpoint of the type of environment of Evergreen and Indian Hills [and] the personal and financial damage to the residents.” However, Dittman also added that the DRI should base its decisions, “perhaps, most important of all, from the standpoint of the permanent injury to the ecology.” After complaining that “[n]ot only will the peace and quiet which we enjoy be destroyed, but the value of our homes will be greatly diminished,” Dittman emphasized: “The ecology of the foothills is one of delicate balances. Once the trees, ground cover and top soil are destroyed, or seriously disturbed, recovery is a matter of centuries, not merely a few years.” Dittman also noted “these events will leave marks on our landscape which will be unsightly and practically permanent.” For Dittman, preserving property values, defending ecological well-being, and safeguarding

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20 Dr. Moras L. Shubert to the Denver Olympic Committee, Letter, 9 June 1970, Box 4 Folder 44, POME SHHL.

21 Vance R. Dittman to John Wells (Denver Research Institute), Letter, 30 June 1970, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL; Dittman specifically references Shubert’s letter to the DOC as evidence.
aesthetically pleasing surroundings became inextricable issues that bolstered his anti-Olympic stance.

With a mean income of around $11,500 per household (around $70,000 in 2016), living in a relatively rural area outside a major city, residents of Jefferson County fit the standard demographic of late 1960s and early 1970s environmental activists. Environmentalists of this era became increasingly concerned with issues such as safe drinking water and clean air, the health of fellow American citizens, and the protection of endangered species. Nonetheless, as environmental historian Samuel Hays argues, the emergence of the 1970s American “environmental movement” was tied to a rising standard of living that occurred throughout the United States after World War II. By the late 1960s, instead of the development of resources for utilitarian and economic ends, affluent Americans viewed clean rivers and lakes, untouched forests and mountains, fresh air and open spaces as valuable for enhancing one’s overall “quality of life.”

Most often middle- and upper-class white-collar workers, such as lawyers, accountants, doctors, and college professors expressed these concerns. As historian Richard White contends, in the American West especially, “more and more metropolitan residents viewed the land not in terms of resources it produced but rather in terms of the experiences it could provide.” Post-war environmentalists were motivated by rising

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22 Samuel Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence*, 171-207. Also see Adam Rome *The Bulldozer in the Countryside*, 148; Rome contends throughout the United States in the 1960s that “the destruction of open space . . . led many middle-class Americans to reassess the costs and benefits of economic growth.”

23 Ibid.

expectations to live in or near naturalistic environs, often for the purpose of enhancing recreation, leisure and general overall well-being.

Within this historical context, two weeks before Denver won its Olympic bid, on April 22, 1970, millions of Americans demonstrated support for a broad based environmental movement during the first Earth Day. In Denver, 5,000 people attended a “teach-in” at the Currigan Convention Center. In fact, the day before meeting with the MAPC and approving their re-worded resolution, Governor Love gave a keynote Earth Day address before an estimate 3,000 onlookers, where he advocated for population control regulations. Historians consider the nationwide event to have been crucial in sparking the “first green generation,” and generating an ensuing torrent of environmental legislation. As Dittman’s environmentalist evolution demonstrated, the argumentative resources of Jefferson County’s Olympic protesters had expanded.

Many of Dittman’s neighbors imbibed this environmentalist mentality. Indeed, led by Dittman, in the summer of 1970, thirteen Jefferson County residents, the majority from Indian Hills and Evergreen, established a new non-profit organization called Protect Our Mountain Environment (POME). The new group’s articles of confederation stated its intention “to protect, preserve, and improve the mountain area and ecology.”

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26 Rome, The Genius of Earth Day; In 1970 President Richard Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act, ensuring that knowledge of the environmental impact of federally funded projects, such as dams and highways, would be made available to the public. That same year the United States Congress created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). By 1973, Congress had passed the Clean Air Act (1970), the Water Pollution Act (1972), the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Fungicide Act (1972), the Coastal Zone Management Act (1972), and the Endangered Species Act (1973), giving the EPA a broad mandate for enforcement. See Steinberg, Down to Earth, 329 – 260.

27 Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. Articles of Incorporation, 26 August 1970, Box 4 Folder 40, POME SHHL.
group was a direct response to the DOC’s plans for Indian Hills and Evergreen and presented itself unequivocally as a team of environmentalists. As Vance Dittman, POME’s president, explained to the *Denver Post*, the Olympics promised “substantial mountain environment and physical destruction.”²⁸

In October of 1970, POME’s members passed their first resolution unanimously, claiming the Olympics would cause deforestation and soil erosion, as well as water and air pollution. The group additionally cited a lack of road access and parking facilities, along with a high probability of minimal snowfall during the time when the Olympics were to take place. Where once diminished property values and aesthetic damage had been the fulcrum, now ecological concerns justified POME’s official request that Nordic events, the bobsled, and the luge “not to be staged” in “Indian Hills . . . Evergreen, and adjacent areas.”²⁹

As POME’s secretary Jean Gravell explained, the groups’ “most pressing interest now relates to . . . the 1976 Winter Olympics in the Evergreen-Indian Hills area.”³⁰ However, POME soon found other environmentalist causes to rally behind. Within months of its formation, POME demanded the use of “scientific methods” for handling sewage and regulating water supplies. They advocated for the construction of highways “in accordance with a plan which will best serve the interests of the public.” POME supported regulations for snowmobiles and motorcycles “[so] they will not affect


²⁹ Protect Our Mountain Environment, Resolution, 29 October 1970, Box 4 Folder 40, POME SHHL. This resolution also specifically cited North Turkey Creek, an area about 10 miles south of Evergreen.

³⁰ Lee (Jean) Gravell to Donald F. Magarrell, Letter, 26 September 1970, Box 2 Folder 17, POME SHHL.
residential property.” Moreover, they opposed the “encroachment of industry . . . inconsistent or incompatible with the preservations of the foothills environment.” POME also supported new zoning laws “designed to protect . . . desirable natural qualities and residential areas.” At one point, along with the MAPC, the group went as far as to request a moratorium on sub-division development in Jefferson County until a new comprehensive plan could be devised. The Olympics awakened a new band of environmental crusaders.

Protecting the Cultural Environment

As POME’s growing demands demonstrated, the organization’s primary goal was not centered on merely defending the health of the physical world. POME aimed to prevent growth in the name of maintaining a distinct cultural setting. “We in Evergreen – Indian Hills have deep and abiding human and social concerns,” professed George Varadam, one of the first Indian Hills dissenters and an original member of POME. As Vance Dittman similarly explained, “[i]n the opinion of the members of POME . . . protecting our mountain environment” meant “no Front Range locations on public or

31 POME Bulletin No. 5, “Protect Our Mountain Environment,” Published in the Canyon Courier 17 September 1970, Box 5 Folder 53, POME SHHL.

32 “Resolution Before the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Jefferson State of Colorado: Moratorium and P.O.M.E.,” 15 December 1971, Box 1 Folder 11, POME SHHL; William S. Willson to Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, Letter 4 October 1971, Folder 25 Box 1, MAPC JCA; John Toohey, “Year Long Moratorium Urged,” Denver Post, 7 April 1971, clipping, Folder 7 Box 8, MAPC JCA.

33 POME also formally opposed the construction of a new industrial plant near Bergan Park, congressional approval of Super Sonic Transportation, and supported a ban on a garbage dump in O’Fallon Park. For a more comprehensive listing of POME’s environmentalist engagements see, POME, First Annual Membership Meeting, 10 August 1971, Box 4 Folder 4, POME SHHL.

34 George T. Vardaman to John G. Well, Letter, 10 July 1970 Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL.
private land should be considered [for Olympics events], both because of the social factors involved, and because it would be a travesty on clean outdoor activities.” When POME passed a second anti-Olympic resolution in January of 1971, the resolution warned of “the destruction of a considerable area of trees and ground,” which would contribute to erosion, water pollution, and ruin natural scenery. Yet POME ultimately feared that Olympic “sports facilities” would “degrade” not just the physical land but “the whole community.” As POME’s members explained, the Olympics “in residential areas” such as Jefferson County would not only be “inconsistent with the broader concepts of the preservation of the environment,” but also “detrimental to our preferred way of life” In POME’s eyes, clear water and tree-filled mountains on the one hand, and maintaining a desired cultural milieu on the other, were inseparable.

It may be a philosophical mistake to draw clean cut distinctions between the cultural and the natural world. Still, POME constructed a view of environmentalism that became tethered to distinct social and cultural experiences. As it happened, the group believed these experiences – their “way of life” – depended on specific physical surroundings and attributes. Perhaps POME’s executive board put it best when justifying their financial support of the Colorado Philharmonic which performed in Evergreen. POME, the executive board asserted, fought on behalf of an intertwined “cultural environment.”

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35 Vance Dittman to Dr. Beatrice Willard and DOC Planning Commission, Letter, 30 November 1971 Box 5 Folder 53, POME SHHL.

36 Resolution, 8 January 1971, Box 4 Folder 40, Box 4 Folder 30, POME, SHHL.

37 Board of POME to Owen K. Ball, Letter, 17 August 1970, Box 6 Folder 60, POME SHHL.
In early 1971 POME described the “way of life” or “cultural environment” to which they referred in more detail. Jefferson County, the group explained, “has become a refuge for retired people and young families who did not want a city life for their children . . . The areas in question, with the exception of Evergreen, have no beer or liquor outlet, nor commercial areas, but they do have schools, churches and church camps, and a beautiful setting.”

Vance Dittman later explained to IOC president Avery Brundage that “Evergreen and Indian Hills residents . . . are here because we have deliberately chosen this quiet way of life.” Surely, he offered to Brundage, “the influx of people, contestants, officials, newsmen, technicians and spectators, will be detrimental to our communities.”

This redundant identification with a particular “way of life” might come across as a vague abstraction, but to Dittman and members of POME it referred to a concrete communal sensibility – a social identity consisting of wholesome church camps and peaceful retirement homes, set apart for the drudgery of the city.

Since the 1940s, when Vance and Catherine Dittman moved to Indian Hills, middle-class identities had been connected to and even constituted by idealized visions of the bourgeois good life. A private home with a family, abundant open spaces, naturalistic settings, a collection of consumer goods, and large amounts of leisure time denoted middle-class membership. Rather than simply monetary measures, “class, especially in

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38 Letter to the International Olympic Committee, 26 April 1971, Box 4 Folder 48 POME SHHL; fifteen other, mostly local, advocacy groups cosigned this letter with POME: North Turkey Creek Associations (Pine Hills, Marschner, Chinook Chapters), Wild Rose Grange, Marshdale Homeowners Association, Evergreen Naturalists, Hill and Dale Society, Indian Hills Improvement Association, El Pinal Association, Genesee Grange, Kittredge Home-owners Association, Buffalo Park Association, V.F.W. Post 3471, Inter-Canyon Environmental Improvement Association, Crescent Park Land and Home-owners Association, Upper Bear Creek Homeowners Association. Almost identical letters were also sent to the International Skiing, Luge, Bobsled, and Biathlon Federations, see letter to International Ski Federation, n.d., Box 2 Fold 16, POME SHHL.

39 Vance R. Dittman to Avery Brundage, Letter, 6 November 1971, Box 1 Folder 16, POME SHHL.
America,” historian Loren Bartiz claims, “is a state of mind” achieved by conduct “acceptable to the norm.” When citizens of Jefferson County mustered their collective strength to halt Olympic development and commercialism, their actions could be read as a collaborative attempt to safeguard material trappings and symbols of their middle- and upper-class positions.

By fighting to protect middle-class social markers, Jefferson County residents inevitably drew actual class boundaries around their communities. According to the MAPC, single family homes were all that the land in Jefferson County could support. As one MAPC representative acknowledged, this stance facilitated planning and zoning policies that made it so “only the rich can live here.” The chairman of the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, Jack Tresize, likewise explained that by instituting stricter zoning regulations, such as those recommended by the both MAPC and POME, “[w]e know we’re limiting the ability of the average wage earner to buy property in the mountains.” The MAPC’s and POME’s opposition to the Olympics rested on an image that ensured their neighborhoods would remain middle- to upper-class.

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42 Cheryl Hayes, Dear Earth (Denver Colorado), April 1971, 9, 10.

43 Tresize quoted in John Toohey, “Mountain Developing Slowed,” Denver Post, circa December 1971, Folder 6 Box 6, MAPC JCA.
The Strategy of Jefferson County Environmentalists

For the most part it was self-identified members of this middle class – teachers, doctors, dentists, nurses, engineers, geologists, physicists, bankers, corporation executives, accountants, lawyers, artists, technicians, builders, airline pilots, naturalists, conservationists, and “outdoorsmen” – who enlisted with POME. By December 1971, the group reported that it had 476 official members.44 As Dittman told Olympic booster Clifford Buck, the newest President of the USOC and a DOC member, most of the membership “live[d] in the communities and their environs, which will be directly affected by these [Olympic] events.”45 The heart of the anti-Olympic environmental movement in Colorado remained based in Jefferson County, primarily within Indian Hills and Evergreen.46

POME members claimed to have directed over a thousand separate objections to the DOC alone.47 The MAPC also encouraged its members to reach out to the DOC and to local administrators.48 As MAPC meeting minutes from June 1970 described, the group hoped to keep the Olympic issue “stirred up through a letter writing campaign.”49

44 Membership information, 21 December 1970, Box 3 Folder 47, POME SHHL.

45 Vance R. Dittman to John A. Love, Letter, 18 November 1970, Box 2 Folder 17, POME SHHL; Vance R. Dittman to Joe Clancio, Jr. (Manager of Parks and Recreation), Letter, 11 December 1970, Box 2 Folder POME SHHL.

46 Vance R. Dittman Jr. to Clifford H. Buck, Letter, 8 December 1970, Box 4 Folder 4, POME SHHL.

47 Ibid.

48 MAPC, Newsletter, circa 1970, Folder 14 Box 1, MAPC.

49 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 22 June 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA. For MAPC letter writing strategy also see Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 13 July 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA; Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 14 September 1970, Folder 24 Box 1, MAPC JCA; Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 13 September 1971, Folder 25 Box 1, MAPC JCA.
In March 1971, the DOC seemed to respond, announcing that they were looking into new venues. However, the decision to relocate events was probably driven by problematic weather conditions, rather than objections from Jefferson County’s citizenry. Indeed, one place the DOC considered moving cross-country skiing to was Buffalo Creek, a location still located in Jefferson County. At the same time, though they did not specify exactly where, the DOC remained committed to holding bobsled, luge, and ski jumping contests somewhere near Evergreen. Although the DOC would move some events, evidence indicates that the cries of Jefferson County residents fell on deaf ears.

At this juncture, the MAPC’s policy was that no Olympic events should be held in Jefferson County. To POME, nowhere in the Front Range was to be permitted. As Dittman explained to Beatrice Willard, the head of the DOC’s new Planning Commission, formed to help the DOC take environmental well-being into account: “Any of the points and questions we raise, and our comments . . . apply to any sites in the Front Range where installations do not exist and are not now in use.” With the DOC still considering Front Range locations, Dittman reported to the POME membership over a year after the group’s initial formation that “[i]t is clear that we have NOT yet been successful in our efforts.”

50 See chapter 3.

51 Protect Our Mountain Environment, Resolution, 6 March 1971 Box 4 Folder 40, POME SHHL; Vance R. Dittman Jr. to International Olympic Committee C/O Mr. Avery Brundage, Letter, 3 April 1971, Box 2 Folder 17, POME SHHL; Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 13 December 1971, Folder 25 Box 1, MAPC JCA. Other location considered for cross country skiing included Sedalia in Douglas County (adjacent to Jefferson County) and far away Steamboat Springs.

52 Vance R. Dittman to Dr. Beatrice Willard (Chairperson) and DOC Planning Commission, Letter, 30 November 1971, Box 5 Folder 53, POME SHHL.

53 POME, First Annual Membership Meeting, 10 August 1971, Box 4 Folder 40, POME SHHL.
In the spring of 1971, fed up with trying to sway the DOC and Colorado politicians, such as Governor Love and Mayor McNichols, POME redirected its energy toward the IOC. As Dittman explain to IOC president Avery Brundage, “[b]ecause of the insensitivity of the DOC officials . . . we have resolved to take our objections” to you.\(^54\) With the 1972 winter Olympics in Sapporo, Japan, approaching, Dittman wrote to the IOC headquarters in Lausanne asking for “the names and address of all the members of the International Olympic Committee” so that he could “communicate with each one of them.”\(^55\) He hoped that when the IOC convened in Japan, the organization would react to POME’s flood of protest letters by opting to end the Denver Olympics for good.\(^56\) POME members additionally wrote to foreign Olympic committees and international sport federations. They even pleaded with the runner-up to Denver for the 1976 winter games, Sion, Switzerland, to try and finagle the event away from the DOC.\(^57\) As Dittman told a fellow POME supporter, the “battle has now taken on a distinctly international aspect.”\(^58\) To protect the cultural setting that they so cherished, Jefferson County

\(^{54}\) Vance R. Dittman to Avery Brundage, Letter, 6 November 1971, Box 1 Folder 16, POME SHHL. After registering complaints with Governor Love and Mayor McNichols, POME concluded that the “indifference” of elected leaders “to the wishes of a substantial number of citizens and to the rights of property of owners in the Evergreen-Indian Hills area is appalling,” see Vance R. Dittman to John Rodda, Letter, 29 October 1971, Box 4 Folder 44, POME SHHL.

\(^{55}\) Vance R. Dittman to Monique Berlioux, Letter, 24 October 1971, Box 2 Folder 16, POME SHHL; Vance R. Dittman to Avery Brundage, Letter, 26 October 1971, Box 2 Folder 16, POME SHHL.

\(^{56}\) Vance R. Dittmann to Mark Brewer, Letter, 24 November 1971, Box 2 Folder 17, POME SHHL.

\(^{57}\) Catherine P. Ditmann et al. (“representative citizens of Colorado”) to Sion Olympic Committee, Letter, 19 October 1971, Box 1 Folder 3, POME SHHL; Vance R. Dittman to Serge Lang, Letter, 21 October 1971, Box 2 Folder 16, POME SHHL.

\(^{58}\) Vance R. Dittmann to Mark Brewer, Letter, 24 November 1971, Box 2 Folder 17, POME SHHL.
environmentalists reach out anyone they could think of who might be able to help them halt the commercialization of their towns.

**The Argument for Aesthetic Rights**

The arguments that POME made to the DOC, Colorado politicians, the IOC, and others carried similar themes. Dittman demonstrated as far back as 1968 that protecting the environment meant, at least in part, protecting certain aesthetically pleasing qualities. When residents met at the MAPC’s June 1970 forum, they affirmed the importance of this point of view. While biologist Moras Shurbert had pointed out ecological challenges connected to warm weather and water supplies, even he found it problematic that “abandoned ski runs will be raw scars on the landscape.” As one of POME’s earlier resolutions claimed, part of the reason the Olympics would “degrade the whole community environment as a place to live” was that they would leave “attractive nuisances” that “will consist of unsightly, unusable permanent structures.” Dittman reiterated to one of Colorado’s members of the U.S. House of Representatives, Frank Evans, that Olympic facilities “are bound to be unsightly.” To POME, Jefferson County’s appearance was of the utmost concern.

Michael Holland, a Kansas attorney who owned property in Jefferson County, expressed the importance of aesthetics to Jefferson County homeowners most explicitly.

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59 Dr. Moras L. Shubert to the Denver Olympic Committee, Letter, 9 June 1970, Box 4 Folder 44, POME SHHL.

60 Protect Our Mountain Environment, Resolution, 8 January 1971, Box 4 Folder 30, POME SHHL

61 Vance R. Dittman Jr. to Representative Frank E. Evans, 25 January 1971, Box 4 Folder 42, POME SHHL.
“I have no intention,” he wrote to Dittman “of allowing this beauty to be destroyed without a fight.”\textsuperscript{62} Holland therefore wrote to Avery Brundage professing that though he was “not against the olympics or their purposes,” he was “very definitely against the proposed location for the 1976 winter olympic games.” As Holland explained, “I certainly do not want as a view man-made marks and blemishes upon the mountain scenery, which must and will be the ultimate result if the proposed . . . site [in Evergreen] is consummated into reality.”\textsuperscript{63} Preserving natural beauty remained an essential aspect to the environmentalism Jefferson County protesters espoused.

However, the rights of citizenship, expressed earlier by the MAPC, constituted a powerful complementary polemic. Following in MAPC’s footsteps, Vance Dittman avowed in December of 1970 that “the opposition of POME to holding the Nordic Events of the 1976 Winter Olympics in the Indian Hills-Evergreen area is based upon one fundamental approach. This fundamental approach,” he declared, “is as follows: citizens of the area had nothing to do with the invitation nor with the decision to hold NORDICS here. Their opinion was never asked. They never voted in any way on the question.”\textsuperscript{64} The real roots of POME’s opposition, Dittman now claimed, resided in the fact that the democratic right to determine how one’s town gets developed had been overridden.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{62} Michael Holland to Vance R. Dittman, Letter, 11 January 1971, Box 2 Folder 17, POME SHHL.

\textsuperscript{63} Michael Holland to Avery Brundage, Letter, 2 December 1971, Reel 110 Folder XII Olympic Winter Games 1976 Denver, Colo. Protests (1969-1971), ABC IOCA.

\textsuperscript{64} Vance R. Dittman, Introductory statement, 18 December 1970, box 4 folder 47, POME SHHL.

\textsuperscript{65} POME felt so strongly about the merits of this aspect of their case that they even submitted it outside of United States’ borders. In February 1972, in Sapporo, DOC leaders were expected to answer IOC queries about Denver’s progress and preparation. POME members felt they had a fundamental right to know what those questions would be. To the IOC, Dittman contended: “Since the staging of the Games as a whole is a matter in which the whole citizenry of Colorado has a stake . . . we feel that we are entitled to know the questions which the DOC will have to answer at Sapporo. We want to know in what respect the DOC is failing to measure up to the standards set by the IOC.” See Vance R. Dittman Jr. to Comite International
When taking this approach, at times, POME’s leaders abandoned environmentalism completely. As historian James Longhurst argues, a “recurring emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of citizenship” often made “the new modern environmental movement” of the late 1960s and early 1970s seem “not as environmental as one might expect.”66 In November 1970, for example, Dittman argued to Governor Love that “[a]ny question of the physical suitability of these [Olympic] sites is entirely irrelevant. The real issue,” Dittman explained, was that “we, as citizens of Colorado . . . appeal to you as Governor . . . to exercise your enormous influence.” In a similar vein, when Dittman wrote to IOC member Rodolphe J. Leising to learn about the process for choosing Olympics venues, the POME leader made sure to clarify that the “reason for the question is that the citizens of these communities, in substantial numbers, are opposed to these events at these sites, regardless of their technical suitability.”67 Even if the physical layout of Jefferson County did not present any significant “technical” challenges, Dittman asserted, the preferences of local residents should be enough of a reason to move the Nordic events elsewhere.

Sharing this outlook, POME secretary Jean Gravell drew a clear distinction between Jefferson County’s “human” environment and its non-human one. “To our group the human environmental issues come first,” Gravell asserted, “hence our stand that technical feasibility, which could be equated with bulldozer and snow making

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66 Longhurst, *Citizen Environmentalists*, x.

67 Vance R. Dittman to Rodolphe J. Leising, Letter, 23 November 1970 Box 2 Folder 17, POME SHHL.
expertise, is not the right measurement.” In Gravell’s eyes, specialized and scientific knowledge should not be allowed to outweigh the subjective judgements of Jefferson County citizens. As Gravel insinuated, the quality of life of residents, rather than strict ecological dimensions, ought to be the prevailing the consideration.

When it was deemed helpful to their cause, POME turned to “technical” matters, such as soil erosion, water sanitation, or the harmful effects of downed trees. Still, in other instances, such factors took a back seat. Technical studies to ascertain the Front Range’s environmental suitability were “irrelevant,” Dittman told Clifford Buck, “since we do not want the events here no matter how feasible it may be to stage them.” In such moments, an essential right to determine what should be and what should not be allowed within one’s own community was all POME felt it needed to make its case.

Of course, to POME and other Jefferson County residents, the intrinsic value of undeveloped natural settings did need not be divorced from the rights of citizenship. Indeed, aesthetic considerations provided substance to the notion that rights were being violated. POME often expressed this by assuming that they owned the beauty around them. “There is just so much of this planet earth and very little is as beautiful as our hills and valleys and mountain peaks,” POME members pronounced. “We are extremely concerned,” Vance Dittman told the Chairman of the Jefferson County Planning

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68 Jean Gravell, “Open letter to the Evergreen Chamber of Commerce, Att’n Mr. Jack Moore; From Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. Jean Gravell, Secretary and Treasurer,” The Canyon Courier, 27 November 1970, clipping Box 2 Folder 17, POME SHHL.

69 Vance R. Dittman Jr. to Clifford H. Buck, Letter, 8 December 1970, Box 4 Folder 40, POME SHHL.

70 Protect Our Mountain Environment, General Membership Meeting, 29 October 1970, Box 4 Folder 40, POME SHHL.
Commission, “about what is happening in our mountains.” Dittman later bemoaned to professional environmentalist Roger Hansen that “no one seems to give a damn whether we want our homes involved or not, or whether we want our landscape torn to pieces.”

Attorney Michael Holland likewise declared to the IOC: “We resent very much . . . [that] our location was volunteered by the politicians of other areas to sacrifice our mountains to this unwarranted and undeserving destruction.” In February 1972, while in Sapporo, Japan, presenting a revised proposal to the IOC, Governor Love received a similar message by wire from Evergreen homeowner John S. Irwin. “[T]hese are true residential suburbs and can never become winter sports centers,” Irwin declared; “We bitterly resent uncomprehending outsiders ruining our scenery.”

Even though a majority of Nordic events were scheduled for land belonging to the City of Denver and that neither Evergreen nor Indian Hills were incorporated, in the minds of many Jefferson County residents, the mountains and scenery around their properties were theirs.

With this understanding in mind, Jefferson County environmentalists presented an argument that reached beyond traditional legal boundaries. This came to light most clearly in POME’s response to a report submitted to the United States Congress (which was debating whether or not to help fund the DOC) by the U.S. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (then a part of the Department of the Interior). The authors of the report

71 Vance Dittman to Jack Wolf (Chairman if County Planning Commission, Jefferson County), Letter 31 May 1972, Box 5 Folder 51, POME SHHL.

72 Vance R. Dittman to Roger P. Hansen, Letter, 21 April 1972, Box 5 Folder 53, POME SHHL.


74 John S. Irwin to Governor Love, telegraph, 31 January 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLP SCAR.
found that the Olympic games would not, in the long run, substantially increase the rate of growth and environmental damage in Jefferson County. “While it is speculated that the publicity surrounding the Olympics may serve to draw people and businesses to the area,” the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation claimed, “the magnitude will be in the range of a relatively small incremental increase in the intensity of growth and development” already underway.75

As the report explained, though growth and development would deplete and pollute water supplies, harm air quality, reduce the range of wildlife, and alter natural settings, “[i]t is emphasized . . . that Olympic impacts as they relate to growth and development are only a small part and parcel of the larger pattern.” The report speculated that “land use decisions as they relate to the Olympics and afterwards could [even] be environmentally beneficial in the long range.” As the federal bureau continued, “insomuch as Olympic planning stimulates precedent setting land guidance systems, and insomuch as those precedents and systems are established Statewide, then the holding of the 1976 Winter Olympics could be considered to have a positive indirect environmental impact on land use practices.”76 In other words, the changes POME claimed the Olympics would facilitate were probably inevitable with or without the 1976 winter Olympic games. Meanwhile, properly initiated, Olympic developments could potentially help minimize pending ecological damage.

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75 Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Department of the Interior, Environmental State DES 72 65: Proposed 1976 Denver Olympic Games, 8 June 1972, quotations from 22.

76 Ibid., quotations from 27, 8, and 48. For more on benefits of sound planning see 36-37. For the effects on water, air, and wildlife in Jefferson see 28-32.
In a reply also submitted to Congress, POME claimed that the Bureau of Outdoor recreation report possessed “important inaccuracies and omissions and a general lack of depth.” Yet, POME did not question many of Bureau’s main assertions. Rather, POME countered that drawing comparisons to changes due to population growth revealed a misunderstanding of the larger issue. What mattered, POME claimed, was that along with “water rights” and “rights from freedom from trespass” the DOC “proposes to deprive adjoining landowners of their property rights to the [a]esthetic values of their land.”

Colorado environmentalist Roger Hansen substantiated this position when he submitted his own take on the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation’s report. Recalling the Denver Olympics controversy in 1975, Hansen admitted that he believed “the Olympics could have been good for the environment.” However, in 1972, he also agreed with POME that the Bureau’s analysis was flawed because “possible impacts of an Olympics on aesthetic values and scenic resources are recognized but considerably underplayed.” This was a significant “deficiency,” Hansen reasoned, “[b]ecause public concern is focused more on ‘environmental amenities’ than on sewer and water systems, fire protection, transportation, financing, or the status of local planning commissions.” That is to say, Hansen continued, “Olympic opponents are primarily concerned about protecting the beauty of Colorado. Therefore, possible aesthetic insults—from land sales schemes, ticky-tacky developments, roadside tourist strips, proliferation of billboards,

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77 Officers of Protect Our Mountain Environment, Comments of ‘Protect our Mountain Environment’ Regarding Draft Environmental Statement DES 72, June 11, 1972, Box 1 Folder 6, POME SHHL.

highway and road improvements, etc. – must be examined in [more] detail.”

After reading Hansen’s critique, Vance Dittman wrote to him in gratitude for “dealing with the inadequacy of examination and analysis of citizen concerns.” POME employed a specific kind of environmental advocacy, contingent on their rights as citizens and property owners, which they believed entailed access to the beauty around them. Professional environmentalists such as Hansen then legitimized this political position.

POME supporter Michael Holland expanded on such thinking. In May 1971, Holland wrote to democratic Senators George McGovern and Edward Kennedy. As Holland blustered, “[t]o me, the issue is boiling down to whether or not the individual landowner has any right to his property any more or whether the government, either federal or state, can destroy without recourse the beauties of nature and what the individual man so much enjoys.” In a third letter written two days later to one of his own state’s senators, Kansas Republican Robert Dole, Holland concluded that “if the government gives the money to the Olympic Committee for this destruction, the government has committed a criminal act.” To Holland, building Olympic facilities that would compromise the aesthetic value of his Evergreen homestead should literally be viewed as a legal violation.

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79 Roger P. Hansen (Executive Director of the Rocky Mountain Center on Environment), Review and Critique: Draft Environmental Statement of Proposed 1976 Denver Winter Olympic Games of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Department of the Interior, 26 September 1972, Box 1 Folder 6, POME SHHL. For another critique about inadequate attention given to water quality and also waste disposal see John A. Green (Environmental Protection Agency Regional Administrator) to Harold R. Green, Letter, 26 September 1972, copy in the authors possession.

80 Vance R. Dittman to Roger P. Hansen, Letter, 2 October 1972, Box 1 Folder 6, POME SHHL.

81 Michael S. Holland to Senator George McGovern, Letter, 6 May 1972, Box 4 Folder, POME SHHL; Michael S. Holland to Senator Edward Kennedy, Letter, 6 May 1972, Box 4 Folder 42 POME SHHL.

82 Michael S. Holland to Senator Robert Dole, Letter, 8 May 1972, Box 4 Folder 42, POME SHHL.
The presence of this point of view within Jefferson County became evident once again on June 26, 1972, four months before Colorado’s anti-Olympic referendum took place. That evening, approximately three-hundred townspeople gathered once more in Evergreen High School’s gymnasium to make their voices heard. Members of the DOC also attended. The issue at hand was the DOC’s newest plans for ski jumping, bobsled, and luge facilities at Doublehead Mountain, about an eight-mile drive from Indian Hills. The DOC again located Olympic events within the confines of Jefferson County. However, unlike the earlier proposals, use of the land on Doublehead Mountain had been offered to the DOC by the developer who owned it.\(^{83}\) During the meeting over thirty local residents spoke. Twenty-seven opposed the DOC’s plans, including POME secretary Jean Gravell. “The DOC,” Gravell argued, “seeks to deprive us of the valuable . . . rights of quiet enjoyment of our property, freedom from encroachment by actual trespass . . . and of the right to aesthetic satisfaction.”\(^{84}\) Through such statements, Gravell and other Jefferson County environmentalist went beyond ecological impacts and even traditional notions of property rights, pointing to an infringement of a more expansive possession – a right to enjoy the aesthetic experiences made possible by the undeveloped lands near one’s home.

A Pragmatic Class-conscious Environmentalism

The anti-Olympic environmentalist uprising in Jefferson County was a pragmatic movement. Before Denver even won the games, Vance Dittman and others focused on

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84 Gravel quoted in “We Don’t Want Olympics, DOC Is Told,” *Canyon Courier*, 29 June 1972, pp. 1, 5.
property values. Later, in the context of an emergent nationwide environmental movement, those same protesters transferred their attentions to ecological harms. In the processes, Jefferson County residents developed an even more complex environmentalist stance. They claimed that they had rights as citizens and property owners to preserve the aesthetic value of the areas that surrounded their homes. At times, this line of reasoning even led them to quite explicitly abandon the significance of “technical” factors. In such cases, protesters contended that their right to access beautiful landscapes superseded all other measures.

Throughout all this, a key question remains. Precisely what practical end did these various arguments seek to achieve? Put another way, what factor or factors led naturalistic settings to become envisioned so valuable by Jefferson Country residents? This is a complicated question, but the history of the social construction of middle- to upper-class identities offers a trenchant explanation. In protecting the environment of the Jefferson County from the Olympics, MAPC and POME members safeguarded, among other things, an idealized cultural setting and the social statuses inscribed therein. The environment became a cultural signifier essential to preserving a romanticized middle- to upper-class “way of life.”

