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The Graduate School
College of the Liberal Arts

ARISTOTLE’S IMAGINATION
AND THE BIRTH OF NAMELESS THINGS

A Dissertation in
Philosophy

by
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Abstract

Aristotle’s investigation of the soul in the *De Anima* challenges his understanding of nature and the natural, complicating his distinctions between naturalistic and logical methodologies, between perceptible and intelligible, and between physics and metaphysics. At the heart of each of these distinctions is his understanding of *phantasia*. By attending in the *De Anima* to what Aristotle says about the imagination, but also to how he uses imagination, this project aspires to sketch out a naturalistic account of *phantasia*. It takes seriously Aristotle’s suggestion that *phantasia* is some sort of motion and discloses a unified image of Aristotelian *phantasia* as the *kinēsis* by which the intelligible comes to be. *Phantasia* is the motion by which the *entelecheia* of the extended magnitudes of the perceptible realm come to be the analogical ‘perceptible things,’ the *phantasmata*, of the intelligible realm. This understanding not only attempts to account for *phantasia*’s seemingly contradictory appearances within the *De Anima*, but, by means of a metaphoric extension, also considers *phantasia*’s roles in the *Rhetoric*, the *Poetics*, and the *De Memoria*. Here, the “metaphoric *phantasia*” of *DA* III.3 428a is found to be the motion by which the intelligible is “brought before the eyes” and made clear and distinct. It is the motion by which the intelligible becomes perceptible, and is thus the motion by which metaphors themselves come to be. And insofar as such “bringing before the eyes” relies on one’s ability to present the *entelecheia* of a given thought, metaphoric *phantasia* can also be uncovered as the motion by which apophtahical naming itself occurs. “Metaphoric *phantasia*” thus makes room for a creative, poetic imagination within Aristotle’s thought, and its link to *phantasia per se* means that a physics of *phantasia* is also a physics of language, is an account of how a thing gets to be said as what it is. *Phantasia*, metaphoric and otherwise, can thus be seen to account for the birth of nameless things.
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<table>
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<th>De Anima</th>
<th>DA</th>
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<tr>
<td>De Caelo</td>
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<td>De Generatione Animalium</td>
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<td>De Generatione et Corruptione</td>
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<td>De Interpretatione</td>
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<td>De Insomniis</td>
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<td>De Partibus Animalium</td>
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<td>Eudemian Ethics</td>
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<td>Rhetoric</td>
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Acknowledgments

First, I’d like to thank you, reader, for taking up this text. I welcome any corrections, comments, or questions; my email address can be found on the final page.

Without the encouragement and direction of my primary dissertation director Christopher Long, this project may well have never been undertaken, let alone completed. It is a rare experience to see, in the space of one project, such significant development in one’s abilities as to not even recognize the beginning efforts as one’s own: this, though, has been my experience in working on this dissertation with Chris. For all of the pages read, encouragement given, and comments made, Chris, I am extremely thankful.

The fact that I am completing this project at the end of a very complicated time in my life is a testament to the amount of support I have received not only from Chris, but also from many people at Pennsylvania State University. During this time, my primary residence has never been on campus, my husband’s education and profession as a physician have resulted in two interstate moves, and, not least of all, my husband and I have welcomed four children into our family. As parents themselves, the encouragement from both Chris and my initial academic adviser, Shannon Sullivan, has been hugely significant.

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Dedicated to my children,
Oliver, Elliot, Timothy, and Rose Stenger,
as each of you sacrificed something towards the completion of this project;
and above all, to my husband and partner, Rob Stenger,
who wouldn’t let me quit.
Chapter One: The Unfolding of Entelecheia

*Phantasia by way of Entelecheia: Alternate Intelligibility*, page 4

*Phantasia by way of Entelecheia: Living, Ensouled Bodies*, page 9

*Aristotle’s Method(s)*, page 21

*The Naturalist, Intelligible ‘Space,’ and Spatial Intelligibility*, page 30

It is this way with all of us concerning language: we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things—metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities...the genesis of language does not proceed logically in any case, and all the material within and with which the man of truth, the scientist, and the philosopher later work and build, if not derived from never-never land, is at least not derived from the essence of things.

*Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*¹

There is only one answer to the question “where does the word “entelecheia” come from?” that all etymologists, classicists, and philosophers agree on: it comes, of course, from Aristotle, who coined it. From that point forward, the conversation fractures into conflicting viewpoints as to the linguistic pieces that comprise the term, the time of its first appearance, and, ultimately, the meaning it was meant to express. This investigation does not intend to resolve or even fully explain those conflicts. It asks the same question regarding the provenance of “entelecheia” but directs it differently: according to what Aristotle has to say about the human soul, where does the word “entelecheia” come from? Would the answer be the same? That it comes from Aristotle, that he coined, created or invented it? No; it does not seem so. In fact, it seems unlikely

that Aristotle himself would provide such an answer, given two passages from the

*Metaphysics* wherein he suggests that “entelecheia” emerged, as though of its own

accord, as a particular use of “energeia”:

The term ἐνέργεια, which tends to mean ἔντελέχεια, has been generalized from

applying mainly to κινήσεις to apply to other situations as well. For ἐνέργεια

seems especially to be κινήσις. (*Met. IX(Θ) 3.1047a30-32*)

For the ἐργον is a τέλος, and the ἐνέργεια is the ἐργον; therefore the term ἐνέργεια

derives from ἐργον, and it tends to mean ἔντελέχεια. (*Met. IX(Θ) 8.1050a21-23*)

Daniel W. Graham observes that what is “striking” about both of these passages is that

Aristotle treats *energeia*—and I argue *entelecheia* as well—as though it “has a life of its

own” even though “Aristotle had invented the word.”

Far from being able to reply that the word “entelecheia” comes “from Aristotle,” Aristotle’s response would likely be

quite complicated—so much so that it would exceed the capacity of this project. The

goal here is not to provide a systematic review of Aristotle’s remarks on language and

meaning, nor to detail the place of language in an Aristotelian philosophy of mind.

Neither is it to ask after Aristotle’s theory of the origin of language generally. It may be

that what is uncovered is applicable to a larger Aristotelian philosophy of language, and

that what we find to be true about “entelecheia” is equally true of the numerous other

Aristotelian neologisms at least, and words in general at most. But achieving that

application is not the goal of this project, which has a much narrower focus.

The question about “entelecheia’s” origins has arisen from a reading of the *De

Anima* in which the central concern has not been *entelecheia*, but rather *phantasia*. Thus

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the leading question of whence “entelecheia” is more fully rendered: given what Aristotle says in the De Anima about the role of phantasia in the human soul, where would he say that the newly created or discovered word “entelecheia,” as presented in that same work, originates? The suspicion behind this question is that if we focus on the relationship between phantasia and the activity of entelecheia (as distinct from the word, “entelecheia”), it will help us to better understand the relationship between phantasia and the creation, discovery, or formation of the word “entelecheia.” What’s more, coming to phantasia by way of entelecheia and to “entelecheia” by way of phantasia will allow a unique understanding of Aristotelian phantasia to emerge. This understanding will avoid the three most common difficulties encountered by those seeking to account for Aristotle’s phantasia. The first grouping consists of suggestions that Aristotle’s main exposition of phantasia, DA III.3, interrupts the larger work; the second, that this troubling chapter is itself internally inconsistent; and the final, that any conclusions drawn about the phantasia presented there are difficult to apply to the phantasia presented in III.7-11, let alone in others of Aristotle’s works, such as the Rhetoric or De Memoria. The phantasia presented here will confirm that DA III.3 stands precisely where it should, that it is internally consistent, and that it provides the key to understanding how a unified phantasia may be read across Aristotle’s works.

The task of the first four chapters is to come to phantasia by way of entelecheia, and this task will make our reasons for choosing entelecheia as our touchstone obvious; its meaning will resonate with phantasia in a way that any other of Aristotle’s numerous neologisms will not. It does so in two ways. Firstly, entelecheia and phantasia both
seem to indicate a sort of intelligibility operative even apart from the way things are said, and consequently seem like promising places to begin an investigation into how the word “entelecheia” originates. Secondly, entelecheia describes a type of ousia that is best exemplified by natural, living things, and it is in our interactions with natural, living things that the function of phantasia seems to be most clearly illuminated. And so, in order to better establish the reasons for pursuing phantasia by way of an examination of entelecheia, and for thereby pursuing “entelecheia” by way of phantasia, let us begin by saying more about this alternate intelligibility; secondly, we will turn to a consideration of the way in which living things may engage phantasia in an exemplary way.

Phantasia by way of Entelecheia: Alternate Intelligibility

The existence of this alternate intelligibility in Aristotle is not presupposed, though there are grounds for such a presupposition in the opening of the De Interpretatione. This passage, while “highly compressed and elliptical,” has been called “the most important part of Aristotle’s linguistic theory” and “the most influential text in the history of semantics.”

For our purposes, it is also noteworthy that this enticing passage points to the De Anima for clarification. Within just a few lines, Aristotle recognizes that “written marks are not the same for all men,” and “neither are spoken

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4 Norman Kretzmann, “Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Convention,” in Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations: Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972, ed. John Corcoran, Synthese Historical Library, v. 9 (Dordrecht; Boston: Reidel, 1974), 3. This passage of the De Interpretatione has also been maligned by J.L. Ackrill as notoriously inadequate and full of “grave weaknesses.” My own reading is more sympathetic to that of Deborah Modrak, who seeks to understand how this passage may be consistent with and helpful to understanding Aristotle’s epistemology and ontology (see Modrak p. 27). Aristotle and J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s “Categories” and “De Interpretatione”, trans. J.L. Ackrill (Clarendon Press, 1979), 113; Modrak, Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning, 2; Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Its Tradition: Texts from 500 to 1750 (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: J. Benjamins, 1984), 27; Kretzmann, “Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Convention,” 3.
sounds,” and yet he still maintains that “what these are in the first place signs [σημεῖα] of—affections [παθήματα] of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses [ὄμοιόματα] of—actual things [πράγματα]—are also the same” (16a3-6). The possibility for disjunction between words (spoken and written) and “affections of the soul” is most easily seen in considering the act of translating between languages. The chief challenge of all translation, which today necessarily accompanies all ancient Greek scholarship, is of course not avoided here: consider “logos” itself, which is a veritable polyhedron of a word, having so many faces it seems impossible to bring them all together in a single word in a different language. This difficulty is embraced in this project since it points to the possibility that something may be intelligible apart from the word that names it. We might say that the goal of this project is not just to identify the πράγμα that is behind or within the πάθημα in Aristotle’s soul that gave rise to the word “entelecheia,” but to try to understand how we identify—how we understand—that πράγμα so that we may have the πάθημα, an “affection of the soul” that leads to the name “entelecheia,” that somehow comes into spoken and written language.

But the De Interpretatione cannot help us with this question. All Aristotle tells us in this passage is that “these matters have been discussed in the work on the soul,” and he concludes that they thus “do not belong to the present subject” (16a7-8). While the vocabulary of DI 16a3-8 is not identical—actually, is not even remotely consistent with that of the discussions of phantasia in the De Anima— it seems possible that Aristotle is

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5 Aristotle and Ackrill, Aristotle’s “Categories” and “De Interpretatione”, 43.
6 A possible exception is the appearance of ὅμοιας at 429a5, which does seem to reinforce the likelihood that a phantasma is a likeness, a ὅμοιόματα: “If, then, it is nothing other than imagination that has the attributes mentioned (and this is what was being claimed), imagination would be a motion coming about as
pointing us in that direction, in which case he perhaps means us to understand that the phantasmata of III.3 are the “likenesses,” [ὁμοιώματα], the “affections” [παθήματα] mentioned here. Perhaps we can take the difference in terminology as an illustration of how perceiving a certain πράγμα can give rise to multiple ways of saying that πράγμα.

Phantasia is common both to souls with and without logos; it is thereby possible for an animal without logos to nonetheless have phantasmata arise in its soul upon encountering sensory things. For human beings, those souls capable of logos, these phantasmata certainly do result in spoken and written words, which indeed might differ across nations. And so while DI 1.1 may have indicated that we rely on any number of passages from the De Anima in seeking to clarify its meaning, it seems strongly unlikely that the passages regarding phantasia would not have been included in the reference. But how do phantasmata result in words, and how do we understand them until they do? This question is not strictly a temporally/process-oriented one; we will look to the way a new word—“entelecheia”—comes to be for the first time while remaining open to the possibility that the type of understanding necessary to that process may be undertaken even after a thing has a name.

There is good reason to suppose that the passages in the De Anima regarding entelecheia are also included in the reference in DI 1.1. “Entelecheia” is not merely

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7 This is, of course, not the only option. Long provides a helpful summary of the various places commentators have argued are candidates for this reference; he himself suggests that the most beneficial reading is to take the vagueness of the reference to point to any and all things Aristotle has said about the soul. Christopher P. Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 74, n.7., 76.

8 “And because imaginings remain within and are similar to perceptions, many animals act in accord with them, some, the beasts, because of not having intelligence, but others, humans, because their intelligence is sometimes clouded by passion, disease, or sleep” (DA III.3, 429a5-9).
useful in this project insofar as it is an Aristotelian neologism, and thus testifies to Aristotle’s own experience in encountering a thing that, while identifiable, stands yet in need of a name. “Entelecheia” also, in its meaning, says something about the way a name may be an essential part of the way a thing appears. In the context of the De Interpretatione passage, “entelecheia” thus has a twofold importance: as a neologism, it performs this transition from being a “likeness,” “affection,” or phantasma of the soul that then leads to a word; in its meaning, it describes something about this very transition, this process of coming to be said.9 DA II.1 opens by detailing three sorts of ousia, and clearly states that entelecheia and saying are indeed intimately connected, even if the details of that connection remain obscure. Ousia, “one of the most general ways of being,” can be divided into three sorts: material, form, and the combination of these; entelecheia is the form (412a4).10 Material is “not a this [τόδε τι],” but the “form or look of a thing [μορφήν καὶ εἶδος],” does lead us to call [λέγεται] something a this [τόδε τι] (412a5-8). Entelecheia, then, pertains to the connection between a thing’s “form or look” and it’s ability to be spoken, named, or called a τόδε τι, a “this.”

The tripartite connection between the “form or look of a thing,” what that thing is called, and entelecheia can also be found in the Metaphysics, in Book VII(Z), but the analysis in DA II.1 is not simply a summary of that discussion.11 This can be seen in how

9 This “twofold” importance denotes a doubleness in how we are attempting to understand the word: we are paying attention both to what the word “says,” i.e., it’s meaning, but also to what the word may be said to “do,” which in this particular case is the performance of coming to be. This same doubleness will mark our treatment of phantasia, albeit to a different degree: we will attend to its meaning (which pertains to appearances) but also to the way it itself appears in the text.

10 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of passages from the De Anima are from Joe Sachs: Aristotle and Joe Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection (Green Lion Press, 2002), 81.

11 These three types are also part of the discussion in Met. VIII(H).
each discussion delimits its focus: the threefold division of ousia that appears in DA II.1
is a further subdivision found within a higher-order division in the ways ousia is meant as
laid out at the beginning of Met. VII(Z).3. This four-fold division is comprised of these
items: The first is “what it keeps on being in order to be at all,” the second “the
universal,” the third “the general class,” and fourthly, “what underlies these
[ὑποκείµενον].” The threefold division of material, form, and a compound of these
made in DA II.1 further details this fourth way in which thinghood is meant, “what
underlies these.” The presence of the three forms of ousia in the De Anima is not a
restatement of previously made ontological conclusions, but rather an extension of
them—an extension that emphasizes the importance of phantasia to the concept of
entelecheia; Aristotle nowhere refers us to the Metaphysics to pursue a fuller account
though he frequently employs such cross-referencing. To make this argument, let us first
begin by considering the ways in which the subject matter of the Metaphysics overlaps
with that of the De Anima to better situate what is unique about the De Anima’s
approach—the appearance of phantasia.

“What is being?” asks the Metaphysics; “what is the soul?” asks the De Anima. It
is not difficult to see how these questions might be related. The connection is central to
the only two essays Seth Benardete ever published about Aristotle: one about Met.
I(A).1-2, and the other on DA III.3-5. Writing about these essays together, Richard
Velkley says, “If the subject-matter of metaphysics is questioning…[i]n a sense its

12 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Metaphysics are from Joe Sachs: Aristotle and Joe
Sachs, Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Santa Fe, N.M.: Green Lion Press, 1999), 119.
subject is the soul as questioning, or the soul as wondering.”\textsuperscript{13} For this reason, Benardete “reads the treatise on the soul as an implicit introduction to first philosophy, and concludes with the claim that the self-thinking of mind is the highest concern of inquiry into being, into what is.”\textsuperscript{14} The two treatises cover rather different territory, however, even if their destination is the same. *Phantasia* marks the *De Anima*’s approach as unique. Returning to Velkley’s statement that Benardete’s essay on *DA* III.3-5 “concludes with the claim that the self-thinking of mind is the highest concern of inquiry into being, into what is,” we find that he continues, “[t]his claim, however, completes an account of *phantasia* as the bond between noetic and aesthetic soul, an account showing that *nous* without *phantasia* is impossible.”\textsuperscript{15} Here, let us further substantiate the claim that *entelecheia* can be productively—and uniquely—approached through a reading of the *De Anima*, this time by reading carefully what Aristotle has to say about the relationship between *entelecheia* and soul. Doing so will further support the claim that pursuing *phantasia* by way of *entelecheia* will result in a fuller understanding of both terms.

**Phantasia by way of Entelecheia: Living, Ensouled Bodies**

That *entelecheia* may have a privileged relationship to soul is evidenced by George A. Blair’s intriguing table cataloging the appearances of *energeia* and *entelecheia* in Aristotle’s works, and which we include here as Table I.1.


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
Table 1.1: Distribution of “Entelecheia” and “Energeia” in Aristotle’s Works
(Source: George A. Blair, “The Meaning of ‘Energeia’ and ‘Entelecheia’ in Aristotle,” page 103.)

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In his summary of the findings of that table, Blair observes that “ἐνέργεια is used five times as often as ἐντελέχεια, and is fairly evenly distributed throughout the works, while the latter is clustered in a very few locations.”\(^\text{16}\) Among these places are Book II and the first part of Book III of the \textit{De Anima}—that is, in the chapters of the \textit{De Anima} that lead up to the introduction of \textit{phantasia}.\(^\text{17}\) Blair goes on to conclude, “ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια must mean exactly the same thing… Aristotle coined two words and then defined them in such a way as to show that he should have coined only one.”\(^\text{18}\) Looking again at the table, however, one wonders if \textit{entelecheia} may pertain more specifically to the activity of living, and thereby to soul, while \textit{energeia} does not. After all, appearances of \textit{entelecheia} are “clustered” not only in the \textit{De Anima}, but in those books of the \textit{Physics} (III and VIII) in which coming-to-be [γένεσις] and passing away [φθορά] are discussed, and in Book XI(K) of the \textit{Metaphysics} in which these two topics are raised again. Furthermore, Blair in his summary neglects to mention what is clear in his chart: \textit{De Generatione et Corruptione} is another work in which the word appears frequently. Whether or not \textit{entelecheia} is distinct from \textit{energeia} in this regard is the work of a separate project; here, though, let us more fully pursue the possibility that \textit{entelecheia} and soul may need to be taken together if either is to be fully understood.

In \textit{DA} II.1, Aristotle again moves very quickly from the question of being, to the question of thinghood (“One of the most general ways of being we call thinghood…” [412A14]). He then divides thinghood into the three sorts we enumerated earlier. Next,

\(^\text{17}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., 110.
he focuses on one of the three sorts of thinghood in particular—the one that is a compound of matter and form—and then narrows it again to a sub-group of this sort of compound thinghood comprised of “independent things,” noting that “[t]he things that seem most of all to be independent things are bodies” (412a13). He then limits his focus twice more, moving from all bodies to “the natural ones,” and from these to those in particular that have life (412a13-14). He thus concludes: “So every natural body having a share in life would be an independent thing having thinghood as a composite [of material and form]” (412a15-16). This is the sort of thinghood that is the focus of the *De Anima*. It is of course included in the more comprehensive reach of *Met. VII(Z)*, but it is not its focus.\(^{19}\) If, as we are here considering, *entelecheia* has a privileged relationship with soul, and thus with life, it would of course appear with more frequency in both places (and Blair’s table reflects this). “[B]eing is meant in more than one way,” Aristotle tells us in *Met. IV(Γ).2*, even if all of these ways point “toward one source” (1003b5-6). The task of the *Metaphysics* is to pursue these ways, but with hopes of ultimately uncovering their one source. The task of the *De Anima* is to pursue a specific type of thinghood (natural, living things) that is already a specific type of being.

\(^{19}\) Reading *Met. VII(Z)* alongside *DA II.1* could comprise a worthwhile project. This book of the *Metaphysics* is also a discussion of “the way [of being] that is first among [all types] is what something is,” thinghood [*ousia*] (1028a15). And by the second chapter of the book, Aristotle clarifies that “thinghood seems to belong most evidently to bodies” (1028b10). He goes on to discuss what we might call natural, living bodies—“animals and plants”—but also natural bodies which we would not say are living, “such as fire and water and earth and each thing of that kind, and as many things as are either parts of these or made out of them, out of either some or all of them, such as the cosmos and the parts of it, the stars and the moon and the sun” (1028b10-14). This last group of bodies, those of the cosmos generally, is not part of the consideration of *entelecheia* in *DA II.1*. Further, *Met. VII(Z)* is largely a logical account (Chapter 4 begins “And first let us say some things about it [thinghood] from the standpoint of logic,” and Sachs here notes that “The rest of Bk. VII, except for Ch. 7-9, is logical in character, an analysis starting from the way we speak and think. For Aristotle, this is always secondary to examining the way things are by nature…”). The three chapters not part of this logical account further extend the narrower focus of *DA II.1* insofar as they take up not natural bodies, but the products of art… and do so in a naturalistic way. Aristotle and Sachs, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, 120, fn.4.
The reason for this focus, of course, is that natural bodies having a share in life are the ones that can be said to have a soul, to be ensouled. Living natural bodies move quickly to the forefront in the De Anima’s consideration of being, because it is these that exemplify the sort of ousia that is entelecheia: soul. There is no need to turn to Blair’s table to support this statement, for the next step in the argument of DA II.1 says in no uncertain terms that “the soul has its thinghood as the form of a natural body having life as a potency,” and “this sort of thinghood is a being-at-work-staying-itself,” an entelecheia (412a20-21). The soul, then, is “the being-at-work-staying-itself of such a body,” is the entelecheia of a living thing (412a22). The question is no longer whether entelecheia and soul are closely related, but has become one of just how intimate this relationship is, and, of course, how that relationship gets us closer to understanding the nature of phantasia and the emergence of the word “entelecheia.” Following DA II.1 yet further, we begin to find answers to both of these questions.

These few paragraphs in DA II.1 that claim that soul has the ousia that is entelecheia lead up to a wondrous, if abrupt, conclusion: “Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή; οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον” (412b10-11). This is typically rendered by translators in ways that diminish the force of κατὰ τὸν λόγον: “We have then said what soul is in general, substance in accordance with the account of the thing” has one, “substance as notion or form” has another, and, even more vaguely, a third has substance “corresponding to the principle of a thing.” (We will consider Sachs’ unique translation

20 “Being-at-work-being-itself” is Sachs’ translation of entelecheia, and will be adopted in this project in those instances in which it is helpful to do so instead of using entelecheia itself. A consideration of this translation is provided in Chapter Three.

in what follows.) But even apart from the presence of logos in the general summary of the soul, what is immediately striking and abrupt about this passage is the absence of the word entelecheia. The first clause of the next sentence is something of a restatement, reading: “…and this is what such-and-such a body keeps on being in order to be at all [τὸ δὲ τὸ τί ἐν ἔσται τὸ τοιοῦτο σώματι]” (412b12). This undoubtedly invokes entelecheia, though again, “entelecheia” itself is oddly absent. The discussion preceding this strange conclusion has posited the connection between soul and ousia [it is entelecheia], and between ousia and logos [also entelecheia], but nowhere has Aristotle discussed the connection between soul and logos. In fact, when we recall Aristotle’s earlier summarization of the second of the three types of thinghood as “the form or look of a thing, directly as a result of which something is called a this” at DA 412a8, this “general” restatement of what soul is might make more sense if “psuche” were replaced with “entelecheia:” “Generally, we have said then what entelecheia is: thinghood according to speech.” What is the relationship between entelecheia and psuche, then? Which one defines the other? Is the soul one instantiation or analog of the “sort” of ousia that is entelecheia? Or is entelecheia an instantiation or analog of soul?22 The first is easier to envision: It is easy enough to say that the way the soul acts on the body of a


22 Consider Polansky’s consideration of why Aristotle uses entelecheia in the definition of soul instead of energeia: “In the definition of soul, Aristotle uses one of his terms for actuality, ἔντελεχεια (entelecheia), rather than the alternative, ἐνέργεια (energeia). These terms, both probably coined as technical terms by Aristotle himself, are difficult to distinguish and are sometimes used by him nearly interchangeably. Nevertheless, examination of all the appearances in this treatise discloses that he limits himself to entelecheia here in the definition of soul, while he tends to use energeia to speak of the operation and condition of the faculties of soul and their objects. It seems that entelecheia as stressing the condition of completeness or having the end fits well with speaking of the soul’s being in relation to the body, while energeia with its suggestion of working busily does a good job for speaking of the operations of the faculties of the soul and their objects…” The question here, of course, is whether entelecheia “fits well” with the soul, or is in fact another word for it. Ronald M. Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 150, emphasis mine.
natural living thing exemplifies the sort of thinghood that *ousia* is, and is thus one species of a broader genus.

And at first, this does indeed seem to be Aristotle’s meaning. Directly after this “wondrous, if abrupt conclusion,” Aristotle moves on to illustrate by way of analogy just what he means by saying the soul is “generally” thinghood “in accordance with the account of the thing.” And what he turns to is not a living thing at all, but rather is a non-living thing: the ax. What is odd about this choice can be seen even before getting into its nuances. It might not seem odd to illustrate *entelecheia* by means of an inanimate object. But what is supposedly being illustrated here is not *entelecheia*, but soul. The choice of the ax as an example, then, further tangles soul and *entelecheia*, and the details of that choice do little to differentiate the two terms. Frederick Woodbridge summarizes these details well:

> What then is the proper analogy [for the definition of soul]? Aristotle's own answer is the analogy of an ax and its cutting. He goes first to what is inanimate. The soul is related to the body as the cutting of an ax is related to the ax, or, in general, as what a thing does or can do to the thing that does it. We can put this into familiar categories and say, the relation is that of function and structure, but it is better to have a homelier expression in mind at first-- the doer and what it does- - and see, with Aristotle, the soul as simply the doings of the body. But it seems a little absurd to say that cutting is the soul of an ax. Yet Aristotle reminds us, although withholding his approval, that Thales said that the magnet has a soul because it attracts iron. This is, however, evidence that we give souls to things in consequence of what they do. We give them at least the power to do it,

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24 Though it won’t become our focus until Chapter Six, it is worth noting this turn to analogy, as well as the fact that this is the third analogy to be drawn in the space of a single page. Just above, Aristotle has tried by means of two analogies to illustrate the “two senses” of *entelecheia*, saying that “form is a being-at-work-staying-itself” in “two senses, one in the manner of knowledge, the other in the manner of the act of contemplating,” before immediately making another comparison to sleep and waking (412a10).
converting the fact that they can do what they do into the category of power. The soul, then, is first of all a power.\(^{25}\)

The soul might be a power or a function, but it does not follow that all things that have a power or function have a soul: Aristotle “withholds his approval” of Thales’ ensouled magnet. Woodbridge clarifies that

> the ax with its ability to cut is not a wholly satisfactory example, for the ax is not alive. It does not cut without somebody to use it to cut with. A man, however, does what he does without anybody to use him to do it with... it is just this operating of one's own instruments which distinguishes the living from the dead and from the nonliving.\(^{26}\)

Again, for Aristotle, “to live is to have a start of motion in oneself; not to live is to have a start of motion outside oneself.”\(^{27}\) And so Woodbridge arrives at a conclusion that further reinforces our question about the differentiation between *entelecheia* and soul: “Were the ax alive, its power to cut exercised in actual cutting would be its “entelechy” or soul.”\(^{28}\) He finds that Aristotle denies *entelecheia* to non-living things. And so again, what is then the difference between soul and *entelecheia*?

A fuller (although by no means exhaustive) examination of the complex relationship between soul and *entelecheia* will unfold as this project progresses. For now, it is enough to emphasize that the relationship between soul and *entelecheia* is not at all immediately obvious in *DA* II.1, which reinforces our suspicion that *entelecheia* may be distinguished from *energeia* due, at least in part, to its close relationship to soul and life. Remembering, though, both the larger goal of this chapter—to support the claim


\(^{26}\) Ibid., 33.

\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 37.
that a better understanding of *entelecheia* will help us to access Aristotelian *phantasia*—and the particular goal of this section—to show that *entelecheia’s* relationship to ensouled beings in particular gets us closer to reaching that larger goal, we can now make one final observation about living things: they may include more than one at first assumes.

When Aristotle talks of “the things that seem most of all to be independent things,” the things that lend themselves to being identified as a *tode ti*, and says the *entelecheia* of these things is soul, do we really know what things he is indicating? Might “life” include more than what we typically assume, more than those bodies both external and perceptible to us? Why must such things only be external to our own soul? “Externality” is not part of Aristotle’s specification for natural, living bodies. Indeed, in *DA II.2*, he seems to gesture in the opposite direction:

> So we say, taking this as a starting point for the inquiry, that what is ensouled is distinguished from what is soulless by living. But living is meant in more than one way, and if any one alone of the following is present in something, we say it is alive: intellect, perception, moving and stopping with respect to place, and the motion that results from nourishment, that is, wasting away as well as growing. (413a21-25)

Might the presence of intellect itself, in the non-perceptible, intelligible thing, be enough to make something alive and thereby an instance of *entelecheia* as soul? This project will eventually confirm this possibility, and will do so by looking at *entelecheia* in the *De Anima* instead of in the *Metaphysics* because it allows us to see how *phantasia* helps us to uncover and understand *entelecheia* and soul in the world around us, in both external *and* internal things, so that we might bring them—or rather, so that they may somehow come themselves—to be made clear through speech. The soul, through its capacity for
phantasia, allows us to discover the entelecheia of things around us, which allows us to encounter, generate, or set free the word “entelecheia.”

To restate the unique nature of this angle, let us return to 412b10-11, this time drawing on the line’s translation by Joe Sachs for whom entelecheia, or “being-at-work-staying-itself,” is “at the heart of everything in Aristotle’s thinking,” and is “the soul of the soul.”\(^{29}\) This last formulation in particular seems to reflect Sachs’ own understanding of the doubled nature of the word: entelecheia performs for the word “soul” what the soul does for the body; it is a word that animates words. This is further indicated in the way he translates the summary of the soul as “οὐσία ἥ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.” As we saw above, this phrase is generally translated in ways that soften the oddity of “logos” appearance. But Sachs not only picks the more forthright translation of τὸν λόγον as “speech,” but translates the preposition in an altogether novel way: “So what soul is has been said in general, for it is thinghood as it is unfolded in speech” (412b10-11).\(^{30}\) (Also interestingly, he translates another instance of κατὰ τὸν λόγον a few lines later as “disclosed in speech.”)\(^{31}\) This investigation will find reason to support Sachs’ translation, poetic though it may be, by attending to the way in which entelecheia is the sort of ousia that has sufficient form to be intelligible enough to be nameable, which way is never more clear as in the case of (external, perceptible) living bodies. It will find reason to support Woodbridge in his summarizing of Aristotle’s treatment of language:

\(^{29}\) Aristotle and Joe Sachs, Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided Study, First edition (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 245; Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 79; Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, li. These comments resonate too with Aristotle’s conclusion in DA III.8 that “the soul is like a hand, for the hand is a tool of tools, while the intellect is a form of forms…” (432a1-3).

\(^{30}\) Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 82.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 83, 412b20.
…for things to go into language is as a going, just as much of a going on their part, and just as natural, as their going into air or water, up or down, or from seed to flower. It is a going which requires for its elucidation precisely the same sort of factors that are required for any other sort of going.\(^{32}\)

This “just as natural” going of things into language, this motion of entelecheia towards “entelecheia”, is what also leads Woodbridge to say that when Aristotle “made [the soul's] home in nature,” he was “forced… to enlarge the conception of what nature is.”\(^{33}\)

That is, the fact that the soul is natural means that the comings and goings of language are natural, too.

Latent in Sachs’ choice of “unfolds” for κατά (and, for that matter, in Woodbridge’s “going” into language) is a sense of spatiality that we too have hardly been able to avoid in discussing the sort of intelligibility that might apply to the παθήματα associated with words. We have said it is “apart from” the realm of logos (pp.4 and 5); have said that naming entails a thing “coming into” language, that the πάθημα is “behind or within” a word (p.5). But here we need to proceed with care, and must resist the temptation to see in this space or gap reason to mistake Aristotle for our post-Kantian contemporary. The separation between words and the παθήματα, ὁμοιώματα, and πράγματα that give rise to them is not a separation between what is intelligible and “the things themselves.” It is not even a separation between the intelligible and the perceptible. In separating, intelligibly, the word from the appearance of a thing, or even further, from the “actual things” themselves, we risk thinking that Aristotle sees an unbridgeable distance between them. But for Aristotle, words are not “derived from


\(^{33}\) Ibid., 38.
never-never land." Implicit in his conception of the second sort of ousia, the sort also known as entelecheia, is the belief that a word is an expression of the way a being appears (and appearing seems very much to be the business of phantasia), and is intimately connected to the thing thus articulated. Christopher Long summarizes that for Aristotle, “appearing is a way being expresses itself,” and so “each attempt to articulate something of the truth of things is always involved with the expression of the things encountered.” There is no fundamental division between our understanding of things and the things themselves. In which case, what is the nature of the ‘space’ between a thing and its name?

This question must be answered if we are to discern how phantasia allows thinghood to “unfold” in speech, to say more clearly ‘where’ it unfolds ‘from.’ But how to answer it? What way or road [hodos] should we take, what method [methodos] should we employ? To return to Benardete/Velkley:

The world would not be knowable, and the mind would be enclosed in itself, if phantasia did not transform the aisthēton so it can be read as a noēton. But about this constructive power there is no science. What makes possible a logos of being has no logos.

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34 Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth, 82–83.

35 The importance of Aristotle generally, and the De Anima in particular, to Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology likely cannot be overstated, and teasing out just what he thought about Aristotelian phantasia would be an interesting project that would likely resonate with this one. (Consider, for instance, that the De Anima was the focus of the first of the 8 Aristotelian seminars and lectures at Freiburg and Marburg between 1921 and 1924.) Heidegger also explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Aristotle in the autobiographical essay “My Way to Phenomenology” (Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: London: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 78.) We will be in a position to say something more about Heidegger’s understanding of phantasia in Chapter Five. For more regarding the role of the De Anima in particular in the formation of Heidegger’s thought, see the article by Josh Michael Hayes, “Deconstructing Dasein: Heidegger’s Earliest Interpretations of Aristotle’s ‘De Anima,’” The Review of Metaphysics 61, no. 2 (December 1, 2007): 263–93.

36 Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 55.

It might not have its own logical science, but is there another way in which it can be made intelligible? Perhaps a physical, natural account? Woodbridge observes that attending to the “going” of things into language means that the Aristotle’s logic “becomes a part of his physics, or better perhaps, a part of his entire doctrine of nature.” Velkley with Benardete asks, “Is there a physics of phantasia?” This project, by examining phantasia’s role in the “unfolding” of entelecheia into “entelecheia,” attempts to rise to the challenge of providing the sketch of one.

Aristotle’s Method(s)

To both better understand what is meant by a natural/physical account of phantasia, and to address the question of the ‘space’ between a thing and its name, it is useful to reflect on Aristotle’s remarks in DA I.1 about two chief ways or roads [ὅδοι] one can follow to understand the world, particularly his understanding of the φυσικός. For while it is possible, and, for post-Kantian commentators, especially intuitive to find in these remarks a polarization between a thing and its name, this interpretation results in the need for qualifications and reservations. If we look more closely at Aristotle’s remarks about method in the De Anima (a work which Woodbridge says “admirably illustrates Aristotle’s method of working and gives an insight into his type of mind”), it is possible to find a methodology, a pathway, that does not rely on such polarization, and

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39 Velkley, “Prelude to First Philosophy: Seth Benardete on De Anima,” 192. We might also pose the question in Heideggerian terms, which would likely read, “is there a phenomenology of phantasia, of appearing?”
which clarifies how we might speak of a ‘space’ between a thing and its name without thereby seeking to divide the two in any fundamental or unbridgeable way.\textsuperscript{40}

In the \textit{De Anima}, Aristotle is clear that there is a difference between “the one who studies nature and the logician,” and maintains that it is important to be clear about the best method for “approaching each particular thing” we seek to understand (403a29-30, 402a19). His introductory delineation between the two is to say that the naturalist “gives an account [ἀποδίδωσιν] of the material,” while the logician gives an ἀποδίδωσιν “of the form and meaning” (403b2).\textsuperscript{41} On the face of this, such a distinction seems fairly self-evident, and may in fact seem to easily coordinate with the distinction between a thing and its name. This distinction has been taken up and renamed by more than one commentator, and generally the conclusion is that Aristotle maintains two distinct methods, the one based on things said, and the other on things seen. L. Bourgey observes “a distinction which occurs very often” in Aristotle, and “especially in the scientific treatises:” that between “proof from reason” versus “proof from fact.” He further notes that these can easily be found in Aristotle’s work by locating various “recognizable formulae:” “in accordance with reason (logos)” and “in accordance with observation (aisthēsis),” or “in reason (logoi)” alongside “in fact (ergoi).”\textsuperscript{42} Terence Irwin juxtaposes

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Woodbridge, \textit{Aristotle’s Vision of Nature}, 27.
\item ἀποδίδωσι is curious word choice here; it has little to nothing to do with matters of speaking and language, and much more to do with the financial aspects of keeping accounts. In other contexts, it means “to render,” or “to give back what’s due;” to “give an account” well is to accurately reflect what is there. It is worth noting that in this introductory delineation saying plays no part. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, \textit{An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon: Founded upon the Seventh Edition of Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon.} (Oxford [England]: Benediction Classics, 2010).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the “empirical” against the “dialectical.” Christopher Shields finds Aristotle’s method alternately directed at *phainomena* (“the things appearing to be the case”) and at *endoxa* (the “credible opinions” of other scholars).44

However, this distinction is more than once made with caveats, especially in the wake of a paper published in 1961 by G.E.L. Owen, “*Tithenai ta Phainomena*.”45 Owen makes clear that Aristotle’s sense of *phainomena* is often ambiguous, sometimes pointing to empirical observations, but just as often indicating things said. More than this,

> [e]ven within the second sense of *phainomena*, the sense in which it is equated with *endoxa* and *legomena*, some essential distinctions lie concealed. For an appeal to a *legomenon* may be an appeal either to common belief about matters of fact (e.g. *EN* I 11, 1101a22-24) or to established forms of language (e.g. VII 1, 1145b19-20: 2, 1146b4-5) or to a philosophical thesis claiming the factual virtues of the first and the analytic certainty of the second (e.g. I 8, 1098b12-18).46

Shields readily agrees with this, and finds *endoxa* a “significant sub-class of *phainomena,*” pointing to those times in which the opinions of predecessors “serve as the starting points of dialectic.”47 Whether or how he finds the other sorts of things said to be *phainomena* is not readily clear. Irwin admits outright that this division is not a clean one, saying that the “dialectical” approach is only “relatively non-empirical,” and that both methods ultimately do the same thing by attending to the way things appear, even if

46 Ibid., 242.
there are “two different sorts of appearances.”⁴⁸ Ultimately, he concludes that the distinction is thus “admittedly rough.”⁴⁹ And one scholar goes even farther: John Cleary claims that the distinction is so “rough” as to not constitute a true bifurcation at all, saying that since what is empirical—strictly speaking—is what is discovered in experience (ἐμπειρία), there is no reason to distinguish between experience that is sensory and experience that is dialectical.⁵⁰ As a result, he claims that “there is a single common method” in Aristotle, and phainomena may indicate either “sensory appearances or common opinions,” with equal plausibility.⁵¹ If one questions the reasons Irwin and Shields wish to maintain a distinction between two methods when that distinction seems so tenuous, one should also question the ease with which Cleary makes the claim that all distinctions should be dropped. But Owen’s conclusion is also not satisfactory:

I think such considerations show that it is a mistake to ask, in the hope of some quite general answer, what function Aristotle assigns to phainomena, or to aporiai, or to epagoge, for they show how the function can vary with the context and style of inquiry.⁵²

I propose that it is within our grasp to ask such a question, and to get such a “general answer.”

Clearly Aristotle intends for there to be a difference between the “the one who studies nature and the logician;” to collapse that difference, as with Cleary, seems to do Aristotle a blatant injustice. On the other hand, it seems more than likely that the two approaches are significantly connected, as Owen, Irwin, and Shield all recognize. The

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⁴⁸ Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, 30.
⁴⁹ Ibid.
⁵¹ Ibid.
⁵² Owen, Logic, Science, and Dialectic, 243.
alternative, as Bourgey himself points out, quickly leads to an untenable position. The distinction, if “taken to extremes,” “would imply that reason can work out its requirements on a purely abstract level, while observation is self-sufficient and does not involve an intervention of thought.” He is, and we with him are, quick to note, “Certainly, this total separation is not in the spirit of Aristotle's teaching; both as an epistemologist and as a practitioner of science, Aristotle rejects it.” The question, then, is, how we are then “to explain the fact that formulae marking a clear-cut distinction appear so often?” But Bourgey’s answer is quite unsatisfactory: “As a first approximation, we can say that they agree with a superficial view of the relation between mind and nature, a view which common sense accepts easily, and which must have answered well enough to the general spirit of the age...”53 It seems far more likely that the delineation Aristotle has in mind is not predicated upon a “total separation” that can be “taken to extremes” and that the answer is something more like those proposed by Owen, Shields, and Irwin: the way things appear, the phainomena, are somehow relatable to the way things are said.

