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CLAIMING GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTANT SUFFERING IN MEDIA DISCOURSE: BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

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Mass Communications

By

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the formation of global responsibility discourses used in promoting NATO's military interventions in other sovereignties in the post-Cold War era in the mainstream US media. The study utilizes discourse analysis to examine the construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses surrounding the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Kosovo Conflict (1998-1999). I approach the concept of global responsibility involving military interventions as one that can be assembled from the associated discourse. Accordingly, I have identified three major ways to discuss the global responsibility of "what we ought to do" at the national and global level: humanitarian responsibility, regional security responsibility, and the critiques of these two responsibilities.

The case study of global responsibility discourses surrounding the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict in the mainstream US media and their intertextuality offers an account of the roles of the US media in foreign policy concerning military intervention in the post-Cold War era. The construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media were closely related to the US government's policy, and were formed within the framework of US national interest. The fact that the discourse on global responsibility functioned to facilitate US national interests and domestic responsibility not only means that the mainstream US media propagated the US government's policy and agenda. The cases of military intervention also imply that there were more fundamental structure and patterns by which the mainstream US media approached the "humanitarian crises" in the post-Cold War era: namely, the "benevolent

domination" and the subsequent construction of a "melodramatic national identity" and war narratives.

Based on the presumption that the discourse of the mainstream US media was a primary site for the public for learning and experiencing the two crises, this research maintains that global responsibility discourses functioned to provide US and global citizens with common knowledge and an experience of the hegemonic notion of "humanitarian intervention" via mediated discourse. I argue that the construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses in the military interventions may have had dangerous ramifications for global democracy because the discourse of responsibility can potentially absorb the progressive energies created by the public's awareness of responsibility on a global scale in order to reinforce the relations of domination.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Global Responsibility Discourse and Military Intervention

A growing awareness of human responsibility on a global scale and scope, based on a sense of interconnectedness from witnessing the violence and suffering of distant others and events, is a salient characteristic shared by an increasing number of people in our contemporary world. It can be argued that assuming responsibility and irresponsibility beyond the local is not a new phenomenon in human history, in that encountering and witnessing others has generally produced some sense of responsibility (also animosity) as well as a complex set of actions and consequences both intended and unintended. But the current fullness of the claim of global responsibility surrounding humanitarian, economic, cultural, and environmental issues, and subsequent engagement in these issues, is different in substance from that of earlier times in terms of scale, scope, degree, and patterns, in an increasingly globalized world.

One of the most observable areas full of responsibility claims that are increasingly global in scope is that of military interventions and the closely related underlying global power and media structures. A “new world order” has emerged since the end of the Cold War, which is often said to have strengthened a sense of global community. The global media also allow global audiences to observe the violence in distant locales and the suffering of distant others. These ever-changing conditions create the potential for global audiences to witness distant violence and suffering in other countries, while offering the suffering peoples or others we are involved, the chance to more effectively display their

dire straits via global media outlets. Of course, the power to do so has not been evenly distributed neither within nation-states, nor across the world.

This dissertation intends to explore the debates surrounding global responsibility, followed by a more specific discourse analysis and discussion of global responsibility discourses in US media, specifically dealing with modes of discourses used in promoting interventions based on the use of force in the post-Cold War era. In this study, I will approach the concept of global responsibility surrounding military interventions as one which can be assembled from its discourse, as Tomlinson (1991) does while explicating "the hybrid nature of the term" "cultural imperialism."[1] Accordingly, there can be identified three major ways to talk about global responsibility of "what we ought to do" at the national and global level.

First, various entities claiming responsibility as a duty, including the United States, NATO, EU, UN, and non-governmental organizations, argue that it is a means to protect civilians from suffering in humanitarian crises and to rescue the victims of conflicts (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001; Mepham & Cooper, 2004; United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004). Despite the unequal distribution of power and wealth under the current global power structure, the emergence of a new world order promoted claims of shared global responsibility. These come to be constructed in accordance with moral and normative imperatives seeking greater humanitarianism in this new world order.

A second way of thinking about global responsibility is how powerful nation-states, especially the United States under neo-conservatism, pinpoint their responsibility in having a unique role to play in stabilizing the world order against potential security

threats since the end of the Cold War (Elshtain, 2003; Project for the New American Century, 1997, 2000).

Finally, critiques of the hegemonic construction of global responsibility calls for a renewal of the dominant discourse and practice surrounding it. Critics of the dominant discourse are deconstructing the hegemonic ideas by denouncing them as "imperial" or "imperialist" (Chomsky, 1999; Fouskas & Gökay, 2005; Hardt & Negri, 2000, 2004; Spivak, 2004) and argue that the emphasis on global responsibility is articulated within the project of strengthening the global hegemony of the still dominant nation-states.

Each discourse of global responsibility has been emulated by its proponents to varying degrees. The media are among one of the most, if not the most, powerful means to promote or challenge legitimation of military intervention based on claims of global responsibility. The role of the media is not only to mediate communication among foreign policy elites and the public, but also to intervene by educating the public based on its pedagogical functions and owners' interests.[2]

Purpose of the Dissertation

The purpose of this study is to trace the use and movement of global responsibility discourse by first exploring the hegemonic construction of the concept of global responsibility and its articulation in a wider discursive practice by examining US mainstream media discourse, keeping in mind the fact that the discourse can be produced and appropriated differently within different contexts, and by different agents, within a global scope. The second objective is to examine the potential of global responsibility discourses by analyzing how the notion of global responsibility was conceived and produced, experienced, and negotiated within a global context in materializing its

potency or impotency, or ineffectiveness in affecting action. To accomplish these goals, I will look at US-led military interventions since the end of the Cold War for the purpose of deconstructing the common understanding that morality is generally suspended in times of war and of arguing that the case for war requires the construction of a form of (de)politicized morality among the relevant US/global public. US military interventions over the post-Cold War period were increasingly based upon the concept of global responsibility, as just wars based on humanitarianism rather than fighting communism. Therefore, the national and global interests were articulated not only through domestic affairs to suppress dissent, but also through claims of the United States' global responsibilities.

It is a significant characteristic of military intervention in the last two decades after the end of the Cold War that moral claims have often been placed above international laws and treaties. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), citing the ineffectiveness of the UN, intervened in the Bosnian War in 1995. NATO's intervention in the Kosovo Conflict in 1999, without the UN Security Council's authorization, also reflected a shift in legitimation for military intervention. The Second Gulf War in 2003, conducted without the approval of the UN Security Council, exemplifies the fact that the human rights discourse in the United States and abroad has partly replaced global legal structures as a means to legitimate preventative military intervention to save lives. It is not surprising then that the US-led war in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks in 2001 was deeply based upon moral claims that put forward the apparent realization of a harmonious "humanity as a whole" rather than being based upon the specific interests of any one nation-state. Considering the increasing

marginalization of the UN in the international governance system in the post-Cold War era, military interventions grounded on moral claims may provide the potential to expand the modes of discourse invoking global responsibility.

But the universalizability of specific moral claims or human rights involving military intervention is problematic, especially when the incursion is based on moral claims that are sensitive to the particularity of the context from which they arise and the consequences derived from them. Furthermore, morally legitimated military interventions based on specific interests have deteriorated the grounds for the UN's single global authority. Thus, we should take into consideration not only "what" should be revised in discourse and practice, but also "who" holds the responsibility to intervene and "how" the intervention can be effective in a general humanitarian sense. It is also necessary to examine when responsibility claims are strategically promoted in the course of military intervention; for instance, humanitarian responsibility claims were propagated as a back-up strategy in the 2003 Second Gulf War, especially after the threat posed by Iraq turned to be based upon "misinformation."

This analysis of the US mainstream media discourse on global responsibility during post-Cold War military interventions explores how US foreign policy was mediated to the US public through the media while recognizing the complexities involved in media and personal communication. Analyzing US mainstream media discourse on foreign policy issues in general, and military intervention cases in particular, is important in understanding how the US mainstream media have participated in the formation of public opinion surrounding military intervention. They have also exercised influence in the formation of global public opinion via the global media structure. Thus, it is not only

important to identify the construction of global responsibility in the mainstream US media, but also to understand how these modes of discourse became hegemonic by situating them into the broad social, political, and historical contexts in which they have been articulated.

It is useful here to address the question of why and how media discourse on foreign policy issues is important and why it is necessary to offer an account of its function in global public opinion formation as well as in the shaping of US public beliefs and experiences. First, media coverage of what is going on in foreign affairs and subsequent policy choices made by the US executive administration is the primary site and experience of these issues for most US citizens (Entman, 2004). Moreover, media discourse in the United States mediates communication among US political elites and ordinary US citizens, and hence play an important role in shaping foreign policy in the United States as well as global military, economic and media structures. It is also crucial to examine the roles and functions of media discourse within the global power structure.

Second, the various modes of global responsibility discourse can be understood as a link between the identities of the international/global actors involved and their policy orientations. Moreover, media discourse exerts an impact on policy opinions by influencing the formulation of public opinion. It should thus be relevant to say that a US national identity has been interpolated, maintained, and modified through the US mainstream media discourse, rather than to argue that a US national identity was created through the chosen modes of media discourse. However, identifying specific modes of media discourse on specific military interventions still matters because of its role in aiding the comprehension of the event's peculiarity, and historical continuity. To do so,

this research focuses on the media discourse on the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict of the 1990s, surrounding the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, as well as the potential implications for US foreign policy of the collapse of the former socialist regimes in central Europe, the sentiment of elites and the interested public, and the subsequent development of global affairs.

Research Questions

This research intends to explore the construction of claims of global responsibility for distant suffering in US media discourse during the post-Cold War period by examining how military interventions were grounded morally. It also aims to contextualize the claims to further understand the meaning of global responsibility by situating them within a broader social, historical, economic, geopolitical, and finally, ideological/practical context. Finally, based on the construction and contextualization, I will discuss the potentiality and impotentiality of the global responsibility claims in praxis.

Legitimation of military intervention based on concepts such as human rights and just war by the US government has recently emerged as a key element in the dominant/hegemonic and dissenting modes of discourse. For example, the three consecutive US-led military interventions into the territories of Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq were conducted without the authorization of the UN Security Council. Accordingly, under the circumstances, the success or failure of legitimizing the decision to go to war or de-legitimating it partly depends on how ruling elites can successfully frame the conflict within the political, intellectual, and moral "leadership" in the national and global society, and whether those frames successfully justify or condemn the way a military intervention is exercised. I raise three questions to examine the definitional and discursive functions of the concept of global responsibility as a means to

legitimate military intervention, and to discuss the potentialities of the concept in progressive reform/practice involving military intervention based on moral grounds: My essential questions are the following:

1) How were claims of global responsibility constructed in legitimizing military intervention in US media discourses? [legitimation];
2) How was the legitimation of military intervention based on moral claims of global responsibility articulated to other modes of discourse and practices in US media discourses? [articulation]; and,
3) What were the potentiality and impotentiality of global responsibility claims to end human suffering involving military intervention in US media discourses? [potentiality].

The first research question examines how claims of global responsibility were constructed in legitimating the cases of military intervention in US media discourses. The second question regards the discursive functionality in establishing the legitimacy of the action among interested members of national and global organizations and the public, by examining the manner that the legitimation or opposition to war was linked to other wider issues in US media discourse; in other words, to examine the linkages of the legitimation of military intervention to other sets of discursive practices in the national and global society. The third and final question deals with the potentiality of the current claims of global responsibility in media discourses to successfully end human suffering involving military intervention. That is, what is the potentiality and impotentiality of global responsibility in the underlying global power structure in which the sense of responsibility to particular objects and events is typically promoted in a selective manner in the service of the hegemonic military and economic classes, while underlying structural problems become cooped and disabled? Accordingly, the third research question also intends to contextualize media

discourses by identifying US economic, military and geopolitical interests within the contested domain of global responsibility construction in military intervention.

Essential to the three research questions is unique position of the United States as the only remaining superpower. But, in order to identify the characteristics of the hegemonic modes of discourse for/against military intervention, it is also necessary to include in the discussion section the contested media discourses produced in different contexts, including those in nation-states differing in their geopolitical positions and the power of global non-governmental organization, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Thus, the inclusion and comparison of different types of global responsibility discourse construction can help us to understand whether the peculiarity and sensitivity of the different contexts produce any similarities and differences in influencing the making of global responsibility discourse. This requires examining the intertextuality of US mainstream media discourse. These similarities and differences will be examined in later chapters through discourse analysis with particular attention to the contested domain of global responsibility claims in cases of military intervention.

The methodological requirements of the three research questions are as follows: first, global responsibility discourse is employed in this study to identify the linkages between the construction of identity of involved actors and policy orientation in military interventions. Second, the research questions are interrelated in a way that a preceding question provides a basis for the following question.

In relation to the key questions, three complementary questions will be considered in order to identify the political implications of ways to talk about global responsibility as a member of a national and global society: 1) Who speaks?; 2) Who is accountable and

responsible?; and, 3) How should the growing uncertainties, unintended consequences, or risk involving the discourses and practices of global responsibility for military intervention be dealt with? In other words, the political implications of global responsibility formulation depend on identifying who speaks about global responsibility for whom, and who benefits from the mobilization of global responsibility.

Theoretical and Practical Debates

The Construction and Articulation of Global Responsibility Discourse

The current awareness of responsibility in a global scope and consequent practices based on the sense of responsibility to distant others and events are seemingly significant in a world where the impact of globalization interweaves the texture of the everyday lives of many ordinary citizens, where local actions and consequences increasingly have global implications, and where grassroots resistance against globalization from above emerges as an increasingly powerful force. However, the value formulation of global responsibility within the underlying global power structure is not entirely reliable in creating a more responsible global society. On one hand, suffering under tyrannical political regimes, natural disasters and subsequent unevenly distributed risk, political tensions pertaining to religion and territory, the proliferation of avoidable diseases, and many other conditions are increasingly well-publicized. Accordingly, this publicness on a global scale creates a new possibility of global responsibility (Thompson, 1995). On the other hand, the sense of global responsibility is often overused and abused by dominant nation-states to mask special interests: violence accompanying military intervention, and underlying hegemonic ideas to suppress grassroots resistance and to gain national or partisan interests. Thus, the phenomena involving the formation of global responsibility discourse and practice are quite complicated and problematic.

US military interventions since the end of the Cold War are among the most symptomatic cases involving global responsibility claims. These US "humanitarian interventions" are problematic not merely in that they have been selective and have been based upon national interest, but also in that they show contradictory consequences in terms of their function, regardless of whether the consequences are intended or not. For example, Chomsky (1999) points out that there were three comparable major humanitarian crises in 1999, including East Timor, Colombia, and Kosovo, but US intervention occurred only in Kosovo (and also in the Colombian drug war). Humanitarian aid is also problematic, not in the sense that it supports those who are suffering, but in the sense that the support tends to hide a more structural injustice and provides only a glimpse of some other relatively superficial aspects of the structuralized inequalities and violence in the world, eventually masking not merely the sources of the inequalities but also distant suffering.

In understanding the construction of political responsibility, Young (2004, 2007) suggests unique features of political responsibility different from the blame or the liability model characterizing legal responsibility. According to her, political responsibility, unlike blame or liability claims, expands the scope of those who are considered to assume responsibility, challenges normal condition, looks forward (prospective) rather than backward (retrospective), and is shared responsibility. But it does not blur the primary sources of accountability and responsibility while holding the distinction of degrees and kinds of the normative. This enlarged scope of taking responsibility clearly echoes what Schaap (2004) argues: that politicizing responsibility is to assume the frailty of polity, with which legal responsibility does not deal given the

existing institutional structures. In this sense, political responsibility on a global scale is not only to care about the self by avoiding wrongdoing, but also to enlarge the scope of assuming responsibility for distant others. Additionally, the scope, degree, and kind of responsibility can also be identified in relation to its alternative of irresponsibility.

What is problematic is not whether global responsibility is necessary or not, but what its functionality in political and moral practices in reality is. On one hand, it can be argued that even the politics of good intention out of the notion of global responsibility are partly absorbed by the dominant order and reinforce the relations of domination, and that it is necessary for the international community to redirect its energy into endeavors where it can be used in a more productive manner. On the other hand, the definition and articulation of national interests are also related to those of global responsibility discourse. It is thus necessary to examine how national interest discourse and global responsibility discourse intersect in affecting military intervention, or how they enable or disable each other.

Considering the growing interconnection of local actions to global consequences, it is difficult to identify the scope, degree, and kind of responsibility. Accordingly, a traditional scope of responsibility limited to a locale cannot establish a new kind of notion of responsibility through a global scope. Thus, a growing complexity leads to skepticism toward the consequences of actions based on global responsibility. Even some part of its creative, active energies could be employed by the imperialist project which Hobson (1965) observed a century ago while discussing the “strong interested force” of imperialist enterprise in connection with “weak disinterested” religious and intellectual force in the name of the civilization of “the lower races.” Hobson’s analysis clearly

echoes what Chandler (2000, p. 66) argues regarding the new interventionism, almost a century after the rise of imperialism up through the September 11 attacks: “In the Middle East, in Africa and the Balkans, the exercise of ‘international justice’ signifies a return to the Westphalian system” characterized by the domination of the great nation-states over those too “weak to prevent external claims against them.”

One may be dismayed by what I stated earlier, that the notion of global responsibility facilitates the current construction and practices as a coding of certain rules and as experience in a mostly negative sense, and has potentialities at the same time to imagine new global relations and relationships in a strategic sense. Responsibility is often regarded as a fixed imperative which dictates one’s conduct as such. But it seems that global responsibility consists not only of imposed roles pertaining to specific positions for individuals, organizations, and institutions as well as nation-states, but is also formulated within a movement produced by a series of processes that are conceived, practiced, experienced, reflected, and negotiated. In short, it is on the move. In this regard, global responsibility can be situated in terms of a polarity between an achievement of human maturity and a form of governmentality of the coding and experiencing of the discourse through a complex set of knowledge. It is also a dual pedagogy: a growing pedagogy of the interconnectedness in a global society; a hegemonic pedagogy providing glimpses of the dominant order that tries to control the other and the resistance this inspires. This duality demands an understanding of how material conditions and ideas produce and correspond to each other within specific contexts. In the following sections, I will use the notion of global responsibility as a dialectical tool to criticize the current malevolent practices exercised in the name of global responsibility, and to explore a

generally positive conceptualization of taking responsibility for the humans making up the global society.

The Changing Media Environment and the Construction of Global Responsibility

The second most influential element in exploring the changing conditions of global responsibility is the current structure of the global media. There is a dual role of the media surrounding global responsibility discourse: maintaining the international order on one hand to protect the interests of states and capital, and producing a global civil society on the other. The sense of responsibility for distant others is an increasingly salient characteristic in the modern world for more and more people. With the increased interconnectivity in the world and subsequent awareness of the connectedness, more people have realized their responsibility for distant others, especially their suffering caused by various events. Humanitarian issues should be among the most important issues in a mutually interdependent global system given the impact they have on the human condition. But mediated experience also seems to reproduce distance and remoteness especially in terms of the sense of responsibility for innocent victims. For instance, the Second Gulf War shows that the government and the media are perhaps the two most powerful institutions in producing certain knowledge of foreign affairs. It is not easy question to determine whether the successful mobilization of consent by the US government and the military could erase some accountability felt by US citizens for the atrocities in Iraq. However, it is clear that the media did play a key role in drumming up support for the war in Iraq and justifying the invasion and subsequent carnage before the pre-war information that turned out to be misinformation.

There are two different archetypical conceptualizations of the media and foreign policy. Thompson (1995) views the new media environment as providing more positive

opportunities to substantially change social actions and interactions through social uses of the media, and to produce a sense of global responsibility. In contrast, an account of the powerful propaganda role of the media in foreign policy is provided in political economy of communications theory in general and Herman and Chomsky's (2002) propaganda model in particular. Political economy seeks to understand the political, economic and ideological implications of the role of the media in a capitalist society.

There are various approaches to the propagandistic roles of the media with regards to the government and military in relating the media to government/military and public opinion. They tend to be more feasible in explaining relationships at a structural level. The theorizing of the media's roles for positive possibilities may be useful to explain phenomena at the individual level. A subsequent question is how the two levels of explanations relate to each other. For example, how can the propaganda model illuminate experience at the individual level and the subsequent reproduction or transformation of relations of domination? Also, how can individual self-formation in a positive/progressive manner help the mass movement to materialize the goals of global compassion including a cosmopolitan identity and a sense of global citizenship?

In short, there are two basic potentials in the media's definition and articulation of global responsibility, how individuals can be situated within mass movements for global responsibility and, how propaganda purveys individual experience. Accordingly, the media can have had both a positive and negative impact on the construction of global responsibility given specific circumstances and contexts. There are more alternative symbolic materials available with the development of new media, especially more social dependence on the media and more social uses of them. However, there have emerged

counter-tendencies to lessen the actualization of some kinds of commitments; for example, information fatigue, limited social attention, and growing social uncertainties surrounding the politics of pity (Boltanski, 1999). This duality brings us to question the potentiality of responsibility claims for distant suffering.

The Politics of Global Responsibility: Bosnia and Kosovo

Global responsibility discourse has been based upon the moral principles that have guided "humanitarian intervention" in the post-Cold War era. Thus, the two major Yugoslav wars, the Bosnian War in 1992-1995 and the Kosovo Conflict in 1998-1999, provide an opportunity to observe a representative set of movements based upon the discourse of global responsibility during this period. These are two representative cases of "humanitarian military intervention" in which the discourse of global responsibility was formulated by the United States and NATO. The two crises in the Balkans can be synchronically and diachronically compared and contrasted with other cases of "humanitarian intervention."

Proponents of US and NATO engagement in the Bosnian War argued that humanitarian atrocities were due to age-old ethnic hatred in the former Yugoslavia and (Bosnian) Serbs' nationalism (von Hippel, 2000). The air campaign by NATO against Bosnian Serb positions involving the Bosnian War in 1995 exemplifies the US and NATO argument that the UN failed to prevent this humanitarian crisis. Thus, US policy was reaffirmed by the successful use of force (Beaumont, 2001). Still the United States refused to assume responsibility for the victims of the conflict and for security in Bosnia and its neighboring states as it had for the past three years between early 1992 and early 1995. European states placed peacekeeping troops in the former Yugoslavia before the

military intervention into Bosnia, whereas the United States argued for lifting the UN weapons embargo and providing a field of "fair fights" among the three warring factions, along with NATO's air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions. The way that humanitarian intervention was undertaken was also questionable. Technological warfare conducted by US air power was a means to avoid US casualties, but resulted in more civilian deaths in Bosnia. Moreover, the United States called the mission a "success" and the result of US leadership, as the truce wound down in the latter half of 1995.

NATO's military action against Serbia in 1999 was more controversial than the 1995 intervention, since the use of force against Serbia, without the UN Security Council's support, was a violation of the right to self-determination and international law. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK, 2000), led by Swedish Prime Minister Persson and submitted to UN Secretary-General Annan, concluded that the NATO air campaign was "illegal but moral." In the Report, the armed intervention was not legal because it was not authorized by the UN Security Council. However the intervention was legitimate because diplomatic means had been exhausted and as a last resort the use of force had the "effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule" (IICK, 2000, p. 4). US President Bill Clinton's speech on February 26, 1999 before military intervention alluded to the justification of the use of force on moral grounds.[3]

NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson (2000), after the military intervention, argued that from NATO's perspective the intervention was both legal–despite the position of the UN Security Council–and morally justified. The moral principle upon

which the intervention was based reflected the weakness of the UN and the changing nature of international relations and law.

Gagnon (2004) argues that the massive mobilization during the Yugoslavian wars was not due to ethnic tension as claimed by US neoconservatives, but to tensions among the ruling elites, and that it was not the result of collective responses from below. Indeed, the discourse of ethnic conflict was one part of the strategic constructions of the ruling parties. Gagnon's argument raises the crucial question regarding realistic solutions to resolving these conflicts if the wars were not the direct result of ethnic tensions. Hammond (2004) also maintains that the notion of a "humanitarian war" in the Kosovo case was a construction of Western policy makers.

There are at least three elements to be analyzed and evaluated regarding the role of global responsibility discourse surrounding military interventions since the end of the Cold War. First, there are always different perspectives regarding military intervention or non-intervention. The second element concerns the consequences of military action. Military action has intended and unintended consequences which must be calculated in the evaluation of such action. Third, as the IICK (2000) concluded in its final report on the Kosovo Conflict, the selectivity in intervening in humanitarian crises keeps challenging the underlying motives for military intervention or non-intervention, as reflected in the shifting principles proclaimed for NATO's engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The construction of global responsibility and its articulation to the geopolitical structure are the effect of power in practice. At the same time, this construction and articulation serve as a force to mobilize resources and allow people to experience a

certain set of experiences. That is to say, our experience of global responsibility is simultaneously a force and an effect of the exercise of political power. The direction through which energies are thus mobilized is important, in that the direction of such motion of forces or energies is critical for the realization of a progressive sense of global responsibility. The growing significance of a sense of global responsibility can also be a positive step toward human maturity (i.e., global justice). Given the uncertain consequences of global responsibility as carried out through practice, media discourse can be evaluated to the extent that it leads to the realization of global responsibility in which peoples of the world really care about one another.

It is not surprising that moral principles have often been used to extend and reinforce the relations of domination, instead of breaking the cycle of such relations. The imperialist era of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, modernization theory after World War II, and global neoliberalism since the 1990s, are all based upon grounds of "benevolent domination." Within each approach, benevolent motives legitimate the dark side of the relations of domination.

Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) conceptualize the dichotomy in terms of "Empire" and "Multitude." They argue that the emerging global power structure of the 21st century is based on a new form of sovereignty encompassing the entire globe. Thus they argue that the notion of human rights can serve as a means to sustain the relations of domination as well as to promote progressive politics from below. Here, it is useful to use Foucault's notion of governmentality as comparison. Foucault (2003) traces certain ideas–for example that "society must be defended"–that were strategically devised to produce practices for the construction of the state in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries in Western Europe. Strategic discourse is deployed, as Foucault (1990, 2000) points out, to code specific rules and to get a population to experience the code of the dominant order as natural. Thus, the disparity between what is told and what is done, or between the discursiveness and functionality, can be used as a starting point for examining the potentiality of global responsibility.

Organization of the Dissertation

A central argument of this dissertation is that responsibility claims on a global scale can be a useful tool in understanding US-led military interventions and related US media discourse concerning them. The main argument is that the creative, productive energies of global responsibility discourse have been absorbed within the hegemonic discourse, and its potential, neutralized.

In Chapter 2, I will trace the definitions of global responsibility as they have been conceptualized as discursive formations and conceived in geopolitical practices. I will examine the concept of "responsibility" in order to make a firmer foundation and trace its formation as a global phenomenon. The concept of responsibility can be examined as to how it translates into ethical, legal, or political conceptualizations. Among these, I will mainly focus on the political conception of global responsibility. Understanding responsibility from a political perspective means that an agent or institution's intention (propaganda) can still produce unintended effects. Second, I will also examine the changes in the scope, kind, and degree of political responsibility as it relates to persons and events. In doing so, I will first explore the changing conditions promoting the discourse of global responsibility by focusing on the development of technology and the media. I will also discuss a paradoxical duality, the simultaneous empowerment of the

dominant order and the local and global resistance by the reordering of space and time with the development of technology and the media. In this chapter, I argue that the media appear to facilitate new conditions of interaction for social actors, and that this interaction is situated within the global power and media structures. Finally, I will draw on the varied, rich literature on military intervention and media discourse in general and the media coverage of NATO's interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in particular, for a theoretical reflection and discussion of empirical analysis.

In Chapter 3, I lay out the methodology of critical discourse analysis and research designs and methods to be used. The chapter goes on to discuss the importance of critical discourse analysis and media discourse in the research project. I introduce three conceptual tools–legitimation, articulation and potentiality–and subsequent analytical rubrics that inform theory and method. I also provide an explanation of the selection of the two military intervention cases that I chose: Bosnia and Kosovo. The chapter concludes with a detailed explanation of the choice of archival sources drawn from mainstream media for the discourse analysis of the Bosnian War and Kosovo Conflict.

Chapter 4 deals with the historical and political contexts in which various forms of discourse on the two chosen cases were embedded. The chapter provides the historical and political contexts leading up to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars in which the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict were interwoven. Following the historical and political accounts, US foreign policy orientation and strategies to sustain global hegemony are considered in order to fully understand the meaning of NATO's military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Finally, critiques of

the two military interventions will be analyzed to expand our understanding of US media discourse surrounding the two cases.

Chapters 5 and 6 apply critical discourse analysis of US mainstream newspapers on the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict. The primary discourse analysis is based on editorials on Bosnia and Kosovo from the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* as the events were evolving. Legitimation and articulation are the main conceptual tools employed in analyzing the construction of global responsibility and its functions on a global scale. For the purpose of analysis, each crisis will be divided into three periods: pre-military intervention, intervention, and post-military intervention.

The final two chapters are concerned with the question of what the discursive functions of global responsibility discourses regarding Bosnia and Kosovo are. In chapter 7, while discussing the potentiality of global responsibility for the two chosen cases, I will also focus on a strategic conceptualization of global responsibility for the possibility of a more humane global society. My presumption is that global responsibility is one of the most productive, urgent, important concepts in reforming contemporary global society. I will suggest a strategic conceptualization of global responsibility as a significant movement containing potentialities as well as impotentialities. The provincialization of knowledge is raised in the conclusion. In doing so, I will discuss the scope of action and consequences of global responsibility discourses. The following will be dealt with in this section: the dangers of inaction and moral urgency, the weakening of the UN and the invention of a new exceptionalism, "sanitized war," and technological warfare. The stability of global responsibility discourses will also be discussed in relation to the framework of US national interest in the mainstream newspapers. The discussion

also includes consideration of US hegemony and leadership, and US and global public opinion. Finally, this chapter looks at the intertextuality of global responsibility in US media discourse. I will draw upon alternative media sources, including a leftist US magazine, European newspapers, and press releases and reports produced by a global non-governmental organization (NGOs).

Chapter 8 summarizes the dissertation's findings and situates them within theoretical and practical debates. The implications of this study of global responsibility discourses, as continuity and discontinuity, is extended by using the concepts of biopower and biopolitical production, the implications of responsibility claims after September 11, 2001, and, finally, the responsibility of the media. The chapter ends with an acknowledgment of limitations and subsequent suggestions for future research. Thus, the risk which I undertake is to suggest some alternative perspectives, viable measures through which we may discuss the potency and impotency of speaking about global responsibility in media discourse.

Endnotes

[1] In Tomlinson's words: "Part of the problem, as Mattelart implies, is that 'cultural imperialism' is a generic concept, it refers to a range of broadly similar phenomena. Because of this it is unlikely that any single definition could grasp every sense in which the term is used. My approach will avoid initial definition: I will argue that the concept of cultural imperialism is one which must be assembled out of its discourse" (1991, pp. 2-3). Accordingly, he suggests four representative ways to talk about cultural imperialism as media imperialism, a discourse of nationality, the critique of global capitalism, and the critique of modernity.

[2] Giroux (1999, 2002, 2004) suggests a double pedagogical reading strategy in deciphering the discourse of neoliberalism and cultural texts such as Disney films. The first concerns what extent which cultural texts are articulated within other dominant ideological texts. The second is that the interpretation of the texts can provide a possibility to intervene the ideological role of the texts. Accordingly, it can be argued that the discourse of global responsibility is a dual pedagogical tool (both analytical and political) for understanding the military interventions in the post-Cold War era.

[3] Klare, M. T. (1999, April 19). The Clinton doctrine. *Nation, 268*(14), p. 5.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Concept of Global Responsibility: Its Meaning and Uses

The spread of the term "global responsibility" is reflective of an emerging awareness that traditional notions of social responsibility have limitations in embracing the changing conditions in which the consequences of local and global actions are interwoven. Despite the fast-increasing popularity of the term, the meaning of the concept of global responsibility is not always clear. The concept itself is relatively new as it appears in discourse on security as well as humanitarian concerns. It is difficult to explicate the meaning of the notion due in part to the newness of the term, reflecting the processes of globalization. More significantly, the difficulty can be located in the large scale and scope of actions and consequences that the concept deals with at various analytical and practical levels.

There are two particularly useful works for identifying uses of the notion of global responsibility. The first is the usage of the term global responsibility in Küng's *Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic* (1991). In this text, Küng focuses on the role of religious groups and dialogues concerning global ethics, necessitated by new conditions in a "postmodern" society in which traditional value systems are modified and which demands a holistic approach to world problems. The text exemplifies a way to use the term global responsibility to introduce an ethical approach to what one ought to do. Similarly, Midgley (1999) presents global responsibility as ethics for human rights. In both approaches, global responsibility offers an ethics for a global society in the changing conditions of the international community. Secondly, Biefnot, in his consideration of

attempts to categorize the uses of global responsibility, defines global responsibility as follows: “whoever takes an action has to evaluate the possible impact on the rest of the world and is accountable for it” (Biefnot, 2003, p. 18). The author divides this definition into its practical uses in various fields and by various people: religious authorities, public authorities, and the private sector, including academia (especially business schools). This approach illustrates how the notion of global responsibility is conceptualized and articulated in practice. However, there still remain two important points worth noting concerning the analytic and practical applications of the meaning of global responsibility to specific practices. To illustrate the difficulties, Vogt (2006, p. 2) puts it thusly:

> [T]here is no single mode of understanding “responsibility” in today’s world affairs, but it has become a catchword for many different things. It is invariably used as a political notion or a moral or both, and often it is impossible to know where the line between these categories should be drawn. What is more important, however, is that the promoters of “responsibility” generally do not seem to ponder upon the ultimate sources of these responsibilities. Why, in the final analysis, should A be responsible toward B? And to what degree? And if we can indeed decide upon the reason why A bears a responsibility toward B, how can A best fulfill it? In more concrete terms, if rich countries have promised to halve poverty in the world by 2015, what actual measures are they morally required to take in order to succeed in this?

The first point to highlight is that the elastic use of the term global responsibility implies that, in order to critically analyze global responsibility discourse, it is necessary to observe the meaning and scope of global responsibility as specifically related to the objective of research–and, in this dissertation, the implications of global responsibility discourse for military intervention in the post-Cold War era. In this regard, the meaning of “global” as part of the phrase “global responsibility” will be used to focus on US and NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The second point, or question, is how to approach the term “responsibility” within a specific domain of practices. Thus, it is also necessary to trace the meaning and uses of responsibility to further understand global responsibility discourse by observing ways to talk about responsibility. This undertaking must begin with an examination of the concept of responsibility and, subsequently, an exploration of the concept of global responsibility on a global scale, situating the politics of global responsibility within a national and global society, and locating prevailing discourse within the contested domain of military intervention.

The semantics of responsibility as a historical concept have their origin in the juridical conceptualization of imputation and retribution. Ricoeur (2000) traces the expansion of conceptual semantics from classical juridical uses of obligation, making compensation or suffering a penalty, to philosophical and moral conceptions of responsibility. He suggests that the conception of the word “responsibility” is extended in terms of time and consequences, and that it is necessary to balance the three ideas of imputability, solidarity and shared risk that surround the concept of responsibility. Thus, expanding the scope of practices of responsibility often goes beyond the limits offered through juridical usage (for example, immediate responsibility for future generations and nature beyond the foreseeable effects of actions and interhuman relationships). Ricoeur (2000, pp. 29-30) also suggests that a reformulation of both the juridical and moral concepts of responsibility is necessary. In the moral concept, things to be considered include the object, effects, and relationships to other people, and even extend to “the very condition of vulnerability of itself” with “heuristic fear.” However, Ricoeur adds, “it is easy to see the new difficulties raised by this virtually unlimited extension of the scope of

our acts and therefore of our responsibility." In this regard, Ricoeur (2000, p. 35) draws on Jonas's "extension of our responsibility with regard to future humanity and its environment" and suggests the three ideas of imputability, solidarity, and shared risk beyond the classical juridical idea of compensation and suffering a penalty.

Jonas's (1974) notion of "imperative of responsibility" also raises five points regarding the scope of responsibility. First, he divides the scope of responsibility temporarily into prospective and retrospective responsibility and its related roles as the object and subject of responsibility, or durability. Second, in the spatial scope, he argues that the more pervasive the sense of responsibility, the more the sense of responsibility shrinks. Third, the awareness of responsibility also enlarges the sense of responsibility and reduces reliance upon notions of luck or fortune and misfortune (Minow, 2002, p. 15); in this sense, something once regarded as misfortune comes to be seen as injustice. Fourth, the object of responsibility includes nature and the environment beyond living creatures. Fifth, and finally, collective responsibility is problematic, and obedience to authority is not an uncommon phenomenon at a structural level. In relation to these five points, the problem of actions and consequences is a key analytical tool.

Casey (1971) offers an account of actions and consequences surrounding morality. Using the notion of moral reasoning, he contrasts consequentialism to absolutism, as represented by Kant's moral law. Casey's moral reasoning provides an argument that roles and intention do not guarantee that subsequent responsible consequences will arise from actions based on those roles and intention. However, it is possible to make a counterargument that it may be irresponsible when consequences of actions (results and effects) justify the actions. The various concepts of the meaning and

scope of responsibility bring us to discussions over the logic of the politics of pity and the changing and transformative conditions of global responsibility regarding technology and mediation. I will discuss the impact of technological development in greater detail in following sections.

The concept of responsibility may be dealt with in terms of how it is imposed. Hart (1968, p. 212) classifies four different types of responsibilities: role, causal, liability (legal and moral liability), and capacity. In order to bridge debates on the characteristics of responsibility to global responsibility for military intervention involving the four types of responsibilities, it is necessary to ask whether states and international institutions may be considered morally responsible agencies, and whether they can act upon moral principles at the expense of national and institutional interests. Drawing on Barry (2003) and Miller (2001), Szigeti (2006, p. 27) suggests six distributive principles for the allocation of duties for institutional responsibility pertaining to, for example, the UN, NATO, and the European Union: the contribution principle ("a duty is incurred by those who are causally, or at least indirectly by omission, responsible for bringing about the situation in which the duty arises"); the beneficiary principle ("someone has benefited from a situation which at the same time involves a loss or is harmful to others"); the community principle ("membership in a community or group singles out agents as incurring certain duties"); the capacity principle ("if there is a valid duty to do X, then all those who are capable of doing X incur a duty to do X"); the legitimate expectation principle ("one has a duty to do X, if other legitimately expect one to do X"); and the consent principle ("one is obliged to do X, if one has consented to doing X or has expressly stated her intention to do X").

Global Responsibility Discourse in the Post-Cold War Era

Despite the newness of the term "global responsibility," the concept of "benevolent domination" relations in other sovereignties in political and moral theories and practices has a long history. Critics of imperialism, modernization, and globalization have long observed violent military and cultural domination. But it may be useful to investigate the responsibility discourse of the UN involving military intervention against other sovereignties first, as the UN is the single international legal authority. I will first examine the responsibility concept provided by the UN as an authority in order to provide a sold normative basis. Second, I will trace various historical and political notions of responsibility surrounding relations of benevolent domination.

"Sovereignty as (the right of) responsibility" characterizes the UN's shift in the legitimation of military intervention. After NATO's military intervention in Kosovo without the authorization of the UN Security Council, the UN retroactively legitimated the intervention as force based on responsibility. "Shared responsibility" for international peace and security was followed by the UN Millennium Summit in 2000. This is a transition from the non-intervention principle, which was based on the notion of self-determination and non-domination during the Cold War era (Young, 2000).

In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), in which mostly North and South American states participated, published a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*. In this report, two basic principles are articulated: first, non-intervention, or state sovereignty's "primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself"; and second, the principle "yields to the international responsibility to protect" when the state fails its

responsibility (ICISS, 2001; xi). There are four stated precautionary principles: the intention to "halt or avert human suffering"; last resort; proportional means as "the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective" in terms of "the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention"; and reasonable prospects. The principles confer to the UN Security Council three responsibilities to prevent and react to humanitarian crisis through military intervention as well as to rebuild after military intervention.

The pursuit of legitimacy and justification strategies has played a central role in military intervention by enhancing particular discourses and subsequent basic criteria of value judgment. Two important criteria in legitimacy are a rightful source of authority and the rightful ends or purpose of the exercise of political power (Beetham, 1998, p. 538). Legitimacy can be analytically dealt with as processes of legitimation that are coded "defensible criteria for legitimacy" (Beetham, 1998, p. 540).

In the post-Cold War era, one of the most powerful means for legitimating the military interventions led by the US and NATO forces, as well as the UN, depend on moral grounds. In particular, US and NATO forces have sought to put forward two means for cases in which they are unable to obtain the authorization of the UN Security Council: legitimation of military intervention on moral grounds and the effects of potential military intervention (Hardt & Negri, 2004).

The UN, however, has been the sole authority to judge the legality of global security and the use of military force since 1945, when Article 51 of the Charter of the UN was signed. The use of military force against other nation-states is illegal under current international law and treaties. The only two exceptions to prohibit UN member

states from using force are self-defense against an armed attack and military measures taken under the authorization of the UN Security Council (UN Charter VII, Article 51). A military intervention in the absence of UN Security Council authorization is thus problematic in terms of legality under current international law. The question of whether the UN Security Council has had a substantial effect on avoiding existing and potential harm to "humanity" is controversial. But it may be argued that the UN charter is also the only established criteria for proving some normative and practical suggestions for international peace and security. The five basic criteria for the UN to approve the use of force are as follows: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences. In the report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), the main focus was "the deep division among member states" on the use of force, and the report concluded that there was no intention to revise or extend the Charter of the UN.

The five criteria for UN authorization of the use of force, or legitimate military intervention, may be used to analyze media discourse surrounding military intervention. The NATO intervention in Bosnia was legally controversial, but NATO collaborated with the UN in the operation. On the contrary, NATO's intervention in Kosovo was not approved by the UN Security Council prior to the military operation. Considering the fact that chosen cases of military intervention were not approved by the UN Security Council, the legitimacy of using force demanded morality claims, including human rights, just war, humanitarian aid, and so on. In this situation, the legitimation of military intervention based on moral grounds in general, and global responsibility claims in particular, has emerged as a major source to justify the use of force.

Considering the fact that states and intergovernmental/supranational organizations and unions such as the UN and the EU are the main actors in geopolitics as well as the UN's singular authority in the global governance system, those nation-states and global organizations and unions should be the most powerful agencies in military intervention based on moral grounds, or what I call "global responsibility." In the historical and political traditions of global responsibility discourse, three distinctive approaches may be categorized by the meaning, object, and subject of assuming global responsibility, or "what we ought to do" about military interventions at the national and global level. This means that responsibility is not fixed by roles nor by the capacity of subjects; rather, it is defined and articulated in historical and political contexts. Each discourse of global responsibility has been emulated by its proponents.

First, powerful nation-states, especially neoconservatives in the United States, pinpoint the responsibility of their nation-states (mostly the United States) as playing a unique role in stabilizing world order against potential security threats since the end of the Cold War (Elshtain, 2003; Project for the New American Century, 1997). A second way of speaking about global responsibility is what the UN and non-governmental organizations argue that it is a means to protect civilians from suffering through a humanitarian crisis (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001; Mepham and Cooper, 2004; United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004; United Nations Millennium Summit, 2000). Finally, critics of the current dominant construction of global responsibility argue a renewal of the current discourse and practice of global responsibility by criticizing the hegemonic discourse of human rights and humanitarianism. The critics of the dominant discourse

deconstruct the hegemonic ideas by denouncing them as “imperial” or “imperialist” (Chomsky, 1999; Fouskas and Gökay, 2005; Spivak, 2004).

The criticism of global responsibility discourse echoes that of “benevolent domination” in history. Despite the newness of the concept of global responsibility, notions of “benevolent domination” in other sovereignties in political and moral theories and practices have a long history. Critics of imperialism, modernization, and globalization have observed violent domination of military and cultural domination.

Hobson (1965) examines the historical imperialism accompanied by the quest to “civilize lower races” and “bring Christianity to them.” In the Marxist tradition, the development of a world economy demands militarism for the accumulation of capital. In different ways, both Luxemburg (1968) and Lenin (1968) view war as an essential element in the expansion of capitalist economy. For Luxemburg, war is a device to integrate pre-capitalist society into a capitalist economy and the destruction of over-accumulation. For Lenin, the pursuit of more profitable investments drives international conflict in the processes of the division of world in the period of historical imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his evaluation of Luxemburg’s imperialism thesis, Hunt (2002, p. 370) notes that she understood “the extreme social destruction” of capitalist expansion in imperialism, unlike the neoclassical view that “foreign investment in less-developed countries would benefit those countries by increasing their capital and thereby increasing their productivity and general economic well-being.”

In both modernization theory and globalization, the economic system of capitalism and the political and value system of democracy are the two essential elements.

The proponents of the two traditions emphasize mutual benefits between developed and less developed societies. In their criticism of the construction of legitimate violence through military intervention, Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) maintain that moral grounds and the potential effects of military intervention legitimize the use of force. According to them, US and NATO-led interventions into Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq since 1999 are evidence of US exceptionalism.

Military Intervention and Global Responsibility Discourse in the Media

The Power and Role of the Media in a New World Order: (Dis)Continuity

The end of the Cold War period opened up a new world order, and closed up the Cold War frame in media. This does not mean that there were no exceptions. Rather, the meta-narrative of national security and foreign policy continued to be situated within the existence of the rivalry with the Soviet Union or its substitute, and the threat of its expansionist movement to world security. During the Cold War era, the media, and especially the news media, were internalized and made responsible for securing the stability of the world order by cooperating with the government in the United States and in the West.

Changing geopolitics has certainly impacted the relationships between government, media, and the public. Entman (2000) views the post-Cold War era as a time when the news media enjoyed relative autonomy over foreign policy formation. He hypothesizes that the breakdown of the patriotic problem definition based on the binary opposition between the United States and the demons of the Soviet Union and its allies demanded that the news media replace it with other frames, and that they should be responsible for their role in creating an agenda and coherently constructing the frame. Thus, it may be argued that Entman supports the relative autonomy of the news media

from the national interest frame or patriotic movement. The “CNN effects” thesis also holds that real-time news coverage initiated by the 24-hour international television news channel, Cable News Network (CNN), led to a significant change in the conduct of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era through instant news production and distribution to the public. Although the practical impact is controversial, this thesis exemplifies the changes regarding military intervention as perceived not only by the public but also by the government and military officials (Belknap, 2001).

On the contrary, critics of the end of the national interest frame in media focus on the continuity of the role of the news media in geopolitics. First, critics of human rights discourse argue that current moral claims merely replace the logic of military involvement legitimated by anticommunism, culminating during the Cold War period (Hardt & Negri, 2004). Thus, it is necessary to examine government-military/press relations in foreign issues in general, and military intervention in particular, by examining how the power relations between the two players are mediated by domestic and global public opinion. In this and following sections, I will review the two different positions, explaining the relationships between the media and government in terms of media performance, and then examine their connections through public opinion.

In considering government/press relations during war-time since the end of the two World Wars, there are two different explanations for media performance. First, “the rise of media power in politics” altered US politics since the Vietnam War (Thrall, 2000, p. 61). Thrall argues that administrations have tried to manage the press due to its growing power resulting from advances in technology and the decrease in foreign policy consensus. Thus, the growth of media power does not mean an absolute autonomy; rather,

the new press/government relationship is modified in a changed environment. Entman (2004) observes a different but similar trend of the growth of media power after the end of the Cold War, when the Cold War paradigm that enabled the government to effectively manage the press becomes less powerful and less pervasive. Without a clear binary opposition between the First and Second worlds, the enemy and direct military threats to the United States no longer exist. Entman (2004, p. 96) suggests four different situations since the end of the Cold War: 1) "the disappearance of the Red Menace, so that invoking patriotism to block opposition becomes more difficult"; 2) "journalistic motivations impose a double bind on presidents: a simultaneous demand for assertive, interventionist leadership by 'the world's only superpower,' and chastisement of US leaders when interventions turn costly or appear to become a quagmire"; 3) "the words and concepts needed to explain foreign issues become more complex"; and 4) "there is no longer 'state' power over the media."

In the following sections, I will draw on two different approaches to the media's roles in military intervention. The first tradition is the theory and analysis of propaganda, which emphasizes the continuity of the relationships between the media and government/military since the Cold War period. The theory of propaganda focuses on the production of texts by structural and organizational factors. The second is what can be loosely assembled from the new possibility of cosmopolitan identity and global citizenship through positive self-formation and global compassion. The tradition implies possibilities of changes in the relationships between the government and the public.

It may be useful to specify the level of analysis and the unit of agencies in discussing the roles of the media in military intervention. Table 2.1 depicts possible

interactions by level of analysis and various political actors. The propaganda approach may be more applicable to a, a*, b, and b*, whereas the positive self-formation and global compassion approaches may be more applicable to b*, b**, c*, and c**.

Table 2.1: The Unit of Analysis of Government, Media, and the Audience

Political actor Level of analysis	Government	Media	The audience
Institution	Sovereignty (a)	Cultural transmission (a*)	People(population) /multitude (a**)
Organization	Political party (b)	Media company (b*)	Group (b**)
Individual	Political actor (c)	Reporter (c*)	The self (c**)

Table 2.2: The Roles of the Media

Level of analysis Functional domain	Individual	Organizational	Institutional
Economic	Consumer of cultural industry and technical media	Cultural industry: Commodities as hardware and software	Infrastructure of capital flow: Consumerism and viable ideology
Social	Social interaction and membership	Socialization	Social solidarity
Political	Self-government	Propaganda	Governing knowledge
Cultural	Self-formation	Symbolic transmission	A modality of cultural transmission

Table 2.2 shows the areas where various roles of the media can be identified. The first is several functions of media technology: information networks as a technology to facilitate the faster flow of capital and commodities as hardware and software, as a tool for cultural transmission with the duality to emancipate individuals from the established order, and as a way to govern individuals through propaganda or the "spectacle," as Guy Debord (1990, 1994) would have it.

Secondly, the media have transformed individuals' and social organizations' uses of space and time in terms of interaction and control over symbolic forms. For example, telegraphy was the first electronic medium to realize despatialized simultaneity on a

societal level. In this regard, the uncoupling of space and time leads to despatialized simultaneity, which in turn transforms individual and organizational interaction.

The roles of the media also have a double consequence on the stretching of power. The first consequence is that the dominant power has stretched its influence through the media with an increasingly broadened scope of space and time. Moreover, the media have been developed mainly by the market and politics, although grassroots activism is also a driving force in utilizing and mobilizing the media, especially in light of new technologies and communication networks, such as the Internet, that these technologies enable on a global level. The second consequence is that with the development of the media, individuals are freer than ever before to form their life trajectories.

How we understand the roles, functionalities, and effects of the media and why we need to identify them are central questions in understanding our world, since mediated actions and interactions are increasingly important characteristics of everyday life in the modern world. Today, the media not only provide the texture of our experience but also serve as a social institution and a structural (and economic) force (Silverstone, 1999). Accordingly, there are many possible and meaningful approaches that shed light on the functionalities and effects of the media, so it is necessary to select and limit the scope of the research to ask and tentatively answer more productive questions. I will review useful literature in social theory and the media, in order to conceptualize an emerging role of the media in military intervention.