There are additional reasons that lead to this conclusion. As previously noted, POME did not wholly oppose the Olympics. Protesters presumed certain changes to be unacceptable in Jefferson County and elsewhere along the Front Range. Yet, these same activists judged similar developments tenable in other parts of their state. For example, in the winter of 1972, the DOC moved cross-country events to Steamboat Spring. The Bureau of Recreation would later acknowledge in its June 1972 report that “stadium
facilities and roads from Steamboat Springs to the biathlon and Nordic events would require almost complete alterations of the areas they occupy . . . [and] existing wildlife patterns would likely be disrupted.” Nevertheless, Jefferson County residents did not object to events in Steamboat. Nor did the MAPC or POME voice concern when the DOC selected at location under consideration to become a wilderness preserve to be the site for alpine skiing. That event site was near Vail, over an hour’s drive from Evergreen and Indian Hills. 

Colorado’s anti-Olympic environmental advocacy began as and remained a local movement with objectives constrained by the place. The physical and cultural milieus of the communities MAPC and POME members lived within always stood as the highest priority.

It is also almost certain that if the MAPC or POME relied on aesthetic rights alone they would not have been as effective in garnering support. Aesthetic rights represent the fullest expression of what POME in particular wanted to obtain. Yet, as legal scholar Sheldon Elliot Steinbach noted in the spring of 1970, zoning ordinances in “most states have either recognized aesthetics by aligning it with an expansion of traditional notions of public welfare, or they have rejected it outright.” That is to say, when aesthetic considerations got raised in the political sphere up through the 1960s, they were only recognized as legitimate if they “could be fitted in one of the traditional molds that encompassed public health, safety, [and] morals.”

To protect Jefferson County’s

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85 Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Department of the Interior, Environmental State DES 72 65: Proposed 1976 Denver Olympic Games,” 8 June 1972, quotations from 38 POME SHHL. In contrast, the same Bureau of Outdoor Recreation report also claimed that the “long-term Olympic impacts on the vicinity of Doublehead Mountain,” to which POME stood in ardent opposition, were “not judged to be significant because of the present growth patterns in the area,” see 42.

physical appearance and the cultural capital it carried, POME had to do as they did—highlight additional public harms such as pollution, water contamination, and soil erosion.

The local focus, the legal setting, the explicit anxiety over losing one’s “way of life,” along with a historical context the equated middle-class membership with certain standards of living, lends weight to the argument that the brand of environmentalism that Jefferson County protests and their supporters constructed and embrace was built upon predominantly white middle-and upper-class expectations. To prevent Colorado’s pro-growth ethos from spilling into Jefferson County, local environmentalists employed “aesthetic rights,” fashioning a stance that enabled—in addition to the preservation flora and fauna—the protection of an idealized social status. Due to the DOC’s plans for the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games, this self-interest and class-inflected environmentalist thinking gained significant attention in Jefferson County, the state of Colorado, and even nationwide. Though Jefferson County’s middle-class rights-based environmentalism does not deserve sole or even primary credit for Colorado’s decision to banish the 1976 winter games, it would play an important role in fueling the broader movement that did.

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87 Newsweek, Sports Illustrated, and Walter Cronkite’s Face the Nation each covered POME and interviewed Vance Dittman.
As the Mountain Area Planning Council in Jefferson County solidified its opposition to Olympic events in Evergreen, on the other side of Denver, in Arapahoe County, a citizen named Alice F. Ellis came to an even bolder conclusion. Ellis believed the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games should be kept out of Colorado entirely. As Ellis wrote in a June 1969 “open forum” essay published in the Denver Post: “I suggest we stop and think for a moment about where our priorities should be.” “The racial climate in Denver has just hit a new low,” Ellis warned; “our air and water pollution problems are mounting; we desperately need an adequate public transportation system; our money is needed for education; we are threatened on the north by poisonous gas and on the south by serious floods.” As Ellis saw it, Coloradans should address these more important issues first, before playing host to an international sports extravaganza. “Let’s not be like the man who knows he should spend his money to repair the leaky roof and faulty wiring of his home,” she cautioned, “but who can’t resist the shiny new car in the dealer’s showroom.”

Ellis pointed to multiple reasons for why Denver should not host the Olympic games, but the underlying principle on which she staked her case was straightforward. The Olympics were not the best use of taxpayer resources. Prior to the DOC’s successful bid for the Olympics, only a few Coloradans voiced this type of anti-Olympic objection. However, beginning in late 1970, two small but vociferous factions raised concerns

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related to this notion. As Ellis noted, around 1969 the “racial climate” in Denver became tumultuous. Within this context, fearful that city funds would be wasted on mere entertainment, marginalized Hispanic and black Denverites demanded inclusion in the DOC’s decision-making processes. Meanwhile, two liberal Colorado politicians began to question the overall economic viability of the games. Their discovery of the DOC’s dubious cost estimates, combined with protests from within Indian Hills and Evergreen, led the legislators to demand that the Olympics be removed completely from the Centennial State.

The DOC would eventually move all but the bobsled and luge from Jefferson County. They also responded to minority concerns by bringing half a dozen Hispanic and black Coloradans into the DOC. Moreover, the Olympic planners did their best to provide more detailed cost estimates. Still, the DOC did not take seriously the idea that the majority of their fellow citizens might wish to banish the Olympics. More than anything else, the DOC responded to objections to their Olympic plans by attempting to control portrayals of the 1976 Denver games in the media. However, in the spring of 1971, an investigative journalist from the *Rocky Mountain News* revealed the problematic nature of the DOC’s original Olympic proposal. Soon thereafter it became apparent that the DOC underestimated Colorado’s Olympic dissent and overestimated its ability to manage public discourse. By the end of 1971, broad opposition to the Denver Olympics had gained genuine traction, setting up a political showdown between Olympic boosters and a burgeoning anti-Olympic coalition.
Minority Inclusion

No organization protested for as long or as fervently as Jefferson County’s middle-class environmentalists did. After them, the next group to voice an organized opposition to the DOC’s plans was a contingent of citizens from the Hispanic and African American communities in Denver. In the 1960s, about a quarter of a million Hispanics lived in Colorado, constituting by the decade’s end just under twenty percent of the state’s population. Hispanics represented the state’s largest minority group. As Colorado historians Carl Abbott, Stephen J. Leonard, and Thomas J. Noel point out, Hispanics also suffered institutional and cultural discrimination throughout the state, especially with regard to health care, recreation facilities, schooling, law enforcement, housing, and employment practices. African Americans made up about two percent of Colorado’s population and faced similar racism, highlighted by de facto residential and school segregation. Still, it was the larger Hispanic community that worked the lowest-paying jobs and lived in the worst housing conditions.²

By the late 1960s, as Denver’s bid to the IOC ramped up, friction between Chicano activists and Denver authorities escalated. In 1967, a Hispanic section of the city, known as Auraria, was selected by Governor Love’s administration to become the location of a new college, the Auraria Higher Education Center. Without conferring with Auraria residents, over two hundred households were slated for relocation. In response,

155 Auraria families filed suit. Later, in 1969, a group called the Auraria Residents Organization (ARO) attempted to stop the passage of an election bond meant to finance the project. When the bond passed despite these efforts, 181 individuals or households were forced to move.³

In the spring of 1969, tensions boiled again after hundreds of Hispanic students boycotted classes at Denver’s West High School in protest of a racist slur allegedly used by a teacher. After marching to City Hall, the state’s capitol building, and downtown Denver’s police headquarters, the young activists confronted police officers waiting for them upon their return to West High. As newspapers described, when the students remained outside their school, refusing to go back to class, a “fight” broke out between them and the police. The brawl resulted in two people hospitalized and twenty-six individuals arrested, including adult Chicano civil rights leader Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales. Authorities charged Gonzales with the assault and battery of a police officer. Police also arrested a photographer for hitting an officer with his camera, six female students for “using filthy language,” and five male students for throwing rocks.⁴

Many Hispanic and black Coloradans were inspired by the civil rights movement’s rising militancy as the decade progressed and 1964 Civil Rights Bill failed

³ Magdalena Gallegos, “The Forgotten Community: Hispanic Auraria in the Twentieth Century,” Colorado Heritage 2 (1985): 5-20, see especially p. 20. Relocated families were given compensation, but Gallegos points out it was minimal. One woman, Isabel Ramos, who owned three houses in Auraria, received $35,000.

⁴ Bill Marvel, “West High School Students and Police Fight,” Rocky Mountain News, 21 March 1969, p. 1. Forty percent of West High School students were Mexican American. “Gonzales Trial: Police Blamed for Violence at West,” clipping, Folder 52 Box 6, Rodolfo Gonzales Collection, Denver Public Library, Denver Colorado (Hereafter RGC DPL); “Corky, Five Enter Pleas of Innocent,” clipping, Folder 52 Box 6, RGC DPL; “Police, Students and Others Clash at West High,” clipping, Folder 52 Box 6, RGC DPL.
to eradicate systemic prejudice. In fact, members of the Black Nationalist Black Panther Party joined Corky Gonzales in support of the West High walkout. “This is a day of black and brown unity,” announced Lauren Waston, the founder of the Denver chapter of the Black Panthers. At the same time, Gonzales oversaw a nationwide organization called the “the Crusade for Justice” from his home in Denver, denouncing police brutality, condemning the Vietnam War, fighting drug use, instilling a sense of Chicano solidarity and pride, and, ultimately, arguing for Chicano independence from Anglo-American society.

Within this setting, minority activists sought to politicize Denver’s acquisition of the 1976 winter Olympic games. In May 1970, two days after returning from Amsterdam, Denver Mayor William McNichols faced picketers outside his office. Demonstrators wanted to know how Denver could spend money to host the Olympics while a “housing crisis” threatened the city. As Charles Jones of Denver’s Tenants’ Rights Organization (TRO) explained, the Olympics would divert resources from poverty-stricken citizens in need of shelter. The TRO declared it would campaign against the Olympics unless McNichols approved a plan for the rehabilitation of 1,000 “living units.” McNichols did not meet with the housing advocates, sending a representative from the city council in his stead. When state officials failed to attend an ensuing meeting with the TRO, the group threatened to print brochures showing the “true” picture

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6 “Militants Join Move for Boycott at West,” clipping, Folder 10 Box 5, RGC DPL.

of Denver, as opposed to “only the good part of the city” found in the DOC’s presentation to the IOC. ⁸

For many Hispanic and black residents, the DOC’s procurement of the Olympics without citizen consent proved disconcerting. Peter Garcia, a priest at Auraria’s St. Cajetan Catholic Church, led the ARO’s attempt to stop the Auraria relocations. He was sensitive to possibility of the Denver games harming Hispanics against their will. As a result, Garcia formed a group called Citizens Interested in an Equitable Olympics (CIEO) to press for “black and brown participation” in the planning of the 1976 winter games. Distressed by the decision to build the Auraria Higher Education Center and inspired by their nation’s larger civil rights struggle, Hispanic and black citizens fought to have a say in the changes taking place in their communities. ⁹

CIEO left little room for compromise in this respect. In October 1970, Garcia wrote to DOC President Robert Pringle to request the inclusion of minority Denverites within the DOC, warning there would be “opposition and hostility . . . toward the planned Olympics” if the demand was not met. ¹⁰ In a similar vein, on November 23, 1970, Garcia, Lauren Watson, his brother Clarke Watson, and Marcella Trujillo, the Director of Mexican-American Studies at the University of Colorado in Denver, met with Mayor McNichols and asked him to disband the DOC so that it could be reconstituted with a more diverse Executive Council. Importantly, the CIEO members were adamant that any

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⁸ George Lane, “Housing Dissenters Turn Ire on HUD, Olympics,” Denver Post, 30 May 1970, p. 28.


minorities who joined the DOC should be chosen by fellow Hispanic and black Coloradoans. 11

The DOC reacted by naming three Hispanic and three black members to their Board of Directors, but did not invite any minority citizens to their all-white and all-male Executive Council. The DOC also made the selections without consulting CIEO. Instead, a DOC “screening committee” invited Floyd Little (the Denver Broncos’ star black running back), Paco Sanchez (a Hispanic radio station owner and real estate developer), Joseph Torres (a Hispanic Roman Catholic Priest), Charles R. Cousins (a black real estate investor), William Roberts (the black Director of Metropolitan Denver Construction) and Donald E. Cordova (a Hispanic attorney and member of the Latin American Educational Federation). 12 In short order, CIEO presented the Denver City Council, who approved the new members, with a petition signed by 655 individuals demanding that the CIEO re-select the DOC’s minority representatives. 13

The request went unmet and on December 4, 1970 CIEO’s “chief negotiator,” Clarke Watson, wrote a blistering letter to McNichols. By ignoring CIEO and choosing minority representatives to fit their own preferences, Watson claimed, the DOC and the mayor acted in a manner “reminiscent of plantation masters evaluating slaves at the marketplace.” In doing so, Watson informed McNichols, “you have turned what was a crevice into a gap between your administration and the minority community.” Watson

11 Lane, “Minority Olympic Role Request Will Be Aired,” Olympic Clippings, DPL.

12 George Lane, “McNichols Adds 16 to Olympic Board,” Denver Post, 6 December 1970, p. 3; Mayor William H. McNichols, Press Release, 6 December 1970, Folder 6 Box 1976 Olympics, POME SHHL.

13 Olson, Power, Public Policy and the Environment, 140; Olson obtain this information from a letter between Peter Garcia to Clarke Watson, which was in the possession of Peter Garcia at the time of her study.
continued: “No conscientious and intelligent minority citizen in this community is willing to be duped by your dixiecratic paternalism.”

After accusing McNichols of outright racism, Watson warned the mayor that although “[w]e have yet to see a true crisis rend this community . . . I would not predict that such a possibility is as remote as you seem to think.” Alluding to recent “race riots” in major cities such as Detroit and Los Angeles, which left thousands of people injured, buildings destroyed, and many dead, Watson implied that there was an increasing likelihood of a violent backlash. In the following days, Watson tried to convince the six minority representatives chosen by the DOC to refuse their appointments. He also manufactured meetings with Colorado politicians and Governor Love, where he, instead of the Governor, would unexpectedly arrive to make his case before unwitting Colorado policymakers.

Although the six minority citizens selected by the DOC did not resign from their new posts, CIEO garnered support from at least one prominent black Coloradan. Initially, Mayor McNichols asked African American and 1952 Olympic long jump gold-medalist Jerome Biffle to be on the DOC Board. Biffle grew up in Denver and after winning gold at the Helsinki Olympics returned to coach track at Denver’s East High School. When invited to serve with the DOC, he declined the offer. “I want very much to do whatever I can to make these games the best in history,” Biffle wrote to McNichols,

14 “Chronology,” circa December 1970, Folder 13 Box 100, WMP DPL.

15 Clark R. Watson to William H. McNichols, Letter, 4 December 1970, Folder 13 Box 100, WMP DPL. Other supporters of CIEO cited by Watson included “Senator Brown, James Reynolds, Representative Benavidez, Representative Valdez, Representative Hamilton, Father Garcia, and the vast minority of the communities they represent.”

16 “Chronology,” circa December 1970, Folder 13 Box 100, WMP DPL.
“but I cannot in conscience accept an appointment made by a committee that is not broadly representative of the total Denver community.” Indeed, Biffle went on television on behalf of CIEO to draw attention to the issue, pointing out that even after the six minority representatives were added, twenty-four out of twenty-five DOC board members were still either businessmen or politicians and none at all were women. “I personally can’t go along with doing things this way,” Biffle avowed. The Olympic champion decline to be a part of an organization in which minority groups remained, in his view, underrepresented.

For a limited time, CIEO also attracted supporters from within traditional political circles. Around the end of November 1970, Elvin R. Caldwell, the first African American to serve on the Denver City Council, wrote to the DOC imploring them to listen to minority citizens. The “growing concern as to the involvement of the minority and disadvantaged people of the community . . . is understandable,” Caldwell began. According to the councilman, he had been assured by the DOC that “minority and disadvantaged communities would be equitably represented.” He insisted that “the DOC, by acting in a reasonably fast manner, can demonstrate to our entire community that they are serious about making the Olympics a total community endeavor by enabling the community to have a meaningful input.” Any “further delays and more promises,”


18 “Chronology,” circa December 1970, Folder 13 Box 100, WMP DPL; “Mayor Plans No Meet with Minorities of DOC,” Denver Post, 15 December 1970, p. 3; Technically twenty-three out of twenty-five DOC board members were businessmen or politicians. Two minority representatives, Floyd Little and Joseph Torres, were the exceptions. Additionally, one woman served on the DOC board, Nancy Harrington.
Caldwell contended, “can only serve to do further irreparable harm to the ’76 Winter Olympics effort.” If the DOC failed to respond in thirty days, Caldwell forewarned, he would ask the City Council to rescind the $75,000 they committed to the Olympic organizers for the coming year.\(^\text{19}\) Caldwell took a strong stand in the name of ensuring the input of his Hispanic and black constituents.

In spite of Caldwell’s rhetoric, a divide existed in Denver between minority politicians and activists. When the DOC appointed its six Hispanic and black members at the beginning of December, Caldwell consented to the selections.\(^\text{20}\) Meanwhile, a nine-person DOC Executive Board, consisting only of white men, retained power to override decisions made by the board through a two-thirds majority vote. Moreover, with ties to the Colorado business community, many of the new minority members serving on the board seemed likely to go along with what the rest of the DOC wanted. As DOC legal advisor Richard Davis admitted, when selecting new Hispanic and black members, “the DOC did not want any obstructionists.”\(^\text{21}\) Thus, unlike Caldwell, the founding members of CIEO remained doubtful that decision making related to 1976 would attend to the best interests of structurally disadvantaged groups.

Curiously, CIEO quieted its anti-Olympic advocacy around the start of 1971. This was likely a result of its lack of success, the prominence of other anti-Olympic organizers, and a need to attend to other issues of social injustice. Garcia, however, continued to follow Olympic happenings. For example, he attended a public legislative

\(^{19}\) Elvin R. Caldwell (Councilman District #8) to Denver Organizing Committee, Letter, 27 November 1970, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL.

\(^{20}\) “Chronology,” Report, circa December 1970, Folder 13 Box 100, WMP DPL.

\(^{21}\) Olson, *Power, Public Policy and the Environment*, 137-142, Davis quotation from p. 141.
committee meeting on the Olympics held in March 1971 where he plead with Colorado leaders to “hear his people.” Garcia anticipated that hosting the Olympics would be a “disaster” unless the city built decent housing for minority residents in advance.22 Furthermore, in the spring of 1972, minority citizens protested again when the federal government’s Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) committed funds to assist Denver’s Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) in building press housing for the winter games. DURA designated the accommodations for Denver’s East and West Side, primarily black and Hispanic areas of the city.

DURA slated the new facilities to become low- and middle-income residences after the Olympics were over. In fact, many minority officials voiced strong support for the plan, including Colorado House Representatives Elvin R. Caldwell, Betty Benavidez (the first Hispanic woman to serve in the Colorado House), and Adolph Gomez. As a member of the DOC, Reverend Joseph Torres made the new facilities his primary focus. Members of an area advocacy group dubbed the West Side Coalition even claimed the housing plan was the “only project that will help poor people as the result of the 1976 Winter Olympics.”23

Yet, others doubted the facilities would really benefit Hispanic and black community members. In June 1972, when DURA authorities met with West Side

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22 Norm Brown to Don Magarrell, Letter, Re: Legislative Committee meeting March 5, 1971 (Open Meeting) at the Capital, 2:00-4:30 p.m., Folder 12 Box 1, DOC DPL; Fred Brown, “Ski Officials to Inspect Alternate Colo. Olympic Sites,” Denver Post, 6 March 1971, p. 1, 3.

23 “Denverites Lash Anti-Olympics Drive,” Rocky Mountains News, 15 April 1972, p. 5. DOC minutes show that Torres, the most active member of the DOC minority representatives, advocated strongly for the press housing on behalf of Denver’s West Side Coalition, see Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 16 December 1971, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL; Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 16 March 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL.
residents to explain their position, Peter Garcia stood up in the middle of the presentation to shout: “we heard the same, pardon the expression, bull - - - - two years ago!” The estimated two hundred West Side residents present at the June meeting applauded Garcia’s disruption. The DURA proposal included the relocation of 247 families or individuals and although the city promised new and affordable housing would be the result, the wounds of the recent Auraria relocation remained fresh in people’s minds.24

When it came to the 1976 Denver games, many minority residents in the city held little faith in the impulses or promises of Colorado authorities. Consequently, Hispanic and black Denverites seized the games as a chance to highlight a concrete example of a broader problem – systematic ethnic and racial inequality. In doing so, these Coloradans provided added anti-Olympic ammunition which future Olympic opponents would gladly appropriate.25

Richard Lamm and Robert Jackson Question Costs

While CIEO highlighted a lack of minority representation in the DOC, two Colorado politicians presented another criticism of Denver’s Olympic planners. In 1967, freshmen Democratic Representatives Richard Lamm and Robert Jackson supported the idea of bringing the Olympics toward the Rocky Mountains, voting in favor of a resolution that urged the United States Olympic Committee to assign the games to


25 Others also continued to use the Olympics as a way to advocate for greater minority recognition and input. For example, in April 1972, Colorado Senator George Brown – the only black Colorado senator at the time – tried to introduce an amendment to a spending bill that would have required the DOC to hire more minority citizens, see Richard Tucker, “Senate Hikes State Outlays to $2 Million,” Rocky Mountain News, 15 April 1972, p. 5,
Denver.\textsuperscript{26} As Lamm recalled, there was no debate or discussion since everyone in the legislature agreed that hosting the Olympics in Colorado “would be,” in Lamm’s words, “a great civic coup.” The 1967 vote on the Olympics resolution was unanimous.\textsuperscript{27}

Lamm graduated from law school at the University of California at Berkley in 1961 and moved to South Central Denver, where he became a certified accountant.\textsuperscript{28} In 1966, at the age of thirty-one, his district elected him to represent them in the Colorado House. Jackson worked as a successful business owner, developing and managing car dealerships in Pueblo, Colorado, about 150 miles south of Denver. In 1966, his constituents elected him to the state legislature at the age of forty.\textsuperscript{29} With backgrounds in accounting and business, senior Colorado policymakers selected Lamm and Jackson to be members of the state’s Audit Committee. There they began looking into how much money Colorado should expect to allocate for the winter Olympic games. What they soon realized, Lamm recalled, was that “nobody knew how much it would cost.” After researching the budgets of previous winter Olympics, such as Squaw Valley and Grenoble, the novice politicians faced the “quite sobering experience” of knowing, as Lamm put it, “we had given a blank check to what seemed to us to be a much more expensive endeavor than we ever had any idea it was going to be.”\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{26} This resolution is discussed in chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{27} Richard Lamm, telephone interview with author, 9 May 2016, notes and recording in author’s possession.

\textsuperscript{28} Lamm grew up in the suburbs of Chicago and before law school studied accounting at the University of Wisconsin. The liberal agenda of President John F. Kennedy inspired by Lamm to entered local politics, see Richard Lamm.


\textsuperscript{30} Richard Lamm.
Prior to Denver actually winning the bid, however, Lamm and Jackson left this potential quandary to their peripheral vison. The DOC was only bidding for the games; hosting the Olympics was not a real problem yet. Lamm, moreover, became engulfed in a separate issue. In 1967, he introduced and passed the nation’s first liberalized abortion law, permitting women to terminate pregnancies if their health was in peril, a child might be born with a serious birth defect, or the pregnancy was the result of incest or rape. Lamm represented a wealthy and primarily Catholic district, within a Republican run legislature, in a state with a Republican governor. Presenting the bill was, in Lamm’s recollection, “an insanely risky thing to do” and he did so “having no hope we [the Colorado legislature] could ever pass it.” Yet three weeks after introducing the bill, a majority of his fellow legislators voted to support it and Governor Love signed it into law. Lamm quickly became a recognized defender of liberal causes, spending the next few years battling to keep the new Colorado abortion law intact while testifying throughout the country in states considering similar initiatives.

Up until May 1970, Lamm and Jackson treated Denver’s chances of hosting the Olympics as slim but, after the DOC won their bid, as Lamm described, “it became reality for us.” The blank check they feared writing was now in the hands of the DOC. Accordingly, Lamm and Jackson devised a plan to try and halt state spending on the

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31 According to Lamm, he “ran into” the abortion issue in 1963, when traveling in South America for six months with his wife, Dottie Lamm. As he recalls, “it was estimated 25% of hospital beds is South America were filled with blotched abortions” and he and his wife “saw firsthand the toll of unwanted pregnancy.” Lamm recalls “that was very much my mind when I entered the Colorado legislature,” see Richard Lamm.

32 Richard Lamm; also see Martin Moran, “Love Signs Controversial Abortion Bill into Law,” *Rocky Mountain News*, 26 April 1967, p. 5. Although this entire article is on page five, the paper’s front-page showed the headline: “Abortion Bill Signed into Law by Gov. Love.”

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event. On January 4, 1971, the DOC was asked to testify before the Colorado’s Joint Budget Committee (JBC) to justify their recent request of $310,000 to continue planning the 1976 Winter Olympics. Beforehand, Lamm reached out to a JBC member, Republican Joe Shoemaker, and passed him information regarding the budgets of pervious winter games along with other comparable construction projects. Lamm hoped that upon seeing the research, the JBC would come to the same realization as he had – that the DOC was significantly “low balling” its projected expenses.  

When DOC President Robert Pringle, DOC Treasurer G.D. Hubbard, DOC Secretary Donald Magarrell, and COC Chairman Richard Olson came before Colorado’s JBC in early 1971, as Lamm remembered, they “ran into a buzz saw.” The Olympic planners rehearsed their presentation, but Shoemaker repeatedly interrupted it, asking for specifics that the DOC members were unable to provide. How much money exactly would be spent; what would it be spent on; and where precisely would requisite financial resources come from? The only solid figures the DOC put forward were the same ones they had been citing since 1967, mirroring the expenses of the 1960 Squaw Valley Olympics. They did not know how much the Denver Olympics would cost or how to pay for it.  

Colorado Olympic Commission Chairman Richard Olson explained to the JBC that too many decisions still needed to be made outside of Denver to offer anything more

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33 Richard Lamm.
34 Ibid.
35 Fred Brown, “Colorado Olympic Plan Termed Too General,” Denver Post, 4 January 1971, clipping, Folder 66 Box 6, POME SHHL. The DOC had been using the Squaw Valley numbers they since 1967 when they received an explicitly tentative cost analysis from the Denver Research Institute, discussed in chapter three.
conclusive. By this stage, the DOC had begun reevaluating event locations. But they would remain unable to submit confident projections until they formally chose new sites, the IOC accepted them, and engineers studied construction prospects. Moreover, as a subsequent DOC “Weekly Staff Report” put it, at the JBC hearing, “presence of the press required restraint in revealing some of the information of our proposed planning.” As DOC Technical Director Ted Farwell emphasized at a later DOC meeting, “premature publicity” pertaining to new event locations “could seriously affect our ability to get a proper job done with the IOC.” Fearful of the International Olympic Committee’s reaction, the DOC was not ready to unveil the drastic changes being made to the bid that the IOC technically voted for in Amsterdam.

As a result, the JBC recommended the state withhold funding for the time being. Shoemaker explained the decision, noting “I don’t think the homework has really been done in terms of funding.” Acknowledging that the Colorado legislature had provided a “blank check” thus far, Shoemaker counseled, “you’ve reached the point in time where it’s got to be done according to the same (budget request) standards we apply to everyone else.” As the JBC Chairman, Republican Representative Harry M. Locke, wrote to Olson three days later: “The committee wants to be completely aware now, of all commitments

36 G.D. Hubbard, Jr. to DOC Executive Council, Letter, 6 January 1971, Box 1 Folder 28, DOC DPL. For the DOC revaluations underway see, Technical Division to the DOC Executive Committee, Report No. 1, 14 January 1971, Box 2 Folder 2, DOC DPL.

37 Weekly Staff Report – Weeks of December 28, 1970 & January 4, 1971, 8 January 1971, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL.

38 Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 18 November 1971, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL.

39 Prior the IOC sanctioning new event locations, this was stated by DOC members as the reason all DOC meetings had been closed to the public, see Richard O’Reilly, “DOC Directors Vote to Conduct Open Meetings,” Rocky Mountain News, 25 February 1972, p. 5.
made by the Olympic Commission and of the total costs and funding requirements.”

Attached to Locke’s letter to Olson was a list of twenty-three questions that the JBC instructed the DOC to answer. The particulars of the DOC’s spending plan needed to be cleared up before the JBC would recommend any more Olympic appropriations.40 The JBC’s confrontation with the DOC was reported in the Denver Post and created serious public doubts about the DOC’s cost estimates for the first time.41

One week later, with uncertainty regarding the DOC’s projections under the spotlight, Jackson announced he was going to introduce a bill to permanently bar state funds from going to the DOC. The $310,000 that the DOC just asked for, Jackson asserted, was just “a small part of the iceberg.” As Jackson reasoned, “I can’t see putting money into a sport [such as the Olympics] . . . when there are higher priorities such as education, environmental protection, and benefits to the elderly.” Jackson further exclaimed, “if we’re going to change our minds, this is the time to do it . . . We ought to say to the nation and the world: We’re sorry – we’re concerned about the environment. We made a mistake. Take the games elsewhere.”42 A few days later Lamm stated his

40 Harry M. Locke to R.H. Olson, Letter, 7 January 1971, Box 1 Folder 10, DOC DPL

41 After the January 4, 1971 session, the JBC provided the DOC a list questions to be answered, see attachment to Harry M. Locke to R.H. Olson, Letter, 7 January 1971, Box 1 Folder 10, DOC DPL. For example, the JBC requested overall cost estimates, expected Federal, State and City contributions, and asked about particular facility and highway construction costs. They also demanded revenue projections from television and other sources. The JBC even wondered about how the DOC planned to control over-commercialization and environmental damage. Also see Fred Brown, “Colorado Olympic Plan Termed Too General.”

42 “Bill Planned to Bar Funds for Olympics,” Denver Post, 10 January 1971, clipping, Folder 65 Box 6, POME SHHL.
support of Jackson, repeating that the Denver Olympics were not worth the cost to Colorado taxpayers.\textsuperscript{43}

From the start of their anti-Olympic campaign, Lamm and Jackson zeroed in on costs and environmental damage.\textsuperscript{44} The uproar in Jefferson County had reached them. Indeed, in 1969, Lamm became a faculty member at the University of Denver’s Law School, where he met and began exchanging information with none other than retired law professor and Protect Our Mountain Environment leader Vance Dittman. Lamm and Dittman remained “in very close contact” throughout the Olympics controversy. As Lamm described, “Dittman definitely . . . drew a picture . . . [of] how the luge and the bobsled run would snake down those mountains and cut big scars visible from the highways.” According to Lamm, Dittman was the one who effectively challenged “the idea that this [the Olympics] was going to be a good thing for us growth-wise.”\textsuperscript{45} Thus, following Dittman’s lead, Jackson attested in the beginning of February 1971, “[w]e find these days it’s in our interest to regulate growth or even stop it. We no longer think in terms of something being better just because it’s bigger.” Lamm affirmed that if Colorado hosts the Olympics “[w]e are going to be taking good land and turning it into parking lots.”\textsuperscript{46} Jefferson County environmentalism complemented Lamm’s and

\textsuperscript{43} “Many Pay, Few Gain: Legislators Challenge Olympics for Colorado,” \textit{Denver Post}, 15 January 1971, clipping, Folder 67 Box 6, POME SHHL.

\textsuperscript{44} Notably, Lamm and Jackson did not bring up minority concerns. In an interview with Lamm, he expressed no recollection of CIEO.

\textsuperscript{45} Richard Lamm; Dittman also was the person who made Lamm aware of the lack of snowfall in Evergreen.

\textsuperscript{46} Quotations from Cal Queal, “Yes, They Want no Olympics,” \textit{Denver Post}, 7 February 1971, p. 7.
Jackson’s main point. Committing state money to the Olympics was an ill-advised public policy.

**Olympic Opponents and Proponents Face-off**

Akin to his abortion bill from three year earlier, Lamm recognized that his opposition to hosting the Olympics as – at least at first – a subversive move. “This was like taking on motherhood,” Lamm claimed, “[w]e were sort of civic traitors.” At the beginning of February 1971, Lamm and Jackson together officially proposed their bill to halt state funding on the Denver games. It never got out of committee.⁴⁷ When Lamm and Jackson approached the Denver City Council a few weeks later to ask that the people of Denver be given a chance to vote on whether they wanted to host the Olympics, the effort also did not get far. As City Council President John F. Kelly spouted, the request made him “embarrassed for the citizens of Denver and Colorado.” Another city councilman, Edward Burke Jr., simply declared he “couldn’t support such a referendum because the Olympics are the greatest thing that ever happened to Denver.”⁴⁸ Denver’s political leaders had no desire to let the Olympics slip through their grasps.