In which case, it seems likely that the logician’s concern with language and reason is likely narrower than the naturalist’s concern with perception and appearances; thus does Owen claim that manifestations of language comprise a “second sense of phainomena,” Shield find that endoxa is a “significant sub-category” of phainomena, and Irwin claim that the dialectical approach is only “relatively non-empirical.” The question, of course, is how the logician’s concerns are secondary to and subsumed by the

(more) empirical concerns of the naturalist. It seems easy enough to claim that esteemed opinions [endoxa] and things already said [legomena] generally are, in point of fact, a way in which things have appeared to be the case. Likely this is why Shields grasps hold of endoxa in dealing with the differentiation in Aristotle’s methodology. But certainly it is unfair to the logician, and thereby to Aristotle, to suggest that her dealings are solely, or even primarily with what has been said, nobly or otherwise. As we heard Owen himself point out above, within the language-related sub-category of phainomena, “some essential distinctions lie concealed.” For instance, “an appeal to a legomenon may be an appeal either to common belief about matters of fact,” or to “a philosophical thesis” which is certainly an appeal to endoxa, but it can also be an appeal “to established forms of language.” This is not an appeal to opinion, but is rather an appeal to language itself. In which case, Jakob Klein’s summary of the distinction is more accurate: “if one compares a man who investigates things in words with one who investigates them directly, the former can hardly be said to be dealing more with images than the latter.”

This, then, is the question the answer to which should yield some insight into how the naturalist and logician’s approaches are linked: how is it that investigating things in words and investigating things “directly” are both a matter of dealing with images?

55 This question also draws out the difference between Aristotle and Kant when it comes to the relationship of the human being to the world of perceptible things. Klein’s observation that it is possible, with Aristotle, to investigate things “directly” and yet still deal with images indicates that we are always already involved in the being of the perceptible thing. There is no divide between what can be seen, what can be empirically observed, and on the other, what we say/claim about it, how they appear to us. For Kant, “we” are on only one side of this divide; the result is that appearances are more to do with us than with the things we encounter. Long points to Heidegger, who warns against making such a Kantian presupposition in reading Aristotle; Long himself says that such a division is “a symptom of the lasting hegemony of the modern segregation of the object from the subject.” (Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 55.) This division between observer and observed does not obtain in Aristotle. Where Kant sees a rift between what is observable on the one hand, and what we actually observe about it on the other, Aristotle sees an
To answer this question, we must avoid the temptation to which Bourgey falls victim: it is altogether too easy to pick up on an echo of Aristotle’s broader division of the potencies/faculties of perception and intellection of the soul in distinguishing the naturalist from the logician, and to make the naturalist concerned with what is perceptible and the logician with what is intelligible—to make the naturalist concerned with things and the logician concerned with the names of those things. This is sure to result in difficulty, for Aristotle’s remarks about methodology are directed toward the human soul alone, and the division between perception and intellection is between two different soul types. What Cleary’s approach, extreme though it may be, helps us to see is that the two approaches may be more similar than they are different. It is a reminder that while the naturalist may be more concerned with what is seen and perceptible, and the logician with what is said and intelligible, both are ultimately intellectuals: they are both engaging the faculty for thinking things through, and the naturalist is not strictly engaging the faculty of perception. As Klein observed, both deal with images. Aristotle is clear that both the naturalist and the logician are concerned with “giving an account,” though in different ways. In other words, what appears in the De Anima to be a clear distinction between the soul’s faculty of perception and its faculty of intellection is in fact not as distinct within the human soul itself.

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engagement between observer and observed wherein both parties are moved into a sort of unified action. The observer does not stand apart from what is observed, but is already fundamentally engaged with it insofar as it is observable.

Joseph Owens makes a point that supports Long and Heidegger’s warning: Aristotle has, “strictly speaking, no noun for “self,”” nor does he have a term for “person.” Far from being “more complicated” than “from Aristotle,” Aristotle’s own answer to the question “whence entelecheia” would not point to himself at all. However, a unified Aristotelian phantasia may well give us the language with which to discuss something like an Aristotelian “self.” Joseph Owens, “The Self in Aristotle,” The Review of Metaphysics 41, no. 4 (June 1, 1988): 707, doi:10.2307/20128658.
Here John Herman Randall’s account of Aristotle’s double methodology is helpful. The distinction he sees operative is not between the perceptible and the intelligible, is indeed not even between the phainomena and language. It is far subtler than that, and as a result, it is easier to see how the two approaches may—indeed, perhaps even must—work together. The way he characterizes the two approaches are as two “sets of distinctions,” which would seem to already speak to the fact observed above: both the naturalist and the logician are intellectuals, intent on thinking things through via the making of distinctions, the giving of accounts. What is different about them is the sorts of distinctions they make, not the objects with which they are concerned. Randall says that Aristotle “developed and used one set of distinctions appropriate to talking, to discourse or logos, and another set of distinctions appropriate to becoming, to living.”\(^{56}\)

The first set of distinctions comprises a logike or logical understanding of a term, while the second set makes up its functional/natural, or phusike understanding. The logike approach attends to what a thing “can be said to be,” and the phusike approach attends to a thing in its “genesis and operation,” and how it is seen “co-operating with other things in the world of natural processes.”\(^{57}\) A phusike methodology is not marked by attending to external, perceptible appearances, but by attending to the way in which things come to appear both around us and within us: the naturalist is she who seeks to speak of things as they experience flux and change. Similarly, a logike methodology is not marked by attending to the ways in which things are intelligible, but by attending to what has appeared in such a stable way as to be there, to be named.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 60, 61.
Additionally, Randall observes that “it is not quite accurate to speak of Aristotle as using a “double method,” because words spoken may be so closely tied to things seen as to be necessary to that seeing: in Randall’s account, the two approaches seem more like two different steps within a single method.” He emphasizes that Aristotle relies always first on the analysis of the language “in which we express what is there,” and follows it out as long as possible. However, he “always finds that this linguistic analysis, clarifying and essential as it is, sooner or later reaches a point where it raises questions that cannot be answered through the analysis of language alone.” According to Randall, when logical/linguistic analysis seems tapped, Aristotle begins an examination “of what is there itself.” Only then does he feel he can arrive at an “adequate statement” of what a thing is. This suggests that a phusike understanding is only ever achieved after the logike approach has been exhausted: the latter is necessary to the operation of the former. Randall clarifies further that “the logikos can formulate the questions, but ultimately it is the physikos who must answer them.” Whether the reverse is true, Randall does not say. However, it seems possible that it is: by attending to things that are in the process of becoming and changing, one will eventually reach a point in which something makes a stand and is ‘there,’ and becomes nameable.

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58 Ibid., 61.
59 Ibid., 60.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 61.
With Randall’s insights, we begin to anticipate the answer to the question raised above: insofar as both the naturalist and the logician deal with what is there, but in different ways, it may well be because what is there is not always named, indeed, may not always be nameable. If there is a ‘space’ between a thing and its name, this ‘space’ is within our understanding of the thing, not between “the thing itself” and our understanding of it. Thus Klein speaks of “images” being operative for both the logician and the naturalist… even when the latter is said to be dealing with things “directly.” In a post-Kantian world, this insight is not easily grasped. The suggestion hidden within it is that these “images” of things are not tantamount to poor-quality sketches, poor substitutes of the things they are images of, but are instead just as potent for our intellect as the thing imaged, and indeed, perhaps more so. Further, we can safely assume that Jakob Klein is not one to use such a philosophically-laden word as ‘image’ without cause: it remains to be said just how it is so, but it seems already likely that phantasia is here at work.

**The Naturalist, Intelligible ‘Space,’ and Spatial Intelligibility**

Our consideration of Aristotle’s methodology was undertaken in a rather general way, and this has been helpful in substantiating our suspicion that there is a sort of alternate intelligibility at work ‘behind’ the names of things. It has also confirmed where—and how—we might begin our investigation: it seems even more likely that in attempting a “physics of phantasia” we will also be at least contributing to a “physics of logos” by which we can understand how entelecheia comes to be “entelecheia.” But if we here turn to a more specific presentation of Aristotle’s methodology—one made not by a review of commentary, but instead by a direct look at what Aristotle himself says about it, and in the *De Anima*—we can find two more insights or previews of what such a
physics may have in store for us. The reason for this is that the *De Anima*, in seeking to determine “in which general class” the soul is so as to determine the correct method for approaching it, encounters numerous difficulties. Says Polansky, “The number of perplexities elicited here [DA I.1] in the *De anima*, perhaps only surpassed in Aristotle’s treatises by the mass of perplexities in *Metaphysics* iii, indicates the difficulty of the investigation.”63 And chief among these difficulties is the question of whether a naturalist can even make an account of the soul: the *De Anima* is forced to account for the distinction between the naturalist and the logician in a way that others of Aristotle’s works are not required to do. Velkley writes that Benardete observes that the *aporia* of the “relation of the noetic to the aesthetic, or the relation of form as essentially unchanging to nature as principle of motion” reaches “its most critical stage in the account of soul,” and that this account of the soul, “through disclosing how this problem inheres in being at the highest level, forms the transition from physics to metaphysics.”64 Polansky agrees, saying that “the study of soul will be problematic from the standpoint of his physics that studies natural beings capable of rest and motion,” because Aristotle finds that the soul “will not itself enter into motion,” even though the body will.65 This echoes what we heard Woodbridge state above: when Aristotle “made [the soul’s] home in nature,” he was “forced… to enlarge the conception of what nature is.”66 A physics of *logos* is bound to encounter some of the same difficulties, taxing the distinction between a naturalistic and logical approach even more fully.

64 Velkley, “Prelude to First Philosophy: Seth Benardete on De Anima,” 192.
Looking further at *DA* I.1, then, we can find two ways in which the soul problematizes the distinction between the *phusike* and *logike* approaches. Firstly, the soul calls into question what Aristotle means by aligning the naturalist with an account of material: how is a material-based consideration of the soul possible? Aristotle’s answer will be to propose something like a gradation of materiality, and this gradation will appear throughout this project. The possibility of a gradation in materiality suggests another—more sizeable—difficulty, which we have already touched on by discussing the distinction and relation between the *De Anima* and the *Metaphysics*, and this regards the question of when the physicist ceases to be a physicist, and instead begins to be a metaphysicist, a first philosopher. The best way to grasp this difficulty is to distinguish between the embodied soul and the possibility of its connection to what Aristotle refers to as “all soul.”

What is the physicist to do if, in examining the soul, she discovers that there is an attribute of the soul that belongs “to the soul itself alone” (403a4)? This possibility seems most likely to obtain in the case of thinking, which “seems most of all to belong to the soul by itself,” though Aristotle is quick to point out that “if [thinking] is also some sort of *phantasia*, or cannot be without *phantasia*, it would not be possible for even this to be without the body” (403a8-10). But the relationship between thinking and *phantasia* having not been determined, the possibility of an attribute of soul that can in some way be separated from the body, and thus immaterial, must be taken seriously. The question then is whether a physics of this sort of soul, this separable sort, is even possible. Let us briefly explore each of these difficulties here as a way of grounding the discussion of them that will run throughout this project. The first, regarding the

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67 This distinction—between the embodied soul and “all soul”—becomes increasingly important in Chapter Three when we begin to consider how *phantasia* may or may not be said to be a *dunamis* or a *hexis*. 
materiality of the soul, will entail a discussion about the possibility of a gradation at work between the perceptible and the intelligible. The second, regarding the possibility of a separate soul, or a separate attribute of the soul, will comprise a discussion about whether a physics of nous is possible.

Returning, then, to focus on DA I.1: If one considers how easily Aristotle’s distinction between the naturalist as the one who “gives an account of the material” and the logician who gives an account of the “form and meaning [logos]” may be said to apply to a thing in the perceptible realm—a house, say—one begins to appreciate the difficulties that arise for this distinction in treating the soul (403b2-3). The material that makes up the house is obviously distinct from the function of those materials when put together in a certain way: there are “stone, bricks, and lumber,” and there is “a shelter that protects from damage by wind, rain, and the sun’s heat” (403b4-5). But where is the material of the soul? Does it even have materiality? Yes, but his account of why and how is surprising. The soul may be studied according to a naturalist’s approach because

“It is evident that the attributes of the soul [the various passions of the emotions] have materiality in the very statements of them [λόγοι ἐν ὑλῇ]… so already on this account the study concerning the soul belongs to the one who studies nature, either all soul or at least this sort of soul” (403a25-29, emphasis mine).

In other words, the soul may be considered natural insofar as its attributes are what Polansky refers to as “enmattered logoi.” Certainly Bourgey’s understanding of the difference between Aristotle’s two methodologies cannot be said to apply here, where the only indication of materiality is a certain saying, reasoning, or defining. But even

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68 Aristotle picks up this example himself at 403b4, though his reason is doing so is more complex than ours here, as we shall see in what follows.

Polansky is troubled by the use of *logos* in this reasoning, as well he should be. He explains its presence by saying

> The flexibility of the term λόγος, which can mean speech, reason, notion, definition, account, form, ratio and so on, serves the philosopher’s purposes. When Aristotle says passions are enmattered *logoi*, he surely means that they are enmattered forms…and that their definitions should also include their material involvement,

presumably with the body.\(^70\) Polansky acknowledges that the presence of *logos* here does serve to remind us that the attributes of soul are obviously “connected with speech,” but Sachs goes even further.\(^71\) What if the attributes of soul are so “connected with speech” that the result of this “connection” is a sort of materiality? What if Sachs’ translation is accurate, and “the attributes of the soul have materiality in the very statements of them”?

Another way of approaching the difficulty with materiality is by asking in just what way one can be said to *empirically observe* something that is not a perceptible thing, something that is not such as the stone, bricks and lumber of the house; something like the soul. Aristotle takes this question up in what will prove to be one of the two most important chapters of the *De Anima* with regards to the relationship of *phantasia* to thinking, III.8.\(^72\) We are not yet in a position to turn to that chapter in full, but it does provide an answer to this question. When one observes an animal, does one also empirically observe its soul? No: one cannot, in Aristotelian terms, have an empirical observation of the soul; “there can be no item of experience apart from the extended magnitudes which are the separate perceptible things” (432a3-4). However, Aristotle is

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\(^70\) Ibid.

\(^71\) Ibid.

\(^72\) The other key chapter is III.7. We will explore a reading of III.8 in the second section of Chapter Four, and of III.7 in the first half of Chapter Five.
quick to continue by pointing out that “the intelligible things are present in the perceptible forms” (432a4-5). Insofar as this is the case, then, one can perhaps have something like an analogical ‘empirical observation’ of the soul when one encounters it by means of encountering the perceptible things in which it is found. But to have such an ‘observation,’ one must begin with the powers of perception: thus can one understand the inclination in the secondary literature to overstate the importance of the “extended magnitudes” of the “separate perceptible things” to the naturalist’s endeavors. An understanding of the soul must be rooted in actual empirical observations of the life forms in which such soul is found, and which obviously have material. But does it then follow that the intelligible things have no such material and that there can be no naturalistic account of that which is only intelligible? It is this phrase—“only intelligible”—that is the difficulty. If the “intelligible things are found in the perceptible forms,” there is already no such thing as that which is ‘only perceptible,’ for what is perceptible already has something of the intelligible “in” it. When Aristotle says that “the intelligible things are present in the perceptible forms,” might it be that the reverse is also true, and that there is something yet of the perceptible forms present in the intelligible things (432a5)? Perhaps something very like materiality—‘materiality,’ if you will?

If we return to Aristotle’s suggestion that thinking may be an immaterial attribute of the soul, it is possible to trace out an opening for this distinction (between materiality and ‘materiality’) in the De Anima, and the making of this distinction belongs to phantasia. Again: “if this [thinking] is also some sort of imagination, or cannot be
without imagination, it would not be possible for even this to be without the body” (403a9-10). From which we conclude that imagination has something material about it. But what? For later, in III.8, Aristotle will claim that “the things imagined are just like the things perceived, except without the material,” and that “the uncombined intelligible things” are not images [phantasmata], “but are not present without images” (432a10-13). Taking these two passages together, we have on the one hand the observation that imagination somehow grounds thinking in the material realm, and yet produces (or discovers) appearances that have no (or less?) material. Could it be that a closer, phusike examination of phantasia will show us that it does both? That it allows for the discovery of appearances of perceptible and material things, but ‘appearances’ of intelligible and less-material ‘material’ things, perhaps even of immaterial things? (And again, it is this last clause that is the truly difficult possibility: a gradation of materiality is one thing, but how that may be said to accommodate the possibility of immateriality is no small aporia.)

Isn’t this one way of taking Aristotle’s analogy, central to the De Anima, that “as the power of perception is to the perceptible things, so is the intellect to the intelligible things” (429a17-18)? For while they are similar, perception and intellection are also quite different:

Being-at-work perceiving is described in the same way as contemplating, but differs in that the things that produce the being-at-work of perceiving are external, the visible and audible things, and similarly with the rest of the senses. The

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73 A differentiation between appearances and ‘appearances’ is not as extreme as it may sound. Owen notes that Aristotle himself often attempted to expose “the broader ambiguity between the two senses of [phainomena],” noting “when he wishes to restrict phainomenon to its first sense he calls it expressly a perceptual phainomenon and distinguishes it from an endoxon (DC III.4, 303a22-23).” Owen, Logic, Science, and Dialectic, 242–3.
reason is that active perception is of particulars, while knowledge is of universals, which are in some way in the soul itself. (417b19-23)

While “things perceived” clearly have material, and the “uncombined intelligible things” that are universals clearly do not, the *phantasmata of phantasia* occupy a large—and ambiguous—middle ground. When Aristotle says “the intellect is a form of forms,” just ten lines prior, isn’t he indicating that this middle ground may have some sort of gradation about it? One is here reminded of Aristotle’s frequent insistence throughout his oeuvre that one must proceed from what is more known to us to what is more known by nature: is proceeding along this metaphorical road characterized by jumping over a chasm between perceptible and intelligible, or might it be more gradual, moving from more material appearances to less material ‘appearances’? The idea of this sort of gradation by which the perceptible gives way to the intelligible, and, as we shall see, by which the intelligible can also be seen to give way to the perceptible, will prove central to this investigation.

Having explored this first of the two ways in which Aristotle’s account of the soul problematizes his distinction between the naturalist and the logician, we can see how it is related to the second difficulty. How can such a gradation of materiality accommodate the possibility of that which is immaterial? Aristotle indicates that along with the possibility that a being—say, an attribute of soul—may have its ‘materiality’ by being in *logos* is the possibility that a being may be separate according to *logos* or separate in a (more) physical way, such as in place. By finding the soul to be both embodied and having an attribute that is not embodied, Aristotle indicates that he allows for this sort of separateness in speech and in place. In *DA* II.2, just after Aristotle has enumerated the
four parts or *dunameis* of the soul (nutrition, sense perception, thinking things through, and motion), he observes: “Whether each of these is a soul or part of a soul, *and if a part, whether in such a way as to be separated only in speech or also in place* [πότερον οὐτος ὁστ’ εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἦ καὶ τόπῳ], is for some of these not difficult to see, but some present an impasse…” (413b15-16, emphasis mine). In the case of three of these potencies—the nutritive, perceptive, and locomotive—Aristotle concludes that, “it is clear from what has been said that they cannot be separate, as some people say, though it is obvious that they are distinct in speech…” (413b28-29). About the intellect, however, “nothing is yet clear, but it seems that it is a distinct class of soul and that it alone admits of being separated from body” (413b26-7). Even those things that are not separate from each other in place may yet be separate from each other in speech. But how should one consider the possibility that something may be separate in place from the body, as well as separate in speech? What is one to do with the possibility of an immaterial attribute of the soul?

The first of these difficulties—that of materiality, which Aristotle seems to answer with the possibility of a gradation of materiality—causes him, in the conclusion of I.1, to explicitly question what it means for the naturalist to give an account of a thing’s material. The second of these difficulties—regarding the possibility an immaterial attribute of soul—causes him to further question the distinction between the naturalist and the first philosopher. If we return to the illustration of the house, observing

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74 At the end of II.3, he says such a faculty may require a “different account” than the others, and it seems that this account begins in III.4 insofar as that chapter discusses a a sort of thinking about which “it is not reasonable that it be mixed with the body” (415a13, 429a24-6). And finally, in III.5, he concludes that there is a separate, deathless, everlasting intellect.
again that it is possible to give an account of its form and function (“shelter that protects”) as well as an account of the materials with which it is made (“stones, bricks, and lumber”), Aristotle suggests a third possible account, one which says that “the form is in these latter things [i.e., the materials] for the sake of those former ones [the functions of being a shelter]” (403b3-6). And whereas he has until this point suggested that the naturalist is to give an account of the material of a thing, he now asks, “Which of these is the one who studies nature? Is it the one concerned with the material who ignores the meaning [λόγος] or the one concerned with the meaning alone? Or is it rather the one concerned with what arises out of both?” If this last is correct, well, “[w]hat, then, are each of the others” (403b6-9)? Delaying the answer to this last question, he takes up the penultimate question first and explores what it might mean for the naturalist to be she who considers “what arises out of both” form and material: “Or is there not just one sort of person concerned with the attributes of material that are not separate nor even treated as separate, but the one who studies nature is concerned with all the work done by and things done to a certain kind of body or material…” (403b9-12)? Polansky reads this line this way:

This is the physicist who thus defines all the functions and affections of such a body or such matter…This point confirms that the physicist seeks combined definitions and considers all the attributes that inhere in such a sort of body or matter and accounts for them as thus belonging to a substratum, including enmattered psychical capacities. The physicist deals with all the attributes deriving from what is natural as natural.76

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75 Cf. “It is, therefore, evident that of Causation there are two modes; and that in our treatise both of them must be described, or at least an attempt must be made to describe them; and that those who fail herein tell us practically nothing of any value about "Nature," for a thing's "nature" is much more a first principle (or "Cause") than it is matter...” (PA, I.1.642a1). Also: “Just as in discussing a house, it is the whole figure and form of the house which concerns us, not merely the bricks and mortar and timber; so in Natural science, it is the composite thing, the thing as a whole, which primarily concerns us, not the materials of it, which are not found apart from the thing itself whose materials they are” (PA, I.v.645a33-37).

The naturalist is, then, attentive to material... but in being attentive to material, she must also be attentive to form, for the way a given material interacts with form necessarily impacts that material. The naturalist approaches a given body or material to discern its functioning within a network of relationships with its attributes or other things. This focus on the relationships between things and not with things in isolation perhaps most of all characterizes the naturalist, and it has two significant ramifications. First, as we heard with Randall, it means that the naturalist is concerned with things in their becoming, in the way that they live. Secondly, the naturalist is concerned even with those things that may seem to be “separate,” if only in or according to logos, but which still pertain to a given body or material.

Thus can one begin to approach the complexity involved in Aristotle’s recognition that one attribute may “belong to the soul itself alone” (403a4). This admission, when joined by other references to the “unmixed” intellect that is perhaps a “distinct class of soul” that “alone admits of being separated from body” seems pointed towards preparing us, at least in some small way, for the separable νοῦς ποιέτικος of III.5. Aristotle’s fastidious concern for comprehensiveness would not allow a work on the soul to cover only a subgroup of soul types: his goal in the De Anima is not simply to provide an account of the human soul, nor even of what we called might call generally “embodied souls,” but rather of “all soul,” including that which may be “something more divine” than “composite beings” (403b28-29). Insofar as this sort of soul or attribute of soul is nonetheless associated with embodied souls, it would seem that a naturalistic

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77 405a17, 408b19, 410b12-15, 413b15-17, 415a13, et. al.
account of the latter must necessarily include an account of the former: The naturalist is
grounded in or by a given body or material, and must account for all its attributes,
separate or otherwise. But when the material—‘material’?—in question belongs to the
soul, how should one approach an attribute of the soul that may be “separate” by virtue
not of just being separate in speech, but also perhaps being separate in place? Aristotle
suggests at the very end of I.1 that the one who is “concerned with things insofar as they
are separated” from bodies is the first philosopher, and not the physician.78 But when,
where, or how does one cease to be a physician and become instead the first philosopher?
This problem, whether a physics of nous is possible, and if it is not, how it impacts a
physics of phantasia and of logos, will emerge more clearly in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

But what is most striking about this series of questions at the end of DA I.1 is
Aristotle’s suggestion that the naturalist is “the one concerned with what arises out of
both” the material and the logos. It is this possibility, that the naturalist is still yet
concerned with logos and with the way things get to be said, that Randall’s summary of
Aristotle’s methodology (and, to be fair, Cleary’s as well, though in a much more limited
way) prepares us to see. This insight resonates with the question we have at hand,
regarding the nature of the space between a thing and its name. Distinguishing between
the way things appear and the way they are said, as with Bourgey, Irwin, and Shields is a
sound first step, and considering the ways in which the things that are said are themselves

78 Polansky’s reading of the conclusion of I.1 is helpful here, and seems to suggest that it can be read as an
answer to Aristotle’s last in the series of questions at the end of I.1, “[w]hat, then, are each of the others”
(403b6-9): “Aristotle has set up a trajectory of the extent to which account giving attends to form and
matter. The physicist studies all features as belonging naturally to such and such a sort of matter. The
craftsperson may be less concerned about the specific matter, since a carpenter may use different sorts of
material to make a similar product and the doctor various medicines that are similarly effective.
Mathematicians have still less concern for sensible matter in their accounts, and first philosophers deal with
phainomena, as with Owen and Cleary, is a sound second step. But the most important question in relating the naturalist with the logician is: how does the way a thing appears relate to the way a thing is said? Because “the one who studies nature is concerned with all the work done by and things done to a certain kind of body or material,” it is for the naturalist to be concerned with the way in which that body or material comes into language (403b9-12). That the naturalist is, on the one hand, concerned with the life and becoming of “a certain kind of body or material”, and on the other, that this concern embraces all of the things that pertain to said body/material has significant ramifications for both Aristotle’s project in the De Anima, and for our project here. The right question to ask about Aristotle’s double methodology, then, is not, as with Owen, Shields, Irwin, and even Cleary, how the words that comprise endoxa may be considered a “sub-class of phainomena,” but rather, how we may find “phainomena” at all when engaged with things purely, or even chiefly, intelligible. How can we see things that are not perceptible? Things like justice, the soul, a geometrical figure? Or can we only ‘see’ them? We suggested earlier that just as the perceptible things have something of the intelligible in them, that it may be that the intelligible things have something of the perceptible in them. Might this be a sort of spatiality—‘spatiality’—that allows for a kind of mental landscape, allowing for the ‘appearances’ of things to be kept distinct enough to show the relationships between them? Might the naturalist be the one who is attentive precisely to the spatiality apparent not only between the empirically observable, perceptible things that have “extended magnitude,” but also to the ‘spatiality’ between and even within things ‘observed’ in the intelligible realm?
To review: before this consideration of Aristotle’s methodology, we had asked about the nature of the ‘space’ between a thing and its name: ‘where’ does a word, like entelecheia, unfold ‘from’? Considering Aristotle’s two-fold methodology revealed that Aristotle allows for a sort of intelligible ‘space’ between things needing to be differentiated. What further consideration of such a ‘space’ leads us to consider is whether this metaphoric sense of spatiality characterizes the sort of intelligibility with which we are here concerned. Since Aristotle acknowledges a sort of understanding concerned with saying, and a sort more concerned with ‘seeing’, perhaps this second sort is inherently spatial, leading us not to say what something is, but to ‘see’ what it is—which also means seeing what it is not. Seeing what something is not becomes possible when one sees the space or delineations between things. When Aristotle notes that the “one who studies nature is concerned with all the work done by and things done to a certain kind of body or material,” he is pointing to a seeing that sees difference and dimension between the “certain kind of body or material” and the other things around it (403b12-14). It is this discernment of difference—ultimately a discernment of difference and dimension—between the thing in question and the other things around it that is being considered.79

All of which leaves us with two important clarifications. Firstly, when in this project we purport to understand how a thing—say, the πράγμα that is behind or within

79 “Spatiality” is here chosen over “visibility” insofar as it indicates the space between things in three dimensions, which fact has two chief ramifications: the way things may be separate from one another may well be found to have the dimensionality of depth. Further, the space between things may be sensed by vision, but so too may it be sensed by touch, or, in a way, by smell or sound. In pointing to the way things may be spatially intelligible, I seek to capture something more metaphorically akin to the landscape in which all powers of sense perception are called upon.
the πάθημα in Aristotle’s soul that gave rise to the word “entelecheia,”—may be understood apart from its name, we are not trying to somehow see the “thing itself.” We are not claiming that things exist apart from our understanding of them. Rather, and this is the second clarification, we are claiming that our understanding of them (which is the same as the things themselves) seems, according to Aristotle, to be twofold, and so we seek to understand how we understand that πράγμα. It is possible to understand something by way of using its name to both correctly say what it is, and what may be true about it. But it is also possible to understand something without using that name, to understand by way of something metaphorically akin to seeing, or more appropriately, to sensing. Trying to understand more about this second way of understanding—this ‘sensing’—is the goal of this project. The first level of this goal—‘sensing’ what is behind or inside the word—seems possible, given both Aristotle’s methodology and his insistence that the παθήματα remain unchanged even though the writing and sounds we use to symbolize them change, and so it remains to uncover what we can about the process or approach required. To the extent that this project recognizes, with Aristotle, the existence of a space between “entelecheia” and the πάθημα or πράγμα behind it, it is a hermeneutic and philological project. To the extent to which it believes, with Aristotle, that this space may somehow be bridged by paying close attention to the “genesis and operation” of entelecheia as evidenced in the network of natural processes of the soul, it is phenomenological. But to the extent that it asks just how we make the transition between sensing something to saying it, to asking about the relationship between our twofold ways of understanding the world, it is an epistemological project, and is asking about entelecheia’s very meaning.
I have suggested that we attempt to answer where Aristotle would say “entelecheia” comes from by exploring the possibility of an alternate, spatial intelligibility that belongs to things whether or not we have names for them. This possibility is supported by the passage from the De Interpretatione, Aristotle’s methodology in the De Anima, and Sachs’ interpretation and translation of “entelecheia” as “the soul of the soul.” By turning to Aristotle’s more extensive discussion of phantasia in the De Anima, I hope to further support the claim that there is a spatial intelligibility operative in Aristotle’s thought, and to ‘sense’ and then say more precisely how it operates and co-operates within the human soul to name what appears in or as a result of that spatial intelligibility. The goal, again, is to be able to say how entelecheia unfolds in speech, into “entelecheia.” With this in mind, the next two chapters turn towards Aristotle’s most extensive articulation of phantasia, DA III.3, and within that chapter, to a passage that will be central to our physics of phantasia. This passage is 428a1-4, where Aristotle suggests we consider phantasia—or at least, one sort of phantasia—as that by which phantasmata become present for the soul. As with most other accounts of Aristotelian phantasia, this passage will be featured alongside the two passages in III.3 wherein Aristotle suggests that phantasia is a motion. We will find, however, that it is necessary to turn to other chapters of the De Anima to contextualize these passages.

80 Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Physics, 245; Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 79; Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, li. These comments resonate too with Aristotle’s conclusion in DA III.8 that “the soul is like a hand, for the hand is a tool of tools, while the intellect is a form of forms…” (432a1-3).
On the one hand, the project of Chapter Two, which is to better understand what Aristotle means by “phantasma,” points away from DA III.3 insofar as “phantasma” appears in that chapter only once, but multiple times in III.7, 8, and 11. On the other, Chapter Three’s task of taking seriously the suggestion that phantasia is “some sort of motion” [kinēsis tis] points us away from DA III.3 to II.5, wherein Aristotle presents a highly compressed analysis of different sorts of change, motion among them. By the conclusion of Chapter Three, phantasia will have emerged as neither a dunamis nor as a hexis of the embodied soul, but rather, as a sort of kinēsis which somehow results in phantasmata becoming present for—or perhaps in—the soul. The phantasmata will have emerged as more image than appearance, more true than false, and as necessary to the “prōta noēmata” that mark the beginning of the “natural road” that Aristotle says connects “what is more familiar and clearer to us,” to “what is clearer and better known by nature” in the opening of Physics I.1 (184a16-19). However, much about the phantasma will remain unclear until the end of Chapter Four.

Chapter Four further explores what sort of kinēsis phantasia may be, turning to Physics III to both better understand kinēsis as well as to become acquainted with its various sorts. Because Aristotle says that phantasia is that according to which phantasmata “become present” [gignesthai] to/for/in us, and gignesthai is one of the sorts of motion Aristotle lists in the Physics, this chapter considers that possibility. Such a consideration helps to make sense of the curious fact that there are numerous accounts of phantasia as being preeminently active, as well as several which find it preeminently passive. Focusing on phantasia as a motion of gignesthai reinforces phantasia’s own
middle-voiced provenance, which helps explain why the accounts in the secondary literature struggle to agree about phantasia’s relative activity or passivity. But an account of phantasia as the motion of genesis also requires that we ask how the phantasma may be the sort of thing that can “become.” Answering this question will lead us to further disambiguate what Aristotle means by “phantasma;” it is not the weakened copy that advocates of the “decaying-sense theory” have posited it to be. Rather, by the end of Chapter Four, the phantasma appears to be the very entelecheia of a given aisthēma. Far from being a poor-quality reproduction of what is encountered in experience, the phantasma is discovered to be the intelligible as it comes to be out of the perceptible.

If phantasia is the name of the motion by which the intelligible arises out of the perceptible, could this motion continue, allowing the intelligible to become speakable, to come to have a name? If phantasia is the motion by which the aisthēma becomes the phantasma, could it also be the motion by which the phantasma becomes the noēma? And if so, could phantasia also be at work in the way a thought comes to have a name? These are the questions that begin Chapter Five, and answering them helps us to account for the notorious discrepancies between Aristotle’s presentation of phantasia in DA III.3 and the phantasia presented in III.7 and later, the “rational” [λογιστική] or “deliberative” [βουλευτική] phantasia that is named in III.10 and 11. This rational/deliberative phantasia is found to specify the human experience of phantasia, wherein the phantasmata become the noēmata. But where in this becoming is the arising of a thing’s name, the unfolding of a thing into speech? The second half of Chapter Five seeks to say
more precisely what saying precisely is for Aristotle: how is \textit{logos} different from but implicated by the saying or naming of a thing? The ensuing consideration of \textit{phasis} and \textit{logos apophantikos} suggests that while \textit{phantasia} is the motion by which the perceptible becomes intelligible, so too might there be a similar motion by which the intelligible becomes perceptible, a motion by which one can “make something appear before the eyes” (\textit{DA} III.3 427b19-20). The end of Chapter Five locates what appears to be a turning in the motion of \textit{phantasia}, and Chapter Six begins by taking up a footnote of Dorothea Frede’s in which she suggests that it is precisely this sort of ability to make something “appear before the eyes” that Aristotle sets aside by bracketing “metaphoric \textit{phantasia}” at 428a2.\footnote{Dorothea Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” in \textit{Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima}, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Reprint (Oxford University Press, USA, 1995), 280, fn.3.} This phrase, to put/bring/make appear before the eyes is found not only in the \textit{De Anima}, but in the \textit{Rhetoric}, the \textit{Poetics}, and in the \textit{De Memoria}. In considering these appearances of the making of appearances alongside Aristotle’s understanding of the analogical metaphor as metaphor \textit{par excellence}, the chapter concludes by finding \textit{phantasia}, both metaphoric and otherwise, to be the motion by which what is intelligible comes to light. \textit{Phantasia} is thus said to be responsible for the birth of nameless things.
Chapter Two: The Appearing of Phantasmata

First Question: Appearances and Images, Presentations and Representations, page 50

Second Question: Aisthēmata and Noēmata, page 60

Third Question: Truth and Falsity, page 67

Concluding Remarks, page 80

In the previous chapter, we suggested that “phantasmata” may be another name for what Aristotle calls in the De Interpretatione παθήματα, or “affections of the soul,” which are ὀμοιόματα, or “likenesses” of actual things. Because Aristotle says there that spoken, and eventually written words are the “signs” of these affections or likenesses, phantasmata are of special interest here as we try to understand how we understand something without having a word for it. And so we turn in this chapter to a consideration of “phantasma’s” appearances in the De Anima, even though it means that we must momentarily set entelecheia/“entelecheia” aside. We will find that the nature of phantasmata themselves will point us back to entelecheia. But in this chapter, our goal is to investigate three general questions about phantasmata, examining the way the term appears both in what Aristotle says about it and in the secondary literature that has addressed it. It may well be that what appears about it is at first not at all clear, and that we first imagine the phantasma to be something which it is not. Thus, we won’t rely on only the one question, “what is a phantasma,” with hopes it will be sufficient for seeing it accurately. Instead we will try to approach Aristotelian phantasma from the angles of
three additional questions. The hope is that asking about the *phantasma* in various circumstances and perspectives will give us a more holistic view or sense of the term than one limited appearance may provide.

**First Question: Appearances and Images, Presentations and Representations**

Regarding “phantasma’s” appearances in the *De Anima*, the first thing that we observe is also the most striking: in spite of *DA* III.3’s reputation as Aristotle’s most focused exposition of *phantasia*, “phantasma” appears therein only once while it appears multiple times in III.7, 8, and 11 (not to mention many more times in *De Memoria*). This single appearance, which is also the word’s first appearance in the *De Anima*, occurs at 428a1-2 in a passage that almost always appears in any consideration of the chapter. It will be of such importance in this project that we will speak of it as our ‘central passage:’

Now if imagination [*phantasia*] is that by which we speak of some image [*phantasma*] as becoming present [*gignesthai*] to us, rather than anything we might call imagination in a metaphorical way, is it some one among those potencies or active states by which we discriminate something and are either right or wrong? (*DA* III.3 428a1-4)82

\[\text{εἰ δὴ ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ' ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμα τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐἰ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, <ἄρα> μία τις ἔστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἐξίς καθ' ἂς κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα; (DA III.3 428a1-4)\]

A *phantasma*, then, becomes present to us through *phantasia*, and thus is the sort of thing/being/phenomenon that becomes present to us via *phantasia*: it is *phantasia*’s act or result. The first difficulty in seeking to understand more about what it is, however, is that Aristotle has many occasions in III.3 to discuss what appears to be the same sort of thing—the result(s) or act(s) of *phantasia*—in the rest of the chapter, and he does so… but without again mentioning *phantasmata*. He includes four instances of *φαίνεται* (“it

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appears") in the chapter (428a7,16; 428b2,3), one instance of φαντασίαι (“appearances”) (428a12), the word ειδωλοποιοῦντες (“image makers”) (427b20), and the one instance of the word already encountered in the De Interpretatione, ὁµοίας (429a5). Ought we conclude that this multiplicity seeks to describe, if only through renaming, phantasmata, and that whatever they are said to be, they and they alone are the act and result of phantasia? Or, conversely, does Aristotle seek to suggest in this multiplicity that the acts and results of phantasia are themselves multiple, and that we are thereby to distinguish between “phainetai” and “phantasai” on the one hand, and a phantasma on the other? How ought a translator approach this quandary?

Here we need not recount the details of the etymological relationships between the terms Aristotle uses most often in connection with phantasia—phantasma, phainetai, and phantasias—though they will need to be explored in later chapters. But what seems to emerge as the general shape of what is at stake in these multiple terms is that some—those more overtly tied to the middle/passive verb phainesthai or “to appear/be seen” (phantasia and phainetai, and, not incidentally, phainomena) are better rendered along the lines of ‘appearance’ while phantasma, because of its connection to phantazesthai or “to make something visible,” seems better translated as ‘image.’ The line, strictly speaking, is between what John Isaac Beare in Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition neatly summarizes as a difference between “presentations” and “representations.” On

83 “The impressions of sense, the αἰσθήματα, do not disappear or perish with the instant of their first perception. They leave traces (μορύχια) of themselves, or persist, ‘within us.’ These traces are somehow stored up. This ‘storing up’ is effected by successive φαντασίαι, i.e. ‘appearances’ or presentations through immediate sense; and when a store of αἰσθήματα has been formed, the ground is prepared for φαντασία (or το φανταστικόν) in the further application of this term, i.e. as the faculty of reproducing images which were once before the mind, even when the objects which gave rise to them have disappeared from perception.”
the one hand, *phantasia* may be responsible for our ability to encounter a thing’s appearance, the way it *presents* to us. On the other, it may be responsible for our ability to then make an image of that thing—or perhaps allow such an image to “become present to us”—thereby *re-presenting* it. Allowing the distinction between these two things to be a first step in the right direction, since it is obviously not sufficient as a definition of either term, we could thus be led to suppose that one and the same concept of *phantasia* results in two rather different acts or results. Conversely, we might find that these two acts or results are so distinct as to cause us to question the very unity of *phantasia*, supposing, for instance, that what Aristotle says about it in one place in his works should be held distinct from another sort of *phantasia* that he discusses elsewhere. That is, one could be led to suppose that (i) either *phantasia* is unified, but has (at least) two different acts or results (or, as a variation of this, to claim that (i’) one of these acts or results—presentations or representations—is in someway preeminent), or that (ii) *phantasia* is itself multiple, with (for example) one sort leading to one sort of result (presentations or appearances), and another, to another sort (re-presentations or images). Both approaches—that of a unified *phantasia* and that of a manifold one—are evident in the translations and in the secondary literature, though the latter approach (ii) seems considerably under-represented, and those that acknowledge different acts or results

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Curiously, however, Beare has not the sensitivity to the distinction between φαντασίαι and φαντάσματα we are seeking to uphold here, saying that *phantasia* is the “faculty by which φαντάσματα, mental presentations, are in the first instance formed, and in the second reproduced…” John I. (John Isaac) Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle* (Oxford, The Clarendon press, 1906), 291.

84 In the interest of pursuing a natural/physical account of *phantasia*, we will allow for play amongst these various terms—appearance/image, presentation/representation—as we move towards a closer account of what differentiates a *phantasma* from a *phainetai*.

85 Remembering, of course, that plenty of interpreters fail to make this distinction in the first place, as Polansky: “The way to understand *phantasma* is perhaps undetermined. Most interpreters propose “image” or "mental image," while some suggest that "appearance" is more apt.” Polansky, *Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary*, 414.
ultimately promote one and discount the other (i‘). That is, it seems most accounts find reason to favor one sort of result (appearances or images), and then seek to form a unified sense of *phantasia* around that result.