War Propaganda and the Formation of Public Opinion

Approaching the role of media as propaganda for persuading the public leading up to and during military intervention is hardly novel, as demonstrated by Taylor's (2000, 2003) analysis of earlier precedents in ancient times to modern information warfare. The

modern type of propaganda is integrated into the growth and development of mass society, and became an important psychological tool for modern warfare (Ellul, 1965). In Lasswell's definition of 1937, "propaganda in the broadest sense is the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representation" (quoted in Severin & Tankard, 1992, p. 91); this is reflective of the two World War periods as well as his participation in a wartime communications project (Rogers, 1994, pp. 224-228). Propaganda research traditions during the two World Wars were also reflective of research traditions surrounding behaviorism, Freudianism, the magic bullet theory, and Lippmann's theory of public opinion formation (Baran & Davis, 1995, pp. 58-73). As opposed to scholars who hypothesize the growth of media power in the post-Cold War era, scholars who demonstrate the roles of propaganda and information warfare in modern societies contend that propaganda is consistently used to legitimize military interventions (Macdonald, 2007; Robins, Webster, & Pickering, 1987).

Herman and Chomsky (2002) maintain that in a capitalist society the media functions as a propaganda producer, basically working for the dominant class, and that their propaganda model is even more applicable in the more concentrated media industry structure than it was in 1988, when the first edition of *Manufacturing Consent* was published. Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model is devised to show media behavior and performance, not media effects, by analyzing industrial conditions and news coverage of international conflicts in the mass media. That is to say, the mass media as a system of symbolic transmission in the market economy are a systematic propaganda producer and distributor for power elites in a society, integrating a population into their foreign policy interests and agendas. Herman and Chomsky maintain that the mass media,

in an environment of the market economy and even without formal censorship, function as a vehicle to enable the power elite to deliver the government's paradigm involving foreign events to the public. In their view, the mass media in the market economy and a formal democracy function to manufacture public consent on foreign events mainly by prioritizing news favorable to those in power.

Specifically, Herman and Chomsky's hypothesis in the textual analysis of the news coverage of foreign policy issues is that "worthy victims will be featured prominently and dramatically, that they will be humanized, and that their victimization will receive the detail and context in story construction that will generate reader interest and sympathetic emotion (2002, p. 35). On the contrary, "unworthy victims will merit only slight detail, minimal humanization, and little context that will excite and enrage" (2002, p. 35). This dichotomous treatment of friend and enemy states is produced through a filtration process, and the result is that the mass media function as a tool to transmit to citizens what the government wants to disseminate.

Herman and Chomsky elaborate a comprehensive performance model (propagandist functionality) of US mass media in foreign policy issues by exploring the result of five factors of interaction on mass media discourse: ownership, funding, sourcing, flak, and anticommunist ideology. The first two filters, ownership and funding, are economic conditions that universally govern the laws of motion of a capitalist economy. The first filter comprises the size, ownership, and profit orientation of mass media firms. This tendency toward concentration in the communications industry, as in other industries, creates an environment in which news reporting is increasingly less autonomous from high profit interest. The interests of media firm owners have become

representative of the interests of capital in general, and media firms increasingly have more in common with big business. The less the media industry is centralized, the more diversified the industry's ideological spectrum can become. Historical evidence is the demise of the progressive politics of the earlier media industry as a historical movement (H. Hardt, 2001), with the industry becoming a big business and being concentrated through competition, which in return demands a state's deregulation of economic activities. The second structural force is the advertising industry's influence on news production as a major source of income. Media firms' dependence on advertising is directly related to being pressured by, and depending on, the sponsors' favorable news choice and the cultivation of commercialism and consumerism. The advertising filter is a product of media capital's creative strategies for being paid directly and indirectly for their news product, so much so that it is not as deterministic as the first filter, since media firms should consider audience appeal, which they sell to sponsors, their real investment.

The next two filters refer to the organizational level. The third filter, sourcing, is more strategic and ritualistic in news production. Depending on regular and authoritative news sources, often called "objective," media firms as organizations tend to rely on established forces in society. Sourcing is thus a moment when the position of relative advantage between the media and sources often switches, in that sources need media attention and mobilize the media to manipulate the potential agenda of foreign events based on their strategic interest. There is another way to exercise influential power over the media in a retroactive way, which can in turn lead to the media's favorable or eclectic treatments on relevant issues. The next filter, "flak," refers to "negative responses to a

media statement or program" (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. 26). Flak as pressure from various actors to the media can lead to media self-censorship.

The final filter is a socially and culturally situated atmosphere of anticommunist ideology. Once a fervor of anticommunism is established, the ruling class can leverage "communism" as a threat and mobilize a population by labeling dissenters as supporters of the enemy or enemy communists. Thus, the fifth filter is concerned with mobilization of a population and subsequent subjectification of the public to the sovereignty of a state.

"Filter" effectively conveys the process of transmitting interest-based information and knowledge through filtration, although the term should be more fully conceptualized in consideration of the level of analysis as well as the unit of analysis. Also, the act of filtering is an intentional selection and exclusion process that removes particular types of knowledge and opinion. The term not only captures the image of filtering but also underscores the systematic process of how ideology works by constructing the "worthy victim" favorably dealt with in the mainstream media and marginalizing the "unworthy victim" through a dichotomy between the two. Thus, the process of information filtering corresponds to the representation of the ruling elite's interests. Together, the five filters function to downplay or undermine any real analysis of so-called unworthy victims. Fittingly, Herman and Chomsky write as follows: "the mass media will allow any stories that are hurtful to large interests to peter out quickly, if they surface at all" (2002, p. 33). Examining the five influencing factors, Herman and Chomsky argue that in the free market structure, the mainstream media function as a propaganda machine of the government and power elite's agendas without explicit governmental control or even substantial pressure.

The collaborative relationship between the US government and media is in striking contrast to the more adversarial relationship between the government and media during the post-Vietnam war period on which Hallin (1994) draws. His hegemony model presupposes that a degree of diversity or a chasm in the power structure or power elite is essential to explain the model's application to real politics. Hallin's analysis of the media at the organizational level is, thus, more favorable to the industry's professionalism than Herman and Chomsky's. However, Hallin's hegemonic model can be situated in Herman and Chomsky's model, in that diversification in the political power structure leads to a wider variety of voices in the mainstream media. Schudson's (1991) criticism of the model is also related to his focus on the organizational level. The problem of autonomous reporters is not the focus of the model, however. The degree of diversification among power elites yields the possibility of oppositional and resistant opinion. At the same time, oppositional voices in foreign news coverage are not allowed to go beyond the fundamental challenge to US foreign policy.

Debord (1990, 1994) provides another helpful framework for exploring the functionality of the mainstream media: the theory of the spectacle and the concept of disinformation. He conceptualizes the spectacle as "a social relationship between people that is mediated by images" (1994, p. 12). Debord's abstract explanation of the effect of the spectacle is that individuals are disconnected through the media, and that the former connection between individuals through viable vocabulary and dialogue is replaced by the spectacle mediating the individuals. The spectacle's separation of individuals renders them vulnerable to the manufacture of reality. Debord highlights five basic elements of the "integrated spectacle" as possibly the most developed form of the spectacle (1990, pp.

11-13). The first two elements are “incessant technological renewal” and “integration of state and economy.” The other three features include “generalized secrecy,” “unanswerable lies,” and “an eternal present.” This social relationship, which emerged through the development of media technologies and the neoliberal state, clearly echo what Herman and Chomsky suggest. Debord further generalizes the spectacle’s role in producing knowledge within a capitalist society.

It is necessary to revisit the relationship between the state and the media as institutions, in that Herman and Chomsky’s model centers on the relationship between capital and the media as social system. In doing so, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between the economy and the state, because the media industry is not only part of the economy but also a representative of capital in general. Although the theory and roles of the state are beyond the scope of this dissertation, it may be helpful to briefly address the relationships between capital and the state. The first issue of the relationship between the state and the media was elaborated by Miliband even earlier than Herman and Chomsky’s model. Miliband suggests three main influences on the ideological function of the mass media in a capitalist society: ownership, advertisers, and the state (1969, pp. 227-238). Similar to Herman and Chomsky, Miliband holds that the most important element of pressure upon the mass media is ownership and control over the means of media content production. The second determinant of ideological disposition is advertisers who directly or indirectly exercise their power over media output. The final factor is from government and various parts of the state system (2002, p. 232). The third factor involving the state is noteworthy to mention, in that Herman and Chomsky’s

propaganda model does not include potential direct connections between capital and the state (and the press).

The Media and Global Responsibility as Individual Ethics and a Mass Movement

There are two elements to consider in approaching the media's role in conceptions of global responsibility. The first element is the changing media environment facilitating an ethics of global responsibility by transmitting and sharing relevant symbolic forms in a society. The second is social uses of media that can provide an opportunity to connect individuals for a mass movement. The distinction between the two elements is useful for analytical purposes, but discourses and practices surrounding individual ethics and social morality are linked to the two elements in reality. The two elements can be characterized by the relationships between the new media environment (including texts/discourses) and audiences/citizens, and between individuals and groups' uses of media for social interactions toward global responsibility. But they are not mutually exclusive processes. They are connected to one another, and each process is complex not only in theory but also in practice.

The first element focuses on possibilities opened up by the new publicness, which is created by the development of media and subsequent changes in interactions between individuals. Thompson (1995) provides a systematic account of conditions for an ethics of global responsibility by elaborating on the relationships between communication networks and social relationships. By drawing on symbolic interaction theory and switching the focus from media to interaction, he maintains that "the use of communication media involves the creation of new forms of action and interaction in the social world, new kinds of social relationships and new ways of relating to others and to

oneself" (1995, p. 4). Thompson's argument can combine two theorizations of McLuhan (2001) and Carey (1989). McLuhan's theory of medium as form and content at the same time postulates a model of communications that can shape human associations and relationships, while Carey views media as a possibility to create a community for maintenance and potential change by using the media.

Following Thompson's social theory of the media, I will review the possibility of global responsibility in a changed media environment. To do so, I will begin at the individual level analysis before examining the institutional and structural levels of analysis. Finally, I will consider the consequences of the reordering of space and time created by the development of the media and social uses of them, focusing on political and moral dimensions. The roles of the media also have a double consequence on the stretching of power. The first is that the dominant power has stretched its influence through the media with an increasingly broadened scope of space and time. The second consequence is that individuals are freer in forming their life trajectories than ever before with the development of the media. But it is also clear that the media have been owned and developed mainly by the market and politics and that individuals and groups have less or no control over the practices of media firms. Third, a new subjectivity is emerging in contemporary society, in that interconnectedness in a global society and individual and institutional awareness of the interconnectedness are being deepened and materialized as expressed as in the notions of "global compassion," cosmopolitanism, and "global citizenship" (Atkinson, 2005). While exploring the reinvention of publicness, Thompson (1995, p. 263) maintains that:

> We must seek to develop a way of thinking about moral-practical issues which does justice to the new and historically unprecedented circumstances under which these issues

> arise today. It is a way of thinking that must be based on a recognition of the interconnectedness of the modern world and the fact that spatial and temporal proximity has ceased to be relevant as a measure of ethical significance.

In Thompson's discussion, a sense of responsibility for distant others is an emerging ethic, but it is not an entirely reliable phenomenon in practice since a sense of responsibility is often fragile on a global level.

The Reordering of Space and Time

The reordering of space and time can be a useful entry point to theorize the functionalities and effects of the media. First of all, as Harvey (1990) points out, space and time are important sources of social power. Space and time are also basic elements of human existence and awareness. Second, the reordering of space and time is a main characteristic of the media in the modern world (Thompson, 1990, 1995). Thus we can observe social change through the media's impact on temporal and spatial aspects of social life. Finally, the reordering of space and time has a double consequence on social and political life in the modern world in terms of the stretching of power (Adam, p. 2004). Thus, there is a duality that political and economic powers have been upgraded with the development of the media, while there appear to be more empowered individuals.

As Harvey (1990) points out, space and time have been a central source of social power, and the media are a central force of temporal and spatial changes in social life. Thus, it can be expected that the development of the media is an important source of change in social life. While exploring the reordering of space and time through the media and its consequences, I will discuss why spatial and temporal organization and change matter. Finally, I will move on to the political implications which the reordering of space and time opens up. Thus, discussing how changes in the use of space and time are

transformed to social power with an emphasis on capital and symbolic powers means examining ways of governing space and time as resources of social power. Lefebvre (1991) also maintains that space is not neutral and passive but a site of struggle. He argues that space is reproduced by the practices in his analysis of spatial analysis ranging from individual routines to capitalist designs. For instance, Foucault's (1979) concept of the Panopticon shows how spatial practices can reduce people into a particular subjectificaiton, and in return the subjectification maintains the social practices of surveillance and relations of power.

The Reordering of Space and Time through the Media

Thompson suggests several useful ways to conceptualize the reordering of space and time through the media: despatialized simultaneity, mediated historicity, individuals' sense of space and time in everyday life, the sense of belonging, and the advent of media time. First, despatialized simultaneity is one of the most significant changes with the introduction of the modern world. The uncoupling of space and time in the context of communication has enabled individuals to interact with relatively less effort and cost (Giddens, 1990). In particular, instantaneous electronic communication such as the Internet empowers individuals to deliver, store and reproduce information easily and to an extent that face-to-face communication and mass communication cannot provide. Thus, with the current development of the media, information can be shared instantaneously and simultaneously, available virtually on a global scale (Thompson, 1995, p. 32; Urry, 2000, p. 433). In this regard, "mediated worldliness" is accepted as a newly emerged environment in which individuals can sense the globe as their locality. Thus, simultaneity can be linked to the globalization of a sense of responsibility.

Second, mediated historicity is another salient characteristic of the introduction of mass media. The media's function of restoring information and experience is related to the media's shaping of the past and memory. Although face-to-face communication still plays an important role in shaping our sense of the past, an "ever expanding reservoir of mediated symbolic forms," through the development of the media and social practices concerning media uses, shape the sense of the past (Thompson, 1995, p. 34). The media also juxtapose historical events which may be not directly related to each other (Giddens, 1990). In this regard, the popular understanding and memories of the past military interventions can be continuously constructed and recycled.

A third characteristic regards individuals' sense of space and time in everyday life. One's sense of space and time is also related to the sense of distance (Thompson, 1995, p. 35). Communication technologies transform the sense of distance, which in turn transforms the sense of time by reducing the time needed for delivery of messages. Telephone and videoconferencing overcome not only physical distance in individuals' interaction but psychological distance. McLuhan's idea of the media as an extension of the human neural system and Harvey's concept of space-time compression are closely linked to the sense of space and time. Intriguingly, in an opposing way to Meyrowitz's (1985) observation of no sense of place with the impact of electronic media, Rantanen (2003, p. 446) maintains that electronic news, exemplified the telegraphic news in an earlier form, "creates both placelessness and a new sense of place" in a phenomenological sense.

Fourth, the sense of belonging is linked to the construction of identity and community. The relationship between stars and fans is the epitome of psychological

proximity through the media in that fans feel they share something in common with someone whom they have never actually encountered. Therefore, it is clear that the reordering of space and time through the media influences the sense of belonging. It can be postulated in terms of identity and community. The ubiquitous nature of mediation allows a more expansive experience, in terms of space and time. For example, instantaneous electronic media play an important role in proliferating the market value and the virtue of democracy, the breakdown of the traditional family, the revival of local cultural identities, and the re-mooring of tradition in different parts of the world (Giddens, 1999: Thompson, 1995). Identity is shaped by the symbolic materials available to each individual. With the development of the media, individuals have an increased range of options and can choose from a virtually infinite amount of symbolic materials as new possibilities for self-formation.

The media also provide a resource for community, as mass communications such as the national press and television help shape a national society as an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1983). The new types of social interaction through the Internet represent a resource for building unprecedented communities, differing from those created by mass communication or face-to-face communication. Therefore, the reordering of space and time also enables individuals to construct and deconstruct communities, as Internet networks also establish themselves as imaginary/online communities.

Real communities are primarily shaped by face-to-face interaction. Moreover, they are dialogical in character, involving a two-way flow of information and communication. Real communities, however, can be compared to online communities

through space-time distanciation. The ways of making bonds between individuals or groups have been more flexible beyond spatial and temporal restrictions. For example, while television, an "old" media, is generally consumed domestically, the Internet, a "new media," is not restricted by physical space. Furthermore, space in online communities is regarded as qualitative and heterogeneous, rather than homogeneous as in real communities. Hence, community becomes conceptualized not in terms of physical proximity, but rather in terms of social networks. Accordingly, social space carries more importance in the modern world. Most notably, cyberspace, a social space with exercises in collective actions, is increasingly served to the construction of social reality and the restructuring of communities. As mentioned earlier, the formation of identities and the construction of communities are influenced by interactions through new communication technologies, ultimately becoming more reflexive and open-ended. This occurs because individuals increasingly fall back on the media to construct an identity for themselves by referencing the information most available to them in terms of space and time (Thompson, 1995, p. 207).

Finally, Silverstone (1994) suggests that the media have produced intensive media-centered routines in everyday life and that these routines become a source of ontological security. Ontological security refers to the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action. A sense of the reliability of persons and things, so central to the notion of trust, is basic to feelings of ontological security; hence the two are psychologically related. Ontological security has to do with 'being' or, in the terms of phenomenology, 'being-in-the-world.' But it is an emotional, rather than a cognitive,

phenomenon, and it is rooted in the unconscious (Giddens, 1990, p. 92; Silverstone, 1994, p. 5).

Self-Formation and Experience in the Modern World

Thompson's shift in emphasis from transmission to mediation combined with social interaction in understanding the roles of the media in the modern world allows us to investigate how the self can be a political and moral actor in the modern world by tracing the influence of characteristic temporal and spatial changes on self-formation through the media. In traditional societies local knowledge, through face-to-face communication, mainly shapes individuals' references. In the modern world, the development of the media has increased, in terms of space and time, the potential sources of knowledge that individuals may use. Although there are substantial barriers to access to mass media and new media such as the Internet in many societies, the development of the media expands individuals' interaction to a virtually global level and enables individuals to exchange symbolic materials with less effort and minimal cost. These new types of interaction may provide individuals with a means of escape or resistance from repressive social orders and with exposure to diverse cultural influences. Access to external cultural influences, which may still be weakened by locally dominant ideologies, may offer individuals opportunities for positive self-formation and the actualization of what is already known but is repressed despite its being perceived to be morally and politically correct. An individual may become enlightened with the help of references that have different space and time coordinates.

Using the tradition of hermeneutics combined with symbolic interactionism, Thompson provides an insight into the transformation of self-formation in the modern age: "the self is a symbolic project that the individual actively constructs out of symbolic

materials available to the individual, and materials which the individual weaves into a coherent account of a narrative of self-identity" (1995, p. 210). The introduction of new sources of materials, such as the Internet, upon which individuals can draw for the formation of identity, can be expected to have a significant impact on the process of self-formation. Thompson (1995, p. 207) notes that "with the development of modern societies, the process of self-formation becomes more reflexive and open-ended, in the sense that individuals fall back increasingly on their own resources to construct a coherent identity for themselves," at the same time, that "the process of self-formation is increasingly nourished by mediated symbolic materials." For example, the Internet enables individuals to actively construct their identities by providing an expanding range of resources and individuals actively seek information relevant in constructing their coherent account of a narrative of self-identity (Slevin, 2000). There are, therefore, many more resources and options than ever before, which can be utilized for the construction of identity and the actualization of repressed values in a specific culture.

The increasing availability of the new sources of materials which accompany the development of the media could be considered a new option for self-formation, and it can also create a sense of responsibility regarding distant people or events that is much wider in scope than ever before (Thompson, 1995, p. 234). Despite his Western orientation on the modernization of the third world, Lerner's (1958) view that exposure to the media could be an "empathy provider" may be utilized to grasp the new visibility and the formation of global responsibility. His concept of empathy is used to describe an individual's capacity to project oneself into the other's role. The development of empathy empowers individuals to locate themselves in different space and time coordinates.

Clearly, one's identities are now more open to new possibilities. In turn, there is a shifting horizon of expectation in comparison with the relatively fixed identities of traditional society. In this regard, the new publicness and increased scope of interaction in terms of space and time may be a condition for global responsibility. However, one cannot easily project a new ethics toward distant others and events since individuals are located in societies in which various resources of power are not equally distributed.

Political and Moral Implications of the Reordering of Space and Time

What are the political implications of the emerging role of the global media environment? My assumption is that the roles of the media also have a double consequence on the stretching of power. The first is that the dominant power has stretched its power through the media with an increasingly broadened scope of space and time. Using the term "space-time distanciation," Giddens explains the governing of symbolic materials by social actors. He defines distanciation as "the 'stretching' of social systems across time-space" (1984, p. 181). He suggests that the idea of distanciation can help us to understand mechanisms of societal integration. In a sense, one can observe the opposite possibility to the empowerment of individuals, or the proliferation of the ruling ideas through the development of information networks in terms of individuals' uses of them. Thompson (1995, pp. 21-22) further develops the concept of space-time distanciation as a process by which symbolic forms are distanced and located at different times and places. He suggests a theoretical framework that identifies the mechanisms with which technology extends space and time available to individuals, and how the production, circulation and appropriation of symbolic forms and information are embedded in a complex array of social conditions.

The second consequence is that, with the development of the media, individuals are freer in forming their life trajectories than ever before. Although the media have been developed mainly by the market and politics, grassroots activism is also an emerging force in utilizing and mobilizing the media.

Another question is how we can gain from theoretical and methodological emphases on the media's roles in a global society. To identify ways to conceive the emerging roles of the media, I attempted to define the media within a much broader context in which they are invented, utilized, and suppressed, by combining their economic, social, political, and cultural roles. There are several characteristics which I draw upon to develop my argument. First of all, the media have played a large role in transforming and reordering space and time which are basic categories of our existence and awareness of global responsibility. The reordering of space and time through the media is also a resource for various forms of power. In this regard, I will employ the notion of the reordering of space and time through the media as my starting point to explain global interconnectedness (interconnectivity), awareness, potentiality of global responsibility. Examining the current emergence, awareness, and potentiality of the media's roles can help to grasp a possible intervention point for a global society. Thus, I have situated the roles of the media to geopolitics in which capitalist and terrestrial powers have mainly acquired and stretched their power through the media, and through which grassroots resistance movements have tried to strengthen solidarity within a global scale of operations.

Finally, based on the political implications of the media's roles, I would like to suggest a conceptualization of ideology in terms of not only discursiveness but also

functionality. By this, I mean that the notion of ideology is still effective in explaining the way one experiences the knowledge upon which one acts. Individuals live with a certain set of information and interpret the consequences before and after they act and interact with others. Of course, individuals also act and interact with little or no reflection, when the meaning of affairs is so fundamental that it is unthinkable simply because it is the way the individuals live. What I would like to suggest by this statement is a way in which one can combine two important theoretical and empirical developments in the discussion of ideology.

The first is Foucault's notion of governmentality which dictates our understanding of the world. He argues that one cannot think outside of given knowledge or ideology. There is no point in conceiving alternatives outside of certain knowledge. It is rather that knowledge systems are not less important than material conditions. The second theoretical achievement is what Thompson (1990, 1995) suggests: a strategic model of ideology. By this he means that ideology can be a not-so-overburdening concept. It is powerful only when it is useful in certain contexts, although it still contains the notion of relations of power.

Both models of ideology or knowledge are useful since they reflect power relations and suggest domination in different ways. However, it is clear that the two suggest different directions in which ideology can be utilized. To Foucault, the relations of domination are very pervasive and even penetrates into the web of micropowers, so that the notion of intention becomes a secondary consideration. Agency is also less meaningful in his governmentality because both the governing and the governed are dictated by certain knowledge. For Thompson, intention and agency is more or less

salient in that he observes a strategic dimension of ideology. It may be possible to combine the two models of ideology to interact with each other. For example, the national interest frame as a general ideology is translated into a strategic ideology that is called "misinformation" surrounding the Second Gulf War, as in the (non)existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and its relationship to al Qaeda.

Media, Suffering, and the Construction of Global Responsibility

Global responsibility can be assembled out of several conceptualizations of the relationships between misfortune and suffering, media, and the public. Here, I will consider two: global compassion, and cosmopolitanism and global citizenship. Global compassion provides a useful tool to characterize the media's role in mobilizing resources to alleviate the suffering of victims of crises from various actors. Drawing on Nussbaum's (2001, p. 301) notion of compassion as "a painful emotion occasioned by the awareness of another person's underserved misfortune," Höijer (2004) situates the notion of compassion within international politics. He views global compassion as a "moral sensibility or concern for remote strangers from different continents, cultures and societies" (2004, p. 514). She regards the media as "an intermediate link between the level of social situations, in which audiences' interpretations and responses develop, and humanitarian organizations and politics" (2004, p. 514). On the one hand, Minear, Scott, and Weiss (1996) observe civilian populations' willingness to pay attention to internal conflict in other sovereignties and civil wars at a national and global level. On the other hand, Höijer (2001) examines humanitarian organizations, the media and audience/citizens at the individual, group, and organizational levels.

There is no causal relationship between witnessing the misfortune and commitment, however. Boltanski (1999) points out that distance can be a factor in taking

action due to a sense of responsibility for the misfortune. In an empirical study, Höijer (2001) observes that the degrees and forms of compassion can be affected by different visual images, as well as the character of the victims and the subject witnessing the misfortune. Tester (2001) also observes that the continuing exposure of journalists to misfortune can desensitize the journalists' ethical engagement with the misfortune due to compassion fatigue that means becoming so used to the spectacle of dreadful events, misery or suffering that one stops noticing them. Thus, journalistic practice and production at an individual level can also be problematic in materializing the potential of global responsibility.

Cosmopolitanism, meaning citizenship of the world, has also focused on an individual quality and project, rather than a mass movement (Beck, 2002; Rantanen, 2005). According to Rantanen (2005, p. 119), cosmopolitan identity is "not something fixed and stable, but something that is on the move." Accordingly, it is necessary to discuss how the concept of cosmopolitanism can materialize the objective of the notion in the age of the media.

McLuhan and Fiore (1967, p. 63) projects that electronic technology can create new human associations and relationships called the global village. While pointing out that mediated communication cannot be the same as face-to-face communication, Thompson (1995) and Tomlinson (1999) view global responsibility (for Thompson) and cosmopolitanism (for Tomlinson) as a project to be obtained by efforts.

Moral Fatigue: The Scope of Actions and Consequences

Global compassion is not always materialized and can do harm to the victims of the conflict. First, the propaganda approach suggests that global compassion and the subsequent support of military intervention is problematic. Johnstone (2000, p. 17) argues

that, “[s]o many useful results suggest that the New World Order demonstrated by the Kosovo war is nothing but the old world disorder of power politics where might makes right, transformed into a popular entertainment spectacle for well-intentioned Western audiences by the ‘virtual reality’ of modern media.”

The awareness of changes in the scope of actions and consequences is closely related to technology and mediation (Peters, 2001; Silverstone, 2003; Tester, 1994; Thompson, 2005). Rorty (1999, p. 73) also argues that legal and moral controversies arise when new kinds of events challenge traditional customs. These debates are often posed in terms of a “cultural lag” behind technological development. However, the changing scope of responsibility and the sense of responsibility certainly have a bearing on technology in that new technologies enable agents to enlarge the scope of actions and consequences (Casey, 1971; Jonas, 1974; Ricoeur, 2000; Thompson, 1995). The concepts of proximity, interhuman relationships, and here and now, are in flux, with a new awareness of them and the changing condition of actions and consequences (Jonas, 1974). The problem is the fact that the speed of interconnectivity has surpassed the awareness of it: the veracity of technological change has surpassed our awareness of the sense of responsibility (Jonas, 1974). One of the forces enabling the change is the media which are more observable, in that mediation and communication are sources of one’s own self-formation and lifestyles. This can be seen to have contradictory consequences in everyday life. First, the individual and institutional sense of responsibility has been broadened in terms of the scope of space and time with the development of the media and representation. Today, one can see distant suffering through ubiquitous media. Second, however, our sense of responsibility toward suffering people has not been enlarged and

indeed, may have shrunken due to moral fatigue and uncertainty with broadened exposure to suffering through the media. In addition to the duality of the sense of responsibility, the practicality of actions to be taken is problematic. At the core of this weakening influence of responsibility are mediation and subsequent various sorts of representations.

The Media and Global Responsibility Discourses: Human Rights and New Visibility

Positive and Negative Projections

A number of scholarly works examine relationships between the media and the changing nature of war. First, there are positive conceptualizations of the impact of new communications technologies on the audience and the creation of subjectivity. Webster (2003) is among the scholars who positively evaluate the discourse of human rights and subsequent post Cold War military interventions including Bosnia and Kosovo in that progressive ideas in general and human rights in particular can be more easily proliferated than ever before. According to him, the state of war since the 1980s is characteristically different from the "industrial warfare" culminated between the First World War and the 1970s. Using the term "information warfare" to conceptualize the changes leading from technical development to social uses of technology, Webster contrasts information warfare with industrial warfare. The major concern of the traditional type of war, he argues, surrounded territorial disputes that required the mobilization of entire populations as combatants. The media directly assisted national interests and nurtured a mass commitment to national power by directing and censoring information. In contrast, the new type of warfare, in accordance with the development of technological weapons and tactics, demands a relatively small number of combatants and

casualties. The subsequent changes in war are substantial inasmuch as the majority of the population is regarded as the spectator of the war, rather than combatants. In the changing technological, media, and geopolitical environment, human rights becomes more important than ever before, so much so that media management and perception management emerged as a critical issue for the domestic population and the global public as well (M. Thompson, 2002).

One the contrary, examining the narrative structure of war reporting can be used in the analysis of war coverage in the negative projection. While analyzing the first days of the First Gulf War in 1990, Lakoff (1991) uses the “fairy tale” of the just war. Accrording to him, a villain, a victim, and a hero (he also points out that the victim and the hero can be the same person) combined with the personification of the state has been used in the war news coverage: Saddam Hussein as the demon, Kuwait as the victim, and the United States as the hero. Lakoff argues that the state-as-person metaphor in the fairy tale structure can have dangerous ramifications in democracy in that simple metaphors for war cannot help people to comprehend complex realities. Furthermore, he adds that the metaphor (and cognitive) system exemplified as the selfless hero can indiscriminately legitimate a war, while hiding national interests underlying in the narrative.

The emphasis on US identity in further investigations of the crises in the US media clearly supports Anker’s (2005) observation that, “melodrama is not merely a type of film or literary genre, but a pervasive cultural mode that structures the presentation of political discourse and national identity in contemporary America.” For her example, the melodramatic US national identity evoked in news coverage of the September 11 attacks in 2001 helped to justify ensuing military actions as “retaliation”–an emotional response

as seen in melodramatic plot developments and without further investigation necessary in global democracy. Although Anker's textual analysis is on the news coverage of the September 11 attacks in 2001, US national identity can be used more generally to understand the melodramatic representation of the US identity and those of distant others. As Anker points out, the US collective identity constructed through a melodramatic narrative and plotline can eventually influence US politics and democratic global relations as well as US citizenship, while justifying US military interventions.

Institutional Perceptions and Appropriations of the Media on Global Responsibility

Understanding the US government/military's perception of media coverage of wars and their public relations activities involving the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict can help in discussing the media's roles and influence on the two NATO military intervention cases involving Bosnia and Kosovo. To do so, it is useful to summarize how US administrations understood and responded to the media coverage of the crises and the changing media environment. The Clinton administration's report to Congress, entitled "*A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*," suggests how media coverage of military intervention can be used by both the US government and its enemy states by gaining attention from the public:

> Modern media communications may now bring to our homes both the suffering that exists in many parts of the world and the casualties that may accompany intervention to help. But we must remain clear in our purpose and resolute in its execution. And while we must continue to reassess the costs and benefits of any operation as it unfolds, reflexive calls for withdrawal of our forces when casualties are incurred would simply encourage rogue actors to try to force our departure from areas where there are US interests by attacking American troops (White House, 1995, p. ii).

NATO Secretary General Robertson (2000) counts media as one of the driving forces in the changing forms of conflict and military intervention, and eventually the notion of sovereignty. In his words, "television is changing the pressures on Governments to take action. Today, our populations see, first hand, the effects of conflicts on civilians– the amputees in Sierra Leone, the dead in Rwanda, and the besieged in Sarajevo. Our citizens demand action from their governments, because they understand quite rightly that it would be wrong to walk away" (2000). The IICK report (2000) also pointed out that media and refugee influxes were two of the most influential elements in putting outside pressure on the former Yugoslavia, while Serbian media were viewed to play a powerful role in mobilizing consent and demobilizing dissent in Serbia.

Media Discourses on the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict

NATO's military interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict in the 1990s provoked a number of political and moral debates, and analyses and critiques of media coverage of the two crises have drawn much attention from scholars and activists. Among others, most focus on the role of media and their political and moral significance in the development of the crises.

Military Intervention and the Roles and Power of the Media

Many scholars hypothesize that the impact of the mass media in the post-Cold War era has increased. The CNN effect is an exemplary case that shows one of the most powerful roles of the media in a broader sense and those of the specific channel of CNN in a narrow sense over the same period. While the CNN effect in a narrow sense might be overstated as the media-driven foreign policy thesis, Entman's (2000) hypothesis of a more increased autonomy of media from government would be more plausible.

Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon (2005) conducted a content analysis of coverage of US policy in Bosnia during the war period in two US leading newspapers. They argue that both the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* acted in the crisis as watchdogs and provided explanations of the events to the public. Both newspapers, they maintain, urged the Clinton administration to engage in the crisis more actively by criticizing the administration's inaction. But they found differences in the metaframes of the two newspapers. The *New York Times* focused on the frame of security and world order in the crisis, whereas the *Washington Post* mainly employed the frame of humanitarian disaster. The authors conclude that the *Washington Post* was generally more critical of US foreign policy toward the Bosnian War.

Robinson (2000a) argues that the power of the media in US foreign policy-making is moderate. He analyzed a critical two-week-period of news coverage in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* of the penetration of the safe area, Srebrenica, beginning on July 11, 1995 and ending with some 8,000 deaths. He also argues that US media had an impact on the air strikes of Serb positions in the Kosovo Conflict in 1999, but it was not enough to shape the governmental policy for the deployment of ground troops in defense of Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo.[1]

Criticisms of Media Objectivity

Critics of the claims of "objectivity" in Western media covering international conflicts have played an important part in scholarly debates. The accuracy of the framing in the Yugoslav wars in US and European media is one of most important issues in the debates. There are two representative approaches to the conflicts. On the one hand, some scholars argue that the media's framing of the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict was not accurately represented by balancing the warring factions, instead of framing the war

as genocide by a specific faction. Based on a framing and indexing analysis of British TV news coverage of the Bosnian War, Kent (2006) observes that news coverage of the war failed to accurately frame the war by insisting on "balancing both sides." He argues the media treated that, despite the fact that the war resulted from Serbian expansion, the media treated opposing sides as morally equal through the representation of historical contexts and the use of linguistic terms including "ethnic cleansing," "warring factions," "Muslim," "fighting," and "civil war"–ultimately producing ambiguity in the public's understanding of the supposed genocide. While focusing on journalists' social and moral responsibility in preserving peace, Spencer (2005) argues that US and UK media failed to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo in a different way. Based on his characterization of the West's inaction to the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and its abrupt involvement in Kosovo along with the complexities of the crisis, he argues that journalists should have attempted to help further stabilize the region and prohibit the crises from being augmented.

On the other hand, scholars who accept propaganda approaches criticize journalists' argument on and public understanding of on media objectivity involving the two crises. Their criticism covers the pretense of journalistic objectivity, the propaganda themes of governmental and NATO discourses, and the focus on self-identity in the United States and the West. The position of these critiques stands in contrast to previous studies centering on the role of the media as a watchdog and the primary site of information in the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo.

First, the claims of journalistic objectivity and neutrality as well as the media's dependency on governmental sources for credibility are questioned in the mainstream US

media coverage of NATO air strikes involving the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict. Conducting a content analysis of terms and their usages used in the war reporting, Vincent (2000) analyzes one week of news coverage during NATO's air campaign period in the Kosovo Conflict (April 22-28, 1999) in representative US print and broadcast media. He observes that the Serbs and their lead figure Milosevic were demonized, while the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was not dealt with as one of the two main players in the crisis in March 1999. Based on the asymmetrical media coverage of the two parties in the mainstream US media, Vincent argues that the media were not immune from the governmental and military influence. Thussu (2000) also found a similar trend in her textual analysis of CNN's news coverage of NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia in March to June 1999. She argues that CNN reporting was uncritical on the legality of NATO military action due to its change, "from a defense alliance to an offensive peace-enforcing organization," while demonizing the enemy leader figure and promoting the KLA as "freedom fighter." Serbian atrocity stories were more focused, according to Thussu's analysis, whereas Albanian casualties were exaggerated. She found CNN coverage's support of technological warfare problematic, compared to the marginalization of NATO-inflicted causalities and damage in Kosovo. Thussu also argues that CNN coverage of the NATO bombing was likely to be influential on the global public given the global media structure and its influence.

Second, the propagandistic role of media was the most frequent criticism in the analyses of media coverage of the two crises. Propaganda analysis has been more frequently used to analyze media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict. This can be interpreted that, unlike the reluctant involvement of the United States in Bosnia, the

United States and NATO reacted relatively quickly to intervene in the Kosovo crisis. For example, Ackerman and Naureckas (2000) argue that US media propagated US government's discourse surrounding the Kosovo Conflict. They observed a shift in the attribution of accountability for ethnic tensions by Secretary of State Albright from the KLA to the Milosevic government for its explicit Serbian nationalism since 1987. According to them, the media's acceptance of the governmental policy orientations constructed the equilibrium between negation and the capitulation of President Milosevic, which led to the controversial war in 1999.

The propaganda role of the media was also found in NATO member states' media. Willcox (2005) found five distinctive propaganda themes used to justify the military intervention against Serbia, along with a comparable US-led military intervention in the First Gulf War, in mainstream UK media coverage: the portrayal of the leader figure (personalization and demonization), the portrayal of the enemy, military threat, international stability, technological warfare, media and disinformation, and the marginalization of opposing opinions. It is noteworthy that his propaganda analysis tries to connect propaganda reproduced in media discourses to audiences' perception and subsequent public opinion formation.

Third, criticisms related to US and Western identities are salient in war reporting. The fact that US media focused on US self-understanding and presentation of its identity suggests that the significance of the crises and consequences were not seriously dealt with in the US and NATO member states' media. As Ignatieff (2002, p. 59) puts it, "[t]he Western need for noble victims and happy endings suggests that we are more interested in ourselves than we are in the places, like Bosnia, that we take up as causes." Hammond

(2004) also maintains that the news coverage of Bosnia and Kosovo in the United States and the West centered more on national identity than on the investigation of the crises themselves. According to him, US media viewed Bosnia as a "Western self" embodying the "American value" of multiculturalism, and advocated more active military intervention. Moral evaluations of opposing factions and the legitimation of NATO military intervention in Bosnia reflect a reinvention of "the West" in the Balkans, while producing noble victims and unworthy victims. Hammond also argues that NATO's military intervention against Serbia in 1999 was based on the value of multiculturalism exemplified by Kosovo Albanians. The gendered identities and the gendered justification of NATO military intervention, Stables (2003) maintains, were also problematic in both US official discourse and the media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict. He argues that not only the gendered identity of the Serb part but also the masculinized US and NATO's identities in the legitimation of the intervention undermined the efforts to revise and prevent violence in the crisis.

Comparative Studies

Comparative analysis of media discourses on Bosnia and Kosovo is crucial in identifying whether global responsibility discourses in US media was based on the US national interest frame and patriotism. Using framing analysis, Yang (2003) conducted a content analysis of representative US and Chinese newspapers, and observes that national interests and governmental policy dominated the newspapers' frames involving NATO's air strikes against Serbia in 1999. While the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* framed the attacks as, "a humanistic aid to Kosovo Albanians to stop the ethnic cleansing initiated by Serbians," Chinese newspapers represented them as, "an intervention of Yugoslavia's sovereignty and territory" (p. 231). The comparative analysis not only

provides an intertextual quality of the media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict in the two UN Security Council member states with different policy orientations on the crisis, but also shows that there was a continuous trend of the news coverage of the crisis based on the national interest frame in each state's mainstream newspapers.

Grundmann, Smith, and Wright (2000) found the same trend in their quantitative and qualitative content analysis of NATO's war against Serbia in three representative newspapers in three leading NATO states including France, Germany, and the UK, respectively. They show that the French newspaper *Le Monde* focused on the European inability to "police" European territory, while the UK *Financial Times* followed its governmental discourse, phrasing the intervention as "a fight against evil." The German *Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung* also supported NATO's stance, but it was not outspoken about the character of the intervention. Grundmann, Smith, and Wright's (2000) analysis also proved that national contexts and agenda shaped the news coverage of mainstream media on NATO air strikes against Serbia.

Nohrstedt, Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Ottosen, and Riegert (2000) analyze four leading newspapers from four different European states: Greece, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Combining discourse analysis and propaganda analysis, they examined the first three-day-news coverage of US president Clinton's speeches of March 23 and 24, 1999. Höijer, Nohrstedt, and Ottosen (2002) also used discourse analysis to examine media coverage of the Kosovo Conflict in Sweden and Norway, and observe that, despite some critical coverage in the two states' newspapers, NATO propaganda was successful in that NATO framing of Milosevic as the enemy and NATO's war objective were not questioned in the newspapers. Savarese (2000) examined ten European newspapers,

including two from five different states, and found that the newspapers supported NATO's stance by using persuasive techniques such as "name calling," and constructing a narrative scheme based on the official government's discourse. The analyses of European newspapers demonstrate that the US and NATO official discourse was emulated by the four papers, although in varying degrees. These analyses show that NATO propaganda effectively worked not only in the mainstream US media, but also in those of NATO member states.

Methodological Implications of the Previous Research

Framing analysis, content analysis, and propaganda analysis have been the three most frequently used methods in the analysis of media coverage of NATO's military interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict. There is little research on media coverage of Bosnia and Kosovo using discourse analysis with notable exceptions, however. There are two discourse analyses of media discourse: Hansen (2006) on Bosnia, and Nohrstedt, Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Ottosen, and Riegert (2000) on Kosovo combined with propaganda analysis. While analyzing security discourse surrounding the Bosnian War, Hansen (2006) included US and UK media discourses in her analysis. But media discourse is one of the various sources of security discourses for the analysis of intertextuality in her study. Höijer, Nohrstedt, and Ottosen (2002) also used discourse analysis of Kosovo media coverage in Sweden and Norway.

There are three comprehensive works dealing with media discourses on the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict. Using framing analysis, Kent (2006) examined the extensive broadcast media coverage of the Bosnian War in the United Kingdom. Willcox (2005) focused on the extensive scope of UK media discourse on Kosovo in terms of the number of newspapers in the analysis by using propaganda analysis. His

approach is distinct by including the analysis of how mainstream newspapers presented opposing opinions to NATO policy and propaganda in mainstream UK newspapers. Goff and Trionfi's (1999) edited book, *The Kosovo News and Propaganda War*, provides a comprehensive propaganda analysis by examining media coverage surrounding the Kosovo Conflict in 26 different countries.

But there are few previous works offering a comparative analysis of the Yugoslav wars.[2] Thus, this research can contribute to discourse analysis of this important period of NATO military interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict by focusing on the two representative and controversial military interventions in the eventful period of the military interventions by analyzing mainstream US media discourses on Bosnia and Kosovo. In this study, the primary archival sources to be used are mainstream US newspapers, but other media discourses are included to provide an intertextuality of US mainstream media discourses involving the two NATO interventions outside of the mainstream US media.

The Responsibility of the Media

The issue of the media's responsibility is problematic and complex. It is useful to situate the notion of media responsibility within representative usages. The most common theoretical approach can be found in Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's (1956) *Four theories of the press*. In Peterson's (1956, p. 74) words:

> The functions of the press under social responsibility theory are basically the same as those under libertarian theory. Six tasks came to be ascribed to the press as traditional theory evolved: serving the political system by providing information; safeguarding the rights of the individual by serving as a watchdog against government; serving the economic system, primarily by bringing the medium of advertising; providing

> entertainment; maintaining its own financial self-sufficiency so as to be free from the pressures of special interests.

Altschull (1995) points out that the social responsibility theory of the press created by the Hutchins Commission in the 1940s is ambiguous and does not provide a substantial basis for the construction of practical measures to be taken. Thus, he argues that the notion of social responsibility in *Four Theories of the Press* serves to maintain the existing social order by claiming media's moral duty for the existing political and economic system.[3]

The notion of social responsibility clearly echoes Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon's (2005) analysis, aforementioned as an example of suggesting that media coverage of the Bosnian War in the US media functioned in the crisis as a watchdog and provided information for the public realm. Evaluations of news coverage of the two crises vary. But it can be argued that Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon see two representative mainstream US newspapers, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, adhering to the notion of social responsibility in their coverage of the Bosnian War.

Media responsibility can also be situated within the framework of this research in which the discourse responsibility is examined. The research presupposes that media discourse and foreign policy orientation and choice in practice cannot be understood as having a direct cause and effect relationship. Although the research accepts the view in social responsibility theory that media ought to help support democratic processes, the understanding of the media as watchdog and information provider to the public is too much depoliticized. Rather, it is more realistic that media is an important political player in the political process in general and in foreign policy affairs in particular.

Endnotes

[1] In order to identify the causal relationship between the critical media coverage on US governmental inaction and policy uncertainty and US intervention in Kosovo, Robinson (2000a, p. 407) hypothesizes as following: "Used as a tool to assess the claim that media coverage causes intervention, if policy uncertainty and critical and empathizing media coverage is found proceeding intervention, confidence in the assertion that media coverage triggers intervention will be increased." For a detailed explanation of the model, see Robinson (200b, 2000c).

[2] Spencer's (2005) book chapter on the media's role in peace surrounding the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict is one of few exceptions.

[3] By borrowing Green's conceptual distinction between obligation and duty, Altschull (1995) views that responsibility as duty tends to be problematized as duty since obligation first appears as related to the law. On the one hand, Altschull argues that the term "social responsibility" is less convincing since it does not provide substantial measures taken, while providing a tool to support the status quo. On the other hand, he also sees that the notion of social responsibility can provide the possibility of serving the socially marginalized, as in the "human dignity and individual growth" shown in the Third World (p. 448).

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGNS AND METHODS

This dissertation will explore the construction and articulation of the discourse and practice of global responsibility in the US media, and discuss the potentialities of the discourse of global responsibility by focusing on the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict in the 1990s. By utilizing the theory and methodology of critical discourse analysis, this study looks at how discourses of global responsibility was constructed and articulated in the leading US newspapers including the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal*–as one of the primary sites through which official policy discourse and public opinion are mediated and by which they are influenced.

In this chapter, I will first provide a brief overview of critical discourse analysis which guides the theory and methodology upon which this discourse analysis is based. Second comes a detailed explanation of research designs and methods based on critical discourse analysis. Third, I will discuss why the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict can serve as representative cases in exploring the construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses, and why it is important to examine such in the post-Cold War era, especially during the 1990s. Finally, the chapter will explain why the three mainstream newspapers and other intertextual archival sources were chosen as a means for a systematic analysis of global responsibility discourses.

Methodology and Research Designs

Critical Discourse Analysis

Drawing on the rich and varied literature in the theory and method of critical discourse analysis (CDA), I will seek to answer three research questions based on the conceptual tools of legitimation, articulation, and potentiality for analyzing the discourse

of global responsibility: 1) How were claims of global responsibility constructed in legitimizing military intervention in US media discourses?; 2) How was the legitimation of military intervention based on moral claims of global responsibility articulated to other modes of discourse and practices in US media discourses?; and, 3) What were the potentiality and impotentiality of global responsibility claims to end human suffering involving military intervention in US media discourses?

Foucault uses the term discourse to define "ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them" and, as worldview, "[d]iscourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern" (quoted in Weedon, 1987, p. 108). Foucault identifies the function of discourse as more than signification and relations of domination. The notion of discourse also offers the "positive" mechanism in which the subjectivity of individuals and a population is created, with resistance existing in the relations of power (Foucault, 1990).

Following Foucault's conceptualization of discourse, Link and Jäger suggest there is a relationship between discursive and material practices. Link provides a concise definition of discourse as "an institutionally consolidated concept of speech inasmuch as it determines and consolidates action and thus already exercises power" (quoted in Jäger, 2001, p. 34). Drawing on Link's conceptualization of discourse, Jäger defines discourse, "as the flow of knowledge–and/or all societal knowledge store–through all time," and, "which determines individual and collective doing and/or formative action that shapes society, thus exercising power. As such, discourses can be understood as material

realities sui generis" (2001, p. 34). Accordingly, based on the presupposition that language is a form of social practice (Fairclough, 1989), CDA views discourse as "ways of representing aspects of the world" and focuses on how different ways of representing the world reproduce domination and hegemony in social and political life (Fairclough, 2003, p. 124). Thus, discourse is not isolated from non-discursive practices; rather discursive practices and non-discursive practices are mutually coordinated.

In relation to Foucault's notion of discourse, the time span which he examines for his discourse analysis as methodology should be considered. He generally explores centuries of time to trace changes in knowledge systems by offering a diachronic analysis of knowledge production and how power is exercised based upon such knowledge systems (Foucault, 1970). Thus, it seems useful to consider the applicability of Foucault's method of using diachronic and synchronic research to trace the shift for the legitimation and justification of military intervention in the less than two decades after the end of Cold War. Fairclough (1992, 1995) points to the difficulty of using Foucault's methodology to examine a short time period in history. In contrast, I argue that discourse analysis based on Foucault's conceptualization of discourse is applicable in providing an account of the power of discursive practices in both the general and specific for the post-Cold War period. In this way we combine institutionalized discourses and public understandings and the actual experience of the discourses in supporting or challenging military intervention in other sovereignties.

Discourse analysis is crucial to the understanding that language and discourse are a force and the result of relations of power at the same time, the medium through which political elites define foreign policy issues and public opinion is mediated. Subsequently,

the issues and policy orientation are experienced in the public's everyday life within discourse and also materially to support massive war spending. Governmental and military discourses become mediated through media interpretations of the "official voice" and affect public understanding and experience. The formation of public opinion is important in a democratic society as a legitimate government must obtain public consent by convincing the public that the ends and means of the chosen policies are legitimate. There can be tensions between official discourse and foreign policy choices. Generally two elements are mutually constituted in a broader frame of the discourse (Hansen, 2006).

Critical discourse analysis also draws upon social theory such as the work of Harvey (1990) on postmodernity. He provides a research agenda for empirical research within the narratives of social theory that can be used as conceptual tools. Following Harvey, we can examine the emerging discourses regarding the contemporary world in general and the hegemonic discourses in US government and media in particular. Accordingly, analytical rubrics can serve to systematically analyze global responsibility discourses in US media, both mainstream and alternative. To do so, I will focus on legitimation to answer the first research question, and then move to broaden the scope of discursive practices in answering the second and third research questions concerning articulation and potentiality.