The popular press also condemned Lamm and Jackson, depicting them as misinformed political agitators. In January of 1971, while taking shots at CIEO, POME, and Jackson, the *Denver Post* attested that the “1976 Winter Olympics have been

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⁴⁸ Quotations from “Olympic Vote in Denver Goal of 9 Legislators,” *Rocky Mountain News*, 26 January 1971, clipping, Folder 67 Box 6, POME SHHL. They were joined by Representatives John S. Carroll, Charles J. DeMoulin, Hubert M. Safran, Eldon W. Cooper, Wayne N. Knox, Betty L. Benavidez, Ruben A. Valdez, and Gerald H. Kopel.
awarded to Denver and it is inconceivable that the community would allow that fact to be negated.” As the Post continued, the “award of the prestigious event . . . looms large in the history of the city and state . . . it should not suffer lack of support merely because it provides a convenient lever for some to use in an effort to pry concessions for their interests.” Quoting Jackson directly, the Denver Post editorial professed, “[t]o follow Jackson’s advice . . . would be a disastrous and stupid mistake.”49 A Rocky Mountain News editorial, also directed at Jackson, concurred: “We . . . trust that other legislators with less concern for political grandstanding will take a look at the facts, weigh the probabilities and possibilities, and then act without [a] closed mind, such as Jackson exhibits.”50

After Lamm and Jackson went to the Denver City Council, the Rocky Mountain News continued to reiterate the view that the young Colorado representatives had lost their way. “The almost unbelievable flap thrown up by a handful of state legislators . . . to renege on Denver’s successful bid for the 1976 Olympics is the rawest kind of political pandering,” the newspaper proclaimed. “We certainly hope that City Council ignores that ridiculous demand.” Acknowledging criticisms about high costs and environmental damage, the News further retorted, “[w]e don’t buy either . . . Tourism is the state’s second biggest cash crop” and, as the editorial added, “[t]o hold off priming the pump of attraction would be like a beet farmer not fertilizing his field.” The Rocky Mountain News just as easily discounted protesters from Jefferson County. “The environmental

50 “Looking on the Blind Side,” Rocky Mountain News, 27 February 1971, clipping, Folder 68 Box 6 POME SHHL.
“pitch,” the editorial bluntly claimed, “is almost too ridiculous to take seriously.” Within Denver’s most widely media outlets, the DOC appeared correct to assume that only a few would ever object to the commercial value of hosting the winter Olympics.

Even so, neither Lamm nor Jackson relented. “I don’t think anyone knows how much the Olympics will cost,” Jackson contended in February 1971, “and I’m certain nobody knows exactly where the money’s coming from.” In the same vein, Lamm clarified that when he and Jackson voted in favor of the Olympics in 1967, “[w]e had no idea what it was going to cost. If wisdom comes late,” Lamm surmised, “that doesn’t mean reject it.” On February 25, 1971, DOC members returned to Colorado’s capitol building to update a joint session of the Colorado House and Senate on their plans. The DOC went into the summit intending to emphasize that there could be no question of whether or not Denver should host the Olympics because the city already had them. As President of Midland Federal Savings & Loan Association and the DOC’s Chairman of Finance and Business Relations, Rollin Barnard, exclaimed at the meeting, “[w]e have the games for 1976. There’s no moral or proper way that this fact can be reversed or refuted . . . Our job now – yours and mine – is to stage these games the best way possible.” Presumably, doing so meant the continued appropriation of funds from state coffers. At the joint session, Jackson remained incredulous, telling the DOC representatives “we deserve better answers.” Fellow Democratic Representative Wayne Knox agreed, calling the DOC’s presentation an hour long “flag waving rally” filled with

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52 Lamm and Jackson quoted in Cal Queal, “Yes, They Want No Olympics.”

53 Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Board of Director’s Meeting Minutes, 18 February 1971,” Box 1 Folder 19, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL.
“propaganda.” Lamm and Jackson successfully made their point to the JBC and now other Colorado politicians began to see things from their point of view.

At the beginning of March 1971, DOC members provided their most in-depth analysis of Olympic costs and revenues to date, presenting the information before a legislative committee formed to study the DOC’s plans. Though the DOC finally provided hard numbers, projecting expenses between $18 and $25 million, they also admitted there remained many “unknowns.” These included the number of people they would have to employ, transportation requirements, expenses for the housing and feeding of athletes and the press, which facilities they would use, and at what rates. As a “status report” sent from Donald Magarrell to the DOC’s Board of Directors shows, through the

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54 Barnard, Pringle, Jackson, and Knox quoted in Leonard Larsen, “Games Must Go On, Solons Told,” Denver Post, 26 February 1971, p. 3. For the DOC’s preparation for the joint session see Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Board of Director’s Meeting Minutes, 18 February 1971, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL; Robert Olson, Outline of Presentation to Joint Session of the Legislature Thursday, February 25, 1971 – 11 a.m. – State House Chambers, 18 February 1971, Folder 13 Box 1, DOC DLP.

55 Legislative Committee to Study Plans for the 1976 Winter Olympic Games, Minutes of Meeting, 4 March 1971, Box 1 Folder 10, DOC DPL. Many of these same unknowns were shared with the JBC earlier, see attachment to Richard Olson to Senator Harry M. Locke, Letter, 20 January 1971, Box 1 Folder 10, DOC DPL. In this document the DOC claimed “the Winter Olympics can be held in the State of Colorado without requiring the State to provide a majority of the necessary funds.” However, the DOC also explained, “[w]ithout a solid planning base and continued demonstration of State backing the ability of the Committee to obtain fund elsewhere will be seriously restricted.” Indeed, at this stage, the DOC advised, “$1 wisely spent on planning now might save $5-10 in the future” and “denial of planning funds now might well cause the Sate to have to step in later to straighten out a financial mess at what would be far greater expense to Colorado taxpayers and embarssment to the State.” To get funds from other sources and keep costs down in the future, the DOC contended, the JBC needed to approve state funds now. Characteristically, the DOC then proceed to provide uncertain answers. As one example, while they estimated overall costs would reach between $18 and $25 million, the DOC stressed “significant ‘unknowns’ . . . will effect these estimates.” The DOC could not say: (1) the number of people they would need to employ, (2) how many athletes would attend, (3) whether they could charge athletes and members of the press for housing and food, (4) what construction costs would be generally because location remained undetermined, (5) what facilities they would need to pay rent for, (6) what snowmaking costs would be, (7) what transportation to facilities would be provided, (8) or costs added due to environmental concerns. Meanwhile, the DOC also could not say for certain who precisely would pay for what, once exact costs were determined. Though they estimated broadly the between $25 and $100 million would be brought to Colorado because of the Olympics.
spring of 1971, the committee simply did not know where they were going to hold many winter Olympic events.56

The committee of legislators that set out to examine the issue of public funding soon provided their fellow policymakers with recommendations. The group concluded that state should provide the money that the DOC had most recently asked for, but afterward stop there. As their report read, the “committee does not believe that state money should be used for construction of facilities or even structural planning.”57 Yet, even these concessions left Robert Jackson unsatisfied. As a member of the group examining the DOC’s budget, he decided to author a dissenting view.

In Jackson’s mind, it continued “to appear unreasonable to believe that, even with the best of controls, the eventual expenditure for the games has much of a chance of being under [a] $20 million net tax burden.” Jackson noted that “the Denver Organizing Committee indicated an estimated range of expenditures.” However, he exclaimed, “the same document has so many items specified as ‘unknowns’ as to make the estimates meaningless.” Aware of the funding history of the Squaw Valley Olympics, the Pueblo Democrat predicted that in a few years the legislature would be faced with “an ‘emergency request’ in order to ‘save the games.’” With the event only a year or two

56 Donald F. Magarrell to Board of Directors, Status Report, 10 June 1971, Folder 4 Box 48, POME SHHL.

57 The 1971 Legislative Committee on the Olympics, “State Participation in the 1976 Winter Olympic Games,” 25 March 1971, Box 4 Folder 45, POME SHHL. Committee members included Senators Fay DeBerard, John Bermingham, and Joe Calabrese, and Representative Harold McCormich, Robert Jackson, and Charles Lindley. The Committee also suggested that the DOC should be required to submit all of their future budgets to the JBC, the State Executive Budget Office, and the Budget Office of the City and County of Denver for approval, while the state’s Land Use Commission be charged with overseeing site selection to mitigate the environmental impact. The Committee was formed thanks to a resolution submitted by Colorado Senators John Bermingham and Bill Armstrong, see Forty-eighth General Assembly, Senate Joint Resolution No. 9, 27 January 1971, CSAR.
away, Jackson forewarned, Colorado policymakers would have no choice but to acquiesce. To prevent such a scenario, Jackson thus repeated his call to put a stop to state funding permanently and immediately.\(^5^8\)

Notably, Jackson also argued that “environmental damage caused by an acceleration of uncontrolled growth throughout the state” was not given enough attention. The legislative committee recommended that the State’s Land Use Commission participate in site selections to limit environmental harm.\(^5^9\) For Jackson, that was not enough. As he remonstrated, if Denver holds the Olympics, “[a]t no time in the history of this state will we have such a TV spectacular which will ‘sell Colorado.’” Out of context, this assertion might have been read as reason for hosting the Olympics. Indeed, “selling” Colorado was precisely what the DOC and their backers wanted to do. But in March 1971, Jackson had other ideas. “[G]rowth,” he averred, “poses the greatest threat to our environment and thus the desirability of Colorado.” It was not just damage done by specific facilities that worried Jackson. He wanted to halt commercialization and stop the rabid development of his state. Governor Love’s and the DOC’s inspiration for hosting the Olympics had become one of Lamm’s and Jackson’s central reasons for opposing it.\(^6^0\)

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\(^5^8\) Robert Jackson, “Minority Findings of the 1971 Legislative Committee on the Olympics,” 25 March 1971, Box 4 Folder 42, POME SHHL.

\(^5^9\) When the DOC re-select Nordic and alpine sites they were supposed to run their plans through the State’s Land Use Commission, but never did, see “DOC hit for site selections,” *Golden Daily Transcript*, 11 February 1972, p. 1; G.D. Hubbard, Jr. to DOC Executive Council, Memo, Subject: DOC’s Obligations to the State Land Use Commission, 14 February 1972, Box 1 Folder 29, DOC DPL.

\(^6^0\) Robert Jackson, “Minority Findings of the 1971 Legislative Committee on the Olympics,” 25 March 1971, Box 4 Folder 42, POME SHHL.
In the early 1960s, Governor Love’s “Sell Colorado” campaign was uncontroversial. Yet, by the early 1970s, as the debate over the Olympics intensified, Lamm and Jackson used the winter games to challenge it directly. “Why sell Colorado? Is this vital for us to do?” Jackson would rhetorically ask. Lamm, meanwhile, openly proclaimed that the Olympics were just “a bloated and unwise addition to Governor Love’s ‘sell Colorado’ program.” As Lamm professed in September 1972, “over the past few years there has been tremendous change in public attitude . . . [and the Olympics] is simply the last gasp of the sell Colorado program . . . We don’t need growth.” With the assistance of Jefferson County environmentalism, Lamm’s and Jackson’s campaign to prevent excessive spending on the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games evolved into a full-fledged indictment of Governor Love’s most successful idea.

The DOC’s Public Relations Battle

By January of 1971, as one DOC member put it, Denver’s Olympic planners felt “constantly under attack” from “Evergreen, minorities . . . [and] the Joint Budget Committee.” In response, rather than trying to initiate dialogues or reach compromises, the DOC attempted to shape the image of the Denver Olympics and control the diffusion of information. Part of this attempt included bringing six minority members into the

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62 Richard Lamm, “Open Forum: Games’ Removal from State,” Denver Post, 1 March 1972, clipping, Folder 34 or 39 Box 3, POME SHHL.


64 Technical Division to the DOC Executive Committee, Report No. 1, 14 January 1971, Box 2 Folder 2, DOC DPL.
DOC to appease Hispanic and black protesters. The DOC also tried to give clearer cost estimates to counteract the attacks of Lamm and Jackson. Furthermore, to placate environmentalists, the DOC created a Planning Commission (also called the “Planning Board”), meant to ensure the public of limited environmental harm.

The Planning Commission included nine members from governmental bodies and nine “experts” with specialties in architecture, civil engineering, landscape development, and ecology. The commission’s membership was to serve as a “community representative,” providing “independent review of all [the] development plans of the DOC.” However, when the time came to present revised event locations to the International Olympic Committee, the Planning Commission had minimal input. As the Planning Commission’s chairwoman, ecologist Beatrice Willard, wrote to DOC President Robert Pringle in February 1972, to accomplish the commission’s stipulated goals “there must be the utmost cooperation, coordination and adherence to established predetermined objectives and procedures. To date, there has been considerable evidence that was indeed

65 Paul I. Bortz (with Theodore D. Browne), Prepared for the Denver Organizing Committee for the 1976 Olympic Winter Games, Inc., Organization of the XII Olympic Winter Games: Objectives, Tasks, and Organizational Structure, October 1970, Box 1 Folder 6, DPL DOC. D.F Magarrell, Denver Olympic Committee: Planning Commission Concept (adopted 21 January 1971), 25 January 1971, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL; Robert J. Pringle, Minutes of the Nominating Committee for the Planning Commission of the Denver Olympic Committee, 4 March, 1971, Box 1 Folder 33, DOC DPL. The governmental bodies included: Denver Planning Office, County Planning Office, State Natural Resources, State Planning Office, Land Use Commission, Colorado Environmental Commission, US Forest Service, Denver Regional Conference of Governments, and Federal Executive Board. The nine experts included: Bertram Bruton (architect), Kenneth R. Wright (engineer), Dr. E.R. “Bob” Weiner (moving), Chris Moritz (landscape architecture), Dr. Beatrice E. Willard (ecologist), Byron Johnson, John Welles, Gilbert F. White (geographer), and Thomas Kristopeit (planner). The Planning Commission’s first meeting took place 31 August 1971, see D.F. Mangarrell, Planning Board Meeting Minutes, 31 August 1971, Box 1 Folder 33, DOC DPL.

66 Richard M. Davis, Minutes of the Denver Olympic Committee Board of Directors, 20 January 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL; Carl DeTemple to Dr. Beatrice Willard, Letter, 25 January 1972, Box 1 Folder 29, DOC DPL. Except for recommending cross country events be moved to Steamboat Springs, the commission had been unable to complete its analyses before the DOC shared its new format with the IOC in February of 1972.
not occurring.” In particular, Willard was upset that the DOC selected a new alpine skiing site without Planning Commission input. Instead of a genuine public service, it seems that the Planning Commission was a public relations tool, aimed at allowing the DOC to appear as if they were taking environmentalist complaints seriously. As was noted at one of the Planning Commission’s first meetings “positive Public Relations is the one most significant things that should be done well.”

While the DOC hoped to make their site reevaluations appear as a response to public concerns, they kept their actual decisions concealed. At the beginning of February of 1971, Richard Lamm asked for admittance to DOC board meetings. The DOC did not permit it. As Richard Davis advised the DOC Executive Committee after hearing of Lamm’s request, “[f]rom the policy standpoint . . . there have been many confidential and delicate matters discussed at meetings of the DOC over the years, most especially including relationships with the IOC and USOC, and the financial support of private citizens and organizations.” Moreover, the DOC Board of Directors realized if they opened their doors to Lamm, they would have to do so for others as well. Thus, they met a few weeks later to consider the issue more broadly: should they open their gatherings to the public? The Board determined the answer to be a firm no. As Rollin Barnard contended, “the agenda of the meetings would not permit public participation on a regular

67 Beatrice E. Willard to Robert Pringle, Letter, 18 February 1972, Box 1 Folder 29, DOC DPL. Willard concluded her letter to the DOC President, declaring that “the Planning Commission will not tolerate such treatment and remain members . . . To continue to do so they must be convinced that their efforts will produce the end for which they are dedicating their time and abilities.”

68 Phil E. Flores, Planning Board Meeting Minutes, 28 September 1971, Box 1 Folder 33, DOC DPL.

69 Richard M. Davis to the Executive Council, Memorandum, Subject: Public Attendance at Meetings, 9 February 1971, Box 1 Folder 28, DOC DLP.
basis.” George Robinson concurred, emphasizing that “until decisions are made on sites, discussion should be carefully guarded.” The DOC decided that there were certain things regarding the Denver Olympics – specifically site relocations – that should remain hidden from public view.

Along with preventing certain information from entering the public realm, the DOC attempted to shape the material that did. As DOC member Neil Allen (an Area Development Representative for the Public Service Company of Colorado) suggested, “dozens of different staff reporters are writing copy pertaining to the DOC effort. Would it be possible to persuade the two newspapers [the Denver Post and Rocky Mountain News] to assign several specific people to do most of, if not all, the writing pertaining to Olympic matters?” Allen reasoned that “[o]nce these people were identified they could be briefed in-depth by the DOC, which would give them a background of information which should certainly help them to be more objective and realistic.”

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70 Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Board of Director’s Meeting Minutes, 18 February 18, 1971, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL. Moreover, after someone leaked that the DOC was considering moving cross country skiing to Steamboat Springs, the Olympic planners implement a new “disciplined procedure of restricting statements to the press,” see Donald F. Magarrell, Denver Organizing Committee Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 25 February 1971, Box 1 Folder 26, DOC DPL. The new procedure was as follows: “Henceforth all press inquiries will be referred to Norman Brown . . . No comment will be made on subjects within the authority of the Board of Directors which are premature or have not been acted upon. Standard written statements will be prepared for such subjects as site selection . . . Regular informative press conferences will be scheduled and written hand-outs will be prepared.”

71 The DOC continued to turn down various request to make their meetings open to the public. For example, in October 1971 they denied a request from the League of Women’s voters, see Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 28 October 1971, Box 1 Folder 28, DOC DPL. When the DOC finally narrowed down their option for site relocation, they chose to keep new developments to themselves, see Denver Olympic Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 22 December 1971, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL. When the DOC finally opened meeting to the public it was only after the IOC had approved new sites. DOC member Roland D. Barnard specifically claimed the meeting had been kept closed because the DOC did not want to upset the International Sport Federations, see Richard O’Reilly, “DOC directors vote to conduct open meetings,” Rocky Mountain News, 25 February 1972, p. 5.

72 Neil H. Allen to Denver Organizing Committee, Letter, 17 February 1971, Box 1 Folder 41 DOC DPL.
suggestion indicates a desire not just to assist or advise, but to regulate what the press published about the DOC and the 1976 Denver games.

By mid-February 1971, the DOC and Denver’s major newspapers were communicating and appeared to be working together. According to DOC meeting minutes, under the heading “public relations,” the DOC reported that the “two major papers are doing extensive research in order to do a series of constructive articles.” By acknowledging that the papers were conducting “research” meant from the outset to be “constructive,” the DOC revealed the intentions of the Colorado press – seemingly, to bolster the DOC’s image in the midst of a rising public backlash.73 In a similar manner, following their presentation to the Colorado Legislature near the end of February, DOC advocate Richard Olson advised his fellow Olympic supporters that “it is important that in addition to telling our story to the Joint Legislature Committee we arrange for a good publicity release or a press interview whereby we offset the charge that the Olympics are going to be a horrendous cost to the citizens of the State of Colorado.”74 Regardless of what the DOC’s budget would be, by February of 1971, the organizing committee embraced the notion that they were in a public relations battle.

For the DOC, this clearly meant vetting and influencing what the media printed and broadcasted. On March 8, 1971, DOC Public Affairs Chairman Norman Brown met with the leaders of the Denver Post and the Rocky Mountain News, as well as major television stations such as KOA-TV, KZL, and KBTV. Brown explained that the

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73 Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Board of Director’s Meeting Minutes, 18 February 1971, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL. At the same meeting, it was once again “suggested that one person from each media be fully briefed and kept up-to-date on happenings within the DOC, to simplify matters and create more accuracy.”

74 Richard H. Olson to Donald F. Magarrell, Letter, 26 February 1971, Box 1 Folder 39, DOC DPL.
“purpose of this meeting was to begin explaining to the executive level of the major media in Denver some . . . insight into the DOC, the problems and solutions the DOC is encountering and trying to work out.” The result, Brown asserted, “will allow these management people to possibly head off certain elements of the press that could be destructive or which might [in] some way hamper a project through ignorance of what was going on.” Brown apparently meant to thwart stories that could hinder the DOC’s goals.  

Some of Denver’s media bosses fell in line with the DOC’s instructions. The Denver Post, for instance, remained devoted to fostering positive views of the 1976 Olympics. When the newspaper did a series of stories on Evergreen, it agreed to let the DOC make “suggestions to ensure accuracy.” By April 1971, as Norman Brown reported at a DOC meeting, the Post began clearing all their stories on the Olympics with him. Nonetheless, under the new leadership of editorial manager Michael Howard, such collaboration did not occur with the Rocky Mountain News. Howard was at the gathering with Brown and other media kingpins. But as Brown told Don Magarrell afterward: “Mike being younger, still has some doubts and thinks we were trying to

75 Norm Brown to Don Magarrell, Memorandum, Re: Media Executive Advisory Committee Meeting on March 8th 1971 at the DOC offices between members of the DOC staff and Mr. Charles Buxton, Bill Hornby mad John Rogers of Denver Post; Mike Howard of the Rocky Mountain News; Don Faust, General Manager, KOA-TV Hugh Terry and Sheldon Peterson, KLZ Al Flanagan, president of Mullins Broadcasting (KBTV),” 11 March 1971, Box 1 Folder 39, DOC DPL.

76 Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 18 March 1971, Box 1 Folder 10, DOC DPL.

77 Staff Meeting Minutes, 2 April 1971, Box 2 Folder 44, DOC DPL.
curtail the press.” In truth, Howard had already dispatched a journalist whose investigation would significantly undermine the DOC’s credibility.

During the week of April 4, 1971, the *Rocky Mountain News* published a six-part series on the Denver Olympics written by Richard O’Reilly. O’Reilly began working at the *News* in January 1971, charged by Howard to simply “come up with something” to investigate. When O’Reilly saw the DOC’s bid books submitted to the IOC he found his first story. As O’Reilly recalled, the books “had this beautiful steep mountain covered with snow, which I recognized as a place called Mount Sniktua.” An avid skier, O’Reilly had driven past the mountain many times on his way to distant ski resorts. He was aware “that it was always bare in the winter.” Sniktua “was a windblown place and whatever snow fell just blew right off,” O’Reilly recounted. As he further described, “I thought this is nonsense. That’s not going to be an alpine site.”

Like many Coloradans, O’Reilly held positive views of the winter games. He watched them and read about them, and found skiing especially to be a “thrilling sport.” As O’Reilly remembered, “my opinion of the Olympics was high.” He undertook his investigation intending to clear up what needed to be changed to make the Denver

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78 Norm Brown to Don Magarrell, Memo, Re: Media Executive Advisory Committee Meeting on March 8th, 1971 at the DOC offices between members of the DOC staff and: Mr. Charles Buxton, Bill Hornby and John Rogers of Denver Post; Mike Howard of the Rocky Mountain News; Don Faust, General Manager, KOA-TV Hugh Terry and Sheldon Peterson, KLZ Al Flanagan, president of Mullins Broadcasting (KBT), 11 March 1971, Box 1 Folder 39, DOC DPL.

79 In a July 1974 letter, the journalist who did the investigation on the Olympics, Richard O’Reilly, recalled he spent five weeks working on the project. Since the O’Reilly’s series was published at the beginning of April 1971, he probably began the investigation around the end of February 1971. See Richard O’Reilly to Bill Rod, Letter, 23 July 1974, author’s possession.

80 Richard O’Reilly, Interview with author, Pasadena, California, 1 June 2016, notes and recording in the author’s possession.

81 Ibid.
Olympics a success. His research included interviews with various sources, including many DOC members and contributors, as well as Vance Dittman, Richard Lamm, Robert Jackson, and organizers from the 1960 Squaw Valley Olympics. O’Reilly then framed the Denver Olympics as an issue with two embellished but somewhat reasonable sides. “Its opponents say the event will ruin our fragile mountain ecology, while its boosters say it will be the best thing ever to happen to Colorado . . . The truth,” O’Reilly posited, “undoubtedly lies somewhere in between.”

O’Reilly downplayed environmentalist objections in his series, noting that although “some trees will be cut and some mountain slopes will be carved up to prepare for the games . . . the damage will be far less than that caused by normal mountain area construction and exploitation over the next five years.” The crowds, he also observed, would be big, but no greater or more inconvenient than that of a Denver Broncos football game. O’Reilly’s series, additionally, gave credence to the DOC’s point of view, noting the games would promote tourism and become a source of local and national pride.

Yet, O’Reilly also provided many reasons to doubt the wisdom of hosting the Olympics and for trusting the DOC. Most noticeably, he revealed that the DOC airbrushed snow onto a picture onto Mount Sniktua to gain IOC approval. He also cited multiple DOC members who admitted that the mountain was not an ideal site. He noted

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82 Richard O’Reilly, “The Olympics and Colorado, First of a series: Olympics—Good or Bad in Colorado?,” Rocky Mountain News, April 4 1971, p. 1, 5, 8. Much of what O’Reilly reported (including problems with Evergreen and Sniktua) was reported two months earlier in Sports Illustrated, see Roger Rapoport, “Olympian Snafu at Sniktua,” Sports Illustrated, 15 February 1971, 60-61. Rapoport’s article did not seem to reach Coloradans as effectively as O’Reilly’s series.


that cross country events probably could not be held in Evergreen because of a lack of snow. The warm weather in Jefferson County, O’Reilly added, would make it challenging to keep the seventeen million gallons of water needed for the luge and bobsled courses frozen. O’Reilly also recognized that it would be difficult to displace University of Denver students in order to turn their dorm rooms into an Olympic Village.85 Furthermore, examining the Squaw Valley Olympics as a possible precedent, he observed that those games ended up costing thirteen times more than initially predicted, while many facilities built for the event had since proven useless.86 This, of course, legitimized the fears voiced by Lamm and Jackson. Indeed, O’Reilly acknowledged that the DOC’s cost estimates had quickly risen from $14 to $25 million and that “there’s no way at this point to know how much of that taxpayers will have to provide.”87

O’Reilly presented his readers with an uncertain analysis about the impact of the Denver Olympics. “[N]o one can know what the Olympics will do for Colorado or how much they’ll cost or even where they’ll be held,” O’Reilly reported. Nevertheless, he did not see the DOC as inept or malicious, just behind schedule. “What plans there are,” he wrote, “were thrown together by a handful of prominent and well-meaning volunteer businessmen-turned salesmen who told the International Olympic Committee what it


wanted to hear.” As a result, he noted, most of the necessary planning remained incomplete. O’Reilly hoped his report would inspire the DOC to pick up the slack.

“My intention was to point out this is a big deal and there are a lot of problems and they need to be dealt with,” O’Reilly remembered. At the time he had “no idea” his articles “would contribute to . . . the loss of the games.”

O’Reilly’s disclosures created even more distrust between the DOC and Colorado citizens while vindicating much of the criticism stemming from Colorado’s earliest Olympic objectors. Vance Dittman, for instance, sent O’Reilly’s entire six-part series to the IOC, the International Ski Federation, the International Biathlon Federation, and the International Bobsled Federation. As Richard Lamm described, O’Reilly’s series gave Olympic opponents “quite a shot in the arm.” Another leader in Colorado’s anti-Olympic cause put it more concretely: “I don’t know that we could have done what we did without his [O’Reilly’s] series. His series cast such a bright light on the whole DOC operation . . . That was the basis of all of our literature initially and we used it heavily later on in the campaign . . . In some ways I don’t know if anything would have happened without that series.”

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89 Richard O’Reilly.


91 Richard Lamm.

92 Meg Lundstrom, telephone interview with author, 19 May 2016, notes and recording in the author’s possession.
articles “were the origin of the substantive arguments . . . about the Olympics,” which proved “absolutely central to making the case” against the event.93

By the end 1971, Jefferson County environmentalists, Denver minority advocates, fiscally judicious Colorado legislators, and the DOC’s own problematic Olympic proposal provided seeds for broader anti-Olympic dissent. A diverse set of actors raised legitimate doubts about hosting the winter games from a variety of individual perspectives. Yet, politically, most Coloradans still had not received a chance to speak on the issue for themselves. Lamm pressed the case forward, writing to Vance Dittman in November 1971: “Maybe there is still a chance to get a question on a ballot.”94 With Lamm and Jackson’s assistance, a handful of young political operatives would soon take charge of attempting to make that opportunity a reality.

93 Sam W. Brown, telephone interview with author, 11 April 2016, notes and recording in the author’s possession.

94 Richard Lamm to Vance Dittman, Letter, 18 November [1971], Folder 18 Box 2, POME SHHL.
Chapter 7
Bringing Direct Democracy to Middle-America

At the end of 1971, Olympic opponents still faced an uphill climb. After Richard O’Reilly published his six-part series in the Rocky Mountain News, anti-Olympic advocates received added firepower. Yet, nothing environmentalists said or did convinced the DOC to remove the bobsled, luge, or ski jump from the Front Range. Nor could fiscally judicious and environmentally conscious Colorado politicians, such as Richard Lamm and Robert Jackson, convince their fellow policymakers to halt state funding or allow a popular vote on the issue.

In this setting, at the behest of Richard Lamm, a small cohort of organizers formed another anti-Olympic group called Citizens for Colorado’s Future (CCF). CCF led the charge to place a referendum on Colorado ballots that would bar public funds from going to the winter Olympics. The members of CCF had a lot in common. They were young, liberal-minded, and politically engaged. However, they did not fit the mold of late 1960s New Left radicals. Rather than uncompromising idealists, they were careful pragmatists, sensitive to moderate points of view.1 Although taxes became important to their stance, they were also far from New Right conservatives, aiming to stop public resources from going to government-run programs.2 Colorado’s newest Olympic opponents represented a waning breed – well educated and in some cases extremely

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seasoned political operatives, working within traditional pathways on behalf of liberal causes.\textsuperscript{3}

As such, the members of CCF picked their battles tactically. They focused on issues where they believed they could win. They also searched for ways to bring young liberals as well older and more moderate Americans to their side. Ultimately, they wanted to expand civic participation in the name of liberal causes. In their eyes, the Denver Olympics stood as a prominent social phenomenon, already fraught with citizen dissent, and seemingly forced upon Colorado by its political establishment. The games were an attractive surrogate through which CCF could infuse their broader agenda.

CCF members made the Olympics their proxy, employing an argument that theoretically unified Colorado’s diverse Olympic objectors. Along with environmental damage, social exclusion, and undue costs, CCF claimed that Denver’s Olympic planners and their supporters were in actuality wealthy and manipulative “power elites,” not only lying but doing so at the expense of everyday citizens. The harmful growth that would result from the Olympics, CCF members asserted, was going be the product of decisions made by greedy, self-interested, and misguided authority figures. On this view, democracy had been subverted and everyone had been taken advantage of, expect for a select and powerful few.

**Love at Woodstock West**

During the 1960s and into the early 1970s, many Americans questioned traditional political authorities. Before delving into the formation of CCF it is worth

\textsuperscript{3} Isserman and Kazin, *America Divided*, 177-178.
considering the presence of this critical ethos within the Centennial State. At the start of the 1970s, an older generation still ran Colorado. Many of these leaders, such Governor John Love, gained power in the 1950s and early 1960s. They witnessed the Great Depression as children and teenagers, survived the deadliest war in world history as young adults, and found success during an area fraught by Cold War anxieties. As a consequence, many prized security, unquestioned patriotism, and cultural conformity. These leaders also remained committed to the notion that economic growth and development was the key to social prosperity. The post-war era was not monolithic, but in the 1950s many (probably most) Americans viewed communism as an unequivocal evil and American capitalism as a beneficent good. They accepted the role of white women as unpaid caretakers within households. Most white Americans ignored the legal and de facto segregation of their fellow black and brown citizens, if they did not actively support or impose such practices themselves. In the beginning of the 1960s, when United States’ armed forces invaded Vietnam, few Americans doubted the wisdom and good intentions of their leaders.4

Yet, as the decade progressed, American society underwent a dramatic shift. The egalitarian principles promoted to muster individual sacrifices during World War II stirred reflection and critique within various marginalized social groups. By the mid-1960s, as historian Terry Anderson claims, a diverse set of social injustices drove a far-reaching countercultural “movement” that challenged the merits of traditional rules and conventions at every level. As previous chapters on Jefferson County environmentalists

suggests, in particular, the civil rights movement in the South provided inspiration, tactics, and knowledge for protesters fighting on behalf women’s rights, gay rights, Hispanic rights, Native American rights, and even middle-class aesthetic rights.  

The movement struck deepest within younger Americans, who began to question, as Anderson asserts, “almost every institution – from the armed forces to religion, from business to government.” In doing so, activists expressed a belief that America was not living up to its ideals of freedom and equality for all. Continued legalized racism and violence in the South and later the unending Vietnam War motivated more Americans than any other issues. Probably the most defining event for Denver’s cohort of anti-Olympic organizers was the war in South East Asia.

By 1963, President John F. Kennedy placed up to 11,000 “advisors” in South Vietnam to help prevent a communist takeover by North Vietnam. Kennedy’s administration feared that if South Vietnam fell to communism other nations would follow. By 1964, Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, gained congressional approval as well as public support to send ground troops to the region. In 1965, in an effort to help South Vietnam defeat their Northern adversary and establish American credibility in international affairs, Johnson deployed 40,000 American fighters. When the war dragged on longer than expected, the president faced two hard realizations. First, the United States was at risk of an embarrassing defeat. Second, funding for his liberal

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6 Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties, quotations from preface. Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin likewise characterize the 1960s as a debate over the meaning of America’s “fundamental beliefs and institutions,” see Isserman and Kazin, America Divided, quotation from 5.
reform programs, dubbed the “Great Society,” depended on bringing the civil war in Vietnam to a swift conclusion.\(^7\)

Thus Johnson ramped up U.S involvement, eventually bring the total number of American soldiers deployed in South East Asia to 500,000. Nonetheless, by 1968, during the brutal “Tet offensive” devised by the North Vietnamese, enemy forces came within sight of South Vietnam’s capitol city of Saigon. By this point, many Americans had realized they were not going to win the Vietnam War anytime soon. The death toll continued to rise, eventually reaching 68,000 Americans and millions of Vietnamese, leading more and more students, civil rights activists, and others to call for ending the United States’ involvement.\(^8\)

At the same time that the DOC presented their bid to the IOC in Amsterdam, anti-Vietnam protests in Colorado reached an apex. When Richard Nixon ran for President in 1968, he promised a “secret plan” to end the Vietnam quagmire, but, in reality, intended to intensify the fighting. Although the growing anti-war movement left Nixon hesitant, he ordered the bombing of neighboring Cambodia and then, in May of 1970, announced that United States troops had entered that country. This move sparked massive student protests across the nation, boiling over tragically when National Guardsmen shot and killed four students voicing their disapproval at Kent State University in Ohio.\(^9\)

\(^7\) Isserman and Kazin, *America Divided*, for Kenney’s strategy and the beginning of the war see 67-83; For Johnson the decision making 105-111. A turning point to gain such support was the “Gulf of Tokin Incident,” when in all likelihood a one U.S. ship fired on another, though blame fell on a non-existent North Vietnamese vessel. For Johnson’s 1965 deployment see 122-130.