Michael Wedin, for instance, makes representational images the central business of *phantasia*. He says he is intent on “providing [Aristotle] with a general theory of [re]presentational devices that play an essential role in the account of cognitive faculties and intentional acts,” which largely depends on arguing that *phantasia* “plays the central role” by being “thought of as a quite general [re]presentational capability that subserves the operations of standard faculties.”\(^\text{86}\) Martha Nussbaum, on the other hand, takes up the matter to support her work in translating *De Motu Animalium* and argues that “only Aristotle’s basic interest in appearing … can serve to explain the extended role of *phantasia*.”\(^\text{87}\) From the outset, she is concerned to correct what she sees as the “one-sided” nature of the scholarship that tends to gravitate towards a “prevailing view of *phantasms*’ workings: that *phantasmata* in Aristotle are always mental images that resemble the things they represent and are to be contemplated as internal pictures by the living being.”\(^\text{88}\) Both Nussbaum and Wedin clearly recognize, with Beare, a distinction between Aristotle’s own terms that would suggest that Aristotle himself allows for both sorts of phantastic results, and yet each tries to make one of these the central business of *phantasia*.\(^\text{89}\) Significantly, though, both have doubts that holding one result above the


\(^{88}\) Ibid., 221–2.

\(^{89}\) Nussbaum argues, however, that there is “much less evidence for the image-view of *phantasia* than has usually been supposed.” Ibid., 223; Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*. See Wedin’s account of
other can truly result in a unified sense of Aristotelian *phantasia*, and both seem also to recognize that the main obstacle to doing so is a pronounced difference between *phantasia* as presented in III.3 and the *phantasia* mentioned in III.7 and later.\(^9^0\) This difference is not easily articulated here, but will become clearer in what follows.

On the other side of the spectrum, one might agree with Cornelius Castoriadis, whose essay “The Discovery of the Imagination” represents the strongest possible case made for (ii), the possibility of multiple *phantasias*.\(^9^1\) He writes:

> It is Aristotle who first discovers the imagination-- and he discovers it twice, that is, he discovers two imaginations. He discovers first (*De Anima* 3.3) the imagination in the sense that later became banal, which I shall henceforth call the *second imagination*, and he lays down the doctrine of the imagination that has since his time become conventional and that still reigns today in fact and in substance. He then discovers another imagination, one with a much more radical function, that enjoys almost nothing but a homonymic relation to the previous one, and which I shall henceforth call the *first imagination*.\(^9^2\)

This “second *phantasia*” is itself “two manifestations” of *phantasia*: one is a “generally deformed doublet of sensation” or a “persistence of sensation,” (perhaps more akin to presentations/apparitions) and the other is “the capacity to evoke such images

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\(^9^0\) In introducing the work, Wedin forthrightly recognizes that in “finding in *De Anima* III.3 a canonical theory of imagination, I am not only isolating the account that admittedly best suits a cognitivist theory of mind but also giving it an importance over other things Aristotle says, or appears to say, about φαντασία. And it is well known that Aristotle does have other things to say on the topic, some of which seems, prima facie at least, incompatible with the canonical theory.” And Nussbaum is even more modest about her goals, nowhere admitting to trying to find a completely unified *phantasia*, but hoping instead to better explain its role in “action contexts.” She admits, “There seems to be no canonical theory of *phantasia* in Aristotle, but rather a number of assorted observations, sometimes apparently inconsistent, of varying length and technicality.” Aristotle and Nussbaum, *Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium*, 222; Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, xi–xii.


\(^9^2\) Ibid., 214.
independent of all present sensation, including a certain power of recombination,” a capacity that “reproduces” the “movement of sensation in actuality,” even if “its emergence” could “certainly not” be limited by that movement (and this seems to pertain to representations/images). He offers no explanation for the possibility that thinking “simultaneously or alternatively” of these two results may yet indicate a unified phantasia, though this does seem to be the assumption as both results are encompassed by the “second imagination.” The “first imagination,” of course, is entirely other than either of these “manifestations” of the second sort. Castoriadis claims that it “interrupts the logical order of the treatise” when it appears in the later half of Book III, and that it “virtually bursts apart Aristotelian ontology- which amounts to saying, ontology tout court.”

DA III.8 begins by observing that all beings “are either perceptible or intelligible” (431b23) and Castoriadis observes that

\[\text{[n]o sooner than it is reaffirmed, the thoroughgoing of division of what is into sensible and intelligible is thoroughly shaken. A Third surges forth that escapes division and challenges its foundation. This Third, moreover, does not appear as something that would have been left out, that would point to an insufficiency in this division for exhausting the given, that would invite its completion or overcoming. It is from and within the division that it acts, and it seems to render this division impossible since this Third sometimes finds itself in the One and sometimes in the Other, without being the One or the Other.}\]

This “Third” is the phantasma, the being of which is neither strictly perceptible nor intelligible. We will take up the matter of the phantasma’s relationship to the aisthēma and the noēma in the next section. For now it suffices to see how different Castoriadis’ dual (if not trinal) phantasias are from Nussbaum’s and Wedin’s attempts to unify the concept.

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93 Ibid., 227.
94 Ibid., 215.
95 Ibid., 219–220.
Castoriadis’ account aside, the desire to find such a unified concept of *phantasia* seems a strong one, and this is a fact interesting in itself; every complaint (and there are several) about Aristotle having exhibited “the untidy-genius syndrome to an unusual degree” in his presentation of *phantasia* is the expression of an expectation of unity, consistency, and independence. This desire also likely accounts for Castoriadis’ lack of company in taking such a strong stance on Aristotelian *phantasia*’s inherent disunity: far better to make as much of what Aristotle says make sense, even if ultimately one must acknowledge, as with Wedin or Nussbaum, that it cannot all be made to cohere. The mind seems especially attuned to expect organic unity, even in man-made presentations. Joyce Engmann, for instance, agrees with Castoriadis that Aristotle’s presentations in III.3 and III.7-11 (specifically III.8) constitute a “dual conception of imagination.”

(The reasons for the difference are, for her, different: she contrasts the imagination responsible for uncombined and simple images in III.8 with the imagination in III.3 that

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96 The quotation here is from Dorothea Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” in *Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima*, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Reprint (Oxford University Press, USA, 1995), 280–1. Similarly, consider Hamlyn: “[T]here is clearly little consistency here,” Aristotle and David Walter Hamlyn, *Aristotle “De Anima”: Books II and III (with Passages from Book I)* (Oxford University Press, 1968), 131. And Ross, as cited by Watson, even sees in this short chapter the “reversal” of the work on perception in Book II, and suggests rather hopefully that it thus may not “represent his deliberate view.” Gerard Watson, “Φαντασία in Aristotle, De Anima 3. 3,” *The Classical Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 143, doi:10.2307/638742; Even Aquinas seems to hesitate in his reading when he indicates it rests on something that Aristotle did not say, but in Aquinas’ opinion, should have said: “Now Aristotle does not establish here whether this movement requires a power different from the sensory one. But since powers are distinguished in terms of the difference between acts, and a difference in movement requires different objects that can be moved-- since that which is moved moves not itself but another-- it seems necessary for there to be a phantasm-producing (*phantastica*) or imaginative power different from sense.” This difficulty—that phantasia seems like it ought to be a faculty with objects particular only to it—is articulated with more or less clarity in several places in the secondary literature. Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” 280–1; Aristotle and Hamlyn, *Aristotle “De Anima,”* 131; Gerard Watson, “Φαντασία in Aristotle, De Anima 3. 3,” *The Classical Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 143, doi:10.2307/638742; Thomas Aquinas, *A Commentary on Aristotle’s “De Anima,”* trans. Robert C. Pasnau (Yale University Press, 1999), 339.

allows us to entertain a thought without believing in its truth or falsity.) But unlike Castoriadis, she still wishes to hold this “dual conception” as a unity, specifically by making both abide by the same conception of truth and falsity: a move made more striking since she recognizes and names a possible “dual conception” of truth at play in the work as well, as we will have cause to review in the third question about truth and falsity. Nonetheless, her reason for looking for one phantasia is understandable: she points out that Aristotle himself uses “phantasia” consistently throughout, and thus decides that the numerous difficulties that arise in understanding what he means by it are due not to differing types of phantasia, but rather to the “very comprehensiveness of the concept.” (Unfortunately, she does not see in this comprehensiveness reason to find that phantasia could possibly result in acts that relate to truth differently.) Given the degree of ambivalence present in her concluding remarks, one wonders if she would have rather allowed for multiple phantasias after all.

What can be said of all four thinkers, though, is that even in the cases where one assesses the variations in Aristotle’s terms for the various results of phantasia, the larger issue always seems to be how one makes sense of an apparent shift in the way Aristotle talks about phantasia in III.3 versus III.7 and later. This is particularly interesting given that, while phantasma only makes the one appearance in III.3, it makes numerous appearances in III.7, III.8, and III.11. Consequently, as we seek to navigate this shift in what follows, the approach here will be neither (i’) as with Wedin or Nussbaum, nor (ii) with Castoriadis and Engmann. Instead of pursuing a unified definition of phantasia,

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98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 259, fn.1.
which seems to resist such efforts, we will instead focus on the *phantasma*, which has something more of “a this,” or τόδε τι about it, and therefore is more likely to yield to questions regarding its “what-it-is-to-be”, its τί ἢν εἶναι. That is, we will continue to prioritize the question(s) about what a *phantasma* is (and thus, how it might differ from *phainetai*) above the question about *phantasia* generally, and in doing so, will try to find a pathway that unifies not only presentations/appearances with representations/images within Castoriadis’ “second imagination,” but that also unifies the *phantasia* of III.3 with that of III.7 and beyond. The approach here will ultimately be (i), wherein *phantasia* is found to result in both appearances [*phainetai*] and in images [*phantasmata*], but not to be more concerned with either one of these since it ultimately pertains more to the connection between them. (In this regard, it is more similar to Beare’s approach than to any of those laid out above. His reading of *DA* III.3, old as it is, is unique among those considered here in that it allows *phantasia* to result in both sorts of acts. We will have a better opportunity to review his account in the final section of Chapter Four.)

It is this pathway between the way something appears and an internal image that occurs in the soul that will bring us back to *entelecheia*: a *phantasma* will be the *entelecheia* of a thing encountered in the appearing of perceptible things. More, the pathway that links the one to the other, the pathway along which *entelecheia* begins to unfold, will then be found connect *phantasmata* to thoughts [*noēmata*]: we will have cause to wonder if this pathway is in fact the “natural road” of *Physics* I.1. This connection, which is anticipated and described in III.7 and beyond, will also lead us towards *logos*, towards understanding how *entelecheia* becomes “*entelecheia.*”

100 We will also more closely examine Wedin’s account, as his account of “images” is more multifaceted than most. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle*; Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*. 
Thus far we have suggested that, whatever a phantasma is, it is distinct from how a thing “appears” [phainetai], from the “appearances” [phantasiai] that also seem to result from phantasia’s operation, just as an image or representation is distinct from an appearance or presentation. This, however, might be a schematically interesting difference, and a good start towards saying something more substantial about phantasmata, but it is does not offer much in the way of a definition, as was already admitted (see footnote 84 above). But this question—what is meant by the difference between appearance and image—is only the first of three questions we will explore with hopes of accurately articulating the phantasma. The other two are as follows: if a phantasma is an image or representation, what sort of being does it picture/represent—beings sensed (aisthēmata), or beings thought (noēmata)? Also, are phantasmata the sorts of things that can be said to be true or false? At the end of this questioning, we will have begun to situate phantasmata alongside or amongst phainetai, aisthēmata, noēmata (as well as prōta noēmata), alētheia, and pseudos. It will then remain to attend to the motions and interactions between these terms, to turn to the question that Aristotle himself asks and which animates the whole, and which is posed in the central passage cited above: “If phantasia is that by which we speak of some phantasma as becoming present [γίγνεσθαι] to us… is it some one among those dunameis or hexeis by which we discriminate something and are either right or wrong” (428a1-4)? Phantasia in III.3 will, a few short paragraphs later, begin to appear as “some sort of motion [kinesis] and not to occur without perception” (428b11), and by the end of III.3, will be confirmed to be such, “a motion coming about as a result of the being-at-work of sense perception, and
corresponding to it” (429a2-4). If, then, phantasia is the kinēsis that results in the
gignesthai of phantasmata, and phantasmata are distinct from, but nonetheless associated
with phainetai, aisthēmata, noēmata, prōta noēmata, alētheia, and pseunos, what role do
each of these things play in this process, in this kinēsis? And what can we deduce about
phantasmata by considering what Aristotle has to say about the process by which they
“become present to us”? 

Second Question: Aisthēmata and Noēmata

“Phantasma,” as was said above, appears only once in III.3, but multiple times in
III.7 and III.8, and then again in III.11. The passages from III.7 and 8 quickly add to the
complexity of the debate over just what phantasma are: no longer is it sufficient to
question which of the several varieties of “representation” one ought to use to translate
the term, because just what is being “represented,” “imaged,” or “pictured” is now in
question as well. Assuming, of course, that a phantasma is in fact a representation, just
what sort of thing is being re-presented by a phantasma? Are the phantasmata more
closely associated with perceptions (the aisthēmata), or with thoughts (the noēmata)?

DA III.3’s emphasis on phantasia as being a motion attendant on sense perception seems
to suggest the first possibility. But III.8 concludes with a question that, while largely
unanswered, nonetheless lends credence to the second:

…whenever one were to contemplate, it would be necessary at the same time to
behold some image [phantasma]. For the things imagined [phantasmata] are just
like the things perceived [aisthēmata], except without the material. And
imagination is different from affirmation and denial, since what is true or false is
an intertwining of intelligible things [noēmata]. So how do the uncombined
intelligible things [prōta noēmata] differ from being images [phantasmata]? But
in fact these are not images [phantasmata] either, but are not present without
images [phantasmata]. (432a8-14)
Phantasmata are like aisthēmata, but not completely like them, as they are without material. What is without material are the noēmata, so phantasmata are also like them, but not completely like them, for some reason that Aristotle does not provide, or at least not here. But given that the phantasma is like both the aisthēma and the noēma, and especially like the prōta noēma, which one is it properly said to be an image/representation/picture of?

Of course one must wonder why it needs to be one or the other. The trouble, according to Cornelius Castoriadis, is that “[f]or Aristotle, as well as for the philosophical tradition he already inherits, two terms seem to be and are assured: the aisthēton and the noēton, the sensible and the intelligible.” Indeed, as we heard already, III.8 opens with the reiteration, “let us say again that the soul is in a certain way all beings, for beings are either perceptible or intelligible” (431b21-24). Consequently, the ontological status of the phantasma poses a sort of a threat—not just to Aristotle’s understanding of phantasia, but to his ontology: as Castoriadis has it, the “first imagination” of III.7 and later “virtually bursts apart Aristotelian ontology- which amounts to saying, ontology tout court.” The being of the phantasma causes Castoriadis to ask:

What then is, and what then can be, the bipartition noēton-aisthēton, noēsis-aisthēsis? How can we think that it is exhaustive, that it exhausts whatever could be said to be? The phantasm is not “nothing,” since not only do “we have it,” but

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102 Ibid., 214.
it is necessarily implicated in thinking, as it is impossible to think without phantasm... It is not nothing—but one does not know what it is. It is obviously not sensible: it is “like the sensible” but without matter, and that makes all the difference in the world for Aristotelian ontology, and for all ontology.103

Certainly a good way to begin to tentatively answer this question is to ask another one: what would cause one to confuse a prōta noēma with a phantasma? Why are they similar, and what fine line discriminates the one from the other? Thus, what are the prōta noēmata?

Our first hint in addressing this question is what Aristotle says just prior to raising it: imagination is “different from affirmation and denial, since what is true or false is an intertwining of intelligible things” (432a10-11). Likely, then, that whatever the first thoughts are, they too are different from affirmation and denial, and also avoid the matter of being true or false as a consequence. This observation is probably what led Sachs to translate prōta noēmata not as “first intelligible things,” but as “uncombined intelligible things” (432a12).104 This seems helpful, as far as it goes, but just what are such “uncombined intelligible things”? One may be tempted to recall DA III.6, which begins by addressing the “thinking of indivisible things,” and immediately says that this is “one of those acts in which falsehood is not possible” (430a25). The first examples offered in that discussion of “separate intelligible things” are “incommensurability and the diagonal” (430a25, 430b1). Are these examples of prōta noēmata? The most general—and we might follow Wedin and say “higher”—universals, such as being, and unity?105

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103 Ibid., 219.
104 Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 150.
105 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 128.
Such was the opinion of one F.A. Trendelenburg as cited by Wedin.\textsuperscript{106} Wedin does his best to be sympathetic to this reading, but ultimately we agree with his conclusion that such a suggestion is simply not likely, since such universals are “least likely to be confused with images.”\textsuperscript{107}

In which case, we could consider the other end of things: something like the “lower” universals, though such a term may seem strange.\textsuperscript{108} Perhaps this perspective is something like Engmann’s, who supposes that by “first thoughts” “Aristotle probably means the most basic, least abstract thoughts, like the thought of a cat.”\textsuperscript{109}Returning to \textit{DA} III.6, which concludes, it seems, in much the same way as it begins, by talking about how “thinking what something is, in the sense of what it keeps on being in order to be at all [κατὰ τὸ τί ἐἶναι], is true, and is not one thing attached to another,” we find a footnote by Sachs.\textsuperscript{110} It doesn’t mention cats \textit{per se}, but it does talk about horses and olive trees. Thoughts of these individual things may easily be confused with images; perhaps here, in “thinking what something is, in the sense of what it keeps on being in order to be at all,” thinking of something’s “τὸ τί ἐἶναι”, is an instance of the \textit{prōta noēmata}. And if we look more closely at the language of the opening of III.6 against that of its conclusion, we find that while \textit{what is being predicated} of the subjects in both places is consistent—namely, that both are the sort of things that do not admit of falsity—

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 127.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 128.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Engmann, “Imagination and Truth in Aristotle,” 264.
\item \textsuperscript{110} “Recognizing something as a horse, say, or an olive tree, is not an act of thinking a collection of attributes together as a sum…The form that organizes the plant or animal also works upon the perceiving or thinking soul that recognizes that plant or animal…” Aristotle and Sachs, \textit{Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection}, 145, fn.16.
\end{itemize}
The subjects themselves are not consistent from place to place. At the outset, Aristotle names the “separate intelligible things,” and at the conclusion, the thinking of “what something is, in the sense of what it keeps on being in order to be at all.” In short, what we may have here is a distinction between two types of things that are similar in not admitting of falsity, but which are different insofar as they are on, well, the opposite sides of things. That is, Aristotle is in this chapter discriminating between two different types of primacy. On the one hand, we have what is first in our experience of the world (cats, horses, olive trees): these things have epistemological primacy. On the other, we have what is first in terms of sheer intelligibility and knowability (being, unity, incommensurability, the diagonal), and which have a logical primacy. In Physics I.1, Aristotle talks specifically about our need to proceed along the “natural road” from “what is more familiar and clearer to us,” to “what is clearer and better known by nature,” and he clarifies that these two things are not the same: “for it is not the same things that are well known to us and well known simply” (184a16-19). The traveling of this “natural road” seems also to be the subject of Posterior Analytics II.19, in which Aristotle is at pains to discuss the centrality of the things perceived in experience to deriving the most intelligible things (and to which we will have cause to turn in Chapter Four.)

Three considerations emerge from this discussion. Firstly, it is obvious that

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111 In rephrasing this thought, he puts it this way: “thus it is necessary to proceed from what is general”—and here the word used is καθόλου, which is often translated as “universal”—“to what is particular” (184a24-25). Better perhaps than either of these options is the “undifferentiated whole” as with Christopher Long or “concrete whole” as with Wicksteed and Cornford, the translators in the Loeb edition. It is within this whole that we begin to become acquainted with the many things that are its parts; this description is in keeping with the discussion of the “larger context” or “field” that opens the “concluding remarks” of this chapter, on page 80. Aristotle, Aristotle: The Physics, Books I-IV (Loeb Classical Library), trans. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, Revised edition (Cambridge (Mass.); London: Harvard University Press, 1957), 11; Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 57.
Aristotle embraces what we have seen Wedin distinguish as “higher” and “lower”
universals, though it is doubtful that he would embrace these descriptions in particular.
That is, it does seem, even from what has been said here, that there is a process by which
the latter becomes the former, but this is not a process akin to traveling “up” Plato’s
divided line. Rather, and this is a second consideration, it is a process that centers firmly
on those things of which we have our prōta noēmata: those cats, horses, and olive trees
that surround us. It is a process that centers firmly on those things that have “a this”—a
τόδε τι—about them.112 It is likely not happenstance that has led this group of examples
to share a general feature in common. We conjectured in Chapter One that the motion of
phantasia may be found to be illuminated particularly well by “every natural body having
a share in life,” those that “most of all” are “independent things” that have “thinghood as
a composite [of material and form],” and thus are most properly said to be “a this” [τόδε
τι] (412a12-15). Noting, then, the seeming centrality of ensouled things, especially
insofar as they are the most “independent” things, to the formation of prōta noēmata,
whatever that formation may be, and the likely possibility that these prōta noēmata
undergo some process of formation that results in the logically primary thoughts, we have
cause here to wonder whether these processes may be somehow similar. This is a third
consideration, and while mentioned in the previous chapter, it is still very much
conjecture. But here we may begin to approach what Aristotle means by describing the
soul as “like a hand, for the hand is a tool of tools, while the intellect is a form of forms
and sense perception is a form of perceptible things” (432a2). How else might we

112 Consider here Polansky’s description of the term, which points in the same direction and adds to our list
of cats, horses, and olive trees, two more items- dogs and plants: “A this’ [τόδε τι] perhaps refers initially
to what can be pointed out, and hence in Categories 3b10-23 the best instances of “a this” are ordinary
substantial beings such as a dog or a plant readily pointed toward as substrata for the other categories of
understand the contrast between the “form of perceptible things” that is sense perception and the “form of forms” that is intellect unless through the understanding of some gradation of material or ‘material’? Might it be that the same sort of power of abstraction—which may in fact be better described as a power of refinement—at work in deriving the form from perceptible things is at work deriving the form from these forms? That the “natural road” between cats, horses, olive trees, dogs, plants, and the prōta noēmata of each of these continues, connecting these prōta noēmata with, say, the thought of entelecheia?

These remarks are still more suggestive than conclusive. What does seem clear from all that has been said about the relationship between phantasmata and prōta noēmata is twofold: First, that both likely pertain more directly to what we find immediately in experience, the aisthēmata instead of that which is most intelligible, the noēmata, and secondly, that both are able only to be true, but never false. And so, having touched on two sizeable questions regarding phantasmata—what it means to think of it as a representation or image, and, more broadly, what sort of thing it represents or “images”—things sensed, or things thought—let us consider the third question, which asks more directly after the phantasma’s proximity to alētheia and pseudos.

A remark from Polansky intensifies the attractiveness of this suggestion: "Hence, thought, in its origination with its liability to error, contrasts with the beginning of sense. Of course thought of the proper intelligibles, that is, essences (see Met. ix 10.1051b17-33), is generally true, as is perception of proper sensibles. Intellecction of essence is basic for thought, but it does not emerge at the very beginning of the intellectual life of the human as proper perception is at the start of perceptive life. This contrast in order of truth attainment, as a result of the role of developing judgment, is key to distinguishing sense and thought.” Described here is the way in which sense perception and intellection may be seen to dovetail, with the former beginning with truth but leading to error, and the latter beginning (often) with error and ending with truth. It is this “dovetailing” that we hope to explore further. Ibid., 409.
Third Question: Truth and Falsity

Those wishing to explain what Aristotle means by the similarity of *phantasmata* and *prōta noēmata* with respect to truth and falsity at the end of III.8 may turn to *Met.* IX(Θ).10, which elaborates on the sense of truth described in *DA* III.6. The secondary sense of truth proposed here is described via the image of touching something. This ‘contact theory of truth’ holds that “touching and affirming something uncompounded is the true… while not touching is being ignorant” (1051b24-25). It is secondary to Aristotle’s more usual ‘combinatory theory of truth’ by means of which truth and falsity arise by the way in which one thing is combined with, or predicated of, another thing. How might *phantasmata*, and *phantasia* generally, be situated with regards to these two theories? The 1976 article “Imagination and Truth in Aristotle” by Joyce Engmann, while not recent, remains the most widely-cited resource on these questions. Interestingly, while she will also turn us to *Met.* IX(Θ).10 to illustrate both her acknowledgment that Aristotle has a “dual conception of truth” and how it may be that “imaginations” abide by the secondary, contact-based sense, she ultimately determines that the contact theory of truth is not meant to apply to *phantasia*.114 We commented above that this is indeed remarkable, since Engmann does recognize that Aristotle seems to hold a “dual conception of imagination.”115 How and why she rules against the possibility that the contact theory of truth is not applicable to even just one of these dual conceptions is therefore of interest here. We will see that the chief reason she does so is that she makes no distinction between *phantasia* as a power or condition in which something results or becomes present to us, and the results or acts themselves. This is, of

115 Ibid.
course, somewhat understandable, given that Aristotle does on occasion use the same word to name both. However, neither does she distinguish systematically between appearances and images. Accordingly, she is led to conclude that *phantasia* itself may be said to be true or false. And because she has determined it “better to reflect Aristotle’s own usage by retaining a single term [for *phantasia*] throughout” her analysis, she is then forced to find that all aspects of this “very comprehensive” concept abide by this same criterion for truth and falsity.\footnote{116 Ibid., 259, fn.1.}

As briefly mentioned above, Engmann bases her first sense of imagination on the end of III.8, wherein the imagination is said to be different from affirmation or denial, because what is true or false is a combination of intelligible things. She supposes, as we have above, that the force of this “because” is that images are uncombined, and are thereby not true or false. But she contrasts this with what Aristotle says in three other places in III.3: “at 428b17 Aristotle says that imagination may be true and false; at 428a18 he speaks of false imagination; and at 428a12 he says that the majority of imaginations are false.”\footnote{117 Ibid., 260.} Given these translations, little wonder that she calls his account of phantasia “confused and inconsistent”\footnote{118 Ibid., 259.}! There seems little to connect III.8 with these passages.

The difficulties drop away, however, if one pays attention not to *phantasia*, but to the *phantasma* as distinct from the way things *phainetai*. The *phantasma*, as we have
seen, is what is at issue in the conclusion of III.8. And as for the three passages from III.3, what Aristotle actually says at 428b17 is not that imagination is true or false, but that “the one having [the motion of imagination] would do and have done to it many things resulting from this motion, which could be either true or false.” This is in keeping with our suggestion that phantasia is the motion responsible for multiple results, which may differ in their relationship to truth and falsity. Consequently, and this is her second cited passage, “phantasia would not be any of the things that are always truthful… since there is also imagining [phantasia] that is false,” namely, that which results in appearances that don’t line up with what is actually there, and thus are false via the combinatory theory of truth (428a18). That is, and this is her last cited passage, “most phantasai [which we would translate appearances] turn out to be false” (428a12).

Further, discriminating between images and appearances with regards to phantasia’s truth and falsity is also supported by Nussbaum, Hamlyn, and Polansky, though with different levels of clarity. Both Nussbaum and Hamlyn make the distinction between appearances and images, and find this difference of significant importance in determining how phantasia may be said to be false. Nussbaum, according (correctly, I think) to Wedin, claims that “Aristotle’s interest in the truth and falsity of imagination is an interest in the truth and falsity of appearances and has nothing to do with images.” She makes the clarification that is missing in Engmann, that “strictly speaking Aristotle ought to have said not that the imagination is false but that the information it presents [which we have called its acts or results, and] (which can be expressed propositionally) is

119 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 97.
false.”\textsuperscript{120} Hamlyn finds 428a18 “to go against the suggestion at 427b16ff. that truth and falsity are irrelevant to imagining,” and cites that the discussion there presents \textit{phantasia} as an experience that “is available to us whenever we want it,” which is parenthetically explained by the fact that “it is possible to make something appear before the eyes in the way people do who make images [ἐιδωλοποιοῦντες] to fit things into a memory-assisting scheme” (427b17-21).\textsuperscript{121} This passage clearly has to do with images, as does the next one, where Aristotle says that “with \textit{phantasia} we are in the same condition as if we were beholding…a painting” (427b25-27). Thus does Hamlyn conclude about 428a12 that “Aristotle presumably has in mind here under ‘imaginings’ appearances in general,” and not images.\textsuperscript{122}

Polansky’s account, while more detailed, is also somewhat less clear because he does not systematically distinguish between the way a thing \textit{phainetai} and a \textit{phantasma} even though his account points directly at such a distinction. He observes that “\textit{phantasia} set up by proper sense perception that is actually present will be true,” but that anything less than proper sense perception can give rise to \textit{phantasai} that are false.\textsuperscript{123} Here he is employing the combinatory theory of truth, but is careful to point out that this combinatory theory can be at work even apart from judgment and/or predicative thought: “The falsity [of these \textit{phantasai}]… is the deceptiveness of the presentation or appearance rather than any judgment or conviction to which it gives rise.”\textsuperscript{124} Thus, he says:

\textsuperscript{120} Aristotle and Nussbaum, \textit{Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium}, 248, fn.43; Wedin, \textit{Mind and Imagination in Aristotle}, 98.
\textsuperscript{121} Aristotle and Hamlyn, \textit{Aristotle “De Anima,”} 132.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Polansky, \textit{Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary}, 429.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
we can explain why phantasai set up even by proper sensibles not currently present can be false. Phantasia of a proper sensible not actually present is possibly false because it represents something absent as present and something that may no longer be the case as the case. All phantasai of what is not actually present thus have something potentially false about them: notice that Aristotle says only that phantasai can be false whether the perceptible objects giving rise to them are present or absent. 125

This account will fall much in line with what Engmann has to say: phantasia can be said to be true or false depending on how it accords with—how it combines with—what is present in reality. But, unlike Engmann, Polansky continues in the passage above by saying, “Of course where there is phantasia involved in memory or anticipation and these are accurate, we incline to call them true.” 126 He does not, however, observe that it is precisely when Aristotle is talking about phantasia’s role in memory (De Memoria) and its role in anticipation and desire (DA III.9-11) that talk of phantasai and how a thing may phainetai drops away, and is replaced instead by talk of the phantasma, an act or result of phantasia that can be said to be true by means of the contact theory of truth. 127

Even though Engmann’s account will bypass this distinction, it is worth recounting here to show the ways in which it could have accommodated it had she not been so intent on trying to link truth and falsity to phantasia instead of to its various results. She tries to account for the differences between III.8 and III.3 by saying each illustrates one side of a “two-fold contrast:” on the one hand she posits a difference between (i) simple images and (ii) combined images (which she then has to say is the

125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 The degree to which Polansky’s account is amenable to our own is further illustrated by another passage from this same section: “phantasmata hanging around from previous sense perception reenter cognitive life to fill in what is now obscure to lead to the faulty perception,” the “phainetai” in 428a12-15. Ibid.
same as the combination of the thoughts they constitute). This contrast she says applies more to III.8. On the other hand she distinguishes between (iii) “entertaining a thought” without committing to that thought’s truth or falsity and (iv) believing or asserting something, a contrast that she says is the business of III.3. She doesn’t think Aristotle articulates what the difference is between (ii) and (iii), and I assume the reason she feels there needs to be a stated difference is because both pertain most directly to thoughts. She proposes two possible differences, and the first is that (ii) more properly has to do with images (even though she does not indicate a place where Aristotle discusses “combined images”), and (iii) with thoughts. The second, which she finds more credible, is that images—even, presumably, “combined images”—“lack the element of assertion which is said in the De Interpretatione to be essential to that which is characterized by truth and falsity.”

If there is supposed to be a difference between (ii) and (iii), she goes on to say, and the difference does pertain to belief/assertion, then the “combination of thoughts” (note she does not reiterate “combined images” here) of (ii) is “more or less identical with the belief or assertion” of (iv). I agree with this assessment. In my view, (ii) and (iv) are similar: belief or assertion is, in fact, a combination of thoughts, or a matter of predication: namely, “what appears as X is in fact X.” But Engmann then goes on to say that the two-fold contrast is thus “over-schematic,” attributing this to the “imperfect tie-up between III.3 and III.8.”

It seems the far more obvious conclusion would be to see the similarity between (ii) and (iv) to invite one to view (i) and (iii) as possibly similar as well, to wonder if “simple images” and “entertained thoughts” might have something in common. Would she have realized that just as (ii) and (iv) are similar

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129 Ibid., 261.
insofar as they involve an act of predication, a combination of thoughts, that (i) and (iii) are similar insofar as they do not?

The problem is clearly not that Engmann fails to recognize both of the theories of truth mentioned above. She summarizes Aristotle’s more usual combinatory conception of truth by saying that something—“a thought or expression”—may be true or false depending on how it is either combined or separated; whether this corresponds to how something is combined or separated “in reality.” Thus, she says, it follows that “nothing simple (whether a name or thought) can have a truth value,” or at least a truth-value given this conception of truth. And she recognizes that there do seem to be, however, three illustrations of a different conception: “the apprehension of what a thing is “according to the what-it-is-to-be,”” the “perception of the special sensibles,” and “imaginations”. She summarizes Aristotle’s presentation of this different conception in Met. IX(Θ).10 as follows:

The sense in which this is true is there said to be a different one from that in which statements (involving combination and separation) are true. In the new sense of “true,” there is no complementary predicate “false” (Met. 1051a-2). Aristotle compares such apprehension to touching, where the alternatives are touching and not touching; just as it does not make sense to talk of somebody’s touching something unsuccessfully, so it does not make sense to talk of someone’s apprehending what a thing is falsely.

However, she focuses on the fact that this passage seems to only specifically regard “the apprehension of what a thing is,” and, while she is comfortable extending this position by way of analogy to the second illustration given above (that of perception of the proper

130 Ibid.
131 She also provides a list of places in Aristotle’s corpus where this is observed: Cat. 2a4-10, de Int. 16a12-18, Met. 1027b18-19, de An. 430a26-28. Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
sensibles, referenced often in III.3), she cannot extend it to include the last, “imagination.”\textsuperscript{134} This even though she spells out the terms of that possibility:

Since the faculty of imagination is dependent on perception (428b10-429a2), or is identical with it though different in \textit{being} (De Insomn. 459a15-17), one might think that Aristotle would give the same account of the truth of imagination as of perception: the alternatives are to have an image or not to have it; when I imagine something, there is no disputing the content of my imagination.\textsuperscript{135}

But ultimately, “in spite of the close connection between imagination and perception,” she will not read Aristotle’s \textit{phantasia} as participating in this second conception of truth.

Why not? The reason is that it cannot be applied to \textit{phantasia} consistently. She thus reaffirms that the “only explanation” that works consistently for Aristotle’s understanding of the imagination’s ability to be true or false is derived from the combinatorial theory of truth. And this explanation is definitely a derivation. It “contains implicitly two differences from his normal [combinatorial] conception of truth: it is possible for simple thoughts, or rather, images, to be true or false, and the element of assertion which he normally takes to be characteristic of that to which the predicates “true” and “false” properly apply is allowed to be absent.”\textsuperscript{136} She herself admits that “this criterion for the truth and falsity of imagination is in many cases a forced and unnatural one,” and this is specifically because I don’t always engage in imagination expecting what I envision be “actually spread before my eyes; so that to characterize what I imagine as false on the ground that it is not present to my senses seems quite

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 262.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 265.
irrelevant.” But she attributes the unnaturalness of it to the fact that Aristotle’s conception of imagination is comprised of “very heterogeneous” “mental activities.” She says it is therefore “likely” that Aristotle has elevated a criterion of truth which is not without plausibility for certain forms of imagination into a general criterion for all. The phenomena embraced by Aristotle’s concept of imagination are so diverse that it is not surprising that this extension cannot be carried out successfully.

And so, in spite of contriving this derivation of Aristotle’s usual combinatory theory of truth in order to treat one very comprehensive phantasia consistently, ultimately it seems Engmann cannot say that she—or perhaps Aristotle—has done this successfully. In her conclusion, she acknowledges her stance does require her to focus on DA III.3.

Had she allowed that the comprehensiveness of the concept may contain appearances, which may be considered true or false under the combinatory theory of truth with no derivations necessary, and images, which are true or not-true in the sense suggested by the passage from the Metaphysics, both difficulties—that III.3 and III.8 appear at odds, and that III.3 seems to require a specially tailored formulation of the usual concept of truth—would disappear. In short, couldn’t it be that phantasia, insofar as it results in two different acts or results, bears different relationships to truth and falsity? Appearances or “phantasias,” the way a thing “appears,” [phainetai], and the very formulation of which is the predication “X seems to be F” may well be either true or false according to the combinatory theory of truth, depending on whether what they suggest

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137 Ibid., 263.
138 Ibid., 263, 259fn.1.
139 Ibid., 265.
140 Ibid., 265, 262.
about reality is accurate. *Phantasmata*, on the other hand, might better be assessed by the contact theory, wherein there is no corresponding adjective of “false”: a *phantasma*, the formulation of which would be closer to “F”, either ‘touches’ or ‘does not touch’ that which it apprehends.

Here, our discussion can be profitably extended by turning to what Wedin has to say about truth and falsity—not about appearances or images, but about the *prōta noēmata*. Recall that we identified Wedin’s reading in the First Question as one that upholds a unified *phantasia* that is nonetheless responsible for different acts or results, and further, that Wedin’s account is one which finds one of those results—the image—to be preeminent. However, a discussion of the truth or falsity of the image in Wedin is not available, though he does discuss the truth of the *prōta noēmata* that are hard to distinguish from these images. His discussion of “the notion of truth as contact [θιγεῖν],” or as he will call it later, “acquaintance,” applies directly to the “first thoughts,” and so if it applies to the *phantasmata*, it will do so only by way of extension.\(^{141}\) It seems a small point, but is worth noting. Wedin does not specifically indicate a reason for this discrimination, but I suspect that it may have to do with the language in which *Met.* IX(Θ).10 presents its thesis. (This may also be responsible for Polansky’s care in making sure the sort of falsity that applies to appearances is not the same thing as a predicative judgment, heard above when he says, “The falsity [of these *phantasiai*]… is the deceptiveness of the presentation or appearance rather than any judgment or conviction to

\(^{141}\) Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, 125.
which it gives rise.”\textsuperscript{142} Up until this point, we have described the combinatory theory of truth as pertaining to the way thoughts are combined, and have elided this with the way something is predicated of something else without pausing for distinction. But this last formulation, “predicated of something else,” points strongly to language. And for all its talk of touching and not touching, \textit{Met. IX} (Θ).\textsuperscript{10} also points to language by describing a difference between φάσις and κατάφασις (not incidentally, this is the same distinction made in \textit{DA III}.6.430b26-31.\textsuperscript{143} As we move closer to our own discussion of \textit{logos}, it will be easier to appreciate the possibility that Wedin is hesitant to discuss the truth of images in terms of “assertion” (\textit{phasis}) and “affirmation” (\textit{kataphasis}) or, in Christopher Long and Richard Lee’s translation, “saying simply” (phasis) and “saying something about something” (kataphasis).\textsuperscript{144} Images, insofar as they can belong also to beasts without \textit{logos}, perhaps ought not to be discussed in terms of saying, be it simply or otherwise. And so, where Wedin in what follows discusses “first thoughts” instead of “images” we will silently acknowledge a difference and anticipate its further exploration in Chapter Five.

\textsuperscript{142} Polansky, \textit{Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary}, 429.

\textsuperscript{143} The use of \textit{phasis} and \textit{kataphasis} to illustrate the distinction is indeed curious, since the types of knowing that Aristotle is most clear about belonging to the contact theory of truth are precisely those in which predication is not involved. Consider, for instance, Kenneth Turnbull’s summary: “Evidently, proper sensation is analogous to νόησις because both involve immediate contact with their ‘objects.’ Just as νόησις involves no predication, i.e., no saying something of something, but rather is the soul’s pre-predicative contact with beings in their intelligible aspect, proper sensation does not involve any predication, but rather is the soul’s pre-predicative contact with beings in their sensible aspect, that is, with the sense-qualities of things.” Neither perception nor contemplation involve predication, though the potency of soul of “thinking things through, \textit{dianoia}, does. Kenneth Turnbull, “Aristotle on Imagination: De Anima lli 3,” \textit{Ancient Philosophy} 14 (1994): 324, fn.15, 324.

\textsuperscript{144} It is worth noting here, in advance of the fuller discussion in Chapter Five, that Wedin’s translations of \textit{phasis} and \textit{kataphasis} are the same as Joe Sachs’ translations… but reversed. Sachs translates \textit{phasis} as “affirmation” and \textit{kataphasis} as “assertion”. For this reason, the translations of Long and Lee are preferable. Christopher Long and Richard A. Lee, “Nous and Logos in Aristotle,” n.d.
To illustrate both the application of Aristotle’s dual senses of truth to the workings of *phantasia*, Wedin provides an example regarding daffodils. If one holds that “the flower in the vase is a daffodil,” he says, and expects it to be a true statement, there must be a correlation between what one is here claiming appears to be the case and what in fact is the case. This statement, insofar as it seeks to accurately combine what is said with what is seen, predicates one thing (the appearance) of another (the reality). It also, in claiming that the flower so seen is a daffodil, predicates that the flower is a daffodil. And so the combinatory theory of truth is very much at work in making such a statement. But Wedin points out that one “must already be acquainted with the thoughts” within the statement, and which the statement combines.¹⁴⁵ That is, the statement “the flower in the vase is a daffodil” depends on one knowing what “flower,” “vase,” “daffodil” (and, one supposes, “in”) are. Such knowing, this being “acquainted” with the uncombined thoughts, “is an all-or-nothing affair.”¹⁴⁶ One either is or is not “acquainted” with these uncombined, first thoughts; one has either touched them or failed to touch them. And so, there are “two ways we might override someone who falsely” makes this statement.¹⁴⁷ Firstly, we might “improve his local epistemic situation, perhaps, by turning on the light” so that he may engage his perception more accurately, hoping that what *appears* to the subject falls more in line with what is *perceived* by the subject. “But suppose,” he continues, that “after we have taken all reasonable measures, that our subject continues to assert” that the flower is a daffodil. Here we move away from the appearance of a daffodil being false (or, as with Polansky, “deceptive”), and towards the possibility that

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.
¹⁴⁷ Ibid.
the “first thought” the subject has of daffodils has not been grasped or touched, in which case “the question of his mistaking the flower for a daffodil,” or of his statement being false, “doesn’t arise because he is not even capable of such an error.”\textsuperscript{148} Put another way, “[i]n Aristotle’s terms, he has failed to hit the object at all”—it’s not that the first thought he has of the daffodil is “false,” but rather that he does not have the first thought of a daffodil at all.\textsuperscript{149} (It is precisely here, of course, that we must temporarily allow that the notion of truth that applies to images, if there is one, is more likely to be that which applies here to first thoughts, and not the propositional notion which seems to pertain to appearances.)