Research Designs

This research presupposes a triangular relationship among the definition of the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, the identities of the involved Yugoslav and international actors, and subsequent policy orientations, while using critical discourse analysis. By putting the interventions into a global context and global responsibility discourses, we can triangulate the relationships in order to trace the construction and articulation of the

discourse of global responsibility. As Vogt's (2006, p. 2) points out, the term "responsibility" has become so elastic that its meaning has become polysemic. Vogt's observation on the difficulty of clarifying the notion of global responsibility can be such that responsibility discourse may not be the principle of policy orientations. Rather, it is possible to examine how responsibility is constructed regarding military intervention at specific moments of a conflict. Thus, in order to trace the movement of the construction and articulation of responsibility discourse, this study first assumes that humanitarian responsibility and regional security responsibility discourses regarding military intervention do not exist in or of itself. Specific forms of responsibility discourse are adopted from preexisting discourses for a specific crisis and the responsibility discourse evolves throughout the crisis in relation to the preexisting responsibility discourse. In its application, the general responsibility discourse is reconstructed, evolved, and eventually challenged within the specific representations of the events of the crisis. The responsibility discourse for an understanding and experience of the events by the public is also constructed by the various agents involved, including ruling parties, oppositional parties, and groups within state, as well as international, institutions, the media and the domestic and global public. Based on this presupposition, Figure 3.1 shows how humanitarian responsibility and/or security responsibility discourse in military intervention is constructed and evolves from the link between the representations of identities of various involved actors and policy orientations. Figure 3.1 illustrates the triangular relationships of the three elements.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the specific construction of a crisis and subsequent policy discourses that are reproduced and modified based on earlier history. The figure shows

how the role conceptions of the United States for two archetypical global responsibilities (humanitarian responsibility and security responsibility) were conceived between the specific construction of a crisis and subsequent policy discourses. It is worth noting that the degree of fixation of the preexisting identities and the degree of involvement are much higher in the construction of one's own identities, for example the identity of the United States may be more stable than that of its Yugoslav counterparts in the mainstream US media. But the degree of fixation regarding the identities would be reflective of the development of the situation in the chosen crises.

Figure 3.1: The Construction of Global Responsibility in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict



It is also useful to extract the archetypical types of humanitarian responsibility discourse in the case of military intervention. That is the responsibility for the victims of the conflict. Then, there are useful categories such as the three characteristics of humanitarian responsibility for the victims of the conflict (and world security) in the 2004 UN discourses: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react, and responsibility to rebuild. But it is still necessary to examine who speaks of the responsibility and who is accountable and responsible for the victims of any international conflict. Table 3.1 illustrates the analytical framework that may be useful in identifying the attribution of accountability and responsibility in the legitimation of military interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict.

Table 3.1: The Attribution of Accountability and Responsibility in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict

Attribution characteristics	The subject of the attribution
Accountability for the victims of the conflicts	Former Yugoslav warring factions, United States, European states, NATO, UN, Russia, and China
Responsibility for the victims of the conflicts	Former Yugoslav warring factions, United States, European states, NATO, UN, Russia, and China

Figure 3.2 provides an abstract model of the relationships among official discourse, media and the public in foreign policy. The diagram shows that media discourse serves to mediate the official discourse and public opinion formation. By including the potential changes in terms of time in Figure 3.3, the function of the media discourse can be further clarified.

Figure 3.2: Relationships among Official Discourse, Media and the Public



Figure 3.3: Relationships among Official Discourse, Media and the Public in Time



Figure 3.2 also can be used in explaining the relationships among official discourses provided by the government and military, media, and public opinion in the case of military interventions. The media exercised more power over public opinion

formation in foreign policy issues in general and military intervention cases in particular than domestic issues because ordinary citizens have little or no direct sources about distant events. Thus, the government and military have more influence on media discourse concerning foreign policy issues than domestic policy issues. Central to discourse construction is the national interest frame and media's dependence on official sources for gaining accessibility to events and "legitimate" information (Herman & Chomsky, 2002). Entman (2000) argued that journalistic autonomy in the domain of foreign issues are greater than before since the end of the Cold War, focusing upon the organizational level of analysis. Embedded journalism, epitomizing government/military control over the media in military interventions, operates at the institutional level, however. Thus, Entman's observation brings us to a question: If there needs to be enemies to justify a democratic government to use military force in other sovereignties, how have the previous anti-communication frames changed in the post-Cold War era?

Methods: Conceptual Tools and Analytic Rubrics

Legitimation Strategies

Legitimation strategies play a central role in military intervention by elevating the representation of the crisis to influence policy discourses and value judgments. The process of legitimation requires a "defensible criteria for legitimacy" (Beetham, 1998, p. 540). Two important criteria in establishing legitimacy are a rightful source of authority and the rightful ends or purpose of the exercise of political power (Beetham, 1998, p. 538).

More specifically, the UN has been the only authority in judging the legality of global security and the use of military force in cases of military intervention since 1945, when the member states signed Article 51 of the Charter of the UN. The use of military

force against other sovereign states is illegal under current international law and treaties. There are two exceptions prohibiting UN member states from using force: self-defense against an armed attack and military measures taken under the authorization of the UN Security Council (UN Charter VII, Article 51). A military intervention in the absence of UN Security Council authorization is thus problematic in terms of legality under international law. The question of whether the UN Security Council has had a substantial effect in avoiding existing and potential harm to humanity surrounding international conflicts is controversial. But it can be argued that the UN Charter is the only established system for providing normative and practical suggestions for keeping international peace and security. The five basic criteria for the UN to approve the use of force are as follows: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences.

The five criteria for the UN authorization of the use of force, or legitimate military intervention, can be used in analyzing media discourses and military intervention. The two military interventions in the case studies I have chosen were not approved by the UN Security Council, so the legality of the war and subsequent legitimacy arguments have been debated from a wide range of positions. Since the cases of military intervention were not approved by the UN Security Council, the legitimacy of using force demanded moral claims for legitimizing it, including human rights, a "just war," and humanitarian assistance. In this situation, the legitimation of military intervention based on moral grounds in general, and global responsibility claims in particular, emerged as a major source to justify the use of force in the post-Cold War era (Couldry & Downey, 2004; Mertus, 2001).

Along with the notion of responsibility, the legitimation of military intervention and justification of the ways in which it was carried out are not permanent, fixed, or pre-determined, since claims of global responsibility are ultimately embedded in historical, cultural, and political contexts. In Rojo and van Dijk's (1997, pp. 561-562) words:

> The fact that legitimacy is not a permanent good, but the object of social and political struggle, explains why it cannot be preserved in conditions of free production and circulation of discourses. The intervention in the order of discourses by the imposition of restrictions on the production, access or uses of discourses, thus acts as a link between the social-political legitimation at the macro-level, on the one hand, and discursive legitimation at the micro-level.

By "the object of political and historical struggle," Rojo and Dijk (1997, p. 560) pinpoint that "a dichotomy between positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation" discursively and rhetorically promote positive or negative opinion on specific events. Thus, it is necessary to examine the discursive strategies in the case of a specific military intervention, based on claims of global responsibility. In this regard, legitimation is also related to de-legitimation of the other discourses.

Legitimation and de-legitimation also require penetrating that which is inexplicit. As Sholle (1988, p. 23) points out, legitimation is related to naturalizing possible contradictions and producing consensus through processes of official and formal sanctions. But this does not mean that legitimation occurs only by excluding the realities of actual conditions or misinformation and disinformation. The process of producing legitimacy also occurs through the lack of appropriate knowledge and contexts, since little or no information on policy issues is widely available. This leads to feelings of impotence in the public which then tends to support the existing order (Held, 1982; Sholle, 1988).

Methodologically, van Leeuwen (2007) and van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) categorize four major discursive legitimation strategies along with the following sub-categories (Fairclough, 2003, p. 98):

- Authorization: "legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law, and of persons in whom some kind of institutional authority is vested."
- Rationalization: "legitimation by reference to the utility of institutionalized action, and to the knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity"
- Moral evaluation: "legitimation by reference to value system"
- Mythopoesis: "legitimation conveyed through narrative"

Vaara, Tienari, and Laurila (2006) also distinguish five legitimation strategies by modifying van Leeuwen and Wodak's four categories and by adding "normalization" in an analysis of industrial restructuring in media discourse: (1) normalization, (2) authorization, (3) rationalization, (4) moralization, and (5) narrativization (mythopoesis).

In order to answer the first research question, I will analyze the discursive legitimation strategies and the strategic importance and frequency of the construction of global responsibility used in the archival sources. In doing so, I will use the aforementioned categories of discursive legitimation.

The Theory and Method of Articulation

Legitimation or de-legitimation does not self-generate specific meaning in social and political life in general or military intervention in particular. Legitimation strategies are interwoven into other sets of discursive practices. It is thus necessary to examine how the legitimation of military intervention based on claims of global responsibility was articulated or disarticulated within other objects and discursive practices. I also consider how legitimation strategies are linked to wider discourses.

Gramsci (1971) views articulation as the process of conjecture of different ideological elements that produce hegemony. Articulation as a hegemonic process creates "common sense" and "normal reality" acceptable to the public. Drawing on Gramscian theory of hegemonic articulation, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Hall (Grossberg & Hall, 1996) consider how different elements of discourse are combined and put into material practices. Foucault and Jessop also use the notion of articulation in a different manner to further develop the notion of governmentality or hegemony. Foucault (1991, p. 70) maintains, while hypothesizing a progressive politics, that it is necessary for progressive politics to identify "the historical conditions and the specific rules of a practice" and to recognize the linkage between practices and conditions. It is also necessary that certain practices are "obedient to certain rules" and "part of a system of correlation with other practices." Jessop (2004) also observes that the discourse of a "knowledge-based economy" is linked to and translated into some representative terms in different functional systems and the wider society. Although different in their analysis, both Foucault and Jessop combine discursive and material practices in a theoretical and methodological conjecture using the notion of articulation.

Slack (1996, p. 112) observes that the generative concept of articulation has been used as theory and method. Articulation as theory has been employed to characterize a social formation and provides a framework for analysis avoiding economic reductionism and essentialism, while methodology provides "strategies for undertaking a cultural study, a way of 'contextualizing' the object of one's analysis." She points out that in an epistemological sense, articulation can be used for political analysis and as a strategic device to provide "a mechanism for shaping intervention within a particular social

formation, conjuncture or context" (1996, p. 112). Accordingly, it is necessary to contextualize methodologically the legitimation of military intervention based upon claims of global responsibility within a broader discursive practice in order to understand the discursive function of the legitimation of military intervention in a wider society.

The second research question regarding the articulation of global responsibility discourse provides two generic criteria: how the notion of global responsibility for military intervention is articulated in other discursive practices in US media. First, humanitarian responsibility and/or security responsibility discourse in military intervention is constructed and evolves from the link between the representations of identity of various involved actors and policy orientations in US media, considering the fact that the divisions of the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict into the pre-military intervention, intervention, and post-intervention reflect US and NATO policies over the periods in a broad sense (Figure 3.1). The second criterion concerns the manner that the military interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict were exercised during the military intervention period and how US and NATO roles for distant suffering were articulated in US media.

The Potentiality of Global Responsibility Discourses

The third research question is introduced in order to discuss the potentiality and impotentiality of the construction of global responsibility discourses and subsequent legitimation and articulation of military intervention in the US media in the post-Cold War era. With legitimation and articulation as the initial strategies, the potential of global responsibility discourses will be analyzed in terms of politicization and de-politicization. Agamben (1993, 1998, 1999, 2005) suggests a paradoxical formula of "the potentiality for (not) being (other than) what one is" by using Aristotle's concept, potentiality (as in

matter) and actuality (as in form). Prozorov (2007) analytically uses the concept of potentiality by situating it within the Foucauldian discussion between freedom and sovereignty.

I argue that the poetic notion of potentiality can be used for the analytical framework for this study. To do so, I will draw on Giddens's (1984) structuration theory. Instead of following consequentialism (Casey, 1971), utilitarianism (Janzekovic, 2006), and functional social theory (Merton, 1936), his framework provides two useful ways in approaching NATO military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. First, structuration theory provides a way to combine two different kinds of consequences (regulated and unintended) by examining continuous actions and reflections in the development of the two crises. In using the framework, a theoretical presupposition is that the agents should be knowledgeable of their conduct since military intervention is a purposive action. By including the byproduct of purposive actions, in this case military intervention, unintended consequences can include the continuous cycle of the constitution and reproduction of a society, instead of understanding unregulated or unintended consequences as the externality. Second, Giddens's situation of legitimation in relation to structural power and ideology can be best suited to the objective of this study for examining the potentials of the discourse of global responsibility in media since a state can be analyzed as an agent seeking legitimation in the structuration model.[1]

Borrowing Vogt (2006) and Szigeti's (2006) conceptualization of national and institutional agencies as responsible agencies, Chapter 7 will be an analysis of action and consequences surrounding the legitimation and articulation of military intervention based on global responsibility discourses. Thus, examining the scope of action and

consequences means approaching the discursive and material potentials of responsibility discourses that were constructed within the US media. Thus, I will first discuss the construction of global responsibility on the basis of the scope of actions and intended and unintended consequences and how they were dealt with in the US media. More precisely, to situate the political and moral characteristics of the discursive functionalities of the US media requires an analysis of the scope of action and consequences of the global responsibility discourses. In doing so, Four points can be raised: 1) the dangers of inaction and the moral urgency versus ambiguity, 2) the weakening of the UN and a new US exceptionalism, 3) the "sanitized war," 4) technological warfare and militarism. Next, we must consider the stability of global responsibility discourses throughout the crises. Also, I will discuss the stability of global responsibility discourses, particularly humanitarian responsibility, which is important in understanding its potency when it comes to the intersection of domestic responsibility and global responsibility and that of humanitarian responsibility and global security responsibility. The analyses in the first two sections are an examination of the movement of global responsibility discourse within the mainstream US media. Finally, the intertextuality of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media serves as a comparative analysis in media texts.

Intertextuality is a key element for identifying the political implications of global responsibility discourses in terms of their function. I will compare the responsibility discourses in the mainstream US newspapers with other media discourses, two newspapers from Britain, press releases from global humanitarian non-governmental organizations, and other secondary literature. Alternative mediated discourses are compared to the hegemonic discourses in the mainstream US media. The primary

elements include: 1) the ideological spectrum in the United States, 2) the hierarchical global power structure, and 3) the contesting discourses within global public sphere leading to the following table:

Table 3.2: The Intertextuality of Global Responsibility Discourses

The hegemonic discourse in the mainstream US media	Discourse in the alternative US media
	Discourse in the semi-hegemonic and counter-hegemonic countries
	Discourse of the humanitarian global non-governmental organizations

In this study, discourses in the invaded and occupied states surrounding the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict are not included as the interxtuality of the discourse of the mainstream US media. The mediated discourses are similarly absent regarding the many states invaded and occupied by US military forces in exploring the construction of the notion of global responsibility from a US perspective. The arguments from invaded and occupied states have been marginalized in the mainstream US media and to a certain extent by the progressive media. Though it can be argued that such voices are less audible because of the difficulty of US and Western journalists in gaining access when covering complex issues in invaded and occupied states, their relative absence should be regarded as a serious problem in terms of informing the citizenry.

Figure 3.4 shows the conceptual tools and subsequent analytical rubrics based on the interrelated research questions in this study. The second research question is based on the first research question, and the third and final question draws on the first two questions by using the construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses regarding Bosnia and Kosovo. The comparison of the analysis of US media discourse in each case provides a comparative element to the study by examining the movement of global responsibility construction and articulation.

Figure 3.4: Conceptual Tools and Analytical Rubrics Guiding Research Questions

The construction of global responsibility discourses and legitimation of military intervention:	
	authorization, moralization, rationalization, narrativization, naturalization
↓	
The articulation of global responsibility discourses in wider discursive practices:	
	identities of involved actors and policy orientations
	the manner that the interventions were exercised
↓	
Discursive functionalities:	the scope of action and consequences of global responsibility discourse
	the stability of global responsibility discourse
	the intertextuality of global responsibility discourse
	global responsibility discourse and public opinion

Case Study Design: Two Cases of Military Intervention

The Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Kosovo Conflict (1998-1999): An Overview

With the end of World War II, the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was constituted at the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia Conference in 1943, and the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia was established with six constituent socialist republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (containing two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina), and Slovenia. After the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of Yugoslavia accelerated with Serbian nationalism under Slobodan Milosevic's regime and growing nationalistic movements and declarations of independence from other parts of Yugoslavia. The breakup began in 1992 when Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence. The dissolution led to a Serb minority in Croatia, three minority populations of Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and an oppressed ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo.

The Yugoslav wars were comprised of six main conflicts in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), divided into two distinct periods. The first period was during the breakup of SFRY, including the War in Slovenia (1991), the War in Croatia (1991-1995), and the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter the Bosnian War, 1992-1995). The second period is composed of wars in Albanian-populated areas including the Kosovo Conflict (1998-1999), the Southern Serbia Conflict (2001), and the Macedonia Conflict (2001).

Among others, the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict were well-publicized for creating humanitarian suffering. One hundred thousand Bosnians and Herzegovinans were killed and 1,325,000 refugees and exiles were forced to move from Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 by the Bosnian Serbs (Tabeau and Bijak, 2005). During that period, the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 became a key event used by NATO to justify its air strikes at the end of August (Honig & Both, 1997). During the Kosovo Conflict, 2000 Albanians were killed along with some 300,000 people becoming internal refugees before NATO began its bombing campaign. Two to three thousand Kosovo Albanians were killed and 300,000 more became refugees after the bombing within and around Kosovo (Chomsky, 1999, p. 49).

There are various accounts for the conflicts, dating back to ancient ethnic hatreds and mythology during the Middle Ages. It is worth noting that constructing and identifying the source of tension has been dependent upon the strategic positions among the major ethnic groups as well as NATO (Gagnon, 2004; Johnstone, 2002). The various accounts of the causes of the wars will be dealt with in the next chapter.

There have been nine major US- or NATO-led military interventions since the end of the Cold War, from the First Gulf War in 1990 to the Second Gulf War in 2003. One of the most salient characteristics in the recent global war state is the moral claim for waging war. NATO's military interventions in the Yugoslav wars represent a distinctive shift of the US government's foreign policy and practices in relation to the role of the UN and the approval of the use of military force from the UN Security Council. Before the end of the Cold War, the approval of US military intervention beyond the national border by the UN Security Council had been critical, while recent US military intervention cases have claimed moral grounds, especially humanitarian values and human rights as "good intentions" for waging war. Moral justifications had to be provided for military intervention as embedded in the era of the new world order, the new media environment, and the more enlightened and engaged global public. The three consecutive interventions since 1999, as Hardt and Negri (2004, p. 60) point out, can be described as following: Kosovo (1999): "the imperial humanitarian logic," Afghanistan (2001): "the national, imperialist logic," and Iraq (2003): both logics. Over the eventful periods during each war, moral grounds have been crucial in both mobilizing and demobilizing public dissent.

The Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict are the two most representative conflicts among the major interventions since the end of the Cold War during which US-led coalitions intervened with use of military force based on moral claims. There are several reasons that the two cases are relevant to an objective of this study examining the discourses and practices based on the claims of global responsibility.

First, both "ethnic conflicts" in the former Yugoslavia had relatively less strategic importance to the United States, as compared to the First Gulf War in 1991 or the war

with Afghanistan in 2001. This does not mean that the two chosen cases are lacking in strategic importance from a US government perspective, since NATO's credibility was a driving force in the course of NATO's military intervention in the post-Cold War era. Rather, the two military conflicts can provide the most observable moments when the discourse of responsibility was more powerful than direct US security concerns were involved, such as the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after the September 11 attacks in 2001.

Second, the two military interventions led by the United States were a major humanitarian crisis on the European Continent, while being the two most salient events in the series of conflicts in the Yugoslav wars between 1991 and 2001. Facing the integration of the European nations and refugee influxes to European states, the United States and European states needed to be engaged in the events on the European continent as "the world police." Thus, responsibility discourses can be more easily observed since the United States also had to beautify its intention to continue to lead Atlantic allies in its own way, without the anticommunism frame postulated during the Cold War period.

A third character of the cases is that they have been well-publicized among various humanitarian crises in the United States as well as European nations. In particular, the two intervention cases, especially the Kosovo Conflict, were recorded in the most representative humanitarian intervention, while the Bosnian War was regarded both as an example of a successful US intervention and as the failure of UN or European nations. Furthermore, critics of humanitarian intervention also argued against the imperialist or imperial projects of the United States and NATO. Characterizing both interventions by their "good intentions" was controversial especially in relation to the discourse of human

rights, so much so that the interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict are especially useful for exploring the construction and discursive practices of global responsibility.

The crises in Bosnia and Kosovo can also reveal continuity and discontinuity in claims of global responsibility in the 1990s in the period between the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attacks in 2001. We can thus analyze the 1990s as a turning point. The interventions also differed in the way intervention was exercised, and each national and supranational agency defined its own identity and roles. It is thus useful to compare and contrast the two cases while examining the discursive practices of global responsibility.

Finally, a comparative analysis of the two interventions led by the United States and NATO provides the opportunity to compare US and European policy orientations toward the former Yugoslavia and subsequent media discourses in both parts regarding global responsibility discourses. Thus, the combination of the two cases can offer a rich context for the characteristic grounds for military intervention and non-intervention. The policy of the United States and European NATO member nations over the two cases also showed different dynamics. For the Bosnian War, European members opposed US policy for a three year period before their accepting US initiatives, while for the Kosovo Conflict both shared a generally common approach. Moreover, NATO intervention in Bosnia was criticized because it was too late and too weak by proponents of "democracy with/by force," while its intervention in defense of people in Kosovo was too early and too destructive.

The Periodization of the Military Intervention Cases: 1991-2001

The legitimation of military intervention and justification designed by national authorities, including the US government and its allies and critics, may differ by the stages of military intervention. Thus, this study divides the military intervention cases by the stage of development of military intervention: publicizing conflicts, beginning of war, ending of major combat, and finally, a peace-keeping or nation-building stage. Accordingly, I will examine three periods in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict respectively: pre-intervention, intervention, and post-intervention.

Analyzing media discourse by intervention period and temporal division is useful in observing the stability and change of the construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses and evaluating their potentials. Moreover, the ideological spectrum during the military intervention period is expected to be assimilated to the governmental discourse involving each military intervention (Carruthers, 2000; Hallin, 1994).

Table 3.3 shows the periodization of the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo for the archival sources in this study. The archival sources for the pre-military intervention periods in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict are collected from the time when the mainstream US newspapers recognized each crisis on March 1992 and March 1995 respectively, and those of the post-intervention periods are collected from the end of NATO's major military operations on September 21, 1995 and June 10, 1999 to the end of the years, December 31, 1995 and December 31, 1999 respectively, in order to trace the patterns that represent the chosen newspapers' editorials. The periodization of each military intervention case along with a brief chronology will be provided in more detail in the next chapter (Table 4.1).

Table 3.3. The Periodization of the Interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo

Periodization	Pre-Intervention	Intervention	Post-Intervention
The Bosnian War	(Mar. 1, 1992–Aug. 29, 1995)	(Aug. 30, 1995–Sep. 20, 1995)	(Sep. 21, 1995–Dec. 31, 1995)
The Kosovo Conflict	(Mar. 1, 1998–Mar. 23, 1999)	(Mar. 24, 1999–Jun. 9, 1999)	(Jun. 10, 1999–Dec. 31, 1999)

Archival Sources: Mainstream US Newspaper Editorials and Their Interxtuality

In the selection and reading of texts for an archaeological approach, Foucault (1998, p. 263) maintains that, "one ought to read everything, study everything. In other words, one must have at one's disposal the general archive of a period at a given moment." As he points out, it is necessary to identify the meaning and discursive functionality of a specific discourse by relating the chosen discourse to others under different strategic interests and perspectives. Approaching the definition, articulation and potentiality of global responsibility discourses in mainstream US media demands situating the chosen discourses in relation to their counterparts produced under different contexts. If power is exercised in relations, the position of the responsibility discourses in US media can be only identified in relation to that of the same and different kinds of discourses.

When it comes to the post-Cold War period, it may not be possible or doable for a researcher to follow Foucault's methodology, however. As Malmvig (2006, pp. 40-44) suggests, there needs in a historical approach a compromise to systematically frame a comparative research and include as many different texts as one can. In order to obtain the objective of the research analyzing global responsibility discourses on NATO military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in mainstream US newspapers, it is necessary to justify, in the case study, the selection and exclusion of potential archives based on the representativeness.

First, US mainstream newspapers can be situated within the two polarities between the mainstream US media and their critics in the military intervention cases, and between the dominant nation-states and grassroots resistance from below. It is thus necessary to identify who speaks about global responsibility, in that the position of speakers in geopolitics makes a difference in the formation of global responsibility. For example, the US position in recent military interventions should be different from other states due to its power over the rest of the world. Accordingly, the analysis and critique of US foreign policy cannot be generalized as the formation and practices of global responsibility in general. However, considering the degree and scope of influence among varied media, mainstream US media is the most powerful not only in its domestic society but also in the world. Second, the United States is the only remaining superpower in the world. No nation-state in the current global power structure is comparable to the United States in terms of its power or influence on global society.

It should also be considered that the division of local and global domains is often blurred and overlapping, so much so that the division can be more analytical than practical. For example, recent natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, show a link between the US military occupation in Iraq and the aid to Louisiana in terms of resource allocation. This overlapping does not lessen the importance of global responsibility compared to domestic responsibility. It is rather that the distinction and combination of domestic and global responsibilities can imply that global responsibility is increasingly interwoven into domestic policy issues in contemporary society, and vice versa. Moreover, the consequences of the domestication of military intervention such as the

party-press parallelism (Seymour-Ure, 1974) and domestic responsibility for US citizens (and soldiers) are points to be analyzed in the discussion section on global responsibility.

Under this justification, this dissertation first focuses on claims of global responsibility in the mainstream US press. It covers the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* as three representative US mainstream daily newspapers. According to the Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC), the three newspapers are among the leading six mainstream newspapers in the United States by circulation. More specifically, I have selected editorials published in the three popular US mainstream newspapers as the primary site of hegemonic discourse. Editorials are chosen as the archival sources since they most explicitly reflect the coherent ideological position of the newspapers.

The analysis of the three newspapers enables a comparative study by examining the diversity of political stances involving the cases of military intervention. The *New York Times* is viewed as one of the most liberal newspapers on the ideological spectrum in the mainstream US media, whereas the *Wall Street Journal* is regarded as one of the most conservative in its editorial tone, supporting corporate interests in its editorials, while news articles in the newspaper are seen as more objective in terms of sourcing. The political stance of the *Washington Post* is located between the ideological spectrums of the first two newspapers. Despite their being relatively diverse in the political stance, the three newspapers are similar to one another in supporting the government position in foreign policy issues in their editorials. Thus, the three newspapers can be taken together as one of the primary sources of hegemonic discourse in foreign affairs in general and military intervention in particular. The press-party parallelism in the United States also

provides an important element in the choice of the newspaper in that the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* are regarded to be pro-Democrat, whereas the *Wall Street Journal* is said to be supportive of Republicans.

Second, for the opposing critics in the alternative US media to the hegemonic discourse in the mainstream US media, I will choose the *Nation*, as a representative archive for the criteria. Founded in 1865 as an Abolitionist publication, it is the oldest weekly magazine regularly published, and the circulation is among the highest. It was ranked the highest in the genre in 2004, and the circulation has increased since then, according to the ABC. The magazine positions itself as a spectrum of the left in the United States, and is operated mainly by citizen donors. Considering its political stance and subscription, the *Nation* is an exemplary source for the opposing media discourse to that of mainstream US media. For the responsibility discourse of representative global non-governmental organizations, the news releases of Human Rights Watch involving the two crises will be analyzed, in that, although different in genre, the organizations' news releases are comparable to the editorials of the chosen newspapers and magazine.

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the availability of the news editorials covering the two military intervention cases published in the chosen three newspapers and their contextual media sources between March 1, 1992 and December 31, 1995 for the Bosnian War and between March 1, 1998 and December 31, 1999 for the Kosovo Conflict respectively. Using the news databases ProQuest Newsstand, America's Newspapers, and Lexis/Nexis, I calculated the number of editorials containing the words, "Bosnia" (and Bosnian) for the Bosnian War and "Kosovo" (and Kosovar) for the Kosovo Conflict in the three mainstream newspapers and their intertextual sources. The Human Rights Watch's news

releases covering the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict are collected by retrieving the News Releases Archive at its own Web site at http://hrw.org.

Table 3.4: Archival Sources of the Mainstream US Newspapers on Bosnia and Kosovo

	Period / Resources	Pre-Intervention	Intervention	Post-Intervention	Total
Bosnia	*New York Times*	194	5	21	220
	Washington Post	188	6	23	217
	Wall Street Journal	56	1	12	69
	Subtotal	438	12	56	506
Kosovo	*New York Times*	29	50	32	111
	Washington Post	39	45	46	130
	Wall Street Journal	17	33	18	68
	Subtotal	85	128	96	309
Total		523	140	152	815

Table 3.5: Archival Sources of the Intertextual Sources of the Mainstream US Newspapers on Bosnia and Kosovo

	Period / Resources	Pre-Intervention	Intervention	Post-Intervention	Total
Bosnia	*Nation*	38	1	11	50
	Guardian	275	4	20	299
	Human Right Watch	1	0	0	1
	Subtotal	314	5	31	350
Kosovo	*Nation*	6	26	15	47
	Guardian	32	51	35	118
	Human Right Watch	30	58	12	100
	Subtotal	68	135	62	265
Total		382	140	93	615

Endnotes

[1] For a comprehensive analysis and criticism of the theory of structuration, see Giddens (1984) and Thompson (1989).

CHAPTER 4

THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS OF THE BOSNIAN WAR AND THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

"Balkanization" became a geopolitical term used to describe ethnic tension and hostilities within or around a specific region beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Balkan nations including Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro regained their independence from the Ottoman Empire. The term is used for explaining security crises within or around a specific sovereignty and the use of military intervention in international affairs. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary*, the term means "to divide (a region) into a number of smaller and often mutually hostile units, as was done in the Balkan Peninsula in the late 19th and early 20th centuries." The Balkanization of the Baltic provinces has been repeated since the early 1990s, with four main wars in Yugoslavia during the period of 1991-2001 and total reconciliation yet to come.

This chapter explores the historical and political contexts in which the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict were embedded in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, including an emerging new world order in the 1990s and the subsequent events following the September 11 attacks of 2001. Contextualization reveals that the political implications of the two NATO interventions were more complex and complicated for rationalizing the action to the public. The Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Kosovo Conflict (1998-1999) are regarded as the worst conflicts in the European continent since the end of the two World Wars (Blackburn, 1993, p. 100). As a remedial attempt by the West to secure itself within the US media mainstream and in popular memory as having acted responsibly, NATO's military interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict have been

continuously addressed retrospectively. The repeated narratives in public domains along with the existing discourse and subsequent perspectives of the United States as well as the popular understanding of the Balkans have led to the construction of a hegemonic discourse concerning global responsibility that has been distributed and continually reproduced in subsequent military interventions.

In retrospect, US and NATO engagements in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict were often romanticized as epitomizing US efforts to intervene on behalf of the victims of the conflicts. Such responsibility claims, however, had often been muted and even eclipsed within US governmental and media discourses during the periods over 1992 to 1995 and 1998 to 1999 respectively. In this regard, propagandistic information and subsequent popular understanding of the two interventions remain as originally constructed. Thus it is necessary to trace the contours of the development of the crises in order to have a thorough background of the events.

After the collapse of the Cold War system that balanced the First World (the West) and the Second (the USSR), Yugoslavia's delicate stance between the two, caused internal tensions among the various ethnic groups and the experiencing of uneven economic development. In order to fully understand the discursive functions of responsibility discourses as found in the US media, it is necessary to situate the two crises within a series of broader contexts in which they were embedded and to discuss the construction of responsibility discourses or what we ought to do for the victims of the conflict and regional security from the perspective of each international/global actor's identity and policy orientation.

In order to pursue my research objective of exploring responsibility discourses in the US media concerning NATO military interventions, I will approach the historical contexts surrounding the interventions in a multidimensional way. First, I will focus on the historical accounts of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Second, I will center on the development of the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict within the broader context of the four consecutive wars in Yugoslavia from the early 1990s into the twenty-first century. Finally, I will trace the contours of the historical and political contexts surrounding the destruction of the nation of Yugoslavia and the role of the UN, the United States, NATO, and other key nations with strategic interests in the Balkan Peninsula. The historical account will be situated within the broader framework of the post-Cold War era and the historical explanations that have been actively constructed by competing forces pursuing their strategic interests.

The following questions will be addressed in order to trace the contours of global responsibility discourses for the Bosnia and Kosovo cases in US media. First, why and how did the collapse of the Cold War system influence the situation in the former Yugoslavia? Second, how did the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia affect the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo? Next, what drove the United States and NATO to intervene in both cases and what did this mean to not only the former Yugoslavia, but also the global society and the United States? Finally, how can the discourse of responsibility be understood within a context of the new world order, especially the weakening of state sovereignty and the growing international community's involvement in seeking to resolve local conflicts in other sovereignties?

The historical and political contexts surrounding the interventions offer a framework that can guide the analysis of discourses and practices based on the concept of global responsibility. They can be used to examine how such discourse was constructed in relation to the legitimation of NATO's use of force and how the legitimation grounded upon the discourse of responsibility in wider discursive practices. I thus explore the link between the constructed identities of involved actors and the suggested policy orientations.

History is always a human construct of reality, attempting to define or recover past worlds. Methodological concerns in understanding the historical contexts of the specific events and discourses are as follows: First, a certain event or discourse does not necessarily exist autonomously, and subsequent developments are processual; Second, when writing the history of the Balkan cases and the US position, it must be situated within the new world order; Third, the intertextuality of US media discourses is of utmost importance in order to understand broader political contexts; Fourth, seemingly contradictory narratives in a narrower scope may not be so at times in a broader scope, especially in terms of US national interests; Finally, the history of NATO interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict were constructed upon preexisting contexts that are essential to understanding the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Historical Contexts of the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia and Kosovo

A Brief History of Yugoslavia before the Dissolution of Yugoslavia

There were three distinctive periods in the creation and growth of Yugoslavia in the Balkan Peninsula before its dissolution in the early 1990s: the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941), the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY, also known as the Second Yugoslavia: 1943-1991), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(FRY, 1993-2003). The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was first established as a monarchy in 1918, and then became as a Socialist state in 1945 after the defeat from the Axis powers in World War II. The FPRY succeeded the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a socialist state. The FPRY was constituted of the six socialist republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia along with two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina located within Serbia. After the dissolution of the FPRY, the FRY established a federation comprising the two remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia and Montenegro declared their independence in 2000, ending what remained other former Yugoslavian federation.

The following table provides a brief overview of the chronological development and historical contexts within which the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict occurred. The periodization of the two crises is depicted in the Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: A Partial Chronology of the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict

1989	
May	Milosevic becomes president of Serbia
1991	
June 25	Croatia and Slovenia declare independence
June 27	Yugoslav-Slovene War starts; lasts ten days
August	Croatian-Serbian War starts; lasts six months
September	UN weapons embargo on Yugoslavia
The Bosnian War (1992-1995)	
(1) Period of Pre-NATO Military Intervention	
1992	
March	Bosnia-Herzegovina declares independence after a public referendum
Early April	Outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the factions
April	US and EU recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina independence
1993	
March	War between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina escalates
August 9	The North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's highest decision-making body approves NATO air strikes on Bosnia-Herzegovina

1994
March 1 NATO bombs first time

1995
July A "Safe area" haven in Srebrenica taken by Serbs

(2) Period of NATO Military Intervention

August 30 NATO initiates airstrikes against Bosnian Serb targets (Operation Deliberate Force)
September 20 End of NATO's major combat operations

(3) Period of Post-NATO Military Intervention

December 14 The Dayton Peace Agreement signed

1996
September 14 Federal elections in Bosnia

The Kosovo Conflict (1998-1999)

(1) Period of Pre-NATO Military Intervention

1998
January 15 Open conflict between Serb police and separatist Kosovo Liberation Army
August United States announces NATO-approved plans to use force against the Serbs

(2) Period of NATO Military Intervention

1999
March 24 War between Serbia and NATO begins (Operation Allied Force)
April 23-25 NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington, D.C.
June 9 President Milosevic's agreement to withdraw troops from Kosovo (Ending major combat operations)
June 10 UN passes Security Council Resolution 1244

(3) Period of Post-NATO Military Intervention

2000
September 25 Presidential election; Milosevic voted out of office in Serbia

(Source: Benson, 2001; Kaufman, 2002; Meier, 1999; Pavkovic, 2000; Rogel, 1998)

The Outbreak of Yugoslav Wars: The Post-Cold War Era and Yugoslavia

With the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of Yugoslavia accelerated as Serbian nationalism increased under the Milosovic regime and with growing nationalistic movements that led to declarations calling for the independence of Yugoslavian provinces. The breakup began in 1992 when Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence. The dissolution led to a complex set of conflicts among ethnic minorities, including the Serb minority in Croatia, three minority populations of Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and an oppressed ethnic Albanian majority of Kosovo in Serbia.

In the dissolution process, there were four main wars within Yugoslavia. First, the Slovenian and Croatian War in 1991 accelerated the dissolution as each territory claimed independence, thus creating hundreds of thousands of refugees that brought back to public consciousness the traumatic memories of World War II. Second, the Bosnian War took place between 1992 and 1995, when NATO intervened with the use of force toward the end of the war in 1995. The Kosovo Conflict followed from 1998 to 1999, when NATO intervened for the first time against another sovereignty in civil war in 1999.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia has mainly been explained by internal factors, including ethnical tensions, nationalist hatred, and extreme nationalism in the region (Cviic, 1992). However, competing explanations for the breakup of Yugoslavia that are critical to constructed mythologies regarding the violent history of the nation have arisen (Woodward, 1995). Fouskas and Gökay (2005) observe that the dissolution of Yugoslavia and subsequent displacement of civilians were the result of the linkage between internal and external factors, and that external factors were more important in

the deterioration of the situation than the domestic environment. They point out three interrelated accounts leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia. As they put it (pp. 167-8):

> First, the regional disparities in the country, most notably the fact that the area north of the river Sava (Slovenia and Croatia) was (and is) richer and far more integrated into Western markets than the Southern zones (Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Second, Yugoslavia's uneven economic development continued throughout the post-World War II years, state policies being unable to reverse the trend. Third, the interventionist policy of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the Vatican, encouraging Croatian and Slovene separatism at a moment when it was certain that this would lead to civil war, also contributed to the violent and chaotic breakup of the country. Last but not least, America's demand for an independent Bosnia, despite the fact that no ethnic Bosnian majority existed to back such a signing of the Dayton accords in 1995. But the United States entered the Yugoslav theater to stop Germany's influence there, not to protect Bosnian Muslims from Serb nationalist aggression."

According to Fouskas and Gökay (2005), Western acknowledgements of the declarations of independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia also boosted the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. US and Western ignorance of the nature of Serbian nationalism in the early stage in the early 1990s led Serbian leaders that the West was indifferent to its course of action, along with their inconsistent policy in the processes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

The Bosnian War

Proponents of US and NATO engagement in the Bosnian War argued that humanitarian atrocities based upon extreme nationalistic ideologies could be stopped by the use of force (von Hippel, 2000). The air campaign by NATO against the Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1999 gives credence to US and NATO arguments that the UN failed to prevent the humanitarian crisis, and US leaders also felt reaffirmed by the success of the use of force (Beaumont, 2001). But a three year pre-intervention period in

Bosnia demonstrated US refusal to assume responsibility for the victims of the conflict or for the security within Bosnia and its neighboring states. European nations placed peacekeeping ground troops in the former Yugoslavia before the military intervention, whereas the United States argued for lifting of the weapons embargo, which was imposed in the entire former Yugoslavia by the UN in 1991 and the subsequent two equal parties' "fair" fighting among the three Yugoslav warring factions.

There were a number of events in the Bosnia War over the eventful period of 1992 to 1995, so much so that it may be useful to trace the several major events over the period. First, Bosnia declared its independence after its referendum of February 29 to March 1, 1992 (Burg & Soup, 1999, p. 117). After Slovenia and Croatia sought independence from the Yugoslav confederation with the weakening solidarity of the socialist federation, instead of being part of a Serbian-dominating federation, Bosnia and Macedonia also faced a choice between remaining inside of the federation or pursuing independence. There was no majority ethnic group in Bosnia, having remained a multi-ethnic state with three major ethnic groups before the war. The pre-war distribution of the three major ethnic groups in 1990 was Bosniaks (43%), Serbs (31 %), and Croats (17%) (Hansen, 2006, p. 118). Bosnia declared its independence after the referendum with the favorable rate of 62.68 percent of the total voters to independence in March 1992, and the EC and the United States recognized the independence on April 6, 1992 (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 117).

Most Bosnian Serbs opposed the movement and boycotted the referendum. The Serbs viewed Bosnian independence movement as "a step toward war," (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 117) and the disparity between the two parts led to the fierce attacks against each

other (Hansen, 2006, p. 117). In response to the Bosniaks' independence and the establishment of the Bosnian government in 1992, Bosnian Serbs in the region intended to remain within the Federation and established the Republic of Srpska the same year. The Bosnian Serbs operated what was often called "ethnic cleansing" by urging the transport of Bosnian Muslims to other regions. Croatian nationalism also worsened the situation in Central Bosnia, resulting in three warring factions in Bosnia: Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croatians, and Bosnian Serbs. Meanwhile, UN peacekeepers were ineffective due to the brisk pace of events.

In early 1993, the Bosnian Serbs took control of seventy percent of the territory, making the war situation more intense. In response, the UN and the EU presented several peace plans in attempts to end the war. The UN Special Envoy Vance and EC representative Lord Owen proposed a peace plan in January 1993, envisioning ten "safe areas" controlled by one of the three factions, except the sharing of the capital of Sarajevo. The Vance-Owen peace plan suggested that Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims were to govern three safe areas respectively, Croats two, and a mixed Croatian-Muslim constellation one (Hansen, 2006, p. 118). Although the plan was supported by the foreign ministers of the EC, the benefits of the peace plan varied for the warring factions. The Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan since it had a thirty percent of population before the war, while occupying seventy percent of the territory in 1993; the Bosnian Croats accepted the deal immediately (Hansen, p. 118; Silber & Little, 1997, p. 276). Burg and Shoup (1999, pp. 405-406) point out that the peace plan was attractive to engaged international actors because it accommodated ethno-territorial autonomy and de-legitimated ethnic cleansing.

With the war situation deteriorating in Bosnia, especially the Bosnian Serb attacks on Srebrenica, the UN Security Council attempted to establish Srebrenica as a safe area, and added Tuzla, Bihać, Žepa, and Goražde to the safe haven (Hansen, 2006, p. 119). The assigned safe areas declared by the UN Security Council were protected by UN peacekeeping units (UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR). European peace negotiations stopped the United States from lifting an arms embargo and so-called "fair fights" between Bosnian warring parties. The Contact Group including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, Italy, and Germany pressured the Bosnian Serbs to accept the settlement to end the Bosnian conflict. The Contact Group plan emerged as one critical peace plan during the Bosnian War.

During the two-year time span between mid-1993 and mid-1995, the key moments in the Bosnian War were the peace negotiations, Bosnian Serb atrocities, and the struggle between UN peacekeeping efforts versus US argument for lifting the 1991 UN arms embargo and for letting the warring parties fight with the help of US/NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions in Sarajevo, Bosnia (Hansen, 2006, p. 122). NATO's highest decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), approved NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions in August 9, 1993, and NATO launched bombings against Bosnian Serb positions in Bosnia in March 1994, the first NATO bombing in history (Friedman, 2004, p. 54). But it is viewed that the NATO bombing violated the UN no-fly zone and UN rules that "UN peacekeepers could only shoot when fire upon" (Friedman, 2004, p. 54). This first NATO direct military actions since its formation exemplified the tensions between the UN and NATO concerning the Bosnian crisis.

The dramatic change from European leadership to the US initiative in July 1995 resulted from the Bosnian Serbs' attacks under general Mladić on the UN safe area of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia protected by lightly armed Dutch peacekeepers. During the Serbian occupation of Srebrenica under general Mladić, the Srebrenica massacre occurred, when more than 7,000 people were killed and more than 10,000 Bosnian Muslims were driven from their homes. The event pressured the UN, NATO, and the US government toward a more aggressive approach against the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serb Army's shelling of the Sarajevo market place on August 28, 1995 led to increased NATO air raids beginning on August 30, 1995.

NATO intervention, code-named Operation Deliberate Force, occurred between August 30 and September 20, 1995. NATO air strikes aimed at Bosnian Serb objectives to maintain control and pushed them to accept peace talks. The warring parties agreed to peace talks on September 8 and led to an agreement on the framework for a Bosnian constitution. The Dayton peace talks were held from November 1st to the 21st the same year, and the peace agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, followed by the arrival of NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) troops in Bosnia (Rogel, 1998, p. xxiii).

The fundamental basis of the war was often presented in the media as "age old" or "ancient ethnic hatreds" (Johnstone, 2002, pp. 4-5). The popular identification of the source in the crisis had many critics who argued that the ethnic tensions were utilized by political leaders to mobilize popular support and also to demobilize public dissent in Bosnia (Rogel, 1998, p. 43). Western participants in the crisis brought into the discourse of ethnic hatred, partly because the discourse of Balkanization or "Balkanism" facilitated

the naturalization of the disturbing events in Bosnia. It also reduced the extent of Western responsibility for not taking more active engagement. Critics of those using ethnic hatred maintain that Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, the three main ethnic constituents, had been able to maintain harmonious relationships, with minor conflicts, throughout the twentieth century (Rogel, 1998, p. 43). In this regard, how historical contexts were created is important in defining the Bosnian War and in determining how the West engaged as monitors of the peacekeeping area (Willcox, 2005). Critics of US and NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 maintain that technological warfare using US air power and precision-guided munitions was meant to avoid US casualties, but it also resulted in massive civilian casualties. Meanwhile, the US government called the mission a success with the truce late 1995.

The Kosovo Conflict

Kosovo as a "Balkan state" has a long history of who controls the land. Serbian and Albanian nationalism in the 1970s and the 1980s were due to latent tensions in Bosnia and Kosovo (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2000, p. 33). Moreover, US officials and media repeatedly suggested that the main source of the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo were due to ethnic hatred that has existed for centuries. The ICISS commission maintains (2000, p. 33):

> The origins of ethnic conflict are often claimed to date back hundreds of years. Protagonists refer to great migrations, epic battles, and holy sites. The conflict over Kosovo is no exception. Although it is true that stories and myths surrounding Kosovo were kept alive for centuries in ballads and legends, it was only in the late nineteenth century that they were resurrected as part of the narratives of rival Serb and Albanian national movements. The twentieth-century history of Kosovo has been bloody, with episodes of mass expulsions and atrocities conducted both by Slavs and Albanians.

> Nevertheless, the latest round of violence cannot be explained merely by reference to this history.

The story of ethnic hatred is more than a thousand years old. First, the Serbs took over Kosovo in the late eleventh century, and the epic Battle of Kosovo of the Serbian Army against the Ottoman invasion in 1389 was employed to situate historical context of Serbian ownership of Kosovo's territory. In the late 19th century, Albanian refugees from the 1876-1877 Serbo-Turkish war and the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war led to the founding of an ethnic majority in the area. During the Balkan Wars in 1912, an Albanian exodus occurred and the Kingdom of Serbia took over Kosovo, known as vengeance for the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Historians and politicians claim that Serbian leaders induced its population to trace its history back to 1389 "when the Ottomans defeated the Serbs during the battle of Kosovo Polje and where Prince Lazar was martyred" (Willcox, 2005, p. 57).

The Serbs took over Kosovo during the First World War and it became one of the two de facto republics of Albania in the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) after the Second World War. Based on a belief that the weakening of Serbia can makes Yugoslavia stronger, Tito pursued a policy to weaken the power of Serbia. To this end, Kosovo and Vojvodina became autonomous regions in the 1974 constitution, and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo's government emerged as a de facto republic within the Socialist Republic of Serbia. However, autonomous status of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo was threatened by Serbian nationalist repression in the late 1980s. Since President Milosevic rose to power with a policy of strong Serbia, the Republic of Serbia (later Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997) suppressed ethnic Albanians in Serbia. Milosevic delivered the Gazimestan Speech, which marked

the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo on June 28, 1989. Milosevic's mobilization of Serbian nationalism can be observed in a speech given in Kosovo on April 25, 1987 to the Serbian League of Communists (LC):

> In order to solve the problems we have in Kosovo, as well as the other problems that we have, unity of the LC is indispensable. This unity is the most important task facing the party now. This demand for unity was made yesterday and the day before yesterday by almost every speaker at the plenum of the Central Committee of the LC of Serbia that was just held. I am convinced that we have made a big step toward the unity of both the LC of Serbia and the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia]. Indeed, with unity we can solve many problems, almost all of them. Without unity we cannot solve a single problem (Milosevic, 2000, p. 11).

Milosevic gradually reduced Albanian autonomy in Kosovo between 1990 and 1996, and the dominant position of the Albanian political party shifted from Kosovo's Communist Party, which sought a policy of peaceful resistance against Milosevic's crackdown on leftists, to the Democratic League of Kosovo wanting autonomy. The increased repression led various Albanian factions to create the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that had become more radicalized since 1996. Ethnic hatred was mobilized by both sides over the period. In response to Serbian nationalism, Kosovo Albanians, who actually composed an ethnic majority (approximately 90 percent out of two million), had come to claim themselves as the original inhabitants of an ancestral land. In a response to Serbian domination, the KLA emerged as a force seeking Kosovo's independence. The KLA was classified as a terrorist group by the West well before the Kosovo Conflict in 1998. The crisis and the tension between the Serbs and the KLA made the news by March 1998 when the latter sought to break from Yugoslavia, leading to civil war.

The Kosovo Conflict concerns the conflict between Serbian and Yugoslavian security forces and the KLA in its broader sense and the subsequential war between NATO and Serbia between March 24 and June 10, 1999 in the narrow sense. The civil war ignited in January 1998, when Serbs and Albanians attacked each other. The atrocities of the Racak incident by the KLA and Serbian reprisals in January 1999 forced NATO to try to settle the conflict. The Contact Group suggested a peace conference, the Rambouillet talks in February 1999. NATO regarded the negotiation principles as an ultimatum justifying NATO's intervention in Serbia. Milosevic refused to accept the non-negotiable principles suggested by NATO.

NATO launched air strikes on Belgrade on March 24, 1999 and continued to attack Serbian territory until Milosevic finally accepted the Rambouillet Agreement in June. Serbia and the KLA continued to battle with each other during NATO's intervention, while producing a massive displacement of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo. This was the refugee crisis that was covered by the international media. NATO suspended its bombing on June 10, 1999 with the peace agreement between NATO and Milosevic in early June 1999. Kosovo has been under UN administration since the end of NATO intervention in 1999. The deployment of US ground forces was one of the most critical issues in the US congress and media during and after the military intervention against Serbia.