\(^8\) Isserman & Kazin, *America Divided*, for Johnson’s decision to escalate U.S. involvement see 180-182. For the Tet Offensive 210-215.

\(^9\) Ibid., for Nixon’s secret plan see 219-221. For the Kent State shooting see 255.
Upon learning of the deaths of the four students, 12,000 people marched to Colorado’s capitol building in downtown Denver. In the following days, 500 students occupied Hellems Hall at the University of Colorado, while activists blocked the highway between Denver and Boulder, Colorado, for sixteen hours. Then, at the University of Denver, about 1,500 students, non-students, and some professors built “a shack and tent village” that they christened “Woodstock West: Peace and Freedom University.” For five days the trespassers refused to leave. After 200 police officers evicted them and razed their shelters on the second day, they returned the next morning to rebuild with sturdier materials.¹⁰

On May 12, 1970, Governor John Love planned to make a presentation before the IOC and hoped to celebrate Denver’s victorious bid for the Olympics. But days prior, Nixon instructed Love to leave Amsterdam for Washington D.C. to convene with fellow governors to address the present turmoil. After the Washington D.C. meeting, Love returned to Colorado on May 11 and went directly to meet with University of Denver Chancellor Maurice Mitchell, Denver Police Chief George Seaton, and National Guard Commander Major Dick Shannon. Just two days following the Kent State fiasco, the four leaders spent two hours discussing whether to send the National Guard to the University of Denver to put an end to the Woodstock West encampment.¹¹ The next day, in Amsterdam, the IOC awarded Denver the Olympics. Love, meanwhile, met with hundreds of protesters at the University of Denver, advising them to leave. “I do hope,”


Love pleaded, “that you can resolve the issues without violence” and “through the system.”

At that same instance, 1,200 Colorado National Guardsmen were readied. On May 13, 1970, the Denver Post ran a dual front-page headline: “Denver Wins Winter Olympics” and “Guard on Alert.” At 3:00 a.m. that morning, Love ordered the removal of Woodstock West. Given the recent events at Kent State, he instructed National Guardsmen not to carry ammunition. Although some disobeyed the directive, by the time the soldiers reached the school, the protesters had left. Reportedly, they received a warning that regiments were on their way and decided to disband. The DOC completed its successful bid for the Olympics just as the unrest of the 1960s reached Colorado in full force.

The Formation of Citizens for Colorado’s Future

Anti-Vietnam activism had a significant influence on the movement to stop the Denver Olympics. Sometime towards the end of 1971, Richard Lamm conferred with one of the nation’s most prominent anti-war activists, twenty-nine year-old Sam W. Brown Jr. Brown was one of the most experienced and successful grassroots organizers of his generation. He grew up in a small town in Iowa with a religious and conservative family. While at the University of Redlands in Southern California, he became involved


in various left-leaning causes, such as the free speech movement emanating from Berkley, the United Farm Worker’s strikes in Southern California, and various student run anti-war protests. In 1967, Brown gained experience in door-to-door campaigning when he took part in Vietnam Summer, a project meant to foster local anti-war demonstrations. In 1968, he became the head of the National Student Association’s “Alternative Candidate Task Force.” Brown took charge of searching for a Democratic candidate to run against President Lyndon B. Johnson. After Brown and others recruited Senator Eugene McCarthy, Brown led the operation that guided McCarthy’s 1968 Democratic New Hampshire Primary upset over the president.

By this time, Brown had earned a Master’s degree in politics from Rutgers University and had begun delving into philosophical topics such as “just war” theory and regicide at Harvard’s Divinity School. Yet, in 1969, Brown left Harvard for Washington D.C. to organize the Vietnam Moratorium, a nationwide strike intended to exert pressure on the Nixon administration to withdraw American troops. On October 15, 1969, Brown’s efforts culminated when an estimated two million people participated in what was at the time the largest the mass demonstration in the country’s history. In 1970, Brown moved to Colorado to take time to work on a book about politics and the anti-war

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16 Ibid., 223-226; also see “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Sam Brown, 1982,” 08/11/1982, WGBH Media Library & Archives, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_A55BE9295E024182AD926622157A9791 [Accessed 13 May 2016]; Brown and the National Student Association initially asked Robert Kennedy to run against Johnson. Brown recalls that they believed Kennedy had the best chance to both win the election and end the Vietnam War. However, Kennedy turned them down. The National Student Association then asked multiple other potential candidates to challenge Johnson. According to Brown, McCarthy was the only one they could convince to run.
movement. There, he made connections with members of the state’s liberal base, such as Representative Lamm.  

Lamm and Brown would become strategic guides for CCF’s anti-Olympic campaign. However, four lesser known political activists carried out the movement’s day-to-day operations. At twenty-four years old, Meg Lundstrom and John Parr had both recently graduated from Purdue University in Indiana with degrees in political science. Lundstrom edited the school’s newspaper, while Parr ran (unsuccessfully) on a liberal agenda for student body president. Like Brown, both had been influenced by the movement to end the Vietnam War. “The whole Vietnam issue opened up a lot of questions,” Lundstrom recalled, “I remember . . . coming slowly to the conclusion that the government could be wrong. It took me a while to get to that [but] . . . [t]hat type of questioning attitude fueled a lot of my generation and fueled the Olympics.” Lundstrom and others knew that just because Colorado authorities claimed the games would have a positive impact on the state that did not necessarily make it so. Lundstrom moved to Colorado as an interlude between college and her as yet undetermined career in journalism. Parr, on the other hand, relocated to Denver specifically to work for “peace candidate” Craig Barnes, who was running against an incumbent Democrat, Wayne Aspinall, for a seat in the United States’ House of Representatives. Parr knew Lundstrom from Purdue and soon brushed shoulders with Brown, who also offered his assistance to Barnes’ 1970 run for office.  

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17 Ibid., p. 370-375; also see Sam W. Brown, telephone interview with author, 11 April 2016, notes and recording in author’s possession. Brown also worked for Harold Hughes’ successful 1969 campaign to for U.S. Senator.  

18 Meg Lundstrom, telephone interview with author, 30 March 2016, notes and recording in the author’s possession.
When Barnes lost in November, the former candidate opened up a Common Cause office in Denver. Common Cause had been founded in 1970 to advocate progressive issues and in particular aimed to put a stop to America’s involvement in Vietnam. Brown, Parr, and Lundstrom each contributed to Barnes’ new program. At this point, Parr enrolled in law school at the University of Denver; Lundstrom accepted a position as a secretary at Colorado University’s Medical Center; and, Brown focused his attention on his book. Yet, Brown once again felt moved to enter the political fray, becoming involved with populist Oklahoma Senator Fred Harris’s run for the presidency. In October or November of 1971, Brown recruited Lundstrom and Parr to assist him in opening Harris’s Western States Office.\(^9\)

When Harris failed to raise enough money to stay in the running in Colorado, at Lamm’s nudging the trio turned their attention to the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games. As Brown remembered it, the issue attracted them, in part, because they thought they could succeed. “I was interested” in anti-war Democratic candidate George McGovern’s campaign for president, Brown noted, but “he was never going to win Colorado. So it made sense to be involved in something else.”\(^{20}\) Environmentalist and future CCF contributor Dwight Filley described a similar attraction to the anti-Olympic cause, explaining that unlike trying to prevent highway construction, stopping the 1976 Denver Olympics “was something that could be done.”\(^{21}\) As Lundstrom remembered, if

\(^{9}\) Ibid; Richard Lamm, telephone interview with author; 9 May 2016, notes and recording in the author’s possession; Norman Udevitz, “Small but Artful Activist Wielding Rare Power,” *Denver Post*, 11 October 1972, p. 32-33.

\(^{20}\) Sam Brown (2016).

\(^{21}\) Dwight Filley, telephone interview with author, 21 May 2016, notes and recording in the author’s possession.
Harris’s campaign had garnered more support, she, Brown, and Parr would have never become involved with the winter games at all. “We used to joke,” Lundstrom reflected, “that if the Denver Olympic Committee had known that [giving] $10,000 dollars [to Fred Harris] would have stopped us in our tracks, it would have been easy to raise.” Nonetheless, weeks after closing Harris’s campaign office, around the start of 1972, Lamm, Robert Jackson, Brown, Lundstrom, and Parr formed Citizens for Colorado’s Future.22

Along with Lundstrom and Parr, two others became full-time activists in the new anti-Olympic organization. In 1970, New Yorker Tom Nussbaum graduated from George Washington Law School, but his attraction to liberal politics prevented him from becoming a practicing lawyer. In the summer of 1965, between semesters at Hamilton College, Nussbaum had served as an intern for Senator Robert Kennedy. After law school, utilizing connections made through his time at Kennedy’s office, he moved to Colorado to work for a year with the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation, advocating for Native American rights before the state legislature and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. When his time with the Kennedy Memorial ended, he joined CCF.23

The fourth CCF leader was the only native Coloradan in the group. Dwight Filley grew up in Denver and, after two years of college at Johns Hopkins University, joined the Marines. Filley served four years, including one as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam. Afterward, he returned to Colorado, obtaining a degree in sociology from the University

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22 Meg Lundstrom; Richard Lamm; Udevitz, “Small but Artful Activist Group Wielding Rare Power,” 32-33. Lamm recalls knowing John Parr well and knowing Sam Brown in passing before the Olympics. He recalls meeting Meg Lundstrom through CCF.

23 Tom Nussbaum, telephone interview with author, 6 April 2016, notes and recording in the author’s possession.
of Colorado at Boulder. Like the other members of CCF, Filley had become involved with social activism, joining the Sierra Club and the Colorado Open Space Council. A committed environmentalist, he learned about CCF through a meeting with like-minded environmental organizers.24

Lamm and Jackson were in their mid-thirties and early forties respectively. The other central figures of CCF were in their twenties. Yet, the Denver Olympics was no one’s first experience with politics. Lamm fought for liberalize abortion laws. Brown, Parr, and Lundstrom were dedicated to ending the war in Vietnam. Nussbaum spent his previous year advocating for the welfare of indigenous people. And Filley was involved at the forefront of Colorado’s environmental movement. For each of them, the Denver Olympics was always a secondary issue. As Tom Nussbaum put it: “A lot of us came from opposing the Vietnam War, supporting environmental causes, working with Cesar Chavez or Native Americans, and seeing a certain amount of injustice in the world and wanting to change the balance of power . . . the way decisions were made, who made them. In that sense, we were all thinking in broader terms than just the Olympics.”25

The Agenda of Citizens for Colorado’s Future

Though they each viewed their advocacy in unique ways, CCF’s general approach to the Denver Olympics remained based on goals that reached beyond the winter games themselves. By 1970, most Americans would have been happy to see the Vietnam War

24 Dwight Filley, telephone interview with author, 21 May 2016, notes and recording in the author’s possession.

25 Tom Nussbaum.
come to an end. Many also recognized the presence of racism, gender discrimination, and the threat of environmental harm. Yet, it appeared that America’s leaders were not willing to bring American troops home from Southeast Asia until a clear victory was achieved. Nor did they seem willing to make the changes necessary to halt legal and de facto racism, sexism, and environmental destruction. For the members of CCF, the Denver winter Olympic games became a tool through which to press for these types of larger issues.

Like most of Colorado’s Olympics objectors, CCF members initially had no hard feelings towards the Olympics. Brown remembered being “enthusiastic” about the games. As he put it, “I loved to watch Olympics.” Lamm also proclaimed that he “loved the Olympics,” having fond memories of traveling to see the 1960 Squaw Valley games when he studied at Berkeley. Lundstrom, Nussbaum, and Filley each revealed having no strong positive or negative feelings about the games. Still, the members of CCF had other priorities. In particular, they wanted to show, through the Denver Olympics controversy, that American citizens could implement more rational public policies by virtue of direct democratic action.

In interviews with the surviving members of CCF, Sam Brown expressed this view most explicitly. He wanted to reveal the power of participatory democracy. As Brown recalled, “the games were tactical . . . What I was hoping to do,” Brown insisted, “was to break the stranglehold that an old elite (that crossed party boundaries) had over

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26 Sam W. Brown (2016).

27 Richard Lamm.

28 Meg Lundstrom; Tom Nussbaum; Dwight Filley.
Colorado politics.” Backed by Colorado’s governor, Denver’s mayor, senators, and wealthy businessmen, in Brown’s eyes, the DOC “was the embodiment of the Denver establishment.” Thus opposition to the Denver Olympics represented “a terrific opportunity to try to build an alternative.” While he agreed with the “substantive” issues motivating anti-Olympic positions, as he described it, “strategically, my interest was in building a broad populist, if you will, democratic future.”

Lundstrom echoed this sentiment. In her mind, simply giving people the ability to determine public policies for themselves was the key. “The Olympics were really an important way to raise consciousness in general about the future of Colorado,” she proclaimed; “I didn’t have a hatred of the Olympics or a burning desire to get them out.” As Lundstrom recollected, “the important thing was the process through which people discussed the issue and came to some kind of conclusion . . . The process to me was actually more important than the outcome.” Putting it another way, Lundstrom averred: “All of our hearts at that point were in populist democracy, letting the people have a voice, more than anti-Olympics per se.”

The notion that people’s voices were being ignored was the reason that Tom Nussbaum sought out CCF in the first place. As Nussbaum recounted, he “hadn’t given it [the Denver Olympics] much thought.” Then one day on the news, he heard Governor Love pronounce that there was no need for a vote over whether to hold the winter games in Denver. As Nussbaum described, “that got under my skin.” This blatant suppression of democracy, Nussbaum explained, “was a major triggering event in my thinking of the

29 Sam Brown (2016).
30 Meg Lundstrom.
games.” Without too much knowledge of the fiscal or environmental issues involved, Nussbaum located CCF’s headquarters, where he spoke with Lundstrom, Parr, and Lamm about how he could help them.31

In their effort to reveal the power and possibility of direct democracy, tone and style became extremely important to CCF. In a sense, Brown, Lundstrom, and Parr hoped to be able to reach people with similar backgrounds as their own. Brown grew up in a well-off, “very conservative, very church-oriented . . . Republican family” from Iowa. At the University of Redlands, Brown’s peers elected him President of the College’s Young Republicans. The future liberal leader only severed his allegiance with the party when it nominated war hawk Barry Goldwater for president. Brown (along with Governor John Love) had supported the far more moderate Nelson Rockefeller during 1964 Republican presidential primary. Lundstrom also joined a group for young Republicans while in high school. Having grown up in Indiana and studied at Purdue, she and Parr both became involved in liberal politics from within a rather conservative area of the Midwest. As a result, as Lundstrom described, “[w]e knew middle-America” and “[w]e didn’t have any type of appetite for stridency.”32

This shared perspective made Lundstrom, Parr, and Brown ideal allies. Brown may have wanted “to build an alternative political establishment,” but to achieve this he believed a more restrained and pragmatic attitude was essential. In fact, the book that Brown moved to Colorado to work on was to be an extension of an essay he had written about this very notion, titled “the Politics of Peace.” Brown’s basic thesis was that to

31 Tom Nussbaum.

32 Sam W. Brown (2016); Meg Lundstrom.
stop the Vietnam War “a moderate peace leadership” needed to be launched. Only this, Brown thought, could unite younger and older generations against the intervention in Vietnam and thereby force Nixon to end it.

“I am convinced,” Brown wrote in his August 1970 essay, “it is not possible to build a successful peace movement simply on a student base . . . you must have a strong leadership off the campuses to set the tone and direction.” The reason for this, as Brown asserted, was that in “a successful anti-war strategy, the appeal must be made in such a way that Middle Americans will not ignore the substance of the argument because of an offensive style.” In the later 1960s, the anti-war movement became more confrontational and divisive. As 1960s historians Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin describe, as the war dragged on, for many students, the “standard of political effectiveness . . . became a sense of gratification and commitment” achieved through uncompromising devotion and risk. Brown had no patience for this type of internal victory. “Personal appearance, language, and life style,” he exclaimed, “have nothing to do with the substance or purity of one’s political views.” As Brown continued: “there is no private realm for people dealing with the politics of war. The significance of our acts in the peace movement [are] politically determined, not privately defined.”

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34 Brown, “The Politics of Peace,” quotation from 44. For the varying responses to the failure to end the Vietnam War see Isserman and Kazin America Divided, 180-181.

35 As early example, in 1965 hundreds of Berkley students had stood on rail track before trains carrying American troops to an army base in Oakland, California, see W. J. Rorabaugh, Berkeley at War: the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 93-94.

36 Isserman and Kazin, America Divided, 82.

Brown thus rebuffed a common New Left maxim of the era. The difficulties of ending the war, he lamented, were “exacerbated tremendously by the stupidity of whoever first said ‘never trust anyone over thirty.’” Brown wanted desperately to work with older and more moderate fellow Americans. As Brown reflected in a 1982 interview, “we [the anti-war movement] never figured out . . . how to speak to the parents of those children who were actually fighting . . . we never really figured out how to articulate our opposition in a way that they could identify with.”38 As he explained in his August 1970 article, “the peace movement has not been able to talk with, or feel with, its potential [middle-American] allies.” In 1970, Brown urged anti-war advocates to act more subdued in the hope that this could done. He believed the student movement was not enough to stop the war and that ideological conviction and an unrelenting deference to authority had become counterproductive. Brown wanted the rebellious peace movement of the late 1960s to clean itself up and straighten itself out.39

The members of CCF embraced this strategy. When the group formed, Brown taught Lundstrom and Parr the basics of organizing a grassroots campaign. As Lundstrom recalled, Brown continually emphasized “there is no reason to offend on

38 Sam Brown (1982).

39 Brown Jr., “The Politics of Peace,” 33. According to Brown this was the goal of the Vietnam Moratorium, “to gradually attract new peace constituencies on the right without making unacceptable compromises or cutting off the left . . . We tried to set a moderate tone in everything – from the choice word ‘moratorium’ rather than ‘strike,’ to the constant encouragement of activities that would appeal to people just to the right of our student base – such as vigils, church services, candlelight ceremonies, and community canvassing” (35). Brown notes they specifically targeted clergy, senior citizens, doctors, lawyers, educators, labor unions, and minority groups. Brown also employed this strategy during the 1968 New Hampshire Primary. Brown instructed volunteers that “[w]e were there to win votes. To change people’s minds, and if by people’s physical appearance they were going to offend and affront and frighten people then we didn’t want them to go talk to people unless they wanted to wear Lyndon Johnson buttons . . . there was a long lecture which said, basically, you have to clean up your act,” see Sam Brown (1982).
matters of style, when there is good reason to offend on matters of substance.”\textsuperscript{40}

Accordingly, the younger members of CCF kept themselves out of the limelight. As Dwight Filley described, “we were clean but we weren’t exactly wearing coats and ties . . . we got our spelling right and our documents looked good . . . but we were still almost counterculture.” Instead, as recognized “authority figures” within Colorado politics, Richard Lamm and Robert Jackson became the group’s spokespeople. As Filley added, their public presence “gave a lot of credibility that would have otherwise been beyond the pale.”\textsuperscript{41} Brown, of course, agreed. Reflecting on Lamm’s contribution, he explained, “[h]e [was] older; he was in elected office; he had a reputation; so, he brought a substance . . . that was terribly important.”\textsuperscript{42} In a way, Lamm and Jackson represented the “off-campus” leadership for which Brown longed.

As an experienced politician, Lamm played a central role in forming CCF and devising its overall plan of attack. “He was the wisdom,” as Filley put it, “very instrumental in guiding us, telling us what to do and how to do it.”\textsuperscript{43} However, Lamm left day-to-day operations and decision making to the younger CCF members. In his own words, Lamm became CCF’s “titular head.”\textsuperscript{44} Meanwhile, when they did make public pronouncements, “the young folk” played the role of left-leaning professionals, dressing well, showing rigor and discipline, creating polished written publications, and even

\textsuperscript{40} Meg Lundstrom.

\textsuperscript{41} Dwight Filley.

\textsuperscript{42} Sam Brown (2016).

\textsuperscript{43} Dwight Filley; Tome Nussbaum; Meg Lundstrom.

\textsuperscript{44} Richard Lamm; Meg Lundstrom and Same Brown confirm Lamm’s and Jackson’s role as the group’s spokespeople, see Meg Lundstrom and Sam Brown (2016).
spending extra money on high quality stationery. If Lamm was what Brown envisioned for off campus leadership, the rest of CCF fit his image of young, inspired, but pragmatic social activists.

Along with respectable public figures such as Lamm and Jackson, and young grassroots organizers, such as Lundstrom, Parr, Nussbaum, and Filley, Vance Dittman and other Jefferson County inhabitants resembled the moderate to rightward-leaning constituency that Brown yearned to bring into the fold. As Lamm depicted it, his relationship with Dittman represented a pact between “a stodgy old Republican” and “a Democratic liberal.” Conversely, Denver’s more radical minority activists did not fit within the coalition that CCF aimed to develop. By the end of the 1960s, Chicano and black power advocates, such as the Peter Garcia and Clarke Watson, often proved more impatient and confrontational than Brown wanted. CCF did not excluded Hispanic and black Coloradans. African American Colorado Representative Paul Hamilton was an early contributor. CCF would also be quick to highlight that the Olympics were not going to benefit minority groups. Yet, in all the interviews conducted with CCF members for this project, only Brown recalled the existence of Garcia’s and Watson’s organization, Citizens Interested in an Equitable Olympics. There was a clear division between the CCF and CIEO when it came to style, politics, and priorities. Whereas CCF acted tactfully to gain the support of white moderates, CIEO employed provocative and contentious language, obstinately demanding the empowerment of non-white citizens.

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45 Meg Lundstrom; the phase “young folk” comes from Tom Nussbaum.

46 Same Brown (2016); Meg Lundstrom; Tom Nussbaum; Richard Lamm; Howard Gelt, telephone interview with author, 21 May 2016, notes and recording in author’s possession.
Although each took issue with the DOC’s Olympic plans and used the Denver games for broader political purposes, they ultimately differed in their short-term goals.

The Social Inequity Argument

Brown had meant for his new book to be about “a new populist alliance.” However, after moving to Colorado, he had trouble expanding on his earlier essay. He eventually decided that “doing was a better outlet” for his “energies” than writing. Thus, the advance that Brown received from Random House, which had allowed him to move to West in the first place, yielded an unexpected return. Instead of “theoretically” putting his ideas to paper, he seized a chance to try them out “in the real world.” As Brown boasted: “For me, this [the Denver Olympics] was an opportunity to talk about who had power in Colorado and how they exercised that power and how people might actually be able to take that power away from them and take it for themselves.”47 The winter games became a tool through which young but experienced political operatives sought to gain influence and control over the Centennial State.

To achieve this lofty goal, the members of CCF needed to convince the majority of Coloradans not only that hosting the Olympics was a mistake, but also that the games were a result of anti-democratic practices and authorities. In standing against the DOC, Mayor William McNichols, and Governor John Love, CCF therefore constructed a narrative that pitted themselves as defenders of “everyday people.” In contrast, they presented their pro-Olympic adversaries as wealthy, deceitful, and self-interested powerbrokers. Indeed, CCF connected Love’s “Sell Colorado” program with the DOC’s

47 Brown Interview.
Olympics agenda in an effort to show that Colorado authorities had consistently overlooked the desires and well-being of average citizens.\textsuperscript{48}

CCF was not necessarily a leader in this regard. Coloradans expressed the view that the DOC was looking out only for themselves before Denver even obtained the Olympic games. When Evergreen’s Mountain Area Planning Council drew up their list of concerns in March of 1969, the group fixated on the questionable motivations of Denver’s Olympic planners. “The Denver Olympic Committee is regarded by many here as the organizational consequence of a promotional urge by the Denver Chamber of Commerce, composed of men who couldn’t care less about what happens to Evergreen as long as Denver is glorified and Denver business people reap a profit,” the MAPC asserted; “Can you say anything to us to show that, deep down in your hearts, you really give a damn as to what happens to Evergreen?”\textsuperscript{49}

In December 1970, after the DOC received the IOC’s designation, Denver resident and African American long-jump gold medalist Jerome Biffle also questioned the DOC’s intent. As part of the reason why he refused to join the DOC (discussed in chapter 6), he claimed the committee was “exploiting the Olympics to meet their own

\textsuperscript{48}This perspective echoed the influential theory of widely-read 1950s sociologist C. Wright Mills. Mills argued that the loss of face-to-face interaction enabled powerful business tycoons and politicians to become “power elites,” manipulating consent through backroom deals and policies, all in the name of maintaining their positions. In response, Mills called for Americans to create a more active public realm, where citizens could become informed and direct events to their benefit. Mills’ critique of a powerless mass society and his call for greater participation in American democracy sounded strikingly similar to the position of CCF, see C. Wright Mills, \textit{The Power Elite} (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1959). As scholar James Miller contends, “Mills was the master thinker behind a great deal of what” early 1960s New Left leaders, such as Tom Hayden and William Haber, “were saying and doing,” see Miller, \textit{“Democracy in the Street,”} 78-91.

\textsuperscript{49}Mountain Area Protection Council, “Summary of Questions,” 8 March 1969, Box 1 Folder 23, MAPC JCA.
ends.”50 Around the same time, two middle-class environmentalists from Evergreen affirmed this point of view in a Denver Post “Open Forum” essay. Mr. and Mrs. Boyd Norton provided common middle-class environmentalist complaints, remarking that due to the Olympics “a great deal of disruption will manifest itself [in] new roads, acres of parking lots, real estate speculation . . . disruption of soils and ground water, [and] more power lines draped across the landscape.” But, they also contended, undergirding all this environmental damage lay the DOC’s seedy motives. They claimed that the “Olympic bid for Colorado” represented “nothing more than plain old fashion chamber of commerce boosterish, a circus for the economic interests.”51

CCF members provided an outlet for feelings that already existed. The two key CCF leaders who joined the group after it formed made this clear. As Tom Nussbaum described, “the state’s population and its views on public life were changing. I don’t know that we led that in anyway. We were just sort of swept up in that change, in the feeling of the populace as to whether the way things had been conducted in politics and life in the state were the way they wanted to continue.”52 Dwight Filley reiterated, “[y]ou might be under the impression that we did this enormous opinion change. In fact, it was already around.” People in Colorado “had this unease,” Filley recalled, “and we showed up and said here’s what to do.”53

52 Tom Nussbaum.
53 Dwight Filley.
On January 2, 1972, CCF officially went on the offensive. The group published a full page advertisement in the *Denver Post*, with a headline that read: “Sell Colorado? Olympics ’76? AT WHAT COST TO COLORADO?” Questions with answers implicating the corruption and greed of Denver’s Olympic enterprise followed. The first question asked: “Who Pays?” To which the CCF answered: “YOU do.” CCF explained that the DOC originally placed the price tag of the Denver Games at $8-10 million, while they now predicted a cost of about $28 million. Meanwhile, CCF pointed out, the 1968 winter Olympic games in Grenoble, France, cost a quarter of billion dollars and the 1972 summer Olympics in Munich were slated to cost West Germany over half a billion. Given these huge discrepancies, CCF listed the “[a]ctual cost” of the Denver games ambiguously at: “$?” The Olympic opponents then pointed out a number of “HIDDEN COSTS,” such as highway construction, sewage expansion, military personnel and equipment, and other government services for which the DOC apparently was not accounting.\(^5^4\) According the CCF, the DOC was not only underselling a pending taxpayer contribution, they were purposefully concealing it.

Why would the DOC do this? “For what?” “For whom?” and “Who profits?” the CCF ad rhetorically asked. The “what,” CCF proclaimed, was “a 10-day spectacular of winter sports in artificial snow in highly-engineered technologically contrived structures and situations.” In other words, the Denver winter Olympic games represented a spectacle of little use to most people. To the question of “who” all this was for, CCF responded: the IOC and DOC. As CCF described it, the IOC was “a self-appointed, self-

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perpetuating board of men who rule the Olympics,” while the DOC was “a self-appointed
coterie of political and business figures who privately made public decisions of broad and
lasting effect on Colorado.” In CCF’s portrayal, this “coterie” ignored and even
undermined citizen input.

As CCF implied, it was also these self-appointed business and political leaders
who profited. Instead of listing the IOC and DOC specifically as those who would cash
in, CCF responded to their own question of “who profits” with an additional set of
queries. “How many black and Chicanos will be on sports teams . . . How much low-
income housing will really result . . . What quality environment will result from this kind
of hard sell of Colorado’s beauty?” CCF asked. These unanswered questions left
Coloradans to infer that hosting the Olympics would not do any good for minorities,
poorer citizens, or the environment. Indeed, CCF complemented their inferences by
listing two separate sets of “Priorities?” with their corresponding costs. The first list
included a bobsled, a luge, a speeding skating rink, a ski jump, and an alpine facility.
Directly across from the Olympic construction projects and their dollar amounts was
Colorado’s budget for dealing with water population, air pollution, handicapped children,
and venereal disease. For example, whereas a new speed skating rink would cost
$6,673,000, Colorado legislators provided only $512,874 to remedy smog-filled air.
CCF’s point was clear. Not only would most Coloradans not benefit from the Olympics,
the games would take away resources from more important public projects.56

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

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Importantly, the CCF also asked “How?” How could such a misguided event be thrust upon Colorado’s citizens? The answer CCF provided was that the people of the Centennial State were the victims of a systematic usurpation of democracy. “NO state referendum has ever been held on either the Olympics or the Sell Colorado program of years standing,” CCF professed. As CCF added, “NO cost-benefit analysis has been made, by either city or state, on the desirability of holding the ’76 Winter Olympics in Colorado, or the desirability of population increase, urban growth, and the mountain development that will follow worldwide publicity.” On top of this, CCF bemoaned, “ALL meetings of the Denver Organizing Committee (DOC) are held in secret, with press and public barred.”

CCF accused the DOC and its backers of hiding costs, acting on behalf of their own interests, intentionally disregarding the wants and needs of citizens, and thereby perpetuating Governor Love’s outdated political agenda.

Whether opposed to paying taxes, anxious about the destruction of the environment, or simply concerned about being excluded from their state’s decision-making processes, most Coloradans could now say they held one thing in common. They were being swindled by the rich and powerful men of the DOC. In a January 1972 *New Republic* essay, titled “Snow Job in Colorado,” Sam Brown spelled out the situation. A small group of about twelve white men, Brown observed, consisting of two bankers, an airline executive, a magazine publisher, a former secretary of the Navy, a university administrator, a telephone company executive, two attorneys, and other business executives had already spent $500,000 of public funds however they pleased. For instance, Brown noted, they traveled on “public expense” to Mexico City, Spain, Spain.

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57 Ibid.
Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and Amsterdam aiming to impress the IOC in order to bring the 1976 winter Olympics games to Denver for their own benefits. Meanwhile, Brown added, these men lied about the quality of event locations, underplayed costs, and operated in secrecy.\textsuperscript{58}

In Brown’s eyes, the difference between citizen groups such Protect Our Mountain Environment and Citizens Interested in an Equitable Olympics versus Colorado’s political establishment had become stark. “Colorado’s most prominent citizens are almost all on one side of the issue,” Brown wrote. As he explained, “[b]oth US senators, all Colorado congressmen, the governor and his 1970 opponent, the mayor of Denver and his 1971 opponent, the state’s leading businessmen (particularly those with real estate interests), the two largest newspapers in the state, and a majority of both houses of the legislature favor the Olympics. On the other side have been blacks, Chicanos, environmentalists, many students, a growing number of low income taxpayers, a small number of state legislators, and residents of areas near proposed sites.” What this added up to, Brown contended, was that “the Winter Olympics is a sport of the rich paid for by the poor in order to promote real estate and tourism.”\textsuperscript{59} Brown rendered the point of conflict along the axis of social class. The Denver Olympics represented a case where the interests of power elites were in tension with everyone else and especially the socially and culturally disempowered.


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., quotations from 18.
Members of CCF knew that this contrast between everyday Coloradans and the DOC was an exaggeration. All of CCF certainly believed that the DOC and its backers subverted democratic ideals. However, some of the group’s members also viewed the DOC’s mistakes as the result of stubbornness and naiveté rather conscious self-interest. As Meg Lundstrom remembered, “we called them [the DOC] socio economic elites” and “some of them had very specific interests . . . banks and developers and ski areas.” However, she added, they also held “certain notions of pride in Colorado and Patriotism.” As Lundstrom explained, “I’m not really faulting them. It was just the way things had been done in Colorado for a long time. I think, in their minds, they really had the best interest of Colorado at heart.”

Tom Nussbaum expressed a similar point of view. He believed the DOC saw the Olympic as a “badge of distinction” and that the DOC’s motives had “a lot to do with bragging rights and civic pride.”

Richard Lamm agreed with these assessments as well. When asked how he would characterize the DOC’s motivation, Lamm replied simply: “Total civic pride.” At one point during the controversy Lamm was quoted echoing Sam Brown, asserting that the “Olympics are more of a real estate promotion than sport . . . They’re a rich men’s games paid for by poor men’s taxes.” Still, as he maintained in a later interview, “I never questioned their [the DOC’s] motivations. There is a knee jerk chamber of commerce ethic in every city,” Lamm reasoned, “where they have an unquestioned belief in growth . . . I think they really felt that they were doing our community a good turn.”

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60 Meg Lundstrom.

61 Tom Nussbaum

maintained that though many DOC members were successful business people, aside from those involved with ski areas, “I don’t particularly see how they were going to profit from the Olympics.”