There is another point to Wedin’s example, though, beyond the one made about the truth of first thoughts. The broader argument within which that example is made is one intended to satisfy those who argue that Aristotle never wished to claim we contemplate “isolated” thoughts, or that we could contemplate “something without thinking anything about it,” and it hearkens back to the previous section of this chapter, regarding the difference between first thoughts and images.\textsuperscript{150} It was pointed out there that it may well be quite erroneous to suppose that Aristotle would distinguish between “higher” and “lower” universals simply because that suggests that the contemplation of the highest intelligible things occurs in some far-away realm, on the more properly Platonic ‘plains of truth.’ For Aristotle, the purely intelligible does not ‘come down’

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\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 131–132. \\
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 132. \\
\textsuperscript{150} “…the primary thoughts are the constituents of such assertions and the other thoughts will presumably be the combined thought or assertion itself… Some will feel uneasy about this interpretation of primary thoughts because it will appear to them to saddle Aristotle with what Lloyd (1981) has called “an enigma of Greek philosophy,” namely, nondiscursive thought. Sorabji (1982, 296-299) is typical in worrying about any thought that involves contemplating something without thinking anything about it.” Ibid., 130, 128.
\end{flushright}
from this realm to participate in the perceptible: the intelligible is always found within the perceptible (432a4-6). Thus, Wedin says that the “crucial point” about his daffodil example is that he is thereby “conjecturing” that “the acquaintance [with the first thoughts] occurs only in contexts” such as that of viewing a daffodil in a vase.”151 We only become “acquainted” with the first thoughts—and the images from which they are almost indistinguishable—by way of how a thing appears in a larger context. It is this “larger context” that now needs to be addressed.

Concluding Remarks
But before we turn to this “larger context,” let us first sum up what has been suggested about phantasmata in this chapter thus far. In short, while much here has been “suggested” about phantasmata, none of it pretends to be a definition. And since Aristotle himself tells us that “definitions are like conclusions,” one may well ask how this part of this chapter is titled “concluding remarks” (DA II.2.413a16). Consider the shifting terminology which we have used to grasp at phantasmata, the way in which “image” and “representation” have hovered, unsettled, as possible translations, while being loosely contrasted with “appearance” and “presentation”: certainly these remarks have not been “conclusive.” It is also true that the phantasma’s relationship to the aisthēma versus the noēma has not been clarified with any certainty, even though it seems certain that it is not a prōta noēma (though it still could be a representation of same). Because it is not a first thought, it is difficult to say with certainty whether truth can be said to apply to the phantasma, though it at least seems more than likely that truth applies to appearances, and in a different way if so. Nowhere in any of this is the sort of

151 Ibid., 131.
“defining statement” that not only “makes clear what something [the phantasma] is” but that also “includes and displays the cause” of the thing, here the phantasma, under investigation (DA II.2.413a13-15). It may be, though, that our work above has succeeded in naming some possible “attributes” of the phantasma, and if this is true, these attributes do “contribute in great part to knowing what [the phantasma] is, for it is when we are able to give an account of what is evident [ἀποδιδόςσιν κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν] about the properties [σθµβεβηκότων, attributes], either all or most of them, that we will be able to speak most aptly about the thinghood of the thing” (DA I.1.402b23-28). By working through the various ways in which “phantasma” appears in Aristotle, we have gained some ground.

But it is worth noting that the approach here has not at all been one that proceeds from set definitions to their eventual ramifications, but rather has the shape of what may be more recognizable as a “scientific” approach that works first to determine a “domain of facts to be explained,” and only then towards an explanation of those facts by positing a “theory whose main tenets are acceptable because of the theory’s explanatory power.”152 While we may have not yet moved to posit such a theory, that is the task of the rest of the project, and certainly whatever has been done in this chapter can be described as a presentation of facts or observations about phantasmata (and thus about phantasias) that stand in need of explanation. And so this quoted description seems to apply quite appropriately to what has been laid out here, though originally it was meant by Michael Wedin to apply to Aristotle’s own investigation of phantasias in DA III.3.

152 Ibid., 28.
Wedin points out that “[t]his is surely an unusual, if not unprecedented, modus operandi for Aristotle,” but he goes on to confirm that this is nonetheless his procedure in this chapter.\footnote{Ibid.} But then, Aristotle does tell us in the first chapter of the De Anima that there is a difference between “the one who studies nature and the logician,” and maintains that it is important to be clear about the best method for “approaching each particular thing” we seek to understand (403a29-30, 402a19). It seems more than possible that the best approach to use when studying the particular thing called phantasia, which itself appears responsible for the way things appear generally, would be the naturalist’s approach.

Polansky, for instance, observes that “in both his announcements of what phantasia is (428b14-16 and b30-429a2),” to which we turn in the next chapter, “Aristotle prominently and unusually uses optative forms.”\footnote{Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary, 430.} He also observes that optatives are used quite frequently in the rest of the chapter, as well (428a9-10, a23, b8, b29). He concludes, and we are in a position to agree with him, that these forms “may well suit phantasia, that it is spoken of in the mode of possibility. The reader seems invited to have some sort of phantasia of what phantasia might be.” Whether or not this invitation to better consider phantasia by means of experiencing phantasia is intentionally made by Aristotle or is endemic to the nature of phantasia itself is not clear. We will find, however, that this is not the only place in the De Anima in which we seem to ‘squint,’ to have difficulty making out the full outlines of just what is and what is not phantasia.

The comments of both Wedin and Polansky seem to resonate with what was argued in the last chapter regarding Aristotle’s phusike methodology. What we suggested
there was that the job of the naturalist (whom we today call the “scientist”) is not to move too quickly to isolate individual things, but rather to become acquainted with a “field”—a “larger context”—within which the space between such individual things can become better sensed, and then better described and explained. Polansky further illustrates that this is Aristotle’s approach in III.3 when he summarizes it thusly:

Aristotle has been establishing *that phantasia* is something by distinguishing it from the other cognitive faculties of soul and showing that *phantasia* occurs both when these other faculties are operating and when they are not. This exhibition has cleared the way for attention to *what phantasia* is while already offering useful hints about what it is.  

The naturalist, it could be said, attends closely to the way those sorts of beings called things—whether external or internal, perceptible or intelligible—appear amongst other things, or, in Polansky’s words, attends to the fact *that* something is. Thus it is that the naturalist is described by Randall as attending to a thing not as it “can be said to be,” but rather as it is in its “genesis and operation” amongst other things, how it is seen “co-operating with other things in the world of natural processes.” More than this, it seems also likely that we could describe the naturalist as being preeminently concerned with those *sorts* of things that “seem most of all to be independent things,” those things that are τὸδε τι in an exemplary way because they have the sort of *entelecheia* that is soul. This remains to be seen. But in finding space and differentiation between the *phantasma* and *phantasiai*, between *phantasma* and *aisthēma* and *noēma*, and between *phantasia* and *alētheia* and *pseudos*, we are attempting to establish the field in which the *phantasma* achieves “genesis,” and thus how *phantasia* “operates.” In short, what is being attempted here is an effort to pay attention to the way a thing that is “a *this,*” – the *phantasma*—

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155 Ibid., 424.
appears with hopes that we are perceiving it accurately enough for it to result in our understanding the way in which it “can be said to be.” Thus far, however, we have only identified the “larger context” of “things” surrounding the phantasma. It remains for us to consider the way in which the phantasma interacts with these things “in the world of natural processes,” to attend not just to the spaces between the phantasma and the things that surround it, but to the way those things are animated and moved in the phantasma’s “genesis and operation.” In short, what is missing from our investigation thus far is a theory of motion and interaction.
Chapter Three: The Appearing of *Phantasia*

**What Sort of Thing Is Phantasia?,** page 88

**Phantasia as Dunamis,** page 94

**Kinēsis, Dunamis, Hexis: De Anima II.5,** page 112

The careful reader will have likely noted that while Chapter One prepared us for an examination of *entelecheia* as a pathway to *phantasia*, the focus of Chapter Two was *phantasmata*, and not *entelecheia*. Far from being an oversight, this choice of focus was meant to be illustrative of Aristotle’s own methodology, as was already noted, but also of the way something that is being-at-work-being-itself acts on the soul of she who is receptive of it. In other words: by giving our questioning attention to the intelligible thing named by “*phantasma*,” it became more distinct from the other intelligible things with which it is associated: the *entelecheia* of it began to emerge. As we paid attention to *phantasma* “co-operating with other things in the world of natural processes,”\(^{157}\) the *entelecheia* of the *phantasma* of “*phantasma*” began to work in us. At first, it only made appearances—or, recalling the observations on the differences between external and internal things at the end of Chapter One—‘appearances.’ It began to differentiate itself, coincidentally, from another intelligible thing that we translated—loosely—as “appearance,” *phainetai*. We are in a better position now to discuss this “loose” translation of a third-person, singular verb as a noun. Through its ‘appearances,’ those times when *phantasma* only suggested it was there and was more a verb with a

\(^{157}\) Ibid.
questionable subject to us than a noun, the “it” of “it appears” began to settle down into an image of something, into a phantasma (or more exactly, the phantasma of “phantasma”). It showed itself to be an independent thing that we can call a this—a tode ti. The naturalist is open to encountering a thing by first being attentive to the way in which that thing makes appearances. Seeing tracks in mud, or tufts of fur, or bushes moving is not the same thing as seeing the animal itself, but it is a good start.158 The naturalist starts with the appearances of a thing, the “things that follow from its thinghood,” says Aristotle, for

those properties that follow contribute in great part to knowing what the thing is, for it is when we are able to give an account [ἀποδίδοναι] of what is evident about the properties, either all or most of them, that we will also be able to speak most aptly about the thinghood of the thing. (DA I.1, 402b16-25)

When one is not at first sure of what one sees—or, in the language of Chapter One, ‘sees’—one relies on whatever evidence suggests that there is some ‘thing’ in fact ‘there.’ The naturalist/scientist, before he can say something definite has appeared, one must first find evidence—often indirect evidence—that appearing is beginning to happen. The thing in question makes itself known by affecting the operation of the things around it. It appears, and as it appears, it appears as what it is, which then allows us to call it by name. By being attentive to and receptive of a set of seemingly related appearances, Aristotle encounters the phantasma of “phantasma.” He experiences it moving from being some unknown “it” to something have tode ti, and moving from being an image into being a named thing, “phantasma.” Its movement from simply appearing to appearing to be what

158 Cf. Frede’s assessment of DA III.3: “What surprises one more than these inconsistencies (which can partly be resolved and partly brushed aside as mere negligence) is the fact that Aristotle uses so many arguments from indirect evidence: that is to say, that he spends so much time to point out what sense-perception, phantasia, and thought do not have in common rather than distinguishing them by their specific objects. That is what one would have expected after his careful description of the senses and his insistence that the object defines the faculty in book 2.” Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” 281.
it is, to become a *phantasma*, and its movement to then be named, is the movement of *phantasia*.

*Phantasia* as “appearance” makes an appearance itself in the passage from *DA* I.1 above: when we are able to “give an account” (and again, the Greek word here is “ἀποδιδόναι”) according to [*κατὰ*] what is evident [*τὴν φαντασίαν*], according to the appearances of a thing, “either all or most of them,” only then are we able to “speak most aptly about the thinghood of the thing” beginning to appear.¹⁵⁹ *Phantasia* is the “acting” of this *entelecheia* of things on our souls; it is the motion by which the *entelecheia* of a thing, be it perceptible or intelligible, works to come to presence for us. By approaching *phantasia* by way of the *phantasma*, then, we have in fact approached *phantasia* by way of *entelecheia*. Our central passage suggests that “phantasia is that by which we speak of some image as becoming present to us” (428a1). Sachs’ formulation captures Aristotle’s ambiguity well: *phantasia* is “that.” Apostle includes a footnote to his own, similar translation, saying, “the meaning of “that” is left open; for the category under which imagination comes is yet to be ascertained. Imagination may be a potentiality [*dunamis*] or a disposition [*hexis*] or something else.”¹⁶⁰ Neither scholar names it as a power of the embodied soul¹⁶¹—as a *dunamis* or a *hexis* of the soul—but this marks their translations/commentaries as unique: most others ultimately interpret it that way.

¹⁵⁹ For more about ἀποδιδόμει, see footnote 41.
¹⁶⁰ Aristotle and H. G. Apostle, *Aristotle’s on the Soul* (Peripatetic Pr, 1981), 47, fn.17; Hicks is one translator who does not preserve such ambiguity: “If, then, imagination is the *faculty* in virtue of which we say that an image presents itself to us.” (Emphasis mine). Aristotle and Hicks, *De Anima* (Cambridge University Press, 1907), 125, http://archive.org/details/aristotledeanima005947mbp.
¹⁶¹ See Chapter One, page 32, for more about the “embodied soul.”
What Sort of Thing Is *Phantasia*?

As we saw in Chapter One, Aristotle is insistent at the beginning of the *De Anima* that one must choose one’s method of approaching a given topic carefully, as “different studies have different starting points” (402a24). In making such a decision it is first “necessary to decide in which general class” the topic being studied is:

whether it is an independent thing and a *this*, or a quality or quantity or some other one of the distinct ways of attributing being to anything, and further whether it belongs among things having being in potency [*dunamis*] or is rather some sort of being-at-work-staying-itself; for this makes no small difference. (*DA* I.1 402a26-402b)

What this means is that instead of proceeding by asking, “what is *phantasia*?” it is prudent to ask, “in which general class” is *phantasia*? If we begin again with our central passage, we find Aristotle asking much the same question, and the answer is not a foregone conclusion, even if the secondary literature seems frequently to suggest that it is.

In 428a1-4, after Aristotle has clarified that he is going to discuss the *phantasia* according to which *phantasmata* become present to us, he then goes on to ask whether such a *phantasia* may be either a certain *dunamis* or a *hexis*.

Now if imagination is that by which we speak of some image as becoming present to us, rather than anything we might call imagination in a metaphorical way, is it [*áφα*] some one among those potencies [*dunameis*] or active states [*hexeis*] by which we discriminate something and are either right or wrong? Of this sort are perception, opinion, knowledge, and the contemplative intellect. (428a1-4)

This passage, while highly suggestive, is anything but straightforward; what follows is a list of three significantly difficult issues regarding its interpretation. Firstly, it opens with a simple conditional construction, through which Aristotle excuses himself from attesting to the truth of what is said. Secondly, the apodosis of this conditional may or may not be
a question, depending on whether one accepts the emendation of ἄρα at 428a3 that dates back at least to 1956.\(^\text{162}\) This emendation has been fairly contentious, but it seems wise to include it as it makes the scope of the statement wider, changing it from how phantasia may be a sort of thing by which we discriminate truly or falsely (a dunamis or hexis), to whether it is such.\(^\text{163}\) After all, we saw in the last chapter that phantasia’s relationship to truth and falsity seems so unclear elsewhere. While we did get as far as to say that a phantasma may indeed be true (according to what we called there the contact theory of truth), and that an appearance may very well be false (according to the more usual combinatory theory of truth), we will be careful not to claim that phantasia itself is responsible for such discrimination without further argumentation. It seems safer to preserve the possibility that phantasia may not be the sort of thing “in virtue of which we judge.” But this opens up a third difficulty: If we accept the emendation of ἄρα, we must accept that phantasia may be (i) a discriminatory dunamis or a hexis, such as “perception, opinion, knowledge, and the contemplative intellect” are… and that it may be (ii) something entirely other than these, as we heard Apostle suggest above. On the one hand, it may be (ii.a) some sort of non-discriminating dunamis or hexis; on the other, it

\(^{162}\) This emendation is noted by Wedin to be at least as old as Smith’s Oxford translation (1956), and is also made by Ross in the Oxford 1961 translation. Its inclusion makes it easier to consider, contra Hicks (1907) that phantasia is neither ἄρα δύναμις ἢ ἕξις, a point central to Wedin’s argument. Even so, Wedin himself does not adopt the emendation, claiming that his argument, which centers on phantasia being an “incomplete faculty,” and thus not a faculty at all, does not depend on its inclusion. Instead, he (like Polansky and K. White) decides it is enough to take “dunamis” broadly: it can perhaps point to a non-discriminatory dunamis, as we go on to discuss above. Aristotle and J.A. Smith, “On the Soul, from ‘Aristotle: The Complete Works,’” in *Intelex Past Masters*, 2nd ed., vol. 1, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1956), http://pm.nlx.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/xtf/view?docId=aristotle/aristotle.01.xml;chunk.id=div.aristotle.e.v1.51;loc.id=div.aristotle.e.v1.51;brand=default; Aristotle and William David Ross, *De Anima. Edited, with Introduction and Commentary, by Sir David Ross* (Oxford, 1961); Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, 47, fnn. 29–30.

\(^{163}\) Hicks’ translation, which does not include the emendation, is as follows: “If, then, imagination is the faculty in virtue of which we say that an image presents itself to us, and if we exclude the metaphorical use of the term, it is some one of the faculties or habits in virtue of which we judge, and judge truly or falsely. Such faculties or habits are sensation, opinion, knowledge, intellect.” Aristotle and Hicks, *De Anima*, 125.
may be (ii.b) something entirely other than a *dunamis* or *hexis*, discriminatory or otherwise.

As to (i)—that *phantasia* may be a discriminatory *dunamis* or *hexis*—we can at least say that it is not identical to any of the four examples given ("perception, opinion, knowledge, and the contemplative intellect"). This much seems clear from Aristotle’s analysis in lines 428a5-428b9: “But that imagination is not perception is clear from the following arguments…” (428a5); also, “certainly imagination would not be any of the things that are always truthful, such as knowledge or the contemplative intellect,” (428a18). Lastly, he concludes that “imagination could not be opinion along with sense perception, nor by way of sense perception, nor an intertwining of opinion and sense perception… imagination is neither one of these things, nor anything made out of both” (428a25-26, 428b9). Could it be, then, its own discriminatory *dunamis* or *hexis*? Possibly. And as we shall see, this seems to be what the majority of commentators conclude. One of these commentators, Christopher Long, is unique among those considered here insofar as he discusses *phantasia* as a *hexis*. He calls it a “δύναμις or, indeed, ἔξις according to which we discern.”

We will be in a better position to explore this possibility after we have had a chance to say more fully what distinguishes a *dunamis* from a *hexis*: here, it is helpful simply to note that with his “indeed,” Long indicates that a *hexis* is a certain sort or state of a *dunamis*. Our reading of *DA* II.5 will bear this out, but until we have completed that reading, there is no harm in taking “*dunamis*” to include

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165 We will also be in a position to better understand just how Long’s account of *phantasia* is unique after we have reviewed several other accounts, at the end of Chapter Four.
the possibility of the more specialized *hexit* as well, so long as we are careful to note places in which this is problematic.

What, then, of the possibility (ii.a) that *phantasia* is some sort of non-discriminatory *dunamis*? By II.3, Aristotle has determined that the soul is that which has at least one of the following *dunameis*: nutritive/generative, perceptive, appetitive/locomotive, and intellective (414a29-33). Aristotle definitely refers to the ability of the soul to change food into nourishment and to beget offspring as a *dunamis*, but certainly he would never claim that it is “some one among those potencies or active states by which we discriminate something and are either right or wrong” (428a3). The nutritive potency is *not* a discriminatory potency. Could *phantasia* be a *dunamis* and yet not be a discriminatory *dunamis*? Kevin White, for instance, suggests that “phantasia, as the power whereby sensation is capable of generating a likeness of itself which survives it, might be likened to a *reproductive faculty*: through it, the momentary, stillborn life of sensations is perpetuated in their off-spring.”

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166 It would be worthwhile to better examine why, in the case of the nutritive/generative and appetitive/locomotive potencies, the names are not simple and straightforward as in the case of the perceptive [*αἴσθητικόν*] and intellective [*διανοητικόν*] potencies. On the one hand, Aristotle sometimes refers to the appetitive [*ὀρεκτικόν*] potency as distinct from the locomotive [*κινητικόν*] potency, and yet treats of them in III.10-11 as the same potency (see, for example, 414a32, where they are listed separately, versus III.10 433a31-433b1, where they are clearly so intertwined as to be part of the same potency). On the other, he consistently refers to the nutritive [*θρεπτικόν*] potency by that name, but treats of it in II.4 as two-fold: “But since the same potency of the soul leads to both nutrition and begetting it is necessary first to make distinctions about nourishment, since this potency is set apart from the others by this work…” (416a19-20). As we do not have the room for this ancillary project here, we follow Sachs (and most others) in identifying the four potencies of soul as nutritive, perceptive, locomotive, and intellective (by which we mean “thinking things through” or *διάνοια*, as distinct from the contemplative.)

discriminatory *dunamis*? Polansky, for example, claims that *phantasia* “is presentational or representational rather than discriminating or evaluative.”\(^{168}\)

It seems likely that it is neither of these given what Aristotle says in *DA* III.9. There, he summarizes the parts of the soul that have been discussed thus far in his treatise. He lists “the nutritive part, which belongs both to the plants and to all animals, and the perceptive part,” and this list echoes the two *dunameis* and the order in which they are addressed in Book II and the beginning of Book III. He then lists “the imaginative part,” and this too seems to remind us that directly as he was done discussing the perceptive *dunamis*, he then turns to the imagination in III.3. But here he stops to clarify that this last part, “in its being is different from all the rest, though whether it *is* the same or different from any of them is a major impasse, if one is going to set down the parts of the soul as separate…” (*DA* III.9 432a29-432b2). Its being is different than the two *dunameis* listed first. Given that the list contains one clearly non-discriminatory *dunamis* and one clearly discriminatory *dunamis*, it is very likely neither, leaving us to explore more thoroughly option (ii.b).

If *phantasia* is not a *dunamis*, discriminatory or otherwise, what is it? Luckily, III.3 presents another way of approaching the sort of thing *phantasia* is. After Aristotle has dismissed the possibility that, at the very least, *phantasia* is none of the four discriminatory *dunameis* listed at 428a4, he finally gives us a positive indication of what

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phantasia may in fact be. The important passage at 428b10-15, which Wedin calls the “core of the canonical theory of φαντασία,”\textsuperscript{169} reads:

But since it is possible when one thing is moved for another thing to be moved by it, while phantasia seems to be some sort of motion [κίνησίς τις] and not to occur [γίγνεσθαι] without perception, but in beings that perceive and about things of which there is perception, and since it is possible for a motion to come about [γίγνεσθαι] as the result of the being-at-work [ἐνεργεία] of sense perception, and necessary for it to be similar to the perception, then this motion would be neither possible without perception nor present in beings that do not perceive… (DA III.3 428b10-15)

This suggestion of what phantasia “seems to be” is then asserted forthrightly—or at least asserted more forthrightly (both passages use the optative mood, as we heard Polansky observe above)\textsuperscript{170}—in the chapter’s conclusion:

If, then, it is nothing other than phantasia that has the attributes mentioned (and this is what was being claimed), phantasia would be a motion coming about as a result of the being-at-work of sense perception, and corresponding to it. (DA III.3 429a1-3)

While it is true that this supposed “canonical theory” lacks the sort of assertion one would hope for, it is also true that these optative-mood suggestions of what phantasia “seems to be”—κίνησίς τις—appear in the text just where we would expect Aristotle to say more conclusively that phantasia is a certain dunamis or a hexis, had he meant to say so. Aristotle has, in our central passage, specifically inquired as to phantasia’s status as a dunamis and/or hexis, and in conclusion, refers to it as neither, opting instead for the considerably broader description “κίνησίς τις.” It seems likely that phantasia—at least the non-metaphoric phantasia “by which we speak of some image as becoming present to us”—is this sort of thing, a kinēsis.

\textsuperscript{169} Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 24.
\textsuperscript{170} See page 81 at the end of Chapter Two.
Phantasia as Dunamis

Certainly no account of phantasia in DA III.3 overlooks this twice-suggested possibility. It is that much more surprising, then, that so many commentators consistently refer to phantasia as a *dunamis/hexis* instead of as a *kinēsis*. Those who assume that *phantasia* is a *dunamis* are many, and in good company. Martha Nussbaum is one such commentator, referring throughout her essay on *phantasia* to the “faculty of *phantasia*.” Dorothea Frede is clear that *phantasia* seems to do “triple duty,” referring to “the capacity, the activity or process, and the product or result,” but ultimately addresses *phantasia* as a capacity. Victor Caston calls *phantasia* a “capacity” that is “distinct from sensation and conception,” which seems to indicate his placement in this group as well. Moreover, each of these seems to mean that *phantasia* is a *dunamis* in the stricter, discriminatory sense, as they go on to discuss *phantasia* with regards to truth, falsity, and interpretation. And similar remarks are made by a handful of other authors of briefer accounts of Aristotelian *phantasia*. But we can also add to this group Ronald Polansky and Kevin White, whom we heard above suggesting that *phantasia* is a faculty while clarifying that it is not a “critical and discriminative” faculty, but is rather a faculty

172 That this is her conclusion is clear from the following, whereby she holds up *phantasia* against the tripartite division of the various senses into potency/activity/object that we will explore in what follows. “Throughout his psychological writings [Aristotle] not only distinguishes very carefully between capacity, activity, and product, but in the case of *phantasia* he also often switches to *phantasma* to designate the product, and occasionally uses *phantastikon* for the capacity (432a31).” “Occasionally” here is rather an overstatement. The word appears once, as she cites, in the *De Anima*, and once again at *Insomn.*, 459a17. The word’s rarity contributes to Wedin’s persuasive argument that *phantasia* is not to be considered a faculty. Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” 279, 280.
of “presentation and representation” (Polansky) or of “reproduction” (White); neither author points us to a place in Aristotle that makes such a distinction in a clear way.¹⁷⁴

One wonders if these more contemporary thinkers are predisposed to consider phantasia as a faculty insofar as they have not heeded the various cautionary statements in the secondary literature that we not think of phantasia as “imagination.” For who among us doesn’t first think of a certain ability or capacity of the soul or mind when they hear “imagination”? Even so, each of these more contemporary thinkers is following a well-established historical precedent: Hicks called phantasia a faculty in his sizeable 1907 commentary on and translation of the De Anima,¹⁷⁵ as did Beare, a year earlier.¹⁷⁶ But one can go back further, finding in one of the early commentaries on the De Anima a rather extensive argument for the reasons why phantasia should be considered a “cognitive faculty;” the commentary commonly (but perhaps problematically) attributed to Simplicius from the fifth or sixth century AD tries to argue that just as the various subcategories of perception have their particular objects, so too does phantasia have a particular object in the phantasma.¹⁷⁷ (The core of Wedin’s argument for phantasia’s status as an “incomplete faculty,” incidentally, is to counter this claim. We will more fully examine his argument in what follows.)¹⁷⁸ Likely the fact that Aquinas had struggled with this designation, and yet decided to use it anyway, was of some consequence for many of these thinkers; many of them demonstrate something of the

¹⁷⁴ See footnotes 167 and 168.
¹⁷⁵ Aristotle and Hicks, De Anima, 461.
¹⁷⁶ Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle, 296.
¹⁷⁸ Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 59–63.
same hesitation. Just as Aquinas admits that “Aristotle does not establish” whether
phantasia is clearly a separate “potentia,” he nonetheless determines that it “seems
necessary for there to be a phantasm-producing (phantastica) or imaginative potentia,” so too do many (but not all) of the above thinkers temper their designation of phantasia as a dunamis. For example, Nussbaum makes a (single, parenthetical) allowance that phantasia may not be a faculty at all, but rather a “special aspect of the faculty of
perception” (though ultimately this allowance seems to make little difference to her larger
treatment of phantasia as the power of soul in which “an animal becomes aware of its
object of desire.”) Beare’s caveat is similar to that of Frede’s, seen above, in that he
seems to wish to cover his bases by calling phantasia “[t]he faculty, and sometimes the
process, by which φαντάσματα arise.” We will argue that this allowance for “process”
begins to lead us in a more productive direction.

Hesitations aside, the pull to consider phantasia as a dunamis is obviously a
pronounced one. Where might it come from? The substantial historical precedent for
calling phantasia a dunamis is almost certainly due, at least in part, to the fact that the
eмendation of the question word ἄρα in our central passage did not appear until 1956.
Without ἄρα, it would be difficult to consider the possibility that phantasia is something
other than a discriminatory dunamis or hexis. However, we observed in Chapter Two
that phantasia’s relationship to truth and falsity by itself is enough to call phantasia’s

180 Ibid., 339.
181 Aristotle and Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, 241. C.f. 234-235, where Nussbaum carefully
attends to Aristotle’s remark at DA432a31 that “the being (the einai) of phantasia is different from the
being of any other faculty, but that phantasia might still be “the same as” some other faculty,” and the way
in which it correlates with Insomn. 459a15, where that other faculty appears to be aisthēsis.
182 Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle, 295.
status as at least a discriminatory *dunamis* into question. In the balance of this chapter, we will consider three other reasons why reading *phantasia* as a *dunamis* is, while widespread, nonetheless misleading. The first pertains to the twisted path that “*dunamis*” has taken through translations over time; the second, to the structure of the *De Anima*, which can easily contribute to such a misreading: it is tempting to read *phantasia* as yet another in a litany of *dunameis* of the soul, even though doing so eventuates in the widespread complaint that III.3 seems to interrupt the larger structure of the treatise.¹⁸³ But perhaps more convincing than either of these reasons that *phantasia* has so frequently been identified as a *dunamis* is the intricacy of the connections between Aristotelian *kinēsis*, *dunamis*, and *hexis*: by calling *phantasia* a *dunamis*, for example, one is not necessarily denying that *phantasia* is a *kinēsis*, even if one is being needlessly misleading—a *kinēsis* could be said to “belong” to some (though not all) *dunameis*. (And, for that matter, by calling it a *dunamis* one is not necessarily denying that it is a *hexis*, as we heard above.) In the rest of this section, we review some of the accounts that have called *phantasia* a *dunamis* both to better establish the prevalence of and reasons for this labeling and to say more explicitly why calling *phantasia* a *dunamis* is misleading. This will prepare us for the final section of this chapter, an examination of *De Anima* II.5, in which Aristotle discusses the distinctions between a *kinēsis*, a *dunamis*, and a *hexis*.

And so firstly, a very brief word about the very long history of *dunamis* in translation is warranted. Here we rely on the introductory remarks of both Robert Pasnau, a contemporary translator of Aquinas’ commentary on the *De Anima*, and of

¹⁸³ Recall that this is the first of the three most common groups of complaints summarized at the outset of Chapter One (see page 3).
Sachs, who is unapologetic about his disregard for the central concern of “the usual translations of Aristotle” which he names as the desire to preserve “a continuity of tradition.”\textsuperscript{184} Such “continuity” largely entails recognizing the wanderings of Aristotle’s texts through the hands of translators and commentators of medieval Western Europe, which is to say, through (often inattentive) Latin translation in general, and through Aquinas’ texts in particular. Many scholars in medieval Western Europe did not read Greek, but instead depended on Latin translations; Aquinas was one of those. These translations were not considered, of themselves, to be philosophical but rather technical undertakings: the task was to find Latin equivalents for Greek words while maintaining the Greek word order. Thus Aquinas’ “commentary” on the De Anima is not a commentary in the current sense: it does not raise philosophical questions about the text and then try to answer them. It is instead a more “literal commentary,” aimed at simply untangling the unnatural word order. As a result, we can expect that Aquinas’ (and most other medieval readers of Aristotle’s) attention would not have been on the nuances of the Greek words, but rather on simply deciphering the word order into something more natural and meaningful.

Thus it is that when one reads “potentia” in Aquinas’ commentary on, say, the De Anima, one is not reading Aquinas’ chosen translation of dunamis, but instead is reading William of Moerbeke’s chosen translation of same. For Moerbeke first translated the Greek text into Latin words, and then Aquinas picked it up and did his best to make the

\textsuperscript{184} In fact, he goes beyond disregarding such continuity, and seeks instead in his translations to avoid their Latinate history and so far towards the Greek in both vocabulary and syntax that the result, by his own admission, “could be called Gringlish” (9). Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Physics, 5.
text itself make sense. The case of using “potentia” to capture “dunamis” illustrates very well the incremental slippage that can easily happen between the Greek text and a translation when not enough attention is given to the nuances of the original words.

“Potentia,” which is derived from the present active participle of “possum,” “I am able,” has been most often translated into English as “potentiality,” “faculty,” “ability,” or “capacity,” no doubt with respect to its own provenance as a Latin word, and not with respect to its status as a (poor) substitute for a Greek one. The sense all of these translations share with each other and their Latinate parent is the sense Sachs hopes to avoid in choosing to translate dunamis as “potency” instead. The difference is subtle, but significant.

According to Sachs, “potency” seeks to capture how dunamis is “the way of being of material,” while potentiality (and, I argue, “faculty,” “ability,” and “capacity” as well) “might suggest mere indeterminacy or logical possibility, which is never the sense in which Aristotle uses it.” A potency is not mere possibility, but instead is “the innate tendency of anything to be at work in ways characteristic of the kind of thing it is,” which “will always emerge into activity, when the proper conditions are present and nothing prevents it.”

“My being consists of material and form,” summarizes Sachs, or of “an

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185 “Until very recently it was believed that Aquinas commissioned this revision directly from Moerbeke, a fellow Dominican. Scholars imagined that Aquinas and Moerbeke must have worked in close collaboration, with Moerbeke providing new or revised translations—and even offering notes on the Greek—to fill Aquinas’s scholarly needs. New research has established beyond any doubt that the image of these two men working closely together is but a fiction.” Aquinas, A Commentary on Aristotle’s “De Anima,” xv.

186 Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Physics, 21.

187 Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 199.
inner striving spilling over into an outward activity.”¹⁸⁸ This “spilling,” this “innate tendency … to be at work” is not in the least captured by “potentiality,” “faculty,” “ability,” and “capacity.” To be sure, the idea of some possibility \( X \) underlies all of these, and potency too. But while “potentiality” only suggests “able to \( X \),” “potency” declares “must do \( X \)” “Potentiality,” “faculty,” “ability,” and “capacity” lack the sort of dynamic forcefulness that “potency” captures. *Dunamis*, as the way of being of material, is dynamic.

“Faculty” and the rest not only lack that dynamic aspect; there is another way in which they are misleading as translations of *dunamis*. When one hears “faculty,” “capacity,” or “ability,” doesn’t one automatically hear “ability or capacity of the soul?” Would we speak of, say, the potter’s clay as having a “faculty,” “ability,” or “capacity” for being formed into a pot? Granted, we might say it has a “potentiality” to be crafted in such a way. And in those places in Aristotle’s texts that describe the *dunamis* of things we more readily recognize as material, I suspect the same translators that speak of a “faculty” of the soul will speak of the “potentiality” of the clay. Thus “faculty,” “capacity, and “ability” already tend to imply “of the soul” as part of their meaning. This would make Aristotle’s usual description of nutrition, perception, intellecction and locomotion as “*dunameis* of the soul” translate as “capacities of the soul of the soul.”

Surely this is ridiculous. But the point is that by the time one wonders what it means for *phantasia* to be a “faculty” in the way, say, perception is a “faculty” one has already presupposed that *phantasia* as a *dunamis* means *phantasia* is a *dunamis of the embodied

soul; we have already passed by the possibility that phantasia could belong more properly to something outside of the embodied soul. What if, though, phantasia could more aptly be described as a dunamis of all soul? Here, we are only in the position to raise such a possibility, though it will be considered in what follows.

A second reason that so many describe phantasia as a faculty: Could it be that the very structure of the De Anima seems to prepare the reader to make such an assumption? The comments of both Dorothea Frede and ‘Simplicius’ would seem to suggest as much forthrightly. Again, as we observed above, Aristotle has very tidily set a specific order to his investigation in the De Anima in II.3 and II.4 by not only naming four dunameis belonging to the embodied soul, but by clarifying that these should be approached in a specific way. By II.3, Aristotle has determined that the soul is that which has at least one of the following potencies/faculties: nutritive, perceptive, appetitive/locomotive, and thinking things through (414a29-33). He opens the next chapter (II.4) by saying:

The one who is going to make an inquiry about these potencies must necessarily get hold of what each of them is, and then inquire on in this way about what has directly to do with them and the other things about them. (DA II.4 415a14-17)

And yet he warns that it would be foolish to try to “get hold of” what each is as a potency, “for in an account, activities and actions come before the potencies for them” (415a18). And “even before that one needs to have examined the objects of them [ἀντικείµενα], needing first, for the same reason, to mark out what concerns, say, food, or the thing perceived, or the thing thought” (415a21-22). He sets out, then, to clarify the objects of each of the activities so that he can begin to understand the potencies for each

189 This participle expresses something like “the corresponding things,” and should be heard differently from “οἱτία” (Sachs: “cause”), which would invite one to question which of the four kinds of cause or responsibility (material, formal, efficient, final) are at work.
of these activities. The objects must be considered first: nutritive things, perceptible things, thinkable/intelligible things, and appetitive things. These “corresponding things” [ἀντικείμενα] act upon each corresponding dunamis, allowing that dunamis to “spill over into an outward activity.” So Aristotle spends a chapter (II.4) considering food and nutrition, and, finally, the nutritive potency. Similarly, Book II, chapter 5 begins the conversation about perceptible things, focusing on each of the five senses in separate chapters. This task ends in III.2, the chapter before III.3, with the remark, “So let the source by which we say that an animal has the power of perception be marked out in this way” (427a17).

His approach is so organized, in fact, that it is easy to conceive of a table that neatly lays out the relations he is here proposing, and at least one commentator has, it happens, done precisely that. Table III.1 is taken from Ronald Polansky’s commentary on the De Anima.
Table III.1: Polansky’s Summary of Soul’s “Capacities and Subcapacities”
(Source: Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary, page 10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity and Subcapacities</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Organ</th>
<th>Operation(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nutritive</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td></td>
<td>Heat (pneuma)</td>
<td>Nourishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth, decline</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Growing, declining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life, maintenance</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reproduction</td>
<td>Seed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Heat, form</td>
<td>Reproducing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitive</td>
<td>Visible</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sense organ/sensible form</td>
<td>Sense-perceiving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sight</td>
<td>Audible</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ear</td>
<td>Hearing</td>
</tr>
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<td>Smell</td>
<td>Odor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nose</td>
<td>Smelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taste</td>
<td>Flavor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inner organ (heart)</td>
<td>Tasting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Touch</td>
<td>Tangible</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inner organ (heart)</td>
<td>Touching</td>
</tr>
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<td>Phantasia</td>
<td>Phantasma, sensible</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sense organs</td>
<td>Presentation in many operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellecutive</td>
<td>Intelligible</td>
<td>Agent intellect, phantasma</td>
<td>[Knowledge/intelligible form]</td>
<td>Thinking</td>
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<td>Essence</td>
<td>[&quot;]</td>
<td>[&quot;]</td>
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<td>Mathematical</td>
<td>Abstractions</td>
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<td>[&quot;]</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical</td>
<td>Goods</td>
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<td>[&quot;]</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotive</td>
<td>Desirable</td>
<td>Desire, phantasma</td>
<td>Connate pneuma, joints</td>
<td>Voluntary motions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appetite</td>
<td>Pleasant</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritedness</td>
<td>Incitement</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wish</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Desire, practical thought</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is significant here in two chief ways: firstly, because it (along with Table I.1, Blair’s table in Chapter One) testifies to what we will argue is a persistent tendency in Aristotle’s works to proceed in his logoi as though describing an absent organizing table or diagram. (In fact, in Chapter Six we will observe that on occasion such a table or diagram is not absent, but appears in the manuscripts themselves.) But, more to the point for the current discussion, this table also testifies to the difficulties in numbering phantasia amongst the various dunameis of the soul. Note, for example, that in Polansky’s table the description of the “Operation(s)” of phantasia is markedly different from that of the other listed dunameis, and in fact is the sole reason Polansky was moved to include the parenthetical “s” for the title of this column (having “presentation in many
operations”). Also, note that the cell that is supposed to name the “Medium” of phantasia is simply empty.\textsuperscript{190}

Such troubling failures of phantasia to square up with the other dunameis of the embodied soul detailed in the De Anima lead Michael Wedin to name phantasia an “incomplete faculty,” and to do so based on a comparison between its “ingredients” and those of perception (which we may safely consider a dunamis par excellence given the

\textsuperscript{190} As we shall articulate in Chapter Five, this could be due to the fact that Aristotle compares phantasia itself to the medium of the transparent being moved by activity of light—a comparison made all the more striking since, two chapters later in III.5, he will again use the activity of the medium of the transparent as an illustration, but this time of nous poiētikos. The nature of the medium, then, is of significant importance to the nature of phantasia. Stating fully the way in which it is so is not undertaken here, though it seems that two different but almost certainly related approaches would be helpful. On the one hand, situating both mediums generally and phantasia in particular with regards to the possibility of human self-knowledge would be interesting, as we noted in footnote 55. To further substantiate the statement made there, that, “a unified Aristotelian phantasia may well give us the language with which to discuss something like an Aristotelian “self,” if even briefly, I offer the following: Velkley, again writing about Benardete’s two essays on Aristotle, observes that “[j]ust as the De Anima essay approaches self-thinking mind, and therewith being, through the double nature of phantasia, the Metaphysics essay approaches mind and being through the double nature of knowledge. Each essay reflects on the feature of otherness to itself, or duality, that mind must have in order to be self-knowing” (189). And since, as Joseph Owens observes, “Aristotle’s epistemology allows no direct self-knowledge to the human cognitive agent,” and that consequently “[h]uman cognition is always directly of something else,” “always takes place on the model of its basic object, namely external sensible things,” it is likely that the importance of the structure of perception to understanding the Aristotelian nascent conception of self cannot be overstated (707). (It should be noted, though, that the structure of the potency of nutrition ought also to be considered, particularly since, as Polansky’s table makes plain, it lacks an obvious medium just as phantasia does.) In a consideration of phantasia as a medium, the recent essay of Christopher Long’s regarding the primacy of touch amongst the other senses and its more significantly complicated relationship to a medium is certain to be helpful. In identifying “a decisive but subtle shift” in Aristotle’s treatment of a sensory medium when it comes to touch, which leaves off discussing the medium appropriate to touch as a medium [τὸ μεταξύ], and begins instead to consider it as a mean [τὸ μέσον], Long’s essay also locates a connection to the second approach in which an analysis of phantasia’s relationship to or identification as a sort of medium could be undertaken (84). This second approach pertains to the relationship between phantasia and the common sense, which is described in DA III.1 and 2 and summarized in DA III.7: “Being pleased or pained is the being-active of the mean state in the perceptive part, in relation to the good or bad as such…” (431a10-12). The shift from medium to mean, Long observes, “enables Aristotle to bring the nature of perceiving to language in relational rather than material terms,” and insofar as the common sense deals only in relational terms, and is perhaps itself best understood as a mean, there is certainly more to be said here (88). We will have more to say about the possible relationship between phantasia, common sense, and Aristotelian selfhood in Chapter Five. Velkley, “Prelude to First Philosophy: Seth Benardete on De Anima”; Owens, “The Self in Aristotle”; Christopher P. Long, “On Touch and Life in the De Anima,” in Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Sight, ed. Antonio Cimino and Pavlos Kontos, Lam edition (Boston: Brill Academic Pub, 2015), 69–94.
largely regular way in which all five of its subcategories abide by the object/activity/potency designation of II.4). Wedin lists these “ingredients” numerically, and while he doesn’t actually present them in table form, they lend themselves to such a presentation quite naturally. 191

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Perception (αἴσθησις)</th>
<th>1’</th>
<th>Imagination (φαντασία)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>That by which perception occurs (αἴσθητικόν)</td>
<td>2’</td>
<td>That by which imagination occurs (φανταστικόν)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Perceptual state (αἴσθημα) 192</td>
<td>3’</td>
<td>Phantasma (φάντασμα)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Perceptible/ Perceived thing (αἴσθητόν)</td>
<td>4’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Perceptual organ (αἴσθητηριον)</td>
<td>5’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Perceiving (αἴσθάνεσθαι)</td>
<td>6’</td>
<td>Imagining (φαντάζεσθαι)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, 4’ and 5’ are empty, because Wedin argues that just as phantasia seems to have no organ by which it is enacted, it also has no corresponding object [ἀντικείμενον] that brings it into action. He does find mention in Aristotle of “that by which imagination occurs” (φανταστικόν does appear twice in Aristotle, once in the De Anima in III.10, and once in De Insomniis) and notes that Aristotle does occasionally speak of the act of

191 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle. 30, 58.
192 Notice the difference between the terms in cells 3 and 4: the aistheton, the verbal adjective from aisthanesthai, indicates something that is able to be perceived, something that can bring perception into activity. This is distinct from the aisthēma, which Wedin rightly translates as the considerably more active “perceptual state.” The aisthēma, and with it, the noēma, indicates not just something that is able to be perceived or thought, but something that is being perceived or thought. In this state, the modern “subject” and “object” are identical. What is indicated here is the actual being-at-work of perception or of contemplation, the activities of these potencies.
“imagining” (φαντάζεσθαι). But he nonetheless argues that neither of these is enough to sufficiently demonstrate that Aristotle wishes us to consider phantasia a full faculty.