There are alternative explanations regarding the Serbian strategy in dealing with the Kosovo Conflict. Among others, one political explanation of the internationalization of the conflict is that NATO involvement was prompted by Serbian conservatives seeking to demobilize public opposition against their rule (Gagnon, 2004, p. 125). According to

Gagnon, Serbian leaders assumed that the NATO's air war would not only be aimed at military facilities but create civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian facilities. Eventually, civilian casualties and the deteriorating situation in NATO's air war against Serbia constructed NATO as the enemy of the Serbs in Serbia.

The New World Order and US Military Interventions

In order to understand NATO's involvements in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict, it is necessary to understand not only the historical and political contexts of the two conflicts and subsequent US and NATO engagements in the Yugoslav wars to save Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo Albanians from genocide in Kosovo, but also the new world order in which the two crises and US and NATO foreign policies were interwoven. The United States and Western European nations established NATO to face off with the Soviet Union and its expansion in the Eastern Europe. The object of the alliance since its establishment claimed to provide security for Western Europe, but its critics stated that the real goal of the Atlantic Alliance was to extend US power (Petras and Vieux, 1996).

The end of the Cold War consolidated US global supremacy. Hobsbawm (2000) suggests that US exceptionalism is one of the most distinctive characteristics of the new nature of war since 1989, as exemplified by the use of NATO to intervene in the former Yugoslavia. Among others, the Yugoslavian case was politically new in that "the line which distinguishes internal conflicts from international conflicts has disappeared or is tending to disappear" (Hobsbawm, 2000, pp. 7-30). Hobsbawm argues that geopolitics should "return to a situation in which military intervention cannot be undertaken by anyone without there being a wide consensus and without it being based on serious

justifications. The world cannot function if some can just say, 'I am strong enough to do what I want, and therefore I will do it'" (Hobsbawm, 2000, pp. 7-30).

During the Cold War period, it was strategically difficult for a nation-state to intervene into civil conflicts as it would disturb the power balance between the United States and USSR. Despite these difficulties, both superpowers used Third World nations for extending their geopolitical power. Technological developments also changed the nature of NATO's intervention in the sense that it sought more efficient ways of reducing civilian casualties and alleviate the use of ground troops.

US Foreign Policy and National Interests

Efforts to sustain US political, military and economic hegemony globally in a unipolar system drives US foreign policy in general. NATO's credibility has been derided, making its existence questionable, especially with the dissolution of the USSR (Petras & Vieux, 1996, p. 4). The early 1990s mark when the nations of the EU experienced growing economic power and questioned the need for military dependence on the United States. The political context concerning US security policy regarding EU integration is illustrated in the draft report *US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One-Superpower World* distributed by the US Defense Department in 1992:

> NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defence and security, as well as the channel for us influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of Europe-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance's integrated command structure (Tyler, 1992, p. A1).

The US goal therefore was to retain NATO as one division of its military force. The US foreign policy orientation since the end of the Cold War was laid out in the Clinton administration's *1995 National Security Strategy Report to Congress* in February 1995. In "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" published in the same year, the administration proposed for US foreign policy: 1) "to sustain US security with military forces that are ready to fight," 2) "to bolster America's economic revitalization," and 3) "to promote democracy abroad" (White House, 1995). Domestic and foreign politics were brought together in the report claiming that seeking US hegemony over European nations was a driving force to determine US policy on NATO, which was associated with both economic and political conditions in the United States as well as the global society. The Clinton administration highlighted the goal of democracy as a means of ensuring US security and global hegemony (White House, 1995, pp. ii, 22-23). The essence of the report is as follows:

> All of America's strategic interests–from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory–are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights, is a key part of our national security strategy. One of the most gratifying and encouraging developments of the past 15 years is the explosion in the number of states moving away from repressive governance and toward democracy. Since the success of many of those experiments is by no means assured, our strategy of enlargement must focus on the consolidation of those regimes and the broadening of their commitment to democracy. At the same time, we seek to increase respect for fundamental human rights in all states and encourage an evolution to democracy where that is possible. The enlargement of the community of market democracies respecting human rights and the environment is manifest in a number of ways" (White House, 1995, p. 22).

The White House's National Security Strategy report made it clear that US interests are of primary importance and the sending of US troops abroad should be limited. The report also focused on bringing democracy to other states as a means of securing US economic prosperity. It can be argued that US global strategies seemed to change by focusing on global responsibility, but White House report suggests that the US foreign policy was based on a larger plan for US hegemony. Clinton's rationalization of military interventions combining US responsibility and national interests was not new. For example, Kissinger's role in the overthrow of the democratically elected government has been documented of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973. Thus, the rationalization of US military interventions may be different than what was done by the US government and military. Kissinger gave the following rationalization for US intervention into Chile:

> No country has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the United States. No society has more firmly insisted on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable. No nation has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy, or more ideological in the pursuit of its historic moral convictions. No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope (ÓTuathail, 2002, pp. 624-625).

In the analyses of the discourse of President Bush Sr. regarding the Bosnia situation in mid-1992, ÓTuathail (2002) also found inconsistencies in official discourse. This implies that, despite claims of global responsibility for the international community, US official discourse was still constructed upon national interests in foreign policy.

Technological Warfare and Casualty Aversion in NATO Interventions

One of the most salient characteristics in the ways the US and NATO interventions over Yugoslavia were exercised is technological warfare exemplified precision-guided munitions and casualty aversion especially from the US side. From the first Gulf War in 1990, the precision-bombing by air war was the main strategy deployed to avoid US soldier casualties. The combination of technologically oriented warfare and humanitarianly-induced intervention tends to conflict in their principles. The moral principles of humanitarian intervention is to protect civilian victims of the conflict, while the US technological warfare and its soldier casualties is more important for at least perceived public opinion. The table 1 is an abstract modeling of the order of general casualty aversion in "bloodless war" (Mandel, 2004, pp. 11-16).

As shown in the Table 4.2, limiting one's own casualties takes priority over rescuing civilians in the conflict. The US and NATO interventions in the former Yugoslavia reflect this minimizing of US casualties. "Casualty antipathy" narrowed the range of viable diplomatic and military options. Inversely, technological warfare along with casualty aversion can facilitate support for specific types of war such as air war.

Table 4.2: General Casualty Aversion Priorities

	Civilians	Soldiers
One's own country	1	2
One's major enemy	3	4

Note: 1=highest security priority, 4=lowest security priority in the quest for bloodless war.
(Source: Mandel, 2004, pp. 11-16)

Technological change also created a centrality of information warfare capable of creating propaganda and deception operations for strategic interest and perception management (MacDonald, 2006; Webster, 2003). Thus, in relation to the legitimacy of

NATO's military interventions in the Yugoslav wars, it is useful to contextualize the changing nature of war after the end of the Cold War with continuity and discontinuity.

Critics of US Policy over Bosnia and Kosovo

Criticisms of US policy over Bosnia and Kosovo are characterized by two different approaches. The first argues that US and NATO interventions were too late and not aggressive enough for humanitarian crises, and that the US had a responsibility to do something more. The second position challenges the principle of humanitarian intervention and the way the interventions were exercised. Here, the second approach will be dealt with in more detail since that position is contrasted with US governmental and military official discourse.

First, some critics challenge the notion of humanitarian intervention. They focus on contradictions in US and NATO's policy framework over Bosnia and Kosovo by deconstructing the principle and methods rhetorically guided humanitarian intervention (Chomsky, 1999). These critics argue that external military action cannot do good to the victims of the conflict, and indeed may do harm, worsening the crisis. In his *Strategy of Deception*, Virilio (1999) argues that NATO-led military intervention signaled a total war in which human rights and technological warfare were articulated and the victims of military conflict were inverted from the traditional warfare to a total war. According to Virilio, removing negotiability between antagonistic sides is among the most dangerous ramifications and leads to the worst consequences of the humanitarian war:

> When you claim to prosecute a war in the name of 'human rights'–a humanitarian war– you deprive yourself of the possibility of negotiating a cessation of hostilities with your enemy. If the enemy is a torturer, *the enemy of the human race*, there is no alterative but the extremes of *total war* and unconditional surrender. We can see, then, that this new

> logic of war leads, like the aero-spatial strategy which underpins it, to the uncontrolled "escalation" condemned by theorists of international geopolitics (Virilio, 1999, pp. 8-9).

The demonization and personalization of one's major enemy, especially the leader figure, are not new. But humanitarian militarism, according to Chomsky (1999), has the dangerous implications for military intervention into another sovereignty in modern global democracy because the rhetorical construction of humanitarianism tended to hide the US government's propaganda to promote military intervention.

Second, some critics argue that the misinformation (and disinformation) in estimates of civilian and military casualties were used to support military intervention in both cases. Specifically, from the initial period of the NATO intervention in Bosnia, 250,000 Bosnians and Herzegovinans were reportedly estimated to be killed. Approximately 1,325,000 refugees and exiles occurred during the population transfer of Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, exercised by the Serbs. However, the reported number of the casualties in the war was reduced to 100,000 after the war (Tabeau and Bijak, 2005). The Kosovo case shows that the monthly rate of mortality, missing individuals, and civilian casualties was dramatically increased up to more than five times in the first month of NATO military intervention (Spiegel & Salama, 2000). Based on the increase in war-related deaths, Chomsky (1999) challenges the conception and practical effectiveness of the military intervention in defense of the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo in 1999.

A third criticism centers on the self-interest underlying "well-intended" principles and values, pointing out the consistent US and Western policy for military purposes. Geopolitically, the US and NATO policy over Yugoslavia was appraised under the reconstruction of US and Western hegemony with European integration (Johnstone, 2000,

2002; Waller & Gökay, 2001). In this perspective, NATO expansionism led to the intervention over Kosovo (Blackburn, 1999). There are also criticisms of US policy based on economic motivations. Parenti (2000) maintains that NATO's military interventions over Bosnia and Kosovo sought to create a profitable capitalist economy within the former socialist state. Based on his observations on the US policy drive for privatization of the economy and subsequent "third worldization" of the Balkans, he argues that seeking to include the former Yugoslavia into the neoliberal economic order was consistent with US policy dealing with the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Finally, Hardt and Negri (2004) view the post-Cold War era as the "global state of war." The first Gulf War, US and NATO interventions into the former Yugoslavia, and US military actions after the September 11 attacks shift the character of war from defense to security. Borrowing Foucault's notion of biopower, they emphasize the permeation of war in social life: "War, in other words, becomes the general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of domination, whether or not bloodshed is involved. War has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of all life" (2004, p. 13). According to them, war became not an exceptional moment in international relations but a pervasive source for governing the global society as well as the domestic. From these theories, we can safely devise that the Bosnian War and Kosovo Conflict were not isolated incidences of the overreach of superpower military force, but part of a new ideological system that seeks to involve itself in civil conflicts for the purpose of ensuring political and economic stability at home.

CHAPTER 5

THE BOSNIAN WAR AND GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCOURSES IN THE MAINSTREAM US MEDIA

The Construction of Global Responsibility Discourses

NATO's first military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia), code-named Operation Deliberate Force, occurred between August 30 and September 20, 1995. The intervention did not provoke serious debate over its legality, given NATO's collaboration with the UN. NATO's use of military force was recognized as "legitimate violence," backing up UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) forces. In reaction to a series of Bosnian Serb invasions into the safe havens of Gorazde and Zepa and the shelling of Srebrenica in July 1995, an international crisis meeting, chaired by UK Prime Minister Major, concluded that NATO would replace the UN as the decision-making authority for potential use of air power (Kaufman, 2002, p. 119). Thus, the "legitimate" use of NATO force in Bosnia in 1995 was different from its second intervention in defense of the people of Kosovo in 1999, when the Alliance did not acquire the UN Security Council's authorization. The legal legitimation of military force–the launching of air strikes against the Bosnian Serb Army of the Republic of Srpska on August 30, 1995–was not the most imminent issue discussed in the US media. Rather, the US media focused on issues such as how the accountability for the crisis was attributed to the involved Bosnian parties, NATO and international institutions, which responsibilities were assumed by whom, the manner in which the intervention was conducted, and eventually how the results of the war were appropriated by the United States, particularly in relation to the UN.

The Bosnian War is a case that combined non-interventionary and interventionary (discursive) practices in terms of US governmental policy, over a three-and-a-half-year

period. Unlike European NATO member states that held peacekeeping roles in the first three years of the Bosnian War, the United States refused to deploy its ground troops under the auspices of the UN before NATO's air war against the Republic of Srpska in August 1995. Thus, the first focus of the analysis in this chapter is how the US government's non-intervention was (de)legitimated and how global responsibility discourses were constructed and articulated in the mainstream US media during the non-interventional period–that is, from the European recognition of the conflict in March 1992 to the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, which NATO used as the first reason to invade the Republic of Srpska. The second focus of the analysis is how the military intervention was (de)legitimated and how global responsibility discourses were constructed and negotiated from the aftermath of the Srebrenica event to the end of the NATO war and the conclusion of the Dayton Accord signed by the Bosnian warring factions in December 1995. The final focus is to trace the movement of the responsibility discourses in the two different periods during the Bosnian War.

Two different types of coordinating/competing archetypical global responsibilities were constructed during the pre-intervention and intervention periods in representative mainstream US media, including the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal*. First, humanitarian responsibility and domestic responsibility were divided into arguments for/against the placement of US ground troops. On one hand, the humanitarian responsibility discourse supported US involvement in order to rescue people suffering under state violence, and to end the war. On the other hand, the domestic responsibility discourse suggested that US military intervention, especially in the pre-intervention period, and US casualties were generally not acceptable. Second, although

they are not mutually exclusive, humanitarian responsibility and the responsibility for regional security tended to focus on different roles of the United States. Although they could be contradictory under certain circumstances, humanitarian responsibility and world security responsibility discourses did not necessarily contradict each other. They were often combined in the mainstream US media as they supported US participation in an air war, endorsed the dispatch of European ground troops, and/or blurred the subject of assuming responsibility. But the two different responsibilities generally projected different policy orientations and situated the military intervention with different perspectives. Humanitarian responsibility legitimated military intervention through moralization, while security responsibility was mainly accompanied by rationalization strategies and did not dictate the necessity of the use of force.

In identifying the construction of global responsibility discourses over a three-and-a-half-year period, the mainstream US media's opinion regarding the US government's policy decision of lifting the weapons embargo imposed by the UN in 1991 is one of the key factors to understanding the responsibility discourses disseminated by the mainstream media. European states, especially the United Kingdom and France, pursued peacekeeping by sending their ground troops, whereas the US government argued for lifting the weapons embargo and letting the Bosnian warring parties fight each other. The US argument for lifting the embargo was based on the disadvantage of the Bosnian government in the battles over the Bosnian Serb Army, which was expropriated by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) despite the UN arms embargo (Hansen, 2006, p. 117). For the European NATO member states, the lifting of the embargo would threaten the security of their peacekeepers in Bosnia, whereas the US government refused to

dispatch its ground troops to avoid potential US casualties. In this regard, the US media's stance and (in)consistency in terms of humanitarian responsibility can also be examined by analyzing whether the responsibility discourses in the US media promoted the weapons embargo, or (de)legitimated the placement of US ground troops for peacekeeping and the way in which the intervention was carried out.

In the pre-intervention period, the US government's pursuit of embargo lifting was interwoven in the domestic responsibility discourse. Humanitarian responsibility for rescuing civilian victims from the armed conflict was generally viewed as less important than protecting US citizens and soldiers. It was thus clear that the US government's policy regarding the equal warring factions suggested that US responsibility for regional security was more significant than humanitarian responsibility for the victims of the conflict.

Responsibility discourses were also articulated in policy discourse over three periods: pre-intervention, intervention, and post-intervention. The *New York Times* editorials were consistent with US governmental policy concerning lifting the weapons embargo, more so than the *Washington Post* and the *Wall Street Journal*, especially toward the launching of NATO's intervention in Bosnia in the aftermath of the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995. The *Washington Post* leaned toward the archetypical humanitarian responsibility discourse, although the paper often adopted the governmental policy in favor of embargo lifting and the notion of a fair fight between the Bosnian warring factions. The *Wall Street Journal* approached global security as the responsibility of the United States, as the world's only superpower and leader, while criticizing the Clinton administration's inaction during the crisis.

The times at which responsibility claims were promoted and the movements of the claims in the mainstream US media over the course of the Bosnian War imply that strategic interest discourse was more consistent than humanitarian responsibility as the driving force behind the mainstream US media's policy opinion on the war. Humanitarian responsibility discourse prevailed towards and during Operation Deliberate Force, whereas domestic responsibility and strategic interest were promoted towards the end of the military intervention and in the post-military intervention period. The necessity of dispatching US ground troops for peacekeeping was acknowledged near the end of the NATO war in the mainstream US media, but the US media was hesitant or reluctant to embrace the responsibility of peacekeeping or tended to attribute it to European NATO member states that had already dispatched their troops into Bosnia.

When the three newspapers' editorials promoted the humanitarian responsibility of the United States and NATO in the pre-military intervention period, the responsibility claims did not necessarily move into the realm of US political or military intervention. US responsibility was often left out, the subject of assuming the responsibility was often omitted without specifying any specific political actors, and the UN and NATO often appeared to be responsible for political and military means of intervention in the humanitarian disaster. On the contrary, US leadership and its success in Bosnia were consistently dramatized in the mainstream US media toward the end of the Bosnian War in the second half of 1995, when US policy began to shape NATO's policy on Bosnia. The contrast in the mainstream US media between the UN's (failed) responsibility and the US's leading role in the (post)military intervention period may imply that they legitimated the military intervention at the global level but appropriated the consequences

of the intervention at the national level. Accordingly, US involvement in Bosnia was most rationalized in the post-military intervention period, when the US had the leadership to determine NATO policy for global security, not mainly for humanitarian concerns. Accordingly, NATO's use of military force was defined as a success of US leadership and a symbol of US credibility in the mainstream US media.

The three newspapers also corresponded to one another, although they differentiated their ideological positions on Bosnian policy. The ideological spectrum among the three newspapers was narrower in the way in which humanitarian and domestic responsibilities were constructed and strategic interest was interpolated during the direct military interventional period, while it was broader before and after the military intervention periods. The three newspapers challenged the government at times throughout the three-and-a-half-year period of the Bosnian War. But within their editorials, most of the criticism attempted to pressure the Clinton administration to pursue a more active engagement in the crisis to end the war, or a more aggressive policy against the Bosnian Serbs. Even when the administration was open to censure, the blame was embraced in the domestic frame of the political party and press parallelism in principle. Particularly, the *Wall Street Journal* argued for global security responsibility for US credibility and world leadership, characterizing US national interest from a Republican perspective, and the criticism in the newspaper pointed out the failures of the Clinton administration's Bosnian policy.

In the three-and-a-half-year time span of the Bosnian War, the Srebrenica massacre was the watershed for the US government's Bosnian policy, and representative mainstream US newspaper editorials gradually intensified their support for military

intervention in Bosnia after the event. In relation to governmental and military policy, the newspapers mostly supported the governmental policy, especially when NATO initiated air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs' positions, and pressured the government to intervene more actively to rescue the victims of violence and to end the war. The papers supported US policy during the intervention period with minor opposition, while the representations of the conflict were diversified again after the military intervention ended. Table 5.1 shows salient legitimation strategies of the mainstream US media for military intervention in relation to US/NATO's Bosnian policy.

Table 5.1: US Government's Bosnian Policy and Mainstream US Media's Legitimation Strategies

US Government's Policy		Mainstream US Media's Legitimation Strategies		
		New York Times	*Washington Post*	*Wall Street Journal*
Pre-Military Intervention	Mar. 1992–Jun. 1995	Rationalization Moralization	Moralization Rationalization	Rationalization (domestication)
	Jul.–Aug. 1995	Moralization Rationalization	Moralization Rationalization	Rationalization Moralization
Military Intervention		Rationalization Moralization	Moralization Rationalization	Rationalization Moralization
Post-Military Intervention		Rationalization Authorization	Rationalization Authorization	Rationalization Authorization

Pre-Military Intervention Period: Oscillating Moralization and Stable Rationalization

During the pre-intervention period between March 1992 and August 1995, editorials in the three chosen mainstream US newspapers supported moderate US involvement by switching their emphasis between humanitarian responsibility for suffering people in Bosnia, regional security responsibility, NATO's solidarity and credibility, and a combination of the three. However, editorials promoting the US government's active involvement in the crisis did not necessarily urge the government to initiate military action into Bosnia or to send US ground troops for peacekeeping. Domestic responsibility meant the prevention of US causalities in military action, and

went generally unchallenged before July 1995. Humanitarian responsibility discourse was employed in general with juxtaposition with the rationalization of US positions and interests. Despite their opposition in varying degrees to governmental policy orientations in relation to imminent issues, the mainstream newspapers' editorials identified their representation of the crisis in Bosnia within that of the US government, and their remedial suggestions for lifting the embargo remained within the broader political spectrum of national interest and US credibility and leadership.

Although humanitarian responsibility was constructed in the three chosen newspapers' editorials during the pre-military intervention period, the refusal to place US ground troops and non-intervention characterized the period. US responsibility was often promoted in the newspaper's editorials, but that responsibility did not shape particular policy opinions. Rather, within the press discourse, US responsibilities were often obscured in relation to the rationalizations of the US position in both abstract and practical forms until the Srebrenica event in July 1995. In other words, "NATO solidarity" and "American leadership" in Europe were consistent, but both humanitarian and security-oriented responsibilities did not dictate the specific ways in which the United States ought to engage in the development of the war.

There were two different rationales for/against US military intervention in mainstream media discourse involving the Bosnian War. The first rationalization depended upon US national interests in terms of strategic importance, to which US military intervention would be relevant. The first type of rationalization influenced the definition of US humanitarian responsibility over the three-year time span, ranging from no substantial military intervention due to the attribution of responsibility to European

states, to limited US intervention without dispatching US ground troops based on domestic responsibility, to a more active involvement in the war with armed force. The second rationale appeared in terms of the effect of potential military action against the forces of the Bosnian Serbs. The first rationale based on US national interests tended to place more weight on European engagement over the United States, while the second often highlighted the "West," the UN, or no specific actors/subjects as the ones that had to assume the obligation. The second representative rationalization was thus based on the abstract subject of assuming accountability/responsibility for further involvement. The responsibility was at times associated with the weighing of the "dangers" of inaction to those of action. For example, in the *New York Times*: "Western governments have long been paralyzed by the risks of action to save Bosnia. How long will it take them to understand the price of inaction? Meanwhile Bosnia bleeds."[1]

The two rationale orientations may be viewed as an oscillation of US policy direction in terms of moralization. But they can also be understood as a way to secure US national interests, which were the fundamental basis in framing various issues involving the war in a coherent way throughout the development of the Bosnian War. After the end of the Cold War and subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the former Soviet Union's counterpart of NATO, the United States still needed to dominate NATO alliances under its influence over the integration of the European Community and subsequent European Union, without losing US political and military dominance in Europe.

The *New York Times* exemplifies the oscillation of policy opinions in editorials involving the US and NATO's military actions for the first three years of the war. The editorial emphasis shifted from supporting more aggressive US military involvement to

supporting Muslim Bosnians' own defense against the Bosnian Serbs by lifting the embargo in the area. It was clear that the newspaper's construction of humanitarian responsibility was unstable or unfixed in its policy opinions. However, the shifting interpretation of responsibility did not necessarily mean that the position was ambiguous, but that the positions were embedded in the shifting priorities between the two basic discourses of humanitarian responsibility and national interest, depending on the situation at a given period. In other words, the legitimation of, and challenge to NATO's potential military intervention in Bosnia changed depending on the focus of the war situation and its position with regard to the changing consensus or dissent in the international power structure, in which US interests were able to be identified. It is worth noting, however, that the *New York Times* editorials over the period consistently argued for technology warfare using air strikes over Serbian positions, while it continued to oppose the deployment of US ground troops in Bosnia.

The following two *New York Times* editorials illustrate the attribution of accountability and responsibility in terms of subjects/actors in humanitarian responsibility discourse, including the UN's (ir)responsibility and failure to assume responsibility, and the necessity of lifting the embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia. First, the moral evaluations of "irresponsibility" and the moral abstraction of "shame" were ascribed to the West and the UN without singling out the United States, throughout the year 1992:

> Now there's not even the pretense of a U.N. presence in Bosnia. And the world's collective irresponsibility stands exposed as nakedly as the Milosevic aggression. President Bush, proud leader of the free world, had no trouble deciding that Iraq's aggression against Kuwait should not stand. He assembled a global coalition to force

> withdrawal. Why not a new one now? […] In our time the word is shame (Editorial. (1992, May 21). Shame in our time, in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A28).

In the first half of 1995, *New York Times* editorials focused on whether it was in the nation's interest to dispatch ground troops to Bosnia. The *New York Times* argued, in an editorial entitled "Bosnia: Not America's War," that sending off ground troops to Bosnia would not necessarily strengthen potential US interests:

> The real issue in Bosnia is not one of the United States living up to its NATO responsibilities nor of continued American engagement in European security. Neither of those is in any doubt. The relevant question is whether the United States has a strong enough interest in the outcome of the Bosnian conflict to risk its troops in ground combat. In the view of this page, it does not. (Editorial. (1995, June 3). Bosnia: Not America's war. *New York Times*, p. A18).

When comparing the two editorials, it can be seen that the significance of humanitarian responsibility was defined in terms of US national interests within three years. The affirmation that there was no significant US interest in engaging in the Balkan crisis, as shown in the 1995 quote, stands in contrast to the 1992 quote in terms of moral evaluations combined with narrativization that demanded humanitarian responsibility. But, when it comes to the subject of assuming irresponsibility and responsibility, the subject of attribution is critical. Abstract (ir)responsibility was attributed to the UN and the "international community" in the first editorial, whereas the latter one resisted attributing a new responsibility to the concrete subject that is the United States; the responsibility would have subsequently urged the United States to deploy its ground troops in the Bosnian War. Consequently, the value judgment of humanitarian responsibility was at times modified and disabled. It can thus be argued that the possibility of deployment of US ground troops eclipsed the discourse of humanitarian

responsibility as a priority, due to US domestic responsibilities. The *New York Times* editorial on June 3, 1995, continues: "At several points in recent history, special circumstances have invested the fate of the Balkans with worldwide significance. Today, no such circumstances prevail. The United States has no interest beyond a humanitarian one in the outcome of Bosnia's bloody three-year war."[2] The most crucial criteria of foreign policy in the *New York Times* editorial was that US placement of ground troops was not necessary since, unlike the First World War, the Balkan situation did not affect the global order. As shown in the editorial on June 3, 1995, humanitarian concerns were a less important, risky task for US military personnel to be deployed. In this regard, rationalization was not necessarily used in supporting either military intervention or a deeper engagement in the Bosnian War but instead focused on the potential effects of such action, especially in the face of sacrificing domestic responsibilities by dispatching US ground troops.

During the pre-intervention period, rationalization and moralization were among the most salient features in the *New York Times* editorials. The rationalization of opposition to deeper US engagement was supported by a narrative of historical explanation: the ethnic hatred and equal warring factions. In June and July 1995, before the military intervention, the *New York Times* suggested two major objectives of US involvement: humanitarian protection and NATO solidarity. The *New York Times* editorial on June 3, 1995, stating that "When Austria-Hungary and czarist Russia wrestled for influence in the Balkans early in this century, nationalist quarrels there sparked the First World War," was reflective of the fact that Yugoslavia was no longer as useful to US interests as it was with the end of the Cold War. The *New York Times*

editorial exemplifies the domestication of the foreign crisis by judging its usefulness. Thus, the domestication of the Bosnian War as epitomized in the editorial on June 3, 1995, was the main factor in justifying the oscillation of US policy orientation despite its supporting Western Europe's responsibility for the victims of the conflict, as exemplified in the editorials in 1992. Furthermore, it is clear that the deployment of US ground troops was the key issue not only in the *New York Times*, but also in the other two newspapers.

In order to contextualize the definition of US national interest, it is useful to first look at how the subject of taking responsibility was defined in the media. The devaluation of the UN's potential roles and claims of the UN's limitations in regional conflicts can be part of the rationalization of US foreign policy on Bosnia. For example, a *New York Times* editorial on June 26, 1995, highlighted the situation that the UN did not have enough resources, including peacekeeping forces, and national interests were the crucial criterion for intervening in the international conflict.[3] Dispatching no US ground troops in Bosnia was the biggest issue in terms of US policy. Continued placement of ground troops for peacekeeping by European states was a narrative naturalized by repetition.[4]

The policy positions of lifting the embargo and adopting air strikes were also related to the US government's refusal to deploy US ground troops in Bosnia, where US interests were not solid enough to cause avoidable US casualties. The lifting of the embargo was a consistent discourse not only in the US government but also in the mainstream US media. For example, the *New York Times* justified the lifting of the weapons embargo, stating that the Bosnian government could better defend itself.[5] The suggested remedial means would confirm that US national interests rather than

humanitarian responsibility should be the priority. The critical issue was then how deeply the United States ought to be engaged in the Bosnian War. Accordingly, during the pre-intervention period, the *New York Times* opposed the Clinton administration's approach of sending US troops to participate in the reposition process of the UN peacekeeping forces as a response to NATO's request, which would mean deeper US engagement in the military intervention in Bosnia and with respect to the United States' role in the crisis.[6] The direct association of the opposition to deploy US ground troops with US national interests was not only firmly fixed in the *New York Times* editorials, but also in the other two newspapers.

The *Washington Post*'s position toward the Bosnian crisis was also ambiguous although it used humanitarian responsibility discourse more frequently than the other two newspapers, especially during the time immediately before and after the Srebrenica massacre and subsequent developments in the area, by directly and indirectly addressing the massacre in several editorials in mid-July. Until July 18, 1995, the newspaper's editorials argued that moderate US engagement in Bosnia was the best choice, instead of not doing anything or fully participating in the conflict.[7]

What characterizes the *Washington Post* editorials in the pre-military intervention period is moral evaluation. Moralization is based on moral values rather than authority or instrumental reasoning. Specifically, the newspaper used moral evaluation by defining foreign inaction in response to Serbian atrocities as cause for "shame" and "humiliation." Based on responsibility discourse, the newspaper argued for NATO air strikes in the pre-intervention period.

> THE EVENTS OF the weekend in Gorazde could yet become a defining point of the post-Cold War era. At this refugee-swollen, mostly Muslim town in eastern Bosnia, the

> idea of international responsibility is reeling under successive devastating blows. A year ago the United Nations had designated Gorazde a "safe area." Nonetheless, Bosnia's Serbs attacked. A laggard United Nations finally called in two NATO air strikes. […] Pretending to accept it, the Serbs at once violated it. And incredibly, the U.N. did nothing, NATO did nothing and the United States did nothing. […] The fate of Gorazde, designated a safe area by the United Nations and then allowed to be overrun, will be remembered as a source of international shame (Editorial. (1994, April 19). The Bosnia disaster. *Washington Post*, p. A14).

The *Wall Street Journal* editorials' two most distinctive characteristics in the pre-military intervention period during the Bosnian War were global security responsibility as world police and the domestication of President Clinton's policy on Bosnia. The paper criticized the Clinton administration's domestication of the Bosnian War and subsequent US involvement in the war.[8] Considering its support of lifting the arms embargo in the former Yugoslav territories, the *Wall Street Journal*'s criticism of the President's domestication of the Balkan crisis may have implied opposition to US participation in the forthcoming military intervention in Bosnia. But this did not suggest that the newspaper supported isolationism. Rather, US leadership was understood as being called for by Europe, and that the United States' failure was related to its world hegemony, as it demonstrated poor leadership before the development of the Srebrenica event. But there still remains the question of whether the newspaper's policy opinion contributed to humanitarian responsibility since the opinion was consistently based on the responsibility of the United States for world security, as the only superpower. The following editorial shows the security and domestic responsibilities of the United States, constructed in the paper:

> Creating a US foreign policy reflecting the responsibilities of the world's only superpower is a job for both parties, but the immediate task is getting this presidency to

> act on the basis of something larger than its pollster's printouts. It could do worse than send Dave Gergen on a quiet tour to hear out serious people in Europe and Asia. Their level of concern is deepening (Editorial. (1994, June 29). America's foreign affairs. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A16).

During the earlier period of the recognition of the crisis in Bosnia since March 1992, the three newspapers treated the warring factions as open to negotiation, accountable, and responsible for resolving political tensions, although the Bosnian Serbs were held most accountable. For example, the *Washington Post* took a careful, eclectic position regarding the three groups involved in the crisis–(Bosnian) Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnian Croatians: "The American government is leading a campaign to isolate and punish Serbia diplomatically. This is not easy for Washington, because Serbia is an old and true friend of the United States, having fought bravely on the American side–the democratic side–in two world wars."[9] But the binary opposition of the three warring factions began to appear with the development of the war. Among others, the Srebrenica massacre consolidated the war narrative against the Army of the Republic of Srpska.

The atrocities in the Srebrenica massacre by the Bosnian Serbs led to a significant change in US Bosnian policy "from a passive advocacy of 'lift and strike' to an active policy," epitomized by US initiative in the Dayton Accord and the deployment of US ground troops (Hansen, 2006, p. 33). Thus, taking a closer look at the mainstream US newspapers' editorials covering the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 provides a comparative element to the Kosovo Conflict in identifying the formation and shift of the US media's construction of global responsibility, and in observing the evaluations of the other involved actors. Indeed, when the UN and NATO failed to protect the Bosnians before August 1995, partial accountability was attributed to the UN or Europe, instead of

US policies or personnel. During the Srebrenica events, the failure to protect the safe area of Srebrenica was mostly attributed to the failure of the UN in the mainstream US media. This is an illuminating contrast to the framing of US success in Bosnia since the end of the intervention period when the Dayton Agreement was concluded after NATO's war against the Republic of Srpska.

Regarding the Srebrenica event, the mainstream US media began to support the government's policy with regards to Bosnia. For instance, the *New York Times* argued that "However flawed the President's record has been on other aspects of the Bosnian crisis, he deserves credit for avoiding American combat fatalities. It would be reckless to jeopardize that achievement now in a long-shot bid to halt the Bosnian Serbs from consolidating their stronghold in eastern Bosnia."[10] The *New York Times* did not support greater US military involvement, but rather promoted UN's withdrawal from Bosnia, and the lifting of the UN arms embargo, which would mean the defense of Bosnia by the Bosnian government itself. A *New York Times* editorial on July 26, 1995, supported a US unilateral arms embargo lifting, right after the Senate's adoption of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995 that was introduced in the Senate on January 4, 1995.[11] Even though the bill was vetoed by President Clinton on August 11 (Hansen, 2006, p. 133), the editorial on July 26, 1995 clearly shows the *New York Times*' position–supporting US unilateralism for issues related to lifting the UN arms embargo. In an editorial on July 27, entitled "Let Bosnia Defend Itself," the *New York Times* supported US unilateral arms embargo lifting and subsequent air strikes in Bosnia. That policy orientation accelerated the *New York Times* policy opinion in support of lifting the embargo and for placing US leadership over European NATO members' policy.[12]

Toward the launch of the military intervention, the *New York Times* supported the US government initiative for a peace plan combined with the partition of Bosnia. The 51-49 Peace Plan, also known as the American Peace Plan, was an eclectic plan, considering acceptability from each side in Bosnia rather than focusing on accountability or responsibility. The compromise was supported in the *New York Times*, although the paper represented Muslim Bosnians as the main victim of the war.[13]

The *Washington Post* was distinct in using moral evaluations and comparisons in the legitimation of active US involvement in Bosnia after the Srebrenica event. NATO's air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs were evaluated as "morally vital."[14] The newspaper was critical of the UN, NATO, and US government's previous inaction, associating them with shame and pity, and argued for prospective responsibility of various actors for the Bosnia crisis. By comparing Bosnian suffering with Western inaction, the newspaper demanded US action:

> Typically, one government's hesitations were used to justify another's. The president had further opportunity to be more than mostly a spectator at Bosnia's expiring. He was invited to join allies in sending ground troops to set up "safe areas" for Bosnian Muslims. He declined, and now, without acknowledging the American contribution to the outcome, claims the initiative has been ineffective. Bosnia has held up the cruelest of mirrors to the world (Editorial. (1993, July 23). The shame of Bosnia," *Washington Post*, p. A22).

Humanitarian responsibility constructed in the *Washington Post* was also associated with national interests and regional stability discourse, however. The accountability for failing to protect the victims of the crisis was attributed to the UN, while the remedial policy opinion was lifting of the weapons embargo and preventing escalation of the war in the Balkans:

> The call is intensifying for a lifting, unilateral if necessary, of the arms embargo on Bosnia–the embargo bears most heavily on the Muslim-led government. But this only becomes plausible if it is done in a way that eases the extra risks placed upon the nations furnishing peacekeepers, of which the United States is conspicuously not one (Editorial. (1993, July 13). The meaning of Srebrenica. *Washington Post*, p. A24).

The representation of the event as the UN's failure to prevent the atrocities in the *Washington Post* editorials was in contrast with the identification of the United States as the leader in the successful performance toward the Dayton Accord following the military intervention. Thus, it is an intriguing point that, when humanitarian responsibility discourse through retrospective moral evaluations prevailed and accountability was given to the Bosnian Serb faction, the newspaper attributed the accountability and responsibility for protecting Muslims in the Srebrenica event to the UN, not the United States.[15] The newspaper attributed part of the accountability of the event to the UN, but the remedial policy opinion was for the United States to lift the embargo even in a unilateral way, if necessary: "A further and perhaps ultimate humiliation has now overtaken the United Nations force supposedly protecting Bosnia."[16]

The *Wall Street Journal* appropriated the Srebrenica massacre based upon the frames of national interests and global security and emphasized the US hegemonic position. Thus, the newspaper's approach was closer to the US strategic position in the reaction to the events. The domestication strategy directly opposed active US military involvement. Moral evaluation was also articulated in the *Wall Street Journal*, although it was less salient than in the other two newspapers. For instance, the atrocities were contrasted to civilization.[17] The gendered representation of the events in the *Wall Street Journal* editorial on July 17 and 27, 1995 also corresponded to its consistent support for the lifting of the arms embargo.[18] The gendered violence and US policy orientations

clarified not only Bosnian Serbs' masculinity, but also projected US masculinity, which characterized a typical war narrative. The rationalization and moral evaluation did not support the deployment of US ground troops, however.[19] The *Wall Street Journal* case shows that moralization did not accompany US military intervention: "The Serb rape of Bosnia is demonstrating what can happen when the United States stands back from world events. So it's all the more troubling that the new Republican Congress is moving against two of the best means available to project American power and values in the world."[21]

Implicitly suggesting US unilateralism in Bosnian policy, the *Wall Street Journal* editorials intensively articulated the Bosnian crisis in a global security perspective, rather than focusing on humanitarian accountability and responsibility surrounding the Srebrenica massacre and the later NATO's air war against the Bosnian Serbs.[22] Accordingly, the newspaper supported the US Senate's vote for lifting the embargo in July 1995, while criticizing the Clinton administration's lack of leadership over Europe:

> Doubtless many in Europe will react to the decision with horror and comfort themselves with the hope of a successful Clinton veto. They will cite the possible escalation of the war (as if the collapse of U.N. "safe areas" were not itself an escalation), and they will panic about a possible new influx of refugees (as if Europeans had already done enough for Bosnians already). They will accuse Senators of betraying American allies who have troops in Bosnia, despite the fact that the resolution calls for the arms embargo to end after the withdrawal of Unprofor or within 12 weeks of a request by Bosnia. Talk of betrayal is hardly appropriate here in any case since the continuation of the arms embargo is itself a graphic betrayal of the international principles that all states are supposed to support (Editorial. (1995, July 27). The Senate's embargo vote. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A10).

Military Intervention Period: Diplomacy with Force

"Diplomacy with Force" was a recurring representation of US foreign policy associating the use of force with political solutions of diplomacy and authority which

democracy can provide. Accommodating the US government's discursive strategy to translate US Bosnian policy into diplomacy with force, mainstream US media legitimated NATO's air war against the Republic of Srpska using moral evaluation and rationalization based on its effectiveness over the three-week period of the internationalized conflict: "Mr. Holbrooke himself has said repeatedly that NATO's bombing campaign is neither related to nor necessary for his diplomatic mission. But the bombs have probably softened the Serbs' negotiating stance and have surely given the Muslims greater confidence in the trustworthiness of international commitments."[23]

The typical legitimation of the NATO war in the mainstream US media was grounded in humanitarian responsibility as shown in a *New York Times* editorial: "a way to try to protect civilians in Sarajevo and bring the Bosnian Serbs into peace talks based on the 51-49 formula. Surprisingly quickly, both of those objectives now seem within reach."[24] The responsibility discourse culminated in US newspapers during the military intervention period. The *Washington Post* and *Wall Street Journal*, compared to the *New York Times,* were more supportive of military action in their editorials during Operation Deliberate Force between August 30 and September 20 of 1995. The governmental discourse of diplomacy with force was embraced by the three newspapers not only within the former Yugoslav region, but also in terms of global security in a broader sense. Thus, the rationalization of NATO's use of force was a second legitimation strategy in the mainstream US media.

In the relatively short period of the operation compared to its counterpart in 1999, the *New York Times* published 5 editorials about the Bosnian War during the military intervention period, and its editorials over the same period consistently legitimated the

military intervention based on two objectives: most of all, to protect civilians, especially Muslims, and, secondly, to compel Bosnian Serbs to agree to diplomatic solutions.[25] At the same time, the newspaper editorials warned the US government not to take the risk of broader fighting and engagement in the conflict.[26] In other words, the mainstream US media accepted and promoted US and NATO credibility as a cause of the war, and backed up US-led peace plan for their credibility, instead of prioritizing humanitarian responsibility. Thus, support for the NATO air war did not imply support for US ground troop placement. Instead, the media argued later that Europeans could take care of further military intervention if necessary.[27] The double standard between Bosnian civilians and US soldiers was also based on domestic responsibility discourse involving potential US casualties.

The ambiguousness of humanitarian responsibility in the mainstream US media could be related to the ambiguity of Clinton's policy over the period. Although the *New York Times* pressured the US government to react in a more active way, policy opinion supporting military intervention had been less consistent. It can thus be inferred that the *New York Times* did not argue for sending US ground troops to Bosnia. In this sense, the newspaper's policy opinion of arguing for expanding UK and French ground troops in Bosnia had been problematic, since their existing ground troops might not have necessarily strengthened the US position to not send ground troops. On the contrary, the *New York Times*' support for lifting the embargo in Bosnia had been consistent. The parallelism between the US government and the *New York Times* was salient, while the *Wall Street Journal* challenged the governmental agendas, but without challenging a broader spectrum of US national interests.

The association of global responsibility based on humanitarian responsibility and domestic responsibility grounded in national interest may imply that NATO's credibility was the priority in Bosnia-related policy opinions of the *New York Times*. Particularly, a newspaper editorial on August 31, 1995, defined the objectives of the NATO bombing as the establishment of Western military credibility to support the US-led diplomatic initiative.[29] The editorial suggested that the bombing would assure the Bosnian government that the West was sympathetic to their suffering, while showing the West's resolution to force Bosnian Serb leaders to accept the US-led peace proposal, without a deeper involvement into the crisis.[30]

Toward the end of the NATO air war, the *New York Times* attributed a sign of the development of the situation to not only NATO's military engagement, but also the balancing (self-defense) of military power between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government.[31] The ethnic hatred themes were removed from the *New York Times* editorials, so that the Serbian leader who backed up the Bosnian Serbs, Milosevic, was portrayed as the oppressive, but negotiable, leader. The evaluation of the leader figure in the war narrative plays a key role in mobilizing political and public consent and animosity toward the enemy by suggesting a specific identity of the enemy and the worthy victim. Thus the frame of the US contributions to peace in the region corresponded to the more neutral approaches to the "enemy" leader, unlike the pre-military intervention period in 1995 or the (pre)military intervention periods of the Kosovo Conflict in 1999.

The *New York Times*' placing of "American diplomatic efforts" above the potential effects of the air war was a noticeable emphasis during the NATO war.[32]

Although the peace plan was perceived as not easily obtained, it was represented as a positive step for US leadership that was going developing in Bosnia. Accordingly, toward the end of the bombing on September 20, 1995, the *New York Times* put forward concerns about the feasibility of continuing the peace talks, since the Bosnian government and Croatian allies would decide to retaliate against the Bosnian Serbs for the earlier violence. Although the *New York Times* was sympathetic toward the Bosnian government, the editorial showed a shift of its concerns, mainly from Bosnian Serb aggression and Serbia's deeper engagement in the war to the possibility of the Bosnian government's military retaliation against the Bosnian Serbs, with the changing military situation in which the Bosnian government and Croatian allies gained military advantage over the Bosnian Serbs under NATO's military intervention.[33]

The *New York Times* editorials showed several important ways to legitimate the military intervention through moralization, rationalization, and ambiguity. First, the moralization of the NATO-led air strikes, characterized by US leadership, was to protect Bosnians. Moralization was also combined with a rationalization for US diplomatic efforts to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the peace talks initiated by the United States. Second, rationalization was deployed to emphasize the United States' contribution to the establishment of peace. The *New York Times* editorials during the bombings most implicitly expressed the United States' control over the development of the war and ending the war: the continuous repetitions of the 51-49 proposal and "American-brokered peace talks."[34] This explicit emphasis on US achievements seemed to embrace regaining US supremacy from the Atlantic alliances. This appraisal of US diplomacy was also be related to European failures, although it was not emphasized in the *New York Times*

editorials during the air war. This justification also continued to be used toward the Dayton Accord after the end of the direct military action.

Second, the disappearance of the demonization of the (Bosnian) Serbs, based on binary opposition, was distinctive toward the end of the military intervention period, while the victim frame of the Bosnian Muslims and their government continued to be used. Thus, the *New York Times* advised the US government to not be more deeply involved in the war.[35] This may be interpreted as a strategy to emphasize the US lead for diplomacy, and is reflective of the fact that the time span of the use of force in the military action was relatively shorter than its Kosovo counterpart.

The legitimation of the NATO war did not mean more active US involvement in the Bosnian War, however. A third distinctive justification was treating issues with ambiguity. Despite the newspaper's humanitarian concerns about the Bosnian crisis, active involvement was not justified due to a lack of US national strategic interests. The military conflict was defined in the *New York Times* editorials as "Bosnia's war," and a limited intervention rather than an opened, full military engagement was promoted in the newspaper:[36]

> Mr. Clinton may gain some political credit for looking more decisive on Bosnia. But he must be careful not to be drawn more deeply into the conflict. There is a thin but clear line between using military force to support diplomacy when it has a chance of success and using force to try to press a military solution where there is not an essential American security interest. Mr. Clinton must be vigilant not to cross it (Editorial. (1995, Aug 31). Force and diplomacy in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A24).

The *Washington Post* legitimated NATO's air war by using moral evaluations combined with rationalization and naturalization during the military intervention period. Emphasizing that action was belated, the newspaper focused on the effectiveness of

diplomatic negotiations backed up by military force. Moralization combined with naturalization characterized the military intervention against Bosnian Serb positions. By using moral evaluation such as "shame" for retrospective responsibility, the newspaper's editorial on August 31, 1995, morally evaluated NATO's intervention: "Finally, after 3 1/2 years of war, NATO planes and U.N. ground troops have replied with heavy and suitable force to a deadly attack seen as coming from the Bosnian Serbs. This does not erase the abiding shame of past refusals to honor promises of reprisal. But it sets a standard for allied performance now."[37]

First of all, the *Washington Post* identified NATO's bombing as diplomacy with force in that the use of force backed up the means to resolve the problems in the crisis. The military intervention against the Bosnian Serbs was even more justified as a belated, but remedial, one. Accordingly, the efforts were praised, but the previous inaction was morally evaluated as "the abiding shame of past refusals."[38] Another editorial a week later also indicated that "It was enough to make you wonder whether the alliance's air strikes last week had been a one-time break in a shamefully wobbly pattern or the mark of a new readiness to back up diplomacy with force."[39] By de-legitimating UN and NATO's previous inaction as morally inferior, the newspaper associated the legitimation of the use of force with diplomatic means. Comparisons in discourse as analogy between action and inaction also functioned to strengthen the legitimation of the use of force. The moral evaluation and comparison of the US inaction involving the Bosnian crisis legitimated the United States and NATO's ongoing military actions in Bosnia. The construction of the urgency of US and NATO action, combined with the "shame" of the

past inaction, further justified NATO's military action in the sense that previous inaction had degraded US leadership and its credibility.

The *Washington Post*'s moral evaluations of the West provided a means to stress moral evaluations of other political actors including not only (Bosnian) Serb leaders but also Russia: "The fact remains that the Russians, now loudly protesting the NATO bombardment, showed no concern for victims of the Serbs' own copious misdeeds. They can do the most for their Serb friends by focusing them on the talks the Americans have opened up in Geneva."[40] Russia was represented as supporting the Bosnian Serbs, which may have facilitated alluding to anticommunism, and in return legitimated NATO's military action.[41] Thus, moralization was also associated with the rationalization of the US hegemonic position in the newspaper.

The *Wall Street Journal* published only one editorial during the military intervention period, on the day after NATO launched air strikes on August 30, 1995.[42] The newspaper's editorial of August 31, entitled "Count Serbia Out," legitimated NATO military intervention against the Republic of Srpska by combining Bosnian Serb leaders and Serbian President Milosevic. Identifying the Serb leader as the reason for continuing the war, the editorial represented the NATO war as inevitable in moral and strategic terms: "This duplicitous gang once again on Monday lobbed shells into a crowded Sarajevo marketplace, killing 37 people and wounding many more. That provocation left NATO little choice but to react militarily." Rationalization combined with moral evaluation were salient in the editorial on August 31, 1995, in that (Bosnian) Serb leaders, especially Serbian President Milosevic, were presented as unreliable in terms of peace negotiation, since they did not abide with its previous promises for diplomatic

concurrence. Accordingly, the *Wall Street Journal* concluded the editorial by emphasizing the inevitability of the use of military power against the Bosnian Serbs through rationalization and negative moral evaluations of (Bosnian) Serb leader figures:

> There is little point and no moral justice in attempting to find a solution that Belgrade finds acceptable. The US peace initiative should spare no effort to help the Bosnian state regain its sovereignty. That means control over its territory in its current borders without special confederative relationships that could only create new problems later. This may well mean resorting to force, but as the attack on Sarajevo Monday and NATO's response Tuesday show, force is still very much the name of the game in this conflict (Editorial. (1995, August 31). Count Serbia out. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A8).

Post-Military Intervention Period: Global Legitimation of the Military Action and National Appropriation of the Consequences

After the end of NATO's air war against the Republic of Srpska, the US government's Bosnian policy moved on to the final stages, culminating with the Dayton Accord (also known as the Dayton Agreement), formally signed in December 1995. The post-military intervention period from the cease-fire to the Dayton Accord also marks when the mainstream US media emphasized US responsibility for the peace-keeping based on the identification of the change of the Bosnian War situation with diplomatic success. The mainstream US media evaluated the changing war situation as US success. The period also marked a turning point in the mainstream US newspapers in the way they framed US leadership and its credibility within the effectiveness of US diplomacy in accommodating the peace plan. Over the post-military intervention period, all three newspapers appropriated the ending of the war and the launching of the negotiation among the warring factions in Bosnia as resulting from US efforts and success through diplomacy, and also domesticated the issue by comparing the Democrats and Republicans in their position on sending ground troops. The domestication of the issue was regarded

in the mainstream US press as natural in the wrapping up of the military intervention, but the national and global consequences of the domestication should be reviewed in comparison to the previous claims of global responsibility (especially congressional approval of dispatching ground troops, which appeared in many newspaper editorials over the period).[43] Considering the previous positions of US policy makers as well as those of the three chosen newspapers in the (pre)intervention periods, the domestication in the period exemplified the differences in policy opinion on Bosnia presented in the three newspapers.