This perspective was not universal among CCF members. Dwight Filley, for example, was convinced by the “power elite” argument. “A lot of it was the bottom line,” Filley recounted, the DOC “wanted to increase tourism and awareness of Colorado for their own profits. It was an effort to make the taxpayer buy a whole lot of advertising for the corporations that owned the ski areas and hotels and resorts.” Between 1963 and 1967, ski industry advocates were the main force behind Denver’s Olympic bid. However, as Lamm pointed out, when Denver received the IOC’s designation in 1970, the ski industry was no longer “at the front” of the Denver Olympics campaign. By that time the DOC was made up mostly of businesses owners and executives who probably would have benefited financially from the games only in an indirect manner. Nevertheless, in 1972, CCF continued to paint the Olympic planners as inherently selfish, corrupt, and ill-suited to speak for the people of Colorado.

Citizens for Colorado’s Future at Sapporo

John Parr drew this kind of picture of the DOC when he recounted the trip he and two other CCF supporters took to the 1972 Sapporo winter Olympics. One of the first

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63 Richard Lamm.
64 Dwight Filley.
65 Richard Lamm.
things CCF did after it formed was pass out an anti-Olympic petition, which they planned to send to the International Olympic Committee. As CCF told potential signatories: “We are opposed to Colorado hosting the 1976 Winter Olympics because we fear the unplanned growth and environmental damage the ‘Sell Colorado’ approach creates” and “we feel that Denver and Colorado taxpayers will be paying heavily for something that profits only a few.” As CCF described, the negative side effect of “selling” Colorado and hosting the inherently corrupt sports event were one and the same.

CCF wanted to let the IOC know about their growing opposition as well as the obvious pitfalls of the DOC’s original proposal. With these points in mind, their petition read: “We, the undersigned, respectfully request that the 1976 Winter Olympics not be held in Colorado.” In early January, CCF began circulating the appeal. Within three weeks, they collected over 25,000 signatures. In part, CCF meant to use the petition to get a sense of how much opposition to the Olympics there really was. As Lundstrom recalled, days before the Sapporo Games were set to begin, the members of CCF “were stunned” by response they received.

After such a strong reaction, CCF decided to make sure the petitions reached the IOC’s leadership. They also hoped to seize an opportunity to make an impression and gain legitimacy for their anti-Olympic position. Hence, at the end of January, they dispatched Parr and CCF supporters Estelle Brown (no relation to Sam Brown) and

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67 Concerned Citizens of Colorado to International Olympic Committee, Petition, circa January 1972, Box 2, John Parr Papers, Denver Public Library (hereafter JPP DPL).

68 Meg Lundstrom.
Howard Gelt to the 1972 winter games. Estelle Brown and Howard Gelt came to CCF through Richard Lamm. Lamm and Brown met as members of the Colorado Mountain Club and Colorado Conservation Committee. During the 1960s, they worked together on behalf of environmental and conservationist causes. By 1972, they had been hiking partners for years. Gelt was yet another lawyer with Midwest origins. He grew up in Iowa and became interested in environmental issues while in college at the University of Colorado in Boulder. After getting his law degree, he worked as the Deputy Director of the Clinical Education Program at the University of Denver’s Law School, where Richard Lamm was his boss. Gelt assisted Lamm in his campaigns for the Colorado House.

The trio of Parr, Brown, and Gelt carried the 25,000 anti-Olympic signatures, as well as other anti-Olympic materials to Japan. Their presence at the 1972 Winter Olympic reflected CCF’s attempt to forge a broad coalition of young liberal activists and older moderates. In the words of Meg Lundstrom, with long hair and a beard covering most of his face, Parr represented “the implied threat, in terms of the student protest,” while Gelt was “a gangly young lawyer who represented the voice of authority.”

As Gelt himself described, before leaving for Japan, “I got a haircut and became the young businessman” whereas Parr “had long hair and a beard, so he was the environmental

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69 Richard Lamm. Meg Lundstrom recalled that the first CCF meeting was held at Estelle Brown’s house.

70 Richard Lamm Interview; Howard Gelt Interview. Gelt was also a founder off the Colorado Interest Research Group (mainly focused on the environment and population growth) and on the National Board of Zero Population Growth.

71 Along with the petition, Meg Lundstrom created a booklet that included letters and comments from various Olympics opponents, recent newspaper articles about the Colorado opposition, and a list of DOC claims that CCF contended to be false, see Citizens for Colorado’s Future, “A Presentation to the International Olympic Committee from the Citizens for Colorado’s Future,” 1972.01.01 – 1972.12.31, Games of Denver IOCA.

72 Meg Lundstrom.
The members of CCF were aware they were constructing a certain image of themselves. Estelle Brown, meanwhile, was the oldest member of the CCF contingent and an ardent environmentalist. As Lundstrom remembered, she was “the proverbial little old lady in white tennis shoes.” Along with Brown’s appearance, her personality made her “an obvious choice” for the trip. As Lundstrom described, she was “tiny, but fierce . . . very passionate [and] very strong.”

Estelle Brown was the one who thrust CCF into the spotlight. Upon arrival in Japan, Parr, Brown, and Gelt learned of a pre-Olympics IOC Executive Council meeting being held at the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. On January 28, 1972, they waited outside a conference room at the hotel, hoping to obtain a hearing. John Parr and Howard Gelt both remembered waiting outside the room, seeing its door opened, and then watching Estelle Brown unexpectedly barge through. As Gelt described it, “[a]s the door opened . . . Estelle, who was about five-foot two, a little old lady with white hair, just stormed into the middle of the room.” Parr and Gelt followed her in, just in time to witness her place CCF’s petitions in front of IOC President Avery Brundage, sitting at the head of a “U” shaped table. “It shocked everyone in the room,” Gelt recalled. As Parr depicted, Executive Council member Lord Killian lost his color, while fellow member Comte Jean Beaumont (who later commended Brown for her bravery) slammed his fist on the table. In Parr’s telling, Prince Tsuneyoshi Takeda of the Japanese Olympic Committee yelled to

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73 Howard Gelt.

74 Meg Lundstrom.
“[g]et the American peasants out of here!” Brundage sat still, trying to appear unmoved.\textsuperscript{75}

A number of journalists were present outside of the Executive Council meeting and word of Estelle Brown’s audacity spread. Her intrusion became news from New York to London.\textsuperscript{76} Richard O’Reilly was in Japan at the time, covering all things about the Denver Olympics for the \textit{Rocky Mountain News}. As he reported the next day, Brown “broke in . . . ran up to the committee carrying a 15-inch high stack of petitions and demanded to be heard.”\textsuperscript{77} The IOC’s Executive Committee’s meeting minutes do not show any evidence that the disruption took place. However, their minutes do account for the presentation that the three CCF members were allowed to make to the council about two hours later.\textsuperscript{78}

Parr and Gelt both recounted being escorted out of the meeting but then being invited back to speak for a short time (for twenty minutes, according to Parr). Based on Parr’s and the IOC’s separate accounts, the CCF representatives were able to make their major points. They “outlined their case,” which, IOC documentation shows, “consisted of three main objections: the population explosion in Colorado after the publicity of the

\textsuperscript{75} Howard Gelt; John Parr, “Face to Face with the Olympic Gods,” \textit{Capital Ledger}, March 1972, 1 no. 3: 4-11.


\textsuperscript{77} Richard O’Reilly, “Olympic Protester Crashes IOC Meeting,” \textit{Rocky Mountain News}, 29 January 1972, clipping, Folder 4 Box 6, MAPC JCA.

\textsuperscript{78} International Olympic Committee Executive Board Meeting Minutes, 28-30 January 1972, Executive Board, International Olympic Committee Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland (hereafter EB IOCA).
Games; the amount of taxpayer money needed to build venues; [and] conservation of the
mountain regions.” Implied throughout all of this, of course, was CCF’s assertion that
Coloradans should have a say in whether or not Colorado hosted the Olympics games.\textsuperscript{79}

In Parr’s account, he made sure to stress this point before the IOC. As Gelt recalled,
when the CCF members concluded, Brundidge responded crudely. “That’s all very
nice,” Brundgae blustered, “but I’m going to piss all over your petitions.”\textsuperscript{80}

In his article about the experience in Sapporo, titled “Face to Face with the
Olympic Gods,” Parr made salient the idea that the people behind the Olympics were the
robber barons of sport. As Parr portrayed it, he spent his time “in the Park Hotel in
Tokyo chasing down the halls after lords, counts, barons, and generals who are members
of the world’s most exclusive country club – International Olympic Committee . . . In that
gracious world of international cocktail parties and million dollar public relations
schemes,” Parr contrasted, “we were a small voice for more fundamental realities – like
breathable air, unscarred mountains, and tax money used for a more general welfare.”\textsuperscript{81}

By juxtaposing the Olympic officials and CCF in this way, Parr constructed the IOC, the
DOC, and other Olympics supporter as rulers of a sport fiefdom, living lavish lifestyles,
while ignoring the interests of most people. On the other hand, CCF and other Olympic
opponents became representatives of the simpler – more “fundamental” – needs of
average American citizens.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} Howard Gelt. Neither the IOC meeting minutes nor Parr’s article make not of Brundage’s boorish
reaction.

\textsuperscript{81} Parr, “Face to Face with the Olympic Gods,” 4-11.
Once again, members of CCF presented an argument that could coalesce multiple groups. Environmentalists, Hispanic and black community advocates, and fiscal conservatives could all get behind a movement to stop the Olympics if the campaign were waged broadly in the name of democracy and fairness. When explaining why the Japanese allowed themselves to incur the “enormous costs” of the 1972 Winter Olympics, Parr indeed argued that a lack of commitment to democracy was the reason. “Democracy is a new experiment in Japan,” Parr wrote, “people are used to having projects such as the Olympics sent down as commands from above.” That was not to be the case in Colorado, Parr suggested. “Denver, of course, is a different story,” the CCF leader avowed, “Our [CCF’s] presence in Japan showed that; so did the 25,000 signatures on our petition.” Although CCF did not have negative views of the Olympics when they set out, they made the authoritarianism of Olympic leaders their adversary. In doing so, CCF depicted themselves as representatives of their larger cause – the spread of direct democracy.

**The Petition Drive for the Referendum**

After hearing from CCF, the IOC did not removed the Olympics from Denver. However, as early as November 1971, news outlets reported that there was talk amongst Denver Olympic opponents about another possible strategy – placing a referendum on Colorado’s November 1972 ballot. If passed, the initiative would block state funding for

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82 Ibid., quotation from 9.

83 The IOC seriously considered relocating the 1976 Winter Olympics, but decided against it. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
good. To make this happen, CCF needed to obtain signatures from 51,000 registered Colorado voters by June 30, 1972. Following the Sapporo Games, CCF had about four and a half months to reach the goal. During their Sapporo petition drive, they already proved able to attain almost half the signatures need in three weeks. They knew 51,000 was possible. Furthermore, given CCF’s commitment to providing Coloradoans with a greater say in public policy decisions, as Meg Lundstrom put it, the referendum “was just the logical next step.”

Obtaining the signatures to get the anti-Olympic referendum on the ballot became a full-time job for Lundstrom, Parr, Nussbaum, and Filley. Lundstrom was in charge of writing CCF’s publications and pamphlets. Parr and Nussbaum worked as field organizers, traveling throughout Colorado to create networks of support. Filley oversaw the operation at CCF’s office in Denver. There was much work to do, but the tide was in CCF’s favor. Protests from within Jefferson County and Denver’s minority communities, Richard Lamm’s and Robert Jackson’s denunciations of Olympic spending and Love’s “Sell Colorado” agenda, Richard O’Reilly’s six-part series in the Rocky Mountain News, the DOC’s apparent mismanagement, and the recent CCF trip to Sapporo all made the problems associated with hosting the Olympics visible throughout Colorado. As Lundstrom remembered, after Sapporo, “it was just a matter of keeping the issue going and . . . getting the petitions out.”


85 Meg Lundstrom.

86 Ibid.
By mid-March 1972, CCF’s intention to force a vote was public knowledge. Around that time the Rocky Mountain News commissioned a poll that showed 68% of respondents wanted to have a say in Denver’s decision to become an Olympic host.

Rocky Mountain News editorial manager Michael Howard wrote a complimentary article to go along with the data and made it front-page news. On top of this, when CCF began to gather signatures for the referendum, they already owned an 800-person mailing list built up though their previous Sapporo petition drive. After asking these CCF followers to talk to friends, an estimated 5,000 people eventually helped solicit signatures. In Lundstrom’s words, “it was kind of like the winds of destiny were at our back . . . like riding a really strong wave. We just had to stay on the surf board and not fall off.”

To keep things rolling, CCF embraced standard grassroots tactics. Within a month, they passed out enough petition forms to volunteers to obtain six times the signatures needed. They raised money through fund-raising letters sent to known supporters and used the revenue to buy a mimeograph machine to print fliers. CCF members and supporters spent hours standing in front of grocery stores, shopping centers, churches, movie theatres, and sports events to get citizen autographs. They spoke to sympathetic or potentially sympathetic citizen groups, including the Mountain Area Protection Council and Protect Our Mountain Environment, as well as the Elks and the

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88 Dwight Filley, Meg Lundstrom, and John Parr to Friend, Letter, 30 March 1972, CCF DPL.

89 Tom Nussbaum estimated CCF garnered 4,000-6,000 volunteers; Meg Lundstrom estimated 5,000.

90 Meg Lundstrom.
Rotarians. Though they made sure to maintain their moderate tone and pragmatic approach, they tried a few gimmicks to create buzz, such as a bicycle rally where cyclists took off from Cheeseman Park carrying stacks of anti-Olympic petitions to different parts of Colorado. Led by Dwight Filley, in five days the bike riders reported distributing petitions in 130 “small towns.” By June 30, 1970, CCF had over 77,000 signatures, 26,000 more than they actually needed. At the time, it was most signatures ever gained for a Colorado ballot initiative.

Technically, the purpose of the referendum was to make it illegal for state funds to be spent on the Denver Olympics. However, CCF understood the initiative as a way to give Colorado citizens leverage so that they could weigh in on whether or not Colorado should host the Olympics at all. As Dwight Filley remembered, “[w]e were certain that if there wasn’t any state money there wouldn’t be any Olympics . . . The mechanism was the tax dollars but the purpose was to stop the Olympics.” As Richard Lamm also recollected the “whole debate unfolded as a question [of] do we want the Olympics or not.” Sam Brown confirmed that “from the base, it was a desire to stop the Olympics cold in their tracks, period.”

91 For soliciting signatures see Dwight Filley and Sam Brown (2016). For speaking with various groups see Tom Nussbaum and Howard Gelt. For the bicycle rally see Meg Lundstrom and “Taking Olympic-Funder Petition on Tour,” Denver Post, 28 May 1972, p. 45; for all of the above see, Dwight Filley, Meg Lundstrom, and John Parr to Friend, Letter, 10 May 1972, Folder 28 Box 2, MAPC JCA.

92 Dwight Filley, Meg Lundstrom, and John Parr, Citizens for Colorado News Letter, 25 June 1972, Box 5 Folder 50, POME SHHL.

93 Dwight Filley.

94 Richard Lamm.

95 Same Brown.
Through the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games, Citizens for Colorado’s Future aimed to create a chance for the people of the Centennial State to challenge an entrenched political establishment that was set on promoting development and growth. CCF members had not been able to end the Vietnam War or even elect anti-war candidates. They probably could not stop growth or environmental degradation completely. But, in the case of the Denver Olympics, they could, at least this one time, halt economic boosters run amuck. Moreover, in doing so, they could prove that direct democracy worked. Thus CCF leaders emphasized to supporters that “the Olympics is a pivotal issue for the future of our state.”

Tom Nussbaum spoke for his fellow CCF leaders when he described the group’s approach. As he put it, CCF seized “an opportunity to make a statement about the way the future of Colorado and Denver would be.” Dwight Filley affirmed, the “Olympics was a handle, so to speak, to express dissatisfaction with the way the state was going.” For these young and like-minded organizers, the winter Olympics was a chance to draw support to their liberal goals and make a real difference in Colorado politics.

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96 Dwight Filley, Meg Lundstrom, and John Parr to Friend, Letter, 30 March 1972, Folder 28 Box 2, MAPC JCA.

97 Tom Nussbaum.

98 Dwight Filley.
Chapter 8
The DOC’s Turn to Olympism

When the International Olympic Committee awarded the 1976 winter games to Denver, a number of unstated complications existed. The DOC would need to garner support from within Colorado and from the United States federal government. Denver’s Olympic planners would also have to ask the IOC for authorization to move Nordic and alpine events westward. When that time came, the DOC hoped that IOC leaders would be flexible. The DOC took risks by assuming that these issues would work out. Nevertheless, although the IOC came close to removing the winter games from Denver, it never did. The United States government and Colorado policymakers both came through with funding. However, by spring of 1972, the DOC still found itself in an unexpectedly difficult position. Due to the ardent objections of Jefferson County environmentalists, protests from Hispanic and black Denverites, predictions of huge costs from Richard Lamm and Robert Jackson, and the advocacy of Citizens for Colorado Future, Coloradans were on the verge of expelling the winter Olympics from their state.

As the DOC came to terms with this challenge, the organization realized that it needed to emphasize a new rationale for why Denver should remain an Olympics host. The DOC and its supporters won the games to promote economic growth. Yet now Coloradans opposed the Olympics because of the very developments that made the games attractive to Colorado’s leaders in the first place. For Jefferson County residents, commercialization and development represented an unwarranted incursion on their middle-class refuge. Meanwhile, Hispanic and black residents of Denver feared the
games would divert public resources from their communities. Indeed, many minority residents viewed the DOC’s pro-development agenda as related to their marginalization in Colorado society. To Lamm and Jackson, investing in new Olympic facilities was an obvious waste of state funds as well. Moreover, according to CCF, the economic advancements connected to the winter games were only advancements for a small group of corrupt and greedy power elites.

If the Olympics continued to be read mainly as pretext for commercial growth and Governor Love’s “Sell Colorado” policies, the DOC knew that they were going to lose the games. Thus, rather than highlighting economic benefits, the DOC and its supporters turned to the rhetoric of the “Olympism.” They argued that the Olympics were an opportunity to unite people from across the globe, promoting mutual respect, friendship, and international goodwill – values, they assumed, that no responsible citizens of the world should fail to support. If Colorado citizens took the mission of the IOC and the Olympic movement seriously then the DOC would have made a powerful point.

The IOC’s Perspective

The IOC named Denver an Olympic host in May 1970. They did not expect the DOC to report back until the upcoming 1972 Sapporo winter Olympics.¹ By the time that the Sapporo games began, IOC leaders knew that Denver organizers lied to them about

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¹ Monique Berlioux to Robert Pringle, Letter, 18 May 1970, 1970.01.01-1972.12.31, Correspondences of the Organizing Committee of the 1976 Olympic Winter Games in Denver (not celebrated), Games of Denver IOCA. The DOC did give an earlier status update at the IOC’s Luxembourg meeting in September 1971, where they announced they were re-evaluating sites because of environmental concerns. Brundage raised questions about opponents trying to block the games at this meeting. However, neither issue became a major concern within IOC quarters until the Sapporo Olympics, see 71st Session of the International Olympic Committee, Luxemburg 1971, Sessions IOCA.
numerous components of their bid. Yet, neither the drawbacks to the DOC’s revised proposal nor the DOC’s dishonesty were the IOC’s main concern. In deciding whether or not to pull the Olympics out of Denver, the IOC’s primary objective remained preserving a positive image for itself. In particular, as sport historian Allen Guttmann shows, IOC President Avery Brundage was driven to protect the perceived virtue and further the positive impact of the Olympic movement.²

Brundage knew about the protests stemming from Jefferson County before Denver won the 1976 winter games. In January 1970, Denver’s former mayor, Thomas Currrigan, traveled to Brundage’s home in Chicago to hand-deliver the DOC’s bid books. At that meeting, the IOC President had something for Currigan in return, a letter he had received from two Evergreen, Colorado, residents. Among various environmentalist complaints, the missive highlighted Evergreen’s lack of snow. As Currigan reported, however, Brundage’s suggestion to the DOC was simply that “we clean up our own backyard.”³ In March 1970, Mountain Area Protection Council contributor Robert O. Reddish sent a more detailed anti-Olympic letter (discussed in chapter three) which likewise reached Brundage. Brundage wrote to current Denver Mayor William H. McNichols in turn, there “have been many communications of this kind, which are not helpful to your cause.”⁴ When the IOC selected Denver to be an Olympic host, Brundage had reason to question the reliability of the DOC’s Olympic plans.


³ Thomas Currigan, Report by Phone, 11 February 1970, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL; Ben Eastman Jr. and Martha Eastman to International Olympic Committee, Letter, 30 December 1969, Folder 11 Box 100, WMP DPL.

Brundage also knew the Olympics often failed to acquire public support within host cities. During the 1960s, the size and the cost of hosting and broadcasting the Olympics grew dramatically. As Brundage acknowledged in an April 1970 letter to the IOC’s Director of Administration and Information Madame Monique Berlioux: “Between the arrangements for television and the increasingly extravagant demands of the International Federations and National Olympic Committees, all of which augments the costs of the organizers, we will soon be lucky if we have any invitations [to host the Olympics] at all.” Brundage basically predicted Denver’s opposition before Denver was even awarded the Olympics. As he averred in a speech delivered in Amsterdam during the IOC’s May 1970 session, the “Olympic Games today are a very costly enterprise and no community is going to accept such a burden unless it can be proud of the results.” The expanding size and scale of the Olympic spectacle caused anxiety for the IOC President and Denver Olympic protesters alike. Brundage overlooked the IOC’s culpability for the magnitude of Olympic productions, ignoring, for instance, how demands to keep events within one hour of each

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6 Avery Brundage to Monique Berlioux, Letter, 18 April 1970, 1970.01.01-1970.06.30, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, President Brundage IOCA.

7 Avery Brundage, “Olympic Games in Danger,” Speech, 10 May 1970, 1940.01.01-1972.12.31, Speeches given by Avery Brundage, President Brundage IOCA. According to Brundage Bern, Switzerland and Lahti, Finland also began the process of bidding for the 1976 Winter Olympics but then took themselves out of the running. Brundage blamed the “excesses” of costs and commercialization of the 1968 Grenoble winter games. Brundage was especially concerned with the professionalization of Alpine skiing. “This poisonous cancer must be eliminated without further delay; alpine skiing does not belong in the Olympics Games!” he avowed in his speech.
other created difficulties for winter Olympic hosts. Still, he proved to be very perceptive. “The protests coming from Colorado and from Montreal,” Brundage told Berlioux, “seem to indicate that if plebiscites were held in other communities the results would be similar to those in the city of Zurich,” which also considered bidding for the 1976 winter Olympics. As the IOC President pointed out, “77% of the [Zurich] population refused to have anything to do with the Olympic Games.”

Three years before Colorado’s citizens did so, citizens of Zurich, Switzerland, voted against contributing public funds to the Olympics, thereby forcing city administrators to cease their efforts to become Olympic hosts. Once it became clear that CCF’s referendum would be on Colorado ballots, Brundage knew history might repeat itself. As he wrote to new USOC president and DOC member Clifford Buck in May 1972, “I am not sure you realize the strength of the forces against you.”

Given his awareness of the DOC’s dishonesty and the power of Colorado’s Olympic opponents, it is difficult to say what Brundage was thinking with regard to the 1976 winter Olympics. Later on, when other IOC members were willing to remove the event from Denver, Brundage urged them not to do it. He may have viewed less than ideal event locations and local opposition to the games as necessary hazards for keeping the Olympic movement afoot. Conversely, due to the dominance of a small group of

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8 Avery Brundage to Monique Berlioux, Letter, 18 April 1970, 1970.01.01-1970.06.30, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, President Brundage, IOCA.

9 Avery Brundage to Clifford Buck, Letter, 17 May 1972, Box 2 Folder 66, DOC DPL. In this letter Brundage cited the example of Zurich, Switzerland as well as Banff, Canada, reminding Buck that citizens had prevented Olympic bids from going forth before. In Banff, as Brundage also pointed out, “the conservationists defeated the bid.”

10 This will be discussed in more detail below, see note 51.
Scandinavian and European countries as well as rampant professionalism and commercialism in winter sports (especially hockey and alpine skiing), Brundage believed that the best thing for the Olympic movement in the long-run was to get rid of the winter Olympics altogether. In particular, after the 1968 Grenoble Olympics, Brundage pressed to have the IOC’s winter festival buried.\footnote{For Brundage’s views on the winter Olympics see, Avery Brundage to Jan Staubo, Letter, 6 July 1968, 07.01.1968-09.31.1969, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, President Brundage IOCA; Avery Brundage to Bjorn Kjellstrom, Letter, 6 July 1968, 07.01.1968-09.31.1969, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, President Brundage IOCA. Also see Brundage’s speech, “Olympic Games in Danger,” from note 7.} It is possible that Brundage let Denver back itself into an untenable corner because he wanted the winter games to fail.

Either way, five months after selecting Denver to be an Olympic host, in October 1970, the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland, received another letter from Jefferson County, this time from an environmentalist group called Protect Our Mountain Environment. It was one of many such letters to follow. The stated purpose of POME’s message was to “inform” the IOC “of the true facts concerning the so-called Front Range.” POME shared many environmentalist grievances (discussed in chapters four and five), including the prospects connected to Jefferson County’s mild weather, complemented by data showing average temperatures and snow depths in Evergreen from January to February over the past nine years.\footnote{Vance R. Dittman, Lee (Jean) Gravell, and Justin A. Gargan to International Olympic Committee, Letter, 9 October 1970, Letters of Protest against holding the 1976 Olympic Winter Games, 1970.03.01-1971.10.31, Games of Denver IOCA.}

IOC officials aimed to use sport to promote international goodwill and peace. Yet the IOC also believed that the best way to do so was to stay out of politics. In late 1970, IOC officials therefore brushed POME’s warnings aside. Rodolphe J. Leising of the IOC responded to POME that since “the Games have already been granted to Denver, this is a
subject for them.”

When Leising forwarded POME’s initial letter to the DOC, he heard back from DOC General Secretary Donald Magarrell. “We are well acquainted with ‘Protect Our Mountain Environment,’” Magarrell assured the IOC, “and have a complete program designed to satisfactorily recognize the problem.”

As a result, Leising doubled down on the IOC’s stance. Your “demands should be referred to the Denver Organizing Committee and to officials of the towns” protesting, Leising told POME President Vance Dittman in a later letter. “In any case,” Leising concluded, “the IOC cannot interfere in the private matters of the towns involved.”

The IOC tried to maintain this posture throughout the Denver Olympics debate, but letters from Jefferson County poured into Lausanne as well as the mailboxes of individual IOC members. The letters almost always mentioned how the DOC “misrepresented” the winter conditions of the Front Range. As IOC Vice President

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16 Interestingly, Brundage was the one who gave POME the addresses of IOC members, see Avery Brundage to Vance R. Dittman, Letter, 1 November 1971, Box 2 Folder 16, POME SHHL.

17 Avery Brundage to Vance R. Dittman, Letter, 1 November 1971, Box 2 Folder 16, POME SHHL. For protest letters (mostly from Evergreen and Indian Hills) see Reel 110 Folder XII Olympic Winter Games 1976 Denver, Colo. Protests (1969-1971), ABC, IOCA; also see the 1971.10.01-1971.10.30, Letters of Protest against holding the 1976 Olympic Winter Games in Denver (not celebrated), Games of Denver IOCA; also see the 1971.11.01-1971.12.31, Letters of Protest against holding the 1976 Olympic Winter Games in Denver (not celebrated), Games of Denver IOCA.
Lord Michael Killanin confided to Monique Berlioux, IOC members “may well have voted” for Denver based on the “proximity of sites which were never viable.”

In November 1971, while the DOC dealt with protesters such as Citizens Interested in an Equitable Olympics as well as representatives Robert Jackson and Richard Lamm, IOC Technical Director Artur Takac visited Denver to assess the situation. Afterward he wrote to Brundage. “It is my duty,” Takac explained, “to underline that the previously proposed skiing area in Evergreen and the east side of the Rocky Mountains are difficult to accept because of snow conditions.” Brundage replied by making sure to protect the IOC (and perhaps himself) from charges of wrongdoing. “If the sites are not acceptable, of course, it is an error on the part of the FIS,” Brundage avowed.

Brundage then instructed Takac to not approve anything he observed while in Colorado. “Always remember that this is the duty of our technical advisers,” Brundage advised, “and, therefore, if there is anything wrong, it is their fault – not ours.”

Brundage passed the buck.

During his visit, the DOC promised Takac that they would present new plans for the IOC’s approval when everyone met at the 1972 Sapporo Winter Olympics at the end of January. As Brundage noted to a fellow IOC member, this left plenty of time “to

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18 Lord Killanin to Monique Berlioux, Letter, circa November 1971, 1970.01.01-1972.12.31, Correspondences of the Organizing Committee of the 1976 Olympic Winter Games in Denver (not celebrated), Games of Denver IOCA.

19 Avery Brundage to Monique Berlioux, Letter, 15 December 1971, 1971.08.01-1971.12.31, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, President Brundage IOCA.

20 Avery Brundage to Author Takac, Letter, 17 December 1971, 1971.08.01-1971.12.31, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, President Brundage IOCA.

21 Arthur Takac to Avery Brundage, Letter, 29 November 1971, 1970.01.01-1972.12.31, Correspondences of the Organizing Committee of the 1976 Olympic Winter Games in Denver (not celebrated), Games of Denver IOCA. Takac confirmed that the ski jump, bobsled, and luge could be held in the Front Range with
judge how serious their [Denver’s] problems are.” At the same time, CCF began passing out their Sapporo petition and Jefferson County environmentalists continued to deluge the IOC with letters. DOC Public Affairs Director Norman C. Brown informed the IOC that it was nothing to worry about. Brown claimed the people behind CCF “led many ‘popular’ causes in the last few years” of little importance, “from using bicycles to making the air smell better.” As Brown later added, the “citizen petition drive appears to have practically no support.” Leading up to Sapporo, DOC President Robert Pringle similarly wrote to Avery Brundage that “the environmental leaders are again attempting to show opposition,” however, “we don’t expect you will receive mail from but a small percentage of the citizens of Colorado.” In response, the IOC notified the DOC they would take up each of these issues in Japan.

the help of artificial snow and refrigeration. He also reported that all the Nordic and alpine event would probably be moved to Steamboat Springs, which he visited and recommended to Brundage.

22 Avery Brundage to Count Jean de Beaumont, Letter, 24 April 1971, 1971.01.01-1971.04.30, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, President Brundage IOCA.


24 Norman C. Brown to Monique Berlioux, Letter, 7 January 1972, 1970.01.01-1972.12.31, Correspondences of the Organizing Committee of the 1976 Olympic Winter Games in Denver (not celebrated), Games of Denver IOCA.

25 Robert Pringle to Avery Brundage, Letter, 4 January 1972, Reel 110 Folder XII Winter Games 1976, Denver, Col. Organizing Committee (1972), ABC IOCA.

26 Monique Berlioux to Norman C. Brown, Letter, 10 January 1972, 1970.01.01-1972.12.31, Correspondences of the Organizing Committee of the 1976 Olympic Winter Games in Denver (not celebrated), Games of Denver IOCA.
The DOC’s Sapporo Ordeal

About nine months after receiving the IOC’s designation as host, the DOC set out revising its bid. The DOC convinced the IOC to give them the Olympics but it soon became apparent they were going to have to persuade Olympic leaders to let Denver keep them. In doing so, the DOC once more revealed their commitment to do whatever it took to host the Olympics. Even as Colorado’s Olympic protesters raised their voices to a fever pitch, the businessmen and political leaders behind Denver’s Olympic effort did not express any doubt in the value of bringing the mass sports event to their state.

In the spring of 1971, the DOC began studying multiple locations along the Front Range for the Nordic events. They soon decided that neither making artificial snow nor trucking in real snow from elsewhere would work. The DOC thus chose to move cross country skiing and the biathlon over three hours away from Denver to Steamboat Springs. To satisfy the IOC, the DOC prepared what they called an “air bridge concept,” which included using short distance take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft to transport athletes and officials from Denver’s Stapleton Airport to the Western Slope.

The DOC claimed this would keep the events within forty-five minutes of the Olympic Village. The DOC took longer to decide to move the alpine contests, originally

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27 Technical Division to General Secretary and Public Affairs Manager, Report No. 2, 8 March 1971, Box 2 Folder 2, DOC DPL.

28 Cross Country Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes, 22 March 1971, Box 2 Folder 19, DOC DPL; Denver Olympic Committee, “Sports Facilities Capital Budget,” Press Release, October 1971, Box 1 Folder 8, DOC DPL; Denver Olympic Committee Executive Council Meeting Minutes – Revised, 21 December 1971, Box 1 Folder 28, DOC DPL; Denver Organizing Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 22 December 1971, Box 1 Folder 19, DOC DPL. The DOC had four locations in mind. Three sites – in Evergreen, Indian Park, and Buffalo Creek – were in Jefferson County. Far away Steamboat Springs was the fourth option.

29 Technical Division to General Secretary, Memorandum, Re: Report of attendance at the 28th FIS Congress, Opatija, Yugoslavia, May 20-31, 1971, 22 June 1971, Box 2 Folder 37, DOC DPL; Technical
intended for Loveland Basin and Mount Sniktua. However, by November 1971, they began to come to terms with that fact that they needed to “accept and sell the ‘air bridge concept’” for those events as well.\(^{30}\)

Although the number of outspoken Olympic opponents continued to increase, the DOC was not short on offers from ski resorts eager to capitalize on hosting the games. Keystone Ski Resort, Steamboat Springs, Vail Associates, and resorts near Aspen all submitted proposals to hold slalom and downhill races.\(^{31}\) Two weeks before the Sapporo Olympics, the DOC’s newest “Alpine Selection Committee” had not yet gathered enough information to choose the best option.\(^{32}\) When DOC members left for Japan at the end of January 1971, they had not officially named an alpine site.\(^{33}\) However, at the last minute,

\(^{30}\) Technical Director to DOC Executive Council, Inter-Office Memorandum, Subject: Sport Site Reevaluation – General Alpine Site, 1 November 1971, Box 2 Folder 37, DPL DOC; Technical Director to DOC Board and COC Board, Inter-Office Memorandum, 14 December 1971, Box 2 Folder 15, DPL DOC.