There is a considerable amount to be said about both of these tables. In fact, laying out the logical connections implicit in these visible—or perhaps spatial—representations of the analogous features of supposed faculties (including the obvious vacancies, which for Wedin, at least, are in fact vacancies, and not spots occupied by something nameless) requires many words. But that in-depth investigation is not what concerns us here, even if noting its possibility does: the question here is rather why Wedin (and with him, Polansky) suspects that imagination should be considered analogously to perception, or, why it should be considered a “faculty” at all. While it is true that Aristotle is clear that dunameis ought to be approached via his object/activity/potency structure, he nowhere announces that phantasia is one such dunamis. Wedin in fact collects passages that testify to the contrary. Perhaps the real success of Wedin’s argument lies not in its claim that phantasia is “functionally incomplete,” but rather, that thinking that it ought to be a faculty with a function has caused many previous readings to run aground.

After all, Aristotle’s investigation has taken on a definitive rhythm and order by the end of Book II, and it is understandable if a reader receives the introduction of phantasia as the naming of yet another dunamis that will be discussed in the same rhythm and order. That Wedin does not receive it in this way likely goes far to explain his

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193 Φανταστικόν appears in the De Anima at 432a31 and in De Insomniis at 459a17; φαντάζεσθαι appears in the De Anima only once, at 433b12. (C.f. footnote 172.)
admission that “the view of imagination [he is] proposing diverges from that of almost all recent writers on the topic.”

If a reader pauses to ask just what the object and activity of phantasia is, and further why phantasia is not listed in any of the several iterations of the four dunames of the soul throughout Book II, it is natural to come up empty-handed, thinking that “[c]learly, III, 3-11 constitutes a disruption in the plan outlined in II,3 and followed to the end of III,2.” If one assumes that phantasia is a dunamis, III.3 seems an interruption to the larger structure of the De Anima. It is easy to claim that “nothing has prepared us for a thematic discussion of phantasia at this point,” that the “treatise hardly prepares us” for this apparent digression about phantasia. Consequently, the placement of DA III.3 “might be nothing more than an accident of composition or the work of later editors.”

Thinking that phantasia is a dunamis seems to lead to the belief that DA III.3 is not an organic piece of the work, and/or that phantasia is an “incomplete faculty.” Both of these are dead-ends for textual interpretation, and make Aristotelian phantasia seem a hasty afterthought instead of a significantly important part of the Aristotelian psychic

194 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, xi. 
195 White, “The Meaning of Phantasia in Aristotle’s De Anima, III 3-8,” 490. He determines that the “disruption” is warranted because “an understanding of phantasia will be necessary to the explanation of the human activity of noein” (494). This way of making sense of the appearance of phantasia in III.3 in my opinion skews White’s entire reading incorrectly towards reading De Anima as centrally about the human soul, which means he limits its scope quite significantly; as we have seen the De Anima intends to grapple not only with souls which are inseparable from the body, animals included, but also with the broader possibility of “all soul,” including that which may be separable.
196 Ibid., 488.
198 Caston does take up the more profitable line of investigation, however, continuing by saying, “But we cannot discount another possibility, namely, that phantasia is somehow necessary at this stage of Aristotle’s exposition, prior to his accounts of thought, desire, and action. Instead of interrupting the sequence, De Anima 3.3 might constitute an integral part of it.” Ibid., 23.
anatomy. So what happens if we do not consider phantasia as a dunamis? What happens if instead of assuming phantasia is an additional dunamis (incomplete or otherwise) in Aristotle’s explication of the soul we assume that the list of four has not changed? We can take up III.3 expecting discussion of either the object of “thinking things through” [dianoëtikon] or the object of desire and/or locomotion [orektikon/kinetikon kato topon]. And this approach does prepare us for what comes next: a discussion clarifying that understanding and thinking are not the same thing as perception, and the corresponding implication that understanding and thinking will thus have different objects than perception. So when phantasia is introduced to the chapter at 427b14, we can agree with Gerard Watson: “the passage belongs where it stands.” A discussion of phantasia is necessary if we are to know where the objects, the “corresponding things,” of the next dunamis—intellection [dianoia]—can be found, for they are found in the phantasmata of phantasia. Indeed, we will find that the objects of both of the remaining dunameis require phantasia and the phantasmata that become present through it. The discussion of phantasia in III.3 somehow frees Aristotle to discuss next more pointedly the intelligible things themselves, which he does. The distinguishing line between the phantasmata and the “first thoughts,” remember, is difficult to discern, as we saw in treating the end of III.8 in the last chapter. These first thoughts “are not present without images,” and thus it stands to reason that Aristotle must introduce phantasmata if he is to discuss the objects of the dunamis of intellection, thoughts (432a14).

199 Watson, “Φαντασία in Aristotle, De Anima 3. 3,” 104.
200 It is true, however, that the discussion of the intelligible objects is delayed until III.6; III.4 and 5 seem in their own way to be prefatory to the direct consideration of the potency of thinking things through, as they treat of what Aristotle suggests in multiple places may be considered something of a fifth dunamis, that of the contemplative intellect. We shall have more to say of this in Chapter Five (see page 201).
At the end of III.3, Aristotle attests to what has appeared for him as he seeks out *phantasia*, and it is not a *dunamis*: “If, then, it is nothing other than *phantasia* that has the attributes mentioned (and this is what was being claimed), *phantasia* would be a motion coming about as a result of the being-at-work of sense perception, and corresponding to it” (429a1-3). Aristotle as naturalist has attended to “the things that follow from [phantasia’s] thinghood,” because he knows that “those properties that follow contribute in great part to knowing what the thing is, for it is when we are able to give an account of what is evident about the properties, either all or most of them, that we will also be able to speak most aptly about the thinghood of the thing” (402b16-25, which we cited at the outset of the chapter). It is as though Aristotle were in unfavorable viewing conditions, unable to make out exactly what he was seeing. For “when we are engaged accurately with some perceived thing we do not say, for example, that we imagine this is a human being [or, in this case, *phantasia*], but we say this instead when we do not perceive plainly whether that is true or false” (428a12-13). Could Aristotle be performing the role of *phantasia* in his attempts to cautiously say what appears to be *phantasia*? Isn’t this precisely what the beginning of a “physics of *phantasia*” would look like?201

*Kinēsis, dunamis, and hexis* form something of a philosophical thicket that is just the sort of place where one expects to encounter unfavorable viewing conditions: little wonder that we’ve needed to ‘squint’ to make out what *phantasia* is if it is best described as a *kinēsis*.202 These three words are intricately connected, and all pertain to the sort of thing that was *not* included in Aristotle’s example of thinghood in II.4 (and which was

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201 Velkley, “Prelude to First Philosophy: Seth Benardete on De Anima,” 192.
202 See footnotes 154 and 170.
central to our discussion in Chapter One). Change, alteration, motion—the very multiplicity of words with which we might seek to name a process as opposed to a thing illustrates how the former participates in thinghood differently than the “natural body having life as a potency” that for Aristotle seems to exemplify best what it means to be a thing. If living things seem to have the strongest sense of tode ti about them, it is clear here that processes/changes/motions/alterations have a much weaker sense (412a20, 412a12). Unlike even the word “phantasma,” which one can readily recognize as a thing having “this-ness” about it, a process or motion or change is difficult to see as a unity.

When we name any of these—process, change, alteration, motion, etc.—to what do we refer? Where and how can we locate the thinghood of a change, an alteration, or a motion? For instance, on the one hand we could speak of what is changed/alternated/moved—the thing “acted upon”[πάσχειν]—on the other, of the thing that is the changer, the thing “acting” [ποιεῖν], the “agent” [τὸ ποιοῦν]. And Aristotle does speak of both of these. In fact, he even subdivides the possible referents of each of these into two categories, as well: by the thing “acted upon,” we could indicate a sort of material that is changed, or we could mean the quality or attribute with specific regards to which the change happens. We could mean the human who changes to an educated human, or we could mean the uneducated aspect/quality/attribute of the human that changes to an educated quality. Similarly, by “the agent,” we could mean a subject, but we could also mean the quality or attribute that subject utilizes to effect change. We could mean the human who teaches (the teacher), or the educated aspect/quality/attribute by which the uneducated quality of the student is changed. When we say “motion,” then, or “change,” or “alteration,” it is not always immediately clear to which of these we
might be referring. It seems likely that this is true of Aristotle’s assessment of phantasia as a motion as well. Consider again 428b10-15. Does Aristotle ever indicate what is moving?

But since it is possible when one thing is moved for another thing to be moved by it, while phantasia seems to be some sort of motion and not to occur without perception, but in beings that perceive and about things of which there is perception, and since it is possible for a motion to come about as the result of the being-at-work of sense perception, and necessary for it to be similar to the perception, then this motion would be neither possible without perception nor present in beings that do not perceive…(428b10-15)

What might it mean to take seriously the possibility that phantasia is a “sort of motion” that is “similar to the perception [τῇ αἴσθησι]” that occurs “in beings that perceive” as “a result of the being-at-work of sense perception”?

Firstly, it would mean doing all we can to improve the “local epistemic situation” or “viewing conditions” so that we can disentangle kinēsis, dunamis, and hexis from one another. Doing so not only increases our understanding of what Aristotle means by kinēsis, but also reinforces what heretofore has only appeared as a suspicion: if Aristotle had meant us to think of phantasia as a dunamis (or, we shall see, as a hexis), he would not have called phantasia a kinēsis. While a kinēsis applies to a certain sort of dunamis, it does so indirectly—by naming the entelecheia of a dunamis. Further, kinēsis does not apply at all to the other sort of dunamis—the sort that seems most likely to be considered a hexis. In what follows, we will first establish that kinēseis and dunameis are distinct, and that by calling phantasia a kinēsis tis, Aristotle can be heard to say something new about phantasia. Establishing this claim will also reveal that, as a kinēsis, phantasia is

203 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 131.
not a *hexis*. To do this, we will look to *DA* II.5, and also to the helpful words of Aryeh Kosman. This will prepare us to turn, in the next chapter, to the *Physics* and Joe Sachs to help better discern what a *kinēsis* is generally, and what sort of *kinēsis phantasia* is specifically.

*Kinēsis, Dunamis, Hexis: De Anima II.5*

To contextualize the distinction between *kinēsis*, *dunamis*, and *hexis*, first recall from our work in Chapter One on *DA* II.1 that there are two ways in which the type of *ousia* that is “the form or look of a thing” may be *entelecheia*. In speaking of natural bodies having life as a potency, Aristotle concludes that “the soul is the *entelecheia* of such a body” (412a21-2). And then immediately: “But this [*entelecheia*] is meant in two ways… [αὐτὴ δὲ λέγεται διχῶς…]” (412a22). Here already, even before we have gotten to the challenges of speaking about change, alteration, or motion, *logos* encounters a two-fold challenge in saying clearly: a homonymic word that resists straightforward definition. On the one hand, when we say that the soul is the *entelecheia* of a natural body having life as a potency, the meaning of what we say is twofold: *entelecheia* can mean more than one thing. As Glenn Most observes, Aristotle “almost never has kind words for homonymy,” or at least for those who argue on its basis.204 But, as Sachs notes, he also “always paid attention to the fact that important words are meant in more than one way,” and believed this homonymy “was not a fault of language, but one of the ways in which it is truthful.”205 The task of the philosopher, as distinct from that of “sophists, charlatans, fools,” or “other low types,” is “the task of discriminating among

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the various meanings of words.” The task of the philosopher is to use logos to say clearly what appears clearly. But in the case of “entelecheia,” the homonymic difficulties are compounded by the fact that a straightforward definition—of either sense of the word—appears to be impossible.

He instead turns to analogy to clarify the two different ways in which “entelecheia” may be meant: “one in the manner of knowledge, the other in the manner of the act of contemplating” (412a8-12). Entelecheia can be like knowledge; ‘had’ while not being actively used, and like contemplating, which is an active ‘using’ of such knowledge. Aristotle continues by likening this analogical pair to another: “waking is analogous to the act of contemplating but sleep to holding the capacity for contemplating while not putting it to work” (412a25-26). Elsewhere he has more to say about this pair, which is frequently referred to in the secondary literature as the first and second entelechies or actualities. In this chapter (DA II.1), however, Aristotle is not concerned to fully analyze the difference between ‘having’ and ‘using,’ but rather only to clarify that the soul is of the first sort (analogically likened to knowledge and to sleep); he says no more about the difference. He takes it up again, though, four chapters later, but with a different emphasis. The reason this differentiation is drawn into DA II.5 is also the reason its treatment there is distinct amongst treatments of energeia/entelecheia and dunamis elsewhere (not only in DA II.1, but more notably Met. IX(Θ), and also

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207 The slashing of the terms energeia and entelecheia here is not meant to erase the difference between them, but to recall what we heard Aristotle say in Chapter One, in the Metaphysics, that energeia “tends to mean” entelecheia.
throughout *Physics III.* The distinction is subtle: instead of focusing on the ways the activities differ between the ‘first and second entelechies’ in the secondary literature, the focus in *DA* II.5 is on the ways the *potencies* for these activities differ, and how their activities, the results of their being-at-work can thus be seen to differ. Our reading of this chapter finds that the sort of thing that has the *dunamis* that can be *moved* is distinct from the sort of thing that has a *dunamis* that can only be *acted upon*.

It would be misguided, though, to proceed as though *DA* II.5 were centrally concerned with two different types of potency. The two potencies are a footnote to a broader concern: that of the status or nature of “all sense perception in common” (416b32). While having already in several places called perception a *dunamis*, in II.5, Aristotle seeks to specify the way in which it is so. The first substantial claim of that inquiry is that “the perceptive power [*αίσθητικὸν*] does not have being as a being-at-work but only as a *dunamis*” (417a6-7). Nonetheless, we speak of “perceiving [*αἰσθάνεσθαι*] in two senses,” since “what has the potency of hearing and seeing we say hears and sees even if it happens to be asleep, as well as what is already at work hearing and seeing,” and so “even the power of perception [*αἰσθησις*] should be spoken of in two senses, the one as being in potency, the other as being at-work, and similarly the thing perceived means both what is in potency to be perceived and what is at-work being perceived” (417a10-14). *DA* II.5 is centrally concerned with explaining why we speak of perception as having being as a being-at-work when it really only has being as a potency; the delineation between two different types of potency serves this larger discussion.

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208 Polansky notes that it is this focus on the second of the two types of *entelecheia*, “taken up in detail only in ii.5,” that makes this chapter unique within Aristotle’s oeuvre. Polansky, *Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary*, 149.
Obviously this rift between how we speak of perception and the being that it has is of interest to us. But we also note this focus on perception because our treatment of DA II.5 will move beyond the difference in the two different types of dunameis—beyond the claim that a kinēsis is not a hexis—and towards the broader claim that this chapter anticipates the role that the kinēsis of phantasia will play in allowing knowledge and contemplation to be-at-work. This claim will find it telling that Aristotle, in both chapters, uses the analogy of knowledge—and not perception—to better illustrate the differences he is concerned with therein.

The shift between II.1’s focus on the ‘first and second entelechies’ and II.5’s focus on the ‘first and second dunameis’ is immediately evident when Aristotle turns once more to the same analogy as in II.1, but handles it differently. In II.5, he again invokes the two ways in which someone may be said to know or understand something. But, unlike in II.1, he does not focus on the having of knowledge (even while asleep) and the using of it in active theorizing, but instead focuses on the ways in which the potencies for each of these two ways of having knowledge differ:

There is something that has knowledge in the way that we say any human being is a knower, because humanity is part of the class of what knows and has knowledge, but there is also a sense in which we mean by knower the one who already has, say, grammatical skill; and each of these is in potency but not in the same way… (DA II.5 417a20-25)

The contrast in this passage is not between having knowledge and using it, but, as it were, ‘one step back:’ it is between being able to have knowledge and being able to use knowledge. Any human being can be said to be a “knower” in this first sense, even an infant who arguably knows very little if anything at all. Just as in II.1, Aristotle seems to
think that one analogy is not sufficient, so he provides another. His discussion has—
tellingly, for our argument—led into a digression about the ways perceiving and
contemplating are similar and different—and he hastily sets this aside, saying

But there will also be an opportunity to get clear about these things afterwards; for
now let this much be distinguished, that being in potency is not meant in an
unambiguous way, but in one way as we might say a child is capable of being a
general, and in another as we might say the same of one who is in the prime of
life, and so too is it with the potency of perception. (DA II.5 417b30-32,
emphasis mine, but as we read it here, likely Aristotle’s as well.)

The way a child is capable of being a general is overtly different from the way in which
an adult “in the prime of life” (presumably a fit male adult in good political standing,
etc.) is so capable. The reason a child is potentially a knower or potentially a general “is
because his kind and his material are of a certain sort,” and the reason the soldier or
grammari an is said to be a potential knower or potential general is because “he is capable
of contemplating [or of becoming a general] when he wants to, if nothing outside him
prevents it” (427a26-28). Again: the reason that Aristotle undertakes a discussion of the
two different senses of “dunamis” is because he is trying to access the sort of dunamis
that characterizes perception, which is notoriously hard to speak accurately about. Let us
be as clear as possible as to the focus that makes DA II.5 different from the larger
conversation about entelecheia/energeia and dunamis elsewhere.

As we have said: in DA II.1, Aristotle contrasts having knowledge with using it.

In II.5, the contrast is between being able to have knowledge and being able to use
knowledge. Each chapter, then, contrasts two different ways of being that are not
characterized by change. We can express this difference this way:
Recalling, though, our earlier conversation about the dynamic nature of *dunamis*, it may be better to replace “being able to X” with “an innate tendency to X.” (This is particularly salient given the analogy being drawn here: A human being does not have knowing as a mere possibility. Rather, as the first line of the *Metaphysics* tells us, his being reaches out for knowledge.) The *dunamis* is not active in the way *entelecheia* or *energeia* is, but is actively striving to be active. Reflecting this understanding, the focus of II.5 can be summarized this way:

Obviously, there is a way in which these two sets of two ways of being can be related to each other: the two states named in *DA* II.1 are the results of the two states in *DA* II.5, once they’ve been allowed to become fully active. We might express that observation this way:
And since “having knowledge” is very similar to “an innate tendency to use knowledge”, we could further condense these states into one illustration:

Illustrating the matter this way clarifies what is most at issue in what we have called the larger conversation about entelecheia/energeia and dunamis. While II.1 contrasts two different ways of entelecheia/energeia, and II.5 contrasts two different ways of dunamis, the broader conversation is of course directed at neither of these two different ways of being, but towards the two different ways of changing. In fact, we might take the liberty of expanding the Sachsian glossary, and here introduce “being-in-potency” to correlate with “being-at-work.” The two sorts of “being-in-potency” and the two types of “being-at-work” are no doubt characterized by their own sorts of activity and dynamism, but this is different from the way activity and dynamism cling to the two arrows in the last

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209 Note that this “similarity” between the first entelechy and the second dunamis is not necessarily an identity. However, as we shall see when we take up the “grammarians analogy” in what follows, it does seem that Aristotle treats them as together both constituting a middle position, as illustrated here. Our argument does not require identity, though, as it is more concerned to draw out how Aristotle characterizes the two different “arrows” or processes by which the first dunamis becomes the first entelechy, and by which the second dunamis becomes the second entelechy.
illustration. These two arrows represent two different ways the two states—the two different ways of being—of II.5 become the two states or ways of being of II.1: they represent changing, altering, moving, processing. We observed in Chapter Two, and again at the outset of this chapter, that it is somewhat easier to discuss the phantasma than it is to discuss phantasia, and suggested that the reason is that the phantasma has more “thinghood” about it than does phantasia, which is less a thing and more of a process. So too might it prove easier to talk here, in DA II.5, about two different dunameis that, for all of their dynamism, are nonetheless more “things” than are the changes, alterations, motions or processes that allow them to become entelecheia/energeia.

Indeed: speaking of change generally, let alone of two types of change specifically, is challenging. We saw at the end of the last section that the thinghood of change struggles to appear clearly both when we found ourselves using multiple names to refer to it (change, alteration, motion) and also when the referent for any of these names also appeared multiple: again, by “change” do we mean the thing changed, the quality changed, the agent of change, the quality that changes… These challenges exist for Aristotle as well. What we have identified above with pictorial arrows he sometimes calls μεταβολή, sometimes ἀλλοίωσις, and sometimes κίνησις (Sachs translates these respectively as “change,” “alteration,” and “motion”). Additionally, he forthrightly claims that what we mean when we speak of any of these is also variable: not only can they refer to both active and passive aspects of a given “arrow,” but each of these can in
turn refer to either a subject or a quality. When it comes to the ways a thing can change from being a *dunamis* to being an *energeia, logos* meets many challenges. This difficulty is doubled, though, since the task of the larger conversation in II.5 is not only to get clear about one sort of change, but two. And with one of these types of change, that which characterizes the perceptive power, there is a further challenge: recall that while the *being* of the power of perception is only a *dunamis*, we nonetheless speak of it “in two senses, the one as being in potency, the other as being-at-work” (417a14). *DA* II.5, then, is Aristotle’s attempt not only to articulate in speech the difference between two ways things change from one way of being to another way of being, but to try to say why and how one of these changes (which pertains to perception) may only be articulated in speech. The goal of *DA* II.5 is to argue that even before the change, alteration, or motion, a thing is predisposed to a certain sort of change based on the *dunamis* that characterizes it. We will find that one of these *dunameis* characterizes the sort of thing that can be moved: this is the sort of *dunamis* that gives way to a *kinēsis*. The second sort characterizes the sort of thing that can be “acted upon,” and this is the sort of *dunamis* that does not give way to motion, but to the exemplary sense of *energeia*. Perception is this sort of *dunamis*.

\[\text{Footnote:} \text{For a thorough analysis of the variables attendant upon these active and passive aspects, see two articles by Marjolein Oele. In “Attraction and Repulsion,” Oele cites De Generatione et Corruptione, using a translation that is a mixture of Forster’s, Williams’, and her own: “For sometimes it is the substratum [ὑποκεῖµον] which we speak of as acted upon as when we say that the human being is cured or heated or chilled or any other things of this kind; sometimes, though, we say that what is cold is heated, what is ill is cured. And both are true—the same thing happens in the case of the agent: sometimes it is the human being that we say heats, sometimes we say that what is hot heats—for there is a sense in which it is the matter that is acted upon and another sense in which it is the contrary (GC I.7, 324a16-23). Marjolein Oele, “Attraction and Repulsion: Understanding Aristotle’s ΠΟΙΕΙΝ and ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ,” ed. Erick Raphael Jimenez et al., Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 33, no. 1 (2012): 91, 91 fn. 31, doi:10.5840/gfpj20123315; Marjolein Oele, “Passive Dispositions: On the Relationship between πάθος and ἔξις in Aristotle,” ed. Ron Polansky, Ancient Philosophy 32, no. 2 (2012): 351–68, doi:10.5840/ancientphil201232230.}\]
The discussion about the two different ways of being-in-potency opens by asking us to “speak of being acted upon and being moved as though they were the same as being-at-work” (417a15). This is a two-fold request. First, he requests that we collapse change, alteration, or motion—the arrows in Figures III.3 and III.4—into being-at-work. The moment something is changed, altered, or moved, we are to speak of it as being-at-work, and no longer being-in-potency. This first part of the request, then, pertains to how we speak of these two sorts of change. We can illustrate this request by drawing a box around the arrow along with the resulting state of being-at-work, the entelechy, in each sort of change. This transforms Figure III.3 into Figure III.5.

Secondly, he asks us to ignore, for the moment, that “being acted upon” and “being moved” are different from each other. He hints how they are different by mentioning that “motion is a kind of being-at-work, though not in the full sense,” and indicates he has spoken of this elsewhere (which he does throughout the Physics) (417a15-16). “Being acted upon,” it seems, is more likely to be a kind of being-at-work in the full, or at least a fuller, sense. This two-fold request, then, tidily tucks change, alteration, motion—the “arrows”—out of the way, and at the same time uncomplicates, if even momentarily, being-at-work by making it include motion.
We will, of course, need to “untuck” motion from this momentary uncomplication, since a fuller understanding of Aristotelian motion is what we are seeking in our physics of *phantasia*. But for the moment, let us comply with Aristotle’s two-fold request. Doing so allows us not only to distinguish the two sorts of *dunameis*, but to examine a case in which two things that are not separate in being (the potency and activity of perception) are in fact separable in speech. What follows this request bears this out: the thing acted upon—which for now also means the thing moved, as per the second part of the two-fold request—

is acted upon in one sense by what is like but in another sense by what is unlike, as we said, for what is unlike is acted upon, but in the state that results from being acted upon it is like. *(DA II.5 417a18-21)*

> διὸ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄνομοιου, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, πάσχει μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄνομοιον, πεπονθὸς δ᾽ ὁμοῖον ἐστιν. *(DA II.5 417a18-21)*

It seems that the force of Aristotle’s insistence that “it is acted upon in one sense [and not “at one moment”] by what is like but in another sense by what is unlike” is that the change from being-in-potency to being-at-work is *instantaneous*. There is no beginning to be moved, beginning to be acted upon. If there were, motion would be susceptible to the sort of infinite divisibility that constitutes Zeno’s paradox of motion. 211 We shall see, then, that the first part of the request will pertain throughout Aristotle’s analysis of both being acted upon *and* being moved, but that the two types of *dunameis* will nonetheless have to be distinguished in another way.

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211 To understand both Zeno’s paradoxes as taken up by Aristotle as well as the way in which Aristotle’s definition of motion in particular answers to those difficulty of the infinite within motion, see the commentary throughout Joe Sachs’ translation of the *Physics*, particularly pages 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, as well as his commentary on Book III, Chapters 4-8. Aristotle and Sachs, *Aristotle’s Physics*. 
Here, though, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the observation that the perfect participle (in this case, “πεπονθὸς,” “the state that results from being acted upon”) appears not only here but also in two other instances when Aristotle is talking about something that cannot be separated in speech without threatening something of the whole of which it is a part. “Πεπονθὸς” as used here at 417a20 reflects precisely this sort of phenomenon: we want to separate out—maybe in place, maybe in time, and at the very least, in speech—the likeness and unlikeness of the thing acted upon to the thing acting upon it. Sachs avoids, rightly I think, the temptation to separate this likeness and unlikeness in terms of time in this instance, but fails to do so when Aristotle circles back to this same sentiment in his conclusion to II.5. Here, Sachs does translate it with temporal force: “So it [the perceptive potency] is acted upon when it is not like the perceived thing, but when it is in the state that results from being acted upon [πεπονθὸς], it has become likened to it, and is such as that is” (418a6-7). But he could have translated it as he did in its earlier instance at 417a20: “So it [the perceptive potency] is acted upon insofar as/in the sense that it is not like the perceived thing, but insofar as/in the sense that it is in the state that results from being acted upon, it has become likened to it, and is such as that is” (italics indicate my translation.) This would have perhaps remained truer to the being of the change in question, but is less satisfying from an analytical perspective.

Christopher Long, commenting upon the perfect participle in two completely different instances, also finds it appears when Aristotle struggles with the way parts and
wholes are treated as separate or together. Coincidentally, the first instance is that of κεχωρισμένον—“having been separated”—and the other, of συνειλημμένον—“having been brought together, conceived.” The first appears in a passage of the De Interpretatione (to which we turn in Chapter Five), and in which Aristotle dissects logos into its various parts:

Λόγος is significative voice [φωνὴ σημαντικῆ], some parts of which, having been separated [κεχωρισμένον], are significative as an expression [φάσις], but not as an affirmation [κατάφασις]. (DI 4.16b26-28)

He observes that Aristotle uses the perfect participle here to suggest “that the separation is analytical,” that is, that it is an attempt to separate in speech what is not truly separable in being: “and thus that the parts, taken as isolated, are not wholly what they are when operating together as organic parts of a complete λόγος.”

“Συνειλημμένον” appears in Aristotle’s discussion in Met. VI(Ε).1 of the being of the word “snub,” and describes the way in which the definition of the word “snub”—as distinct from the definition of the word “concave”—implies the underlying material in the meaning of the thing, and thus cannot be taken apart from that material. Long cites Met. VI(Ε).1 1025b30-5:

But of being that are defined and that have a “what-it-is,” some are like the snub, but others are like the concave. And these differ because the snub has been conceived [συνειλημμένον] along with its matter (since the snub is a concave nose), while concavity is without sensible matter.

Of the role played by the perfect participle here, Long notes that it “carries with it completed aspect and so expresses the completeness of the being under consideration:

that it is a whole that exists with a degree of ontological independence Aristotle

212 Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 97.
213 Ibid., 187.
associates with the τόδε τι.” Here, too, the perfect participle marks a place in which an attempt to analyze or separate in speech is frustrated by the organic nature of the being in question.

Having clarified the terms with which the investigation can begin, Aristotle proceeds to cautiously untangle the two different ways of being-in-potency, the two different dunameis, from each other. He sets out first to clarify the two different “senses of potency and being-at-work,” observing that until 417a22, “we have been speaking about them as unambiguous [ἁπλῶς].” Turning to the grammarian analogy, he finds that there are two distinct ways for things to be-in-potency, and two distinct ways for things to be-at-work. In the grammarian analogy, he isolates three knowers: the child, the grammarian not contemplating, and the grammarian contemplating. The first two are knowers in potency, and the last two are knowers in activity. Notably, then, it is the one in the middle who is both a knower in potency and a knower in activity. Just as we saw in Figure III.4 (see page 118), the four different ways of being (two different ways of being-at-work, two different ways of being-in-potency) are collapsed into three, since the first way of being-at-work is very similar to the second way of being-in-potency. The grammarian who is not currently contemplating is in the middle position: he has knowledge, and thus has an innate tendency to use knowledge.

Keeping his focus as much as possible on the two different ways of being-in-potency, Aristotle continues by observing that the first knower in potency, the child, 

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214 Ibid., 188.
becomes so in activity when “he has been altered by learning and has changed often from the contrary condition,” while the second knower in potency, the grammarian not contemplating, becomes so in activity “by changing in a different way” (417a33-417b1).

Again, the difference is subtle: the topic here is not change, alteration, or motion, but is instead on the being of the thing altered, the thing changed. He continues by pointing out that “being acted upon” is not unambiguous [ἀπλοῦν] either,” and finds that what happens to the thing acted upon in the two different types of change is different:

   in one sense it is a partial destruction of a thing by its contrary, but in another it is instead the preservation, by something that is at-work-staying-itself, of something that is in potency and is like it in the way that a potency is like its corresponding state of being-at-work-staying-itself. (DA II.5 417b2-5)

Aristotle doesn’t say so here, but it is with this differentiation between two types of “being acted upon” that the differences between kinēsis, dunamis, and hexis emerge. He is no longer comfortable letting us collapse “being acted upon and being moved” without differentiation; being moved here begins to ‘untuck’ from the two-fold request at 417a15ff. “Being acted upon” will be found to be being-at-work, or energeia, in the fullest sense, and the observation that “motion is a kind of energeia, though not in the full sense,” will become more important.

This difference can first be observed by paying attention to the way in which Aristotle uses the word “alteration” [ὑλλο iotaic]. He finds that only one of these changes from dunamis to entelecheia/energeia should be spoken of as true alteration, and this is the change that requires motion. The other type will also be called alteration, but only grudgingly, and will be claimed as the type of change operative in perception. Let us return to the grammarian analogy. He says of the two knowers in potency that
the former of them becomes so in activity when he has been altered [ἀλλοιωθεὶς] by learning and has changed often from the contrary condition, while the latter does [become a knower in activity] by changing, in a different way, from having grammatical or arithmetical skill but not being at work with it, into being at work. (DA II.5 417a30-417b3, emphasis mine)

About this latter change, he says, “this is either not a process of being altered…or is a different class of alteration…it is not right to say that a thinking being, when it thinks, is altered, any more than a housebuilder is altered when he is building a house” (417b5-10). This sort of change is different. It is a “passing over into being oneself, namely into being-at-work-staying-oneself” (417b6-7). Learning is an alteration, contemplating is not. He goes on to try to further clarify this difference in terms of the difference between “being acted upon” and “being moved.” Alteration is not due to being acted upon, but if one wishes to say that it is due to being acted upon, and not being moved, then one has to differentiate between “true alteration” and a less radical sense. He says,

the one who…learns and acquires knowledge…either ought not to be said to be acted upon, or one must say there are two ways of being altered, the one a change to a condition of lacking something, the other a change to an active condition [hexis] and into a thing’s nature. (DA II.5 417b13-17)

That true alteration is due to being moved and not to being acted upon can also be deduced from the chapter’s conclusion, where Aristotle reiterates that

being in potency is not meant in an unambiguous way… but since these distinct senses are without names [ἀνώνυμος], though it has been marked out that they are different, and how they differ it is still necessary to use such words as “be acted upon” and “be altered” as though they were appropriate. (DA II.5 417b30-418a3).

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215 As we did at the outset of this section, we can here again notice how even the states of being (this time being-in-potency, and not being-at-work-being-itself, as earlier) are challenging for logos. This specific challenge—that of being “without names,” or ἀνώνυμος, is a new difficulty, however, and is distinct from the two-fold challenge posed by entelecheia as a homonym without a definition in terms of genus and species. These challenges will be taken up in Chapter Five.
Here, the differentiation between “being acted upon” and “being moved” that Aristotle momentarily asked us to collapse at 417a15 is fully reinstated: the two are now seen to correspond to the two different senses of being-in-potency. One sort of potency is such that it can “be moved,” or, as here, can “be altered.”

There are two different senses of *dunamis*, then, and one of them allows of “being moved,” and is “a change to a condition [διαθέσεις] of lacking something” (417b17), a “change from the contrary condition [ἕξεως],” (417a32), a “partial destruction of a thing by its contrary” (417b4). This is the true sense of alteration: the one that requires *kinēsis*. The other way of being-in-potency requires “being acted upon” to change the being “to an active condition [ἕξεις] and into a thing’s nature” (417b17), and this change is the “preservation…of something that is in potency and is like it in the way that a potency is like its corresponding state of being-at-work-staying-itself” (417b4-5). This is the weak sense of being altered: nothing is destroyed. What can this insight yield to us regarding the differences between *kinēsis, dunamis*, and *hexis?*

If we are attentive to appearances of *hexis* in this summary, we can observe that, on the one hand, a *hexis* is said to be the “contrary condition” which undergoes a change when something is the sort of thing that can be moved and is moved; we can infer that likely it is this “contrary condition” that, in changing, accounts for the “partial destruction” of a thing undergoing a motion. We can also observe that a *hexis* appears in the description of the second sort of change, in which “being acted upon” brings a being

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216 Further, alteration is listed as one of the four species of motion in the *Physics*, III.1, 201a10. We will turn to this passage in the broader discussion of motion.
into “an active condition [hexis].” It is not, then, immediately clear whether we should more strongly associate a hexis with the first sort of change or with the second.217 What is clear, however, is that in either case, a hexis is distinct from a kinēsis. Perhaps it may be best to characterize a hexis as a dunamis that has not yet been set free to do what it strives to do, as the first or second dunamis, but not as the “arrow” in which they have successfully become moved or become acted upon. Recall Sachs’ description of a dunamis as “the innate tendency of anything to be at work in ways characteristic of the kind of thing it is,” which “will always emerge into activity, when the proper conditions are present and nothing prevents it.”218 A dunamis that has not yet been situated in its “proper conditions” is a hexis. The way of being of a hexis is the state of readiness, or, as with Klein, a state of wakefulness:

What characterizes us inasmuch as we are able to perceive and to understand is our being awake. The state of wakefulness (ἐγρήγορος) has its degrees, as we all know. We can be drowsy and half-asleep. We can be inattentive to what goes on around us. But as long as we are not fully asleep, we are awake, and we know that we are...The state and manner of being is a state in which we are not closed up but open. Wakefulness is openness— the very openness of a huge open door. It is not a state of activity, but rather a state of preparedness, of alertness.219

As soon as what we are prepared, alert, or ready for becomes present, the readiness of hexis gives way—either to energeia, as in the case of perception, or to kinēsis, as in the case of learning. And so it would seem that a kinēsis is distinct from both a dunamis and from a hexis. If it were the same, then certainly there could not be an entire sort of

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217 Cf. Polansky, who suggests that a hexis is neither the condition from which one moves (first dunamis), nor the condition resulting from being acted upon (second entelechy), but is rather the condition that is, as it were, “in the middle” as in Figure III.4. He claims the distinction being made between knowledge and sleeping on the one hand and contemplating and waking on the other is “the distinction between a disposition or state (ἕξις) and the exercising made possible by that disposition.” Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary, 149.

218 Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 199.

dunamis that does not allow of “being moved,” which allows instead of “being acted upon.”

As we indicated earlier, Aristotle has much more to say outside of the De Anima about change, alteration, and motion, particularly in the Metaphysics. There is thus an extensive collection of secondary literature that could here be called in to further substantiate that a kinēsis is distinct from the change operative in the weaker sense of alteration, which elsewhere Aristotle forthrightly calls energeia. The result is that both kinēsis and what we might call energeia per se are species of energeia—are both ways of being-at-work—even if kinēsis is not an energeia “in the full sense,” as Aristotle told us in II.5 (417a16). We needn’t undertake a full analysis of these concepts in the Metaphysics here, but it is helpful to note two significant ways in which kinēsis and energeia per se (or, as we called it above, “the weak sense of alteration”) differ. To fully understand what it might mean to take seriously that phantasia is a kinēsis tis, we need to

220 See, for example, Met. IX(Θ).6, 1048b18-34, especially 104831-34: “For one is not walking and at the same time in a state of having walked, nor building a house and at the same time in a state of having built a house, nor becoming and in a state of having become, nor moving and in a state of having been moved, but the two are different; but one has seen and at the same time is seeing the same thing, and is contemplating and has contemplated the same thing. And I call this sort of action a being-at-work, and that a sort of motion.” Calling weak alteration energeia here hearkens back to the beginning of Aristotle’s discussion of the two senses of potency in DA II.5, where he asks us to speak “of being acted upon and being moved as though they were the same as energeia,” although he immediately clarifies that while motion is a kind of energeia, it is so “not in the full sense,” and reminds us that he has said as much in “other places.” Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 174–175.

221 See, for example, the thorough and insightful analysis of Aryeh Kosman in the first three chapters of his book, The Activity of Being, that makes this distinction between two species of energeia clear. “[T]here is a sense of realizing [entelecheia] in which, according to Aristotle, not every realizing is a motion. The realizing of a skill or disposition to act in a certain way, such as occurs, for example, when someone who is wise exercises his wisdom, is not a motion. In such cases, the realizing consists in exercising a capacity in the form of an activity (De Anima 2.5, 417b10-12). This is precisely an expression of the distinction between two senses of energeia that has led us in the first place to a consideration of motion. We might then understand Aristotle to be defining motion as one species of a broader genus of realization, of which the realizing of a disposition in the form of its exercise—a capacity in operation—is another. In a moment I will suggest that this characterization of Aristotle’s views is importantly correct.” Aryeh Kosman, The Activity of Being: An Essay on Aristotle’s Ontology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013), 47, emphasis mine.
have some understanding of an enigmatic passage that is what Kosman calls “the heart” of Met. IX(Θ).6, and perhaps “the epitome of the argument in the central books of the Metaphysics.” 222 “Energeia,” Aristotle writes, is “in one sense as kinēsis to dunamis, in another sense as ousia to some matter [τινα ὢλην]” (1048b8). Making two distinctions will help us to better grasp this comparison. The first characterizes the difference between kinēsis and energeia per se in terms of time; the second characterizes the difference in terms of “constitutive” and “privative” change.