Humanitarian responsibility continued to be used in arguing for the necessity of peacekeeping. A *New York Times* editorial on October 15, 1995, also supported additional potential air strikes unless an appropriate outcome was reached for the humanitarian issues:

> The emerging settlement offers Bosnia's Muslim leadership less than its supporters once hoped for. But it probably assures Bosnia's political and physical survival and it morally obligates United States forces to participate in a postwar peacekeeping operation to guarantee that all sides live up to their territorial and humanitarian commitments (Editorial. (1995, October 15). Bosnia, after the cease-fire. *New York Times*, Section 4, p. 4).

There then remained a question of how the instability and swinging of humanitarian intentions and relevant policy orientations over the Bosnian War would be explained, especially in terms of assuming responsibility by using military force. The *New York Times* also argued that the Clinton administration should not send US ground troops without Congressional approval, which could be a way of domesticating the given issue.[44] In contrast, the *New York Times* evaluated the road to the Dayton Agreement as a US accomplishment through its leadership over European nations, while US leadership

also implied the failure of Europe in assuming its own responsibility: "By deciding earlier this year to commit its prestige and power to achieving the peace that had for so long eluded European mediators, the Clinton Administration has reclaimed leadership in Atlantic affairs."[45]

The combination of rationalization and moralization, emphasizing US leadership in the Dayton Agreement, along with the claim of "US victory," was salient toward the end of the Bosnian War. Specifically, regarding US ground troops as peacekeepers, not nation builders, after the main bombing, the *New York Times* supported US military participation through the dispatching of US ground troops by way of US leadership of the NATO troops:

> Having brokered a workable Bosnian peace agreement, the United States cannot honorably evade responsibility for enforcing it. America's longstanding interest in European security and its humanitarian interest in halting an appallingly murderous conflict also argue strongly for American military participation in a carefully designed peace enforcement mission (Editorial. (1995, November 28). Making the case on Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A22).

Thus, the portrayal of the US role in the *New York Times* editorials towards the end of the war was that of the reaffirmation of US supremacy in Atlantic relationships through rationalization, by consolidating US military/diplomatic supremacy over Europe and international leadership after the end of the Cold War, especially NATO's as well as President Clinton administration's credibility: "The future of America's military role in Europe, Washington's international leadership and Mr. Clinton's Presidency will all be affected by what happens in Bosnia over the next 12 months. President Clinton has defined a reasonable mission for American troops. He deserves the country's carefully considered support."[46]

As Hansen (2006, p. 144) observes on the Clinton administration's change in policy and approach to Bosnia, the period also marked a shift in policy opinion in the *New York Times* editorials: the disappearance of the ethnic hatred theme and the end of the war as the outcome of US leadership. US leadership was highlighted as "the American drive for a negotiated peace in Bosnia,"[47] while the ethnic hatred theme was generally removed in the discussion of the war, noting that the Bosnian government accepted the peace proposal more than a year ago. However, the victim identity of the Bosnian Muslims still remained, although it blurred the clear-cut roles of good and evil, which had been articulated through humanitarian responsibility in the previous periods.[48]

The changing frames of the representations surrounding the end of the war facilitated the transformation of the United States into an authority comparable to global institutions such as the UN and NATO. The authorization from US leadership and credibility in the post-military intervention period clearly mirrors the emergence of US unilateralism. Although European NATO member states had command of the war, the NATO air war against Serbia in 1999 was also reflective of US unilateralism, in a way similar to US exceptionalism after the September 11 attacks in 2001.

The *Washington Post* showed a similar triumphant appropriation of diplomacy (democracy) with force to that of the *New York Times*, and also juxtaposed the appropriation to the US dilemma in providing its ground troops:

> Recent territorial changes in the war moot a requirement for American ground forces, some say; Americans could be hurt; let the Europeans do it. But such considerations do not obviate an American role. It would be grotesque, having so far left ground duty to its allies for fear of American casualties, if the United States still did not join the allies after a peace agreement had cut the risk way back. Gen. John Shalikashvili, Pentagon military commander, rightly suggested to the Senate that to go casually in and out of a leadership

> role–in an alliance "built around the core of American leadership" –would mock American credibility (Editorial. (1995, September 24). A Bosnia peace force," *Washington Post,* p. C6).

The *Washington Post* editorial on September 24, 1995, epitomized the US contradiction or dilemma in the two key discursive elements, including US leadership and its accomplishment toward the peace plan, and its credibility to further sustain US leadership, specifically by participating in the peacekeeping process and by deploying US ground troops in Bosnia. Embracing US diplomatic success backed up by the use of force created a shift in the newspaper's policy opinion from the previous standpoint of not approving of US ground forces in Bosnia, where few of the US strategic interests had been said to be imminent. Accordingly, the dilemma of sending US ground troops was transferred to a domestic arena concerning the President Clinton's promise to send US ground troops and Republican opposition to doing so.[49]

The *Washington Post* also appropriated the outcomes of the NATO war and the setting up of the Dayton Accord as the result of US leadership: "Thus does President Clinton now cheerfully report that 'America's leadership' is indispensable in this period of post-Cold War transition."[50] In relation to US leadership and credibility, the approval of the Republican-dominated Congress for the deployment of US ground troops for peacekeeping was presented in the newspaper as a critical issue in US Bosnian policy, especially with regard to US credibility.[51]

The *Wall Street Journal* focused on US leadership and world stability in the post-military intervention period. The paper challenged the US government's policy on the division of the Bosnian territory among the warring parties and the placement of US ground troops in Bosnia over that period. The following quote makes clear the *Wall*

Street Journal's policy opinion on the Bosnia War, focusing on a structured US global strategy principle, and security responsibility above humanitarian responsibility in the Bosnian crisis:

> We ask these questions not because we are turning isolationist, but precisely because we believe the American superpower has interests in and responsibilities to peace in the world. Because we fear a successful Serbian aggression would encourage all the wrong forces in the former Soviet Union, we would certainly support a sensible intervention in the Balkans, lifting the arms embargo and using US air power where appropriate. This need not require American ground troops; a few arms and a little training produced dramatic gains for the Croats and Bosnians. Seen objectively, indeed, the mission of the 25,000 Americans would seem to be preserving the fruits of Serbian aggression (Editorial. (1995, October 13). Drifting into Bosnia. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A14).

The US triumphal self-appraisal, especially in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* since the end of the military intervention, may generate a question about the consistency of moral principles in their opinion of the United States' Bosnian policy: their policy opinion before and after US active engagement in diplomacy combined with the use of force, and its policy during the military intervention, especially given the fact that there were no real differences between the new US proposal and what the Bosnian Serb government had suggested before the war. The analysis of the construction of humanitarian responsibility in the post-intervention period reveals that the US media legitimated military action at the global level by claiming global responsibility for the suffering Bosnians in the war, while the consequences of the intervention were nationally appropriated by reaffirming US supremacy. The continued reservation and indecision in the mainstream US media discourse over placing US ground troops to take on peacekeeping duties after the use of military force, brings us to the question of what the popular definition and memory of the NATO intervention over Bosnia would be. Thus, it

can be argued that humanitarian responsibility as a US obligation was only constructed in relation to its national interests and global security frames.

In conclusion, the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* showed more diverse policy opinions in the post-intervention period. The *New York Times* used moralization as prospective responsibility, whereas the *Washington Post* employed moral evaluations for retrospective responsibility, which exemplified "shame." But the *Wall Street Journal* was different from the two other newspapers in that its editorials consistently framed the NATO intervention in terms of the US national interest frame and global security as a US responsibility.

The Articulation of Global Responsibility Discourses

The instability of humanitarian responsibility discourse and the consistency of the national interest frame combined with domestic responsibility in the mainstream US media bring us to question the determinant role of humanitarian responsibility as the principal source of legitimation for the NATO intervention in Bosnia. There then arose three interrelated questions in the mainstream US media discourse, regarding the changing stances involving humanitarian responsibility in terms of US engagement in the Bosnia crisis. First, how and why were humanitarian concerns often marginalized, for example, as shown in the *New York Times* editorial on June 3, 1995? How and why was the priority of national interest compatible when US media supported the use of force over the course of the Bosnian War, grounding this stance on moral evaluations? Second, how could US media justify the presence of European ground troops in Bosnia and yet keep opposing the deployment of US troops in the region during the (pre)intervention periods? Moreover, how can it be justified that the United States was responsible as

postulated in the mainstream US press, as long as it was only responsible when not threatened by the potential for casualties? Finally, if the media changed its position depending on US strategic interest with the development of the war situation, and at the expense of moral evaluations that were promoted mostly when the United States had the initiative to shape NATO's Bosnian policy, how should it be assessed in terms of the intention to comply with humanitarian responsibility? These questions should be related to the articulation of legitimation for military intervention, to broader discursive practices and eventually to potentialities of responsibility claims. I will discuss these issues in the following section and the next chapter by tracing the representations of identity of the involved actors in the development of the Bosnian War. In the section, I will examine the linkage between the construction and articulation of global responsibility by exploring the subject and object of the military intervention as well as the ways in which the war was conducted. To do so, I will first take a closer look at the construction of the identities of involved actors, and second, examine the way in which the military intervention was conducted.

The Construction of the Identities of the Involved Actors

Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs

Humanitarian responsibility discourse in the mainstream US media was constructed in relation to the binary opposition of the leader figure and innocent civilian victims in Bosnia, in the pre-military intervention period. The personalization and demonization of the enemy leader figure was also articulated within humanitarian responsibility discourse in the early stages of the Bosnian War. Western and US irresponsibility for the victims of the ongoing war was focused in the pre-military

intervention period, whereas the negative attitude toward the (Bosnian) Serbs did not necessarily support military action and a more active, continuous engagement in the crisis.

There was a correlation between the period at the beginning of the recognition of the crisis in Bosnia and that at the end of the military intervention. The Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian government were portrayed in the mainstream US press as agents open to negotiation in these periods.[52] During the earlier period of recognition of the crisis in Bosnia in early 1992), the three newspapers treated the warring parties as open to negotiation and accountable for the situation, although the Bosnian Serbs were seen as most responsible. For example, the *Washington Post* took a careful, eclectic position among the three ethnic groups involved in the Bosnian crisis: Serbs, Croatians, and Muslims. Although the *Washington Post* made it clear that the Bosnian Serbs and Serbian Milosevic government held fundamental accountability in deteriorating the situation, prior relationships between the United States and the former Yugoslavia, and domestic violence in the nation, were the two main reasons that the newspaper was eclectic in approaching the crisis. First, the previous alliance of the United States and the former Yugoslavia was described as follows:

> The American government is leading a campaign to isolate and punish Serbia diplomatically. This is not easy for Washington, because Serbia is an old and true friend of the United States, having fought bravely on the American side–the democratic side–in two world wars. One has to wonder whether Serbia's Milosevic, committed as he is to a hysterical militant nationalism, could survive his own restraint–and whether Serbia can survive Mr. Milosevic (Editorial. (1992, April 18). Stop Serbia. *Washington Post,* p. A18).

Second, the tensions in the crisis were associated with domestic agendas in Bosnia in the *Washington Post,* as demonstrated by the following quotes: "essentially

from internal strife in Yugoslavia and not from an external assault across a clear international frontier;"[53] "in the indiscriminate application of a simple and worthy principle–self-determination–in a context vastly complicated by the intermixing of peoples and the accumulation of historic grievances;"[54] "the chance of foreign military intervention–the last hope of the Bosnians–is zero."[55]

Finally, the appropriation of the post-war period as the materialization of US diplomacy with force brought the (Bosnian) Serbs' characterization back to that of a group amenable to negotiation, in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. The increased rationalization and the eventual evaluation of the United States itself as the international authority, and the relatively unstable characterization of the former Yugoslav factions in the mainstream US media, imply that responsibility discourse embraced the inconsistency and potential contradiction of Bosnian warring parties' identity constructions in the mainstream US press throughout the war.

*The United States: The Construction of Leadership and National Interest*s

The portrayal of the United States had been relatively more stable than that of any other comparable actor. Humanitarian responsibility and/or global security responsibility were selectively promoted, based on US strategic interests. After the air strikes in the Bosnian Serb positions, "American leadership" was the most salient discourse in which claims of responsibility in general, and responsibility for suffering Bosnians had been articulated in the mainstream US media. US leadership can be dated back to even before the Vietnam War, to the end of World War II, but it can also be found in the more recently emerging discourse of neoconservatives' national interests combined with US leadership. With the neoconservatives, US leadership implies "American hegemony" not

only through political and economic power, but also through soft power, which can be obtained through the attractiveness of American cultural products and branding the state as a closet model of democracy and "utopia" (Nye, 2004).

The notion of US leadership had not been salient or consistent until toward the end of the air strikes in Bosnian Serb positions. The leadership became focused only after the feasibility of the US-led military intervention was confirmed. In other words, US leadership began to be superimposed with responsibility claims, and to embrace these claims within the discourse of US leadership, after the US peace plan shaped NATO's Bosnian policy following the Srebrenica massacre. A strong link between US leadership and US national interests then could blur the previous explicit claims of responsibility, since the US government and military also had domestic responsibilities to protect US soldiers and personnel engaged in the military intervention, as most strongly suggested in the *Wall Street Journal*.

The construction of "American leadership" in the mainstream US media discourse should be identified in relation not only to the collapse of the Cold War but also in relation to UN and EU interests and strategies in the ordering of the global power structure after the end of the Cold War. The *Washington Post* covered the fiftieth anniversary of the UN by drawing on its frailty and failure at sustaining the global order, and emphasizing US leadership.[56] This means that the United States assumes the responsibility/burden–a coupled duality discourse–on behalf of the failed UN. For example, the *Washington Post* characteristically suggested the UN, instead of the United States and NATO, when the paper assigned peacekeeping duty, and when it assigned blame for the failure in Bosnia. The coupled duality discourse is a developing discourse

that suggested that US leadership was needed in the crisis but ground troops/burden were not.

The UN, European NATO Members, and Russia and China

During the Bosnian War, the UN's inability to stop genocide before NATO's intervention was a consistent theme in the mainstream US media. In line with the fiftieth anniversary of the UN in 1995, the UN's ability to preserve peace was negatively evaluated by the mainstream US newspapers.[57] This would be a paradigm shift that happened after the end of the Cold War in order to promote the hegemonic discourse of global responsibility and security: "But all too soon the confusion and casualties in Somalia and Bosnia underlined the limits of UN peacekeeping. In reality, all major powers, and especially the United States, are unwilling to promote ambitious military operations when vital interests are not visibly at risk–a reality too often blurred in lofty rhetoric."[58] One salient discrepancy was that the *New York Times* had different positions between when a situation was approaching demand for US ground troop placement, and when the placement was more relevant to US interests toward the signing of the Dayton Agreement.

The case of the Bosnian War shows a shift from the UN-based legitimation of the use of force, which can be assembled out of many overarching discourses, including the respect for sovereignty, to the "humanitarian militarism" that the US hegemonic position emphasized while Russia was marginalized (Zizek, 1999). The issues that remain to be examined include not only 1) the selectivity of the claims of responsibility for humanitarian atrocities, but also 2) the movement of legitimation of military intervention from respect of sovereignty to US/NATO unilateralism to US exceptionalism. This could

be further explained in a more explicit articulation of moral legitimation of NATO's 1999 military intervention in defense of the people in Kosovo and the subsequent justifications of the means of the war. It is worth noting Zizek's (1999) argument that Yugoslavian cases were not actually the problem of the new world order, but the result of the problem of the new world order. So, rather than asking whether the military intervention in Bosnia was based on responsibility or US national interests, it would be more productive to ask how the notion of power and domination in the new world order since the end of the Cold War has rearticulated and transformed the notion of global responsibility from the previous legality of military intervention authorized by the UN to a new form of legitimation grounded in moral claims in the new world order.

National Identities and Policy Orientations: A Melodramatic Narrative

One of the contradictory policy opinions in the mainstream US media was found between US responsibility for the victims of the conflict and protection of its own soldiers. The rescue of military personnel during the operation in the NATO war should not be less important. However, comparing the casualties in the Balkan area, a US captain's rescue can be a tool for weighing how the US "balances limited national interests with an acceptable degree of risk."[59]

A second dilemma regarding domestic and global responsibility claims was, for example, that the US role in NATO after the end of the Cold War was highlighted in the three chosen newspapers editorials in terms of the peace agreement of the Dayton Agreement. The authorization of the military intervention by US authority itself was a clarification of US success, through which the United States was distinguished from the European NATO member states, and the European Union's failure which in return

consolidated the presence of the US hegemony and the necessity of its existence and renewal during the post-Cold War period:

> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization brilliantly performed its cold-war assignment of protecting Europe and America against the threat of Soviet nuclear and conventional attack. This week's meetings in Brussels have brought encouraging signs that the alliance is ready to make the kind of adjustments that can give it a future providing for the new security needs of an undivided Europe" (Editorial. (1995, December 7). Stirrings of a new NATO. *New York Times*, p. A30).

The responsibility of the United States was defined as helping to end the war, not helping Bosnian nation building, so much so that the US role in Bosnia was defined through "strategic importance."[60] Eventually, a *New York Times* editorial on December 14, 1995, asserted that despite the partisan differences in the Congress, "the place for American leadership in this case is clear and compelling. Without it, there would not be a Bosnian peace agreement to sign in Paris today. Without it, there would not be a credible military force to help preserve that peace on the ground."[61] It is an intriguing point that the appropriation of the results of NATO's war and the conception of US peacekeeping roles in the post-military intervention period clearly echoes the plot development of melodrama.[62] The mainstream US media's approach to NATO's intervention in Bosnia shows that the meta-narrative was based on US hegemonic strategy in a new world order, appropriating the role arising out of humanitarian responsibility discourse. The melodramatic narrative of the war's representation may have resolved the potential contradiction between what they said and what was done from a policy opinion focused on the strategic position of the United States, not from a position to deal with humanitarian responsibility discourse, which was often promoted in the three newspapers during the military intervention.

The Conduct of the US and NATO Military Intervention

Lifting the Embargo and Dispatching Ground Troops

The mainstream US media's opinions on US Bosnian policy and their construction of global responsibility were not consistent regarding how the US government should approach the crisis and the means of the war–including the deployment of US ground troops–although the *Wall Street Journal* had consistently represented the war within the frame of national interest . The mainstream media's inconsistency regarding the claims of global responsibility in and among them corresponded to the changes of the Clinton administration's policy discourse. The US government argued for lifting the UN imposed embargo on the former Yugoslavia and for a fair fight among the warring factions of Bosnia along with NATO strikes on Bosnian Serb positions before military intervention. The US policy on Bosnia and the mainstream US media's policy opinions in the pre-military intervention period were in contrast with their representation of the United States' identity after the government's change in policy towards leading the NATO air war in the (post)military intervention periods. The US media's criticism of the government's inaction may also have influenced this policy change, as Clinton himself suggested before (Tyler, 1992).

After the US government's Bosnian policy shift, the US media's appropriation of US policy, "diplomacy/democracy with force," was backed up with its dispatch of ground troops for peacekeeping in Bosnia after the cease-fire. The post-intervention period's discourse on the United States' responsibility for world security questions the articulation of humanitarian responsibility during the United States' previous "lift and strike" strategy to accommodate humanitarian responsibility discourse in the pre-intervention period. But the question cannot be dealt with in the analysis of the mainstream US media discourses

themselves. Those should be situated in outside discourses for the intertextuality. It is clear, however, that the mainstream US media's positions also changed with regard to sending US ground troops into Bosnia, over the course of the war. Around the time of the shift of the United States in its Bosnian policy before NATO intervention at the end of August 1995, the *Washington Post* supported the deployment of US ground troops using the moral abstraction of protecting democracy in Europe and the rationalization of US influence, whereas the *Wall Street Journal* opposed potential deployment by attributing the task to the Bosnian warring factions and European allies:

> Until now the American policy mantra has been: no American ground troops. It's foolish to start down a new road without a broad understanding–and it does not yet exist–that this rule may have to be bent. To arm the Muslims in a way that removes the United Nations would require Washington to deliver on its pledge to provide exit escort on the ground–under conditions almost guaranteeing that American troops would be targeted by Serbs and Muslims alike. To leave peacekeepers in place but to shift them into an open combat role would harden the pressure on Americans not merely to supply major new logistical and tactical air support but to share its allies' risks on the ground (Editorial. (1995, July 18). Bosnia: Option B. *Washington Post*, p. A20).

> Whose armies on the ground? / Not ours. No one has ever suggested sending "US boys" from our all-volunteer army to fight on the ground, except of course for the administration's commitment to use troops to extract the peacekeepers in a final Nato surrender. There are currently two large armies already on the ground fighting [...] And we have suggested before that once Western Europe's troops go home, Turkey's tough Nato infantry might be willing and able to train and support the anti-Serb armies already fighting on the ground (Editorial. (1995, August 1). Bomb Brcko. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A14).

The different policy opinions of the three newspapers converged towards support for deploying US peacekeeping forces in the post-military intervention period when the US initiative was consolidated for NATO's Bosnian policy.

Technological Warfare

In the editorials of the three newspapers since the military intervention period, technological warfare was a salient theme in accommodating NATO's air war from a US perspective. By using asymmetrical air power and precision munitions, the new kind of use of force encouraged the mainstream US media to support the intervention. But the way in which US military engagement was suggested in the media clearly reflected the notion of an air war without US casualties. From the US strategy of military intervention, it can be interpreted that US technological supremacy along with its domestic responsibility facilitated a new kinder way in which war can be conducted:

> It is true that air power works in some situations but may only increase civilian casualties, to no good compensating military effect, in others. There is political lunacy, however, in publicly spelling it all out at this moment in the context of the siege of cities in Bosnia. NATO has an encouraging bit of momentum up in Bosnia as a result of finally getting serious about Sarajevo and shooting down some provocative Bosnian Serb aircraft (Editorial. (1994, March 13). A tip to Bosnia's besiegers. *Washington Post*, p. C6).

The articulation of humanitarian responsibility discourse to technological warfare discourse was a salient theme to legitimate potential intervention and the way in which the intervention was conducted in the (pre)military intervention periods. In order to examine the effects and consequences of the articulation and its discursive functionalities of global responsibility in the mainstream US media, it is also necessary to draw on external discourses to see how different discursive elements were used in the (de)legitimation of the NATO intervention in Bosnia in the conduct of the war, which (re)created a pro-military intervention narrative as a whole: lift and strike, no US ground troops, and technological warfare with no US casualties.

Endnotes

[1] Editorial. (1992, November 20). At sea, still, on bleeding Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A30; for another example, "What touching concern for misappropriated emblems–even as whole neighborhoods of Bosnians were being forced to flee for their lives. It is true that the U.N. peacekeepers are too lightly armed to defend against rampaging Serbs. But why is that the only alternative? The larger truth is that the U.N. peacekeepers have become a cover for Western inaction" (Editorial. (1992, May 21). Shame in our time, in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A28). The accountability for inaction and the responsibility for action were attributed to the UN in the editorial. See also other examples: Editorial. (1992, July 15). The well-fed dead in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A20; Editorial. (1992, August 11). Margaret Thatcher as Churchill. *New York Times*, p. A18.

[2] Editorial. (1995, June 3). Bosnia: Not America's war. *New York Time*, p. A18.

[3] Editorial. (1995, June 26). The United Nations at 50. *New York Times*, p. A14.

[4] Editorial. (1995, June 17). Military moves in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A18.

[5] Editorial. (1995, June 17). Military moves in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A18.

[6] Editorial. (1995, June 1). The slippery slope in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A24; Editorial. (1995, June 3). Bosnia: Not America's war. *New York Times*, p. A18; Editorial. (1995, June 9). Rescue in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A28.

[7] Editorial. (1995, July 18). Bosnia: Option B. *Washington Post*, p. A20.

[8] Editorial. (1995, August 15). How about Bosnia's borders?. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A16.

[9] Editorial. (1992, April 18). Stop Serbia. *Washington Post*, p. A18.

[10] Editorial. (1995, July 21). Bosnian exit strategy. *New York Times*, p. A24.

[11] Editorial. (1995, July 26). Buddy, can you spare a steak?. *New York Times*, p. A18.

[12] Editorial. (1995, July 27). Let Bosnia defend itself. *New York Times*, p. A22. See also the following editorial for the Bosnian policy opinion of the *New York Times*: Editorial. (1995, June 17). Military Moves in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A18.

[13] Editorial. (1995, August 18). America's plan for Bosnian peace. *New York Times*, p. A24.

[14] Editorial. (1995, July 28). Sen. Dole's Bosnia policy. *Washington Post*, p. A26.

[15] Editorial. (1995, July 13). The meaning of Srebrenica. *Washington Post*, p. A24.

[16] Editorial. (1995, July 13). The meaning of Srebrenica. *Washington Post*, p. A24.

[17] Editorial. (1995, July 17). Asides: 'A defeat of civilization.' *Wall Street Journal*, A10.

[18] Editorial. (1995, July 17). Projecting America. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A10; Editorial. (1995, July 27). The Senate's embargo vote. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A10.

[19] Editorial. (1995, August 1). Bomb Brcko. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A14.

[21] Editorial. (1995, July 17). Projecting America. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A10. See also editorial. (1995, August 1). Bomb Brcko. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A14. For discussion on US media's gendered representation of violence and military intervention, see Stables (2003).

[22] Editorial. (1995, July 17). Projecting America. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A10; Editorial. (1995, August 1). Bomb Brcko. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A14.

[23] Editorial. (1995, September 14). Avoiding mission creep. *New York Times*, p. A26.

[24] Editorial. (1995, September 2). Glimmers of peace in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A18.

[25] Editorial. (1995, September 9). The Outline of a Bosnia peace. *New York Times*, p. A18; Editorial. (1995, September 14). Avoiding mission creep. *New York Times*, p. A26.

[26] Editorial. (1995, August 31). Force and diplomacy in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A24.

[27] Editorial. (1995, October 10). An honorable Senate career. *New York Times*, p. A22.

[29] Editorial. (1995, August 31). Force and diplomacy in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A24.

[30] Editorial. (1995, August 31). Force and diplomacy in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A24.

[31] Editorial. (1995, September 2). Glimmers of peace in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A18.

[32] Editorial. (1995, September 9). The outline of a Bosnia peace. *New York Times*, p. A18.

[33] Editorial. (1995, September 20). A tipping point in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A20.

[34] Editorial. (1995, August 31). Force and diplomacy in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A24; Editorial. (1995, September 2). Glimmers of peace in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A18; Editorial. (1995, September 20). A tipping point in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A20.

[35] Editorial. (1995, August 31). Force and diplomacy in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A24.

[36] Editorial. (1995, September 14). Avoiding mission creep. *New York Times*, p. A26.

[37] Editorial. (1995, August 31). Answering the Bosnian Serbs. *Washington Post*, p. A22.

[38] Editorial. (1995, August 31). Answering the Bosnian Serbs. *Washington Post*, p. A22.
[39] Editorial. (1995, September 6). The right move. *Washington Post*, p. A20.
[40] Editorial. (1995, September 10). Bosnia: Diplomacy's turn. *Washington Post*, p. C6.
[41] Editorial. (1995, September 13). Russia's misplaced protests. *Washington Post*, p. A18.
[42] Editorial. (1995, August 31). Count Serbia out. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A8.
[43] Editorial. (1995, October 29). Bosnia's murders go on. Washington Post, p. C6; Editrorial. (1995, November 29). Bosnia Opportunity. *Washington Post*, p. A24.
[44] Editorial. (1995, October 20). Congress must vote on Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A34.
[45] Editorial. (1995, November 22). Peace in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A22.
[46] Editorial. (1995, November 28). Making the case on Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A22.
[47] Editorial. (1995, August 18). America's plan for Bosnian peace. *New York Times*, p. A24.
[48] Editorial. (1995, August 18). America's plan for Bosnian peace. *New York Times*, p. A24.
[49] "Even as American diplomacy works to bring the Bosnian conflict to the peace table, the American Congress starts raising doubts about whether American military is whether to make good on President Clinton's pledge to provide half, up to 25,000, of the ground troops considered necessary to police a political settlement for a year Republican challengers have no political obligation to support the president on the troops" (Editorial. (1995, September 24). A Bosnia peace force. *Washington Post*, p. C6).
[50] Editorial. (1995, October 1). Foreign policy week. *Washington Post*, p. C6.
[51] Editorial. (1995, October 29). Bosnia's murders go on. *Washington Post*, p. C6; Editorial. (1995, November 29). Bosnia opportunity. *Washington Post*, p. A24; Editorial. (1995, December 15). For the record. *Washington Post*, p. A24.
[52] For example, see Editorial. (1992, April 18). Stop Serbia. *Washington Post*, p. A18.
[53] Editorial. (1992, May 5). Serbia's aggression. *Washington Post*, p. A24.
[54] Editorial. (1992, May 10). Carving up Bosnia. *Washington Post*, p. C6.
[55] Editorial. (1992, July 23). Victims of the Balkan war. *Washington Post*, p. A30.
[56] Editorial. (1992, October 24). The U.N.: Bosnia's revenge. *Washington Post*, p. A16.
[57] For example, Editorial. (1995, June 26). The United Nations at 50. *New York Times*, p. A14; Editorial. (1992, October 24). The U.N.: Bosnia's revenge. *Washington Post*, p. A16.
[58] Editorial. (1995, June 26). The United Nations at 50. *New York Times*, p. A14.
[59] Editorial. (1995, June 9). Rescue in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A28.
[60] See also, Editorial. (1995, December 11). Keep it simple on Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A16.
[61] Editorial. (1995, December 14). The Republican split on Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. A30.
[62] Editorial. (1995, December 17). Mr. Bildt's responsibility in Bosnia. *New York Times*, p. 4.12.

CHAPTER 6

THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCOURSES IN THE MAINSTREAM US MEDIA

The Continuity and Discontinuity of Bosnia and Kosovo: "Second Bosnia"

The *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal*, in their editorials covering the Kosovo Conflict, generally promoted US involvement in the humanitarian atrocities more actively and early. At times, mainstream US media opposed the US government's policy on the Kosovo Conflict, arguing that the UN, European states, and/or US inaction worsened the humanitarian crisis. But the policy opinions for global responsibility in the mainstream media were not constructed at the expense of domestic responsibility due to potential US casualties, and the discourse of responsibility was generally formed within the boundary of the national interest frame.

As discussed in earlier chapters, the legitimation of military intervention in other sovereign territories in general and the 1999 NATO intervention in defense of the people in Kosovo in this chapter culminated in the mainstream US media discourse when it was made without UN authorization. Responsibility discourses were crucial not only in legitimating NATO violation of the norm of self-determination against Serbia but also in justifying the way in which the war was carried out. But the legitimation and justification were also important because obtaining the support of its military campaign in the Serbian territory from domestic, European, and global societies was critical and because the war was the first NATO military intervention against other nation-state's sovereignty for a civil war within the invaded state.

Given the fact that the military intervention against Serbia was not authorized by the UN Security Council, the definition and articulation of global responsibility,

especially humanitarian responsibility, was even more important in the US media discourse. Two UN Security Council member states, Russia and China, opposed the US, UK, and French-led military intervention against Serbia since the Atlantic Alliances' war was viewed as a Western military expansion in Central Europe. Despite Yugoslavia's autonomous policy under Titoism during the Cold War, Russia also had a political, ethnic interest in Chechnya, as the invaded Serbia had historically been its ally. Moreover, Russian citizens shared a sense of solidarity to their Serbian counterparts. China had also a similar problem in governing Tibet and did not want other states to use Kosovo as a precedent for claiming human rights abuses in China.

In the face of the integration of Western European states, the United States also needed to convince other NATO member states of the necessity of NATO to continue to exist, even after the end of the Cold War when there did not exist a clear notion of the enemy state any longer with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Consequently, the credibility of NATO, in which three permanent member states in the UN Security Council, the United States, United Kingdom, and France participate, was prioritized in the mainstream US media, while the authority of the UN was challenged, and Russia and China were marginalized in legitimating or challenging the new type of military intervention in 1999.

The Construction of Global Responsibility Discourses

Generally, humanitarian responsibility had been a consistent theme that guided the three newspapers during NATO's intervention against Serbia. Along with the pressure for the Serbian acceptance of the Rambouillet peace plan, the basic form of humanitarian responsibility for the victims of the conflict was used as the objective to

protect the Kosovo Albanians from mass deportation–defined as “ethnic cleansing” often with the quotation marks in the three newspapers–by convincing them to return to Kosovo and by removing President Milosevic from the regime. But the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* viewed that the recognition of an independent Kosovo could further destabilize regional security in the intervention period, while the *Wall Street Journal* had supported Kosovo’s independence from Serbia since the military intervention period.

Continuing from the end of the Bosnian War through NATO’s negotiation with the Bosnian warring parties, the binary oppositional representation of good and evil between the Yugoslav warring factions, the Serbian government and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) separatists, was not culminated until the NATO air war against Serbia. Thus, the mainstream newspapers applied the dichotomy between the two warring parts in their editorials during the military intervention period rather than during the early pre- and post-military intervention periods. The representations of the negotiable warring factions had been generally employed in the mainstream US media from the end of Bosnian War to the pre-intervention period in the Kosovo Conflict, as well as in the post-military intervention period in 1999.[1]

The legitimation of the military intervention against Serbia and the propaganda supporting governmental policy in the mainstream US press, as Willcox (2005) observed in the Iraq War in 1990 and the Kosovo Conflict in 1999 in mainstream UK newspapers, has been more fully provided during the intervention period than during pre- and post-intervention periods. Accordingly, it should be useful to trace the movement of the construction of global responsibilities in the legitimation of the military intervention in

the mainstream US media by dividing the entire conflict into the three periods: pre-military intervention; military intervention; post-military intervention.

Narrativization was the most distinctive strategy supporting global responsibility discourses toward the launch of NATO air war against Serbia, backing up moral evaluations and comparisons (rescuing the victims of the conflict and the demonization of the enemy) and rationalization (regional security) in the mainstream US newspapers. The war narrative for the humanitarian intervention may have been more necessary for the Kosovo Conflict, due to the fact that the NATO military action was not authorized by the UN Security Council. Narrativization in the early pre-intervention period constructed the inversion and symbolism for an international aggression beyond a civil war in Serbia, without completely demonizing one of the involved factions. First, the ethnic composition in Kosovo, 90 percent of the Kosovo Albanians, functioned to symbolize the sovereignty of the Kosovo Albanians and to invert the legitimate institutional actor of the Serbian government to an external aggression. Second, the Serbian leaders and Kosovo Albanians, the two warring parts, were both represented as responsible, even though the former had more accountability for the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Kosovo.

The repeated narrative structure of ethnic suppression in Kosovo may have helped the newspapers simplify the crisis by adopting a clear-cut war narrative that NATO involvement was projected to restore the legitimate order and punish deviant Serbian activities. Narrativization, as Johnstone (2002) maintains, can be a powerful means to legitimate military intervention, particularly when the negative stories of Serbian aggression were functionalized to legitimate the incoming NATO air war against

Serbia, and the ethnic conflict narrative was consolidated. The repetition of a coherent story telling created the historical context which in return consolidates it as the truth.[2]

During the military intervention, several legitimation strategies were employed: authorization, moralization (demonization), narrativization (last resort), and rationalization. Among others, moral evaluation was constructed by determining the enemy leader figure, Milosevic, as an unreliable and nonnegotiable demon, while the KLA, which was previously defined as a terrorist group, and the Kosovo Albanians were excluded or modified as a justifiable reaction to the Serbian oppression. The disappearance of the KLA separatists as a terrorist group from the US media frame was a significant change from the pre-military intervention period in reframing the Kosovo Conflict within an international war between the enemy leader figure and the international community.

In the post-military intervention period, the accountability was ascribed to Milosevic, but the demonization strategy utilized by the three newspapers over the intervention period was generally modified to the extent that he ought to accept the NATO's peace plan, partly because the frame of the evil enemy leader figure would not have been compatible with the fact that the enemy leader was a negotiation partner with NATO. The *Wall Street Journal* was an exception in the frame, because the newspaper negatively viewed US government's efforts for negotiation with Milosevic due to lack of his legitimacy.

The three newspapers' editorials generally attributed NATO to the main subject of assuming humanitarian responsibility in Kosovo and for the security of the region. The consistent responsibility attribution pattern to NATO was different from the way in which

the attributions of the subject of the responsibilities have been inconsistent in the editorials when covering the Bosnian War. The change was not only reflective of the fact that European NATO member states commanded its military operation for the first time, but also facilitative of the multilateral representation of NATO's military action, which was not approved by the UN Security Council.

The ideological spectrum unfolded within and among the mainstream US newspapers before and after the military intervention period between March 24 and June 10, 1999 had been broader than that during the intervention period, in a way similar to that seen during election period. The diversity of ideologies presented in the mainstream US newspapers during the direct military intervention period in Kosovo has been narrower than before and after the period. There are several reasons for the ideological representation patterns constructed in the mainstream US media. The most feasible reason would be the pressure of national consensus during military action as well as governmental and military attempts to mobilize public consent and to demobilize public dissent. The governmental and military policy and practices surrounding the Vietnam War may be an early example in understanding the dynamics between the government/military and press parallelism as well as press-party parallelism during military intervention.

The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* showed similar patterns in constructing the NATO's military action as humanitarian intervention, although the former focused relatively more on security issues while the latter more on humanitarian concerns. The *Wall Street Journal* consistently framed its policy opinions over Kosovo within the national interest frame and global security strategy, and argued for regime

change in Serbia. Accordingly, the *Wall Street Journal* argued for removing the Serbian leader Milosevic in the regime by the use of force since the beginning of the air war, and the Clinton administration's Kosovo policy was often criticized in editorials due to its less aggressiveness. The *Wall Street Journal* published relatively less editorials than the other two newspapers and especially before the bombing in March 1999 than during and after the intervention, but its editorial stance supported more active military intervention by the United States and NATO than the other two. The newspaper was also more critical toward the moderate, and often ambiguous, stance of the Clinton administration's policy on Kosovo and Clinton's Balkan policy in the 1990s. US policy, mostly since the Dayton Accord in 1995, was evaluated as a failed compromise in the newspaper retrospectively, and the administration's approach to Kosovo was accordingly criticized due to its opportunistic stance. Table 6.1 shows salient legitimation strategies of the mainstream US media for military intervention in relation to US government's Kosovo policy.

Table 6.1: US Government's Kosovo Policy and Mainstream US Media's Legitimation Strategies

US Government's Policy	Mainstream US Media's Legitimation Strategies		
	New York Times	*Washington Post*	*Wall Street Journal*
Pre-Military Intervention	Narrativization Moralization	Narrativization Moralization (moral evaluation; abstraction)	Narrativization Rationalization (domestication) Narrativization
Military Intervention	Moralization Narrativization Rationalization	Moralization Narrativization Rationalization	Rationalization Moralization
Post-Military Intervention	Rationalization	Rationalization Moralization	Rationalization

Pre-Military Intervention Period: Creating Historical Contexts

Over the pre-military intervention period, the humanitarian responsibility claim constructed in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* was to protect the Kosovo Albanians and to stabilize regional security. In the three papers, the

subject of taking on the responsibility was not often clarified and shifted from NATO to the United States, and/or to European states. The accountability for the crisis was attributed mainly to Milosevic, but the KLA was also regarded as a source of the tension in the early stage of the recognition of the crisis.

Narrativization was the most salient method used throughout the pre-military intervention period for potential intervention, especially at the very beginning of the recognition of the violence in Kosovo in 1998. Considering the lack of authorization from the international legality, the repeated narrative structure based on ethnic tension and hatred consolidated the necessity of NATO's use of force. In creating historical contexts, the two elements were salient. First, the majority, approximately 90 percent, of the population in Kosovo was Kosovo Albanians. Second, the Kosovo Albanians enjoyed autonomy during Tito's administrations, whereas Milosevic reduced it for his political purposes by promoting Serbian nationalism since the late 1980s. Particularly, the Balkanization discourse, focusing on historical ethnic tensions among the warring fractions, emerged at the beginning of the crisis, while the genocide discourse, centering on Milosevic's nationalist policy, prevailed toward and during the military intervention period in the mainstream US media. At the beginning of the mainstream US media's recognition of the crisis, both sides of the ethnic divide were accountable for the conflict. The mainstream US media continued to use negotiation as a useful measure to be taken, which was deployed toward the Dayton Accord in the Bosnian War. Thus, the early stage of the Kosovo Conflict revealed the continuity of humanitarian responsibility without specifying the United States as the subject of taking on the responsibility from the

Bosnian War. The two antagonistic factions were responsible for undertaking remedial means.

Toward the launch of its air bombings, NATO's use of force was legitimated by a new narrative: NATO's air war was the last resort to resolve the crisis by addressing the Rambouillet peace talks that were accepted by the Kosovo Albanians but refused by the Serbian leader Milosevic. Humanitarian responsibility and national interest discourses, used in the post-intervention period of the Bosnian War, continued to be employed in mainstream US media discourse especially in the early stages of the crisis. Narrativization was also the most significant way to prepare for legitimation of potential future use of the force in the area. The personalization and demonization of the enemy leader figure, Milosevic, was not salient for the early period, and the suffering of ethnic Albanians as the worthy victims was highlighted in the three newspapers' editorials instead. It is also noteworthy that Russia and China had been marginalized by the newspapers in terms of their potential roles in mitigating the tension and ending the conflict.[3]

The *New York Times* editorials identified both ethnic groups as accountable for the tension in the Kosovo area in the early phase of the conflict. The first narrative to dramatize the event was to continuously repeat the composition of ethnic groups in Kosovo, and Kosovo's enjoyment of historical independence before Milosevic was inaugurated in 1989 was also a crucial element to strengthen the narrative: [45]

> Rising violence in the Kosovo province of Serbia has dangerous implications not only for Kosovo, but also for its neighbors. Ethnic Albanians make up 90 percent of Kosovo's population, but they suffer severe repression at the hands of Serbia's Government. In the last six months a violent group of ethnic Albanians, the Kosovo Liberation Army, has stepped up its terrorist attacks in Kosovo, and claimed credit for two bombings in the

> neighboring country of Macedonia. That is why a Security Council resolution that cuts off the peacekeeping mission in Macedonia in August is a mistake (Editorial. (1998, March 2). A useful Balkan firewall. *New York Times*, p. A16).

The possibility of militarily intervention in the Kosovo Conflict cautiously emerged in the *New York Times* as early as May and June 1998, and the policy opinion was based on narrativization and moralization along with rationalization (regional stability and security).[6] Toward the military intervention against Serbia, in defense of the people in Kosovo, the Atlantic relations emerged as an important issue. Although alluding more to European responsibility for intervening in the Kosovo Conflict, the *New York Times* confirmed US leadership once more over the conflict in an editorial entitled, "Trans-Atlantic Transitions," which appeared in early March, 1999, before the forthcoming military intervention:

> The most promising evidence of this shift is the negotiations over Kosovo. European countries have shown themselves willing to take on more political and military responsibility than they did in Bosnia four years ago. France and Britain have been especially assertive. But the latest American effort to lock up a deal before the formal peace talks resume later this month in France suggests that Washington's leadership and leverage will not be easy to replace (Editorial. (1999, March 6). Trans-Atlantic transitions. *New York Times*, p. A12).

The *Washington Post* consistently used moralization in the frame of humanitarian crisis in its editorials covering the crisis in the pre-military intervention period for a one year time span between March 1998 and March 1999. The representation of the crisis evolved from concerns about ethnic tension to humanitarian responsibility of the international community to appeal to US intervention in the crisis. The potential use of military force was defined to promote negotiations between the warring parts and

pressure the Serbian leader Milosevic from the beginning of the Western recognition of the crisis.[7]

The *Washington Post* also used narrativization by reiterating the ethnic composition in Kosovo. The consistent storytelling of the ethnic composition of Kosovo facilitated the legitimation of future intervention in a way similar to that in the *New York Times*. The contrasts between the aggressive Serbs and the oppressing Kosovo Albanians and between the autonomy of Kosovo Albanians in the past and their being under the present oppression created a humanitarian rationale, which offered a solid basis for NATO's use of military force. The humanitarian crisis, in return, corresponded to a gradual construction of the dichotomy between the victim and the villain narrative of the two warring parts.

During the pre-war period, the *Washington Post* directed the responsibility to NATO to stop the wrongdoings of the Serbian leaders.[8] Eventually, the newspaper suggested the placement of NATO ground troops in an editorial on December 14, 1998: "Without NATO ground forces in Kosovo or democratization in Serbia, peace in Kosovo remains unlikely."[9] The major objectives of negotiations between the US/NATO and Serbia were to protect civilians, to prohibit a wider regional war in the neighboring states, and to prevent refugee influxes to the states. Gradually, legitimation strategies of military action were diversified among reactions to the humanitarian crisis, the democratization of Serbia, and eventually global security concerns.

Toward the beginning of the NATO air war against Serbia in March 1999, the *Washington Post* legitimated the impending military action into Serbia based on moral abstraction by using the binary opposition of democracy and totalitarianism: "The fight

between democracy and totalitarianism, as we should have learned by now, is never static; if we are not helping one side, we are by inaction strengthening the other. The United States should indeed have an exit strategy for its deployments: It should bring the troops home once democracy is secure."[10]

Before the military intervention, the ethnic composition was also highlighted in the *Wall Street Journal*, as the newspaper editorials supported ethnic Albanian military actions such as the KLA by providing historical and political contexts similar to the other two newspapers. For example, the Serbian Milosevic government had oppressed the previously autonomous Kosovo faction in Serbia since 1989, and the KLA resistance was evaluated as a natural phenomenon that could only reduce or stop the governmental oppression.[11] In the beginning of the conflict, both the Serbs and the KLA were represented as equal factions in conflicts: "That discontent has now spawned a guerrilla movement, the KLA, among the 90% ethnic Albanian majority."[12] The newspaper gradually supported the Kosovo Albanians, but did not promote their independence in the pre-intervention period.[13]

The repetition of the ethnic composition created two frameworks for constructing the background of the conflict. This structurated narrative in editorials powerfully supported ethnic Albanians whose religion was mainly Islam, and the narrativization strategy corresponded to two discourses of Balkanization and genocide. There were no significant efforts to demonize the leader figure, Milosevic, at the beginning of the conflict. But the continuous adaptation of the Balkanization discourse gave way to the genocide discourse for pro-Kosovo Albanian policy opinion in the mainstream US media. In other words, the narrativization constituted the background information of the ongoing

Balkanization, and the sympathetic portrayal of ethnic Albanians was continuously recycled through the genocide discourse.[14] The description of the crisis as ethnic cleansing and ethnic hatred also functioned to help the three newspapers to represent and construct the Kosovo Conflict as genocide by increasingly using the abstract, powerful frame of historical ethnic hatred. But it can be argued that the theme of ethnic hatred as the main source of the conflict is a contradiction in that, despite its multi-ethnicities, the former Yugoslavia had been well governed and pursued its own autonomy during the Cold War era. However, regardless of whether the explanation was accurate in reality, the repetition of the Balkan and genocide discourses emerged as an increasingly powerful discourse in the common understanding of the conflict in Kosovo.

The ethnic Albanian group KLA had been mentioned at the beginning period as one of the key sources of ethnic tension in the mainstream newspapers, whereas the group disappeared in the second half of the pre-intervention period.[15] For example, from the beginning of the crisis recognition, the *New York Times* contrasted the image of Albanians as victims to Milosevic as the source of the conflict.[16] By illustrating peaceful, nonviolent Kosovo Albanian resistance, the victimization of ethnic Albanians and the problems associated with Milosevic became more distinctive in the editorials of the newspapers. The narrativization of the ethnic composition in Kosovo did not necessarily support the potential military campaigns. Yet the construction of the hopeless social group of ethnic Albanians helped to reinforce the popular, dominant negative image of the Serbian government.

Creating historical contexts backed up the political contexts about Kosovo. Differentiating Serbian civilians from the leader figure created the personalization of the

war and provided an easier means to represent the Kosovo Albanians as the worthy victim. Criticizing Milosevic was also an important theme in the construction of the genocide narrative, especially his media policy, since he tried to remove anti-governmental opinions from broadcasting by using licensing renewal and rejecting 35 out of 38 independent radio and television stations.[17] The criticism of the Serbian media policy was also a means to construct worthy victims of the Milosevic regime, and accordingly the dissent in Serbia was highlighted.[18]

The historical and political contexts provided through narrativization gradually became the springboard to claim global responsibility for both humanitarian crisis and global security in the mainstream US press. Once the association of narrativization and moralization was consolidated, global responsibility discourses became the legitimation of potential military intervention.

Intervention Period: Creating Political Contexts for the Last Resort to Force

The legitimation of the NATO military intervention against Serbia was far more important than its first intervention against the Republic of Srpska in 1995. Military action against other sovereignties without prior UN approval is in violation of the right of self-determination of the invaded state and the existing international laws. The absence of legal authorization had to be compensated by other means. Mainstream US newspapers' discourse involving the Kosovo crisis supported the NATO-led bombing throughout the seventy-eight-day period between March 24 and June 10, 1999. The core legitimation strategies can be divided into narrow and broad terms in geopolitics. The narrower legitimation was based on humanitarian responsibility for the victims of the conflict, while the broader legitimation was built on the strategic importance of global security through the military engagement of the United States and NATO.

Based on humanitarian responsibility discourse, the narrow justifications for the intervention were to protect ethnic Albanians and then to end the repression of the ethnic group in Serbia by weakening the Milosevic government, and to urge the Milosevic government to accept and carry out the peace plan suggested by NATO. Eventually, the air strikes were justified as a means of removing the leader figure from the regime. The narrower legitimation in the US media discourse deeply bore humanitarian concerns, while Milosevic appeared personally accountable for the humanitarian crisis:

> The purpose is to limit Mr. Milosevic's ability to attack the people of Kosovo, and get him to sign the peace plan that would be safeguarded by NATO peacekeeping troops. There is also American interest in keeping war from spreading, possibly to the NATO members Greece and Turkey. Moreover, carrying out a threat that the West has been making since October is necessary to deter others who would kill innocents in the future (Editorial. (1999, March 24). The rationale for air strikes. *New York Times*, p. A26).

In broader terms, followed by security responsibility and national interests (rationalization), the NATO bombing was projected to stabilize the regional security as well as to stop the proliferation of terrorists into the neighboring states and refugee influx. The broader legitimation was as significant as the moral legitimation in accordance with the launching of NATO's air strikes against Serbia on March 24, 1999, in the chosen newspapers' editorials. A consistent legitimation strategy of NATO's military action, among others, was to secure its credibility as one of utmost importance for military intervention during its air war against Serbia.