\(^{32}\) Richard M. Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Meeting Minutes, 20 January 1972,” Box 1 Folder 21, DPL.

they seem to have settled tacitly on an area near Vail called Beaver Creek, which Vail Associates pledged to build and pay for. The DOC solidified this choice while they were in Sapporo, the day before they expected to present their new plans to the IOC.\textsuperscript{34}

Yet, before that meeting (and before the DOC had actually selected Beaver Creek), late in the evening on January 29, 1972, the IOC’s Executive Board called DOC President Robert Pringle in his Tokyo, Japan, hotel room. The board asked him to meet them the next morning and instructed him to bring no more than five other DOC members. Carl DeTemple, Donald Magarrell, and George Robinson joined Pringle on short notice. They were the only DOC members who had arrived in Japan for the 1972 winter Olympics so far. With the DOC’s official meeting with the IOC not scheduled until February 1, many Denver Olympics representatives were still in route to Tokyo.\textsuperscript{35}

The IOC’s Executive Board had heard from CCF members Estelle Brown, Howard Gelt, and John Parr two days earlier and, in between other business, they discussed the Denver Olympics. According to the Executive Board’s minutes, Avery Brundage and Lord Killanin agreed that “the FIS had fallen down on its responsibility.” Soviet IOC member Constantin Andrianov asserted that “Denver had lied to the IOC when putting themselves forward as candidates for the Winter Games.” All of the Executive Board’s members concurred that any “action which brought about 25,000

\textsuperscript{34} Miss Sidney L. Cornwall (Recording Secretary), Denver Organizing Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 31 January 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL. Beaver Creek was under consideration for a wilderness designation by the U.S. Forest Service. The DOC took another risk in hoping this designation would not occur, see Bob Saile, “Could Get Wilderness Tag: Alpine Site Snag Possible,”\textit{Denver Post}, 8 February 1972, p. 3; Richard O’Reilly, “Olympic Site Mulled as Potential Wilderness,”\textit{Rocky Mountain News}, 10 February 1972, p. 46.

signatures against holding the Games has a derogatory effect on the IOC.”

When the DOC contingent entered the IOC meeting on the morning of January 30, they were not prepared to provide a full presentation of their revised proposal. Nor was their audience a friendly one.

At the meeting, the DOC members responded to a series of IOC questions. They told the IOC’s Executive Board they were moving Nordic events to Steamboat because the altitude was lower, snow conditions were more reliable, and there was a greater potential for after-use of cross country facilities. They also informed the IOC leaders that they were moving alpine skiing to Beaver Creek because of the availability of private funding. The DOC explained that because of protests in Evergreen the luge and ski jump would be moved as well, but to currently unspecified locations. The DOC promised these events would remain near Denver.  

Lord Michael Killanin expressed irritation at the DOC’s revised plan, remarking that the DOC’s “programme had been almost entirely changed to the point of being unrecognizable.” According to the IOC’s minutes, Killanin then suggested the IOC reconsider Denver’s bid and indeed the IOC Executive Board asked the DOC to withdraw their application. The DOC members refused. After the DOC delegation left, Killanin and Andrianov both supported removing the games from Denver anyway. Brundage, however, held the position that “[i]t would be better if the Denver Organising

36 International Olympic Committee Executive Board Meeting Minutes, 28-30 January 1972, EB IOCA.
37 Ibid.
Committee withdrew themselves.”\footnote{Ibid.} One way or another, the IOC’s leadership preferred seeing the 1976 Winter Olympics held elsewhere.

That evening Brundage summoned Pringle and one other DOC member to his hotel room. Pringle brought Governor Love, who had just arrived in Japan. As Pringle recounted a day later, “[w]e were told the following: The executive committee of the IOC, by unanimous vote, had decided to resolve that the honor of hosting the 1976 Winter Olympics be withdrawn from Denver.” Pringle and Love took this to mean that the Executive Board’s decision was final. The board would share their stance with the rest of the IOC the next day and then officially remove the Olympics from Colorado. Pringle and Love left Brundage’s room believing they lost the winter games.\footnote{Pringle quoted in Richard O’Reilly, “Decision Climaxes Hectic Day in Sapporo: Denver Will Keep the Games, Olympic Committee Rules,” p. 1, 6; Charlie Meyers, “IOC Reaffirms Denver as ’76 Winter Games Host,” \textit{Denver Post}, 2 February 1972, p. 1, 2.}

The DOC still had their presentation to the rest of the IOC scheduled. It was a little over twenty-four hours away. Overnight the DOC officials prepared a last ditch effort to change the IOC’s mind. They contacted Colorado legislators in Washington, D.C., to ask for assistance. Senators Gordon Allott and Peter Dominick along with Congressional Representatives Donald Brotzman and James D. McKeivitt quickly ushered resolutions through Congress that declared support for the DOC and the 1976 Denver Olympics.\footnote{“Congress Passes Olympics Support,” \textit{Denver Post}, 1 February 1972, clipping, Folder 52 Box 1, DOC DPL. The resolution was vague. It read: “The Senate (or House) affirms its support for the continued designation of Denver as host for the Twelfth Winter Olympic Games to be held in 1976,” see Richard O’Reilly, “Denver’s Chance for U.S. Funds for Games Sites Seen as Good,” \textit{Rocky Mountain News}, 6 February 1972, clipping, Folder 68 Box 6, POME SHHL.} Interior Secretary Rogers Morton also wired a message directly to
Brundage, pledging support from the Nixon administration. As Morton informed the IOC president, the “administration is currently preparing legislation for submission to Congress to provide financial assistance.”

The IOC’s leaders may have wanted to move on but Colorado’s most powerful figures remained devoted to hosting the Olympics. Given the various protests being mounted within Colorado, the DOC revealed a peculiar obstinacy. They could not bring themselves to let the Olympics pass through their grasp. Along with their commitment to growing Colorado’s economy, fear of embarrassment likely influenced the DOC at this juncture. As Love declared before the DOC’s critical presentation to the IOC’s membership, it would be “a direct slap to the nation . . . if they [the IOC] go through with it this way.”

On the morning of February 1, 1972, Governor Love, Mayor McNichols, and DOC President Robert Pringle took turns addressing the seventy-second session of the International Olympic Committee. The members of CCF sat outside the gathering, awaiting its results. McNichols began by assuring the IOC that “[w]e have many valid indications that the overwhelming percentage of the people in Denver and Colorado are not only in favor of the 1976 Olympics in Colorado, but strongly support them as well.” Love pledged that the DOC would work with the federal government to make the Olympics the centerpiece of the United States’ bicentennial. Pringle then went into the details of the DOC’s new proposal, noting “the environment, land use controls, the very

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best sport venues, [and] the assurance of after-use of all sports facilities at the lowest possible cost have led us to a new conclusion: We must alter our original plans for the skiing sites.” With events now dispersed between Denver, Vail, and Steamboat Springs, the DOC’s latest design looked very similar to what they had in mind back in the mid-1960s.43

Questions from IOC members followed the presentation. They began by focusing on the distances between Denver and the skiing contests. DOC representatives in attendance did their best to mollify the IOC’s concerns. When asked about travel times, for instance, DOC member (and former NASA astronaut) Walter Schirra discussed the “air bridge,” noting that by 1976 there would be 500 STOL aircrafts available in North America.44 However, the discussion soon turned into a conversation between two individuals from the IOC. This dialogue between International Ski Federation President Marc Holder and Lord Killanin revealed another underlying issue regarding the Denver Olympics. After being misled in Amsterdam, did the IOC have obligation to adhere to the decision it made a year-and-a-half ago?

The discussion began when Holder offered a comment on the DOC’s behalf. “I can confirm,” Holder observed, “these [new] sites will be the best choice we can make.” As the President of the FIS, Holder authorized the original and seemingly infeasible

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43 Denver Organizing Committee for the Denver Organizing Committee of the XII Olympic Winter Games, Report to the 72nd Session of the International Olympic Committee, 1 February 1972, Games of Denver IOCA. DOC member’s Clifford Buck, Carl DeTemple, Donald Magarrell, and were also in attendance and contributed to answering questions from IOC members, see 72nd Session of the International Olympic Committee Minutes, Sapporo 1972, Sessions IOCA.

44 In subsequent presentation to the IOC, in May 1972, the DOC reported the STOL aircrafts provided “the same mobility had the sites been situated in close proximity to Denver,” see Report of the Denver Organizing Committee of the 1976 Olympic Winter Games, May 1972, Games of Denver IOCA.
Evergreen and Mount Sniktua locations. In response to Holder, Killanin announced, “I would like to ask Mr. Holder a question.” Turning his attention to his fellow IOC member, Killanin mused “the only thing that worries me has nothing to do with . . . the things Denver can do.” Instead at issue was the fact that “[w]e were told by the FIS, at the time of Amsterdam, that the sites selected were suitable” and now it appears they “are not suitable or there was no snow.” Killanin implied neither the DOC nor Holder should be trusted.  

Holder defended himself and the DOC, claiming that the original sites were acceptable. “Even if there is no snow in Evergreen,” he asserted, the DOC could have “snow brought into the area.” When Killanin heard this, he posed Holder a more direct query. “Was it made clear at the time of the bid,” Killanin asked, “that snow might have to be brought in?” Holder retorted matter-of-factly, “[w]e know the name of the area is Evergreen.” At this, Killanin became sardonic. “If you can import snow,” the Irishman exclaimed, “I shall go back to the national Olympic committee of Ireland and make an application for the Winter Games.”  

Governor Love proved an astute observer and interjected. “Lord Killanin,” Love declared, “the point of your question seems to me to not only go to the technical proficiency, but to the good faith in the presentation that was originally made . . . I can assure you it was made in good faith.” Love’s proclamation was far from true, but the issue was left at that. According to the IOC’s meeting minutes, after Love’s assertion, 

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45 Denver Organizing Committee for the Denver Organizing Committee of the XII Olympic Winter Games, Report to the 72nd Session of the International Olympic Committee, 1 February 1972, Games of Denver IOCA. As discussed in chapter three, there are reasons to think Holder was biased toward (and perhaps bribed by) the DOC.

46 Ibid.
IOC members returned to questioning the DOC about travel times, costs, and finally Colorado’s Olympic opponents.47

The MAPC, POME, CIEO, and CCF protesters were discounted more easily than any other subject. When the topic was broached, New Zealand IOC member Lance Cross began by speculating that the people who signed the CCF petition probably “comprise largely crackpots and . . . school children who were asked to sign in groups.” Pringle added that although 25,000 people signed the CCF petition, that number made up less than one percent of Colorado’s population.48 The IOC thus set aside the DOC’s dishonesty, while deeming Colorado’s Olympics objectors a minor irritant to be managed by the host city.49 When the Denver organizers left their meeting with the IOC’s Executive Board two days earlier, they were handed CCF documents on their way out. As Pringle recalled, the DOC was told that “these were a domestic matter and of no further interest to the IOC.”50

After the DOC members left the February 1 meeting with the International Olympic Committee, the IOC members discussed what to do about Denver’s problems. Brundage read out loud Lieutenant Governor’s John Vanderhoof’s admission that the DOC “probably lied,” yet the DOC’s deceit was offset by other factors. Brundage himself put weight behind keeping the games in Denver. Citing changes to event proposals made for previous games, he determined that for the sake of consistency and

47 Ibid.

48 The 25,000 signatures (collected in just three weeks) actually made up little more than one percent of Colorado’s population of approximately 2.3 million people.

49 Ibid.

fairness it made sense to let the DOC alter their layout. Five minutes after the DOC left, they were welcomed back to the IOC gathering and told the 1976 winter Olympic games remained theirs. The IOC did not want to engage with Colorado’s Olympic opponents. They also did not want to appear to be treating an organizing committee unreasonably. With these ends in mind, the IOC allowed the DOC to get away with selling them a tarnished set of goods.51 For their part, the DOC reaffirmed their confidence in their salesmanship abilities and their political authority. John Parr remembered DOC Public Affairs Director Norm Brown approaching him, Gelt, and Brown after the conference with IOC. “Listen,” Brown told the CCF contingent, “you guys can’t fight us. You can’t fight the establishment. Could you have gotten a resolution through congress like that? . . [W]e’re too strong.”52

Nevertheless, protests from within Colorado did not subside after Sapporo. In light of this, IOC officials continued to make it clear that they based their decision-making on what they believed was best for the image of the Olympic movement. As Brundage grumbled to Berlioux in March 1972, “we’re getting just as many complaints as before Sapporo. The situation is today just as bad if not worse.”53 Indeed, Brundage voiced to Killanin the following month that the “Denver situation is not good and the Olympic Movement is suffering.”54 Killanin agreed and suggested that the IOC could

51 72nd Session of the International Olympic Committee Minutes, Sapporo 1972, Sessions IOCA.

52 John Parr, “Face to Face with the Olympic Gods,” Capital Ledger, March 1972, 4-11, quotation from 11.

53 Avery Brundage to Monique Berlioux, Letter, 17 December 1971, 1972.01.01-1972.3.31, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, PB IOCA.

54 Avery Brundage to Lord Michael Killanin, Letter, 17 April 1972, 1972.04.01-1972.5.30, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, PB IOC.
still force the DOC to stick to its original plan as presented in Amsterdam, but without holding any skiing events if need be.  

Given the prominence of skiing, such a move would have exerted pressure on the DOC to remove themselves as hosts. The IOC meant to avoid becoming engaged in political affairs and as unrest in Colorado continued to mount they probably saw this as the best possible course of action. When rehashing an exchange with Clifford Buck, Killanin admitted to Brundage, “I should have suggested to him that Denver should themselves ask to be excused from holding the Games . . . each day that passes, both for technical and political reasons, this I feel they should do.” “I don’t think our friends from Denver realise,” Killanin continued, “what damage they are doing to the Olympic Movement.”

Killanin even drafted a letter to the DOC asking them to recuse themselves but then decided not to send it. As he put it, “I . . . on consideration did not think it my business.” Killanin likely did not want to step on the current IOC president’s – and an American IOC member’s – toes. Killanin nonetheless informed Buck that he had read many Denver Olympics protest letters and they “seem reasonable and not cranky!” “I fear,” Killanin voiced to the USOC President, “these political, social, and technical problems in Colorado are not helping” our cause.

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56 Lord Michael Killanin to Avery Brundage, Letter, 22 June 1972, 01.01-1972-08.31, Correspondence of Michael Killanin, PK IOC Archives.

57 Ibid.

Brundage stressed as much to Carl DeTemple, who replaced Robert Pringle as the DOC’s President shortly after the Sapporo games. 59 “I must tell you that all the Olympic people are very disturbed because,” he carped, “they are deluged with letters and articles of opposition. The general publicity, I think you will agree, is not to the benefit of the Olympic Movement.” 60 The IOC’s leaders were rich and powerful men. Still, they were willing to yield control over their beloved international celebration to people who had obviously manipulated them. They did so, however, because they were convinced that it was in the best interest of the Olympic movement’s long-term viability. As time passed, they appeared to relinquish this logic. When Coloradans effectively barred the 1976 winter games from Colorado in November 1972, Brundage, Killanin, and others were probably more relieved than disappointed. They avoided the backlash of forcing the games onto a furious populace and they no longer had to respond to a blatantly political controversy. In their minds, their movement could continue to spread its message or peace and harmony through sport.

**State Funding and Olympic Rhetoric**

While the IOC feared the Denver winter Olympic games would do harm to the Olympic movement, after Sapporo the DOC turned to the IOC’s professed philosophy of promoting international peace and goodwill through sport to justify keeping the event in

59 R.J. Pringle to Members of the Denver Olympic Committee Board of Directors, Letter, February 22 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL “Pringle Quits as Head of Olympic Committee, Denver Post, 23 February 1972, p. 3. Pringle claimed to have resigned to make room for a person who could make the position of DOC President a full-time job.

60 Avery Brundage to Carl N. DeTemple, Letter, 21 April 1972, 1972.04.01-1972.5.30, Correspondence of Avery Brundage, PB IOCA.
Colorado. For the DOC, their experience in Sapporo had been a wake-up call. Many suspected that the IOC Executive Board’s initial stance that the games should be removed from Denver was sparked by CCF’s petition. As DOC member George F. Robinson said of CCF while he was still in Japan, “they’ve drawn blood, there’s no doubt about it.”

By April 1972, CCF began its full-fledged effort to gather signatures to place their anti-Olympic referendum on November’s ballot. On top of this, the DOC and Governor Love remained aware that they needed additional public money to keep their operation afloat. The DOC and its backers had to convince both the Colorado’s citizens and politicians to support them and they now knew that these results were not guaranteed.

By this time, the DOC also recognized that claiming the Olympics would prompt economic growth and spur tourism no longer carried the political capital that it used to. It certainly did not appease protesters in Jefferson County. It also did not satisfy the concerns of minority residents. Nor did it convince prudent Colorado legislators such as Richard Lamm and Robert Jackson. As Jackson declared, even with events moved to Beaver Creek and Steamboat Springs, “I don’t think the IOC has changed the problem . . . I think taxpayers are still going to have to foot a multi-million dollar bill.” If the DOC asks “for any more money in the state legislature,” Jackson continued, “I’m going to

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62 “Papers Filed by CCF for Petition Drive,” *Rocky Mountain News*, 21 March 1972, Folder 49 Box 5, clipping, POME SHHL; “Olympic Referendum Petitions Mailed,” *Rocky Mountain News*, 1 April 1972, clipping, Box 6 Folder 68, POME SHHL.

oppose it every way I know how.” Lamm likewise warned that aside from environmental damage, holding the Olympics would still be “a financial disaster.” The final cost of the Sapporo Olympics only exacerbated Lamm’s and Jackson’s trepidation. As Richard O’Reilly reported, the Sapporo Organizing Committee and the Japanese government spent over $600 million to prepare the 1972 winter Olympic spectacle.

The DOC responded to this dilemma with a solution that they had turned to before. In January 1971, when Colorado’s Joint Budget Committee asked them for more details about the costs of hosting the Olympics, the DOC had referred to the values of IOC’s creed, referred to as “Olympism” – to foster mutual respect, friendship, unity, and international goodwill through amateur sport. Indeed, the DOC began its response to the JBC’s long list of questions by recounting the ideology of Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the modern games. As the Denver Olympic organizers put it, “we thought the [Joint Budget] Committee might like to renew its acquaintance with the objectives of the Olympic Movement.”

64 Jackson quoted in “Jackson Will Continue to Oppose ’76 Olympics,” 2 February 1972, clipping, Folder 4 Box 6, MAPC JCA. Jackson continued to predict that “[i]n the next several years the Legislature will be subjected to the same money blackmail as the California Legislature was [when Squaw Valley hosted the 1960 Winter Olympics],” see Jackson quoted in Robert A. Burns, “Jackson Attacks Olympic Planners,” Rocky Mountain News, 5 February 1972, p. 5, 7.

65 Lamm quoted in Peter Blake, “Press Conference Turns into Open Olympic Debate,” Rocky Mountain News, 20 February 1972, clipping, Folder 4 Box 6, MAPC JCA. Lamm made this statement when he and Sam Brown interrupted a press conference held by new DOC President Carl DeTemple.


67 Richard Olson to Senator Harry M. Locke, Letter, 20 January 1971, Box 2 Folder Box 1 Folder 10, DOC DPL.
In 1971, before answering a single question, the DOC described to the JBC how Olympic sport builds character and teaches fair play. Then, in their responses to the JCB’s inquiries, they infused their answers with Olympic philosophy. For example, when asked about their expenses for traveling to various international conferences and events, the DOC reminded the JCB that the “Olympics are described by some as the prime social force at work in the world today.” As the DOC reasoned, that meant “the Olympic movement [represents] an international understanding among all peoples toward peace . . . We must do the Olympics right . . . We therefore travel to observe and learn.” The DOC even justified future expenditures for event facilities on the logic that the Olympics “bring people of all nations together in a harmonious, yet competitive, relationship.”68 According to the DOC, promoting Olympism warranted the high costs of hosting the winter games.

Later on, just before the Sapporo Olympics, with objections from Lamm, Jackson, and CCF prominent in the background, the DOC’s treasurer Gerald D. Hubbard made this point of view explicit when he reflected on the financial drawbacks of hosting the event. In a mid-January 1972 memorandum to the DOC Executive Council and other DOC supporters, Hubbard acknowledged that the “[s]taging of an Olympic games is not possible without the financial support of government. That is incontrovertible fact.” He also admitted that staging the Olympics so that “expenditures . . . do not exceed operating revenues . . . may not be realistic.” In fact, Hubbard noted, new facilities such as a ski jump, luge course, and speed skating rink “have questionable economic after-use; thus,” he warned, “the commitment of the City to stand behind this after-use is a very

68 Ibid.
significant financial contribution, and perhaps as significant a financial risk” as putting money toward USOC and IOC bids in previous years.\(^6^9\) Of course, had the DOC not won those bids, the money spent on them would have been completely wasted.

Two-and-half weeks after CCF published its full-page ad in the \textit{Denver Post} predicting immense costs and questioning the motives of the DOC, Hubbard nevertheless justified going into the red. “Even if the cost to the government, and therefore to taxpayers, of hosting an Olympics is not recovered from added tax revenues and tourist spending in the future, the price to pay seems small in comparison to the opportunity to make a contribution, particularly from such an insular state, to international goodwill and understanding,” the DOC treasurer proclaimed.\(^7^0\) Taxes and unsustainable sport facilities seemed a fair price to pay to contribute to the goals of the Olympic movement. As Hubbard asserted, “[t]oo many of the Olympic benefits are intangible, as is the case with any effort motivated largely by a desire to do something for somebody else.”\(^7^1\)

At the beginning of March 1972, Governor Love expanded on Hubbard’s analysis when he spoke to Colorado’s General Assembly. Love aimed to prepare state policymakers for a pending appeal from the DOC for more funding. Colorado’s Olympic opposition was fully ignited after Sapporo. CCF would announce their referendum plans two weeks following Love’s address. Thus COC Chairman Richard Olson advised the governor to use the speech to try and “get the whole community behind us.” Olson urged

\(^6^9\) G.D. Hubbard, Jr. to Members of the DOC Executive Council and Tom Currigan and Members of the Colorado Olympic Commission, 17 January 1972, Box 1 Folder 29, DOC DPL.

\(^7^0\) Ibid.

\(^7^1\) Ibid. This echoed the line of reasoning present in Denver Research Institute’s analysis of 1967 (discussed in chapter two).
that it was time to begin a “well planned public relations program.”\textsuperscript{72} The DOC had received $1.1 million from the state so far and planned to ask for $896,400 more.\textsuperscript{73} Yet, heeding Olson’s counsel, Love began his speech by turning his attention Colorado’s Olympic opponents.

As the governor exclaimed, “there are aspects of the Games upon which reasonable men may differ, but some of the debate and dialogue exceeded the reasonable and, in a few instances, approached hysteria.” Love promised smart Olympic planning would not only take the environment into account, it would make a positive long-term impact for environmental protection. Love also reasserted that DOC’s “original plan . . . was presented in good faith at Amsterdam.” The governor then listed the overall costs of Olympic facilities and operations at $35 million.\textsuperscript{74}

By raising the cost to $35 million, Love provided a level confirmation to those who questioned veracity of the previous DOC estimates. Yet, as Richard O’Reilly reported a few weeks later, the number of $35 million itself excluded certain expenses. For example, Love did not count $25 million that the DOC expected to receive from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. HUD was willing to appropriate money for press housing, slated to be converted into low and middle income housing once the Olympics were over. Love’s projection also did not include $10 million the DOC anticipated obtaining from the City of Denver to be put toward improving the

\textsuperscript{72} Richard Olson to John A. Love, Letter, 21 February 1972, Box 67089, JLF CSAR. Olson provided an outline that Love drew from for his March 1972 speech.

\textsuperscript{73} “DOC Gets Frigid Reception,” \textit{Rocky Mountain News}, 2 March 1972, clipping, Folder 18 Box 2, POME SHHL.

\textsuperscript{74} John A. Love, Speech, Address to the Legislature Re: Olympics, 3 March 1972, Box 66951, Speeches of Governor John A. Love, JLF CSAR.
Denver Coliseum, the Currigan Convention Center, and Mile High Stadium. The DOC later explained that these costs were “indirect” and actually “Olympic benefits derived as a result of the Games.” Love and the DOC reasoned that the city needed these projects regardless of whether the games were held and that the Olympics would only speed up their completion.75 As Gerald Hubbard described in a private DOC memorandum, “the total number [of Olympic expenses] can range anywhere from $50 million to probably well into the hundreds of millions, depending on who does the defining of ‘Olympic costs’ and where he strikes the total.”76 In early April 1972, the DOC would openly estimate that with “direct” and “indirect” expenses combined the price tag for hosting the Denver Olympics would be between $81,169,000 and $92,813,000.77 Such numbers represented obvious fodder for Lamm, Jackson, and CCF.

Nonetheless, Love and the DOC maintained that it would take only $35 million in “direct costs” for Colorado to hold the winter sports pageant. Furthermore, as Love described in his speech to the General Assembly, the DOC estimated that the federal government would contribute $20 million of that total. Love additionally implied the games would bring $10 million in revenue through television rights, ticket sales,

75 Richard O’Reilly, “$70 million Total Help Possible: $35 Million Olympic Cost Fails to Cover City Extras,” Rocky Mountain News, 19 March 1972, p. 8; Carl DeTemple to Governor John A. Love, DOC Inter-Office Memo, Subject: Proposed Statement, 27 March 1972, DOC DLP. The DOC also did not include modifications to the Currigan Convention Center, improvement to facilities at the University of Denver, the construction of the Beaver Creek ski resort, and the construction of press housing in the $35 million estimate. These were all labeled “indirect costs,” see Sport Facilities – Capital Modification Budget, March 1972, Box 2 Folder 9, DOC DPL, also see this source for exact cost and modification details.

76 G. D. Hubbard to DOC Board and COC Board, Letter, Subject: Financial Summaries of Prospective Olympic Activity, 30 March 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL.

licensing and franchising. Thus Love promised Coloradans that no more than $5 million in state funds would be put toward the 1976 winter Olympics. The DOC and Love stood firm on this projection throughout the rest of the Denver Olympics debate.

In his speech, however, Love still needed to justify the potential allocation of $5 million. To do so, he too turned to Olympic rhetoric. Out of the $2 billion Colorado would expend in the next four years, he asked: “Is $5 million . . . too much to spend for excellence and pride and an international celebration?” Love did not shy away from proclaiming that the games would be good for Colorado’s economy or that it was still in the state’s best interest to promote “controlled” growth. Yet, the Governor ultimately concluded that when “hosting an event based on the thought that physical competition on the sports field is much preferable to contest on the battle field . . . [i]t is unthinkable to me that at this time and place in the history of the Olympic Games, that Coloradans would stand up and say – ‘we have neither the will nor the unity.’” The way Love depicted it, with the United States in the midst of an unpopular war, for the sake of global well-being, spending money to bolster Olympic ideals was the responsible thing to do. In reply to CCF’s claims that Denver Olympic organizers were self-interested elites, with little regard for people of Colorado, the organizers rebutted that not only did they have the best interests of Colorado in mind – they were motivated by the good that the games would do for entire world.

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78 John A. Love, Speech, Address to the Legislature Re: Olympics, 3 March 1972, Box 66951, Speeches of Governor John A. Love, JLF CSAR.

79 Ibid.
When Hubbard and other DOC representatives faced Colorado’s Joint Budget Committee at the end of March 1972, they pointed to tangible and intangible benefits that would accrue from hosting the games. Just as CCF readied their petition drive, the JBC once again became a barrier for Denver’s Olympic proponents. Although the DOC finally pinned down many event locations, they did not have precise cost projections from engineers. They also tried to continue to avoid discussing “indirect costs.” As Richard O’Reilly recounted in the *Rocky Mountain News*, JBC Chairman Donald Friedman “literally forced” the total cost of the Denver Olympics “out of a reluctant Denver Organizing Committee” when he directed “Carl DeTemple to write on a blackboard the estimates of a series of Olympic needs which the DOC maintain can’t be considered to be a real cost . . . since they were needed [generally] and might eventually be built anyway.” Various JBC members expressed their displeasure afterward. “If you’ll pardon me my saying so,” Senator Joe Shoemaker remarked to the DOC, “one of your problems is that you don’t have a plan.” The JBC suggested providing only $268,000 of the DOC’s $896,400 request.

Afterward, Governor Love continued to advocate for the rest of the funds. The JBC did not want to allocate state resources based on their earlier pledge that the state should not spend any money on constructing Olympic facilities. Love countered that the

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80 Denver Olympic Committee, Press Release, 21 March 1972, Box 1 Folder 44, DOC DPL.

81 Richard O’Reilly, “Joint Budget Committee Exacts $65.3 Million from DOC,” circa March 1972, clipping, Folder 4 Box 6, MAPC.


83 Love technically recommended the state provide a slightly smaller number than the DOC asked for: $833,000.
DOC had not asked for money for construction but for planning. The governor then reached out to Republican Party leaders for help.\textsuperscript{84} As the \textit{Denver Post} described, Denver Mayor William McNichols and ten city council members also “blitzed the State House of Representatives” to persuade them to provide the DOC with the money they requested.\textsuperscript{85} The strongest resistance to supporting the DOC came from House Democrats, led by Lamm and Jackson. Knowing this, Carl DeTemple penned a long explanation of the DOC’s monetary appeal and sent it to the House’s Democratic caucus, pleading for their support.\textsuperscript{86} The DOC and its supporters continued to discount the perspectives of Olympic objectors, as they persisted with every means available to ensure that Denver became an Olympic city.

In his explanation to House Democrats, DeTemple followed a now common pattern. After discussing details regarding new facilities, television revenues, and other factors, the DOC president urged Colorado’s policymakers to pay heed to Olympism. “While we recognize the necessity for deeply probing the economic implications of the Olympic Winter Games at this point,” DeTemple asserted, “it would be unfortunate if they were judged only in this context.” DeTemple asked Colorado Democrats to “consider the less tangible impact.” As he wrote, the “real meaning” of the Olympics will be grasped by Colorado’s “youth,” for the games are “a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to be at the center of a truly international event of goodwill and brotherhood.” DeTemple professed: “The Olympic Games represent the very best


\textsuperscript{85} “Mayor at Capitol: City Pleads Olympics Case,” \textit{Denver Post}, 7 April 1972, p. 10.

qualities of man and woman. They provide the brightest hope for the future that someday peoples from all walks of life and all nationalities can discover the totality of mutual interest that will result in peaceful cooperation.” DeTemple basically declared that to refuse to support the Olympics equated to a rejection of world peace. The discourse of Olympism made the Denver winter Olympics appear to be an invaluable contribution to global harmony.

The Colorado House acquiesced to Love, McNichols, and DeTemple, sending the DOC $739,000. Donald Friedman did not like the decision and expressed a view with which many Olympic opponents probably agreed. “When the DOC comes to a legislative body and says, ‘have confidence in us. Give us a little more money,’” Friedman bellowed, “it’s like the captain of the Titanic suggesting we take another voyage.”

Still, it was difficult to deny the importance of the goals of the Olympic movement. If the DOC’s commitment to Olympism was legitimate, it provided a line of reasoning that could justify virtually anything. Where CCF members argued that money going toward the Olympics would be better spent on health care, education, environmental protection, or housing, Olympic ideologues responded that the mission of Olympics outweighed all of those noble but less ambitious issues. World peace should be predominant. The DOC, Governor Love, and other Olympic supporters initially saw the games as a way to promote growth. They only emphasized Olympic ideals when opposition to their plans arose. It thus appears that the pro-Olympic advocates used

87 Carl N. DeTemple to Representative Thomas T. Farley, Letter, 6 April 1972, Box 1 Folder 46, DOC DPL.

88 Friedman quoted in “House Votes $739,000 for Olympics,” Denver Post, 7 April 1972, p. 3.
Olympism. It was a rhetorical tool that they hoped would enable them to keep the 1976 winter games in Denver. One need not believe in the veracity of an ideology (or religion) to exploit it to one’s advantage.

By the fall of 1972, the DOC also had a clear path toward receiving the results they needed from the federal government too. In particular, Colorado’s U.S. Senator Gordon Allott worked closely with the DOC to help them get government money. In April 1972, with CCF’s petition drive underway, Allott, fellow Colorado Senator Peter Dominick, and Colorado’s representatives in the U.S. Congress presented identical bills in the House and Senate, which promised the DOC $15.5 million. The Colorado politicians then pushed the bills through Congress with more Olympic rhetoric. “With the spotlight on our nation and my State of Colorado,” Senator Dominick argued on the Senate floor, “every effort should be made to bring together in 1976 the [O]lympic athletes of the world in a peaceful setting in furtherance of the goals and ideals under which the Olympics should continue.” The Senate voted on “S. 3531” in September. It went fifty-nine to three in favor of funding the DOC. With the CCF initiative officially on Colorado ballots, the House decided to wait to vote until after November 7. Had they voted, the likely would have agreed to fund the Denver Olympics as well. Meanwhile,

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89 For the bill see, S. 3531, 92nd Congress 2nd Session, 25 April 1972, Folder 17 Box 102, WMP DPL. The bill left open the possibility that more than $15.5 million could be appropriated, reading: “There is authorized to be appropriated the Secretary of the Interior a sum not exceeded $15.5 million (December 1971 prices), plus or minus such amounts, if any, as may be justified by reason of ordinary fluctuation in construction costs.” The bill also justified appropriations for the Olympics because it is “desirable that all American people of present and future generations be assured adequate outdoor recreation resources.”