The first distinction is borrowed from Michael Wedin, though admittedly he does not map it directly onto what he calls “the standard κίνησις-ἐνέργεια dichotomy” as we shall. 223 The distinction is between “durational change” and “durationless change.” 224 This is a rather straightforward distinction: the sort of becoming or change that characterizes perception, as an instance of energeia per se, is “an instantaneous or durationless change” which sort will be “required to explain the actual2 operation of any faculty.” 225 By “the actual2 operation of any faculty,” Wedin is naming the second entelechy, the actual using of an already attained capacity, such as the grammarian contemplating the letter ‘A’. 226 How can one describe just what happens in the change from not contemplating to contemplating? When the grammarian changes from not

222 Ibid., 39.
223 Wedin upholds the validity of what is called in the secondary literature the “tense test” and the “quickly/slowly test” to discriminate between kinēseis and energeiai; we follow Kosman in disregarding these tests. For more about the “tense test” in particular, see “Verbs and the Identity of Actions” by Terry Penner. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 32; Kosman, The Activity of Being, 2013, 40–41, fn. 3; Terry Penner, “Verbs and the Identity of Actions: A Philosophical Exercise in the Interpretation of Aristotle,” in Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. O. P. Wood and George Pitcher (London; Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971), 393–460.
224 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 31ff.
225 Ibid., 31, 32.
226 Ibid., 14ff.
contemplating to contemplating the letter ‘A’, the moment the letter ‘A’ acts upon him is the same moment in which he is contemplating. In Wedin’s terms, “there are not two acts,” there is no “switch” to “active knowing” as distinct from “the active knowing itself.”

The “switch” is instantaneous, or “durationless.” “Durational change,” then, is the “process of developing the talents and capacities” or put another way, is the process of attaining the first entelechy. It is learning about, say, the letter ‘A,’ so that one can then have the ability or “innate tendency” — the dunamis — to contemplate it. Or, in terms of the generalship analogy, the way in which a child becomes a general is an “actualization, the durational process of developing the talents and capacities requisite for generalship.” Referring to DA II.5, Wedin finds that this durational process “counts as a genuine case of alteration.” (He then continues by contrasting this with the activity of perception which is said to involve being altered “by courtesy only,” just as we found above.)

Kinēsis, then, takes time. Energeia, the change operative in making a first entelechy (which is, or is very like, a second potency) into a second entelechy, does not take time: the change is instantaneous.

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227 Ibid., 34.
228 It is important to note, however, that this distinction between durationless and durational change is not meant to revise or ignore the first half of the two-fold request we heard Aristotle make in DA II.5, and which we illustrated in Figure III.5 (see page 121.) When Aristotle requests that we speak of “being acted upon and being moved as though they were the same as being-at-work,” that is not a temporary request. For both energeia per se and kinēsis, there is no moment in time in which the thing “being acted upon” or “being moved” is unlike what acts on it, though what acts on it is unlike it “in one sense” (though not “at one moment.”) If this were the case, we could easily fall victim to an infinite divisibility in the way a change—of any sort—comes about. Characterizing motion as a “durational” change threatens to overlook this request. According to Christopher Long, then, it is perhaps better “not to try to characterize the temporality of the switch itself, but to emphasize that our access to it is always mediated by time such that we can only discern a before and an after, which is why we revert often in these cases to the perfect tense,” or, as we saw above, the perfect participle. (Quotation taken from written comments on this document from November 7, 2015.)

229 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 33.
The second distinction that makes the *kinēsis-energeia* dichotomy clearer we borrow from Aryeh Kosman: this is the difference between “privative” and “constitutive” change. This differentiation attempts to get a handle on Aristotle’s claims that a *kinēsis* is, firstly, an *incomplete energeia*, and secondly, that *kinēsis* is a true alteration since it entails “a partial destruction of a thing by its contrary” (417b3). However, it does not map onto the *kinēsis-energeia* dichotomy cleanly. While it is true that “in all cases of activity proper [*energeia per se*], realization is constitutive, never privative,” cases of *kinēsis* can be described using both terms: “In cases of motion, however, the ultimate realization is privative, but there is an intermediate constitutive realization.”

A privative change is a change that seeks to negate or somehow eradicate the grounds that give rise to it. “[A] motion is aimed at a realization that lies outside itself and that brings about its destruction,” says Kosman. By becoming educated, one’s uneducated quality is destroyed. By walking from home to the café, I undo my location as being at home. But while I am becoming educated, and while I am walking, there is a constitutive realization of my ability to become educated, or to change places. This stands in stark contrast to “the exercise of a dispositional skill,” which instead of bringing about the destruction of the skill, “preserves and often indeed enriches it.” He refers us to *DA* II.5 to evidence this claim: “This is essentially how Aristotle characterizes the two modes of transition when he says that “the one, a change of qualities, is with respect to privation,

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231 Ibid., 67.
232 Ibid.
the other is with respect to dispositional qualities (ἕξεις) and nature.” (DA II.5, 417b14-16).

Kinēsis, then, is

the realization of a subject’s ability to be other than it is, an ability that is thus aimed ultimately at a state of being other than the motion and fatal to it...The essential self-destructive character of motion brings out what is ultimately wrong with comparing motion to a first realization such as a dispositional skill. 234

If we were to revisit our earlier examination of the possible referents of the words change, alteration, and motion, we can better understand the utility of distinguishing between two possibilities for “the thing changed”: motion is here seen as the privative change of a quality of a thing, while energeia per se, as “the exercise of a dispositional skill,” is the constitutive change of a subject. As one might expect, this distinction is not a strict one: the sort of motion to which we shall turn in Chapter Four—becoming—suggests that motion may yet pertain to substantive change. And yet it is an expeditious way to begin to grasp the difference.

Bringing this double distinction between kinēsis and energeia per se back to bear on the two different sorts of dunamis, the two ways of being-in-potency, examined in DA II.5, we can better clarify their differences. Earlier, Kosman drew our attention to an enigmatic line in Book 9 of the Metaphysics: Energeia is “in one sense as kinēsis to dunamis, in another sense as ousia to some matter [τινα ὅλην]” (1048b8). That is, the way a kinēsis interacts with a dunamis is somehow similar to the way in which ousia, thinghood, interacts with matter [hule]. Here, Jacob Klein’s words are helpful: “What is most noteworthy about “being-at-work” is that there has to be something else, namely,

233 Ibid., 66.
234 Ibid., 67.
that which is being worked on."\textsuperscript{235} So long as we don’t lose sight of what we worked to establish about the dynamic nature of \textit{dunamis}, the formulation “that which is worked on” is helpful here. The sort of \textit{dunamis}, the sort of thing that \textit{kinēsis} can “work on,” is distinct from the sort of \textit{dunamis} that \textit{ousia} can work on. The latter is matter. The former is a \textit{dunamis} itself. Or, as Sachs with his characteristic clarity explains:

The genus of which motion is a species is being-at-work-staying-itself, of which the only other species is thinghood. The being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency, as material, is thinghood. The being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency as a potency is motion.\textsuperscript{236}

What \textit{kinēsis} works on, then, is a potency itself. The way it does so takes time—is “durational”—and has some sort of privative—destructive—result. It undoes the grounds that give rise to it. Over time, it uses up the \textit{dunamis} it expresses, and the being in motion thus experiences true alteration, becoming different than it was before.

Thus does it seem strange that so many have held for so long the view that \textit{phantasia} is a \textit{dunamis}. Aristotle’s twice-made suggestion that \textit{phantasia} is a \textit{kinēsis} indicates that the \textit{dunamis} associated with \textit{phantasia}, if there is one, uses itself up in \textit{phantasia}’s activity. Perception, Aristotle occasionally allows, is a matter of “being moved,”\textsuperscript{237} but what DA II.5 clarifies is that it is more accurate to say that it is a “being acted upon.”\textsuperscript{238} The \textit{dunameis} and \textit{hexeis} by which we discriminate what is true and what is false, and which are listed in our central passage, are all specific ways in which the

\textsuperscript{236} Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Physics, 79.
\textsuperscript{237} See, for example, DA II.5 417b32: “And perception follows from being moved and acted upon, as has been said, for it seems to be a kind of alteration…”
\textsuperscript{238} See also DA III.7 431a4-7: “And it is obvious that the perceptible thing makes the perceptible thing be at-work from being in potency, for the perceiving thing is not [merely] acted upon nor is it altered. Hence this is a different kind of event from a motion, since motion is a being-at-work of something incomplete, while being-at-work in the simple sense, that of something complete, is different again.”
soul is in potency, or, to use Klein’s words, all specific ways in which we can be
“grasped, molded, formed by what is at work.”239 Here again is the difficulty with
translating *dunamis* as “faculty” or “ability;” we confuse what is being grasped and what
is grasping. “It is not we,” says Klein, “who actively grasp something that is prepared to
be grasped. On the contrary, we, in our state of preparedness, are being grasped, molded,
formed by what is at work, by the ἐνέργεια of the εἴδη.”240 We are of the stuff that is
perceptive and intellective, and when we are awake and ready to be perceptive and
intellective, we are characterized by the *hexeis* of these *dunameis*; we are of the material
that can be worked on by the being of the things around us. But the way we are initially
worked on is not a movement. We are “acted upon” insofar as we are perceptive, and
when this has happened, when perception has become an *energeia*, a motion comes about
[γιγνομένη] “as a result of the being-at-work of sense perception” (419a2-3). This
motion is *phantasia*, and *phantasia* is thereby neither properly a *dunamis* nor a *hexis*—or
at least, is neither a *dunamis* nor *hexis* of the embodied soul. It remains to say what sort
of motion it is, and what is in motion.

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240 Ibid., 62.
Chapter Four: The Becoming of the Intelligible

*Phantasia as the Kinēsis of Genesis: Physics III.1*, page 138

*The Perceptible and the Intelligible*, page 148

*Phantasia as Genesis: Active or Passive*, page 163

*Phantasia as Genesis: Active and Passive*, page 174

In Chapter One, we identified a two-fold resonance between *phantasia* and *entelecheia*, suggesting that both concepts pertain in some way to the way a thing may be spatially intelligible without being articulable, but also insofar as both seem to have some sort of privileged relationship to living, ensouled things. We set out to bring the two terms into conversation with each other, hoping that each would illuminate the other. In Chapter Two, we pursued *phantasia* by way of *entelecheia*, finding by the outset of Chapter Three that the *phantasmata* that are associated with *phantasia* seem themselves to be best described in much the same way as Aristotle describes the sort of *ousia* that is *entelecheia*, that is to say, as “the form or look of a thing, directly as a result of which something is called a *this*” (412a8). Chapter Three, then, was animated by the larger question of just how the *phantasmata* are “associated” with *phantasia*, but found progress in this questioning impossible before setting out to say more clearly what sort of thing *phantasia* is. Taking Aristotle’s suggestion that *phantasia* is a *kinēsis* seriously requires that we no longer think of it as a *dunamis* of the embodied soul, and in Chapter Three we sought to support this claim. It remains for this chapter to say more clearly what *phantasia*, as a *kinēsis tis, is*. Here, *phantasia* appears as the sort of motion of becoming,
the motion of *gignesthai*, and *phantasmata* are found to be what becomes as a result of this motion. *Phantasia*, then, is found to be the motion by which what is perceptible becomes intelligible and is thus the coming-to-be of the *entelecheia* of things encountered in perception. At the end of this chapter, we will have even more reason to suspect that *phantasia* is also the motion by which *entelecheia* as “the form or look of a thing, directly as a result of which” something unfolds into speech, and is called—named—what it is (*DA* II.1 412a8).

**Phantasia as the Kinēsis of Genesis: Physics III.1**

In the last chapter, *kinēsis* appeared as durational change that constitutes genuine alteration. *Kinēsis* was found to be a type—though an incomplete type—of *energeia* that results in what Kosman described as an “ultimate privative realization [*entelecheia*],” though it has an “intermediate constitutive realization.”

It is because *kinēsis* works to undo the grounds that give rise to it—because it ultimately results in a “privative realization”—that Aristotle considers it an incomplete *energeia*, having its end outside of itself. And it is because *kinēsis*, as distinct from *energeia* proper, has its own sort of *dunamis* that it can “work on,” (in the words of Klein) that it has this peculiar “intermediate constitutive realization.”

As we heard at the end of the last chapter, Sachs summarizes the distinction between the two sorts of *energeia*, and their respective

242 See, for example, *Physics* 201b31-33, which reads, “motion seems to be a certain being-at-work, but incomplete. The reason for this is that the potency, of which it is the [complete] being-at-work, is itself something incomplete.” Motion is, then, self-defeating: its drive is to cease to be. As Kosman puts it, motion doesn’t “just happen to cease;” rather, “its essential activity is devoted to ceasing.” The being of motion, then, is “autosubversive,” since “its whole purpose and project is one of self-annihilation.” Kosman, *The Activity of Being*, 2013, 67.
sorts of *dunameis*, nicely: “The being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency, as material, is thinghood. The being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency as a potency is motion.”

*Energeia* proper “works on” a material as a potency; *kinēsis* “works on” potency itself as a potency.

These conclusions do not need to rest in the words of commentators, however: Aristotle’s own definition of *kinēsis*, given at *Physics* III.1, 201a11 (and reiterated in a handful of places) bears them all out in a concise—if difficult—line: “ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἡ τοιοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστιν.” Kosman renders this as, “The realization [ἐντελέχεια] of what is able to be [something], as such, is motion.” Sachs’ translation is even clearer, reading, “the being-at-work-staying-itself of whatever is potentially, just as such, is motion.” Commenting on this line, Sachs says that the “being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency as a potency is motion… motions are all potencies staying-themselves as potencies, not fused into the states of active completion toward which they are potencies.”

He gives us a few examples. Consider the motion of a man walking across a room. “While he is walking his potentiality to be on the other side of the room is actual just as a potentiality. The actuality of the potentiality to be on the other side of the room, as just that potentiality, is neither more nor less than the walking across the

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245 Similar iterations are found in the same chapter at 201a29, 201b5, and 202a7, and then again at *Physics* VIII.1, 251a9 and *Met*. XI(K).9, 1065b16 and 1065b23. The version at 1065b16 does present a slight difference, where *energeia* replaces *entelecheia* in the minority of manuscripts. It is easy enough to discount it since the majority of manuscripts have *entelecheia* instead, though one should only do so after taking into account the persuasive and interesting study by George Blair cited in Chapter One, which argues that “energeia” can be seen to gradually replace “entelecheia” over the course of Aristotle’s life.
248 Ibid., 79.
room.”

When a pencil falls to the floor, its motion is the “actuality of its potentiality to be on the floor.” In both cases, motion is “an enduring unity which organizes distinct parts, such as the various positions through which the falling pencil passes.” The unity of the motion of walking across the room is demonstrated insofar as the last step that is taken is just as much part of the motion as any of the other steps. These steps, these positions of the falling pencil, “though distinct, function identically in the ordered continuity determined by the potentiality” for falling. The being-at-work-staying-itself—the entelecheia—of these steps or positions is motion.

Holding on to the insight, then, that kinēsis is the entelecheia of a dunamis as a dunamis, let us now remember that Aristotle specifies that phantasia is not kinēsis simply, but is rather a “sort” of kinēsis. It is thus a “sort” of entelecheia of a dunamis as a dunamis. The purpose here is not to attempt to catalogue and describe the various sorts of motion as recognized by Aristotle. It is enough to note that directly after defining kinēsis in Physics III.1, Aristotle goes on to list four examples of sorts of motion.

A distinction having been made in each kind of being between the fully active and what is only potentially, the being-at-work-staying-itself of whatever is potentially, just as such, is motion: of the alterable, as alterable, it is alteration [ἀλλοίωσις], of what can grow and its opposite, what can shrink (since no name is common to the two), it is growth [οὖξησις] and shrinkage [φθίσις], of the generable and destructible it is coming-to-be [γένεσις] and passing away [φθορά], and of the movable in place it is change of place [φορά]. (Phys. III.1 201a10-16)

One of the types of motion described is that of passing away and coming-to-be [γένεσις]. And the verb related to γένεσις, γίγνομαι, appears in our central passage: phantasia is

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250 Ibid.
251 Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Physics, 74.
said to be whatever it is that is responsible for a *phantasmata* “becoming present”—
*gignesthai*—to us. Taking these descriptions together—*phantasia as a kinēsis tis* and
*phantasia* as that by which *phantasmata gignesthai*, it seems reasonable to wonder what
we might learn about *phantasia* if we consider it as the specific sort of *kinēsis* called
*genesis*.

*Genesis* was found in the above passage from *Physics* III to be the sort of motion
of what is generable [γενητοῦ]. If motion generally is the *entelecheia* of a *dunamis* as a
*dunamis*, *genesis* as a species of a motion is the *entelecheia* of the *dunamis* of the
generable as generable. And if we recall the Sachsian description of a *dunamis*, we could
say that *genesis* is the *entelecheia* of the ‘innate tendency to be generable.’ If we pair this
definition, then, with the description of *phantasia* in the central passage as that by which
we speak of some *phantasma gignesthai* to or for us, does it help us to further explicate
the meaning of that description? If *phantasia* is a motion, and is that motion according to
which a *phantasma gignesthai*, perhaps *phantasia* is the motion of the *genesis* of the
*phantasma*. If it is, we can begin by remembering that all motions insofar as they are
motions are incomplete, and work ultimately to undo the grounds that give rise to them.
This clarifies that the *phantasma*, as the stated result of the motion of *genesis*, is not
where we can look for the *dunamis* of the generable: By the time the *phantasma* has
come to be, the *dunamis* that gave rise to it has been, as it were, ‘used up’ in the
“essential self-destructive character of motion.”

How, then, might we access the *dunamis* responsible for the *genesis* of the *phantasma*?

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Let us return to Sachs’ example of the falling pencil. We heard him earlier describe the motion of a pencil falling from a desk as the “actuality of its potentiality to be on the floor.” And this is an accurate illustration of Aristotle’s definition of motion—suitable, say, for a description of Aristotelian motion on a website serving general readers of Aristotle, which is where it comes from—though there is a way in which it is only generally accurate. Sachs himself speaks more specifically of this same example in the introduction to his translation of the *Physics*. When the pencil falls to the floor, Sachs asks, “What is the potency that is at work, and to what does it belong?” In answering, he goes beyond the answer given earlier, seeming at first to negate it completely: “The potency is *not* that of being at that spot on the floor,” he claims, and, even more surprisingly, “the being that has it [the potency] is not the pencil at all.” Speaking of the motion of the falling pencil as the “actuality of its [the pencil’s] potentiality to be on the floor” is generally accurate, but it would be more precise to speak of the falling pencil insofar as it belongs to what Sachs calls a “genuine being,” which he identifies in this example as the earth: “No motive power belongs to the pencil as such, but it can move on its own because there is present in it a potency of earth, set free to be at work as itself when the obstacle of the desk is removed.” The motion exhibited by the pencil does not, then, belong most precisely to the pencil as such, but to the earth: “The potency at work here is that of earth to be down, or of the cosmos to

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255 Ibid.
What seemed to be the potentiality of the pencil to be on the floor is thus argued to be the potentiality of the earth to be down: the pencil has “present in it” the potency of some other more “genuine,” or, as he says later, more “primary” being, in this case earth.

What supports Sachs’ naming of and turning towards such “genuine,” “primary” beings? It is his understanding that, in Aristotle, “No motion, however random or incidental, gains entrance into the world except through the primary beings that constitute the world.”

For

[t]he incidental and intermediate links, which merely pass motions around without originating them, are not causes at all except in a derivative sense. All of Aristotle’s causes stem from being, and they are found not by looking backward in time, but upward in a chain of responsibility.

At this juncture we could certainly turn to a detailed examination of the four Aristotelian causes, and the way they interact with Aristotelian kinēsis, but it is not necessary: let us here accept this claim as something of an Aristotelian axiom, and turn our attention instead to one of its corollaries. Should we wish “to bring the structure of any motion into focus,” says Sachs, “first, find the being, and then find the potency of it that the motion displays, or to which the particular motion is incidental.” If Sachs is right, when we ask what it means for phantasia to be some sort of generating motion, our next question ought to be what being—what primary, genuine being—is at issue in the motion of phantasia?

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256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid., 24.
259 Ibid., 23.
First of all, let us defend the question against possible charges of pleonasm: why ask what being “is at issue in the motion of phantasia” instead of simply asking what being “moves in phantasia?” Firstly, of course, because the sort of motion “at issue” here is one whereby an altogether new thing is generated. In the example of the falling pencil, the pencil changes location, but not substance. In the instance of phantasia, it is neither clear what exactly is causing the moving nor what is being moved. And secondly, we confront again the difficulty in speaking clearly about the thinghood, the “this-ness” of a motion (or change, alteration, or process) that we experienced in Chapter Three. There we noted that Aristotle understands that by naming a change, we could mean to indicate either the agent or the acted upon—the teacher and the learner—and that these possibilities themselves are two-fold insofar as we speak about the subject or the quality responsible for changing or being changed—the student on the one hand, and her uneducated state on the other. If we return to the first of the two indications that phantasia may be a sort of motion that results from the being-at-work of sense perception, we can find traces of this broader conversation. We cite the passage in full, as we did on page 111:

But since it is possible when one thing is moved for another thing to be moved by it, while imagination seems to be some sort of motion and not to occur without perception, but in beings that perceive and about things of which there is perception, and since it is possible for a motion to come about as a result of the being-at-work of sense perception, and necessary for it to be similar to the perception, then this motion would be neither possible without perception nor present in beings that do not perceive, and the one having it would both do and have done to it many things resulting from this motion, which could be either true or false. (DA III.3 428b10-17)

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260 See the last two paragraphs of the second section, beginning on page 109.
It would seem—and again, the lack of clarity here becomes its own object of wonder—that Aristotle is here indicating that *phantasia* can best be found by looking at something—but what thing?—being moved, and that the agent here is the being-at-work of sense perception. He begins, “But since it is possible when one thing is moved for another thing to be moved by it,” and ambiguously follows that with a second subordinate clause suggesting that *phantasia* seems “not to occur without perception.” He notes further that “it is possible for a motion to come about as a result of the being-at-work of sense perception.” It does sound, then, as though the being-at-work of sense perception is the mover, and *phantasia* is the name of the moving of what is moved… whatever that is.

Here the example of the falling pencil can be found to be instructive in another way: Sachs notes that the pencil (as a being that has earth in it) falls when its potency to “be down” is “set free to be at work as itself when the obstacle of the desk is removed.” This is helpful because it gets us away from our more standard understanding of motion, which typically fails to capture the dynamism of the *dunamis* that is at work. This more prevalent understanding, which Sachs calls “the mathematized sort of motion, which can be fully depicted on a blackboard,” finds that “a body A” moves “from B to C,” and we depict A by a point and the motion by a line along which lie points B and C. Aristotle allows for this, but his definition is broader, finding that motion from place to place is but one sort of motion, which is generally the changing “from one condition to another.” But while it is broader, it is also more specific: A is never simply a point, but is always a

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being “with some nature,” and so even in the sort of motion that goes from place to place, “those places would not be neutral and indifferent positions, but regions of the cosmos, which might or might not be appropriate surroundings for body [not point] A.” This ‘body’ A, then, has a certain nature: the pencil has the nature of earth about it, and as such, a specific sort of dynamism. When we think of motion as a billiard ball being pushed across a surface, it is easy to see the ball as a passive receptor of the motion ‘given’ to it by some more active agent. But for Aristotle, being moved is never so clearly passive. Writes Sachs,

> When an ongoing yearning and striving for form is not inner and latent, but present in the world as itself, as a yearning and a striving, there is motion. That is because when motion is present, the potency of some material has the very same structure that form has, forming the being as something holding on in just that particular motion.\(^{262}\)

It is helpful, then, to think of the thing moved, the thing acted upon, as not simply a passive being, but as a being whose nature has been “set free” to be-at-work. Now we may ask our original question in a more refined way: “What being is at issue in the motion of \textit{phantasia}” has become instead, what being is \textit{set free} to be-at-work by the being-at-work of sense perception?

> We are, I believe, predisposed to suppose the answer to this question is ourselves: that we are—or part of us is—the sort of being that is set free to be-at-work, set free to be in the motion called \textit{phantasia}, by the being-at-work of perception. This presupposition is likely a result of the twisted path of translation the word “\textit{dunamis}” has taken through history, but also of a certain modern mindset predisposed to find a subject acting in a

\(^{262}\) Ibid., 22.
world of objects. But if this the dunamis at work in the motion of phantasia were one belonging to our own, embodied souls, it seems altogether more likely that Aristotle would have spoken of the dunamis of phantasia alongside the dunameis of perception and thinking things through. Chapter Three showed that this is not the case. Also: if we return to the passage from the De Anima cited just previously (428b10-17), it is true that we hear that phantasia occurs “in beings that perceive,” that it is possible for a perceiving being to “have it.” But while it is possible for the one who “has” phantasia to do “many things resulting from this motion,” it is also true that the one having the motion of phantasia would “have done to it many things resulting from this motion.” This suggests that the motion, and with it, the being that is being moved, is at least in some respect separate from us. Let us follow this suggestion where it leads, which is away from the more typical interpretation of phantasia as somehow being about us, and towards the passage’s own suggestion that it is instead “about things of which there is perception.” What if we think of phantasia as a motion not about us, but instead “about things of which there is perception”? Might there be a dunamis belonging to the things “of which there is perception” that is set free to be at work by the being-at-work of perception? In the next section, we go on to argue that this is in fact the case, and that the being that is “set free” to be-at-work by the being-at-work of sense perception is the intelligible as such.

Recall from footnote 55 Joseph Owens’ observation that in Aristotle there is neither a term for “self” nor for “person” in Aristotle—and perhaps in ancient Greek thought more generally—the line between subject and object is not easily found, and this is especially the case in Aristotle’s understanding of perception. Owens puts it this way: “Before going into activity it [the sense or the intelligence] is the things potentially. In the actuality of cognition it is the things actually. Percipient and thing perceived, knower and thing known, are identical in the actuality of cognition.” In Aristotle, it is not we who are not at work on what we encounter in perceiving, but the intelligibility in the world is at work on us. Owens, “The Self in Aristotle,” 709–10.
The Perceptible and the Intelligible: De Anima III.8

In DA II.5, Aristotle tells us that the perceptive state (the being-at-work of perception) is “described in the same way as contemplating,” except it “differs in that the things that produce the being-at-work of perceiving” are distinct from the objects of contemplation in two different ways (417b19-21). Firstly, and most evidently, the objects of perception are external, as opposed to those of knowledge, which are “in some way in the soul itself” (417b23). Secondly, the objects of perception are particulars, while those of knowledge are universals. These differences in their objects mean that the two states of being-at-work, perceiving and contemplating, are also somewhat different with respect to volition: due to the external and particular characteristics of the objects of perception, “perceiving is not up to oneself, since it is necessary that the thing perceived be present,” while “thinking is up to oneself, whenever one wishes” (417b24-25).

Thinking is up to oneself, then, because its objects are “in some way in the soul itself.” This passage, 417b16-28, is the only place in II.5 where knowledge is not treated as an analogical illustration of the two different sorts of potencies, and is instead treated in its own right as a dunamis that is brought to be-at-work by its own object. This difference is especially noticeable directly after this passage, where Aristotle makes a comment that proves the passage to be somewhat of a digression from the central concern of the chapter. Aristotle writes: “But there will also be an opportunity to get clear about these things afterwards; for now let this much be distinguished, that being in potency is not meant in an unambiguous way…” (417b28-9). “These things” are the differences and similarities between perception and knowledge, and the “afterwards,” is DA III.8. This chapter makes a significant contribution to Aristotle’s distinction—and relation—between the perceptible and the intelligible, and so we turn to it here to better determine
how *phantasia* may be the motion—the becoming—of the intelligible that lies, somehow, “within” the perceptible.

Recall from Chapter Three (page 107) our defense of *DA* III.3’s placement in the larger work: considering *phantasia* as something other than a *dunamis* and as something instrumental in specifying the sort of objects of the next two *dunameis* of the soul, thinking things through and desire/locomotion, makes it easy to see that III.3 belongs where it stands. Looking at III.8, Polansky finds further evidence that III.3 is correctly situated, saying that III.8 “concludes the train of thought that began at the start of iii 3.”

He points to III.3 as beginning to differentiate between the “two key differences of soul,” “thought and sense,” and says that III.8 “completes the account of mind, and in conjunction with consideration of sense so that it seems to finish up the treatment of the cognitive faculties.”

This seems correct. *DA* III.4, 5, 6, and 7 have treated extensively of the intellective *dunamis*, looking at both its object and its activity. And in doing so, Aristotle again makes frequent use of analogy to better explain his perspective. It is notable, and a topic full of philosophical potential, that these analogies are on more than one occasion drawn from the realm of perception to illustrate the workings of knowledge, just as we saw Book II making frequent use of knowledge as an analogy to explain the workings of perception. (Consider, for example, the likening of both *phantasia* and *nous poietikos* to light and vision, or the likening of the operation of the intellective *dunamis* to the air acting on the eyeball or hearing in III.7). But when we get to III.8, neither

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265 Ibid.
perception nor knowledge serves as an analogy to the other; they instead appear side by side as twin foci. The chapter begins,

And now, bringing together what has been said about the soul under one main point, let us say again that the soul is in a certain way all beings, for beings are either perceptible or intelligible, while knowledge in a certain way is the things it knows, and perception is the things it perceives; but one needs to inquire in what way this is so. (DA III.8 431b20-24)

About this introduction, Castoriadis will throw up his hands, repeating the last line and calling it a "surprising statement, for we are almost at the end of the third and last book of the treatise, and, above all, because this is all that he has been doing, that is to say, seeking the relationship between nous and the noeta, aisthesis and the aistheta, is all he has been doing, in one way or another, since the beginning of the second book." And this is true. But what Aristotle has not yet finished is the discussion, begun in III.3, of how the aistheta and the noeta interact, which is to say, how the perceptive being can become the knowledgeable being. How perception works, and how knowledge works—how each interacts with the object that brings it to be at work—this has been examined: Castoriadis is correct about that. But how, exactly, does the perceptible—external and particular—thing relate to the intelligible—universal and “in some way” internal—thing? Certainly we must say that in some manner or fashion, the one must become the other. This is why DA III.8 is of central importance in this section.

Let us return to where we left off in III.8 and trace its course. It begins with Aristotle’s summary that “the soul is in a certain way all beings, for beings are either perceptible or intelligible,” because knowledge and perception are the objects that bring

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them to be at work. The question is how we are to understand that the soul *is* the objects it knows or perceives. We can do so *logically*, of course, which is the first way Aristotle answers the question: The next sentence (431b24-26) further clarifies that knowledge and potency can be “divided” [τέμνεται] according to the things with which they are concerned, and into both knowledge-in-potency and perception-in-potency when their objects are in potency, and knowledge-at-work and perception-at-work when their objects are at work. He goes on by saying that “what the perceiving and knowing capacities of the soul are in potency are the same things that are either known or perceived” [τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἑπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταῦτὰ ἐστί, τὸ μὲν <τὸ> ἑπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ <τὸ> αἰσθητὸν.] This answer definitely has the ring of a zealous logician about it: the verb used is “τέμνεται” which Liddell and Scott define as “cut,” “hew,” and “sever,” and here knowledge and perception are not only severed from each other, but from their objects. While it may make a certain degree of sense to speak of perception or knowledge in potency as separate from the knowable or perceptible thing in potency—the tree falling, for example, when no one is there to hear it—what exactly is one speaking of when one speaks of, say, perception-at-work-staying-itself as separate from the perceptible thing-at-work-staying-itself? This separation in speech seems related to—perhaps an extension of—the manner in which Aristotle finds perception one in being, but spoken of in two senses in *DA* II.5. Is there a natural consideration of the seeing of the eye to be separate from the thing seen? No; they cannot be separated in place, even if they can be separated in speech.

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267 Ἑπιστέων and αἰσθητόν are verbal adjectives, which can either function as a perfect passive participle (“perceived things”) or as with a nounal force that expresses possibility (“perceptible things”); in either case, it stands apart from Aristotle’s considerably more present rendering of what Wedin calls the “perceptive state,” the αἰσθήμα, or the circumlocution that is central to the current line of questioning, the “things of which there is perception” (428b13). See also footnote 192.
If until this point Aristotle has spoken as a logician, he speaks more as a physician in what comes next. If the soul in potency is the same as the things that are either known/knowable or perceived/perceivable, what in fact is it? “This has to be either those things themselves or their forms [εἰδη],” he answers, continuing, “it is certainly not themselves, since a stone is not present in the soul, but its form is” (431b28-432a1). The object of the knowing and perceiving capacities—and thus the being of the knowing and perceiving capacities themselves—is not the things themselves, but rather is their forms, their eidei. This argument, combined with the result of his analysis of knowledge and perception which maintains that each has its own proper objects, both in potency and at work, requires that these eidei be subdivided in at least one way, which is what he immediately goes on to say: “the intellect is a form of forms and sense perception is a form of perceptible things” (432a2-3). What this means of the soul, he says, is that “the soul is like a hand, for the hand is a tool of tools” (432a1-2). Like a hand using first one tool and then another to interact with the world around it, the soul, using its intellective capacity, can “handle” the eidos of eidei, the intelligible thing, and using its perceptive capacity, can “handle” the eidos of perceptible things. The soul is, then, the eidei of both the objects of the intellective and perceptive capacities.

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268 This interpretation differs from Polansky’s in a significant way: I take “form of forms” not to mean that “the knowable objects are in the soul of the learned person in potentiality, that is, as first actuality or developed potentiality,” but rather that just as the form of the perceptible object somehow refines and abstracts from the perceptible object itself, so too does the form of such forms further refine and abstract from the forms of perceptible things. This is not a watering down of things given in experience for Aristotle, though, so much as it is a condensing of the intelligibility of the world around us into the form of all forms, one an unmixed. Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary, 495–6.
The resulting two-step question, of course, is how the eidos of the stone, as perceived thing, comes to be in the soul, and, perhaps more difficultly, how the eidos of eidei of multiple stones, the universal of stones, comes to be in the soul as well. The answer to the first question seems to be phantasia: Phantasia is the motion of the eidos of the perceived stone coming to be in the soul. It is the motion of the phantasma coming to be in the soul. The answer to the second question seems much more complex; we shall discuss it in the next chapter. That phantasia is the motion of the eidos of the perceived stone coming to be in the soul is, again, not as clearly articulated as one would like. But as phantasia makes several appearances in the concluding paragraph of III.8, it is a feasible answer. As we squint to make out whether or not it is the motion of phantasia we discern as being responsible for the coming to be of the eidos of the stone in the soul, we again have cause to wonder whether the difficulty in seeing phantasia clearly is a result of Aristotle’s not having seen it clearly himself… or of him having seen it all too clearly, and inviting us to experience it as we come to see it.  

First: the paragraph as a whole is directed towards answering the much more demanding second question, i.e., how it is that the intelligible thing, the eidos of eidei, arises. Thus does the paragraph begin by clarifying where the intelligible things are: “But since—as it seems—there can be no item of experience apart from the extended magnitudes which are the separate perceptible things, the intelligible things are present in the perceptible forms” (432a3-5). As a result, he says, “one who perceived nothing would not be able to learn or be acquainted with anything either.” What Sachs here

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269 For earlier mentions of this possibility, see pages 81, 92, and 109.
translates as “be acquainted with” is the verb σύνει, a compound verb made of the verb “to be” and the conjunction “with.” This radical translation, “to be with,” is not inappropriate here. One who could not perceive anything would simply not be able to be alive, because one would not be able to be with anything, would have no eidei that the soul could be said to be—neither the eidei of perceptible things, nor the eidei of those eidei, the intelligible things. But it is the second half of this sentence in which phantasia makes an appearance, and the appearance made is through the phantasma:

...and, whenever one were to contemplate [θεωρή], it would be necessary at the same time to behold [θεωρεῖν] some image [phantasma]. For the things imagined [phantasmata] are just like the things perceived [aisthēmata], except without material. (DA III.8 432a8-10)

To contemplate, to actively become the intelligible thing, one must also behold some phantasma. And the reason given for this is that the phantasma is precisely the eidos of the thing perceived that was mentioned above: the phantasmata are just like the aisthēmata “except without the material.” The phantasma is the eidos of the perceptible thing.

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270 This claim is repeated with even more force in De Memoria: “And following what was said before about imagination in the writings on the soul, it is not possible even to think without an image...” (449b31). Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 168.

271 It is again important to note that in this awareness of the contemplated thing, one is also aware of oneself: here again, as in footnotes 55 and 190, do we find an indication that a fuller understanding of Aristotelian phantasia may lead naturally to a fuller understanding of an Aristotelian sense of “self.” But here, with the importance of phantasia to contemplation in particular, we can see also the importance of a sensitivity to phantasia’s analogical likeness as a medium, or, as with Long, as possible a mean. To contemplate/behold the intelligible thing, and thereby become it, it is necessary also to contemplate/behold the phantasma. This double contemplating indicates Velkley/Benardete’s “double nature of phantasia” that correlates with the “double nature of knowledge,” and such double-ness necessarily requires a medium that can work to establish both sameness and difference. Klaus Oehler observes that while “the divine Mind knows itself not incidentally but as its only object, whereas the human mind knows itself in so far as it is conscious of its object,” it is nonetheless important to realize that “[s]elf-consciousness is consciousness of itself, and this is by no means identical with consciousness of an object, which it has become.” Klaus Oehler, “Aristotle on Self-Knowledge,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 118, no. 6 (December 27, 1974): 497, 498, doi:10.2307/986399; Long, “On Touch and Life in the De Anima.”
Let us attempt to line up what is being said here with what was said in II.5. The capacity for knowledge is here treated as structurally the same as the capacity for perception: even Aristotle’s syntax encourages this symmetrical reading. As we said above, neither here appears as an analog for the other. But what is more, the striking difference between the two of them, which was so central to the work of II.5, is here totally obscured. In II.5, knowledge is only similar in structure to perception (and thus can only function as a successful analog for it) as a ‘second entelechy.’ Perception, as an *energeia* proper, can be compared only to knowledge as an *energeia* proper. It cannot be compared to the infant’s capacity to know, but rather to the capacity of the grammarian to contemplate ‘A’, or the capacity of the fit adult male to be a general. In II.5, Aristotle says, “In the potency for perception [αἰσθητικῶν], the first change [the first entelechy] comes about by the action of the parent, and when the living thing is born it already has what it takes to perceive” (417b17-18). As his two analogies make plain, however, knowledge is not like this. The human infant is born with a potency for knowledge, but only insofar as “humanity is part of the class of what knows and has knowledge” (417a24). That is, the human infant is born with the second potency of perception, but with only the *first* potency of knowledge.

Aristotle has not forgotten this difference in III.8. Rather, he is building upon it. Just as we saw in Chapter Three how II.5 broadened the context of II.1, so too does III.8

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272 Τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἢ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δοθμάτα, ἢ δ᾽ ἐντελεχεία εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχεία. The subjects of the sentence, knowledge and perception, are grouped together, and then called in to the second and third clauses together, quite symmetrically.

273 Lived experience does suggest that in many respects the first entelechy of knowledge “comes about by the action of the parent,” but insofar as, say, helping a child with homework happens after birth, it certainly does not amount to a counter-argument.
again broaden that context. Let us revisit and expand upon the figures we used to illustrate this broadening. In II.1, Aristotle introduces the difference between the first and second entelechies (the two different ways of being-at-work) using knowledge as an analogy; we found that II.5’s focus was similar, but instead was on the first and second potencies (the two different ways of being-in-potency). We represented that by means of Figure III.1, modifying the translation of *dunamis* slightly in Figure III.2, and so we here present those two figures together as Figure IV.1:

**Figure IV.1: First and Second Entelechies, First and Second Dunamis**

*DA II.1: Having Knowledge v.s. Using Knowledge*

*DA II.5: An Innate Tendency to Have Knowledge v.s. An Innate Tendency to Use Knowledge*

This change in focus was found to be in fact a broadening of the focus of II.1, with the two different ways of being-in-potency relating to the two different ways of being-at-work. We illustrated this as Figure III.3; it appears here as Figure IV.2:

**Figure IV.2: First Dunamis and Entelechey, Second Dunamis and Entelechey**

*An Innate Tendency to Have Knowledge → Having Knowledge*

*An Innate Tendency to Use Knowledge → Using Knowledge*
In III.8, the focus is once again enlarged, as Aristotle promised it would be in II.5 when he says “there will be an opportunity to get clear about these things afterwards” (417b29). His concern with the transition from the first entelchy (second potency) of knowledge (“Having Knowledge”/“An Innate Tendency to Use Knowledge”) to the second entelechy (“Using Knowledge”) depends on getting clear on how the transition from the first potency of knowledge (“An Innate Tendency to Have Knowledge”) to the first entelechy of same (“Having Knowledge”) happens. And this means beginning to see that knowledge does not operate so much symmetrically alongside perception, but over it, including it, depending on it. We might illustrate this by taking the first of the two lines above, that showing the change from the first potency of knowledge to the first entelechy and expanding its arrow symbol to include the transition from the second potency for perception becoming the second entelechy of perception.

**Figure IV.3: First Dunamis and Entelechy of Knowledge Dependent on Second Dunamis and Entelechy of Perception**

An Innate Tendency to Have Knowledge $\rightarrow \rightarrow$ (An Innate Tendency to Use Perception $\rightarrow$ Using Perception) $\rightarrow \rightarrow$ Having Knowledge

Again: the “one who perceived nothing would not be able to learn or be acquainted with anything either” (432a7). But it is not just perceiving that is crucial here: it is the development of the *phantasma* that in someway results from perception. Thus that passage continues, “…and, whenever one were to contemplate, it would be necessary at the same time to behold some image” (432a7-8). The grammarian does not come to be
contemplating the letter ‘A,’ does not transition from the second potency to the second entelechy, without depending upon the phantasma, for without the phantasma of this and that particular letter ‘A’s’, there is no form of these phantasmata to contemplate.

Aristotle is clear in numerous places that learning is true alteration, or a motion. While it is questionable where the motion of phantasia ceases and the motion of learning begins, it is at least clear from what Aristotle says in III.8 that without phantasia, there can be no learning, and that without learning, of course, there can be no contemplation. Phantasia is essential to the possibility of learning, and thus to contemplation.