Considering the absence of the explicit approval of military intervention from the UN Security Council, NATO's credibility in the mainstream newspapers' editorials deserved further scrutiny. The broader legitimation can also be interpreted as US media's framing of the air war associated with US interests. It can thus be observed that the

moralization for rescuing the Kosovo Albanians and the rationalization for the regional security and US interests supported the political decision to introduce military intervention. In doing so, the narrativization of the last resort to force was essential. Accordingly, creating the political contexts consolidated the personalization and demonization of the enemy figure for military intervention against Serbia in the mainstream US media. During the first week of the NATO air strikes in the Serb positions, the three newspapers consistently supported the NATO military actions by adopting NATO and US rationales for the intervention in their editorials. The intense, extensive legitimation of the use of force involving the US and NATO's Kosovo policy in the mainstream media can be regarded as a compensation for UN authorization, through which the US and Western identities were able to be preserved as the purveyors of humanitarian responsibility.

A constant theme shared in the editorials of the three newspapers was the moralization of the military intervention against Serbia, epitomized by humanitarian imperatives. Moral evaluations were transcodified with the development of the Kosovo crisis from March 1998 when the conflict was widely published to the period during NATO's bombing between March 24 and June 10, 1999. Moralization also played a key role during the intervention period in justifying NATO's air strikes in the Serb positions, and the objectives of the military intervention were also constructed throughout the rationalization of the results and effects of the air war over the period. In the moral evaluation and comparison of NATO intervention and potential civilian casualties in Serbia, the "danger of action" was regarded as an opportunity cost through which a more solid solution could be effective, however.[19] The projected positive result of the military

intervention was salient during the first weeks of the bombing, while the US leadership and US hegemony were promoted toward a cessation of the bombing and subsequent peace talks.

During NATO's military actions against the Serb positions, mainstream US media discourse transformed the representation of Milosevic from the negotiable Serbian government to the nonnegotiable leader figure. Propaganda themes supporting the imminent air strikes consolidated the necessity of the use of force. The subsequent rationales for military action, especially around the launching date of the bombing, were extensively promoted in the mainstream US press. Among others, the *Washington Post* most emphasized humanitarian responsibility, while the *New York Times* focused not only on US humanitarian responsibility, but also on regional security. The *Wall Street Journal* was the most belligerent toward the Serbian government for global security and US hegemony. The US deployment of ground troops had been one of the most important but complicated issues in the three newspapers during the military intervention period.

The absence of the UN and UN Security Counsel in the mainstream US media discourse during the military intervention period was significant, considering the problematic legality of the NATO's military intervention against a sovereign state. In a corresponding manner, the other two permanent member states in the UN Security Council, Russia and China, which opposed the use of force against Serbia, had been defined throughout the military intervention period not as member states of the UN Security Council but as individual states prioritizing strategic interests in the humanitarian crisis.[20] The non-recognition of the UN Security Council membership was related not only to the prioritizing of the NATO's credibility claim in the legitimation of

the war but also to US unilateralism. However, it is controversial whether the emphasis on NATO's credibility was able to legitimate its military action in general, particularly for the Kosovo case, and to justify the way in which the war was exercised. It was also problematic whether NATO's credibility claims were relevant to its moral claims in the Kosovo case, or whether NATO's credibility was able to be compatible with the claims of humanitarian responsibility for Kosovo. Given the complexities, the continued humanitarian responsibility discourse may have had dangerous implications in deliberation by oversimplifying the complex political issues. Furthermore, the Kosovo case illustrates the transition of the legitimation of military intervention from the international law to the effectiveness of the intervention.

The spectrum of the ideological stances in the three newspapers editorials showed that the mainstream US media consented and followed the governmental policy choices in the early stage of war, and the ideological spectrum among them became broader throughout the development of the war.[21] When it comes to the ideological spectrum of responsibility claims in the three mainstream newspapers, one of the most significant differences among them was the domestication of the issue. In particular, unlike the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal* often associated Clinton's personal crisis related to his sex scandal with the aggressive foreign policy. The association of the president's personal crisis and foreign policy choices provides an intriguing point regarding the politicization of the military intervention. First, the depoliticization of the intervention would have been problematic in US domestic politics, whereas the politicization of the intervention could have been against the humanitarian responsibility claim in the global realm. The domestication of the decision of the military

intervention against Serbia did not necessarily dictate positive or negative construction of global responsibility, but how the domestication of the NATO war was constructed and articulated to specific policy issues in the *Wall Street Journal* was reflective of the press and party parallelism.

The three newspapers' editorials supported the US government's military intervention, especially for the first weeks of bombing in Kosovo. The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* supported the administration's position in general, while the *Wall Street Journal* did not view the policy of the administration aggressive enough for ending the war. The *Wall Street Journal*'s ideological stance, however, did not oppose the intervention; rather, it did push the United States to dispatch ground troops in Kosovo and eventually removing Milosevic from the power. The newspaper's position diverged from the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*'s opposition to potential US casualties.

There were two interrelated symptomatic legitimation strategies during the first week (days) of the air strikes: the first is the absence of UN authorization. Although not such a striking absence, even unlike the Bosnian case, the recognition of the UN was missing, whereas the notion of the international community was continuously constructed in the mainstream US press. Russia and China were also introduced, instead of addressing the UN's approval, as an ethnic brotherhood or unreliable world powers, lowering the credibility of the two UN Security Council member states. This trend corresponded to what Zizek (1999, pp. 81-82) points out as "humiliating Russia" which in turn changed the "global geopolitical coordinates." The disappearance of the UN in the mainstream US media can be understood as a discursive strategy to legitimate the NATO

bombing, since the two member states of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, did not intend to approve NATO's air war on the Serb positions.

The second was the narrative construction of the last resort to force. The ultimate function of the construction of the narrative in the editorials published in the three chosen newspapers was to support the argument that there was no other option but the use of military force in the Serbian territory. Although the specific ways to provide related narratives differed in each newspaper, the basic function of the narrativization was to justify the bombing against the Serb position. Narrativization may not be a sufficient but is a necessary means to legitimate the military intervention as the last resort to force. Without the UN Security Council's authorization, the repeated narrative of the belatedness of the United States and West's obligation to intervene functioned to strengthen the construction of the humanitarian responsibility narrative and, at the same time, supported the rationalization for regional stability and security discourse. Eventually various legitimation strategies in the mainstream US media constructed a war narrative consisting of the melodramatic identities of the involved states: the Serbian leader as the villain, the Kosovo Albanians for the worthy victim, and the United States and NATO as the heroes who rescue the victims and punish the enemy.[22]

The *New York Times* suggested that the military action was justified since NATO had given the Serbian government and its military personnel every opportunity to withdraw from the Kosovo area: "Mr. Milosevic has been given every chance to end his aggression, and every warning of what would happen if he did not. He has ignored them, and the bombing must begin quickly before his rampage takes more lives."[23] While regarding the use of force as the last resort as an established fact, the *Washington Post*

constructed a stronger statement combined with moral evaluations of the enemy leader figure and the inevitableness of the use of the force.

> A RESORT to force can never be considered an ideal outcome of a diplomatic standoff. But President Clinton and his fellow NATO leaders were right yesterday to attack the forces of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. That Balkan tyrant ignored ample–indeed, more than ample–warnings and apparently decided that provoking a bombing campaign would serve his short-term interests. Now NATO must conduct a substantial enough campaign to ensure that any political benefits are outweighed by lasting harm to Mr. Milosevic's war machine (Editorial. (1999, March 25). Be serious. *Washington Post*, p. A36).

During NATO's air war, the *Wall Street Journal* also constructed a narrative that the deterioration of the Kosovo situation was Western irresponsibility and that the West should have engaged the Kosovo Conflict earlier when the situation became worse. This criticism of the West did de-legitimate US and European states' inaction in retrospect, so much so that it functioned to pressure the West to intervene in the conflict by adopting the oversimplified representation of the conflict. The newspaper was most supportive of US active military engagement based on the necessity of global security, but the way the *Wall Street Journal* promoted NATO military means was different from the other two newspapers. While using the de-legitimation strategy of the previous US and European ignorance of the crisis, the newspaper emphasized US and NATO inaction and less aggressive approach to the Serbian government as a reason for the deteriorating crisis and civilian suffering:

> Kosovo is not an accident, it didn't just happen. It is the product of mistakes. The biggest mistake is assuming that by ignoring a problem, the West in general and the U.S. in particular can stay uninvolved. The lesson is that this is not an option, that in today's

> world the real option is learning how to involve sooner, smarter and therefore smaller (Editorial. (1999, March 24). The next Kosovo. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A26).

Connecting the military intervention against Serbia to Clinton's political crisis by his deferment of the draft during the Vietnam War and his sexual scandal was one of the most significant characteristics in the *Wall Street Journal* editorials:[24] "It is hugely ironic, still, that Bill Clinton is tying his personal and political fortunes to the success of the American military, in which he evaded service years ago, and in particular to Naval aviators, supposedly tarnished by the infamous Tailhook controversy."[25] But the *Wall Street Journal's* criticism of the President did not mean the newspaper's opposition to his Kosovo policy and supporting the Serbian leader. The demonization of the enemy leader figure was most intense in the newspaper among the three mainstream US newspapers. Milosevic was depicted as a "barbarian" differentiated from the Serbian population and as a stratagem that ought not to be trusted by the US government.[26] Demonizing the leader figure of Serbia was emphasized in the *Wall Street Journal*, and this further supported NATO's military action.[27] During the air strikes, *Wall Street Journal* editorials urged the US government not to negotiate with the illegitimate leader.[28] Furthermore, the newspaper strongly argued for regime change,[29] and criticized the US administration's inability to do so.[30] The newspaper, toward the end of NATO air war, distinguished itself from the other two newspapers through moralization in that the newspaper supported the dispatch of ground troops to Kosovo in order to stop civilian sufferings while criticizing the government for avoiding US casualties despite it being politically effective and morally demanded:[31]

> What the American people do not want are casualties for no purpose. They will accept sacrifice, but not needless sacrifice. They can see clearly enough with their own eyes that

> on the edge of Europe, in a region from which many of their ancestors came to America, a tyrant is systematically slaughtering men, women and children. Going to Belgrade and throwing out a war criminal is not going to lose elections. And while it would involve casualties, it would bring the destruction and killing to an end" (Editorial. (1999, June 3). War, civilians and morality. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A26).

All in all, the personification and demonization of the enemy leader figure was distinct in the military intervention period in the mainstream US media, which may have dangerous ramifications in understanding the Kosovo Conflict by oversimplifying the conflict.[32] Based on the constructed historical, political, and ethnic contexts, moralization and rationalization strategies were employed in the three chosen newspapers in the legitimation of the NATO's air war against Serbia.

Post-Intervention Period

The most distinctive change in the post-military intervention period was the enfeeblement of the frame of demonizing the Serbian leader figure in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*. The construction of humanitarian military intervention had not been questioned in the period, whereas the attribution of accountability for the crisis was distributed broadly to the warring Yugoslav parties and Russia. The responsibility for keeping peace and convincing Kosovo Albanian refugees to return to Kosovo was identified as NATO's humanitarian responsibility. Responsibility for protecting the Serbs from the KLA's retaliation in the changed war situation also emerged in the three newspapers. The reappearance of the KLA and more complex array of representing international actors in the post-military intervention period can be interpreted in such a way that peace-keeping processes could not be undertaken with the simplified war narrative culminated during the military intervention. Moreover, Milosevic as a

negotiation partner to end the conflict may have been part of the reason for the changes of the representation of the involved actors in the mainstream US press.

The *New York Times* consistently referred the subject of responsibility for the crisis to NATO, and sometimes the West as well, in the post-military intervention period: "In the days immediately ahead, the NATO-led peacekeepers must assume direct responsibility for security at all levels in Kosovo, including not just military tasks but many police duties as well."[33] In addition, the danger of the KLA's violence was rearticulated in the difficulties of peacekeeping right after the end of the NATO air war: "The quality of the peace that NATO can bring to Kosovo in the coming months will depend in large measure on the cooperation it receives from the commanders and fighters of the KLA."[34] Thus, humanitarian responsibility and security responsibility were converged into peacekeeping and rebuilding Kosovo.[35]

The *Washington Post* consistently supported humanitarian responsibility and reinforced the notion of NATO's legitimate use of force over the post-military intervention period, and the results of the NATO war were positively evaluated by using the moral evaluations and abstraction of "the cause of democracy": "What was achieved was not a perfect victory. But it was a remarkable success, a fruit of allied unity that, if not squandered now, will further the cause of democracy and peace in Europe and beyond."[36] In the editorials of the newspaper for the post-military intervention period, both Milosevic and the KLA were defined to be potential dangers in the stability of Kosovo. On the one hand, the *Washington Post* opined that Milosevic continued to be the most accountable for the crisis and that the democratization of Serbia would be a solution for keeping peace in Kosovo. Thus, the responsibility of the West was further developed

in the newspaper as the support for democracy in Serbia. Accordingly, the *Washington Post*'s appropriation of NATO's war for humanitarian concerns was extended from the ending of the war to the peacekeeping for democracy. On the other hand, the KLA was rearticulated in the representation of the conflict,[37] and the Serbs appeared as the victims of the KLA's retaliation in the *Washington Post* at the end of 1999.[38]

> It remains true also that there can be no stability in the Balkans as long as Slobodan Milosevic remains in power. The authoritarian leader, first of Serbia, now of what remains of Yugoslavia, bears primary responsibility for a decade of war in his region. […] The West must do more to assist the forces of democratization inside Serbia. Western governments also must make clear not only that Serbia will receive no reconstruction aid as long as Mr. Milosevic holds sway, as Mr. Clinton reiterated Friday– but also that Serbia will receive substantial help once it signals a willingness to democratize and live in peace with its neighbors (Editorial. (1999, August 3). Balkan stability. *Washington Post*, p. A14).

The *Wall Street Journal* did not publish as many editorials as the other two newspapers in the post-military intervention period. The newspaper's stance was the most aggressive toward the Serbian government, however. For instance, the *Wall Street Journal* consistently argued for pulling Milosevic from the regime.[39] It is also distinct that the newspaper combined Clinton's Kosovo policy with his crisis in the domestic realms.[40] Finally, it is worth noting that humanitarian responsibility along with US/NATO's unilateralism further developed the changed notion of sovereignty in the post-military intervention period. The argument in an editorial on June 11, 1999, clearly echoes a newly emerging US unilateralism:

> Another idea in play even before Kosovo, was the traditional view of political sovereignty. China lays claim to Taiwan. The European Union lays claim to Ireland's tax policies. Each to us appears to be an impingement on sovereignty worth resisting. But is it still true at the dawn of the 21st century that a tyrant like Slobodan Milosevic can claim

> sovereign authority over each breath drawn by those inside his borders? After Kosovo maybe not. Maybe it is finally possible that there are limits to the claims rank evil can make under cover of sovereignty (Editorial. (1999, June 11). A substitute for victory. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18).

The Articulation of Global Responsibility Discourses

The Construction of the Identities of the Involved Actors

Situating the construction of global responsibility discourses surrounding the Kosovo Conflict within broader discursive practices of the mainstream US media means an attempt to examine the hegemonic processes in the construction of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media. Identifying the articulation of global responsibility discourses including humanitarian responsibility and global security responsibility is devised to understand the discursive strategies and self-understanding of global responsibility claims' producers, and eventually the experience and understanding of audiences who are mediated through the discourses. Global responsibility discourses based on moralizations (moral evaluation, abstraction, and comparison) do not self-generate or guarantee their positive functions or progressive possibilities of the discourse in broader discursive practices involving foreign issues in general and military intervention in particular. It is thus necessary to situate the responsibility discourse within broader discursive contexts, in order to identify the progressiveness and functions of global responsibility claims.

Examining the articulation of global responsibility discourses within the mainstream US media can be a way not only to expound the function of responsibility claims in the Kosovo crisis but also to provide a fundamental basis in which to understand the potentiality of global responsibility discourses in the military intervention against Serbia. It is worth noting that rationalization constructed by global security

responsibility does not necessarily represent the national interest frame. However, it can also be argued that the (dis)articulation processes in the security responsibility illuminated the self-role conceptions of the United States in the construction of global responsibility discourses.

The processes of articulation function to produce hegemonic ideas, which in turn sustain relations of domination. Articulation is also a discursive strategy for both analytical and political means. Examining the contours of articulation of a specific discourse–the discourse of responsibility in this case–in an effort to broaden discursive contexts, requires attempting to understand how the claims mobilize public attention and generate compassionate audiences. US government necessitates forming public opinion in a favorable way to specific policy regarding very complicated issues. Specifically, the NATO's air war against Serbia in 1999 was controversial in its legality and even more problematic in its means with regard to the objectives of the intervention. This was the case so much so that it can be argued that the representations of the events and involved actors surrounding the conflict in the mainstream US media demonstrate not only the political orientation of discourse producers but also public understanding of the conflict.

Analyzing articulatory practices in the US mainstream media can provide an opportunity to understand the construction of the Kosovo Conflict in the United States as well as provide self-understanding of both discourse producers and the public. Fittingly, Hammond (2000) observes that the story of Western intervention in the Yugoslav wars, constructed by the Western actors, reflected the identity and role conceptions of the West: "The debate about the Balkans was also a debate about the West's self-image, and

revealed more about how Western elites were attempting to reinvent themselves for the post-Cold War era rather than about events on the ground" (2004, p. 180).

Humanitarian responsibility discourse over the Kosovo Conflict was articulated in a coherent war narrative in which several discourses and preexisting identities intersected. The most salient articulation that legitimized the military intervention against Serbia in the mainstream US press defined US global leadership as the moral hero who rescue victims under the evil leader's regime and stabilize a new world order after the end of the Cold War. Using the war narrative as a springboard for legitimizing the military intervention, the mainstream US press constructed the binary opposition of the involved actors: the enemy as the de-stabilizer of the global order and the hero figure of the United States as the world order stabilizer. In relation to the articulation of the clear contrast between good and evil, the European nation-states in the Atlantic Alliance appeared in an ambiguous way within the mainstream US media. They were depicted as allies to the United States, but at the same time competitors and potential threats in the new world order. The presence and absence of the United Nations was also one of the most important barometers to understand the articulation of humanitarian responsibility discourse in the US media in regards to US and NATO unilateralism.

Finally, while analyzing the articulation of the legitimation of the NATO military intervention to technological warfare, I will discuss not only the legitimation of the intervention against Serbia in the mainstream US media but also the ways in which the intervention was carried out by air power and precision munitions. Incorporating the conduct of NATO's intervention against Serbia can show the articulation of the US government's foreign policy orientation to the mainstream US media's policy opinion.

Serbs and Kosovo Albanians: from Equal Warring Factions to Enemy/Victim

When the West first recognized a growing political instability in Kosovo in March of 1998, the mainstream US media continued to use the preexisting frame of the identities of the former Yugoslav fractions from the Bosnian War. The identities of the two major ethnic groups in Kosovo and Serbia followed the frame. The Serbian leader, Milosevic, was carved out of the Serbian civilians, through which the leader's identity was portrayed to be unreliable and opportunistic, testing the West for his nationalistic expansionism. Meanwhile Serbian civilians remained innocent victims of his nationalistic dictatorship. Bosnian Muslims in the Bosnian War, the victim, was replaced by the Kosovo Albanians within the frame of the Kosovo Conflict. Kosovo Albanians' identities followed the pattern of the ways their Bosnian counterparts were defined over the development of the Bosnian War and subsequent NATO military intervention.

More precisely, the mainstream US media identified the ethnic majority Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo and the Serbs as the warring parts, although the Serbian leader figure was most accountable for the violence in the early stage of the conflict in March, 1998. Thus, both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians were regarded as involved in the worsening of the crisis in the pre-military intervention period. The identities had gradually shifted from both warring factions, to the binary opposition between enemy and victim, to the launching of a NATO air war in March, 1999. For example, an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal*, the most critical newspaper toward Milosevic, points out that writes: "Kosovo is a small Balkan enclave under assault from Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic, who raped and pillaged Bosnia."[41]

In addition, the binary opposition of villains and victims was consolidated toward the launching of the NATO military intervention. The dichotomy of the good and evil frame increasingly emerged as dominant identities through the development of the NATO air war against Serbia. Since the beginning of NATO's military intervention in the Kosovo Conflict on March 24, 1999, the dichotomy of enemy and victim was firmly fixed in accordance with the identities of each part constructed in the US media discourse. All three mainstream US newspapers' editorials constructed the identities of binary opposition between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in the conflict. Eventually, the personalization of the conflict and the demonization of the leader figure of the enemy were established toward the launch of the NATO air war. For example, the *Washington Post* often mentioned the KLA as a terrorist group before the air campaigns, whereas the frame of the Albanian irregulars and terrorism disappeared from its editorial frame after the intervention period. This absence of aggressive Albanians completed the contrast of the worthy victim images of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo as the helpless victim to the evil leader Milosevic as the source of the crisis. Subsequently, the clear-cut differentiation of good and evil eclipsed the absence of discussion regarding the legality of the military action against Serbia and NATO's violation of Serbia's self-determination right.

> To restate what so many seem determined not to see: For all the bad blood and bad history, the Balkan horror since 1989 did not spontaneously erupt from cursed soil. It is the explicit result of Slobodan Milosevic's strategy of demagoguery and invasion. This tyrant did not react to the slaughter in the Balkans. He planned it. He executed it. Now, if NATO is to have any hope of finishing the job it began in the Balkans, it needs to state clearly that its aim is to remove him (Editorial. (1999, June 8). Milosevic stiffs Clinton. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18).

Finally, the clear-cut examination of good and evil was removed from the mainstream US media and both parts were accountable for potential crisis in the post-military intervention period, although Milosevic continued to be considered most accountable for the crisis. Humanitarian responsibility claims were further related to regime change along with global security concerns within the US mainstream newspapers.

Compared to the stable representation of the Serbian leader, the identity of the Kosovo Albanians had dramatically changed from a warring party against Serbian nationalism, to the victims, to a source of potential crisis as the Kosovo Conflict developed. In particular, the KLA appeared to be accountable for the deteriorating situation in the early stage of the Kosovo Conflict. During the NATO intervention, the KLA disappeared in the three newspapers editorials and they reappeared as a warring faction accountable for the worsening of the crisis in the post-intervention period.

The personalization and demonization of the enemy leader intensified with the development of the NATO war against Serbia. Focusing on the enemy leader is one of the most powerful means to gain public support for intervening in a foreign conflict, especially without prior approval from the UN Security Council. The consistent construction of the demonized enemy leader aided the mainstream US media while it made the case for the moral duty of NATO to intervene in the foreign sovereignty's internal crisis and to save the suffering victims. Particularly, the *Washington Post* criticized Milosevic's statement for a peaceful cohabitation in Kosovo with cynicism, and the leader was portrayed as unreliable and immoral.[42] The personalization and demonizaton (moralization) of the leader helped to promote NATO's military intervention against Serbia and to argue that the use of force was the last resort

(narrativization).[43] Accordingly, the issue of respect for sovereignty and self-determination was excluded in the mainstream US media throughout the entire conflict period.

This construction of the enemy leader also helped to distinguish the leader from the majority of citizens who were defined as innocent or suffering from the totalitarian regime. In the frame, there was no longer an editorial containing the previous frame that Serbia was one of the best ally nations during the Cold War before the military intervention. Furthermore, press freedom in Kosovo and Serbia was often highlighted in dramatizing the binary opposition between the enemy leader and the suffering Albanian Muslims and between the enemy leader and the innocent citizens of Kosovo and Serbia. Press freedom had also been a primary means to criticize the Bosnian-Serb position since the Bosnian War (Vincent, 2000, p. 335), which created a political context that dramatized the innocent victims of both Kosovo Albanians and Serbian civilians in the crisis.[44]

> Serbia is a victim of crazed nationalism. Serbs have never been allowed to forget that they were defeated by Turks in Kosovo six centuries ago. Hence, goes this reasoning, Kosovo should be occupied by Serbs. Hence, ethnic cleansing is justified. Milosevic has achieved his present position of power by propagandizing this craziness. It now has brought down the full force of the NATO alliance on the heads of the Serbian people (Editorial. (1999, March 29). Escalating the 'cleansing.' *Wall Street Journal*, p. A26).

US and Western Identities: The Moral Hero and Security

The construction of a US identity surrounding the Kosovo Conflict was inseparable from its claims of humanitarian responsibility in the conflict, so much so that the US identity was defined in relation to not only those of former Yugoslav fractions, but also to those of its NATO allies and other UN Security Council member states.

Toward the beginning of the US and NATO military actions, the use of force against Serbia was related to the redefinition of the US identity in the mainstream press by rearticulating US leadership over European states as well as over the world, and its paternity for democracy against totalitarian regimes. Reformulating the Cold War frame was a new, salient feature juxtaposed with the limited but reasonable engagement of the United States in the conflict, along with the importance of its strategic interest and the right exit strategy before the military intervention.

US identity and its efforts for credibility in the mainstream US media constructed US roles in resolving the conflict while national interest was a determinant modulator in taking on specific roles in the conflict between moderate engagement and an active military action. The mainstream US media also confirmed that the degree of military intervention should be limited to specific, obtainable goals. Potential US participation, dubbed as the continued efforts of the United States to democratize the world, was characterized by the binary opposition between democracy and totalitarianism.

> SOME OPPONENTS of U.S. involvement in the Balkans argue that Bosnia and now Kosovo could prove to be quagmires for U.S. troops. President Clinton said on Friday that the United States would try to limit its involvement and its mission, and "conclude it as quickly as we can." Fair enough. But in fact a modest number of U.S. troops may need to stay for some time, and perhaps the better response would be: So what? The United States has been fighting for democracy in Europe for more than a half-century. The battle is nearly won. This would be a foolish time to give up (Editorial. (1999, March 21). The right exit strategy. *Washington Post*, p. B6).

In the same editorial, the intervention was also defined, along with presidential objectives of the intervention, as "the risk of more massacres, the danger of war spreading, the challenge of NATO credibility," subsumed by the US role of promoting democracy in the world in general, and in the European continent in particular. Right

after the end of the air war, the *Washington Post* confirmed the US identity of protecting democracy as the world police in relation to the enemy identity of Milosevic.[45] The US identity as the world police and security stabilizer was the general role conception of the United States in the post-military intervention editorials of the three newspapers, most saliently in the *Wall Street Journal*.

The combining of the two identity representations of the Yugoslav warring parts and the United States illustrates how identity construction and policy orientation corresponded. In a similar way that the ethnic tension over Kosovo served as a legitimation strategy for military intervention in the mainstream US media, the contrast between the Serbian leader and the United States created the representation of the crisis. It also eventually helped to facilitate the US policy choice of the military intervention without the authorization of the UN Security Council within the mainstream US media.

The UN, European NATO Member States, and Russia and China

In relation to US and NATO credibility, it is noteworthy that the years of 1995 and 1999 marked the fiftieth anniversaries of the UN and NATO respectively. Accordingly, covering the half-century anniversary for NATO in 1999, its credibility was an issue in the mainstream US media in regards to the end of the Cold War.[46] The role conception of NATO in military intervention can be understood in relation to that of the UN because the UN is the single authority in authorizing the use of force against other sovereignties in the international system. It is thus controversial whether the legality should be protected to improve the UN's roles and functions, or whether the UN was not able to exercise its long overdue roles for making world peace happen, so much so that it was not practical for the UN to resolve the Kosovo Conflict.

One of the most salient missing themes in the chosen US media was the UN and the UN Security Council's authority to legally sanction the US and NATO-led intervention in the Serbian territory. On the contrary, NATO was represented as a responsible, moral authority in relation to the Serbian identity. A *Washington Post* editorial on April 26, 1999, illustrates the intermingling of the construction of the identities and the chosen policy orientation of the Alliance.

> The NATO 19 are in fact allies, but reluctant allies, not automatic ones. The discipline of the Cold War has yielded to a measure of autonomous decision-making that is, though not incompatible with alliance, difficult to shape to it. What must be kept front and center is the horror of the killing and the mass deportation launched by Slobodan Milosevic and the absolute requirement on the Atlantic democracies to stand against such evil in Europe (Editorial. (1999, April 26). Reluctant allies. *Washington Post*, p. A18).

The absence of the UN in the legitimation process of the NATO bombing against Serbia was also associated with the criticism of Russia and China, two non-NATO member states among the permanent member states of the UN Security Council. The opposition of the two nations to the bombing against Serbia was associated with their own ethnic tensions in Chechnya and Tibet respectively. Russia's policy regarding the NATO war was interpreted as solidarity with the Serbs,[47] while China was marginalized as an accidental victim during NATO's strikes on the Chinese Embassy in Serbia. The following excerpt illustrates the US media representation of Russia as an obstacle for peace negotiation.

> International responsibility for dealing with the Kosovo crisis rests primarily with the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Russia. Acting together as the Contact Group, they are trying to force Mr. Milosevic to accept internationally supervised negotiations with the Albanians. But the group has proved ineffectual because its powers are limited and some members, notably Russia, oppose strong pressure against Serbia.

> The group has frozen Serbia's assets abroad and this weekend imposed a ban on new foreign investment in Serbia. The sanctions, however, are impossible to enforce among countries outside the Contact Group and difficult even inside it, given Russia's views (Editorial. (1998, May 10). To prevent a wider war in Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. 4.14).

It is also an intriguing point that Russia, in the post-military intervention period, appeared in the US mainstream media to be a necessary, but not entirely reliable, actor, which had often functioned to induce the old Cold War frame, especially for global security responsibility claims during the military intervention period.

National Identities and Policy Orientations: A Melodramatic Narrative

In Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, worthy and unworthy victims are contrasted in the media's attention of war coverage. The worthy victims focused upon in the mainstream media are used to legitimate potential military intervention and the justification of the means in the intervention. The unworthy victims tend to be marginalized even though they share similar, sometimes even severe, suffering within the identical crisis or different kinds of humanitarian crises. The selective construction of victims' worthiness in crises can be examined in more narrative dimensions.

The previous three components of the identities, including the Serbian leaders (the villain), the Kosovo Albanians (the victim), and the United States and NATO (the hero), constituted a war narrative that transcodified melodrama. The war reporting clearly echoes the melodramatic plot development. One may be dismayed about the connection of war reporting, one of the most extreme political issues, and melodrama in popular culture. The typical melodramatic plot development in war reporting has been criticized by media scholars and critics (Anker, 2005; Lakoff, 1991; Janzekovic, 2006). The "illegal but legitimate" use of force in the NATO war against Serbia clearly echoes the criticism of the melodramatic plot development in foreign policy. There are three key characters in

the melodrama: the evils that create the conflict, the worthy, but helpless victims, and the hero as the subject of realizing the good and rescuing the victims by brutal retaliation.

The melodramatic narrative was also salient in the Kosovo Conflict. As shown in the editorials of the three mainstream US newspapers, Serbian Milosevic was portrayed as the villain toward the launch and duration of the bombing. Meanwhile the Kosovo Albanians were defined as the worthy victims redeemed in the rescue story. Through the dichotomy between the evils and the worthy victims threatened and suffered by the evils, the United States and the West gained the self-image of the moral hero who successfully rescued the worthy victims. On the contrary, the newspaper editorials did not focus on the unworthy victims Serb civilians, and they were generally treated as an opportunity cost to save the worthy victims in the drama.

The problems created by the melodramatic plot development of the subsequent happy ending is that serious and political matters were treated as an emotional matter that waits for the West to resolve it through brute force. Meanwhile, the retaliation of the heroes, the United States and the West in this case, was romanticized by the cause of rescuing the worthy victims. As Anker (2005) points out, the simplified understanding of a war is a potential problem in a democracy in which enlightened debate for public issues and active civic participation is crucial. The melodramatic narratives found in the chosen news editorials are even more viable and dangerous. The common, less involved audiences and citizens in the United States do have fewer, and less direct sources to foreign issues. This lack of access results in less involvement, thus the emotionally constructed narratives can be more powerful as they construct the reality of military intervention in general, and the Kosovo Conflict in particular. But also, the military

action presupposes potential dangers of the US soldiers and governmental officials, as well as the peacekeeping personnel. Thus, the emotional response can more easily mobilize certain political goals of the US government, the military, and interested power elites.[48]

Another problem is that the constructed hero image of the United States and the West can be justified by the degree of success in the realization of the military intervention causes provided by the US government and military officials. In cases such as NATO intervention against Serbia, the media tended to focus on the evaluations from the domestic and engaged politicians and military officials rather than on those of the real victims in the Kosovo and Serbian populations. However, as Ignatieff (2000, p. 213) points out, the potential problem can occur when a military intervention is legitimated and subsequent means are justified by moral claims with the melodramatic national identity:

> While the language of the nation is particularistic–dividing human beings into us and them–human rights is universal. In theory, it will not lend itself to dividing human beings into higher and lower, superior and inferior, civilized and barbarian. Yet something very like a distinction between superior and inferior has been at work in the demonization of human rights violation.

The Conduct of the US and NATO Military Intervention

The Deployment of US Ground Troops

The deployment of US ground troops had been a critical issue for the US government in the intervention period. It was expected that European states would assume responsibility for the deployment of their peacekeepers in Serbia. The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* opposed deployment of US ground troops during the military intervention period.[49] With the change in the government's policy, the newspapers

accepted the necessity of the deployment of the US ground troops in the post-military intervention period. On the contrary, the *Wall Street Journal* consistently supported the option since the military intervention period.

Technological Warfare

The discourse of technological warfare relying on air strikes and precision munitions was overlapped with global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media in regards to the Kosovo Conflict. Both toward the beginning of the military intervention against Serbia and during the intervention, technological supremacy was one of the strongest sources to support immediate and ongoing US and NATO engagement. The safety of US soldiers had been a consistent concern of the US media, and European responsibility was emphasized, especially when the necessity of placing US ground troops in Kosovo was issued. Most importantly, according to the mainstream US media, technological warfare played an important role in protecting the Albanian majority in Kosovo during the military intervention period. Military intervention based upon precision-bombing along with a medium level of air strikes, was strongly preferred in the media discourse, rather than including deteriorating humanitarian situations in Kosovo due to the bombing.

However, the problem with the narrow objective of the military intervention in Kosovo involved whether air strikes aided Kosovo civilians. For example, the China embassy bombing and other civilian causalities were treated as mistakes. Considering the status of China as one of the five Security Council permanent member states, the visibility and influence of the mistaken bombings were more audible in a global society. But the victims of the conflict in Kosovo and Serbia may not have had voices to deliver

the atrocities of the air war to the global community. NATO's use of air strikes were consistently evaluated as one of the most important resources for the NATO military intervention despite the potential dangers covered during the military intervention and even after the military actions.

> Air power is not a panacea, but the war in Yugoslavia demonstrated that sustained aerial attack with precision munitions can erode resistance and bring retreat. Civilian casualties are inevitable, but NATO worked hard to avoid them. It is a tribute to American military technology and the skill of NATO pilots that in almost 10,000 bombing runs no allied airmen were lost and only two planes were downed. Americans should not count on such success in every conflict, but the bombardment of Serbia and Iraq suggests that most air defenses can be defeated by American weapons systems (Editorial. (1999, June 17). Lessons of the Balkan War. *New York Times*, p. A30).

> Even with the ragged start in the Balkans, NATO air supremacy should be sufficient over time to grind down Serbian resistance and bring Slobodan Milosevic to a political settlement. […] But in an era when air power is the preferred form of American armed intervention abroad, it is apparent that the Pentagon needs to develop more effective and varied ways to use its arsenal of warplanes, cruise missiles and precision bombs. It may also need to adjust the mix of weapons it buys and maintains, and be ready to deal with an exodus of refugees that often materializes when ethnic conflicts suddenly intensify. Having made the defensible decision to rely primarily on air power in regional conflicts that do not immediately threaten American security, Washington will need to be as imaginative and agile as possible in fighting such wars and in preparing for their repercussions (Editorial. (1999, April 11). War in an era of ethnic conflict. *New York Times*, p. 4.16).

Here, several issues arise from the dependence of humanitarian intervention on technological warfare in the construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses in the legitimation of using military force. First, did the military actions help the civilians, or would other means have been more effective? Second, as Ignatieff (2000) points out: Was an asymmetrical use of power humanitarian? The two issues aided in the

sanitization of the war, which in turn functioned to legitimate the military intervention on moral grounds. Otherwise, NATO's controversial intervention would have had to use alternative means. Third, what would have been the implications of technological warfare in the military intervention in 1999, as suggested in Virilio's (2000) *Strategy of Deception*. If the enemy's identity would be determined as the enemy of humanity in international conflicts, the last resort of force can be used when the conception of the enemy was adopted in government's policy and interpolated by the media and populations.

Finally, depending on technological warfare is often less useful in regime change and peace-building than military interventions, which have been critical paths to successfully materialize the potential of global responsibility claims in military intervention. Hardt and Negri (2004, p. 45) noted the contradictions in the technologist view of war as following:

> There are, however, significant and growing contradictions in this technologist view of war associated with the RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs]. First, at the simple level of fact, one has to question whether this ideology of war corresponds to reality. Doubts are raised, for example, by the continuing high level of "collateral damage" (when will they manage to perfect the technology?), the disproportionate number of US and Allied troops lost to "friendly fire" (when will they better coordinate the information and command structures?), and the unending problems military forces face while conducting the "democratic transition" that follows after "regime change" (when will they train the army better in the social, political, and cultural tasks of national building?). To what extent is all that even possible? Eventually, as such contradictions persist and accumulate, the ideology will become increasingly difficult to maintain.

With the development of war technology and media, the notion of a technological war without bodies, or "bloodless war," became a new type of war–

unavoidable civilian casualties during military action. The question about identity representations and policy orientation toward military intervention brings us to the potentials of global responsibility discourses in the Kosovo Conflict as well as the Bosnian War. That issue will be the next chapter's main concern. The way in which NATO's intervention was exercised, via an air war, bore the construction of a humanitarian responsibility discourse used in the legitimation of the war. The air war helped the United States and NATO to wage a war in order to avoid their own casualties. However, the asymmetrical war destroyed the invaded Serbia and the defended Kosovo, and the subsequent restoring of the society remains yet to come in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) era. The *Wall Street Journal*'s appraisal of the precision munitions along with the air war illustrates a negative side of the articulation of global responsibility within the technology-driven military intervention, without mentioning the suffering and casualties in Kosovo and Serbia: "But in Kosovo, NATO's American-led bombers, some originating their missions from inside the US, destroyed discrete targets measurable by addresses on a doorway. […] All this without casualties."[50] The dangerous ramifications of technological warfare in NATO's two military interventions surrounding the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict bring us to the debates over the potentiality of global responsibility discourses.

Endnotes

[1] For an example of diachronic and synchronic analyses of the Kosovo Conflict, see Malmvig (2006).
[2] For a detailed explanation of the dichotomy of the villain and the victim in the Kosovo Conflict, see Janzekovic (2006).
[3] Editorial. (1998, June 6). Rising storm in the Balkans. *New York Times*, p. A10.
[4] Editorial. (1998, March 2). A useful Balkan firewall. *New York Times*, p. A16; Editorial. (1998, March 8). Unified pressure on Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. 4.16; Editorial. (1998, June 6). Rising storm in the Balkans. *New York Times*, p. A10.
[5] Editorial. (1998, March 8). Unified pressure on Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. 4.16.

[6] Editorial. (1998, May 10). To prevent a wider war in Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. 4.14; Editorial. (1998, June 6). Rising storm in the Balkans. *New York Times*, p. A10.
[7] Editorial. (1999, March 10). Modest assaults only, please. *Washington Post*, p. A22.
[8] Editorial. (1998, October 13). Hold firm in Kosovo. *Washington Post*, p. A14.
[9] See also Editorial. (1998, October 30). "Peace in Kosovo," *Washington Post*, p. A26.
[10] Editorial. (1999, March 21). The right exit strategy. *Washington Post*, p. B6.
[11] Editorial. (1998, June 5). Another Bosnia?. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A14.
[12] Editorial. (1998, March 9). Violence in Kosovo. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18.
[13] Editorial. (1998, December 29). Kosovo for the holidays. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A12; Editorial. (1999, January 19). Letting Kosovo burn. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A22.
[14] For a detailed explanation of the Balkan discourse, see Hansen (2006, pp. 95-114).
[15] Editorial. (1998, March 2). A useful Balkan firewall. *New York Times*, p. A16; Editorial. (1998, March 8). Unified pressure on Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. 4.16; Editorial. (1998, June 6). Rising storm in the Balkans. *New York Times*, p. A10.
[16] Editorial. (1998, March 13). Kosovo's peaceful activists. *New York Times*, p. A18.
[17] Editorial. (1998, May 23). Muzzling Yugoslavia's media. *New York Times*, p. A14.
[18] For example, Editorial. (1998, May 23). Muzzling Yugoslavia's media. *New York Times*, p. A14; Editorial. (1998, October 22). Muzzling dissent in Serbia. *New York Times*, p. A26.
[19] Editorial. (1999, March 24). The rationale for air strikes. *New York Times*, p. A26.
[20] Editorial. (1999, March 31). Answering Mr. Milosevic. *New York Times*, p. A24.
[21] For a discussion on the diversification of the ideological spectrum in the media for political issues, see Hallin (1994).
[22] For a detailed discussion on the narrative of melodrama for war reporting, see Hammond (2000) and Anker (2005).
[23] Editorial. (1999, March 24). The rationale for air strikes. *New York Times*, p. A26.
[24] For an analysis of media and sex scandals in the political field including the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, see Thompson (2000, pp. 119-158).
[25] Editorial. (1999, March 26). Follow me?. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A22.
[26] Editorial. (1999, June 1). The Holbrooke holdup. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A22.
[27] Editorial. (1999, March 24). The next Kosovo. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A26.
[28] Editorial. (1999, March 31). Indict Milosevic. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A22.
[29] Editorial. (1999, May 3). Milosevic blinks. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A22; Editorial. (1999, May 25). Troops toward Kosovo. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A26.
[30] Editorial. (1999, June 8). Milosevic stiffs Clinton. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18.
[31] Editorial. (1999, April 13). Declare war. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18.
[32] For further discussion on the portrayal of the enemy leader, see Willcox (2006) and Janzekovic (2006).
[33] Editorial. (1999, June 11). Peace and the K.L.A. *New York Times*, p. A32. See also, Editorial. (1999, November 24). Failures of peace in Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. A22: "NATO must also take responsibility for its failure to protect Serbs and Gypsies and preserve the possibility of a multi-ethnic Kosovo."
[34] Editorial. (1999, June 11). Peace and the K.L.A. *New York Times*, p. A32. See also, Editorial. (1999, June 23). A Deal to Demilitarize the K.L.A. *New York Times*, p. A18.
[35] Editorial. (1999, June 26). Mr. Clinton looks home. *New York Times*, p. A12; Editorial. (1999, July 27). Kosovo's incomplete peace. *New York Times*, p. A18; Editorial. (1999, July 30). Rebuilding the Balkans. *New York Times*, p. A18.
[36] Editorial. (1999, June 11). Success in Kosovo. *Washington Post*, p. A36.
[37] Editorial. (1999, June 20). Gunned down. *Washington Post*, p. B6; Editorial. (1999, November 24). Muted victory. *Washington Post*, p. A22.
[38] Editorial. (1999, December 26). A police force for Kosovo. *Washington Post*, p. B6.
[39] Editorial. (1999, June 11). A substitute for victory. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18.
[40] Editorial. (1999, June 11). A substitute for victory. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18.
[41] Editorial. (1998, June 5). Another Bosnia?. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A14.
[42] For example, Editorial. (1999, April 11). The sacking of Kosovo. *Washington Post*, p. B6; Editorial. (1999, April 13). Mr. Milosevic's wars. *Washington Post*, p. A20.

[43] Military intervention was promoted in the premise that the danger of Mr. Milosevic's violence was surpassed the dangers produced by the NATO's bombing. For example, in the *Washington Post*, Editorial. (1998, September 16). A massacre without knives. *Washington Post*, p. A16; Editorial. (1999, February 21). High stakes in Kosovo. *Washington Post*, p. B6; Editorial. (1999, March 21). The right exit strategy. *Washington Post*, p. B6; Editorial. (1999, April 30). The House Republicans duck. *Washington Post*, p. A34; Editorial. (April 15, 1999). Casualties seen and unseen. *Washington Post*. p. A30.

[44] Editorial. (1999, June 11). A substitute for victory. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18.

[45] Editorial. (1999, June 11). Success in Kosovo. *Washington Post*, p. A36.

[46] For example, Editorial. (1998, December 9). NATO's next 50 years. *Washington Post*, p. A24; Editorial. (1999, January 20). The Kosovo test. *Washington Post*, p. A26.

[47] Editorial. (1999, June 6). The Kremlin looks West. *New York Times*, p. 4.18.

[48] The *Spider-man* film series are epitomes of the plot development of melodrama, such as the hero (Spider-man)'s lonely pursing his duty for protecting victims from corrupted, brutal villains.

[49] Editorial. (1999, March 30). Terror in Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. A22; Editorial. (1999, April 2). Patience and tenacity in Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. A20; Editorial. (1999, April 4). Rationed war news from Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. 4.10; Editorial. (1999, April 6). Russia's role in Kosovo. *New York Times*, p. 26; Editorial. (1999, April 11). War in an era of ethnic conflict. *New York Times*, p. 4.16.

[50] Editorial. (1999, June 11). A substitute for victory. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18.

CHAPTER 7

THE POTENTIALITY OF GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCOURSES IN THE MAINSTREAM US MEDIA: BOSNIA AND KOSOVO

Chapters 5 and 6, while analyzing mainstream US media discourses on the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict, examined the construction of global responsibility and the articulation of the responsibility discourses in other discursive practices including the identities of the involved actors and the way in which the interventions were carried out. Borrowing analytical elements used in the international relations model developed by poststructuralist scholars, the two previous chapters examined global responsibility discourses associated with the construction of the role conceptions of the United States in relation to other national/global institutional identities, and its own policy orientations and national interests. The main finding of the two previous chapters is that global responsibility is in a functional relationship to US national identity (along with those of other states and global governance systems) and foreign policy orientations.

This chapter further explores the political and moral dimensions of the construction and articulation of the discourse of global responsibility in the mainstream US media first by examining the similarities and differences in the two NATO military interventions, and, second, by introducing the intertextuality of the mainstream US media discourse. The objective of comparing the two intervention cases within the mainstream US media discourse and introducing discourses outside of the mainstream media is to discuss the potential results of global responsibility claims that took place in the mainstream US media discourse in the 1990s involving Bosnia and Kosovo. The research design is devised to seek a way to understand the discursive functionality of the responsibility claims in a wider society. In other words, the aim is to discuss the potential

relationships between responsibility discourses as role conception and policy orientation, and to situate the relationships within a broader context in which the definition and articulation of the responsibility discourses involving the two cases in the mainstream US media can be compared with other comparative discourses. In doing so, the chapter will discuss how global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media associated with the two chosen cases may or may not have served to materialize the objective of the notion of global responsibility. In addition, the chapter will consider how the mainstream US media discourse is related to the public's experiencing and acting upon global responsibility, or lack there-of, in the two cases of military intervention.

The combined analysis of the two crises in Bosnia and Kosovo is devised to provide a framework to examine the potential of the discursive practices in the mainstream US media by comparing and contrasting the two cases dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6. The contextualization of the responsibility discourses in the two cases is crucial to understanding the politics of responsibility discourses on a global scope by observing the formation (use and movement) of global responsibility discourses involving the two crises in the mainstream US media.

It is useful to note that the presuppositions that assuming responsibility for the two crises (in media discourse) did not necessarily ensure all potentials done in revising the wrongdoings and reducing distant suffering in the crises. In short, claiming responsibility for the crises would not have warranted positive functions that the claims argued for. For instance, criticizing Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian government during the eventful period of the Bosnian War did not dictate the support for punishing the wrongdoers by waging an air war against them. Meanwhile, opposing Milosevic's drive

to an extreme Serbian nationalism did not support the unconditional deployment of US ground troops against Serbia. Furthermore, in order to examine the political and moral implications of the policy opinions postulated in the mainstream US media, it is necessary to compare the policy opinions of the three chosen US newspapers with those of other discourse sources.

Particularly, critics of NATO's military intervention against Serbia point out two political functions of the legitimation of the intervention and the subsequent justification of the means in using military force (Hammond, 2000). First, humanitarian responsibility served to legitimize NATO's war, which was not legally authorized by the UN Security Council. According to the opponents of the intervention, the proponents' point of view that the war is "illegal, but moral" is propaganda. In this regard, the Kosovo case can be a comparative case to the first Gulf War in 1990 in terms of the UN Security Council's approval of military force. Second, the way in which the intervention was exercised, in this case an air war, has been controversial in achieving the objective of moral imperatives for legitimation of the war when it comes to avoidable civilian sufferings and causalities. On the contrary, the events surrounding Srebrenica in July 1995 were viewed as the epitome of the West's inaction.

Finally, the purpose of discussing the potentials of global responsibility discourses for Bosnia and Kosovo in the mainstream US media in this chapter is not to offer an account of evaluating theoretical and practical measures taken in NATO's interventions. Rather, the goal is to provide conceptual and empirical tools to understand the mechanism that the responsibility discourses performed in the mainstream US media as a hegemonic link between the identities of the United States, former Yugoslav parts,

other national and supranational actors, and their policy orientations. To reach the objective, this chapter observes (1) the scope of action and consequences surrounding global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media, (2) the stability of global responsibility discourses for Bosnia and Kosovo in relation to domestic responsibility, and finally (3) the intertextuality of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media.

The Scope of Action and Consequences

US responsibility discourses can be divided into prospective and retrospective responsibilities by the projection and appropriation of the consequences (re)produced by US engagement in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict, as dealt with in the two previous chapters. In this section, I will examine the scope of action and consequences, both prospective and retrospective, surrounding key elements of global responsibility discourses including moral urgency, the UN's legal authority and US unilateralism, presenting opposing opinions, and technological warfare and the sanitization of war.

Moral Urgency and Ambiguous Rationalization of the "Dangers of Inaction"

The scope of (in)action and subsequent consequences dealt with in the mainstream US media involving the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict can be a tool to observe the potentiality of global responsibility discourses. Unlike motives or intentions that can be hard to be identified in substance, analyzing the scope of action and consequences constructed in the media discourse can offer the discursive functions of global responsibility in the chosen newspapers. Moreover, combining the two comparable intervention cases helps to trace the use and movement of global responsibility and the possibility of mobilizing compassions and practices from a global society by examining

the scope of action and consequences. For example, NATO's policy on Srebrenica and Kosovo can be comparative cases illustrating non-intervention and intervention.

That the danger of inaction surpassed the danger of actions was one of the most salient arguments constructed in the mainstream US media in legitimation of military intervention, especially in the Kosovo Conflict. The mainstream US media argued that NATO's intervention against Serbia could be justified by moral principles marginalizing international legality and by the anticipated outcomes of potential intervention (rationalization). Although rationalization cannot be separated from moralization in function, relying on "mean-orientation" (rationalization based on the effects of the intervention) for legitimation of military intervention was a new strategy of the United States and NATO to legitimate military intervention against other sovereignties in that the mean-orientation is more distinctive in the Kosovo Conflict than others. For instance, the *New York Times* repeatedly used the rationalization strategy combined with moralization. The legitimation corresponded with President Clinton's emphasis that "the danger of acting must be weighted against the dangers of inaction," especially at the beginning of the air strikes in March 1999:

> Bombing is no sure thing, he said, but the dangers of acting must be weighed against the dangers of inaction. The purpose is to limit Mr. Milosevic's ability to attack the people of Kosovo, and get him to sign the peace plan that would be safeguarded by NATO peacekeeping troops. There is also American interest in keeping war from spreading, possibly to the NATO members Greece and Turkey. Moreover, carrying out a threat that the West has been making since October is necessary to deter others who would kill innocents in the future (Editorial. (1999, March 24). The rationale for air strikes. *New York Times*, p. A26).