90 Congressional Record – Senate, S 15021, 15 September 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL. The nay votes came from Oklahoma Senator Fred Harris, Connecticut Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff, and Arkansas Senator J.W. Fulbright.
HUD pledged to contribute $15.5 million of their own for press housing.\textsuperscript{91} As Wester Otis of the Department of the Interior observed of policy-makers in Washington D.C.: “There’s nobody against the Olympics. It’s like apple pie and motherhood and those things.”\textsuperscript{92}

The DOC initially asked for $19.9 million from Congress. In return, federal authorities continually pressured the organizers to offer evidence that new sport facilities would continue to be used after the Olympics were over (unlike the facilities the federal government funded for the Squaw Valley Olympics).\textsuperscript{93} Richard Lamm and POME representative C. Ransom Stovall both testified at a hearing of a congressional subcommittee considering the issue, asking that federal money to be withheld.\textsuperscript{94}

Nevertheless, by the fall of 1972, it seemed that the only people who could prevent the

\textsuperscript{91} The Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) sought $28.4 million. They wanted to build 1,600 new units on Denver East Site and West Side, see Don Lyle, “DURA Seeks Olympic Housing,” \textit{Rocky Mountain News}, 14 April 1972, clipping, Folder 4 Box 6, MAPC JCA.


\textsuperscript{93} The DOC considered a request as high as $26.5 million; Robert Threkled, “DOC’s Request for Funds Expected To Be Cut,” \textit{Rocky Mountain News}, 6 April 1972, p. 5; Leonard Larson, “No Fund Amount Set: Olympics Aid Bill ‘Open Ended,’ \textit{Denver Post}, 20 April 1972, p. 25. For the exact language of the bill see, Carl DeTemple to Board of Directors, Colorado Olympic Commission, City Council, Memorandum, Federal Funding Support, 27 April 1972, Box 1 Folder 15, Box 1 Folder 15, DOC DPL; For pressure to promise after-use see, Webster Otis to Robert J. Pringle, Letter, 9 December 1971, Box 2 Folder 37, DOC DPL; Statement by Senator Gordon Allott to Denver Olympic Committee, 16 December 1971, Box 1 Folder 8, DOC DPL.

\textsuperscript{94} 1976 Denver Winter Olympics, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress Second Session, S. 3551, 9 June 1972, for Lamm’s statement see 48-61; for Stovall’s statement see 168-179.
Olympics from coming to Colorado were Coloradans. Through all of the DOC’s maneuvering, they could not stop CCF from gaining the signatures they needed to place their anti-Olympic referendum onto Colorado’s November ballot. Indeed, the DOC and their backers were forced to begin a full throttle campaign against CCF in an attempt to get Coloradans to vote to save the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games.

**The DOC’s Olympic Spirit**

In March 1972, ten days after Love’s Speech to the Colorado General Assembly, Michael Howard published the results of the *Rocky Mountain News*’ poll (discussed in chapter seven) showing Colorado citizens were not completely sold on being Olympic hosts. Almost seventy percent favored a statewide vote regarding Olympic spending.\(^95\) That same day, Richard Lamm and Republican Charles Lindley introduced a resolution that would have put the question of Olympic financing on the ballot in November, identical to the one for which CCF soon advocated. If passed by voters, Lamm’s and Lindley’s proposal would have created a constitutional amendment prohibiting the state from appropriating funds toward the 1976 winter Olympics.\(^96\) The resolution went nowhere and days later CCF announced their petition drive, aiming to acquire 51,000 signatures and thereby enable Coloradans to decide the question of whether or not to host the Olympics for themselves. Love responded that the potential referendum was “too late

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and destructive.” Others disagreed, viewing the citizen initiative as an “opportunity to consider alternatives to laissez faire, growth-oriented patterns of the past.”

By this time, the DOC knew they had created a credibility gap between themselves and many Colorado citizens. Although the DOC and its supporters continued to claim the majority of Colorado citizens wanted to hold the Olympics, they realized that if they were going to keep the games in Colorado they were going to have to change some people’s minds. At the end of February, with no more reason to hide event relocations from the IOC, the DOC opened their meetings to the public. The DOC also began releasing monthly financial reports and required members to disclose any possible conflicts of interest. The DOC additionally re-hired the public relations firm Kostka Associates. As DOC meeting minutes described, through press releases, newsletters, and general openness with the media, Kostka Associates’ “new program will try to develop confidence in the DOC.”

In May 1972, as part of their plan to regain the public trust, the DOC claimed that it was going to “restructure” itself completely. The DOC even changed its name,

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99 Denver Olympic Committee, Press Release, 16 March 1972, Box 1 Folder 44, DOC DPL. Denver Olympic Committee, Press Release, Subject: Expenditures since 1965, 24 March 1972, Box 1 Folder 44, DOC DPL; Carl DeTemple to Board of Directors and DOC Planning Board, Inter-office Memorandum, Conflict of Interest Board Resolution, 12 April 1972, Folder 21 Folder 1, DOC DPL.

100 Kostka Associated helped the DOC formulate their original proposal to the IOC (discussed in chapter three).

101 Richard M. Davis, Denver Olympic Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 16 March 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL; “Kostka Will Handle PR,” Denver Post, 5 March 1972, p. 3.
becoming the Denver Olympic Organizing Committee or DOOC. At first, the Olympic organizers planned to double the size of their Board of Directors, but eventually envisioned membership “easily exceeding 150 people.” Their purpose was to appear more inclusive, with more women, minorities, and other representatives from various interest groups.\textsuperscript{102} However, as George F. Robinson described in a private letter to DOC supporter Gerald F. Groswald, the new DOOC “would have more generalized, but limited functions. The actual operation would be under the guidance of a chairman.” Indeed, a fourteen-member Board of Governors ran the “new” organization’s “day-to-day operation” and everyone involved with the old DOC was included in the new DOOC’s organizational structure. As one DOOC newsletter admitted, the “full-time staff . . . remained basically the same.”\textsuperscript{103} The new name and apparently expanded membership represented yet another disingenuous public relations maneuver.\textsuperscript{104}

Along with creating an image that include more female and minority contributors, the DOC reached out to young people. In August 1972, the DOC sponsored an essay contest called “seniors for ’76.” Colorado students going into ninth grade – who would be high school seniors when the Denver Olympics took place – were asked to write about

\textsuperscript{102} Richard M. Davis, Preliminary Draft of Proposal – 5/5/72: Reorganization of the DOC, 5 May 1972, Box 1 Folder 32, DOC DPL; Denver Olympic Committee, \textit{Olympic News}, July 1972, Box 1 Folder 49, DOC DPL. DOC Rollin Barnard oversaw the restructuring process and at one point suggested the new “DOOC” could have 150 members, see Denver Olympic Organizing Committee, Press Release, 19 October 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL; also Denver Olympic Committee, \textit{Olympic News}, October 1972, Box 1 Folder 49, DOC DPL.

\textsuperscript{103} George Robinson to Gerald F. Groswald, Letter, 14 July 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL; the new Chairman was W.R. Goodwin, the President and CEO of Johns-Manville; Denver Organizing Committee Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 18 July 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL; Denver Olympic Committee, \textit{Olympic News}, July 1972, Box 1 Folder 49, DOC DPL.

\textsuperscript{104} Because of a fluctuating timeline and because Denver’s Olympic organizers remained basically unchanged, for clarity, the DOC and DOOC will be referred to simply as the “DOC” for the remainder of this dissertation.
why they supported the Olympic movement. Hundreds took part. Afterward, with funds provided by the Denver Chamber of Commerce, the DOC awarded twelve winners a well-publicized trip to the upcoming 1972 summer Olympics in Munich, Germany. The essay winners also visited the previous winter Olympic venue of Grenoble, France, and the IOC’s headquarters in Lausanne. The total cost of the youth excursion was just under $12,000.

After their Munich sojourn, the DOC asked the students to share their insights regarding the present Denver Olympics controversy. Ninth-grader Kathy Phibbs reasoned, for example, that everyone “against the Olympics is griping about how much it’s going to cost, but they’re spending more on bumper stickers against the Olympics than it would cost them personally to put the games on.” Fellow student Keli Fennie warned that if Coloradans vote against the Olympics they “would be making a big mistake.” Classmate Barbara Woodley gave away the students’ pro-Olympics predispositions when she wrote that a “lot of people are worried about the damage to our mountain slopes. That’s why I’m glad when we leave here we are going to visit Grenoble and see the reforested mountains, take pictures and convince them.”

Woodley knew what she would find in Grenoble before she even got there. The DOC

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105 Denver Olympic Committee, *Olympic News*, August 1972, Box 1 Folder 49, DOC DPL; for the (hundreds of) essay submissions see, Essay Contest for Children for the 1976 Olympic Winter Games in Denver (not celebrated), 1972.01.01-1972.12.31, Games of Denver IOCA. The students were judged on the quality of the essay as well as school, church, athletic, and other community based activities. Seventy-six finalists were chosen and interviewed. From those seventy-six, twelve were declared “winters” and traveled to Munich, becoming spokespeople in favor of hosting the Denver Winter Olympic Games.

106 Itinerary for Seniors for ’76, Folder 38 Box 87, DCC DPL.

107 Seniors for ’76: Total Contributions Received and Total Expenses, Folder 38 Box 87, DCC DPL.

108 Phibbs, Fennie, and Woodley quoted in Denver Olympic Committee, *Olympic News*, September 1972, Box 1 Folder 49, DOC DPL.
worked hard to create an image of greater transparency, broader citizen participation, and greater enthusiasm, something that even young people could understand and get behind.

Toward this end, DOC President Carl DeTemple made numerous television and radio appearances, and sat for extensive newspaper interviews. DeTemple basically repeated Love’s speech to the Colorado General Assembly, trying to assuage people’s anxieties over environmental damage and reckless spending, while also emphasizing Olympic ideals. Tactfully, he also combined such notions with visions of American exceptionalism. Aside from “the practical benefits,” DeTemple explained during an April 13, 1972, television spot, “we will be participating in the single most important example of international goodwill and peaceful competition that exists in our troubled world. In working, playing, and living with people from many nations,” the DOC leader continued, “we will be representing more than Denver or Colorado. We will be representing our nation and its 200 years of history, as well as our basic philosophy of freedom and individual dignity.” For DeTemple, fostering world peace and national pride went hand in hand – especially at the U.S. bicentennial.

Many Denver Olympic supporters embraced this mode of argumentation. On May 4, 1972, DeTemple, USOC President Clifford Buck, and Public Relations Specialist William Kostka met with IOC President Avery Brundage. Given the dramatic changes to


110 Carl De Temple, Statement of Carl DeTemple – KWNG, 9:00 p.m. News, 13 April 1972, Box 1 Folder 44, DOC DPL.
their original plan, the IOC asked the DOC to provide a progress report in Lausanne at the end of the month. The Denver Olympic planners conferred with Brundage to get an idea of what to expect. At the conference, as DeTemple recalled, “Mr. Brundage was quite perturbed about the volume of adverse publicity generated both locally and internationally and the amount of correspondence he and other members of the IOC are receiving from dissenters.” As DeTemple put it, “he was particularly sensitive to the adverse effect it was having on the Olympic Movement in general.”

After this meeting, Buck took it upon himself to speak up. As Buck observed, although the USOC “avoids involving itself in local affairs whenever possible,” he felt compelled to defend the Denver Olympics coming to Colorado. As he declared in a public statement, the people who are attacking the Denver Olympics “do a great disservice to the citizens of Denver and Colorado. The reputation of a great city and a great state is being degraded in the eyes of our nation and the world.” Buck emphasized that “national interests and the prestige of the U.S. are at stake.” Indeed, the USOC president continued, “[l]eaders in sports, government, and business around the world express disbelief that any city or state can fail to be aware of the great honor and tremendous benefits of hosting the Olympic Games – benefits which include, but go far beyond, dollars. Long after those who oppose the Olympics are gone and forgotten,” Buck averred, “the Olympics will flourish as the grandest international occurrence our world offers.”

111 Carl DeTemple to DOC Board and COC Board, DOC Inter-Office Memorandum, Subject: Brundage Visit, 4 May 1972, Box 2 Folder 66, DOC DPL.

112 Clifford Buck, Statement, 12 May 1972, Box 2 Folder 73, DOC DPL.
maintained that the value of hosting the games carried greater force than other social concerns.

When CCF’s intention to block public funding became known, Olympic supporter also turned to more organized tactics in order to get their message across. Literally the day CCF announced their petition drive, Governor Love conferred with professional public relation strategist Sam Lusky. Lusky proposed forming an organization called the “Committee of ’76 for the Spirit of ’76.” Love was named the group’s leader and he recruited seventy-six “core members,” most of whom were prominent executives. As Love described, their purpose was “to attract the active support of many thousands of Coloradoans in bringing to a successful culmination not only the ’76 Olympics, but the celebration of Colorado’s Centennial.”

The primary task of Love’s new privately financed organization was buying advertising space, which they did in over twenty newspapers. During the CFF petition drive, between March 16 and June 31, 1972, Love’s Committee of ’76 raised over $36,000. Of those resources, $13,000 went to Lusky’s firm, while another $19,000 went to newspaper ads. The ads were an attempt to convey confidence and create the sense

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113 Sam Lusky to John A. Love, Letter, Subject: Operation Impact Re: The Colorado Citizens of 76, 17 March, 1972, Box 67089, JLF CSAR.

114 “Governor Lists Committee of 76,” Denver Post, 26 March 1972, p. 3.

115 Love quoted in “Love Names Committee ’76,” Vail Trail, 31 March 1972, p. 11, 30; also see, Denver Olympic Committee, Newsletter, 11 April 1972, Folder 47 Box 1, DOC DPL.

116 “Committee of 76’ to back Olympics,” Rocky Mountain News, 25 March 1972, p. 5. For details about contributors and their donations see, Sam Lusky to John A. Love, Letter, Subject: Update Report Re Status of Fund Collections for Committee of ’76, 9 May 1972, Box 67088, JLF CSAR.

117 John A. Love to Sam Lusky, Letter, Subject: A Review of the Activities and expenditures of the Committee of 76/For the Spirit of 76, 25 July, 1972, Box 67089, JLF CSAR. The committee also spent money on 10,000 bumper stickers and 10,000 lapel badges.
that statewide support existed for the Denver Olympics. As one ad proclaimed: “We believe in Colorado . . . We believe in the people of Colorado . . . We believe in our Centennial . . . We believe in our Nation’s Bicentennial . . . We believe that the Winter Olympics, held in Colorado in 1976, will give our state the worldwide prideful attention it deserves and which may never again be possible during any of our lifetimes.” The group’s full page promotion then asked fellow “believers” to join Love’s pro-Olympics committee.¹¹⁸

A following full page announcement from Love’s committee listed the names of 507 respondents.¹¹⁹ The iteration after that announced that a total of 1,084 people had joined the Committee ’76, declaring that this “tells us what we already knew – that the people of Colorado are for the Olympics/Centennial. But unless we keep voicing the support … Unless we let everybody know … The Olympic opponents (the group heard from the most to date) will try to make it appear otherwise.”¹²⁰ Love and Lusky connected internationalism with localism, selling both prestige in being international hosts and pride in Colorado’s and the United States’ shared anniversaries. The ad campaign implied, moreover, that the uproar exhibited by CCF’s petition was a magnification of a small group of dissenters. Colorado’s pro-Olympic forces were in fact a strong but “silent majority.”

¹¹⁸ Advertisement, “This We Believe,” clipping, circa March 20, Folder 49 Box 5, POME SHHL.

¹¹⁹ Advertisement, “Thanks! And it’s Only the Beginning!,” Denver Post, 2 April 1972, clipping, Folder 4 Box 6, MAPC JCA.

¹²⁰ Advertisement, “You Support the 1976 Olympics and the Colorado Centennial!” Canyon Courier, 13 April 1972, clipping, Folder 67 Box 5, MACP JCA.
As the vote on CCF’s referendum approached, Love and Lusky repeated their previous strategy. This time Lusky recommend a much larger campaign budget of $125,000. In August 1972, Love formed what he called the “National Advisory Committee to the 1976 Winter Olympic Games,” with former Oklahoma football coach Bud Wilkinson as chairman. The majority of the group’s eighteen members were extremely wealthy businessmen, such as Archie K. Davis (Chairman of the Board of Wachovia Bank and Trust), David Packard (Chairman of the Board of Hewlett Packard), Robert Six (President of Continental Airlines), Thomas Watson (Chairman of the Executive Committee of IBM), and Gustave L. Levy (General Manager of Goldman Sachs).

While Wilkinson insisted that it was “inconceivable that any American not take pride in getting to host the games,” the rest of the group’s members were figureheads. For example, when Love asked William Marriot (Chairman of the Board of the Marriot Corporation) to join the pro-Olympics advocacy group, the hotel executive replied that he was too busy. Love, however, convinced Marriot to take part by telling him that “I certainly understand your circumstance, but want to assure you that really all that would be required is the use of your name and very, very occasional contact.” Love and Lusky seemed to believe that associating with prominent and successful business people would imbue their pro-Olympics task force with respect and authority.

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121 Sam Lusky to John A. Love, Letter, Subject: A Pro-Olympics Campaign to Defeat the Referendum, 25 July 1972, Box 67089, JLF CSAR.


123 William Marriott Jr., to John A. Love, Letter, 18 July 1972, Box 67089, JLF CSAR.

124 John A. Love to William Marriott Jr., Letter, 26 July 1972, Box 67089, JLF CSAR.
In the weeks leading up to the vote of November 7, 1972, all sides acknowledged that CCF’s referendum would not just determine if the state would be allowed to fund the winter Olympics; it would decide if the games were going to be held in Colorado at all. The United States Senate had made their allocation of $15.5 million contingent on additional state support. If anti-Olympic forces passed what became known as “Amendment Number Eight,” they would effectively leave the DOC with no recourse but to rescind their offer to host the Olympics.

During the last days of the controversy, Governor Love and others continued to rely heavily on Olympic rhetoric. “Colorado’s winter Olympics can bring a return to the Olympic ideal as it was meant to be,” Governor Love professed in an October 19, 1972 advertisement. As the ad pressed, it “is time for a world re-birth of the true ideals and meanings of the Olympics and we in Colorado have it within our capability to achieve these goals: To dedicate the ‘76 Winter Olympics to the participants themselves, to the world of brotherhood . . . to the true spirit of competition . . . [and] [t]o demonstrate that Colorado and Coloradans can undertake an event of such proportions.” As Love’s plea concluded: “Light the torch now. Vote NO on Amendment No. 8.”

Denver Mayor William McNichols pushed Olympism as well. As McNichols avowed in a pro-Olympics pamphlet, released just weeks before the referendum: “All men and women of good conscience know that when we meet people from other lands and cultures we understand them better and [we] appreciate the spirit of cooperation which must exist between all peoples of the world if we are to gain peace . . . It is in this

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spirit that the competition of the Olympics was born.” McNichol promised that the Denver games would be held at a reasonable cost, spark the economy, improve the environment, and advance the city’s housing developments by ten years. On top of that, however, the mayor attested that hosting the Olympic games and spreading Olympic ideals was the right thing to do. “Are we now to turn our collective back on the youth of the world,” McNichols rhetorically asked; are “we now to say that we do not wish to [have] share[d] understanding with our world neighbors through the cultural, philosophic, and athletic excellence of the Olympic Games?” “No!” McNichols insisted: “Join us in defeating Colorado Constitutional Amendment #8 . . . VOTE NO.”126 Combining nationalism with Olympism, while promising economically and environmentally beneficial outcomes, Denver Olympic planners urged Colorado citizens to stand with their state, their nation, and the Olympic movement.

126 “Let’s Team Up on Nov. 7 and Keep the Olympics in Colorado,” Pamphlet, circa October-November 1972, Folder 3 Box 102, WMP DPL.
Chapter 9

Colorado’s Defeat of the Denver Olympics

On November 7, 1972, when Coloradan cast their votes, the majority did not heed Governor Love’s or Mayor McNichols’ recommendation. Results showed 537,400 voted “yes” on Amendment Number 8, while only 358,906 voted “no.” The state of Colorado was legally barred from funding the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games. Citizens for Colorado’s Future wanted to make sure Olympic expenses were not passed onto Denver residents, so they gathered signatures and placed a similar initiative on Denver’s citywide ballots as well. Denverites also voted affirmatively, likewise preventing Denver City Hall from allocating any money to the winter Olympics.¹ Many Colorado businesses, community organizations, and chambers of commerce stated their support for the Denver Olympics prior to the vote.² Still, the majority of Colorado citizens did not believe hosting the games was in their best interest. Coloradans proved to be more concerned with protecting the environments near their homes, paying reasonable taxes, and taking part the political process itself.

The Failures of the DOC

Multiple factors influenced the passage of Amendment Number Eight. Investigative journalism, minority activists, and prudent Colorado politicians played


² For letters from Olympic supporters see Reel 110 Folder XII Winter Games—1976, Denver, Colo., Organizing Comm. (1970-1971), ABC IOCA; Folder 1 Box 101, WMP DPL; Folder 24 Box 97, DCC DPL.
important roles. The consternation of Jefferson County environmentalists and the grassroots acumen of Citizens for Colorado’s Future were both vital. However, mismanagement by the governor of Colorado, the mayor of Denver, and members of the Denver Organizing Committee probably had the greatest impact on the outcome.

Monetary self-interest probably motivated many DOC members and their supporters. Olympic planners likely wanted the social prestige associated with hosting a renowned international sports event as well. Some organizers may have genuinely believed that the games would benefit the state of Colorado, the nation as a whole, and even the world. In acting on these complex, intertwined, and variable desires, Colorado’s Olympic planners overestimated the attraction of the Olympics in eyes of Colorado’s citizens and they overvalued the weight of their own political power. As a result, they failed to respond effectively to a changed zeitgeist in the Centennial State.

Governor Love’s pro-Olympics campaign strategy provides a prime example. The day Love announced his new “Committee of ’76 for the Spirit of ’76” a lobbyist for a group called Rocky Mountain Farmers named Medill Barnes put a statewide hold on the names “Committee of ’76” and “Spirit of ’76.” As titles for a profit or non-profit corporation, Barnes was able to reserve the names for 120 days. It cost him $15. As Barnes saw it, Love’s pro-Olympic group was “going to make use of some patriotic arguments.” However, he claimed, a “check of history would hardly find those who were for the revolution would have voted for something like the Olympics.” According to Barnes, allowing Love’s group to go by the name “Committee of ’76 for the Spirit of ’76” did “a historical disservice” to America’s true freedom fighters.³ Barnes did not see

the connection between hosting the Olympics and local profits, regional pride, or national identity.

Noted Denver Post editorialist Tom Gavin responded in a similar way to USOC President Clifford Buck’s pro-Olympics harangue from May 1972. Though Gavin made his point with greater sarcasm. “Make your blood boil?” Gavin asked his readers, “mine too . . . I hadn’t realized that it was in the national interest that the ’76 Winter Games be held in Denver and its Vail and Steamboat Springs suburbs . . . I didn’t know,” the columnist continued, “that what we had here was a matter of national honor. . . It simply hadn’t occurred to me that to have reservations about Denver and Colorado lavishing public money on a sporting event was to be lacking in patriotism.”4 As sport historian David Zang argues, the cultural upheaval of the 1960s, wrought by the counterculture and the Vietnam War left many Americans much less willing to buy into the once unassailable notion that sport was always a good thing for American society.5 Buck’s inspired outburst certainly had not convinced Tom Gavin.

The people on Love’s rosters for the Committee of ’76 and National Advisory Committee to the 1976 Winter Olympic Games did not help his cause either. In August 1972, journalist Ron Wolf, of Boulder, Colorado’s Straight Creek Journal, published an article titled “Who Owns the Olympics? Colorado’s Financial Elite Plan 1976 Snow Job for Public.” Wolf provided the names of every member of the DOC, COC, the Committee of ’76, and the National Advisory Committee to the 1976 Winter Olympic

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5 David W. Zang, SportWars: Athletes in the Age of Aquarius (Fayetteville, AK: The University of Arkansas Press, 2001).
Games. Next to each person’s name, Wolf posted his or her professional status. As Wolf asserted, the list showed that if “you want a voice in the staging of the 1976 Winter Olympics, you had better be a millionaire and a corporate president, preferably the president of a bank.”

According to Wolf, his list revealed that “the hierarchies of committees associated with the Olympic effort . . . are dominated by a business and financial elite . . . [and] [i]n fact, most of these people . . . stand to benefit either personally or for the companies they represent, by holding the games in Colorado.”

Love wanted to make it appear that respected Coloradans and Americans supported the idea of Denver hosting the winter games, but instead he helped reaffirm CCF’s thesis that the DOC and its backers were wealthy powerbrokers taking advantage of everyday Colorado citizens.

Love’s and the DOC’s deafness surprised even the members of CCF. Meg Lundstrom recalled her bewilderment. It “was almost like playing into our game over and over,” she remembered. “We would talk about this decision [to host the Olympics] being made by this small group and then they announced this committee and then bought big ads: Committee of ’76 for the Spirit of ’76. It was like how could you do this?” she marveled.

Sam Brown remembered the DOC’s political obtuseness similarly. In explaining CCF’s success, he admitted that CCF “got lucky because the DOC was so imprudent and thoughtless and full of itself . . . assuming, of course, it’s the Olympics

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7 Ibid.

8 Meg Lundstrom, telephone interview with author, 30 March 2016, notes and recording in author’s possession.
and people are not going to vote against the Olympics. And that they can win by just pounding the patriotic thumb. . . It was a bunch of rich and powerful people who had really no idea what was going on.”

When CCF’s petition drive concluded on June 30, 1972, their 77,000 signatures made their response to Love’s and the DOC’s counter tactics easy to see. CCF would round down. Love had his Committee of ’76 and, as Lundstrom reflected, “[w]e could do our ‘Committee of 76,000.’” Love and the DOC inadvertently helped make the argument that CCF was the group who really represented democratic ideals.

In many ways the DOC came very close to pulling the Olympics off. They were correct to assume the IOC would give them slack to revise their initial proposal. The federal government and Department of Housing and Urban Development offered funding for sports facilities and press housing. The DOC also estimated gaining $10 million from television rights, merchandise, and ticket sales. Indeed, Innsbruck, Austria, who replaced Denver as 1976 Winter Olympics host, accrued $11,627,330 in television revenue alone.

Furthermore, although the DOC was consistently forced against their preference to move events from the Front Range due to snow conditions, the skiing competitions ended up at high quality locations at decent costs. By the time of the referendum, the

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9 Sam Brown, telephone interview with author, 11 April 2016, notes and recording in author’s possession.


11 Meg Lundstrom.

only events left in Jefferson County were the luge and two-man bobsled race. Steamboat Springs leaders wanted to host cross country races, as well as ski jumping and, toward the end of October 1972, the DOC moved the ski jumping events to Steamboat’s renowned Howelson Hill. Howelson Hill needed significant renovations but it was going to be hundreds of thousands of dollars cheaper than building a brand new facility at another location.\(^{13}\) On top of this, Vail Associates pledged to provide money to build state-of-the-art alpine facilities at Beaver Creek. The IOC also accepted the DOC’s suggestion to cut the four-man bobsled competition from the 1976 Winter Olympics program. As a result, the Denver organizers planned to build a single combined luge and bobsled run to save money.\(^ {14}\) Some things appeared to be falling into place for the DOC.

Yet, by November 1972, most Coloradans no longer trusted them. Thanks to the MAPC, POME, CIEO, Lamm, Jackson, and CCF, Colorado citizens probed the merits of hosting the Olympics. For a variety of reasons, many Colorado citizens doubted the

\(^{13}\) Warren Hartman (President of Steamboat Springs Winter Sports Club), Marvin Elkins (Mayor of Steamboat Springs), Sven Wiik (Chairman Nordic Competitions Committee United State Ski Association), Donald E. Barrett (Steamboat Organizing Committee), Marvin Crawford (Steamboat Organizing Committee), Dean Williams (Director Steamboat Springs Winter Sports Club) John R. Fether (National Ski Hill Engineer Committee), “Presentation to the Denver Organizing Committee Concerning the 1976 Olympic Special Jumping Site,” 3 April 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL; Comparative Site Analysis for the Special Jumping Competition, 19 October 1972, Box 2 Folder 38, DOC DPL; Denver Olympic Committee, Olympic News, October 1972, Box 1 Folder 49, DOC DPL.

\(^{14}\) Ted Farwell to Denver Organizing Committee Delegation, Report, 8 October 1971, Box 2 Folder 10, DPL DOC; Denver Olympic Committee Capital Budget Request, March 1972, Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL; Richard M Davis, Denver Organizing Committee Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 27 April 1972, Box 1 Folder 29, DOC DPL; Denver Olympic Committee, Olympic News, August 1972, Box 1 Folder 49, DOC DPL. Combining the luge and bobsled run was actually the DOC’s second preference. Their first choice was to move the event to Lake Placid, New York, who offered to host the event. The IOC turn down this proposition, see Denver Olympic Committee, Olympic News, July 1972, Box 1 Folder 49, DOC DPL. The International Bobsled and Tobogganing Federation would have preferred moving the events to New York and keeping the four man bobsled competition on the schedule, see Denver Olympic Committee Minutes of Board of Directors, 10 August 1972,” Box 1 Folder 21, DOC DPL; Denver Olympic Committee, “Denver XII Olympic Winter Games 1976: Report [to] International Olympic Committee, Munich Germany August 1972,” Report on the organization of the 1976 Olympic Winter Games in Denver (not celebrated), 1970.01.01-1972.12.31, Games of Denver IOCA.
value of the overall growth and development that the Olympic were initially meant to bring. Many people worried about funding for other social priorities, while fearing that Olympic costs would be much greater than anticipated by Olympic organizers. Others questioned the intentions of Colorado’s political and business authorities, as they simultaneously became more aware of their ability to assert – and even create – political rights. As a consequence, the DOC and their backers ran into a firestorm.

The Strategies of Olympic Opponents

In response to anxieties over the infringement of open space and aesthetic damage caused by large sports facilities, commercialization, and rapid growth, Jefferson County residents fought for their right to access and maintain naturalistic settings near their homes. With this agenda in mind, in the summer of 1972, POME members disseminated petitions for CCF. In the fall, they donated money for anti-Olympic (pro-referendum) commercials. POME was adamant through the majority of the Denver Olympics debate that they only objected to events in the Front Range. Nevertheless, when the time came to cast their ballots in November, the group changed its position on the games. As POME leader Richard Kithil wrote to fellow members in mid-September 1972, at “this point many of us have become convinced that we cannot reach any responsive ear if we continue to follow our past policy of having no objection to the Olympics per se, but only an objection to staging them in the Front Range of our county. We feel that we have no choice left but to strongly and effectively oppose holding the Olympics in Colorado AT

15 Vance R. Dittman, Presidents Annual Address, 28 August 1972, Box 4 Folder 40, POME SHHL; Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 11 September 1972, Folder 26, Box 1, MAPC JCA.
ALL.” In POME’s view, the only way to keep their middle-class refuge protected was to keep the Olympics out of Colorado entirely.

Kithil served as POME’s representative at MAPC meetings and he urged the MAPC to follow suit. At the start of September 1972, MAPC decided against donating money to CCF. At the time, it was still the MAPC’s position that it would be okay to have the Olympics in Colorado, so long as events were not near Evergreen. However, in September, the DOC still planned to hold ski jumping, bobsled, and luge races in Jefferson County or its vicinity. Thus MAPC leaders wrote to their membership to ask advice. “Our representatives feel certain that the only means left to citizen groups to influence [the] relocation of [Olympic] sites is toward passage of the constitutional amendment which would deny state funding for the [g]ames,” the MAPC’s letter read; “Therefore, it is time to re-examine our position and determine whether we should now oppose state funding as the only way to remove the events from the area.” After conferring with the membership, this became the MAPC’s stance too.

Objections to spending state money on the Olympics coupled with distrust of the DOC added additional force to arguments against hosting the winter Olympics in Colorado. As CCF highlighted in their campaign literature, the DOC seemed to be raising cost estimates every few months. From the DOC’s bid to the USOC in December

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16 Richard Kithil to Members of Protect Our Mountain Environment, Letter, 15 September 1972, Box 4 Folder 47, POME SHHL.

17 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 11 September 1972, Folder 26, Box 1, MAPC JCA.

18 Tommy Patterson to MAPC Members, Letter, 15 September 1972, Folder 16 Box 1, MAPC JCA.

19 Tommy Patterson, Mountain Area Planning Council Meeting Minutes, 9 October 1972, Folder 26, Box 1, MAPC JCA.
1967 through their bid to the IOC in May 1970, they listed Olympic costs between $10 and $14 million. In early 1971, when providing estimates to the Colorado JBC, the DOC raised that approximation to between $18 and $25 million. Preceding the Sapporo games in January 1972, Governor Love publicly placed Olympic expenses as high as $30 million. After the Sapporo Olympics, in March 1972, Love lifted that number to $35 million in his speech to the Colorado legislature. The DOC’s new president, Carl DeTemple, confirmed that estimate shortly thereafter. Yet, Colorado citizens soon learned that if “indirect costs” were included, Olympic expenses could reach as much as $70 million. On later dates, the DOC listed the estimated cost of hosting the Olympics as high as $77 million and then $92 million. And that was just what the DOC was willing to admit to. Given consistently rising cost estimates, the enormous price tags of previous winter Olympics, and the DOC’s history of deception, Coloradans had legitimate reasons to believe representatives Richard Lamm and Robert Jackson when they claimed that nobody knew what the cost for the Denver winter Olympic games was actually going to be.


22 “Love Confident Colo. to Hold ’76 Olympics,” 31 January 1972, clipping, Folder 4 Box 6, MACP JCA.