Considering it as the motion by which a perceptible thing becomes intelligible, as the entelecheia of a dunamis belonging to the things “of which there is perception” that is set free to be at work by the being-at-work of perception, helps us to understand the reason it is essential.

In addition to III.3 and III.8, there is a third key place in the De Anima where Aristotle pauses to discuss the way sense perception receives not the thing perceived itself, but its eidos. This is DA II.12, and it uses another analogy, the metaphor of the signet ring leaving an impression on wax. A consideration of this chapter in conjunction with a second place in which the same metaphor appears, in the De Memoria, further supports our reading of phantasia. It does so by clarifying the “place” of the soul in the motion by which the eidos of a perceptible thing comes to be in the soul, and also by giving us a vocabulary in which to further discuss and consider the motion that is phantasia: birth.

274 See, for example, DA II.5 417a30, 417b10ff.
DA II.12 opens this way:

But about all sense perception in general, it is necessary to grasp that the sense is receptive of the forms \(\varepsilon\iota\delta\omicron\) of perceptible things without their material, as wax is receptive of the design \(\sigma\nu\mu\epsilon\iota\omicron\) of a ring without the iron or gold, and takes up the golden or bronze design \(\sigma\nu\mu\epsilon\iota\omicron\), but not as gold or bronze… (DA II.12 424a18ff.)

The same metaphor, albeit with considerably more detail, appears in the second section of the Parva Naturalia, De Memoria.

But someone might be at an impasse about how, when the thing one is concerned with is absent, but the experience of it is present, one remembers something that is not present. For it is clear that one must conceive the sort of thing that comes about in the soul—and in the part of the body that contains it—as a result of sense perception as something like a picture \(\zeta\omicron\omicron\gamma\alpha\phi\mu\tau\omicron\), the active holding of which we assert to be memory. For the motion \(\kappa\iota\nu\eta\sigma\zeta\) that comes about \(\gamma\iota\nu\omega\mu\epsilon\nu\eta\) traces in something like an outline \(\tau\omicron\pi\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\) of the thing perceived, in the same way people mark designs into things with rings. This is why, in people who are in vigorous motion on account of passion or their time of life, memory does not come about, just as if the motion and its impression fell upon flowing water; in others, on account of being worn down like old walls and because of hardness in the receptive part that is acted upon, the outline \(\tau\omicron\pi\omicron\zeta\) does not get into \(\epsilon\gamma\gamma\gamma\iota\nu\varepsilon\tau\omicron\) it… (Mem. 450a25-450b5).275

In both presentations of this metaphor, we have the idea that the things we encounter in sense perception impress their form \(\varepsilon\iota\delta\omicron\zeta\) or design \(\sigma\nu\mu\epsilon\iota\omicron\) (or fail to do so) on something akin to wax. But what is the analog to the wax? In the first passage, Aristotle goes on to clarify that “[t]he sense organ is the first thing that has the potency to be acted upon in that way, so the organ and the potency refer to the same thing, but the being of them is different; for the thing that does the sensing must be something extended…” (424a25-27, emphasis mine). When I see an olive, the olive firstly brings my eye to be at work in the same way that the olive itself is at work; the eye, as the sense

275 Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 170.
organ, is the analog to the wax. Sachs provides a footnote here: “…by form, Aristotle
does not mean shape or appearance,” and what is meant here is something more like the
olive’s
invisi
ble look, grasped by looking away from its visible attributes. That to which
one must look, according to Aristotle, is the being-at-work of the thing. It is then,
no part of the analogy Aristotle intends with the wax impression, that the eyeball,
say, becomes shaped and colored like an olive when it looks at one. \(^{276}\)

But in the passage from *De Memoria*, the olive still acts as a signet ring, but the “wax” it
impresses upon is again *firstly* noted as “the part of the body that contains” the
impression—such as the eye—but then *also* as the soul itself: “For it is clear that one
must conceive the sort of thing that comes about in the soul—and in the part of the body
that contains it [the sort of thing that comes about]—as a result of sense perception as
something like a picture…” This “something like a picture,” reiterated a few lines later
as “something like an outline,” is the *eidos*. And what becomes quite clear in the
metaphor’s presentation in the *De Memoria*, is that the motion, the *kinēsis*, by which the
*eidos* becomes “impressed” in (as) the soul, does not originate in the soul, but in the thing
encountered in sense perception. In the act of perceiving something, in the perceptive
state, or *aisthēma*, firstly the “waxen” sense organ takes on an impression; this state, this
being-at-work of perception, then allows the motion of the intelligible to act upon the
soul itself, creating the *phantasma*.

In this passage, Aristotle is faithful to the language of III.3. He speaks of a
motion that results from sense perception. This motion, however, is not always able to
reach its goal: in certain people, the “motion and its impression” fall upon souls that are

\(^{276}\) Ibid., 118, fn.16.
as though “flowing water,” and thus too fluid, or upon those that are as “old walls” and thus too hard. He concludes the paragraph this way: the very young, the very old, the very quick and the very slow fail to form or retain impressions well, with some of these being “more fluid than is needed and the latter…more hardened; the image \[phantasma\] does not remain in the soul in the former, and it does not attach itself to the latter” (450b5-12). Again: what is clear from this part of the metaphor is that the motion that initiates the impression does not belong to the soul, though the receptivity of the motion does: \textit{phantasia}, then, is the motion of the intelligibility in things, seeking to make its mark in us.

This is not to discount that the sense organ or the soul do not have some active aspect in the reception of this motion and its resulting impression. The \textit{dunameis} of the soul mean that it is a dynamic entity, waiting to be set free to do what it is meant to do. But if we here distinguish that capacity from the power that sets it to be at work, we can see more clearly that \textit{phantasia}, as the motion of the very intelligibility of the world around us, has its own power. Just as the earth has the power to actively receive, in a nourishing way, the seed, or as the womb can actively receive and nourish the embryo, the reception of the seed or the motion of the embryo is \textit{not} the motion of the soil or of the womb, no matter how “active” it may be said to be. The soil and the womb are not in motion, but rather are in an active condition, actively prepared to be moved or acted upon. This distinction is tied to what we heard Kosman call “the heart” of \textit{Met. IX(Θ)}.6, that “\textit{energeia} is in one sense as \textit{kinēsis} to \textit{dunamis}, in another sense as \textit{ousia} to some
matter [τινα ολην]” (1048b8).\textsuperscript{277} We might also recall Sachs’ commentary on this passage: The being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency, as material, is thinghood. The being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency as a potency is motion.\textsuperscript{278} The being-at-work-staying-itself of the dunameis of the soul constitute its thinghood; the being-at-work-staying-itself of the intelligibility within things constitutes the motion of coming to be intelligible. A physics of phantasia requires that we carefully delineate the motion of the intelligible from the active, albeit receptive, condition of the soul to better grasp that phantasia is the becoming motion—perhaps even the birth—of the intelligible as such, and thus begins the process whereby entelecheia becomes “entelecheia.”

The passage cited from the De Memoria above concludes by observing that some waxen souls are too fluid or too hard, and as a result the “the outline [τυπος]” or eidos of a given perceptible thing “does not get into” them (450b4-5). What Sachs translates here as “get into” is the verb “ἐγγίνεται.” The primary meaning of ἐγγίγνομαι, an immediate family member of gignomai, is “to be born in” a place, and gignomai itself can be translated as “to be born;” we might wonder what could be gained by considering phantasia, a motion of becoming, as similar to the motion of birth.\textsuperscript{279} Indeed: one may be reminded here of the enticing assertion made in the De Generatione Animalium: “in the human embryo, everything belonging to the soul develops along with the body except the intellect, which comes in from outside” (736b 27-29).\textsuperscript{280} In the next section, we consider a striking observation of a large portion of the secondary literature regarding

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{277} Kosman, The Activity of Being, 2013, 39.
\item \textsuperscript{278} Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Physics, 79.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Liddell and Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon.
\end{itemize}
phantasia: much of it seeks to declare that phantasia is active or passive, but there is no clear consensus as to which. In what follows, the goal is not to fully explicate either side of this dispute, but rather to get a sense of the major points on each side to better illustrate the attraction of attempting to describe phantasia as one or the other. Doing so prepares us to consider phantasia as the sort of middle-voiced motion that birth itself is: appearing, becoming, birth are all motions best described as middle-voiced and neither as active nor passive.

**Phantasia as Genesis: Active or Passive**

It seems likely that failing to make the distinction between the active, receptive condition of the “wax” and the motion that makes the “impression” is responsible for the numerous readings of Aristotelian phantasia that argue for a passive and receptive phantasia. Such readings can largely be taken as variations upon what has become known as the “decaying sense theory” in the secondary literature. In fact, Wedin calls the “decaying sense” theory the “traditional interpretation.” But while the theory often appears by name, it appears less often with attribution, which is perhaps fitting: It was Thomas Hobbes who first used the term, and while it seems more than likely he did so as a result of reading (perhaps better: misreading) Aristotle, neither did he attribute it to Aristotle. Martha Nussbaum has more recently reasserted the appropriation, but Hobbes’ account is nonetheless more sympathetic to what Aristotle is about than Nussbaum’s unattributed gloss of it is. Nussbaum takes “decaying-sense theory” to rely heavily on

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282 For an introduction to the secondary literature that discusses the possible indebtedness of Hobbes to Aristotle, see especially the first four chapters of: Cornelis Hendrik Leijenhorst and Cees Leijenhorst, *The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’s Natural Philosophy*.
visual, pictorial images;\textsuperscript{283} Hobbes’ own account has no such dependence. In fact, he writes in the \textit{Leviathan},

For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee [\textit{sic}] still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latines call \textit{Imagination}, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it \textit{Fancy}; which signifies \textit{apparence} [\textit{sic}], \textbf{and is as proper to one sense, as to another}. Imagination therefore is nothing but \textit{decaying sense}; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.\textsuperscript{284}

Castoriadis doesn’t mention the “decaying-sense theory” by name, though he summarizes it better than Nussbaum, saying that the “second imagination” of III.3 “turns out in fact to be determined as being nothing other than \textit{persistence} (429a4-5) of sensation, a feeble and distorted echo, the retention of an “image” that adds to it [sensation], strangely, only a positive negativity, an increased possibility of error.”\textsuperscript{285} (Recall, too, that we heard Castoriadis say that after Aristotle discovered this sense of imagination, it was “the sense that later became banal,” which further support Wedin’s assertion that the decaying-sense theory is the “traditional interpretation.”) Even accounts that ultimately oppose this “decaying-sense” reading of this chapter, such as Wedin’s,\textsuperscript{286} nonetheless depend on

\textsuperscript{283} “…the image theory persistently ignores auditory, olfactory, and tactile images, and hence has no account of them that would show that they functioned at all like visual picture-images…” Aristotle and Nussbaum, \textit{Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium}, 228.


\textsuperscript{285} This characterization of \textit{phantasia} as “nothing other than \textit{persistence} of sensation” is all the more striking since Castoriadis allows that the “second imagination” has “two manifestations or realizations,” one of which provides a “deformed doublet of sensation,” the other of which is a “capacity to evoke such images independent of all present sensation,” and which is recombinatory/reproductive” (225-226, 227). Castoriadis, \textit{World in Fragments}, 225–226; To counterbalance Castoriadis' derogative tone in calling this “persistence of sensation” that only adds "an increased possibility of error" to sensation, see Caston on the possible explanatory power of \textit{phantasia} for Aristotle's account of error itself: Caston, “Why Aristotle Needs Imagination.”

\textsuperscript{286} “So if the canonical theory is the theory that imagination is nothing but decaying sense, then it is doubtful that it can cover imagination involved in deliberation. As we shall see, other problems also face this version of the theory…” and then, in conclusion, “…the decaying sense theory is not required to account for Aristotle’s canonical theory of imagination.” Wedin, \textit{Mind and Imagination in Aristotle}, 84-90.
understanding *phantasia*’s role as somehow causing what is encountered in sensation to persist, and thereby find *phantasia* to be about the soul’s receptive nature.

Indeed, even if one thinks of *phantasia* as an *actively* receptive nature, one still fails to access the fully active power of *phantasia*, which has far-reaching effects. Even Sachs, who we heard say in Chapter Two that the *eidos* “that organizes the plant or animal also works upon the perceiving or thinking soul that recognizes that plant or animal,” still nonetheless translates the deponent verb γίγνομαι where it occurs in the central passage in an considerably more passive way. Sachs has the *phantasma* “become present” to us, which seems to suggest that *phantasia* is more about the passive attunement of the soul than it is about active creation; *phantasia* is not that by which we speak of how *phantasmata* are created or come to be, but is rather that by which such images “become present to us.” It is noteworthy, however, that the deponent verb γίγνομαι has other—more common—translations, and that in other places in the *De Anima*, Sachs chooses the more typical—and more active—sense of “to come into being” to render the word.287 Using this sense at 428a-12 would certainly animate the passage—and our understanding of *phantasia*’s relationship to *phantasmata*—in a completely different way. *Phantasia* would be that by which images come into being, are produced, or are even born—and the dative, ἡμῖν, could then be translated as “to us,” “for us,” or even “by us.” And yet Sachs is not alone in providing the word with a more limited sense at 428a1-2: several other translators opt to temper this instance of γίγνομαι

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287 Two other such appearances occur at 431a3, which Sachs translates as “come into being,” and a participial appearance at 430a31, which he renders as “things that are going to be.” “Become present” does allow for all of these, of course, but it still stands a far distance from a rendering wherein *phantasia* is that by which images “come into being,” to say nothing of “are produced” or “born.” See Liddell and Scott, *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon*. 
with presence, instead of extending it to existence more generally (Scott and Liddell call
the latter category of definitions those of a “radical sense.”)288 LAWSON-TANCRED AND
HAMLYN have the image “occur to us;” HICKS AND HETT have it “present itself to us;” ROSS
simply says phantasia is that in virtue of which we say we “have” an image, no doubt
thinking the dative signals possession, as SMYTH notes it can when taken by gignomai.289
The approaches of POLANSKY, SMITH, AND APOSTLE are somewhat less limited: the first two
have the phantasma “arise” for us, and APOSTLE says it is “formed” in us.290 ONLY B EAR, in
glossing this passage, uses a more “radical” sense, and speaks of phantasmata being
“engendered” in us.291 Why might a translator avoid the translations “produced in/for us”
or “come into being in/for us” or even “born to/for us”/“birthed by us”? The grammar of
the passage does not prohibit such readings.

Perhaps translators are often swayed because there seem to be many reasons—
both contextual/philosophical and grammatical—to argue for a phantasia in III.3 that is
“a passive or presentational phenomenon.”292 According to a detailed and lengthy
footnote on the grammatical provenance of “phantasia” in Malcolm Schofield’s article
“Aristotle on the Imagination”, both phantasia and phantasma are derived from the verb
phantazō, “to make apparent,” a word that is “found only in its middle and passive forms

288 Ibid.
289 Aristotle, Christopher Shields, and David Walter Hamlyn, De Anima: Books 2. and 3. with Passages
1957); Aristotle and Hicks, De Anima; Aristotle and Lawson-Tancred, De Anima (On the Soul), 244;
Aristotle and Ross, De Anima. Edited, with Introduction and Commentary, by Sir David Ross; Herbert Weir
Smyth, Greek Grammar (Benediction Classics, 2014), sec. 1476.
290 Aristotle and Apostle, Aristotle’s on the Soul; Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary,
291 Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle, 291, sidebar.
before the Hellenistic period.”293 Phantasia’s passive/middle genetic inheritance, then, means that it has “a natural passive tendency in the language as we find it, at odds with the active force of ‘imagination.’”294 Schofield is not alone in advising us thereby to avoid conflating the phantasia presented in III.3 with a more modern (and actively creative) sense of “imagination.” Says Lycos:

I feel we must avoid the odd procedure of translating "φαντασία" with a word that has very different uses from the Greek one, and then, in order to avoid misunderstanding and nonsense, having to exclude from our minds the ordinary uses of "imagination", and, especially, of the verb "to imagine".295

Though “‘imagination’ may often be the closest English approximation to Aristotle’s phantasia,” Kevin White warns us to “bear in mind the extreme inappropriateness” of the “post-Aristotelian connotations of the term” that suggest “poetic theory” or even “an aspect of scientific genius.”296 Michael Wedin’s reading, which is certainly one of the most comprehensive readings of phantasia in DA III.3, proposes a “canonical theory” of imagination that depends on it not being an “active faculty,” at all, “let alone the so-called creative imagination.”297 Victor Caston agrees, adding that translating “phantasia” as “imagination” not only “makes little sense of Aristotle's arguments,” but that recognizing that fact and proceeding with such a translation anyway is risky: for even though “the secondary literature standardly takes note of the discrepancy, it is difficult to remain uninfluenced.”298 Given this chorus of voices, Schofield’s assessment that “phantasia’s” etymology has left “its mark on Aristotle’s treatment of the faculty of

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294 Ibid.
297 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 29.
phantasia in DA 3.3,” is fair. He points to Aristotle’s “predilection for phainetai, ‘appears,’ as an index to the operation of phantasia,” and suggests that this predilection “suggests that he thinks of the mind in phantasia as the passive recipient of experiences, not as actively imagining.” Little wonder, then, that so many choose to translate gignesthai in our central passage in terms that make phantasia appear as being receptive to images as they “become present.”

However, Schofield also recognizes that Aristotle occasionally “presses phantasia into service as the name for a mental disposition or act, comparable with thinking and perceiving,” and in so doing “reveals a philosophical impulse to force the word into a more active sense,” even if this sense is “latent” within it. Schofield is not alone in making this observation; we shall go on to look briefly at others who do the same. But first, let us look again at III.3 itself: what in the philosophical and contextual aspects of the chapter may contribute to such a division in the secondary literature? Advocates of a largely passive phantasia have less to say about the portion of DA III.3 that leads up to our central passage (428a1-4) and more to say about what follows it. In fact, the second category of difficulties in the secondary literature that we enumerated in Chapter One (see page 3) is largely comprised of those who find what is said before our central passage to be at odds with what is said after. Before 428a, we have several indications that phantasia may be active. It is said to be necessary to “conceiving that something is the case” [ὑπόληψις], but distinct in that phantasia is “available to us whenever we want it” while ὑπόληψις is “not up to us” (427b17-18). Here, it sounds like something we

300 Ibid., 252, fn.11.
actively engage when we feel moved to do so. Aristotle supports this claim by pointing to two examples as evidence. The first is the ability of rhetoricians “to make something appear before the eyes [πρὸ ὀμμάτων …τι ποιήσασθαι],” glossing them as people “who make images [εἰδωλοποιοῦντες] to fit [τιθέμενοι] things into a memory-assisting scheme” (427b18-20). This ability to “make images,” to “fit” them into a mnemonic device, to “make something appear before the eyes,” is overtly active in sense (even if the grammatical underpinnings vary in voice: “ποιήσασθαι” is an aorist middle infinitive, “εἰδωλοποιοῦντες” is a present active participle, and “τιθέμενοι” is a present middle/passive participle.) The second example contrasts having an opinion that something is terrifying with only imagining that it is: “when we have the opinion that something is terrifying or frightening we immediately feel the corresponding feeling…but with the imagination we are in the same condition as if we were beholding terrifying …things in a painting” (427b21-24). Clearly here, too, Aristotle indicates an active sense of imagination, an active ability to call to mind images that we know are images, and which cannot therefore frighten us.

But what comes next is our central passage, wherein Aristotle proposes via a simple conditional to turn our attention to the possibility that phantasia is that by which we speak of some image as ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι. Firstly, of course, he asks (again, accepting the emendation of ἄρα at 428a3, as we did in Chapter Two) whether phantasia is one of the dunameis or hexeis by which we actively discriminate something, and as we argued in Chapter Three, he finds that it is not any of the possibilities that he goes on to suggest (perception, opinion, knowledge, and the contemplative intellect.) The rest of the chapter
is what is largely at issue in those interpretations that advocate for a largely passive
phantasia in DA III.3.\textsuperscript{301} Especially curious is what happens to a heretofore unexamined
portion of our central passage amongst those who seek to get a handle on the felt
inconsistencies in III.3 by analyzing phantasia according to its relative activity or
passivity: metaphoric phantasia. “Now if imagination is that by which we speak of some
image as becoming present to us, rather than anything we might call imagination in a
metaphorical way…” Because Aristotle so clearly brackets metaphoric phantasia off
from what follows, but is unclear about what it means, it is common to find amazingly
diverse readings of just what metaphoric phantasia is. The fact that one of the most
consistent manners of dealing with metaphoric phantasia is to differentiate it from the
phantasia per se (a designation I here introduce to maintain clarity) by way of a
distinction in voice is interesting; the fact that some readings find it active (Frede,
“Philoponus,” and Brann) and others passive (Hicks, Hamlyn and Polansky) is
fascinating.

Metaphoric phantasia is almost always a topic relegated to footnotes, and this is
where we find Dorothea Frede’s interpretation. The footnote reads:

without wanting to be over-confident on this much debated question, my
suspicion is that this active use of imagination, the \textit{eidōlopoiein} in 427b20 (that is
up to us and is \textit{neither true nor false}) is the sense of phantasia that is ruled out in
428a2 as \textit{kata metaphoran}, since it never recurs in De Anima and does not suit the
cognitive use which Aristotle wants to ascribe to phantasia… Most importantly,

\textsuperscript{301} In this group we may include: Caston, “Why Aristotle Needs Imagination”; Castoriadis, “The
De Anima Iii 3”; Wedin, \textit{Mind and Imagination in Aristotle}; White, “The Meaning of Phantasia in
Aristotle’s De Anima, III 3-8.”
free phantasizing does not fit the definition of *phantasia* that is soon to follow: a motion in the soul caused by sense-perception.\textsuperscript{302} This “cognitive use,” then, reflects the “passive or medial meaning of ‘having an appearance,’” and not creating an appearance.\textsuperscript{303} But it would be a mistake to thereby conclude that Frede’s “cognitive *phantasia*” is entirely passive: she takes seriously its medial inheritance, too. Cognitive *phantasia* is responsible not just for the “retention of sense-perceptions,” but also for the *synthesis* of same; hers is not strictly a decaying-sense theory, for she finds that *phantasia* is also responsible for the application of “thought to objects of sense-perception.”\textsuperscript{304} Nonetheless, it remains the more passive of the two *phantasiai* that Frede here distinguishes, and in this she is joined by the commentator known as “Philoponus.” Frede does not cite Philoponus’ interpretation to substantiate her suspicion, but she easily could have: he also observes that just prior to the central passage, Aristotle has said “that it is within our power to imagine what we wish,” and he calls this a “voluntary imagination” which in the central passage he finds being contrasted with *phantasia per se*:

… but there is also imagination against or will, which is taken from phantasms, that is, from sense-objects; there is not only voluntary imagination, which he rightly calls ‘metaphorical,’ since it carries off from things that are and constructs a representation of that which is not, for instance a centaur from a horse and a bull. If there is imagination against our will, then, I do not imagine what I wish, but by some one discerning power I imagine what is false as false and the truth as truth…”\textsuperscript{305}

(Later, in Chapter Six, we shall find that the distinction “voluntary/involuntary” leads interpretations of *phantasia* in a more accurate direction than “active/passive”: there is

\textsuperscript{302} Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” 280, fn.3.
\textsuperscript{303} Ibid., 280, note 3.
\textsuperscript{304} Ibid., 282.
Insofar as she suggests that metaphoric phantasia points to an “active use” of phantasia, Frede is somewhat in the company of Eva Brann, who takes Frede’s assessment of metaphoric phantasia even further. Brann’s broader conclusion, after considering what she finds to be “the two crucial sentences on the nature of the imagination” in Aristotle—428a1-4 and 428b10-15, or our central passage and the first of the two on phantasia as a sort of motion—is that phantasia is not a power of the soul because it is actually just an element of perception. She connects 428a1-2 with 459a1-17 from De Sommiis: “The phantasia-faculty (τὸ φανταστικόν) is the same with the sense faculty, but their being differs.” Of this passage she writes, “In other words, phantasia, if you insist on speaking of it as a faculty, is sensation, but when it comes to explanation, it is not the same but only a certain movement in the process of sensation.”

What, then, does she make of metaphoric phantasia? “I therefore understand Aristotle to say that those who call it a power speak of it metaphorically.” In other words, Brann takes Frede’s conclusion even further: metaphoric phantasia is not actually an active use of phantasia that is not at issue in the De Anima. Rather, it is simply a way of talking about phantasia that is in error by speaking of it as an active power of the soul.

But again, what is most interesting about this interpretive move—for those supporting a largely passive phantasia to see in the cast-off “metaphoric phantasia” an

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307 Ibid., 41.
active counterpart—is that a similar but opposing move is made by two readers who support a largely active phantasia. Hicks, Hamlyn, and Polansky similarly attempt to get a handle on the felt inconsistencies within DA III.3 by analyzing phantasia along the lines of its apparent activity and passivity, but declare phantasia to be active, and metaphoric phantasia to thereby be passive. Consider, for example, Hicks’ interpretation, that “the wider, or what A. here calls the metaphorical, meaning is based on the felt connection of φαντασία with φαίνεσθαι [the present middle/passive infinitive of φαίνω, meaning “to come to light, to appear”], while the more limited meaning [what we have been calling “phantasia per se” is determined rather by the meaning φαντάζεσθαι [“to make visible, to present to the eye”] and φάντασμα.” Metaphoric phantasia is thus involved with “πᾶν τὸ φαίνόμενον [anything that appears] or πάθος ὁτιοῦν τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ [affection of whatever is in the soul]” while phantasia per se is responsible for a more active sense of the soul’s ability as image-producing. Polansky sites Hicks and agrees with him, saying that “[t]he ignored metaphorical usage is that...”

308 It is here worth mentioning that this trio is not alone in suggesting that phantasia per se is largely active. It is also worth noting that several of these readings do not find metaphoric phantasia to be a passive counterpart to this more active phantasia per se. Consider, for example, the position of Martha Nussbaum, which, though it connects phantasia per se instead of metaphoric phantasia with φαίνεσθαι, argues that this connection makes of phantasia an active faculty, responsible for helping a creature with phantasia identify what appears as beneficial or detrimental. When she connects phantasia per se with appearing, she does so with the understanding that what she means by “appearing” is actually closer to “appearing as,” making of phantasia per se an active sort of judgment. Metaphoric phantasia, in her interpretation, does not become the passive partner in this interpretation. Rather, she follows Freudenthal, and is followed by Watson, in claiming it means “mere show” (and which we will consider in Chapter Six.)

This examination of readings of DA III.3 with respect to the activity of passivity has not been undertaken to show that all readings are either one or the other, nor to show that readings in either group always result in a claim that metaphoric phantasia is the alternate option (active, if phantasia per se is argued to be passive, and vice versa.) Rather, this examination has been undertaken to show the extent to which the general reaction to the felt inconsistencies in DA III.3 is to try to get a hold of phantasia in terms of the distinction “active/passive”. Aristotle and Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium; J. Freudenthal, “Zur Kritik Und Exegese von Aristoteles’ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργων (parva Naturalia). (Teil I) (Rheinisches Museum Für Philologie) | Freudenthal, J.,” Europeana, 1869, http://www.europeana.eu/portal/record/09428/permalink_2011_01_rhm_5401.html; Watson, “Φαντασία in Aristotle, De Anima 3. 3.”

309 Aristotle and Hicks, De Anima, 460–1.

310 Ibid.
extended way of saying anything "appears" (φαίνεται) so that *phantasia* might include any cognition whatsoever...” and contrasts this position with Frede, with whom he disagrees.\(^{311}\) Hamlyn also links the metaphoric *phantasia* with φαίνεσθαι and *phantasia per se* with φαντάζεσθαι, though he does so somewhat half-heartedly, noting that in what follows the central passage, “Aristotle makes many references to ‘appearing’ under the heading of imagination proper.” “There is clearly,” he says, “little consistency here.”\(^{312}\) The inclination to sort *phantasia* out according to its relative activity or passivity is obviously pronounced, but so too is the frustration when it fails to entirely line up as one or the other. One commentator, recognizing the myriad ways in which other scholars have found *phantasia* to be active, says in conclusion that he has “tried to show, however, that *phantasia* is essentially passive,” and suggests that “the active functions attributed to it by some scholars would be better assigned to other faculties of the soul.”\(^{313}\)

*Phantasia as Genesi: Active and Passive*

The difficulty, then, is that *phantasia*—even metaphoric *phantasia*—hasn’t appeared as clearly active or passive, and so commentators relying on the active/passive distinction need to provide considerable caveats to present a *phantasia* that appears unified within only *DA* III.3, let alone with what is said about *phantasia* elsewhere in the *De Anima* and in Aristotle’s *œuvre* in general. In fact, the case could be made that the third category of complaints about Aristotelian *phantasia*—that what is said most explicitly about it in the *De Anima* cannot be made to square with mentionings of it

\(^{311}\) Polansky, *Aristotle’s De Anima*, 414.
\(^{313}\) One of the readings Turnbull here reacts to is Dorothea Frede’s, mentioned above on page 170. Turnbull, “Aristotle on Imagination: De Anima Iii 3,” 333.
elsewhere in Aristotle’s oeuvre—is also a matter of the more prevalent passive readings of DA III.3 coming into conflict with the more active tone of its appearances elsewhere (most notably III.7 and III.10 and 11, not to mention the Rhetoric). In this section, the goal is to look at three accounts that attempt to leave room in their interpretations for phantasia to be both active and passive. These are the accounts of Beare, Wedin, and Long.

In the first “Question” of Chapter Two, we observed that phantasia may be responsible for our ability to encounter a thing’s appearance, the way it presents to us, but that it also may be responsible for our ability to then make an image of that thing, thereby re-presenting it. We can now see that these two possibilities also line up well with the interpretations of phantasia considered above: a passive phantasia would be more likely to result in “presentations” of things encountered in experience; an active one would be better suited to resulting in “representations.” John Isaac Beare, less concerned with a unified sense of phantasia than Michael Wedin, speaks freely of phantasia as a faculty with “two grades,” which essentially divides phantasia into two faculties: “In the one grade it is the faculty of presentation; in the other, the faculty of representation, or the reproductive imagination.” Thus he tries to hold together both the passive sense, the “process” wherein presentations are received, and the “activity of ψυχή” that represents, in various forms, these presentations. He says that “[t]he characteristic meaning of φαντασία, or τὸ φανταστικὸν [and this appositive clause alone demonstrates

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314 Additionally, a case could be made whereby the phantasia that appears in the Nicomachean Ethics is of a more passive variety.
315 Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle, 290.
316 Ibid., 296, 293.
his desire to elide what others have so carefully tried to distinguish], in Aristotle’s psychology,

is that of the faculty by which φαντάσματα, mental presentations, are in the first instance formed, and in the second reproduced, in the absence of the αἰσθήματα to which they are ultimately affiliated… The impressions of sense, the αἰσθήματα, do not disappear or perish with the instant of their first perception. They leave traces (μοναί) of themselves [see here his note of the multiplicity of places in which this term is found], or persist, ‘within us.’ These traces are somehow stored up. This ‘storing up’ is effected by successive φαντασίαι, i.e. ‘appearances’ or presentations through immediate sense; and when a store of αἰσθήματα has been formed, the ground is prepared for φαντασία (or τὸ φανταστικόν) in the further application of this term, i.e. as the faculty of reproducing images which were once before the mind, even when the objects which gave rise to them have disappeared from perception…”  

Beare is to be applauded for looking at Aristotle’s *phantasia* and seeing what is really appearing—something like an active faculty, but also something like a passive process—without trying too hard to impose a pre-existing image of a solely active or solely receptive ability onto the text. And yet, the difficulties encountered by a more careful reading of *DA* III.3 are real: where, for instance, is Beare’s account of our troubling central passage? Moreover, had Aristotle truly intended to present something like a “bi-grade” faculty, it seems more than likely that he would have done so with the usual clarity attending his frequent descriptions of anything that has multiple parts or levels.

Wedin, for his part, is more concerned with a unified sense of *phantasia*. Even though he admits that his canonical theory emphasizes some things over others that Aristotle says about *phantasia*, and recognizes that “Aristotle does have other things to say on the topic, some of which seems… incompatible with the canonical theory,” still his account of *phantasia* does well to both preserving the multiplicity of things Aristotle

317 Ibid., 291.
says about *phantasia* while nonetheless coming away with a unified conception.\(^3\) As we saw in Chapter Two, Wedin hardly speaks of appearances/presentations, focusing almost exclusively on images as the result or act of *phantasia*’s motion. What keeps his account more true to Aristotle’s sometimes passive, sometimes active sense of *phantasia* is not, as with Beare, a holding apart of presentations and representations, but rather a more nuanced and multivalent sense of what an image is for Aristotle. We’ve already demonstrated his curious position amongst readings of III.3 when in this chapter we firstly cited him as one supporting a passive *phantasia* (see page 167), as well as citing him as one who opposes the decaying sense theory (see page 164). What, then, is his account? And what distinguishes it from the one we pursue in this project?

The first indication that Wedin’s understanding of “images” in Aristotle is multivalent is his frequent practice of speaking of imagination’s “general [re]presentational role” in cognition.\(^4\) The use of the brackets, he says, is “to alert the reader to the fact that I am not foisting on Aristotle the view that we do not actually perceive objects but only make inferences to them from Hume-like images,” or, in other words, he is leery of using “representation” outright lest he be understood to be putting more distance between the image and the thing perceived than Aristotle would wish.\(^5\)

When we asked in Chapter Two whether the *phantasma* is more closely related to an *aisthēmata* or a *noēmata*, Wedin’s use of these brackets places his own answer directly in the middle. The image is somehow just as firmly tied to the thing perceived as it is to the

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\(^3\) Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, xi–xii.
\(^4\) Ibid., 40 et.al.
\(^5\) Ibid., 17, fn.27.
thing thought; it occupies a space in between. The question, of course, is how it can be related to both of these without being more one than the other. And his answer is to argue, based on a passage in *DA* III.2, that “something can be without matter without being immaterial,” and that “images, as well as perceptions, are just such items.”

This answer—that something can be without matter without being immaterial—points to the possibility raised in Chapter One and echoed in Chapter Two: that there may be some sort of “gradation” of materiality. Wedin supports this gradation by claiming that the “φάντασμα is related to αἴσθημα and αἴσθημα to αἴσθητον as form to matter. At each remove the form is increasingly abstract.”

What is more, Wedin will go on to argue that this “form-matter distinction” applies “to the relation between thoughts and images, much as it applied earlier to the relation between images and perceptions.”

“At each remove the form is increasingly abstract,” indeed.

The burden of Beare’s claim, that *phantasia* has two grades which result alternately in presentations and representations—is similar to the burden now facing Wedin’s—what accounts for this gradation of increasing abstraction? How do we get from the presentation of a thing in sense perception, to the representation or image of it, to the thought of it? What drives this process? Obviously, the answer is *phantasia*. In both Beare and Wedin, the task of phantasia is somehow to abstract form, some ‘level’ or perhaps ‘degree’ of form, from what is encountered in experience. The question, of

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321 The passage under consideration is 425b23-24, which reads, “…the sense organ is in each case receptive of the perceptible attribute without the material [ὅνεον τῆς ὀλης].” He takes this passage together with the end of III.8, “For the things imagined are just like the things perceived except without material,” (432a9-10). For the larger argument, which is too intricate to trace here, see Wedin’s Chapter IV, subsection 4. Ibid., 122.

322 Ibid.

323 Ibid., 123.
course, is how this abstraction happens. It is a motion. And that it is a motion, a *kinēsis*, is important, as Wedin notes: it is not what he calls the “durationless change” operative in sense perception. Ultimately—and convincingly—Wedin will turn to *APo*. II.19’s account of how it is that the “persistence of the perceptual state,” the μονή τοῦ αἰσθήματος in any animal who has any sort of cognition whatsoever, is due to the motion of *phantasia*.

This passage from the *Posterior Analytics* has many parallels to the signet ring passage from *De Memoria* that we discussed above: both Wedin and Beare cite the two passages together. It, and Wedin’s treatment of it, will become increasingly important in our next chapter; and so we cite it in full here.

Clearly this [perception] is a property of all animals. They have an innate faculty of discrimination, which we call sense-perception. All animals have it, but in some the perception [here Wedin has “persistence of the perceptual state,” μονή τοῦ αἰσθήματος] persists [ἐγγίγνεται], while in others it does not [ἐγγίγνεται]. Where it does not [ἐγγίγνεται], there is either no cognition at all outside the act of perception, or no cognition of those objects of which the perception does not persist [ἐγγίγνεται]. Where perception does persist, after the act of perception is over the percipients can still retain the act of perception in the soul. If this happens repeatedly, a distinction immediately arises between those animals which derive a coherent impression [logon] and those which do not. (99b34-100a3)

Both Beare and Wedin (as well as Tredennick, above) translate μονή as “persistence,” though Beare occasionally uses “trace.” Wedin observes that Aristotle recognizes

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324 “…durationless changes will be required to explain the actual operation of any faculty. This durationless change cannot, however, be the movement that yields imagination. For the durationless change is not, as the canonical theory requires, a movement resulting from the activity of perception; rather it is the cause of, or at least the switch to, this activity…” Ibid., 31ff., esp. 32.


327 Sachs chooses the verb “to trace” as his translation of the rare verb ἐνσημαίνεται that appears in the *De Memoria* passage about the signet ring: “For the motion that comes about traces in something like an
some “minimal perceivers,” who have no ability to “store up” [Beare] such “traces,” and thus for whom “cognition is either absent or equivalent to something like registration of immediate objects.”

But so too does Aristotle recognize “certain nonminimal perceivers,” for whom “repeated persistence” of these “traces,” of these “perceptual states of a given kind somehow generates what Aristotle calls a *logos* [λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς at 100a2-3].” Wedin goes on to discuss that the appearance here of *logos* is “noteworthy,” observing that “[i]t cannot be read proportionally, as Aristotle frequently allows; nor can it be read propositionally, as Aristotle sometimes requires.”

Tredennick opts for “a coherent impression” in the above; Wedin argues that this use of *logos* is “best read as “form.”” Again, the “production” of this form is a “durational process, for it takes repeated episodes of the right kind of persistence (not just perception) to generate the form.

Consequently,

if that which, in *Analytica Posteriora* II.19, results from the persisting of perceptual states [αἴσθημα] is the same as the image [phantasma] of the canonical theory, then imagination will be the *kinēsis*, or process involved in their formation, and thus, in the formation of forms as well. In the idiom of *De Memoria* 450a31-b3 the change in the soul produced by perception amounts to something like imprinting a sort of pattern [τύπος, Sachs: outline] of the perceptual state.

Here, then, the “*logos*” of *APo.* II.19 is the *phantasma*, and the *phantasma* is also the *eidos*. This “item” is thereby more abstract than the particular perceptions that have contributed to it. But while it is “an item whose existence in the soul is then independent

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329 Ibid.
330 Ibid., 43.
331 “The process will be durational, even if, as I suspect some would urge, repeated episodes aren’t required or, at least, not always.” Ibid., 43, fn.25.
332 Ibid., 43.
of occurrences of particular perceptual states,” it is not the same as a “word” in the realm of human *logos*, since those animals with *phantasia* certainly are capable of *phantasmata*. Nor, for that matter, is it a concept, even if it “amounts to a whole universal coming to rest in the soul (as at 100a5-6).” And Beare agrees, though again, with far less precision: “The φαντάσματα, like the αἰσθήματα, are individual and concrete [Wedin: more individual and more concrete] in their nature: they have not the universality of concepts.” 333 The *logos* at *APo*. II.19 100a3, then, is something like a nascent, pre-logical *logos* that, in belonging to beasts but not to humans, reinforces our suspicion that we can learn more about how a thing unfolds into speech, into *logos*, if we further examine the *phantasma*, and with it, *phantasia*.

Wedin, more than Beare, fully attempts to describe how it is that *phantasia* may be the motion or “process” that allows a presentation to not only be retained, but then also reproduced by the soul, and thus manages to reflect a *phantasia* that is neither purely passively receptive nor purely actively creative. Neither, however, discusses what it might mean to consider *phantasia*, this motion of the becoming of an image, the “formation of forms,” as neither strictly passive *nor* active, but rather middle-voiced. For in fact, just as *gignomai* (and with it, *eggignomai*, which appears four times in the above passage from the *Posterior Analytics*) is a deponent verb that serves as a marker of the middle voice, so too is *phantasia* related to another middle-voiced form, *phainesthai*. Perhaps interpretations that ask (and then answer) whether *phantasia* is passive or active quite miss the point, because they presuppose that what is moving is the soul. Perhaps

333 Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle*, 291.
the better approach, then, is to consider phantasia as neither active nor passive, but as being “something like the middle voice.”

We heard in the last chapter that Christopher Long’s account of phantasia is unique among those considered here insofar as it takes seriously the suggested possibility in our central passage that phantasia may be a hexis. It is also unique because it attempts to treat phantasia as a “middle-voiced activity,” and not just as a word with a middle-voiced provenance. Ultimately, it will not go as far in this direction as our own account; in maintaining that phantasia is an “active condition” of the embodied soul, he will neither find phantasia to be a motion of the intelligible as such, nor will he define the middle voice as something more than the sum of active and passive components, as we shall. His account will, however, not only point towards the relationship between phantasia and logos, as Wedin’s treatment of APo. II.19 did, but will anticipate some of the terms in which that relationship happens. Long’s consideration of phantasia as being “at once actively attuned to and passively receptive of that which presents itself through perceiving,” results in him finding phantasia to result in the soul being “said to be appeared to in a determinate way.”

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334 There will be more to say about this quotation in Chapter Six. The passage from which it is taken comes from Derrida’s Différance, and in full it reads: “And we will see why that which lets itself be designated différance is neither simply active or simply passive, announcing or rather recalling something like the middle voice, saying an operation that is not an operation, an operation that cannot be conceived either as passion or as the action of a subject on an object, or on the basis of the categories of agent or patient, neither on the basis of nor moving toward any of these terms. For the middle voice, a certain intransitivity, may be what philosophy, at its outset, distributed into an active and passive voice, thereby constituting itself by means of this repression.” Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (University of Chicago Press, 1982), 9, emphasis mine.

335 See page 90.

336 Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 133.