"The dangers of inaction" was the logic of legitimation that emphasized what must happen and what must be done by the international community in order to react to

and prevent humanitarian suffering in and beyond Kosovo. The military intervention in 1999 was legitimized in the mainstream US media to protect victims of the conflict in moral evaluation, while rationalization in means-orientation also served to legitimate the intervention in a broader set of consequences beyond the victims of the conflict. But the precarious and unstable form of the prospective responsibility narrowed the scope of negative consequences for Kosovo that in return made the prospective accountability of the subject ambiguous. On the contrary, the legitimation strategy broadened the scope of the positive consequences of the potential intervention beyond the victims of the conflict. The ambiguousness conveyed by the projected improvement of the situation with military intervention also fortified the pro-military intervention discourse by promoting the anticipated positive effects of military intervention not only for victims but also for regional stability.

Moralization in the mainstream US media with regard to the legitimation of both interventions was accompanied with their specific rational objectives, while hiding other potential or unintended consequences. Thus, it can be argued that the lack of background information can lead to the ambiguousness of potential consequences of NATO's interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. The ambiguity created the inevitableness of a pro-intervention policy orientation by urging the US government to take on viable options. This ambiguousness also served to legitimate military intervention by abstracting the situation, which in turn narrowed the scope of possible action and subsequent negative consequences that the intervening actors would be accountable for. In other words, the urgency built on the dangers of non-intervention and ambiguousness also functioned to reduce the accountability of the United States and NATO for potential unintended

consequences as a result of military actions. The unintended consequences may mean the "known as unknown" rather than "unknown" since potential consequences are selectively presented and excluded.

The dangers of inaction and the urgent request of military intervention also functioned to narrow the policy options available in the repertoire of agenda and to limit the scope of perceivable consequences. The contracted realm of actions and consequences reduced the scope of evaluative criteria involving the Kosovo Conflict. The specific orientation of foreign policy has a deep bearing on subsequent consequences. Foucault (1991) maintains that "they [discourses] form a practice which is articulated upon the other practices." Identifying consequences followed by specific chosen policy should be considered in realizing the objective of global responsibility claims. Thus, it can be argued that the claim of the dangers of inaction had negative ramifications in that it did not assume the accountability for the consequences of the action chosen as the last resort of the use of force.

Not taking dangerous ramifications seriously is another discrepancy of retrospective responsibility between the presentation of responsibility discourses and the realizations of the objectives of those discourses. This is evident in the mistaken bombings of civilians in Serbia and its neighboring states in the Kosovo case as well as the deteriorated living conditions in the area. In a broader term, the consequences can be dealt with the legality of international legal authority and the UN's roles for future international conflicts, especially in the 1995 NATO air strikes against the Republic of Srpska and subsequent peacekeeping processes in Bosnia and the legality of the 1999 NATO air strikes against Serbia.

The discursive strategy of urgency regarding Kosovo in 1999 in the mainstream US media contradicted the strategy used regarding Bosnia in 1995. It took three years for the mainstream US media to attribute responsibility for Bosnia from European allies to the United States until the United States took the initiative to determine NATO policy on the use of force after the Srebrenica massacre in 1995.

A New Exceptionalism of the United States and the Weakening of UN's Legal Authority

In relation to the global legal structure, NATO's interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict had a bearing on the declination of the UN's ability as the single authority to legitimate the use of force in other sovereignties. The pre-military intervention period of the Bosnian War was evaluated as the failure of the UN within the mainstream US media, while the results of the intervention were attributed to US leadership and responsibility for global security. In Kosovo, the UN was even sidelined in the legitimation processes of the intervention, and moralization combined with rationalization replaced the legal authorization of the military intervention. Thus, a new form of legitimation of the use of force against other sovereignties emerged at the cost of the UN's ability to legitimate states' use of legitimate violence in other sovereignties. Moreover, mainstream US media had excluded in their editorials the point that NATO's Kosovo intervention was illegal. Considering the effects and consequences of the 1999 NATO military intervention against Serbia, the legality is a key element in evaluating the legitimacy of the military intervention grounded on humanitarian responsibility. It can be thus argued that moral grounds established the legitimate violence in the NATO's military intervention in 1999 in the US mainstream media, while the intervention was largely viewed as illegal under the international law.

The weakening role of the UN and international legality in the mainstream US media clearly echoed the narrowed scope of actions and consequences. The exclusivity of the UN as the responsible agency for military intervention had a significance in the new world order and its global legal structure. Although the legality of the UN became increasingly fragile in the post-Cold War era, the military intervention against Serbia in 1999, without the approval of the UN Security Council, further weakened the organization's authority. Given the establishment of the old world order during the Cold War in which the UN had the single authority to sanction military intervention against other sovereignties, any military intervention without UN Security Council approval would have deteriorated the frailty of the UN. In this regard, global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media functioned within a narrower scope of action and consequences in Bosnia and Kosovo since the discourses did not indicate the international legality for a longer term perspective of prospective responsibility. The narrowed scope of the consequences followed by the use of military force, without the authorization from the UN Security Council was problematic in realizing the potential of the responsibility discourses. On the contrary, the other two UN Security Council members, Russia and China, were portrayed as opportunistic and irresponsible in the mainstream US newspapers when they opposed the US-led policy orientations toward Bosnia and Kosovo. Meanwhile, they appeared to be responsible global powers, although not as UN Security Council members, when their participation after the NATO's war was required for peacekeeping in Kosovo.

In relation to the changing conditions of legitimation of military intervention in the new world order, NATO's intervention in Bosnia can be understood as the remedy

and reaction to the crisis, and the intervention against Serbia as reaction and prevention. The US-led second Gulf War in 2003 can be regarded as preventative and preemptive. The trend clearly proves the United States to be the only remaining super power. The US government and media's legitimation through moralization and rationalization fit in Hardt and Negri's (2004, pp. 7-10) explanation of US exceptionalism. First, for moralization it means "*an exception from the corruption* of the European forms sovereignty" from an ethical foundation and "republican virtue in the world." Second, in regards to rationalization, it involves "a relatively new meaning–*exception from the law*." From a liberal tradition, for example, Rawls (1999), the two exceptions may not contradict each other by dividing decent and indecent states in geopolitics. Hardt and Negri (2004, p. 9), however, disagree with the idea that US exceptionalism can guarantee the realization of "freedom, equality, and democracy" due to the contradiction of the two notions of exceptionalism. This may imply the changing notion of sovereignty in discourse and practice. A new form of discursive construction of sovereignty will be dealt with in the next and final chapter.

Presenting Opposing Opinions

Not surprisingly, mainstream US media did not cover opposing opinions seriously concerning the NATO interventions in 1995 and 1999. Instead, the UN, Russia, China, and of course, the enemy states/factions in the wars were represented as obstacles and objects to criticize. Besides the legality of the two interventions into Bosnia and Serbia, there had been voluminous oppositional reactions to the interventions. First of all, the United States and its NATO allies had different Bosnian policies, which were generally framed as the military inability of Europe in the mainstream US media. Second, US liberals were divided in supporting the US and NATO military interventions based on

humanitarian responsibility and subsequent right to intervene in the build-up to the launching of the two military interventions. As Žižek (1999) argued in his paper entitled "Against the Double Blackmail," the NATO bombing on Yugoslavia was related to "humiliating Russia" by marginalizing Russia's influence in Eastern Europe. Three interrelated questions result from this conclusion. First, were the interventions simply reflective of the changes or efficient movement of the international community's enforcement of peace within the changing conditions of international relations and new world order? Second, was the mobilization of responsibility acquired through humanitarian discourse not abused by the US project to sustain and reinforce its global hegemony in the post-Cold War era? Especially considering, the "center-left" administration's self-representation fit well into the category of the humanitarian supporters, why then did "successful intervention" not happen in other regions, such as Somalia or Cambodia at roughly synchronical periods? Third, if the consequences of both interventions in the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict were not necessarily positive, or if the productive, creative energy produced by responsibility claims was absorbed by the dominant power (the US political and military elites in these cases) then does it mean there ought to be no military intervention without UN authorization? How then could it be dealt with other humanitarian crises under the current frailty of the UN?

Žižek (1999) points out that given selective intervention based on the strategic interests of NATO, the Serbian aggressive nationalism, and subsequent "humanitarian militarism," these were not the problems of the new world order, but the very result of the order. Regarding NATO's legitimation of the intervention into Serbia as the "false" one, Žižek argues that a new third way is necessary in that NATO's military intervention in

Kosovo, as a “double blackmail,” strengthened aggressive foreign policy combined with the use of force and boosted the anti-Western movement and resistance in the invaded nations. Unlike NATO’s prewar premise, it could not break the vicious circle of the antagonism in the world if anti-interventionist voices were not even audible for deliberation in the West.

Technological Warfare and the “Sanitization” of War

The US media’s concerns about unintended US soldiers and civilian casualties in interventions, which can be identified as domestic and humanitarian responsibilities, are among the issues that can be discussed in the moral evaluation and effectiveness of military intervention in general and Bosnia and Kosovo in particular. Accordingly, “sanitized war” associated with technological warfare was divided into two responsibility discourses: domestic and global. In regard to domestic responsibility, the US public has vehemently opposed mass casualties in foreign conflicts since the Vietnam War. The second form of war sanitization was related to the unintended civilian causalities in the former Yugoslavia territories. Both forms of responsibilities were related to air war combined with precision munitions that provided low risk of US soldiers and personnel and were said to be able to minimize unintended results from air strikes. Both wars were exercised by air power along with precision munitions, and civilian casualties and refugees created by the two NATO wars were treated as an opportunity cost in order to stop genocide and rescue Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia, and Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo. The contrast between domestic responsibility for US soldiers and civilian suffering in Bosnia and Kosovo in the mainstream US press implies that, as Hammond (2000) points out, the interventions were more about the self-image of the United States and NATO in terms of moralization.

The construction of technological warfare can be traced back to the discourse of a "revolution in military affairs (RMA)" (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 41). After the end of the Cold War, US technological dominance over the rest of the world created a new combat strategy. The construction of technological warfare presented as the panacea of battle was interrelated to the construction of US policy orientations. It should also be investigated further how the notion of air war facilitated military intervention more easily in the mainstream US media in that the possibility of relatively low US casualties allowed the United States to use its force more easily. The following two *Wall Street Journal* editorials illustrate the efficiency of the modern warfare:

> As architects of modern warfare, they understand that if the United States feels compelled to use military force, the job should be finished as quickly as possible. That means deploying that force overwhelmingly. This is so not only for reasons of politics or strategy, but for reasons of morality (Editorial. (1999, June 3). War, civilians and morality. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A26).

> Now, it must be acknowledged that this intervention has tangled many conventional wisdoms and normally predictable ideological lines. This is hardly surprising in a post Cold War era marked mainly by technology-driven changes coming so fast that even the participants themselves barely know what to make of them. So too with Yugoslavia, an ancient place suddenly in the grip of a hands-on barbarism called ethnic cleansing, now apparently ended by warfare's most modern technologies. Clearly some new watersheds have been crossed. One, clearly, is that computer-guided air power must suddenly be reckoned a very potent instrument of military strategy. For sure the use of air power alone in this instance raises many issues worth discussion. But in Kosovo, NATO's American-led bombers, some originating their missions from inside the U.S., destroyed discrete targets measurable by addresses on a doorway. […] All this without casualties (Editorial. (1999, June 11). A substitute for victory. *Wall Street Journal*, p. A18).

Besides the sanitization of the military actions into Bosnia and Serbia with the notion of no casualties, the presence of army and ground troops in the peacekeeping

process after military intervention was crucial for preserving peace, as acknowledged in the mainstream US media's responsibility discourses and policy opinions in the post-military intervention periods. Still, war legitimation based on technological supremacy tended to hide the concerns prior to the interventions. It was also clear that the use of precision munitions and air strikes were constructed as a panacea for the problems associated with the casualties and suffering of both US soldiers and civilians in Bosnia and Kosovo, according to the mainstream US media. Therefore, the emphasis on technological warfare reduced, in both interventions, the scope of action and consequences regarding the responsibility for civilians of Bosnia and Kosovo in the mainstream US media. Humanitarian concerns associated with global responsibility became "cookie cutter" by celebrating technological advancement as a possibility to promote humanitarian intervention, but not considering the peculiarity of the contexts in which a crisis is embedded or from a victims' perspective as constructed in the quoted *Wall Street Journal* editorials on June 11, 1999: "All this without casualties."

The Stability and Consistency of Global Responsibility Discourses

The stability of global responsibility discourses, particularly humanitarian responsibility, is important in understanding its potency when it comes to the intersection of domestic responsibility and global responsibility and that of humanitarian responsibility and global security responsibility. The policy opinions presented in the mainstream US media urging the military intervention and emphasizing the dangers of inaction at the beginning of military intervention in Bosnia were withdrawn when humanitarian responsibility was impeded by domestic responsibility. In other words, unlike the early stage of acknowledging the crises with no need to specify the subject of

assuming the responsibility, the responsibility discourse was often muted when specific means of the United States to engage in the crises were demanded.

In conceiving the role of the United States in the interventions, the placement of US ground troops in Bosnia and Kosovo for military action and peacekeeping was one of the most critical issues of US policy orientation during the intervention and post-intervention periods. But humanitarian responsibility discourse was at times withdrawn from the editorials or remained hidden when the necessity of deploying US ground troops was raised. It can thus be argued that, with the exception of *Wall Street Journal* editorials in the post-military intervention periods of the Kosovo Conflict, US national interest had been the fundamental basis linking domestic responsibility discourse to policy orientation.

> The real issue in Bosnia is not one of the United States living up to its NATO responsibilities nor of continued American engagement in European security. Neither of those is in any doubt. The relevant question is whether the United States has a strong enough interest in the outcome of the Bosnian conflict to risk its troops in ground combat. In the view of this page, it does not. (Editorial. (1995, June 3). Bosnia: Not America's war. *New York Time*, p. A18).

The consistency of global responsibility discourses can be traced back not only by the stability of humanitarian responsibility, but also by the way in which the war was exercised. Emphasizing domestic responsibility also accompanied by the redefinition of importance of humanitarian responsibility. Although it was not necessarily so, domestic responsibility discourse, especially in the case of the deployment of US ground troops and peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, may have contradicted with humanitarian responsibility when it came to when and how the responsibility discourse was promoted. Thus, the re-definition and articulation of global responsibility within national interests can demonstrate the vulnerability of the claims of humanitarian responsibility for the distant suffering of Bosnia and Kosovo civilians compared with US casualties. The inconsistency of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US

media may question the precarious, instable construction of the hegemonic humanitarian responsibility discourse in the Kosovo Conflict without legal authorization.

The Intertextuality of the Mainstream US Media

Global responsibility discourses became a master-narrative surrounding military intervention in the post-Cold War era. Those who speak of global responsibility vary from hegemonic and semi-hegemonic states including the US government to various actors and institutions including media situated within the hierarchy of the global power structure. The discourse of responsibility on a global scope is not free from the global power structure and the political-military-industrial complex. The intertextuality of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media provides not only comparative, and thus analytical, elements to this study but also offers a possibility to deconstruct the hegemonic ideas by comparing them with other readings and interpretations intertwined in different contexts from those of the mainstream US media. In order to examine their similarities and differences covering the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict in the mainstream US media discourse and other comparable discourses, I chose the following archival sources surrounding the military interventions in Bosnia and Serbia: 1) US government/military's official discourse, 2) alternative US media, 3) a semi-hegemonic state's (left leaning) mainstream media, and 4) the news releases of a representative global non-governmental organization (NGO).

US Government and Military Discourse

As shown in the analysis of global responsibility discourses in Chapters 5 and 6, there were homologies surrounding military interventions between the US government's policy orientation and the mainstream US media's policy opinions. In the early 1990s, the US government and military proposed to reinforce its hegemony in international relations.

For example, the key argument in the Pentagon document entitled, “Ways to Thwart Challenges to Primacy of America,” was the maintenance of the US hegemonic position as the superpower in the new world order. The argument of the document explicitly includes the notion of “benevolent domination by one power.” The US hegemonic status in geopolitics and discourse supporting the US hegemonic position include US credibility and benevolent responsibility. In the Pentagon document in 1992:

> While the US cannot become the world’s “policeman,” by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of US interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to US citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to US society from narcotics trafficking (Tyler, 1992, p. 1).

The notion of US leadership was not something new in the early 1990s; it has existed at least since the two World Wars and the Vietnam War when US moral duty and practical capability to protect its allies were unchallenged during the Cold War period. But the association of global responsibility claims and US national interests in military intervention was still not explicit. The notion of benevolent domination was specified in a document published in 1995 by reconfirming US interventionism:

> Our nation can only address this era’s dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs. We are the world’s greatest power, and we have global interests as well as responsibilities. As our nation learned after World War I, we can find no security for America in isolationism nor prosperity in protectionism. For the American people to be safer and enjoy expanding opportunities, our nation must work to deter would-be aggressors, open foreign markets, promote the spread of democracy abroad, encourage sustainable development and pursue new opportunities for peace (White House, 1995).

The 1995 Nation Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement document clarified the US interventionism and reconfirmed the strategic importance of the security/hegemony stability that intersects US global interests and responsibilities. The US security strategy was clearly echoed by the mainstream US media discourse for humanitarian responsibility and global security responsibility. Global security responsibility may have existed prior to humanitarian responsibility in terms of strategic importance. But the link between the two may have been more easily embraced by the notion of "benevolent domination." Both discourses of global responsibility were found in the analysis of the mainstream US media's global responsibility discourses for Bosnia and Kosovo in earlier chapters and the previous sections in this chapter.

The Clinton administration's foreign policy consolidated a new US interventionism in 1999, which is also known as the "Clinton doctrine." President Clinton argued for interventionism in his speech on February 26, 1999, alluding to the fact that global stability was associated with US strategic interests for the maintenance and reinforcement of the US hegemony along with its economic interests. The interventionism was materialized in the NATO's air war against Serbia in March 1999:

> It's easy … to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this or that valley in Bosnia, or who owns a strip of brushland in the Horn of Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are, or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so (quoted in Klare, 1999, p. 5).

From the government and military's discourse on interventionism associating US strategic interests and global responsibility, the discourse of global responsibility was put

forward as a key element to project US military interventions of the 1990s. Military intervention was viewed in the document to be based on a larger strategic framework for the US hegemonic stability, and global responsibility was at times promoted as the driving force for military intervention when "inaction" involving internationalized conflicts was associated with an unaffordable shame.

Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO between 1997 and 2000, who commanded the Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo War, also linked US interventionism to US interests and moral responsibility:

> Because we live and extol these values, the US enjoys a solid ethical basis for its power, a supportive community of like-minded nations and international institutions, and a moral force that extends our influence. Preserving these ideas and projecting our values should therefore be ranked among the most important of American interests. […] Living up to our values will cost resources that could always be used elsewhere. We can't do everything. But these burdens we must carry, if we expect to maintain the benefits we currently enjoy. They provide hope for others, and a purpose beyond our own prosperity. "Shared risks, shared burdens, shared benefits"–it's not only a good motto for NATO, it's also a good prescription for America's role in the world (Clark, 2001, p. 461).

Alternative US Media: The *Nation*

For the context of the mainstream US media's global responsibility discourses, I will examine an alternative US media's discourse covering the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict. In doing so, I will use the evaluation tools used in the previous sections in this chapter: first, the scope of action and consequences (moral urgency, the legality of the UN, presenting opposing opinions, and technological warfare), and, second, the stability and consistency of global responsibility in relation to national interests. Analyzing the alternative US media discourse in relation to its mainstream counterpart can offer an opportunity to situate the mainstream media discourse within a broader

political spectrum and identify the characteristics of the responsibility conception in both media arenas. Further, it illustrates the potentiality inherent in the hegemonic construction of global responsibility discourses. The meaning of the construction of global responsibility involving Bosnia and Kosovo in the mainstream US media can be more fully identified when compared with external discourses and contrasted with the other discourses in which global responsibility discourses were constructed and articulated in different ways.

The *Nation* was chosen as a representative case of alternative US media. The magazine consistently supported humanitarian responsibility, while it challenged the US government and mainstream media's claims of global responsibility regarding both humanitarian and security responsibilities. More precisely, the *Nation* was distinctive in approaching the warring factions in Bosnia under the framework of neutrality in its editorials covering the Bosnian War, compared to the three mainstream US newspapers. The magazine did not follow the US and NATO's general framework of the Bosnian policy in the course of the war in its policy opinions regarding the NATO's war against the Republic of Srpska (i.e., the "Clinton doctrine").[1] The position of neutrality dealing with the Bosnian warring factions in the magazine corresponded to the opposition to US and NATO unilateralism, in support of UN's primary roles in mediating the warring factions. The absence of the national interest frame in a narrow sense and US global stability strategies–constructed in the mainstream US media during the Bosnian War–was salient, and facilitated the magazine to embrace a broader spectrum of policy opinions.

The fact that the *Nation* editorials had a broader spectrum of policy opinions is partly due to the composition of the magazine's editorial department. It publishes mainly

anonymous editorials combined with named affiliated writers or editorial board members. However, the diversified ideological spectrum in the editorials also shows that they had not been grounded on the US national interest frame in a narrow sense. Thus, the analysis of the *Nation* reveals the selectivity and exclusivity of the mainstream US media's construction of the Bosnian War, along with different problems with the NATO intervention against the Republic of Srpska.

More specifically, the *Nation* consistently employed a position of neutrality throughout the entire Bosnian War period, not adopting the good and evil dichotomy although it defined the Bosnian Serbs as the most accountable for the crisis. Second, the magazine defined the instability in Bosnia as a political, rather than ethnic, crisis, and viewed the United States and European states not as external interventional actors but as deeply involved ones in the development of the war. The following editorial indicates that the US and EC's inconsistent policy on the former Yugoslav ethnic groups and factions' independence declaration deteriorated the political instability of the former Yugoslav territories:

> The international community also has a responsibility to aid Bosnia because its actions contributed to the fighting. In the European Community's first intervention last year, it offered Yugoslavia associate membership if the federation held together. Rather than a neutral position, this was seen as backing the designs of Belgrade and the federal army. After more than a dozen cease-fires in the Serb-Croat war, the E.C., under strong German pressure, switched its support and recognized Slovenia and Croatia, despite the determination by the E.C.'s own independence commission that Croatia's maltreatment of its Serb minority disqualified it (Borden, A. (August 31, 1992). Bosnian rescue?. *Nation, 255*(6), pp. 196-197).

Defining the Bosnian crisis as a political, not ethnic, one, the *Nation* maintained that the US and European policy of recognizing Bosnia's independence did not consider their potential political role of mediation between the Balkan warring parties:

> The situation is more complex than a good/evil dichotomy. Because of our legitimate revulsion at the Bosnian Serbs' behavior, we seem to have forgotten that they have legitimate claims to procedural consideration of their desire for self-determination. We need to talk to all sides. Fairness requires us to weigh Serbian claims on the same scales we use for Muslims and Croats (Kenney, G. (1995, August 14). Snowed in Bosnia. *Nation, 261*(5), pp. 151-152).

Consequently, the *Nation* consistently emphasized the UN's roles in securing the stability in Bosnia, and generally opposed the US government's policy of lifting the embargo in the pre-military intervention period: "Advocates of isolationism and unilateralism cannot hide their glee that UNPROFOR, the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, has been so ineffectual. But what this poor performance really shows is that UN operations must be fundamentally reconceived, not abandoned."[2] The magazine's editorials positively evaluated the UN's efforts toward Bosnian peace. On the contrary, the Contact group was represented as unreliable and self-interested. For example, in an editorial on June 19, 1995: "The truth is that the contact group leaders are at this point more interested in containment of the war's political fallout on their own soil than the fate of Bosnian or its people," and "Take the U.N.-mandated tribunal on Balkan war crimes led by Judge Richard Goldstone, which has already taken the important step of including rape as a war crime."[3] In the same editorial:

> None of the countries party to the ill-advised NATO airstrikes are serious about resettlement of ex-Yugoslav refugees, who still languish in camps around Europe. The United States and other countries play active roles in the global arms trade, which helps fuel the Bosnian war. What's more, some of the war's central issues–jurisdiction over

> crimes against humanity and the whole question of, U.N. peacekeeping–threaten the autonomy of the powerful governments of the contact group in arenas far beyond the Balkans (Editorial. (1995, June 19). Bad to worse in Bosnia. *Nation*, pp. 869-871).

The Srebrenica massacre also influenced the position of the *Nation* editorials. Continuing its multilateral approach to the war, the *Nation* included an editorial by Anthony Borden that supported potential military intervention.[4] Since the end of the military intervention, the *Nation* continued to argue for political solutions and negotiations: "The Realpolitik of peace may require that all warring parties, no matter how unsavory, talk."[5]

> Here there is a role for those in the United States who have stood properly aghast at the false choice between ethnic cleansing on the ground and bombs from the sky: to create ways of supporting those democrats in Serbia, Croatia and increasingly authoritarian Bosnia with the kinds of practical aid and solidarity once lent to dissident movements in Poland and South Africa. With ethnic separatism and demagogy continuing at a wartime pitch despite the prospect of an 'agreement:' those few who still stand for an alternative need all the help they can get (Editorial. (1995, October 2). Gunning for peace. *Nation, 261*(10), pp.335-336).

The *Nation*'s post-military intervention period editorials also presented different representations of the ending of the war from its mainstream counterparts. On the one hand, the magazine was critical of the results of the war: "The President presents this as a choice between international leadership and isolation. In reality this US intervention represents an abject failure of leadership and internationalism. The UN has little capacity or credibility to undertake this peacekeeping operation?"[6] Moreover, one of NATO's war causes, the explosion of the marketplace in the center of Sarajevo in August 1995, was also questioned by drawing on a UN report: "The crucial U.N. report on the market massacre is classified secret, but four specialists–a Russian, a Canadian and two

Americans–have raised serious doubts about its conclusion, suggesting instead that the mortar was fired not by the Serbs but by Bosnian government forces."[7]

On the other hand, the magazine was critical toward the deterioration of human rights and the feasibility of bringing peace back to Bosnia due to the NATO air war, whereas the mainstream US newspapers highly evaluated the government's policy initiative for ending the war in the same period. Among others, the *Nation*'s evaluation of the US roles in the peace plan was critical, especially in terms of global security and US unilateralism, which were the most contrasting viewpoints to those of the mainstream US media. NATO's irresponsibility for the peacekeeping budget epitomized the magazine's demand of NATO member states' assuming responsibility after the war: "Bosnia alone accounts for nearly two-thirds of the U.N.'s peacekeeping budget. If NATO assumes this responsibility, the cost of the U.N. will fall sharply (but not necessarily the cost for the United States–indeed, it may go up)."[8]

> Having scapegoated the U.N. in Somalia and Bosnia to protect its own mistakes, confusion and indecision, the Clinton Administration might at least hire a speechwriter who could remind it of how the U.N. serves America's larger purposes by seeking a world based on the rule of law, by its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the U.N. Charter's principles of collective security and social justice (Editorial. (1995, December 18). Debt of Shame," *Nation*, *261*(21), pp. 773).

The *Nation* showed a more dynamic change in its position regarding NATO's military intervention in Serbia throughout the Kosovo Conflict. In the pre-military intervention period, the magazine characterized the conflict in Kosovo as a humanitarian crisis and attributed the accountability of the crisis primarily to the violent Serbian government. Further, the magazine began to support military intervention for protecting the victims of the conflict under UN auspices.[9] The magazine claimed a more active

involvement of the international community as well as the United States for resolving the conflict and restoring the previous Kosovo Albanians' autonomous status (and its independence in the early-1999) before military intervention.[10] The *Nation* employed moralization through moral evaluation and comparison in the legitimation of the use of force. In the moral comparison, the Serbian "consistent racist oppression" and "ethnic cleansing" based on Serbian nationalism were contrasted to Kosovo Albanians' pacifism. Milosevic's oppressive Kosovo policy including his media policy gradually legitimated potential military intervention against Serbia in the period:[11]

> It shouldn't surprise anyone that some Kosovars have resorted to arms. It is amazing that they didn't earlier under Serbia's consistent racist oppression. For almost ten years Albanians in Kosovo have followed their elected President, Ibrahim Rugova, down the path of passive resistance, while Slobodan Milosevic imposed a devastating form of apartheid on them (Williams, I. (1998, March 30). Kosovo: Another Bosnia?" *Nation, 266*(11), pp. 4-5).

The *Nation*'s editorial opinions regarding NATO's war against Serbia became divided into two positions with the launch of air strikes in the Serb positions. The magazine presented both pro-interventionist and anti-interventionist approaches to the NATO's war for the first half of the intervention period, whereas it opposed not only to the way in which the war was carried out but also to the war itself during the second half of the war against Serbia. Interestingly, the position of situating the NATO's war within a "new strategic template for the US military establishment," surrounding global security, economic interests, and global stability, also supported the war.[12] It can be said, then, that the *Nation*'s editorials showed a diversified ideological spectrum on NATO's air war during the period.

The divide of the Kosovo policy opinions in the *Nation*'s editorials reflected that of US liberals regarding US interventionism for the first month of the NATO war, and the magazine thoroughly covered the two polarities. The division also shaped the representations of the warring parties in Serbia and Kosovo. On the one polarity, the intervention itself was supported to protect civilians under oppression, although the way in which the war was carried out was generally viewed to be problematic.[13] This position argued that international legality and the UN were not able to resolve international crises any more, and legitimated the NATO's war as humanitarian intervention: "Real internationalists can hardly use the dubious rights of 'national sovereignty' to oppose action to stop massacres. Opposition to US military intervention is an understandable rule of thumb, but it shouldn't become obsessive dogma."[14]

On the other polarity, the *Nation* editorials argued that NATO's intervention deteriorated the humanitarian crisis by further provoking Serbian nationalism. Editorials on this side criticized that the effects of the war did not serve the self-acclaimed war objective: "The catastrophic effects of the air war against Serbia subvert the Clinton Administration's declared humanitarian intentions"[15] and argued for diplomatic negotiation: "Right now the best prospect for saving lives is for the United States and its allies to bring all parties back to the negotiating table."[16] Thus, the weakening of potential roles of the UN and Russia in the mainstream US media appeared to be clearer, when compared to the *Nation*'s policy opinion on Kosovo.[17] Accordingly, both Serbian and Kosovo Albanian warring parts were evaluated to be accountable for the conflict.[18]

Next, a month after the beginning of the air war, the *Nation* began to argue for stopping the war, and consistently argued for bringing the UN and Russia back for

negotiation and for peace talks.[19] The magazine concluded that NATO credibility had been the priority of its intervention, not moral imperatives.[20] It also challenged the objective of NATO's air war and urged the United States and its NATO allies for humanitarian aid to rebuild the destroyed areas due to the air strikes. The policy opinion divide in the editorials of the first half of the military intervention period was partly due to its aforementioned editorialship. Thus, it may have included more diverse political orientations. But, considering the fact that the *Nation* editorials included more diversified views on the NATO war, it may be more plausible to view that the magazine functioned as a springboard for debate and deliberation on the possibility of humanitarian intervention for suffering people in Kosovo. The position of the magazine on Kosovo was similar to that of neutrality during NATO's intervention in Bosnia. The magazine's editorials considered the UN as the most reliable political actor and the UN was primed to help create global security in the post-military intervention, and even when the *Nation* generally supported military intervention for the first weeks of NATO air war.

The means of the NATO war were also challenged in the *Nation* in the second half of the military intervention period. The magazine consistently argued that the moral legitimation of the NATO war against Serbia was not tenable over the period.[21] It also delivered international public opinions on the anti-NATO intervention.[22] Most interestingly, the critics of the humanitarian intervention emerged as a more comprehensive approach to global responsibility including the anti-war movement for ending human suffering:[23]

> The strategic failure was driven not by military necessity but by political calculation. The President sensibly assumed that we wouldn't accept the loss of American lives to save the Kosovars. He disastrously assumed that Slobodan Milosevic would fold after a few days

> of bombing. When Milosevic chose instead to escalate attacks on the Kosovars, the President intensified the bombing, leaving the victims to their fate. But if we are not prepared to defend the Kosovars with American lives, what moral right have we to make war on the Serbs? In the gulf between ends and means lies the slaughter and displacement of nearly a million Kosovars (Editorial. (1999, May 24). Stop the war now," *Nation, 268*(19), pp. 3-4).

The two following quotations from the magazine illustrate the shift of the magazine's policy on the Kosovo crisis. The editorials in the *Nation* urged the US administration to intervene in the Kosovo Conflict before the direct military intervention in 1999 (February 22, 1999 issue), but it opposed the way that the intervention was undertaken when the military action deteriorated the humanitarian crisis (April 19, 1999 issue):

> Ideally, international forces should come under UN auspices, but the experience of Bosnia and the reluctance of Congress to fund any such forces suggest they would have to be NATO-led, even if the UN or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-already doing similar work in Bosnia -played a part in the follow-up. Above all, the purpose of intervention should be to protect the Kosovars, not to give Milosevic the excuse he needs to extract himself from a problem of his own making (Editorial. (1999, February 22). Independence for Kosovo. *Nation, 268*(7), pp. 3-4).

> With neither Europe nor the United States willing or likely to commit ground troops, this bombing campaign appears to risk little and has more to do with salvaging NATO credibility than saving Kosovar lives. The Administration and the allies have always been ambivalent about the Balkans. They want credit for ending ethnic violence but aren't willing to pay the price for suppressing it. The contradiction is at the center of what US officials call "coercive diplomacy"–based on the threat of military force, limited by an unwillingness to sustain casualties. (Editorial. (1999, April 1). Destroying Kosovo. *Nation, 268*(14), pp. 3-4).[24]

As the *Nation* editorial, entitled "Crossroads in Kosovo," (the online title, "Parents and Police," posted on April 8, 1999, April 26, 1999 issue) argued, the Kosovo

Conflict, like the Srebrenica events in July 1995, reflected the divisions among US progressives.[25] The debates between Bérubé and Herman (2002), who supported and challenged the US interventionism after the September attacks in 2001 respectively, can also be a useful source to contextualize the debates of US liberals and political lefts.

In the post-military intervention period, the *Nation* argued for humanitarian assistance for the people of Kosovo,[26] and critically reviewed the new global strategy of the United States.[27] From the *Nation* editorials over the period, it became clearer that the NATO air war created several problems that had not been dealt with seriously in the mainstream US media. This may imply the mainstream media's potential influence on public opinion involving NATO's intervention against Serbia through their selectivity and exclusivity of relevant issues. It is worth noting that the magazine functioned as a springboard for discussion and deliberation while covering perspectives for and against the NATO war against Serbia, unlike the mainstream media that presented a relatively coherent representation of the NATO war and policy opinions in terms of ideological position in their editorials.

The main findings in the analysis of the *Nation* editorials covering Bosnia and Kosovo can be summarized as follows: first, the scope of action and consequences was broader in the *Nation*'s editorials by discussing the broader consequences of the NATO intervention both intended and unintended. The magazine's editorials were similar to those of its mainstream counterparts in the pre-intervention period, while its approach to the NATO's wars differed from the mainstream media after the pre-intervention period. Second, the magazine continued to prioritize the role of the UN in resolving both crises. Third, the magazine generally presented the position of neutrality toward the warring

factions during the military intervention periods, especially the Kosovo case. The findings confirm the neutrality of the magazine's position. Next, the magazine generally opposed the means of the war due to the air wars' deterioration of the humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Kosovo. Global responsibility discourses, particularly humanitarian responsibility, were also stable and consistent throughout the wars. Finally, it is worth noting that the *Nation* also addressed domestic responsibility, especially involving the deployment of US ground troops.[28] However, it was clear that it shows a greater possibility for the realization of the objective of global responsibility claims.

UK Mainstream Media: The *Guardian* and *Observer*

The construction and articulation of global responsibility involving the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict in the European mainstream media can provide a comparative element to both mainstream US and alternative media. Particularly, the United States and the Western European nations pursued different Bosnian policies, whereas they had similar Kosovo policy orientations. Considering the fact that mainstream media discourse can be understood in relation to the national interest frame in varying degrees, a comparative research between US and European media discourses can provide comparative elements between their mainstream media and between their left-leaning media. Through the comparative elements, it can be observed how the national frame influenced each media's representations of the crises and policy opinions involving the two crises and subsequent NATO interventions.

More specifically, as Hansen (2006, p. 123) observes, Western Europe's policy, including the United Kingdom, on the Bosnian War was to alleviate a humanitarian crisis by peacekeeping and seeking political solutions that the warring parties were able to accept. The US Bosnian policy differed from the UK policy since the United States

pursued an end to the war by lifting the weapons embargo, using military force, and coercing the Bosnian Serb leaders' to accept the US peace plans. On the contrary, the two world powers collaboratively decided to use NATO force against Serbia without the UN Security Council's prior authorization. Accordingly, the mainstream UK media discourse covering the two crises, among others, can provide an opportunity to compare the two states' media discourses in relation to their government's policies on the use of the NATO force. Their governmental policies were different from each other in regards to the Bosnian War, whereas they pursued similar policy orientations toward the Kosovo Conflict. Thus, the comparison of the mainstream media discourses on global responsibility within the two allies may provide comparative elements in both states' hegemonic discourses of global responsibility. Incorporating UK media discourse to the intertextuality of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media may provide different conceptions of global responsibility under different national frames, and help to further situate the US hegemonic construction and articulation of global responsibility within a broader frame of the national identities and policy formations involving the two crises.

The *Guardian* and its Sunday paper, the *Observer*, two of the most progressive mainstream UK newspapers, were chosen for their comparative analysis because the newspapers, despite their support of UK national interests, may have been relatively more autonomous from the national interest frame than the mainstream US media, and would have presented a more active humanitarian approach toward global responsibility in the two cases of military intervention. The UK's center-left newspapers are useful for another comparison with the *Nation*, since they are among the most progressive and left-

wing media among the popular press in both states, although their international reputation and readership as well as their levels of influence on domestic and global public opinion formation may be different. The *Guardian* and the *Observer* (hereafter the *Guardian*, except when directly quoting editorials in the *Observer*) are expected to have explicitly combined humanitarian responsibilities and a national interest frame more similar to its mainstream US counterpart than the *Nation*, despite its political and ideological position in domestic issues.

It is not surprising then that the *Guardian* de-legitimized NATO's air war against the Republic of Srpska. Based on moralization and the authorization of the UN, the newspaper opposed the potential and ongoing use of NATO's military force in Bosnia. Accordingly, the policy opinion of the *Guardian* prioritized the role of the UN to reach political solutions, provide peacekeeping operations for humanitarian aides and facilitate negotiation for the ending of the war among all three warring factions. Russia also consistently appeared to be a responsible actor, so much so that Russia was expected to improve the situation. Although the Bosnian Serbs were accountable for the deterioration of the situation, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croatians were also viewed to be related to the nationalist movements in Bosnia. In a way similar to the *Nation*, the *Guardian* admitted explicitly, without depending upon moral abstraction (i.e., "shame" and "pity" shown in the *Washington Post* editorials), that the West was partly responsible for the instability of Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia due to their unprincipled non-recognition and recognition of Yugoslav warring parts' independence declaration: "The Western nations have their own share of responsibility for the suffering, present and future, of the former Yugoslav republics."[29]

At the time of the Srebrenica massacre, the *Guardian* viewed it not only as a UN failure but also a UK and French one. But the newspaper opposed withdrawing UK peace keepers since the newspaper maintained that the withdrawal could lead to an escalation of the war. As such, the *Guardian*'s Bosnian policy opinion paralleled its government's policy.

> Britain's moral responsibility cannot be shirked by high-handed talk about who is to blame for leaving the Bosnian Muslims in the lurch. Malcolm Rifkind, the new Foreign Secretary, sounded more outraged by President Chirac's references to the appeasement of Hitler than by the murderous behaviour of the Bosnian Serbs. It is too bad if Chirac's harsh criticism stung. Words hurt less than the blows inflicted on the people whom the British and French forces promised to protect (Editorial. (1995, July 16). Stand up to the Serb bully. *Observer*, p. B15).

Leading up to, and during NATO's air war against the Republic of Srpska, the *Guardian* took the same position as the UK government's policy, when the conservative Tories led the parliament at the time. Unlike the US Bosnian policy of lifting the embargo on the former Yugoslavia and conducting an air war, the newspaper supported continued peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and considered the UN to be responsible and capable in pursuing a long term peace solution there. The *Guardian* regarded the US-led NATO air war as "a big gamble" and appealed for peace efforts. The negative representation of the incoming NATO war against the Republic of Srpska was contrasted with the mainstream US newspapers' orchestrated arguments for the "dangers of inaction" bigger than those of action. The mainstream UK newspaper also took a similar position of neutrality on the Bosnian warring factions as the US left magazine, the *Nation*.

> Bosnia's leaders know that the US peace plan would leave the country enfeebled and overdependant on Croatia. Irrespective of any commitments to the Americans, Sarajevo's political establishment may mistakenly calculate that Bosnia's future can now be better

> assured by military means. If this is to be prevented, it is essential for Nato/UN to make it crystal clear that they have not entered the conflict on Bosnia's side (Editorial. (1995, August 31). When war may not mean peace: The decision to launch more airstrikes is a big gamble," *Guardian*, p. 14).

NATO's means during the war, accordingly, were criticized by the *Guardian*. Particularly, precision munitions were viewed as a symbolic escalation of the war; increased civilian casualties and the destruction of the national basic infrastructure were not compatible with the pre-war humanitarian objective of the NATO war legitimation for intervention in Bosnia. In regards to the Dayton Accord, the newspaper was skeptical of the negotiation's restoration of peace, due to the fact that the US peace plan of deploying ground peacekeeping troops only for one year was unrealistic. The *Guardian*, it can be inferred, viewed the US Bosnian policy toward the end of the war as based on unilateralism and a hegemony stability strategy. The newspaper's representation of the results of the NATO intervention was different from its US counterpart's positive appraisals of US accomplishments and contributions to world security, as well as the rescuing of conflict victims. Thus, it can be argued that both states' mainstream newspapers appropriated the effects and results of NATO's intervention in a way similar to their government's policy orientations. The negative evaluations that appeared in the *Guardian* were not indicated in the mainstream US media, however. The UK newspaper's criticism of technological warfare and precision munitions was also different from the mainstream US media, as well as differing views on peacekeeping and the deployment of ground troops.

Unlike its approach to the Bosnian War, the *Guardian* promoted the necessity of NATO's military force for ending the crisis and for rescuing the suffering people in the Kosovo Conflict. The newspaper consistently supported NATO's air war against Serbia,

based on humanitarian responsibility, in order to protect the people of Kosovo.[30] However, the *Guardian* also acknowledged the danger of the action, which contradicted the position of the mainstream US media. Thus, the parallelism between the UK government and the newspaper can be found in their approaches to the conflict. The newspaper supported the NATO war against Serbia by moralization to protect the people in Kosovo. However, it also viewed NATO's air war against Serbia as a self-serving enterprise, which could deteriorate the humanitarian crisis. Another distinctive criticism of the *Guardian* in regards to the war was that the newspaper pursued humanitarian responsibility through force, even though it had a realistic view of the NATO member states' motives for the war, including the economic inspiration.

> ROBIN COOK told the Commons yesterday that Nato's action against Serbia was purely humanitarian. It's not. National, American and European interests are inevitably involved. Some of these interests are almost consensual–regional stability in the unstable Balkans, allowing a start to be made on vital economic reconstruction. Some are downright self-interested. On one level, the Italians don't want Albanian refugees clogging Brindisi harbour. On another, Nato 'needs' to be tested in its new guise and this conflict will do the job as well as any other. So it's time, with aircraft taking off and people being killed–munitions never fall as precisely as military PR officers promise–for some adult conversation. This episode can't be spun. Intervention needs serious, honest exposition by our political leaders in all its ambiguity and imperfections. Simply to demonise Slobodan Milosevic is to dumb down foreign policy. The massive and brutal deployment of state power in the Balkans does have a rationale. The public deserves to hear more of that reasoning (Editorial. (1999, March 26). Why Kosovo matters: It's a test for our generation," *Guardian*, p. 21).

Finally, despite the *Guardian*'s more elaborate humanitarian approach, the newspaper's policy opinions regarding the two NATO air wars in the Balkans demonstrated that the newspaper framed its policy opinion within governmental policy

orientations. Although critical toward the means of the Bosnian War, and at times the Kosovo Conflict, the *Guardian*'s approach to the UN as the single legal authority involving the violation of sovereignty and its right for self-determination is reflective of the government and the press relationships viewed in Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model. The newspaper supported the authority and the role of the UN for the Bosnian policy, whereas it changed its previous position on the privileged role of the UN in the international conflict during the second NATO air war in 1999:

> For some the United Nations is the only legitimate law-giver. But its constitution is a recipe for inaction. Its imprimatur cannot be the sole trigger for international action to right an obvious wrong: the test must surely be whether such action is more than the pursuit of American self-interest cloaked in noble phraseology. In the Balkans this week Nato is doing more than Washington's bidding (Editorial. (1999, March 26). Why Kosovo matters: It's a test for our generation," *Guardian*, p. 21).

Despite its glamorous reputation, the *Guardian*'s global responsibility discourses for Bosnia and Kosovo have reflected the UK government's policy orientation. But it is also clear that the newspaper postulated the construction and articulation of humanitarian responsibility discourse closer to the archetype than its mainstream US counterparts. The main findings can be summarized as follows: first, the scope of action and consequences was broader in the *Guardian's* editorials than those in the mainstream US newspapers. Second, the role conceptions of the UN in the newspaper constructed during the two NATO wars were not consistent. The differences corresponded to the change in the UK government's policy regarding the UN. The newspaper supported the UN's initiative for the Bosnian War, but it also supported NATO's initiative to end the conflict and to rescue the victims of the conflict in Kosovo. Thus, the *Guardian's* approach differed from that of the *Nation*, which continued to prioritize the role of the UN in the Balkan crises. In

other words, the newspaper continued to support UK's humanitarian responsibility for Bosnia and Kosovo, and it also considered the role of the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War era. Next, the *Guardian* at times opposed the means of the war due to the air wars' deterioration of the humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Kosovo. But the newspaper was more favorable to NATO's second air war against Serbia than the *Nation*. Finally, global responsibility discourses, particularly humanitarian responsibility, in the UK newspaper was more stable and consistent throughout both wars than that constructed in the mainstream US newspapers.

Global Non-Governmental Organization: Human Rights Watch's News Releases

Human Rights Watch is one of the two most representative global non-governmental organizations for human rights along with Amnesty International. Although different in genre, the organizations' news releases are comparable to media discourses analyzed in previous chapters and the previous sections in this chapter. But it is worth noting that the genre influences the content, including the topic, structure, and presentation of political and ideological positions of the organization. The format of news releases consists of the organization's own articles and reports as well as those from the other news sources and scholarly articles. Thus, the Human Rights Watch news releases can be regarded as a comparable discourse to the US mainstream media.

In the online Human Rights Watch archive (www.hrw.org), there is only one news release available for the Bosnian War: a scholarly article, written by Thomas and Ralph (1994), entitled, "Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity," in *SAIS Review*.[31] However, the news release archives for the Kosovo Conflict are comparable to those of the other media sources dealt with earlier in this study. The number of news

releases available may reflect the growth and development of the organization as well as the increase in the social uses of the Internet for the last decade.

The news release materials of Human Rights Watch regarding the Kosovo Conflict were also reflective of the organization's objectives in publicizing human rights and humanitarian issues. Human Rights Watch's news releases mainly concerned Serbian atrocities in Kosovo in the pre-military intervention period, while the three warring parties, the Serbian government, Kosovo Albanian resistant groups and Kosovo Albanians, and NATO, were covered due to their violations of human rights from the beginning of the Kosovo Conflict to NATO's air war against Serbia. Thus, it can be argued that the NGO had a tendency to correspond to a pro-intervention position in the pre-intervention period in the Kosovo Conflict and to an anti-intervention or neutral position since the beginning of the intervention. It can be inferred from the Human Rights Watch case that global NGOs may have had the same function in military intervention that the Human Right Watch showed in the Kosovo case.

The Selectivity and Exclusivity of Other Military Interventions

When it comes to the evaluations of the two military interventions in Bosnia and Serbia, the selectivity of the US and NATO's interventions in the post-Cold War era makes the analysis of the scope of action and consequences in military intervention more complicated. Considering other cases in which the United States and NATO have not intervened despite the humanitarian urgencies, global responsibility discourses may have been weakened, especially cases with more salient evidence of human rights abuses, for example, in Colombia in 1999 (Chomsky, 1999). The United States and NATO did not intervene in two humanitarian crises of great scale–the crises in Cambodia in the 1970s

and in Rwanda in the 1990s (Thakur, 2006, p. 212). Rwanda in 1994 is an example of the exclusivity of humanitarian intervention, which was not undertaken against the genocide.

The selectivity of military intervention does not prove whether the interventions in Bosnia and Serbia were needed. But the selectivity itself brings up a question of what would be the more important driving force resulting in (non)intervention in relation to the discourses of humanitarian responsibility and global security responsibility as well as domestic responsibility. As the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) report (2000, p. 298) concludes: "The legitimacy of such use of force will always be controversial, and will remain so, so long as we intervene to protect some people's lives but not others." Intervening into all crises may be unrealistic, undoable, or undesirable. But if the pattern that made the United States or NATO (non)interventions happen can be identified, it should be useful to examine the relationships between the governmental policy and the media's presentation of policy opinion on humanitarian crises.

Endnotes

[1] I borrow Rawls's (2005, pp. 190-195) conception of neutrality in relation to his discussion on justice as fairness. The way in which I relate neutrality to two archetypical global responsibility discourses does not coincide with his use, however. Rawls uses the term for offering a reasonable measure for sustaining "fair social cooperation between its citizens regarded as free and equal" for overlapping consensus.
[2] Shuman, M. H. (1995, July 17). Force for peace. *Nation*, *261*(3), p. 77.
[3] Editorial. (1995, June 19). Bad to worse in Bosnia. *Nation*, *260*(24), pp. 869-871.
[4] Borden, A. (1995, August 28). Zagreb speaks. *Nation*, *261*(6), pp. 187-188.
[5] Editorial. (1995, October 2). Gunning for peace. *Nation*, *261*(10), pp.335-336; Borden, A. (1995, December 18). The Dayton deal. *Nation*, *261*(21), p. 773.
[6] Editorial. (1995, December 18). Bosnia's rescue?. *Nation*, *261*(21), pp. 771-772.
[7] Binder, D. (1995, October 2). Bosnia's bombers. *Nation*, *261*(10), pp. 336-337.
[8] Maynes, C. W. (1995, November 13). Blue helmet war. *Nation*, *261*(16), pp. 560-561.
[9] Editorial. (1999, February 22). Independence for Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(7), pp. 3-4.
[10] Williams, I. (1998, March 30). Kosovo: Another Bosnia?. *Nation*, *266*(11), pp. 4-5; Editorial. (1998, July 13). The noisy American. *Nation*, *267*(2), pp. 3-4.
[11] Borden, A. (1998, November 9). The Kosovo conundrum. *Nation*, *267*(15), p. 7; Editorial. (1999, November 22). Independence for Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(7), pp. 3-4; Editorial. (1999, June 7). Voices at the Hague. *Nation*, *268*(21), pp. 4-5.
[12] Klare, M. T. (1999, April 19).The Clinton doctrine. *Nation*, *268*(14). p. 5.
[13] Bird, K. (1999, April 26). False history lessons. *Nation*, *268*(15), p. 6; Editorial. (1999, April 26). Crossroads in Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(15), pp.4-5.
[14] Denitch, B., & Williams, I. (1999, April 26). The case against inaction. *Nation*, *268*(15), p. 5.
[15] Editorial. (1999, April 19). Destroying Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(14), pp. 4-6.