26 For CCF’s use of these changing estimates see, “How Much Will the 1976 Winter Olympics Cost?” *The Colorado Destiny*, 2 September 1972, CCF DPL.
With middle-class environmentalists and fiscally concerned residents, as well as minority activists, CCF spent the months and weeks before the referendum pressing their case for direct democracy. They continued to claim that the only people profiting from excessive Olympic spending would be the “groups planning and promoting the Olympics . . . dominated by a business and financial elite which comprise a virtual Who’s Who of wealth, power and influence in Colorado.” Just as important, CCF organized to get out the vote. Where Love devised a plan that involved spending $150,000 on advertising through newspapers, billboards, radio, and television, CCF spent about $20,000 raised through donations on distributing campaign literature door-to-door. They assigned volunteers to blocks, neighborhoods, precincts, and districts. They then instructed these contributors on how to interact with Colorado voters. They told volunteers overseeing smaller zones to pass out CCF pamphlets and other anti-Olympic materials, such as bumper stickers that read “Vote YES for NO Olympics” and “Save Our Money, Save Our Mountains – Stop the Olympics.” CCF advised fellow Olympic opponents taking on larger regions to find additional foot soldiers and passed along CCF directives to them.

With faith in a democratic and politically engaged civic society, the young but ambitions political operatives behind Colorado’s anti-Olympic referendum made their case person-to-person.

27 Ibid.


29 Dwight Filley, Meg Lundstrom, and John Parr, Citizens for Colorado Newsletter, 25 June 1972, Box 5 Folder 50, CCF DPL.
Love’s Letters

Letters written to Governor Love in the months leading up to the November 1972 referendum provide additional evidence that people from across Colorado opposed hosting the Olympics for various combinations of the reasons discussed above. Merging her concern for the environment with her worry of gratuitous costs, Margaret Fleming, from Boulder, Colorado, asked Governor Love, “what will happen to our environment” if Colorado hosts the Olympics? To which she rhetorically answered: “I, for one, do not want to pay extra taxes for its destruction.”30 Michael Bram of Colorado Springs, Colorado, similarly attested: “I find that it [hosting the Olympics] is economically and ecologically bad for the state of Colorado.”31 Ron Burian, also from Boulder, likewise wrote to Love that the “cost (historically and proposed) is ridiculous and the benefits apply only to tourists and related businesses. Too-rapid growth is already a problem.”32 When it came to selecting their reasons for opposing the 1976 Denver games, Colorado residents could easily cite “all of the above” and many did.

Love’s writers emphasized environmental concerns, fiscal prudence, and DOC deceptions. However, just as often they underscored their right to decide if the games should come to Colorado or not. Raymond Foster from Colorado Springs expressed these sentiments. “By hosting the forthcoming winter Olympics,” he informed Love, “you are permitting the ecological destruction of a beautiful area . . . Why should we, the

30 Margaret Fleming to Governor John Love, Letter, 15 January 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

31 Michael Bram to Governor John Love, Letter, 5 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

32 Ron Burian to Governor John Love, Letter, 11 January 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
residents of Colorado, be expected to foot a significant percentage of the bill to see our beautiful state turned into a commercial venture?” Foster then added: “Shouldn’t we be allowed to vote on whether or not we want the Olympics to be held here?”

When Mary Freed from Denver wrote to Love she did not even take the time to list her reasons for objecting to the winter Olympics, telling the governor he probably knew them all already. “My only request,” she asserted, “is that the people of Colorado be allowed to vote on the controversy.”

As Christie Drake of Denver also pleaded: “I find it distressing that monies are being taken away from health areas and given to the Denver Olympic Commission. Let’s once and for all ask the people of Colorado how they feel about the 1976 Winter Olympics. After all, isn’t that the democratic process?!”

With added anguish, Kathleen Eccles of Littleton, Colorado, expressed a similar feeling. “Apparently, you feel it is more important to give this state the so-called ‘prestige’ of the Olympics than it is for the populace to breathe clean air,” Eccles wrote; “why were we not allowed to vote on the Olympics before they were authorized by the Olympic Committee . . . have you forgotten you are an elected official and not a Demigod?” As Eccles concluded: “What you are doing goes against this country’s very beginning; ‘Taxation without Representation.’”

For numerous and often

33 Raymond W. Foster to Governor John Love, Letter, 10 April 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

34 Mary Freed to Governor John Love, Letter, 1 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence, Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

35 Christine Drake to Governor John Love, Letter, circa 5 May 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

36 Kathleen Eccles to Governor John Love, Letter, 7 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
complementary reason, Coloradans pleaded for Love to let them have a voice in how their society chose to spend their money and allocate public resources.

As CCF argued, many Coloradans felt that their right to self-determination had been circumvented by self-interested Colorado politicians and businesspeople. “We the people do not want the Olympics held in Colorado,” wrote Fred Cocher from the Denver suburb of Littleton; “we the people who were not allowed to vote on this important matter; we the people who recognize that the only ones who want them are the cheap egotistic politicians, the hotel / motel owners, and the land speculators.”37 Mr. and Mrs. Dan Fahrney from Lakewood, Colorado, echoed this claim: “The decision was never put to the people who it seems will eventually be paying for it. The decision was made by business men and politicians whose motive is selfish profit making.”38

Lawrence Bradley of Pueblo, Colorado, made this point when comparing CCF’s Sapporo petition to the resolution rushed through the United States Congress by Colorado’s congressional representatives during the IOC’s Sapporo meetings. As Bradley declared to Love: “Not only does the passage of the Olympic resolution reveal that you gentlemen don’t represent the people of this state, but it reveals just whom you do represent. It reveals that you represent two organizations composed of people who are only minimally concerned with the welfare of the state, but are maximally concerned with their own welfare: the International Olympic Committee and the Denver Organizing

37 Fred Cocher to Governor John Love, Letter, 6 January 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

38 Mr. and Mrs. Dan Fahrney to Governor John Love, Letter, 15 January 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
Committee.” Bradley further asserted, “I must conclude that representative democracy is dead.”

Minnie Hoy of Golden, Colorado, reiterated the notion. “You know of course that the public was never consulted on whether they wanted this rich man’s hobby entertainment here or not, when it will be charged to them,” she wrote to Governor Love, “and I haven’t even mentioned how I feel about tearing up our beautiful mountains . . . as I see it, it has taken a lot of nerve to bring this mess to Colo. without the people voting on it.” Alicia M. Acord of Brighton, Colorado similarly wrote: “The State of Colorado belongs to the people who live here, not to the Governor alone. He has been elected to serve the wishes of the majority, not a few of your friends or other politicians.” As Acrod told Love, “I cannot understand how you could have done this without putting [it] to the vote of the tax-payers . . . Those games will never benefit even one percent of the people of Colorado and in your own mind you know that.”

As Jefferson County environmentalists, minority activists, Lamm and Jackson, as well as CCF demonstrated, citizens often interpreted their right to decide what to do about the Denver winter Olympic games as a right to challenge one of Love most popular policies – “selling Colorado.” As K.W. Hugo from Longmont, Colorado, wrote with regard to the Denver Olympics: “I am unalterably opposed to the over-selling of Colorado. All the natural things that have made Colorado a great tourist attraction,

39 Lawrence Bradley, Open Letter to Governor John Love and the members of the Colorado Congressional delegation, 2 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

40 Minnie Hoy to Governor John Love, Letter, 25 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

41 Alicia M. Acord to Governor John Love, Letter, 10 April 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
sportsman’s paradise, and a wonderful place to live are being threatened by over
industrialization and the consequent over population . . . Bigger does not necessarily
mean better.” Ken Benziger from Boulder also connected the Olympics to Colorado’s
growth. “A person in government sometimes becomes confused as to who his
constituency is – it is not industry,” Benziger declared to Governor Love; “If industry and
state growth committees want the Olympics, let them pay for it.”

Mary Crabbe from Littleton made the link between stopping the Olympics and slowing growth even clearer
when she demanded of Love: “Stop the Olympics from coming here,” qualifying “I ask
this as I ask you to discourage all industry and business from coming here.”

Touching upon all the major issues of the Denver Olympics debate, Fred Douglas
of Wheat Ridge, Colorado, provided yet another layer to anti-Olympic protests – his
political clout as a Colorado citizen. As he wrote to Governor Love: “I oppose the
taxpayers financing the Olympics. I think the Denver Olympic Committee has not been
honest with the people. I don’t like to think of tearing up the mountains and all the cheap
commercial buildings that will happen . . . At the very least I think this should go to a
vote of the people.” Douglas then averred, “I will not support any legislator who shoves
this Denver Olympics down my throat.” Richard J. Heider from Littleton expressed the
same perspective. The “Olympics is the most blatant waste of the average citizen’s

42 K.W. Hugo to Governor John Love, Letter, 4 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
43 Kent Benziger to Governor John Love, Letter, circa 27 April 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
44 Mary Crabbe to Governor John Love, Letter, 15 May 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
45 Mr. & Mrs. Fred Douglas to Governor John Love, Letter, 8 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
money and assets (Colorado’s environment) imaginable for the profit of a very few,” Heider proclaimed. He then added, if “you waste one dime of my money on the Olympics, you will have lost my vote (Republican, ordinarily) forever.”

The games became representative of a denial of democracy. Consequently, many of Love’s traditional supporters refused to stand behind him. “For many years I have been a member of Colorado’s ‘silent majority,’ content to live with, or adjust to, the many decisions made by the elected leadership of this state,” wrote Richard R. Gordon of Littleton. “I am taking this opportunity, however,” Gordon told Love, “to explain my grievous dissatisfaction, and offer my prayer for restitution of a major injustice rendered by you.” As Gordon avowed, the “people of the State of Colorado are being denied the right, granted by the Constitution, of voicing their opinions in the way they are governed. In essence, a form of dictatorship has been imposed upon Colorado with the 1976 Winter Olympics.” Bringing attention to unreliable cost estimates, the prospect of taxpayer contributions, and the “destruction” of the environment, Gordon professed: “I will do everything in my limited power to prevent the 1976 Winter Olympics from being held in the State of Colorado for the simple reason that I firmly believe, as our founding fathers did, that our form of government is a government by the people, for the people, rather than a government by the government, for the government, as you are attempting to force upon us.”

Although a member of the traditionally conservative “silent majority,” Gordon and Love stood on separate sides of the Denver Olympics debate.

46 Richard J. Heidler to Governor John Love, Letter, 2 March 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

47 Richard R. Gordon to Governor John Love, Letter, 15 March 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
Gary O. Curtin of Avarda, Colorado, endorsed a likeminded view. “I am just now being made aware . . . we’ve been bamboozled by the DOC and conspiring politicians who thought the 1976 Olympics could be easily shoved down the throats of ‘pushover’ Colorado resident-taxpayers,” Curtin wrote. Many Coloradans, Curtin advised Love, “now believe that the members of the DOC are motivated by self-interest rather than any interest in Colorado or its residents, who will be paying through the nose . . . Staging the 1976 Olympics would be a financial and environmental disaster.” A self-identified “Republican for more than 15 years,” Curtin thus counseled his Republican leader: “I really am losing faith in the Republican Party when I see you and other Republican legislators back this scheme. Perhaps men such as Dick Lamm and Bob Jackson are the real hope for Colorado’s future!”

Theo M. Fenlon repeated such thoughts. At 72 years old, Fenlon told Governor Love that he had “always voted the Republican ticket.” As a public school teacher, he “taught, proudly, about this country of my birth, upholding democracy.” However, Fenlon lamented to Love, “I am at a loss to see that democracy gradually deteriorating.” With a week and half left in CCF’s referendum petition drive, Fenlon asked the Colorado Governor: “why I am forced to a petition, for the first time in my life to try to force you, among other elected servants of the State of Colorado, to allow me my right to vote on the issue of the 1976 Winter Olympics being brought here by you and others. This to me is NOT DEMOCRACY.” Fenlon continued to commiserate: “I resent this dictatorial action with all my soul . . . I am beginning to feel that the Democratic Party is the more

48 Gary O. Curtin to Governor John Love, Letter, 18 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
‘democratic’ party and therefore my long support of the Republican Party is fast waning.” 49 Many writers who identified themselves as committed Republican voters warned Love that if he continued to support hosting the Olympic they would turn against him. 50

Another disgruntled republican was W.K. Brockne from Evergreen, Colorado. Brockne repeat many of the points considered thus far, while implicitly calling attention to a final aspect of the Denver Olympics controversy. “I wish you to know that after 52 years I am, thanks to you, ashamed of being a Republican!” Brockne trumpeted to Love; “How can you so stubbornly support a handful of ‘Sell Colorado’ men in their Olympic adventure?” Brockne continued, as “an ecologist I cannot but be dismayed at the damage the games will do . . . As a taxpayer I find it incredible to be asked to pay taxes for such folly when items of much greater importance go unfunded.” Brockne then moved regretfully from the nature of his objection to the methods of his protest. In the case of the Denver Olympics, Brock claimed, “[m]iddle-class white Americans are a minority – the minority which pays the bill! Must we stoop to street demonstrations and raised fists before we are heard![?]” 51 Although not necessarily proud of it, as a middle-class white American attempting to slow growth in a residential area, Brockne became part of the 1960s rights revolution ushered into American culture by the struggles of traditionally

49 Theo M. Fenlon to Governor John Love, Letter, 19 June 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

50 For other examples see, Robert M. Baker to Governor John Love, Letter, 5 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR; Jamie V DuBuse and Sandra M. DuBuse to Governor John Love, Letter, 31 January 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR.

51 W.W. Brockne to Governor John Love, Letter, 27 March 1972, Administrative Correspondence, Box 67068, JLF CSAR.
marginalized and politically disempowered groups. Thus the critical ethos of the 1960s helped make various anti-Olympic and anti-growth protests possible.

The arguments presented to Governor Love in these letters came from across Colorado. Middle-class environmentalists, minority advocates from Denver, Democratic politicians, and liberal-minded political operatives brought the Denver Olympics debate into the public sphere. In particular, Lamm, Jackson, and CCF put Colorado’s anti-Olympic referendum on statewide ballots. Still, at least some Olympic adversaries came from conservative backgrounds. The campaign waged by CCF against the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games aimed to reach Middle America. In the instance of the Denver games, the approach worked.\(^{52}\)

The DOC, Governor Love, and other Olympic supporters never anticipated the anti-growth environmental movement of Jefferson County. Nor did they foresee how easily such anti-growth sentiments could be spread across the state. They did not take minority activists or CCF seriously. Meanwhile, by arguing that the Olympics represented a misuse of state resources that it subverted democratic ideals, Lamm, Jackson, and CCF led a diverse set of Coloradans to the ballot box. Driven by a diverse set of interests, once they entered the voting both the Centennial State’s citizenry determined that in the late 1960s and early 1970s the politics of growth and individual rights did not align with hosting an event such as the winter Olympic games.

\(^{52}\) Some letter written to Love literally copied CCF advertisements and literature point for point, see Martha Daiss to Governor John Love, Letter, 12 January 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR; Michael Bram to Governor John Love, Letter, 5 February 1972, Administrative Correspondence Box 67068, JLF CSAR;
Epilogue

The Olympic Spirit of ’76 after November 1972

The political process that culminated in the defeat of the 1976 Denver winter Olympic games had significant repercussions for Colorado. By 1972, two years after Protect Our Mountain Environment incorporated, a new citizen group based in Jefferson County called PLAN Jeffco formed. PLAN Jeffco and POME had similar aims and POME’s 600 or so members soon aligned themselves with their fellow environmentalist organization.¹ PLAN Jeffco hoped to “convince the electorate of the county that OPEN SPACE should be acquired and preserved throughout the county with public funds.” As a PLAN Jeffco brochure described it, “[w]e citizens of Jefferson County have migrated here for many and varied reasons. But we have all stayed for the same reason: IT’S A GREAT PLACE TO LIVE! . . . We can live in the mountains or We [sic] can see and smell those mountains from our homes on the plains. We like the proximity to nature that we’ve found here. LET’S KEEP IT THAT WAY!”²

The alternative, PLAN Jeffco contended, would create a community engulfed by “a sea of rooftops, even into the mountains, without the relief of bare hillside, trees or streams.”³ Vance Dittman of POME expressed similar thoughts when he asked the Jefferson County Planning Commission to halt the construction of a new residential areas

¹ Protect Our Mountain Environment, Motion by Hugh Dewigh, 20 April 1972, Box 4 Folder 40, POME SHHL.
² Plan Jeffco Citizens Organization, “Vote for the Open Space Land Proposals,” Pamphlet, Box 1 Folder 10, POME SHHL.
³ Ibid.
a year earlier. “Will we destroy permanently the very qualities which make this environment beautiful and unique? Will we still have the unbroken open spaces, the forests, the wild life and the serenity and quiet? Or will we be just commuters and polluters in another setting?” Dittman asked. PLAN Jeffco and Dittman came to the same conclusion. The uniqueness, the very essence of where they lived, was determined by the presence of the “open space, the forests, [and] the wildlife” around them. Moreover, where they lived in large part defined who they were. Without open spaces, forests, and wildlife, their beloved hamlet would regress and their identities would change. They would become mere “commuters and polluters.”

When the referendum prohibiting Olympic spending came to the ballot box in November 1972, Jefferson residents passed it with the rest of Colorado. Moreover, they also passed a countywide resolution drafted by PLAN Jeffco that proposed a local “open space tax.” It was a 0.05% sales tax to be used to acquire undeveloped land within Jefferson. Jefferson County residents helped defeat the Olympics by raising the volume of opposition to new levels. Yet, perhaps more importantly, Olympic protesters played a part in building a successful localized class-oriented environmental movement that culminated when Jefferson’s citizens raised their own taxes to buy up surrounding land. As MAPC President Douglas Jones observed in 1971, during a Colorado State University

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4 Vance R Dittman Jr. to Jefferson County Planning Commission, Letter, 26 July 1971, Box 4 Folder 40, POME SHHL.

5 “1972 Open Space Resolution,” [http://www.planjeffco.org/about-us_our-history.html](http://www.planjeffco.org/about-us_our-history.html) [Accessed 20 July 2016]; Plan Jeffco still functions today “as a watchdog group, observes meetings of the Open Space Advisory Committee (OSAC), participates in subcommittees and issue groups, proposes and works for important land acquisitions, and keeps citizens informed about what is going on in the Open Space Program.”
seminar on the physical and environmental aspects of the 1976 Olympics, the games spurred townspeople to pay closer attention than they ever had to county zoning policies.\textsuperscript{6}

The campaign to banish the winter Olympics also had a profound effect on the political aspirations of Richard Lamm and the members of Citizens for Colorado’s Future. As Lamm recalled, after their anti-Olympic referendum passed the group felt “euphoria . . . we had taken on a giant.” As a result, from “the moment of the night of the Olympics [vote],” Lamm explained, “it was definitely in the back of my mind that the same people who defeated the Olympics could get me elected Governor.” The night the anti-Olympic referendum passed, at a victory party for newly elected democratic U.S. Representative Patricia Schroeder, as Lamm remembered: “I looked around that room and recognized we had captains in all of the major population centers. We had people with lots of enthusiasm and that same enthusiasm – I could piggyback onto it.”\textsuperscript{7}

When Lamm called a meeting to outline a run for the governorship Meg Lundstrom, John Parr, Sam Brown, Dwight Filley, and Howard Gelt attended.\textsuperscript{8} As Lundstrom recalled, we “moved pretty much as a group into that campaign . . . We had worked with Dick . . . and we wanted to keep working for him.”\textsuperscript{9} As Nussbaum remembered, “[w]e sort of just switched from one gear to another gear . . . it was an easy shift of focus from a referendum issue to electing somebody who might have an


\textsuperscript{7}Richard Lamm, telephone interview with author, 9 May 2016, notes and recording in author’s possession. Robert Jackson also considered a run for governor, see Tom Gavin, “Bob Jackson Looking Higher,” \textit{Denver Post}, clipping, Folder 49 Box 5, POME SHHL.

\textsuperscript{8}Lamm pointed out that political advisor Jim Monahan was another important advisor.

\textsuperscript{9}Meg Lundstrom.
opportunity to put some of those specific goals that were involved with CCF into practice.”

During Lamm’s run for governor, the members of CCF took on roles similar to the ones they held during their fight over the Denver Olympics. Lundstrom oversaw the campaign’s publications; Filley managed Lamm’s campaign office; Gelt became his deputy campaign manager; Nussbaum and Parr worked together as field organizers. As Lamm remembered, after the Olympics controversy concluded Parr still “had the files and the contacts [from CCF] . . . He knew all the people who had just taken on the establishment [to defeat the Olympics] and brought them together to help elect me.”

Notably, in the fall of 1973, Lamm walked across the state of Colorado – from Wyoming to New Mexico to Oklahoma – to gain publicity during the state’s Democratic primary battle. Nussbaum and Parr oversaw the logistics for the trek. Lamm and the members of CCF remembered the campaign tactic giving Lamm an edge over other Democratic contenders.

In 1974, Coloradans elected Lamm as governor. Lamm garnered 53% of the statewide vote to win the race handily over his Republican rival, John D. Vanderhoof. When asked about the part played by his resistance to the Denver Olympics in his gubernatorial victory, Lamm admitted openly: “I think it made all the difference.”

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10 Tom Nussbaum, telephone interview with author, 6 April 2016, notes and recording in author’s possession.


12 Tom Nussbaum.

was probably right. The Denver Olympics not only made Lamm a well-known liberal advocate, fresh within the electorate’s minds, it drew attention to issues such as controlling growth and protecting the environment that became keynotes during Lamm’s gubernatorial run. Furthermore, if the Denver Olympics debate did not bring rightward-leading Coloradans, such as Vance Dittman, to Lamm’s side, it may have tempered enthusiasm for his Republican opponent. Former Republican Lieutenant Governor and a known DOC supporter, Vanderhoof credited his 1974 defeat to Lamm to low voter turnout in traditional Republican strongholds, such as Jefferson County. Even so, if letters to Governor Love were any indication, some who would normally have voted for Vanderhoof backed Lamm instead because of the two candidates’ stances on the 1976 winter Olympics, environmental protection, and overall growth and development.

By 1974, after a short stint as President Richard Nixon’s “energy czar,” John Love’s political career came to an end. In contrast, the members of CCF were just getting started. Lamm served as the governor of Colorado for three terms. Nussbaum and Parr worked for Lamm’s administration through his re-election in 1978. After that, they both began strategizing with Democratic representative Federico Peña. In 1982, with the help of the CCF duo, Peña defeated none other than incumbent William McNichols to become the mayor of Denver. A Mexican-American, Peña became the first minority candidate elected by a majority white constituency to lead a major United States

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14 Richard Lamm.

city. Indicating Nussbaum’s importance to Peña’s success, the former CCF leader severed as the new mayor’s chief of staff during his first term in office.¹⁶

Meanwhile, Sam Brown entered Colorado politics in his own right. In 1974, at the age of 31, he was elected the state’s treasurer. “Sam Brown isn’t marching anymore,” the *New York Times* reported, “[h]e’s investing . . . $375 million in state funds.” As Brown described, his new position was “the first real opportunity I’ve had to get a handle on the economic issues that are of concern to me. The fundamental question is, who profits and who pays? Now that I’m here,” Brown reflected, “I have a sense that there’s a real chance to get some of that profit away from banks and into the community.” Brown pushed large Colorado banks that held state funds to offer improved services and lending opportunities to minority groups, small business, women, and residents living in rural areas. Brown continued his populist mission to redistribute political power away from an elitist establishment and toward ordinary individuals.¹⁷

In the early 1960s, for Colorado’s Olympics bidders, the winter games represented a chance to promote growth. At the end of the decade, for Olympic opponents, the games and growth itself presented a variety of problems. However, by 1972, the roles reversed. The 1976 Denver winter Olympic games became an opportunity for Olympic protesters. The games were not a magic charm that completely blew apart an established power structure. The controversy surrounding the Denver games did not stop Colorado’s population from almost doubling between 1970 and the

¹⁶ Tom Nussbaum.

year 2000, rising from about 2,210,000 to 4,300,000 people. In 1999, Lamm looked back at his time in office with some disappointment. The “Colorado I was afraid was going to happen with the Olympics happened without the Olympics,” he admitted. Still, by attempting to bring the winter Olympics into Colorado during the 1960s, Colorado’s political establishment created a surrogate issue through which the likes of Vance Dittman, Peter Garcia, Richard Lamm, Sam Brown, and their supporters could be heard.

These political advocates not only stopped the Olympics, they used the impending event to articulate, popularize, and advocate different ways of thinking about Colorado’s future. In the short term, they made a real impact. In particular, the Denver Olympics prompted Jefferson County residents to undertake their distinctive environmentalist agenda, while the games enabled the members of CCF to reach out for and successfully obtain explicit political power. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Coloradans generally became convinced that they had a right to answer a question with which communities across the United States and the globe continue to grapple. Should their city and their region host the Olympic spectacle? Do the Olympics enhance or degrade the quality of life, the economy, the environment, and the culture of host cities. Moreover, who decides the Olympic question – the bid designers and organizers, the elites, the politicians, the taxpayers, the common folk? How do they decide and why?

Within Colorado, in offering positions on these questions, citizens of diverse stripes took


part in politics, fighting to influence how Colorado would look and function in the days ahead.

After Denver rescinded the Olympics, the IOC welcomed replacement bids. The USOC selected Salt Lake City to submit an offer, but similar anti-growth sentiments within Utah forced that city to withdraw. As a Salt Lake official reported to the IOC, the city could “could not be assured of proper funding.” A week before the IOC met to select Denver’s replacement, the USOC invited Lake Placid, New York, to represent the United States instead. To win the games, Lake Placid representatives made familiar promises. They reported that the people of Lake Placid “fully backed the candidature.” They guaranteed federal funding. New York’s governor, Nelson Rockefeller, openly championed the bid as well. Furthermore, Lake Placid organizers pledged that all the required facilities were already in existence. Tellingly, however, Lake Placid representatives made one additional vow. They assured to the IOC that New York protesters could not stop the games from coming to Lake Placid even if they wanted to. As they told the IOC, “any opponents to the Games would not be able to organize a referendum, as this was illegal in the State of New York.” It appeared that the less power citizens held the more suitable a city became to be chosen as an Olympic host. 20

Since the voters of Colorado rejected the Olympics, the issues Coloradans raised continued to plague potential host cities. Increasingly, in metropolitan centers where voters have input, winning an Olympic bid has become a task that requires daunting political skill. In such cases, to host the Olympic games, while courting the IOC, organizing committees must also manufacture democratic consent with local residents.

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20 International Olympic Committee Meeting Minutes, 2-5 February 1973, EB IOCA.
They must convince a city’s inhabitants that hosting the spectacle is indeed worthwhile. By the end of the 1970s, the exceedingly high cost of hosting the games made Denver look like a precursor of things to come. After the 1976 summer Olympic games left the Canadian city of Montreal with a $1.2 billion deficit, few municipalities lined up to follow in their footsteps. In 1978, when the IOC selected Los Angeles to host the 1984 summer games, the only other city bidding was Tehran, Iran, which eventually withdrew as Iran headed toward a full scale revolution. Since no one else wanted to host the event, the Olympics-obsessed City of Angels won the 1984 Olympics by default.\footnote{Wayne Wilson, “Los Angeles,” in Encyclopedia of the Modern Olympic Movement, ed. John E. Findling et al. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 381-387; Mark Dyreson and Matthew Llewellyn, “Los Angeles is the Olympic City: Legacies of the 1932 and 1984 Olympic Games,” International Journal of the History of Sport 25, 14 (2008):1991-2018; Matthew Llewellyn, John Gleaves, and Wayne Wilson, “The Historical Legacy of the 1984 Los Angeles Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32 1 (2015): 1-8.}

Many scholars agree that that 1984 Los Angeles Olympics saved the Olympic movement. Los Angeles organizers left the city with $222.7 million surplus. They did so, however, without expending public funds. The Los Angeles planners relied solely on private financing and corporate sponsorships. Los Angeles also benefited tremendously from the ability to (actually) use facilities already in place. They did not have to promise state of the art event sites, set in perfect locations, because they were not competing against another bid city offer something better.\footnote{Ibid.}

No other city has been able to replicate the success of “LA84.” Meanwhile, bid cities continue to face added obstacles in democratic countries where public funding is involved. In Colorado during the early 1970s, citizens worried about rising cost estimates, an ensuing tax hike, and wasted public resources. These fears hold an uncanny
similarity to the Olympic opposition that recently emerged in Boston, Massachusetts. The USOC selected Boston as the U.S. representative to bid for the upcoming 2024 summer games. Yet, soon after the USOC decision, discord arose in Boston. As in Denver, anti-Olympic Bostonians claimed the costs of the games was just too high. And again, as in Denver, many believed that public funds would be better off going exclusively to public infrastructure, schools, and other programs that could support the Boston’s general well-being. To Bostonians, as to Coloradoans before them, the Olympics appeared to be an unwise investment.23

Part of the problem for Denver in the early 1970s was that the size of the Olympics had grown significantly. New and renovated event facilities designed to hold thousands of spectators, accommodations for thousands of journalists, and a sizable Olympic village for athletes, coaches, and trainers all became prerequisites for the IOC. At the same time, locals doubted the utility of new Olympic facilities after the games left town. Though the DOC claimed that the games would bolster Colorado’s overall economy and create invaluable pride and prestige within Colorado, the Olympics organizers proved unable to convince their fellow citizens that this was so. All of these issues played out in Boston decades later, leading Boston’s mayor, Marty Walsh, to refuse to promise his city would cover cost overruns for the 2024 Olympics. As a result, in July 2015, the USOC pulled Boston’s bid off of the IOC’s table. As USOC CEO Scott Blackmun explained, “the USOC does not think that the level of support enjoyed by Boston’s bid would allow it to prevail.”24

24 Blackburn quoted in Ibid.
Olympic opposition has arisen outside the United States as well. In November of 2013, citizens of Bavaria, Germany, voted to reject a plan to try and host the 2022 winter games in Munich. Then, in January of 2014, Stockholm, Sweden, one of six IOC finalists, also pulled itself out of contention for 2022 winter Olympics. Just five months later, in Krakow, Poland, voters passed a referendum against hosting the games, forcing the city to remove itself form the list of finalists too. Oslo, Norway followed suit. In Oslo’s case, concerned government officials pressured organizers to halt the Nordic city’s application. In all four European cities, the enormous costs that the winter Olympics entail were a key factor.25

Denver, Boston, Munich, Stockholm, Krakow, and Oslo are all cities subject to democratic processes. Thus it appears that autocratic, rather than democratic societies have become the IOC’s surest bet in finding a city willing and able to fund the games. The case of the 2014 winter games in Sochi, where Russian organizers spent an estimate $51 billion without major protests, serves as a striking example.26 Meanwhile, by the summer of 2015, the only bidders left vying to host in 2022 Winter Olympics were


Beijing, China (the eventual winner and host to 2008 summer games) and Almaty, Kazakhstan (believed to be a democracy in name only).²⁷

One might speculate that after Denver ’76, the IOC would never again consider Denver as an Olympic host. However, given the recent dearth of winter Olympic bidders, Colorado has a legitimate chance to regain the games if it wants to. If Colorado had bid for the 2022 winter Olympic, it very well might have beaten out Beijing’s winning proposal, which included a plan to hold skiing events three-and-half hours from the host city. Over the years Colorado leaders have tried to overcome any grudge that the IOC might possess. In 1985, former DOC supporters Steven Knowlton and Willy Scheaffler met with Denver Mayor Federico Peña about organizing a bid. Peña signed off on the idea and in 1989 a new Denver organizing committee submitted a bid to the USOC to host the 1998 winter Olympics.²⁸ The bid failed, but, years later, Denver attempted to obtain the 2022 games. That effort stalled when the USOC decided against offering any U.S. city for the IOC’s selection. The Americans wanted to focus their efforts on their futile attempt to bring summer games to Boston.²⁹

Nevertheless, as Colorado Governor John Love and Denver Mayor Thomas Currigan did over forty-eight years before, in August of 2016, current Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper and present-day Denver Mayor Michael Hancock traveled south of America’s boarder to witness the summer Olympics. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, at the


2016 summer games, the Centennial State officials aimed to learn first-hand about the planning process and the economic impact of hosting the sports extravaganza. They may yet decide once more to try to host the winter Olympics, perhaps as soon as 2026. If they do so, given the democratic practices and ideals imbedded in their state, history would advise them to be transparent in their planning and to consult their constituents first. As the failed 1976 winter Olympic games of made clear, the decision over whether or not to sponsor one of the world’s most renowned and expensive sports spectacles will ultimately be up to Colorado voters.\textsuperscript{30}

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KMTA-TV (Television station: Denver, Colo.)

Websites

bbc.com

boston.com

businessinsider.com

census.gov

coloradosports.org

deadspin.com

denverpost.com

dw.com

legacy.com

norwegianamerican.com

postindependent.com

nytimes.com

skihall.com

washingtonpost.com

westword.com
Secondary Sources

Articles and Chapters


Books and Dissertations


Vita

Adam Berg

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Education

Doctor of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University (2016)

- Major Field of Study: Kinesiology (Concentration: History and Philosophy of Sport)
- Major Advisors: Dr. Mark Dyreson & Dr. Scott Kretchmar
- Minor Field of Study: U.S. History
- Minor Department Representative: Dr. Lori Ginzberg
- Expected Date of Graduation: December 2016

Master of Science, Pennsylvania State University (2012)

- Field of Study: Kinesiology (Concentration: History and Philosophy of Sport)
- Advisor: Dr. Mark Dyreson
- Thesis: Vacation From Civilization: the Origins and Emergence of Thru-Hiking on the Appalachian Trail

Awards

- 2016 North American Society for Sport History Dissertation Travel Grant
- 2016 Olympic Studies Centre Ph.D. Student Research Grant

Scholarship