[16] Editorial. (1999, April 19). Destroying Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(14), pp. 4-6; Editorial. (1999, May 3). Looking beyond NATO. *Nation*, *268*(16), p. 3.
[17] Editorial. (1999, April 19). Destroying Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(14), pp. 4-6.
[18] Konrad, G. (1999, May 3). Nationalism unleashed. *Nation*, *268*(16), pp. 4-5; Loza, T. (1999, May 17). The KLA cleansed. *Nation*, *268*(18), pp. 5-6.
[19] Kornbluh, P. (1999, May 10). Halt the bombing. *Nation*, *268*(17), pp. 3-4; Bird, K. (1999, June 14). Another course in Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(22), pp. 5-6.
[20] Kornbluh, P. (1999, May 10). Halt the bombing. *Nation*, 268(17), pp. 3-4.
[21] Editorial. (1999, May 24). Stop the war now. *Nation*, *268*(19), pp. 3-4; Editorial. (1999, June 7). The high cost of Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(21), p. 3.
[22] Margaronis, M. (1999, May 24). The view from Greece. *Nation*, *268*(19), pp. 6-7.
[23] Hayden, T. (1999, May 24). The liberals' folly. *Nation*, *268*(19), pp. 4-5; Cohen, S. F. (1999, May 24). Degrading' America. *Nation*, *268*(19), pp. 4-5; Editorial. (1999, May 31). Protest the war. *Nation*, *268*(20), p. 3; Editorial. (1999, June 14). Oppose a wider war. *Nation*, *268*(22), pp. 3-4.
[24] The editorial continues that "[t]he shrewd Milosevic called the Administration's bluff: If the alliance failed to follow through on its bombing threats, he'd be David to the NATO Goliath; if bombing began, his ground forces could accelerate the creation of Albanian-free zones. And while the Western news media focused on Kosovo, Milosevic could launch a second war–this one on dissent within Serbia. As Vojin Dimitrijevic, director of the Belgrade Center for Human Rights, reports, the bombing has wiped out ten years' effort to lay the foundations of a Serbian civil society" (Editorial. (1999, April 19). Destroying Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(14), pp. 4-6).
[25] Editorial. (1999, April 26). Crossroads in Kosovo. *Nation*, *268*(15), pp.4-5.
[26] Lafferty, E. (1999, June 28). Welcome home, Kosovars. *Nation*, *268*(24), pp. 4-5; Editorial. (1999, August 9). Reconstructing Kosovo. *Nation*, *269*(5), p. 3.
[27] Editorial. (1999, November 8). Banning the ban. *Nation*, *269*(15), pp. 3-4.
[28] Binder, D. (1995, May 8). Gnats for Bosnia. *Nation*, *260*(8), p. 620.
[29] Editorial. (1992, June 25). The need to fight to make the peace," *Guardian*, p. 22.
[30] Editorial. (1999, March 23). The sad need for force: Kosovo must be saved. *Guardian*, p. 19.
[31] Thomas, D. Q., & Ralph, R. E. (1994). Rape in war: Challenging the tradition of impunity. *SAIS Review*, *1*, 82-99.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Research Summary

This dissertation explores the formation (use and movement) of global responsibility discourses used in promoting NATO's military interventions in other sovereignties in the post-Cold War era in the mainstream US media. The study utilizes discourse analysis to examine the construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses surrounding the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Kosovo Conflict (1998-1999). I approach the concept of global responsibility involving military interventions as one that can be assembled from the associated discourse. Accordingly, I have identified three major ways to discuss the global responsibility of "what we ought to do" at the national and global level: humanitarian responsibility, regional security responsibility, and the critiques of these two responsibilities.

In order to explore the formation of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media, this dissertation first examines the construction of global responsibility discourses surrounding the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict in the mainstream US media. Next, the dissertation situates the construction of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media within a broader discursive context, in which the identities of various international actors, including the United States, NATO, the UN, and ethnic groups and parties in the former Yugoslavia are articulated during the same periods. The discourse of responsibility was also situated in the manner in which the interventions were conducted. In the analysis, each crisis is divided into three periods surrounding the US government's policy and NATO's military interventions in Bosnia

and Serbia in order to trace both changes and consistency in global responsibility discourses throughout the crises. The three periods are pre-military intervention, military intervention, and post-military intervention. Finally, the political and moral dimensions of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media are analyzed with regard to the scope and stability of actions and consequences by comparing global responsibility discourses on Bosnia and Kosovo in the mainstream US media with its intertextual media sources in order to discuss the potency and impotency of various modes of responsibility discourse.

Assuming the mainstream US media as one of the primary sites through which official policy discourse and public opinion are mediated and by which they are influenced, the intertextual sources were introduced to provide comparative elements to the hegemonic formation of global responsibility in the mainstream US media. For the archival sources of representative mainstream US media, three newspapers, the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* were chosen. For comparative elements from intertextual sources of the mainstream US media, the alternative US media, the *Nation*, UK mainstream media, the *Guardian* and *Observer*, and the news releases of the global non-governmental organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch were analyzed.

The case study of global responsibility discourses surrounding the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict in the mainstream US media and their intertextuality offers an account of the roles of the US media in foreign policy concerning military intervention in the post-Cold War era. The construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media were closely related to the US government's policy, and were formed within the framework of US national interest. The fact that the

discourse on global responsibility functioned to facilitate US national interests and domestic responsibility not only means that the mainstream US media propagated the US government's policy and agenda. The cases of military intervention also imply that there were more fundamental structures and patterns by which the mainstream US media approached the humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era: namely, the "benevolent domination" and the subsequent construction of a "melodramatic national identity" and war narratives.

Based on the presumption that the discourse of the mainstream US media was a primary site for the public for learning and experiencing the two crises, this research maintains that global responsibility discourses functioned to provide US and global citizens with common knowledge and an experience of the hegemonic notion of humanitarian intervention via mediated discourse. I argue that the construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses in the military interventions may have had dangerous ramifications for global democracy because the discourse of responsibility can potentially absorb the progressive energies created by the public's awareness of responsibility on a global scale in order to reinforce the relations of domination.

The following four criteria are used to closely examine the structure and patterns in the mainstream US media's construction and articulation of global responsibility for the US government's policies on the two crises: (1) the time periods when responsibility discourses were promoted in the representation of the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo; (2) the modes of global responsibility discourse (humanitarian and security) that were included/excluded; (3) the appropriation of the results of the NATO interventions in Bosnia and Serbia; and (4) the articulation of global responsibility discourses in relation

to the identities of the involved actors and the ways in which the interventions were conducted.

Based upon these four criteria, the moments when global responsibility discourses were constructed and the movement of the responsibility discourses over the eventful periods in the two crises were traced in the case study of Chapters 5, 6, and 7. First, humanitarian responsibility was constructed, but precisely who should assume responsibility was generally not clarified when the three newspapers first recognized the political instability in Bosnia and Kosovo between March 1992 and June 1995 in Bosnia and between March 1998 and February 1999 in Kosovo. Specifically, the mainstream US newspapers at times discouraged an active US engagement in Bosnia in the pre-intervention period, while the European states took the initiative in the Bosnian crisis over the same period. The three mainstream US newspapers generally opposed the deployment of US ground troops for peacekeeping based on domestic responsibility discourse during the intervention period, whereas they appropriated the results of the war and the US diplomatic initiative in the post-intervention periods. However, the mainstream US newspapers generally supported the US and NATO war against Serbia. The authority of the UN was marginalized in both NATO wars.

The national interest framework in the mainstream US newspapers was clearer when compared to the UK left newspapers, the *Guardian* and *Observer*. The UK newspapers supported European states' policy and the UN's role of peacekeeping in Bosnia by pursuing political solutions different from the US policy of lifting the weapons embargo and "fair fights" among the warring parties along with air strikes. On the contrary, the UK newspapers supported NATO's war against Serbia in 1999 in

accordance with the UK government's policy. The analysis of both the US and UK mainstream newspapers shows that the mainstream media's policy opinions generally paralleled their government's policy orientation.

More specifically, the findings in the case study can be recapitulated by using the three conceptual tools used in the analysis: legitimation, articulation, and potentiality. First, responsibility for the victims of the conflicts and for regional security were the two archetypical modes used by the three US newspapers in the legitimation of NATO's military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. The two most typical constructions of responsibility were those of alleviating the suffering in Bosnia and Kosovo and ending the violence for regional security. The former was the basic form of humanitarian responsibility, while the latter was interwoven in the US strategic policy choice by combining US responsibility and national interests. The most distinctive characteristic of the responsibility discourses in the legitimation processes of the military interventions was that the responsibility discourses were not consistent or stable. They appeared/disappeared depending on the development of the two crises and the construction of US national interests. This means that the discourse of responsibility did not shape the US policies involving the two crises in Bosnia and Kosovo. Rather, following the US government's policy, discourses of humanitarian responsibility and strategic national interest were selectively used over the eventful periods. Thus, it can be argued that responsibility discourse is one of the two links between the construction of the identities of involved actors and policy opinions. On the contrary, the UN's lack of ability and the necessity of US leadership in dealing with the crises were two consistent narratives found in the mainstream US media.

The inconsistent appearance of responsibility discourses from the three newspapers in the legitimation processes has negative ramifications in the materialization of the objective of global responsibility discourses. Despite the popular memory of humanitarian interventions surrounding the Bosnia War and the Kosovo Conflict, and the common understanding of the use of force for humanitarian concerns in general, it can be argued that responsibility discourses functioned as a link between the representations of engaged actors and the policy choice of the US government and military. In other words, the discourse on responsibility was devised and used to facilitate US credibility, leadership, and eventually US government policy in the two cases. The appropriation of the role of the United States from the end of military intervention in Bosnia toward the Dayton Agreement in 1995 in the three mainstream US newspapers illustrates when responsibility discourse was promoted. In a similar way, responsibility discourse was cultivated when leading up to and in the early stage of military action in Kosovo in 1999. This may also imply that responsibility discourse was highlighted when the United States overruled NATO policy on Bosnia and Kosovo. The trajectory of the use and movement of global responsibility discourses suggests that US military action was legitimated at the global level and the consequences were appropriated at the national level in the mainstream US media. The fact that humanitarian responsibility was not the principle of the military interventions further implies that it was used to promote the US and NATO's global strategy in the new world order. The trend also corresponded to US unilateralism and exceptionalism over the period.

Second, humanitarian responsibility discourse was articulated both in the representations of the identities of various involved actors and policy opinions,

particularly the way that the interventions were conducted in each NATO war. The fact that the role of responsibility discourses combined with identity construction and policy opinion does not necessarily mean that the mainstream US media always functioned to propagate the US governmental and military position. Although inconsistent, the three newspapers at times pressured the government to rescue the victims of the conflicts and stabilize the regions surrounded by the wars. But it is clear that mainstream US newspapers mainly emphasized humanitarian responsibility during the intervention period for Bosnia and during the pre-intervention and military intervention periods for Kosovo. The trend shows that mainstream US newspapers emphasized humanitarian responsibility discourse when the use of force became the US policy on Bosnia and Kosovo, while responsibility for security was more distinct during the intervention and post-intervention periods when the US government became further involved in both crises. Thus, the beginning of the interventions marked a shift from moralization to rationalization in the legitimation of the use of force in Bosnia and Serbia in the mainstream US media.

It is problematic in two senses that the discourse of responsibility over the two crises was not consistent and that the subject of taking on the responsibility varied upon the development of the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. One the one hand, the representation of the various engaged actors including the (former) Yugoslav warring ethnic groups and parties as well as the United States, UN, and European NATO member states, and Russia and China functioned as a device to present a specific ideology. The construction of ethnic hatred as the fundamental basis in the US mainstream media mirrored the use of the representations of the national and institutional identities in the

military interventions. Malešević (2006) offers an alternative explanation for ethnic tension mobilized during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. According to her, the power elites in the Federation of Yugoslavia used ethnic identities for decentralization to repress democratization and liberalization. The identity construction of the United States in the US mainstream media took place in relation to European states, Russia, and China along with the UN. The consistency of US supremacy claims was reinforced by the articulation of global responsibility discourses within the identity construction. The representations of each national and institutional identity were simplified to support US policy. For example, when the United States took the initiative in NATO policy, the period marked the emergence of US responsibility through its leadership and credibility. The trend was also applicable when the *Wall Street Journal* criticized the Democratic administration.

On the other hand, the UN or European NATO member states were generally represented as accountable and responsible when humanitarian conditions deteriorated in Bosnia and Kosovo. It can thus be argued that global responsibility discourses were used as a two-way mirror that built up the US identity in relation to the identities of the warring former Yugoslav factions and European NATO member states as well as the UN, Russia, and China.

Global responsibility discourses in the mainstream media functioned to build up a linkage between a melodramatic US national identity and US governmental policy. Specifically, the US national identity facilitated a simplified war narrative structure based on binary oppositions: the villain, the victim, and the moral hero. The simplified conventional war narrative reduced the complex nature of the conflicts to a simple

narrative of the villain and victim, which supported simplified solutions of the hero as the United States. The melodramatic narrative, as Anker (2005) argues, deters the public from further deliberating and investigating complex issues. The metanarrative framing the crises is unlikely to facilitate two important resources for democracy: deliberation and active civic participation. Compared to the alternative US media and mainstream UK newspapers, the mainstream US media did not significantly cover the deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as civilian casualties since the launch of NATO's war in both crises. They were treated as opportunity costs for ending humanitarian crises in the areas. The articulatory and disarticulatory practices surrounding the melodramatic war narrative and the evaluations on the way in which NATO's wars were carried out in the mainstream US newspapers proved that the association of the specific identities and policy orientations were the hegemonic processes of articulation helped to reproduce relations of domination.

By drawing on the notion of potentiality, Chapter 7 analyzed the scope of action and consequences of global responsibility discourses and the consistency of these discourses within the mainstream US media. The first two analyses were employed to observe the movement of global responsibility discourses within the internal logic of the mainstream US media. The scope of action and consequences in the military interventions and the stability of the mainstream US media's global responsibility discourses were also compared with their intertextual media sources. The element of intertextuality is introduced to identify the direction of global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media because the comparison and contrast among the media discourses produced in different contexts can provide a comparative political and moral

space for observing the movement of the mainstream US media's formation of responsibility discourses. The mainstream US media's discursive functions can be better understood when they are compared with and contrasted to other discourses of global responsibility, which are conceived and negotiated differently in different contexts. The analysis of the editorials in the alternative US media, the *Nation*, and UK's left-wing newspapers, the *Guardian* and *Observer*, and Human Rights Watch's news releases showed that the mainstream US media functioned to facilitate the legitimation of military interventions in Bosnia during the intervention period and in Kosovo during the pre-military intervention and intervention periods. The ways in which the interventions were conducted were also justified in general in the mainstream US newspapers, although there were at times oppositions to governmental policy for national interests when they conceived interests differently from the government in the course of the military interventions.

Compared to their intertextual media sources, the mainstream US newspapers showed a narrower scope of action and consequences dealing with the two NATO wars. The construction of humanitarian responsibility was less stable in the mainstream US newspapers than in that of the three other media sources. The *Nation*, *Guardian*, and Human Rights Watch news releases were more supportive of humanitarian responsibility during the intervention and the post-military intervention periods. However, even alternative media sources corresponded to the governments' policy and agenda before military interventionsm, and at times in the early military intervention period. This may be due to the fact that the media did not have resources to investigate the crises in a coherent, comprehensive way before the war was launched by the US government and

NATO. Regarding the *Nation*'s position on US national interests, the framework was much broader than its mainstream counterparts. The *Guardian* showed that it supported the UK government's policy orientations on Bosnia and Kosovo. Although Human Right Watch's news releases reflect a neutral position on the Kosovo Conflict, the genre of the news release and the activities of the organization may have promoted military interventions in the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo in the pre-intervention periods.

This analysis shows that global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media in terms of the construction and articulation of global responsibility fell far short of realizing their potential, especially when compared to other intertextual discourses. The most distinctive characteristic in both cases is that the US media framed NATO's military intervention as a moral venture at the global level, whereas their appropriation of the consequences was limited to the national level. The themes of the dangers of inaction, the weakness of the UN as a legal authority, and technological warfare along with sanitized war illustrate a narrower scope of action and consequences for the two military interventions projected in the mainstream US media. Among others, the dangers of inaction should be fully examined in relation to deliberation. The paradox of the necessity of decision for intervention and that of deliberation for the realization of the objective of global responsibility can provide positive effects for rethinking democratic theory. Honig (2007, p. 1) observes that the paradox may provide "the happy effect of reorienting democratic theory" by identifying the process with democratic practice itself.

The comparison between the event in Srebrenica in July 1995 from the Bosnian War and NATO's military intervention in Kosovo illustrate the dynamic of the application of humanitarian responsibility discourse. The mainstream US media

supported the lifting of the weapons embargo and the fight between the Yugoslav warring parties before NATO's intervention in Bosnia in 1995, while the failure of the mass killing of Bosnians in Srebrenica was attributed to the UN. The placement of US peacekeeping troops was consistently downplayed in the mainstream US media, while the responsibility to do so was attributed to European states, and US responsibility was only constructed as a device for embracing air strikes codenamed Operation Deliberate Force for the Bosnian War.

Contrarily, humanitarian responsibility was most salient during NATO's military action against Serbia in 1999. In the case that the use of military force was not authorized by the UN, the responsibility discourse culminated in legitimation of the NATO action. Ethnic tension represented in the US media was also accompanied by the construction of US humanitarian responsibility for military intervention. Although the Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian War and the Serbs in the Kosovo Conflict were more accountable for the crises, all the warring parties appeared as negotiable and accountable in the early pre-intervention periods. However, personalization and demonization in the representations of the Bosnian Serbs and Serb leader figures in the crises were constructed in the mainstream US media when military intervention was promoted.

The ideological spectrum among the three mainstream US newspapers followed a similar trend to facilitate the US government's policy. During the critical period of the military interventions, the three newspapers accepted the US governmental and military discourse, while they were relatively free to criticize the governmental and military discourse before and after the military interventions. There are, however, variations among the three newspapers. The *Washington Post* focused relatively more on both

retrospective and prospective humanitarian responsibilities in the crises, while the *New York Times* centered relatively more on regional security. The *Wall Street Journal* was distinctive in its consistent domestication of the military intervention, especially in President Clinton's decision on air strikes against Serb positions in 1999. The newspaper was the most aggressive during the military intervention, and the stance was justified by the rationalization for global security. The difference in the three newspapers clearly echoes the party and press parallelism since each newspaper's political orientation was reflective of the representations of US engagement in the crises. The reduced ideological spectrum among the mainstream newspapers during the military intervention periods may mean that the mainstream media were a political actor facilitating the necessary consent of the use of force by the audience/citizens.

The Implications of Global Responsibility Discourses in the Post-Cold War Era

Biopower and Biopolitical Production: A Theoretical Reflection

This study suggests seemingly contradictory understandings of the discourse of global responsibility and its discursive functions in geopolitics and a global society, as well as the individual and group identities of cosmopolitan and global citizenship based on their self-formation and self-identity: to sustain the relations of domination in a global society and to realize the potentials of the discourse of global responsibility. In order to understand the roles of media discourses claiming global responsibility for the experiential dimension of the public surrounding military interventions, it is necessary to situate the media discourses, first, within the development of the media, and, second, within social uses of the media. The objective of situating global responsibility discourses in the two changing conditions is to explain the integration of the "loose" hegemonic conception of US global responsibility in military interventions and the penetration of the

political ideology into individuals' social lives. In its functionality, global responsibility discourses are loose not only in the sense that they are more porous than the ruling ideology of anticommunism in the Cold War era. It is also a decentralized form of governmentality in the sense that humanitarian and security responsibilities can only function as long as a violation of humanitarian conditions is constructed without any specific predetermined enemy states. The shift of the notion of the enemy should be intertwined with the changing notions of sovereignty and global security. The unfixed enemy of humanitarian interventions clearly echoes what Hardt and Negri (2004, p. 20) describe as the US government and NATO's policy shift from defense to security in the post-Cold War period.

A growing concern of global publics, more specifically domestic and global compassionate audiences/citizens, about humanitarian crises can be related to the emerging form of war in the post-Cold War period. With the development of technology and media, along with more awareness of global interconnectedness by an increasing number of ordinary people, media discourse and greater uses of the media should provide individuals and their communities with more symbolic forms involving humanitarian concerns available to them at both individual and collective levels. The globalization of the media, global uses of the media, and the proliferation of knowledge and information on global issues, especially distant suffering in international conflicts, suggest human progress and the enlightenment of human beings. But at the same time, one should be reminded that various resources of different types of power in a domestic and global society are not equally distributed; individuals may appropriate media discourses differently; and technical media along with personal and mediated communications may

be used differently and creatively, but not necessarily for mass movement or positive formation of a collective identity. Thus, individuals' progressive politics does not necessarily guarantee political progress as a whole.

Military interventions grounded on moral claims backed up by humanitarian responsibility and (regional) security responsibility, along with the effectiveness of military intervention, in the 1990s differed from those based on fighting communism during the Cold War. I have assumed that US mainstream media discourse is the primary site for the US public to learn and experience foreign affairs in general and military interventions in particular. Thus, it is necessary here to discuss how US mainstream media discourse can be situated within the triangular relationships among the government/military, the press, and the audience/citizens. To do so, I will first draw on Foucault's notion of biopower and Hardt and Negri's theorization of biopolitical production in order to explain the mediation between US foreign policy in the cases of military intervention and US publics via mediated discourses, especially in the mainstream US media and their intertextual sources. Second, I will discuss strategic ways to problematize the notion of global responsibility to further imagine the materialization of the potentials of global responsibility discourses.

For the notions of biopower and biopolitical production, the subject of assuming responsibility for distant suffering can be translated to the changing notions of sovereignty and a population within the sovereignty. UN's shift in approaching the notion of sovereignty in international conflicts from non-intervention to "responsibility to protect" formally suggested in 2004 is reflective of Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003. The changing notion of sovereignty can be understood in two interrelated perspectives: first,

from those who proposed and determined the five criteria of legitimacy in use of force in other sovereignties in practice: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences; second, from those who are or can be invaded and occupied by military intervention. Particularly, US government's emphasis of itself as a "security state" after the events of September 11, 2001 helps us to understand the changing notion of right/responsibility to protect its own and other populations.

Foucault's (1990, p. 140) notion of biopower is useful in understanding a dual construction of global responsibility for domestic and foreign populations respectively: "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations." According to Foucault, there had been a shift in the mechanisms of controlling a population regarding the "power of life and death" from "the right to *take* life or *let* live" of individuals or groups in the population to the positive notion of "precise controls and comprehensive regulations." In his words, "Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone. Entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have been vital" (1990, p. 137). He adds that "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population."

In order to create a successful subjugation, "raising morality and responsibility" is crucial (Foucault, 1990, p. 146). In a world, as Hard and Negri (2000; 2004) observe, in which the sovereign power of nation-states weakens and a new form of a global

sovereignty is increasingly powerful, the ways in which "humanitarian intervention" along with the notion of "just war" has been conceptualized, exercised, experienced, and eventually reproduced can be understood as a form of governmentality. Fittingly, the notion of responsibility is emerging as a way to facilitate military interventions and induce subjugation of populations within the discourse of global responsibility.

It is hard, if not impossible, for a democratic state to wage a war without claiming the basic form of global responsibility at least rhetorically for the malevolent practices within other sovereignties. Without legitimizing a war as "humanitarian war," a state may not gain domestic and global public support. Thus, humanitarian concerns accompanying military force from a democratic state became a justifiable cause of military interventions. In this regard, global responsibility is a key to obtain part of legitimation of waging a war against other sovereignties, and it can be argued that what Foucault observed concerning the practice of biopower within sovereignty as "protection of life" is applicable to military interventions in the post-Cold War era. In other words, without a prior UN Security Council authorization, dominant nations could use moral legitimation as an alternative justification for the use of force.

Hardt and Negri (2004, pp. 94-95) maintain that US-led military interventions during the post-Cold War era can be understood by the notion of civil war. In their observation, the global state of war is a symptom of the transition of global power structure from the US (and the West) domination to a new form of power in a form of networks (what they call "Empire"). Contrasting to biopower, biopolitical production is viewed by them as potentials from ordinary citizens to create a collective solidarity and possibility of resistance to the new form of networked power: "Biopower stands above

society transcendent as a sovereign authority and imposes its order. Biopolitical production, in contrast, is immanent to society and creates social relationships through collaborative forms of labor" (Hardt & Negri, 2004, pp. 94-95).[1] Following their observation, I argue that global responsibility discourses create a new form of subjectivity based on moral grounds and upgrade the military and moral power of the new form of sovereignty by absorbing moral subjectivity and resistance.

Foucault's notion of biopower and Hardt and Negri's use of biopolitical production can be useful in understanding the hegemonic articulation of the discourse of global responsibility to military intervention grounded in moral claims. The continuity of responsibility discourses from civilization discourse to humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War era is confirming the binary opposition between civilized and uncivilized populations and between friend and enemy states. National interests had been a primary factor in mobilizing public consent in waging a war, while the claim of national interests should not be enough for a democratic state to go to war in a new world order in which there are an increasing number of citizens who identify as cosmopolitan and global citizens. Thus, the discourse of global responsibility in media discourse based on universal human rights can interpolate US and global publics for taking action to remedy distant suffering.

If global responsibility discourses are continuous from the discourse of benevolent domination, the discontinuity of the discourse can be found in the changing conditions where the discourses are embedded, especially in terms of global power structure and the underlying global media structure. Then, it can be observed how the emergence of the notion of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship are absorbed by

dominant states' foreign policy orientations. While providing the two conceptual tools of "the Balkan discourse" and "the genocide discourse," Hansen (1996, p. 115) observes that each discourse articulates "radically different constructions of spatial, temporal, and ethical identity and they create very different scopes for Western policy." Thus, identifying the characters of a specific humanitarian crisis and constructing justifications of US or the West's engagement with the crisis are crucial in the creation of US and West's identities and their citizens' policy opinions.

There has been continuity and discontinuity of the moral and political discourse of global responsibility from the Cold War era to the 1990s, situated between the end of the Cold War and up through the September 11 attacks in 2001. The discourse of global responsibility for military interventions in the 1990s is one of the most crucial tools in understanding the public understanding of US foreign policy. In addition, the changing conditions of the domestic and global media environment should be considered in order to understand the role of the mainstream US media in national and global society.

The most salient continuity is the emphasis on US leadership combined with national interests and global security. The moral imperative associated with national interests can be dated back to colonialism and historical imperialism. The notion of "benevolent domination" intersects humanitarian responsibility and national interests. Despite a common understanding that morality is suspended in a time of war, moral claims have emerged as an important source to mobilize public consent and demobilize dissent for potential and ongoing military interventions since the 1990s. Human history clearly shows that the presence of moral and ethical discourse is not a new phenomenon. In particular, civilization discourse since the historical imperialism of the late nineteenth

century can be an archetype of moral and political discourse in foreign affairs and subsequent experience of the public on the relations of domination. More recent exemplary discourses are modernization and globalization discourses which argue that powerful nation-states can help less powerful ones to develop their quality of life in terms of economy and culture. Specifically, the imposition of "democracy with force" in other rogue states has been an exemplary US master narrative in military intervention since World War II.

On the one hand, this study observes that the moral and political discourse of global responsibility surrounding US and NATO military interventions in the 1990s functioned to reinforce the relations of domination in a global society. Considering the two changing conditions of a new global order and the development of media along with more social uses of the media, the continuous discourse of responsibility emerged as a powerful device to legitimate military interventions of more powerful nation-states in less powerful ones and to justify the means of the interventions. On the other hand, responsibility is not only for domination but also for the empowerment of progressive individuals through mediated experience.

In order to illuminate the dynamic of responsibility discourse in the new world order, it is necessary to divide the influence of the discourses into three aspects. First, global responsibility discourses facilitate powerful nations to legitimate military actions based on self-interest. Second, the relationships between sovereignty and population cannot be identified as a one way passage of propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation. Rather, the process is to mobilize progressive identities associated with cosmopolitan identity and further global citizenship. The subjects of accepting

responsibility discourses are US citizens who are mediated through responsibility discourses in media, and, second, ordinary people around the world who can be connected via current global public opinion. Finally, the weaker nations which are vulnerable to the responsibility discourses should be included in the explanation of the dynamic. Virilio (1999, p. 4) observes that "In this sense, the new ground broken with the allegedly humanitarian war for Kosovo could not but trouble a growing number of 'weak' nations, and confirm the views of all those who fear some day becoming targets of the 'strong' ones."

Positive self-formation toward global responsibility and subsequent engagement with military interventions can be explained with the concept of biopower, which controls a population and creates a certain subjectivity of individuals within the population. Capital's upgrading itself by using grassroots' resistance is an analogy which can be useful in understanding biopower and subsequent use of biopolitical production in military intervention between both sides of powerful states and global publics.

There still remains the important dilemma that responsibility claims cannot be fully accepted or negated in creating a more responsible global society. In order to fully understand the dynamics of responsibility discourses, it is necessary to take a closer look at the other cases than the two intervention cases dealt with in this study, including non-intervention cases such as Algeria in 1998.[2]

This study suggests that global responsibility discourses in the mainstream US media legitimated military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo and justified the manner that the interventions were exercised during most of the explicit moments of political tension in the former Yugoslav territories. However, the way the interventions were

based on the use of force, especially when it comes to US policy including the placement of US ground troops in the area, had not been consistent in terms of characterizing the sources of tension in the area and suggested remedies in dealing with the two cases over the eventful periods. Moreover, the ways US media discourse appropriated the ending of the interventions supported US unilateralism and exceptionalism above the international legality.

An important discontinuity to note is that biopower has not only been waged during the decades-long rivalry with the Soviet Union, but also, despite the absence of any explicit post-Cold War national security threat or comparable superpower, the "center-left" Clinton administration utilized biopolitical production as a powerful means for domination in global society. By biopolitics here, I mean that the relations of domination in international relations goes hand in hand with positive self-formation and construction of a mass movement toward answering to distant other's events and suffering. It is fair to add that there has been a substantial progress in being responsible to distant suffering in an increasingly globalized world. However, this global society seemingly accommodates a sense of cosmopolitanism and even that of global citizenship in varying degrees, whereas the relations of domination has been more solidified through the creative, productive energies toward a more responsible global society. This would mean that the more cosmopolitan US society becomes, the more necessary it will be to reflexively think about its effectiveness in terms of the functions of claims of responsibility on a global scope.

There still remain important questions yet to be answered. To what degree does the notion of global responsibility discourses of US media shed light on the dynamics of

development of military interventions in the 1990s, in general, and Bosnia and Kosovo, in particular? In other words, it is necessary to discuss why the formulation of global responsibility in military intervention is important and why this research examines it. The second question is: Does the analysis of the two chosen military intervention cases throw light on military intervention cases since September 11, 2001, the event evaluated to mark a significant influence on US national security policy and its approach to geopolitics. If global responsibility discourse can be associated with the notion of benevolent domination, what would be a way to further democratize the notion of responsibility?

"Contextual objectivity" may provide a way of identifying anther aspect of the consequences of political and moral dimensions of responsibility discourses. It also seems that a way to conceive global responsibility as a movement in relation to capacity and potentiality can be found in what Buck-Morss (2003) calls "provincialization." By provincialization of certain knowledge, she means that our experience and consciousness through perception should not be universalized but should pertain to a certain culture or way of living.

The emphasis on humanitarianism based on easily visible actions and events in the post-Cold War era has been mobilized in a reinforcement of "organized irresponsibility," in which only relatively peripheral issues rather than core ones can be visible with the development of the media. For example, the organized irresponsibility can be seen in the US military's abuse of prisoners of war. Jail abuses practiced by the coalition force to Iraqi soldiers were not a small issue, while the waging of the war with improper "prewar intelligence"–and against international law–was the source of

malpractices; that is, the ultimate context and set of relations/practices in which violence and suffering were made acceptable. Arguably, the universalized knowledge produced by mass-mediated experience provides the conditions in which people feel released from responsibility for the violence that is wrought in the world. In the process, the ultimate humanitarian questioning of the necessity of war is marginalized. In other words, the abuses could be identified unlike other humanitarian issues, such as the war itself. This phenomena should not necessarily be welcomed in the global public sphere, since it would be an example that responsibility claims do not fully realize their potential, reducing the sense of responsibility for distant others.

The notion of biopolitics can also be useful in explaining the formation of global public opinion in the post-Cold War era. How then can the relationships between the discourse analysis of US mainstream media and public opinion in this study be related to each other? "Social imaginary" on a global scope can be a conceptual tool in understanding the way that the use of language can be repeatedly articulated to sustain the relations of domination. The language of responsibility is not new in maintaining the relations of domination between the powerful and powerless nation-states. As we can see from the historical imperialism thesis, the symbolic power of the "civilization" force since the nineteenth century continued to be used in the relations of domination in such forms as modernization and globalization.

It is then necessary to examine how language use, responsibility in this case, or claims of global responsibility as a discourse can be a powerful domain in which various social groups within populations and "global citizens" can be connected by the notion of responsibility. The idea that responsibility is a medium combining people through various

ways and techniques (which should include the uninterested and even its resistors and antagonists) can be explained by Foucault's notion of governmentality (2000, 2003). But it would be easier to begin with an abstract idea of language as a social activity by using Thompson's suggestions of studying ideology first (1984, p. 41). He suggests that:

> Ideology is both 'immanent' in social relations, in so far as the use of language is a social activity interwoven with others, and 'transcendent' to them, in so far as expressions used to sustain domination may refer beyond what is immediately given. By stressing the creative character of language use and its constitutive role in social life, this approach would draw upon the dissimulatory sense, for it would acknowledge that language may be used to conceal and obscure the relations of domination in which human beings are enmeshed (Thompson, 1984, p. 41).

In discussing the "dissimulating" effects of the discourse of responsibility, actors' intentions and motivations toward responsibility should be a secondary interest, although they cannot be ignored. Intention and motivation as well as the discursiveness of global responsibility are secondary, not in the sense of the byproduct of relations of power, but in the sense that they can be successfully absorbed by the power of the "imaginary." The imaginary constitutes a dual function: the first is that it can mobilize a multitude of publics across the world in general and US citizens in particular by using and creating a multitude of energies that "ordinary people" embrace or cannot ignore or oppose the notion of global responsibility; the second is that the notion of responsibility can dissimulate the underlying consequences constituted by the actions taken by the notion of responsibility.

Considering the "quasi-mediated communication" created by newspapers and television as traditional media and more diversified communication accommodated by old and new media, the making of the imaginary can be more powerful. Clearly,

witnessing the suffering of others is now more visible in a new media environment than ever before. In this regard, talking about the discourse of responsibility on a global scope that can be identified as foreign policy issues in the contexts of signification (meaning production and appropriation) can illuminate the constitution of the imaginary of global responsibility today more effectively.

This can be discussed in two ways in terms of production of discourse though media. One is the relationship between media structure and each producer and distributor's performance. The second is the relationship between the producer/distributor and the recipient (Garnham, 2000). For example, most US and other Western citizens, in the case of the undue treatment of Iraqi prisoners, cannot bear the malevolent practices, but most of them do not necessarily relate the issue to the war itself. By this I mean that it would be possible to negate the war in the name of human rights, in that the war has been the source of the kinds of malevolent practices. This is one way to more greatly humanize humanitarianism. In doing so, the media can bring a sense of responsibility to the global public beyond when the dominant power structure can deal with it within acceptable boundaries.

The aggressive news reporting of the abuses of Iraqi prisoners in the mainstream US media seemingly supports Hallin's (1994) hegemony model in news reporting surrounding the Vietnam War by showing journalist autonomy from the government. But the case clearly shows how US mainstream media eventually support the war itself in terms of functionality in the pre-war and early war periods.[3] Then, the dilemma of intervention/non-intervention brings us to the notion of mainstream media's

responsibilities involving military interventions grounded on moral claims in the post-Cold War era.

The Responsibility of the Media

If the US media claim that the US government bears responsibility for humanitarian crises, it can also be argued that they ought to assume their own responsibility by challenging the end and means of the government's military interventions, as the adversarial model between the government and the press assumes. The relative responsibility of the media can be approached according to different levels of media analysis.

First, the responsibility of individual journalists for further examining the different contexts and understanding surrounding specific humanitarian crises is of importance (Corera, 2003; Seib, 2002, p. 107). "The ethics of compassion" should be applied not only to the audience/citizens but also journalists in reporting war (Tester, 2001). Second, institutional practices between the military and the media, especially "embedded journalism" influenced media discourses on global responsibility (McLaughlin, 2002, p. 98). A former commander of US-led forces in Bosnia, Nash (1998) illustrates the concerted efforts of the military to mobilize domestic and world media to gain public support for the war in Bosnia. Political economy of communications in general and the propaganda approach argues for media reform because media ownership concentration strengthens the symbiotic relationship between the government/military and the press as analyzed in previous chapters (Bettig & Hall, 2003; McChesney, 2004; Mosco, 1996).

Both the individual and institutional levels of analysis suggest that the mainstream US media's approach to global responsibility tended not to question the "moral

principles" of military interventions or challenge the way in which the interventions are conducted (i.e., suffering in invaded states and technological warfare). The distinct parallelism of the press-government and of the press-political party implies that the media did not provide the audience/citizens with a bigger picture of events. Different approaches to and conceptualizations of global responsibility can be provided as shown in the differences analyzed in the comparative analysis between the mainstream US media and their intertextuality.

Here, I will focus on the triangular relationship among the press, the government, and the audience/citizens in order to explain that it is less likely for the media to challenge potential military interventions before the negative consequences of war become salient. The *New York Times* on May 26, 2004 and the *Washington Post* on August 12, 2004 published an editorial and an article respectively, which admitted that their news coverage leading up to the war with Iraq in 2003 was not accurate, and apologized. The two apologetic statements for the pre-war information that turned out to be misinformation involving the second Gulf War in 2003 and the newspapers' articles covering the *New York Times* editorial including the *Wall Street Journal* and *Guardian* provide an opportunity to observe the notion of media's responsibility in practice. The *New York Times* editorial on May 26, 2004, entitled "From the Editors: The Times and Iraq," acknowledged that:

> We have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have been. In some cases, information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged. Looking back, we wish we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence emerged–or failed to emerge (Editorial. (2004, May 26). From the Editors: The Times and Iraq. *New York Times*, p. A1).

The *Washington Post* also apologized in an article on August 12, 2004, entitled "The Post on WMDs: An Inside Story–Prewar Articles Questioning Threat Often Didn't Make Front Page." The article states that "Across the country, 'the voices raising questions about the war were lonely ones,' Downie said. 'We didn't pay enough attention to the minority.'"[4]

The mea culpa in both newspapers acknowledges that their prewar intelligence reporting was inaccurate. For example, in the *New York Times* editorial: "The Times never followed up on the veracity of this source or the attempts to verify his claims." According to the two apologetic statements, the problems in the prewar coverage range from authorship and sourcing associated with subject matters at the reporter's level to investigative journalism and editors' collaboration with reporters at the organizational level. The most problematic was sourcing, in their view. Both papers suggest that if they would have been more careful in choosing reliable sources, and if they would have been more skeptical in the run-up to war period, they would not have published faulty prewar intelligence. The editorial in the *New York Times* admits that the paper relied on the same defective sources as the government, suggesting serious problems in the practices of embedded journalism. In the prewar coverage, the *Washington Post* argued for the inevitability of going to war. Executive Editor Leonard Downie Jr. later defended the *Washington Post*'s position by maintaining that "we were so focused on trying to figure out what the administration was doing that we were not giving the same play to people who said it wouldn't be a good idea to go to war and were questioning the administration's rationale. Not enough of those stories were put on the front page. That was a mistake on my part" (*Washington Post*, August 12, 2004).

Both newspapers acknowledged that there were at least minority opinions contradictory to the US government and Iraqi exile sources. Thus, these journalistic apologies bring us to questions of who is responsible for the misinformation which should have helped in waging the war in 2003.

> Whether a tougher approach by The Post and other news organizations would have slowed the rush to war is, at best, a matter of conjecture. "People who were opposed to the war from the beginning and have been critical of the media's coverage in the period before the war have this belief that somehow the media should have crusaded against the war," Downie [Executive Editor] said. "They have the mistaken impression that somehow if the media's coverage had been different, there wouldn't have been a war (Kurtz, 2004, p. A1).

Both editorials attempt to place responsibility for prewar misinformation at the individual level of sourcing while claiming that they did the best they could with knowledge available at the time. The two articles thus attempt to reduce their own responsibility while acknowledging their faulty prewar intelligence. Interestingly, the *New York Times* editorial also implied that their misinformation resulted from standard routines of information-gathering and processing.

Credibility is a much needed resource for journalistic institutions not only to get newsworthy information from news sources but also to appeal to their audiences through their social reputation and trust. The main reason why the two newspapers apologized for the misinformation was probably that they needed to maintain their credibility by acknowledging their faulty prewar information which claimed that the Iraqi government was actively working on weapons of mass destruction. The day after the *New York Times* published the apologetic statement, some leading newspapers, including the *Wall Street Journal* and *Guardian,* covered the belated apology of the *New York Times* but without

the direct self-reflection of their own news articles involving the prewar intelligence in the newspapers in 2003.[5]

The question arises: what can and should the media have done after admitting to misleading their audience/citizens in the pre-intervention and intervention periods in the second Gulf War? The problem is that the statements concerned their credibility to the readers/citizens instead of the consequences of the war. Despite the mainstream media's self-representation as watchdog, they work within the capitalist economy and coordinate with the government, especially in terms of foreign policy. The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* explain their misinformation as a result of faulty news sources. The two newspapers' reaction to their own failure to report the information failures surrounding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is problematic in terms of sincerity and further measures to be taken. *The New York Times* concludes by stating that "We consider the story of Iraq's weapons, and of the pattern of misinformation, to be unfinished business. And we fully intend to continue aggressive reporting aimed at setting the record straight." The *Washington Post*, as noted above, seeks to minimize its own responsibility for the building up to the invasion of Iraq. It is possible to regard the two editorial statements in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* as a form of public apology for the misinformation they functioned to disseminate. But this ambiguous apology, without any clear subject of responsibility and viable future actions, only functions to regain pubic support for journalistic trust.

Another question is whether the mainstream media's role in the war can be defined as propaganda campaigning. In the two newspapers' statements, they domesticate Iraqi reporting and the subsequent consequences, without mentioning their pro-war

support, and individualize the responsibility of news reporting based on sourcing. Both newspapers domesticated foreign news by focusing on national interests and excluding foreign consequences and suffering in Iraq.

The political and social ramifications of the newspapers' oversimplification of the consequences of the war reporting in the statements can be understood using Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model. For the media, it is thus important to produce distance instead of appropriating distant events based on the US national interest frame. By this I am suggesting that it is necessary for the US or western Europeans to provincialize their value systems. As Buck-Morss (2003) points out, understanding international conflicts in specific contexts would accommodate the realization of the potential that the discourse of global responsibility has in the global society.

Limitations of the Research and Suggestions for Future Research

I acknowledge that the main thesis and subsequent arguments in my dissertation may have been even more convincing if I had examined a larger volume of archival sources focusing on the construction of responsibility discourses in military intervention in the 1990s. In this section, I will discuss this and other limitations of the study as a way of suggesting implications for future research on media discourse and military intervention in a global society. The first four points are related to the usefulness of intertextuality in analyzing complex and contentious events. If a wider variety of discourses on global responsibility could be included in the research design, subsequent discussion on strategic conceptualizations of global responsibility discourses would gain a deeper substance.

First, it would be useful to include comparative elements on the presence and absence of military intervention in other humanitarian crises. The Bosnian War and the Kosovo Conflict represent the discourse of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, whereas there were different types of military interventions in terms of temporal, geographical, and importance in the 1990s. In addition, there were cases that the US did not actively engage in with the use of force in the same period. It is thus necessary for future research to fully grasp the eventful period of the 1990s by incorporating different types of military interventions and non-military interventions while exploring the definition and discursive functionality of responsibility discourses in international crises. The broader scope of research design in types of military interventions can help identify further implications of military interventions since the 1990s in the global society. By including other (non)intervention cases, researchers could examine the construction of the changing notion of sovereignty and global responsibility in synchronic and diachronic analyses. Considering the importance of the comparative elements, this research regarded the Bosnian War as a case including non-intervention and intervention at the same time in order to include both elements.

Second, in analyzing and discussing US media discourse involving US and NATO-led military interventions of the 1990s, the study examined US mainstream discourse among diverse political spectrums that cover the construction and articulation of global responsibility. The critics of the popular discourse and imagination of global responsibility claims from alternative media and oppositional discourses to the hegemonic discourse could be given deeper substance if the research included more of the oppositional discourses and comparative elements in terms of identity construction

and policy orientation. It is worth noting that my chosen archival sources are reflective of key elements of what Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) call Empire. Thus, examination of media discourses with more diverse political ideology might show a more varied conception of US roles in fostering global responsibility and the "dialectics" of Empire and Multitude. In particular, alternative media other than the *Nation* such as the radical Internet-based media, *Z Communications: The Spirit of Resistance Lives*, and more conservative religious groups' media discourse such as the *Washington Times* would offer a clearer difference between mainstream and alternative media discourses and would help to illuminate the hegemonic discourse in the mainstream media discourse. Including alternative media would also provide a space to discuss the relationships between domination and resistance through global responsibility claims surrounding military interventions.

Media discourses which are produced and circulated in different contexts than the mainstream US media especially in different nation-states might lead to more diverse conceptions of global responsibility. For example, incorporating more diverse archives in terms of political ideology in UK media in the analysis could have provided better comparative elements by explaining the UK publics' understanding and experience of responsibility in the chosen cases. As Hansen (2006) points out, the UK government's policy on Bosnia and Kosovo adds an interesting comparative element to the US counterpart in that UK government continuously adhered to humanitarian responsibility discourse in the Bosnian War period unlike its US counterpart, whereas both governments shared a similar policy orientation on Kosovo. But this study only included the *Guardian* to illustrate an oppositional element to US policy within US's NATO allies.

Thus, future research might be able to provide more solid comparative elements by incorporating European mainstream and alternative media discourses. The media's policy opinions in NATO member sates and non-NATO member states may provide a more dynamic formation of global responsibility discourses, foreign policy, and public opinion. For example, according to an editorial in the *Nation*, 96 percent of Greek citizens opposed the NATO air war against Serbia in March 1999 before the NATO's war.[6] Further examination of oppositional voices could have helped to further illuminate the global conceptions of responsibility discourse on Bosnia and Kosovo.

Next, it should also be noted that future research may benefit by incorporating media forms other than print media or by combining personal and mediated communications. In analyzing US media discourse, the research focused on mainstream newspapers, especially editorials appearing in three mainstream newspapers. Considering the growing importance of electronic media, including television, radio, and the Internet, the analysis of global responsibility discourses in new media could have added more substance to the analysis of media discourse, especially in a media-saturated world. According to some theorists, both conventional media scholars (i.e., Entman, 2000) and French theorists (i.e., Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard, and Paul Virilio), also point to the increasing importance of visual images in influencing the public's understanding of specific military intervention events and popular imagination of national and global identities and policy opinions.

Moreover, it would be useful in future research to examine connections between interpersonal communication and mediated communication. Rantanen (2005) suggests the importance of individual and mass identity construction as movement by combining

mediated communications and everyday life experience.[7] As the formation of identity cannot be reduced in mediated communication, the interaction and situation of media discourse to everyday life experience can help to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the construction and experience of global responsibility in the era of mediated communication. Audience (citizens at the same time) research and the analysis of social uses of the media can shed lights on the lived experience of global responsibility discourses in practice.

Finally, it is worthy noting that the critique of global responsibility discourses surrounding US and NATO's interventions in media discourses in the invaded and occupied states may further illuminate a more diversified space of global responsibility discourses. Even though their media discourse are less audible and it is difficult for US and western journalists to get access to complex issues in the invaded and occupied states, their exclusivity and the asymmetrical flow of information are serious problems in understanding different conceptions and potentials of global responsibility claims. This dissertation acknowledges this limitation that repeats the asymmetrical analysis of global responsibility discourses in media. Nonetheless, it is my hope that this research will make a meaningful contribution to our understanding of ways to talk about global responsibility.

Endnotes

[1] For an analogy, post-Fordism facilitated the grassroots' resistance in order to upgrade the capitalist economy. In this understanding of the historical moment, it can be inferred from what Lotringer (2004, p. 10) recorded, regarding Autonomia, is that historical experience shared in common, in a context, is the crucial point in producing collective action. Autonomia was against Fordism and capital's reaction was post-Fordism. Fordism empowered laborers and industrial reservoirs with technological innovation and scientific management exemplified by Taylorism. In this regard, Lotringer's suggestion is not so dramatic in the sense that, shown from the failure of Autonomia, capital creatively absorbs its reaction and develops through resistance. This failure of Autonomia seems to bring him a more paradoxical explanation.
[2] For an example of the comparative discourse analysis of Kosovo and Algeria, see Malmvig (2006).
[3] As Fairclough (1995, p. 106) points out by using the scale of presence (absent, presupposed, background, foreground), the legitimation and justification of a war is implicitly presupposed, while only part of a series

of the malevolent practices produced by the war was highlighted by individualizing and oversimplifying the root of the abuse.

[4] Kurtz, H. (2004, Aug 12). The Post on WMDs: An inside story–Prewar Articles Questioning Threat Often Didn't Make Front Page. *Washington Post*, p. A1.

[5] Bandler, J. (2004, May 27). *New York Times* criticizes its own Iraqi-weapons coverage. *Wall Street Journal*, p. B1; Younge, G. (2004, May 28). NY editor slams apology for his record. *Guardian*, p. 15.

[6] Margaronis, M. (1999, May 24). The view from Greece. *Nation*, *268*(19), pp. 6-7.

[7] Rantanen (2005) suggests five "zones" of everyday cosmopolitanism: (1) Media and communications, (2) Learning another language, (3) Living/working abroad or having a family member living abroad, (4) Living with a person from another culture, and (5) Engaging with foreigners in you locality or across a frontier. As she notes, it is important how individual identity and a mass movement can be related for the objective of cosmopolitanism.

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Book Review

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