337 Ibid., 133.
difference between “being appeared to and perceiving.”\footnote{Ibid.} This distinction is exceedingly helpful in determining what Aristotle may have meant in the *De Somniis* by saying that *phantasia* and perception are exceedingly similar, but not the same in being (459a).

However, drawing out this difference makes it difficult to maintain the language of *phantasia* as a *hexis*: the language of “active attunement” quickly gives way to talk of active “discernment,” ultimately of “interpretive discernment.”\footnote{Ibid., 133–135.} *Phantasia*, “[t]his activity of the soul, as Aristotle insists, does not operate without perceiving, although it involves a capacity for discernment that extends beyond that endemic to perceiving.”\footnote{Ibid., 133.} Perceiving is not able to account for the appearing of things: “For this, another sort of interpretive discernment is necessary; this is the critical capacity endemic to φαντασία.”\footnote{Ibid., 135.} Thus does *phantasia* become in his remarks a “capacity for discernment,” a “critical capacity” instead of a matter of “attunement.”\footnote{Ibid., 133, 135.} This is a subtle difference, but it could be a significant one, causing *phantasia* to sound very much like a “faculty” and not nearly as much as a “middle-voiced activity”, let alone as an actively receptive *hexis*. And so Long is quick to clarify that “[t]his sort of discernment, however… is not the sort of interpretation that involves the imposition of cognitive categories upon what is presented in perceiving.”\footnote{Ibid., 136.} Rather, phantastic discernment is “a matter of being moved by things encountered in such a way that they are permitted to appear as what they
Here, in finding discernment a “matter of being moved” as opposed to a matter of “the imposition of cognitive categories,” Long reasserts phantasia’s status of a middle-voiced activity. He also heads down the path towards articulating phantasia’s relationship to logos. In short: because phantasia allows for a discernment in which things “appear as what they are,” this sort of discernment “must be apprehended in naturalistic terms,” and not logical terms. This attempt to articulate phantasia as a “discernment...in naturalistic terms” simultaneously points to phantasia as a middle-voiced activity and to phantasia’s curious relationship to truth and falsity.

Long’s naturalistic account of how phantasia appears in DA III.3 thus begins with the chapter’s preoccupation with truth and falsity. Perceiving, we are told in III.3 directly before phantasia is introduced, is “always truthful” when it is “directed at its proper objects,” and dianoia, or “thinking things through,” can result in an opinion or supposition [hupoleipsis] that is true or false (427b12-14). Unlike the commentators we discussed in the third “Question” of Chapter Two, Long does not get caught up in trying to assess whether phantasia itself is true or false, but focuses instead on the more naturalistic concern of how and why phantasia is ‘situated,’ how and why it appears between perception and supposition [ὑπόληψις], especially given that the we are told that the latter “is present in no animal in which there is not logos” [427b12-14]. According to Long, the question Aristotle asks us to consider in the text between this passage and our own central passage is not necessarily whether or how phantasia is true or false, but rather how appealing to phantasia helps us “to clarify the very meaning of what it would

344 Ibid., 136.
345 Ibid., 136.
be for an animal to have λόγος.” He reads the fact that Aristotle introduces phantasia directly after the observation that dianoia and hupoleipsis are only present in animals with logos as more significant than the fact that it is introduced in a schema that points to the capacity for truth and falsity of phantasia’s neighboring capacities (perception and thinking things through). This is a truly unique reading amongst those considered in this project, and in fact is antithetical to Hicks’ own reading (as Long himself notes). When Aristotle introduces phantasia in 427b14-16 by saying, “For imagination is different both from perceiving and from thinking things through, and does not come about without perception, and without it there is no conceiving that something is the case,” the force of “for” here is to have us “appeal to the φαντασία in an attempt to articulate further the way thinking things through involves but is not identifiable with φαντασία.” The force of “for” here is to alert us to the necessity of phantasia to precondition a creature for logos.

By situating φαντασία between the critical capacity of perceiving, on the one side, and the sort of responsive supposition that is true or false because it seeks to say something of something, on the other, Aristotle suggests that the discernment endemic to φαντασία conditions the possibility of the sort of judgment associated with the truth and falsity but is not yet itself a judgment in this apophantical sense.

Phantasia’s being situated between perception that is “always true” via what we called in Chapter Two the contact theory of truth and supposition that is true or false via the correspondence theory of truth results in what Long calls phantasia’s “naturalistic”

346 Ibid., 134.
347 Ibid., 134, fn.51. “To link this sentence [427b14-16] so closely to the previous sentence and to read the introduction of φαντασία here as intimately connected to the discussion of those animals with λόγος is to take a position in direct opposition to Hicks, who argues, “The present passage 427b14 sqq. opens a distinct paragraph and should not be forced into too close a relation with the preceding sentences.” Aristotle and Hicks, De Anima, 456.”
348 Ibid., 134.
349 Ibid., 134–135.
hermeneutic capacity. In the next chapter, we will attempt to articulate in just what way *phantasia* allows for a sort of truth and falsity that is itself situated “between” these two theories of truth.

In explicating further what this “naturalistic” interpretive discernment is, Long’s account points to Martha Nussbaum’s similar argument for a hermeneutical *phantasia*. But what is missing from Nussbaum’s argument, and present in Long’s, is a sensitivity to what it means to consider *phantasia* as a “middle-voiced activity”: it seems as though this is what is behind both his suggestion that *phantasia* is “naturalistic” in its interpretive capacity, as well as his propensity to add a definite article to *phantasia*, calling it “the *phantasia*.” When Long suggests that ‘the naturalistic *phantasia*’ is “itself a matter of being moved by things encountered in such a way that they are permitted to appear as what they are,” he seems to demonstrate a sensitivity to the way in which *phantasia* does not properly belong to the embodied soul, but is a naturalistic aspect of things apart from the embodied soul.  

On page 143, we asked what being—what primary, genuine being—is at issue in the motion of *phantasia*, and began to wonder if there might be a *dunamis* in the things “of which there is perception” that is set free to be at work by the being-at-work of perception. We suggested that this *dunamis* is the very intelligibility of things which comes to be, through *phantasia*, the *eidos* of the perceptible thing. Beare, Wedin, and Long have helped better prepare us to consider what this suggestion in its most radical

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350 Ibid., 136.
form entails. If we proceed both by maintaining that *phantasia* is the motion of the intelligible as such and by seeking out what it might mean for this motion not to be both active and passive, but rather truly middle-voiced, we arrive at the possibility that *phantasia* is perhaps the *kinēsis* of *nous* itself, that *phantasia* is the motion of the mysterious—and separate—*dunamis* of contemplation.

Light, Aristotle tells us in *DA* II.7, is the motion of a medium—the transparent—and as such, is what makes us able to see. He observes at the end of III.3 that *phantasia* “has even taken its name from light (*phaos*), because without light it is impossible to see” (429a4-5). Two chapters later, he describes the *nous poietikos* as the sort of intellect that forms all things “in the way an active condition such as light does” (430a15). *Phantasia*, insofar as it is like light, allows the intelligible to appear from within the perceptible, and perhaps even allows the intelligible within the intelligible to appear. It is what makes us able to know. Sachs supports this view: “The form that organizes the plant or animal also works upon the perceiving or thinking soul that recognizes that plant or animal.” And then he says, “It is ultimately the active intellect of the preceding chapter that forms and produces these wholes.”

In this line of thinking, one can then naturally connect *phantasia* with, on the one side, light itself, and on the other, the *nous poietikos*.

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351 This is the same footnote we considered in Chapter Two, when we were discussing the differences and similarities between the first thoughts and the *phantasmata*. Aristotle and Sachs, *Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection*, 145, fn.16.

352 Randall in a number of places gets close to articulating a linear connection between these three discussions of light, but the connection remains largely suggestive. Firstly, regarding Aristotle’s theory of light and color, he says, “In view of his total lack of any instruments of exact measurement, Aristotle’s theory of color and light is quite a remarkable achievement. It runs: There is a transparent medium, *to diaphanes*, the Diaphanous, which is potentially light, and which becomes actual light when the sun or fire imparts motion to it. This motion of the transparent or diaphanous medium, when actualized as light, in turn actualizes the color of the wall—which is thus a kind of “second light”—in the seeing of the eye.” He then reflects on this summary in language that parallels the epigraph of the next chapter, which is not about
comparison is encouraging for two reasons. Firstly, it seems to suggest that the unified sense of *phantasia*—that as the motion of the intelligible as such—fits well into Aristotle’s understanding not just of *embodied* souls, but of “all soul,” which must necessarily include the possibility of divine, or “separate” soul. Secondly, it suggests that a physics of *nous*, insofar as it is similar to the fully natural phenomenon of light, is perhaps possible. Let us, then, turn our attention to the way in which the motion of the intelligible as intelligible can be seen to result in what here was found to be pre-logical, nascent *logos* becoming *logos per se*.

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seeing, but about knowing. “Thus the answer to the question, What makes us see? What is the efficient cause of seeing? Is that it is ultimately motion that makes us see, the motion imparted to the transparent medium by the agent of illumination, and transmitted from the colored surface to the eye. For motion is the only agent, the only efficient cause, to be found in Aristotle: only motion can ever “make” things happen for him.” He also elsewhere makes the observation that “‘Knowing’ includes both *phantasia*, “imagination,” the power of retaining sense images, *phantasmata*, and *nous*, the power of retaining intelligible forms.” Randall, *Aristotle*, 86–87, 94–95.
What “makes” us think and know? What actualizes certain universals at certain times? Is the efficient cause of “nousing” like the efficient cause of sensing? What “makes” us see is light: in seeing, it is light that actualizes particular colors, and light is the outcome of the motion of a medium. Throughout Aristotle, only motion can be an agent, “make” things happen, and serve as an efficient cause. So we should expect Aristotle to answer his question, What makes us know? “Some motion makes us know.”

John Hermann Randall, Aristotle

“[T]hinking and walking are different ways of getting about in a common world which has a make-up agreeable to each of these ways.”

Frederick James Eugene Woodbridge, The Realm of the Mind

We set out in this project to consider how entelecheia could assist us in getting a clearer view of what phantasia is. In Chapter Two we began to sense how the phantasma appears to be the entelecheia of a thing, and our further consideration in Chapters Three and Four of phantasia as the genesis of the intelligible out of the perceptible supported this perspective. The phantasma is the eidos of a perceptible thing, and for Aristotle, the eidos of a thing is its entelecheia. But just as Aristotle’s description of entelecheia is double, so too was our original intention: just as entelecheia is “the eidos or look of a thing,” and is that “directly as a result of which something is called a tode ti,” we set out

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353 Ibid., 99.
not only to engage *phantasia* by way of *entelecheia* as *eidos*, but to then engage

“*entelecheia*” as something said, making use of our understanding of *phantasia* (*DA II.1 412a8-10*). “*Entelecheia,*” as the name of a certain something that holds together such that it can be a “certain sort of articulation [λόγος τις]” an “articulation in speech [λόγος],” is a name that participates in the realm of *logos* (*DA II.2 414a13, 414a9*). The suspicion that motivates this chapter is that *entelecheia* as *eidos* and “*entelecheia*” as some spoken part of *logos* are organically linked, and that the motion by which the *entelecheia* as *eidos* comes to be for us is the same motion by which this *entelecheia* further unfolds into “*entelecheia*.” In Chapter One, we suggested that this motion is behind Sachs’ translation of what we called the “wondrous conclusion” regarding the soul in *DA II.1*: “So what soul is has been said in general, for it is thinghood as it is unfolded in speech [κατὰ τὸν λόγον]” (412b10-11). A few lines later, this same formulation, [κατὰ τὸν λόγον] is repeated again: here, Sachs translates it as “disclosed in speech” (412b20).355 It is this “unfolding” and “disclosing” in speech that we are concerned with in these final two chapters.

The possibility that *logos* has organic and natural underpinnings has been taken up before. As we heard in Chapter Two, Frederick Woodbridge says that for Aristotle, “for things to go into language is as a going, just as much of a going on their part, and just as natural, as their going into air or water, up or down, or from seed to flower.”356

John Herman Randall frequently speaks of Aristotle’s understanding of the world’s

355 “For if the eye were an animal, the soul of it would be its sight, since this is the thinghood of an eye as it is disclosed in speech (and the eye is the material of sight); if its sight were left out it would no longer be an eye, except ambiguously, in the same way as a stone eye or a painted one.”

intelligibility as a “flowering” in man’s intelligence in which language plays a key role: “we can be said to “know” a thing only when we can state in precise language what that thing is, and why it is as it is. Knowledge and language are a flowering of the world, an operation of its power to be understood and expressed…”\(^{357}\) However, Randall also maintains that

important as Aristotle makes *logos,* what things can be said to be, he never treats *logos* itself in biological and functional terms, as an activity of organisms with the power of *nous:* he never treats *logos* as a “part” of the *psyche,* as one of the functions making up “life.” Such a treatment is not in the *De Anima* at all, but it ought to be.\(^{358}\)

But what if such a treatment *is* in the *De Anima,* but is doubly disguised as a not-at-all-straightforward treatment of the motion of *phantasia?* If *phantasia* is the motion by which the intelligible arises from the perceptible, perhaps that motion continues. Perhaps it not only allows the intelligible to become the *phantasma,* but to eventually “flower” or “go into language” as “from seed to flower.”

In exploring reasons why Aristotle does not provide a naturalist’s account of *logos,* though, Randall does raise an important and difficult point, and that point regards *nous.* In Randall’s hands, *nous*—particularly the *nous poietikos*—and *logos* are almost identical.\(^{359}\) Perhaps, considers Randall, Aristotle does not provide a functional account of *logos* because it is too close to being something more than “merely human,” and in

\(^{357}\) Randall, *Aristotle,* 5, 7, 104 et. al., emphasis mine.

\(^{358}\) See also page 96: “There is to be found in it no treatment of *logos,* of language and communication, in connection with knowing—there is no treatment of *logos* in functional terms. In treating *logos* Aristotle is always the formalist, the *logikos,* never the functionalist, the *physikos.*” Ibid., 102.

\(^{359}\) “Of course, what Aristotle ought to have meant by “the *nous* that makes all things,” the active intellect, in terms of his own thought, is clear enough. To his question, What makes us know? What actualizes universals? the answer is, it is *logos,* discourse, language and communication. The “active intellect” is actually *logos.*” Ibid.
fact threatens not to be natural at all.\textsuperscript{360} It is one thing to discuss the \textit{phantasma} as something that can “come to be” via the motion of \textit{phantasia}, which Aristotle says more than once is tied to the natural body. It is altogether another to discuss \textit{nous} in the same terms. \textit{Nous} is frequently posited in the \textit{De Anima} as unique amongst the potencies of soul because it is \textit{separate} from the body, and in this separateness, appears also to be “deathless and everlasting:” certainly it seems strange to speak of the coming-to-be of the intelligible, but isn’t this the very idea behind the “going into” or the “flowering” of \textit{logos}? As we predicted in Chapter One, we will, both in this chapter and the next, encounter this problem on a number of occasions: it is the problem of whether a physics of \textit{nous} is even possible. How can we reconcile \textit{phantasia}’s apparent naturalness with the intelligible as such?\textsuperscript{361} Woodbridge suggests one way: Aristotle “made [the soul's] home in nature, and by so doing was forced…to enlarge the conception of what nature is.”\textsuperscript{362} In what follows, then, we shall have to be watchful for the way in which the intelligible challenges our understanding of the natural.

The proposal, then, is to continue as though along the same path, hoping that what has brought us from the \textit{aisthēmata} to the \textit{phantasmata} will now take us from the \textit{phantasmata} to the \textit{noēmata}, and that along this path we will get a better sense of what \textit{logos} in fact is, and “where” it is. The previous chapter already pointed us in this

\textsuperscript{360}"It seems clear that for Aristotle the “active intellect” must be something that is more than merely human.” Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{361}For a concise look at the long history of interpretation regarding the problem of the physics of \textit{nous} in Aristotle, see Randall’s section “What Makes Us Know?” Randall’s own answer, with which this project is in agreement, is also that of Pomponazzi, Zabarella, and Santayana: Aristotle is a naturalist “through and through,” and must therefore embrace the “cardinal difficulty in any naturalistic theory of knowing and intelligence,” viz., if “knowing” is a fact, if it does get us to “what fairly can be called “truth,” then our ability to know, mind or \textit{nous}, must “rise above the limitations and conditions of its bodily instrument,” must be, as Aristotle puts it, “unmixed and separable,” “deathless and eternal.” Ibid., 98–106.
\textsuperscript{362}Woodbridge, \textit{Aristotle’s Vision of Nature}, 38.
direction: we heard Aristotle discuss the intelligible thing as the form of forms, and heard Wedin claim that the relationship between the *phantasma* and the *aisthēma* is the same as that between the *noēma* and the *phantasma*: “At each remove,” Wedin claims, “the form is increasingly abstract.” When the form thus abstracted from the *aisthēmata* is called in *APo*. II.19 “a *logos,*” we concluded along with Wedin that this “*logos*” was in fact better understood as “*phantasma,*” but wondered what it might mean that Aristotle nonetheless calls it a *logos.* Wedin’s own answer is that *logos* here is best translated as “form;” we, for our part, may wonder whether what was indicated was in fact a sort of pre-logical *logos,* attainable by animals as well as by humans (especially given Long’s treatment of *phantasia* at the end of the last chapter.) If *phantasia* is the motion by which the *aisthēma* becomes the *phantasma,* it seems possible that this motion, or one like it, is how the *phantasma* becomes the *noēma,* and in this analogous motion, it seems likely that the nascent or pre-logical “*logos*” posited in Chapter Four becomes a logical, full-fledged *logos.*

It thus becomes increasingly important to say, to the best of our ability, just what *logos*—“full-fledged” *logos*—is. As we remarked in Chapter One, *logos* is the sort of word that preeminently exemplifies the chief challenge of translation. On page 5, we compared it to a polyhedron, “having so many faces it seems impossible to bring them all together in a single word in a different language.” Often it can be translated as “speech,” or as Sachs frequently has it, “articulation in speech.” In Plato’s hands, it frequently refers to spoken or written “compositions” or “accounts.” Not only is *logos* not reducible

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to so many disconnected words, neither does it always have to do directly with speech: sometimes it is best translated as “ratio” or “reason.” And, while no scientific overview was here undertaken, it seems that when Aristotle wishes to speak of a “word,” he speaks of the “name” \([\text{nomos}]\) or “simple saying” \([\text{phasis}]\) of something. Moreover, as we shall see, this handful of possible definitions is still a short list: the definition of \(\text{logos}\) in any Greek dictionary occupies columns. But if we are to say more clearly how a thing moves from being a \(\text{phantasma}\) for beasts without \(\text{logos}\), to being operative in and as \(\text{logos}\), we must try to say what this \(\text{logos}\) is.

**Walking Towards Logos: Rational/Deliberative Phantasia**

Let us, then, first turn our attention towards Wedin’s suggestion that the \(\text{aisthēma}\) is to the \(\text{phantasma}\) as the \(\text{phantasma}\) is to the \(\text{noēma}\), which seems at least on the face of it supportable by what we found in III.8: that sense perception has to do with the form of perceptible things while the intellect has to do with the form of forms. Regarding the \text{"logos"
 that appears at } \text{APo. II.19 100a3, Wedin says, “However else one may characterize this item, it need only be formally identical with the perceptual states \([\text{aisthēmata}]\) that give rise to it.}^{364} \text{ This “formal identity” links the } \text{aisthēma} \text{ with the } \text{phantasma}, but also conceivably with the } \text{noēma}; \text{ the three differ only insofar as each has varying degrees of materiality. We have now in several places discussed the possibility of a gradation: in Chapter One, this was suggested as accounting for the difference between an appearance and an ‘appearance,’ in Chapter Two we reviewed the possibility of “higher” and “lower” universals vis-à-vis the } \text{prōta noēmata}. \text{ With this characterization, we have gotten closer to a more rigorous analysis of what this gradation}

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\(^{364}\) Ibid., 43.
may entail: the *eidos* that, in the perceptible realm, is mixed with matter, becomes ever more refined as what it is—as the intelligible—when it is set free to do so by the being-at-work of perception. As the *phantasma*, indeed, even as the *aisthêma*, such an *eidos* is without matter, but not “immaterial.” This is so far from being the decaying-sense theory as to be its opposite: Says Wedin, “What, for instance, would it mean to claim that the *form* embodied in a blueprint is less vivid than that embodied in the actual building?” What, from one perspective, appears to be a process of *abstraction* in which the force of the original is ever more diminished, can be seen also from another perspective as a process of *refinement*. The form as it emerges from the perceptible is not a weakened copy, but is rather ever more the form itself, and this is repeated as the form emerges from the *phantasma* into the *noêma*: at each stage, the form gathers itself together more than it did in the stage before. And this gathering happens in us: it is not tantamount to our soul’s moving ever upward along Plato’s divided line, as we said in Chapter Two.

But in this process of refinement and/or abstraction, which is really the gathering together or concretion of form into itself, where is *logos*? We have already indicated that it can neither properly be found in the *aisthêma* nor the *phantasma*, since these are both attainable by animals who Aristotle is clear do not have *logos*. The relationship between the *aisthêma*, *phantasma*, and *noêma* has nothing to tell us about communication, but lest we go looking for *logos* in that direction, Sachs tells us that “[t]he characteristic human capacity is manifest as speech,” and this “is not the same thing as communication.” For

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365 See footnote 321. Ibid., 122.
366 Ibid., 121.
“[t]he other animals perceive things as pleasant and painful and communicate these perceptions to one another.” So what is the difference between simple communication and the “characteristic human capacity,” which is not speech but which is manifest as speech? Since it can neither be found in those creatures capable of aisthēmata nor phantasmata, perhaps it is found in those creatures that have noēmata, thoughts. In Chapter Two, we discussed the prōta noēmata as introduced by DA III.8 and found them to be the thoughts that arise first in experience, and which consequently are tied most naturally to those things around us that have a “this,” a tode ti, about them. Aristotle is clear at the end of III.8 that it is difficult to distinguish these prōta noēmata from the phantasmata, but maintains that there is a distinction. It is in looking at this distinction that we can begin to better understand logos.

Sachs confirms this possibility: logos can be found in those creatures that have “the capacity to distinguish among those pleasant and painful things as advantageous.” Being able to distinguish what is advantageous requires a creature to “hold on to the universal kinds” and to connect these kinds in judgments. Here, Sachs sites Politics 1253a7-18, which reads:

It is clear, then that a human being is more of a political animal than is any bee or than are any of those animals that live in herds. For nature, as we say, makes nothing in vain, and humans are the only animals who possess logos. Voice, of course, serves to indicate what is painful and pleasant; that is why it is also found in the other animals, because their nature has reached the point where they can perceive what is painful and pleasant and express these to each other. But logos serves to make plain what is advantageous and harmful and so also what is just and unjust. For it is a peculiarity of humans, in contrast to the other animals, to

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have perception of good and bad, just and unjust, and the like; and community in
these things makes a household and a city. (Pol. 1253a 7-18)\textsuperscript{368}

Certainly the “advantageous and harmful” and the “just and unjust” are thoughts, and
saying what is and what is not advantageous or just is a judgment. But Aristotle in this
passage says that “logos serve to make plain” these thoughts and the judgments they in
turn make possible; he does not equate logos to them. Sachs then connects this
“characteristic human capacity” to the intriguing—and singular—appearances of the
“rational” [λογιστική] or “deliberative” [βουλευτική] phantasia in III.10 and 11, but also
to the passage from the Posterior Analytics at issue above, saying,

To do the latter would require combining the images in the imagination into
wholes that can be compared to a single criterion of the greater good (On the Soul
434a 7-10). This would amount to holding on to the universal kinds within
particular perceptions (Posterior Analytics 100a 5-9), and connecting these in
judgments or propositions (De Interpretatione 16b 26-17a 8)…\textsuperscript{369}

In DA III.10 and 11, the “rational” or “deliberative” phantasia is further differentiated
from the “sensory” [αισθητική] phantasia, “and of the latter the other animals have a
share” (433b30).\textsuperscript{370} An examination of the nature of this differentiation is likely to be
helpful in our quest to discuss phantasmata and noēmata, especially the prōta noēmata,
in terms of their similarities and differences more clearly. This is reinforced by an


\textsuperscript{369} Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 30.

\textsuperscript{370} It is true that Aristotle in one place speaks of rational phantasia and in another, just lines later, of
deliberative phantasia. It seems most likely that these two terms point to one and the same thing: the
human’s experience of phantasia. When rational phantasia is introduced, it is introduced in disjunction
with the sensory phantasia of animals; when deliberative phantasia is introduced, it is in the same vein.
Moreover, if we return to III.7, we can find the two adjectives in verbal form used together, in the same
clause, to describe an act of what seems to be just this sort of phantasia. After the example of the
physically present signal fire of the enemy, he says: “But sometimes, by means of the imaginings and
thoughts in the soul, just as if one were seeing, one reasons out [λογίζεται] and plans [βουλευτείται] what is
going to happen in response to what is present” (431b6-8). For these reasons, we continue to use the two
adjectives as a single slashed compound adjective.
etymological connection: “rational” phantasia translates “ἡ λογιστικὴ φαντασία.” What, then, can we make of this difference?

First of all, let us situate DA III.10 and III.11 vis-à-vis the rest of the De Anima: Above all, it is important to understand that the discussion of deliberative/rational phantasia and sensory phantasia emerges in the context of Aristotle’s treatment of the fourth potency of the soul which he variously refers to as the appetitive and/or locomotive potency. The reason that phantasia is important to this discussion is because of its ability to trace in the soul the outline of something perceived, which outline remains even after the thing perceived has gone away: the impression remains, though the ring is gone. Aristotle reminds us of the persistence of the phantasma in very clear terms in DA III.7, a chapter which shall prove to be central to discriminating between rational/deliberative and sensory phantasia, and thus also to our understanding of the distinction between those creatures with and without logos.

Now the thinking potency grasps in thought the forms that are present in things imagined [phantasmata], and since what is to be pursued or fled from is marked out for it in those imaginings, even apart from sense perception, it is moved when it applies itself to imagined things. (DA III.7 431b1-4, emphasis mine)

τὰ μὲν οὖν εἰδὴ τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ός ἐν ἐκείνοις ὑρίσται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτόν καὶ φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων Ἑ, κινεῖται...

It is because of the phantasma that a creature can recognize an item it has encountered on previous occasions, but also because of the phantasma that a creature knows to look for the item it wants even when that item is not immediately present in perception.371 Here it becomes clear that just as the phantasma is crucial for the formation of the object of the

371 We anticipated the importance of phantasia to the appetitive/locomotive potency in Chapter Three; see the end of the second section, “Phantasia as Dunamis.”
potency of thinking things through, so too is it crucial to the potency of appetite/locomotion, which we share with animals. But what is also clear is that while the potencies of the soul as presented thus far have been ordered in a sort of hierarchy, the appetitive/locomotive potency toys with this order. The process thus far has been cumulative: the perceptive soul must also be nutritive, the intellective soul must also be perceptive and nutritive. But the appetitive/locomotive soul need not be intellective (though it must be both perceptive and nutritive.) Animals may have both desire and the ability to move from place to place, but they are not intellective creatures.

Thus is the distinction between sensory and rational phantasia important: it marks the ways in which this fourth potency, appetite/locomotion, is different for different souls, for animals and humans. Phantasia, as the motion of the intelligible as intelligible, continues to be just that. But the being with the innate tendency to think things through is moved by this motion differently—is perhaps moved more, since it is made of the stuff that is both perceptive and intellective—than is the being with only the innate tendency to perceive. DA III.10 opens by saying that “it is obvious that these two things cause motion, desire and/or intellect, if one includes imagination as an activity of intellect,” and goes on to substantiate such an inclusion by arguing that “many people follow their imaginings contrary to what they know, and in the other animals there is no intellectual or reasoning activity, except imagination” (433a9-13). For the reader who has left DA III.3 with the understanding that phantasia is a passive ability tied to perception, the suggestion that phantasia is an activity of the intellect is incredibly confusing. At the end of III.3, phantasia is held so far from intellect that if humans are seen to act in accord
with the phantasmata it gives rise to, they do so only because their intelligence has been clouded over and is not fully operative. That same reader would also likely be taken aback by the suggestion that in the “other animals,” phantasia can be considered an intellectual or reasoning activity, since the end of III.3 so clearly states that such beasts do not have intelligence. But this is the reader who has taken phantasia as a dunamis of soul, and not as a kinēsis of the intelligible. If phantasia is the motion of the intelligible, then of course it is an activity of intellect (especially if one thinks of it as a motion of thinking as a separable attribute of embodied soul), and if it is an activity of the intellect, it is bound to affect those souls with an intellective potency differently than it affects those who only have the potency of perception.

Aristotle’s description of deliberative phantasia is incredibly brief, and is perhaps included at all only because his main concern in III.11 is to show that while desire is operative in those creatures without the intellective potency, it is not a deliberative sort of desire: he seems less concerned with indicating what it is and more concerned with showing us what it is not, i.e., it is not sensory phantasia. One can understand why Aristotle fears confusion on this point: it may seem that a dog, for example, “deliberates” if presented by both food over here and a treat over there—but this is not deliberation because reasoning, and opining, are not present. Instead, “at one time this desire wins out and knocks away that one, and at another time that one wins out and knocks away this one” (434a13-14). And so it is that the description of deliberative, rational phantasia is but a parenthetical remark:

372 “And because imaginings remain within and are similar to perceptions, many animals act in accord with them, some, the beasts, because of not having intelligence, but others, humans, because their intelligence is sometimes clouded by passion, disease, or sleep…” (DA III.3 429a5-9).
So a sensory imagination, as was said, is present in the rest of the animals, while there is a deliberative imagination in those that can reason (for whether one will act this way of that way is already a job for reasoning, and has to be measured by one criterion, since one is looking for the greater good, and thus is able to make one thing [ἐν] out of a number of images [phantasmata].) (DA III.11 434a6-10)

Insofar as it can “make [ποιεῖν] one thing out of a number of phantasmata,” deliberative phantasia seems very much similar to phantasia per se, which, while it does not “make” the phantasma out of a number of aisthēma, nonetheless allows such a phantasma to “become” from them (434a9-10). Sensory phantasia allows an image from a number of perceptions to come to presence; deliberative phantasia makes “one thing” [ἐν]—and it is indeed curious that Aristotle leaves this product so unspecified— from a number of images. But what is not similar, and is thus unexpected, is mention of the “greater good.”

Walking Towards Logos: Phantasmata as ‘Aisthēmata’: De Anima III.7
It is not unexpected, however, if one turns again to III.7. To situate this chapter, recall again Aristotle’s professed agenda in the De Anima as announced in II.4: he will treat of the four dunameis of the soul by analyzing first their objects, then their activities, and lastly, will say more thoroughly what each potency is. As we said in Chapter Two, DA III.3 is prefatory to the treatment of the object, activity, and potency of the potency of dianoia. So too, though in a different way, are III.4 and 5 prefatory: they discuss the “separate” fifth faculty, that of the contemplative intellect. But III.6 can be found to be a discussion of the intelligible object, and III.7 is thus directed at the way in which the intelligible object brings the potency of thinking things through to activity. (And III.8, as
we saw already in the last chapter, focuses on summing up what has been said about the role of thinking things through.\textsuperscript{373} DA III.7, then, in discussing the way the intelligible object brings the potency of \textit{dianoia} to activity, naturally turns again to the importance of \textit{phantasia}. Polanksy’s commentary on this chapter opens by saying that, in III.7,

> Aristotle needs to give more attention to thinking’s initiation. Possession of knowledge puts universals in the soul that provide for thinking at wish. But what can provoke such wish, and in general how does dispositional knowledge lead to actual thinking? This is the role of \textit{phantasmata}.\textsuperscript{374}

And how do the \textit{phantasmata} motivate the thinking potency into action? Just as in so many other key points in this project, we once again find Aristotle turning to the explanatory power of analogy, and just as we supposed in the last chapter, since he is here seeking to explain something of knowledge, the analogy drawn here is from the realm of perception. In what follows, we will occasionally refer to this as our “key analogical passage.”

And perceiving is similar to simple declaring and to thinking contemplatively; but when the thing perceived is pleasant or painful, the one perceiving pursues or flees it, as though affirming or denying. Being pleased or pained is the being-active of the mean state in the perceptive part, in relation to the good or bad as such, and the fleeing and the desiring, in their being-at-work, are the same thing, nor are the desiring part and the fleeing part different from each other or from the perceiving part, though the being of them is different. And for the soul that thinks things through, imaginings are present in the way perceptible things [\textit{aisthēmata}] are, and when it asserts\textsuperscript{375} or denies\textsuperscript{376} that something is good or bad it flees or

\textsuperscript{373} Recall Polansky stating that III.8 “completes the account of mind, and in conjunction with consideration of sense so that it seems to finish up the treatment of the cognitive faculties.” Polansky, \textit{Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary}, 494.

\textsuperscript{374} Ibid., 481.

\textsuperscript{375} As was mentioned in footnote 144 in Chapter Two, Sachs’ translations of two key terms in \textit{Met. IX(Θ).10}, \textit{phasis} and \textit{kataphasis}, are the same as Wedin’s, but are reversed. Sachs translates \textit{phasis} as “affirmation,” Wedin (and Tredennick) as “assertion;” Sachs translates \textit{kataphasis} as “assertion,” Wedin (and Tredennick) as “affirmation.” Long and Lee’s translations, while less ambiguous, are also more cumbersome (\textit{phasis}: “simply said” and \textit{kataphasis}: “saying something about something”). I will endeavor in what follows to make quite clear which word is being implicated. Further, to add to the complication, in this passage, the Greek has “phasis,” and Sachs has nonetheless translated it as though it had “\textit{kataphasis}” (assertion.) I agree with treating this instance of \textit{phasis} as though it were \textit{kataphasis}, as the context clearly indicates that the imaginings are not simply being said, but are rather being said to be a certain way, i.e.,...
Here, then, the analogy being drawn is between aisthēmata, which may be pleasant or painful, and phantasmata, which may be good or bad. When one encounters, in the world, a perceptible thing that is pleasant, one pursues it; when one encounters, in thought, an imagined thing that is good, one says that it is good. Similarly with the painful and the bad: one flees the first, and says the second is not good.

To better appreciate the analogy being drawn here, it is important to fully explicate the analog of the perceptive soul so that we can better fill in what may be unclear about the case of the intellective soul. A non-intellective embodied soul, an animal, encounters a perceptible thing in the world. If it recognizes the perceptible thing, it is due to the ‘storing up,’ a gathering or collection of perceptive states, of aisthēmata, that the animal has experienced over time, and which have allowed the more refined/abstracted intelligible eidos of the thing encountered to result in the thing’s good or bad. Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection, 146; Aristotle and Sachs, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 184; Long and Lee, “Nous and Logos in Aristotle”; Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 125; Aristotle, Aristotle: Metaphysics, Books I-IX, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Harvard University Press, 1933), 471.

376 The confusion dispelled (hopefully) by the last footnote threatens again here: the Greek word here, apophasis, may seem to be the opposite of phasis (saying simply), but according to what Aristotle says in Met. IX(Θ).10, the opposite of phasis is not apophasis, but is tantamount to ignorance, to not touching. To deny something is to make a claim about what has been said about it, which is clearly the realm of kataphasis. It seems likely that wherever Aristotle speaks of saying and denying, regardless of whether the saying is expressed as phasis or kataphasis, that what is meant is kataphasis as partnered with apophasis.
phantasma coming into the soul of the animal. Due to what Aristotle calls the “common sense” and which is described with some detail in III.1 and III.2 (and named at 425a27), the relative attributes of this perceptible thing are weighed against each other and against what Aristotle calls the “mean-state” of the animal itself; the result of this non-rational analysis of ratios is to determine whether the thing encountered is pleasant or harmful. If it is deemed pleasant, the animal moves towards the object to gather it to itself; if it is deemed painful, it moves away.

Now let us turn to the intellective embodied soul, a human, who encounters not a perceptible thing out in the world, but rather a phantasma within her own soul. If she recognizes the phantasma, it is due to the ‘storing up,’ a gathering or collection of the phantasmata which have resulted in something like a second-order phantasma. Where have we heard mention of a sort of thing that is made up of phantasmata? In two places. Firstly, and most recently, in our discussion of rational/deliberative phantasia, which we heard to be responsible for making some unnamed “one thing [ἕν],” “out of a number of phantasmata” (434a8-10). Secondly, we have already heard Aristotle suggest the existence of something like a second-order phantasma, as well as suggest what it may be named: In III.8, he tells us that in the perceptive state, the aisthēma, we retain the form of what is perceived; in the intellective state, the noêma, we thus encounter the form of forms. And what would a second-order phantasma be, if not a form of forms?

377 “The striking difference between Plato's use of phantasma and that of Aristotle is that, while Plato makes it describe every sort of reflected appearance, including visible reflections, mistaken impressions, dreams, and the "reflections" of things in speech, Aristotle uses it exclusively to describe the inner appearances or "reflections" which are evident in such activities as dreaming and remembering, instances in which we ourselves are the medium into which the reflected appearances are cast, transformed, and separated from their originals.” White, “The Meaning of Phantasia in Aristotle’s De Anima, III 3-8,” 487.
While Wedin argues convincingly that the phantasma is to the aisthēma just as the noēma is to the phantasma, he does not attribute the creation of the noēma—not even of a prōta noēma—to the rational/deliberative phantasia. But not only does such an attribution fit well with what is said about this sort of phantasia in III.10-11 and what is said about the intellect being the thinking of the “form of forms” in III.8, it also makes sense of the conclusion of III.8. Aristotle asks, “So how do the uncombined intelligible things [prōta noēmata] differ from being phantasmata?” and claims by way of response that “in fact, these are not images either, but are not present without images” (432a12-14). But in fact, the last line can also be translated this way: “in fact, these are not images either, but are not without images.” One could handle the similar claim, made in our key analogical passage, in much the same way. Aristotle claims that “…for this reason the soul never thinks without an image,” and this could simply mean that all thinking is dependent on the images that give rise to thoughts themselves (431a16-17). The explanatory power of attributing the genesis of noēmata to the rational/deliberative phantasia extends backwards into our analogy as well: if rational/deliberative phantasia is the phantasia that accounts for the motion of phanstamata becoming a noēma, perhaps the sensory phantasia is a way of specifying the motion by which aisthēmata become a phantasma. The rational/deliberative phantasia, then, would name the same motion as the sensory phantasia, but as experienced by an intellective soul, for whom the phantasma of the sensory phantasia are as ‘perceptible objects’ within the mental landscape of the soul. And so again: if the human recognizes the phantasma in her soul, it is due to the ‘storing up,’ a gathering or collection of phantasmata that she has
experienced over time—the noēma. This noēma, as an ‘image’ of images, a form of forms, names the emergence of an even less material eidos coming to be in the soul. Analogies work so much better if one can actually see the relationships being discussed laid out in a spatial fashion. Let us, then, add to the number of tables presented in this project one more:

### Table V.1: Comparison of Analogs from III.7’s Key Analogical Passage, Incomplete

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Human</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aisthēma</td>
<td>Phantasma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>Soul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Phantasma  
(Many aisthēmata over time,  
the motion of sensory phantasia) | “One Thing” or Noēma  
(Many phantasmata over time,  
the motion of deliberative phantasia) |
| Common Sense,  
determines pleasantness or painfulness according to “mean-state” of perceptive part |  |
| Animal pursues or flees |  |

Given that Wedin is centrally concerned to determine whether and how “the form-matter distinction might apply to the relation between thoughts and images, much as it applied earlier to the relation between images and perceptions” with the result that “a thought [noēma] is the form of an image [phantasma],” it is indeed curious that he does not see in
rational/deliberative \textit{phantasia} another part of the analogical structure here proposed.

Why not?

We saw already that the appearance of rational/deliberative \textit{phantasia} is especially challenging if one has already determined via \textit{DA} III.3 that phantasia is a more or less passive/receptive motion of the perceptive soul: Recall that III.10 opens by asking us to conditionally “set down” [\textit{τιθείη}] phantasia “as an activity of intellect.” Moreover, this chapter contains “\textit{φαντασθῆναι},” the middle/passive aorist infinitive of \textit{φαντάζω}, “to make visible.” While the form is still obviously middle/passive, the root verb is overtly active, and this is its only appearance in the \textit{De Anima}. (\textit{Φαντάζω} is also generally rare for Aristotle). Its transitive nature is also challenging for those who maintain that \textit{phantasia} does not make \textit{something} appear.\textsuperscript{378} As one might expect given his insistence that \textit{phantasia} is an “incomplete faculty,” that it has no actual employment (second entelechy), Wedin’s reading must stretch to make sense of rational/deliberative \textit{phantasia}. His approach is to argue that this is another instance in which \textit{phantasia} is serving some other faculty, as it can be seen to do in instances of “dreaming, remembering, desiring, thinking, and the like.”\textsuperscript{379} Ultimately, most readings of rational/deliberative \textit{phantasia} can be placed in one of two groups: either the reader finds it to be a sort of \textit{phantasia} serving thought, or a sort of thought mimicking \textit{phantasia}.\textsuperscript{380}

Wedin is clearly in the first group, and argues that deliberative \textit{phantasia} is the \textit{phantasia} of III.3 being used in deliberation. He says,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{378} Wedin underlines that in spite of this, the word “clearly has passive force at this, its sole occurrence in \textit{De Anima}.” Wedin, \textit{Mind and Imagination in Aristotle}, 61.
\item \textsuperscript{379} Ibid., 53, see especially fn.36.
\item \textsuperscript{380} Aristotle and Hamlyn, \textit{Aristotle “De Anima,”} 153; Aristotle and Ross, \textit{De Anima. Edited, with Introduction and Commentary, by Sir David Ross}, 317.
\end{itemize}
Certainly, grammar does not legislate that “ἡ βουλευτικὴ φαντασία” (the deliberative imagination) or “ἡ λογιστικὴ φαντασία” (the calculative imagination) denote a kind of thought as against imagination connected with thought. And in light of Aristotle’s arguments in De Anima III.3, prospects for identification are rather slim.”

But maintaining that deliberative phantasia is phantasia per se as employed by deliberation is tricky and requires his translation of this passage to have two distinctly non-standard aspects to it. First, he argues that it is not deliberative phantasia that is responsible for the “combinatory function of putting together separate images,” and instead says it is the rational animal that does this. This switch means that though it appears that deliberative phantasia “makes” something, he says, “it need only be a necessary condition on deliberation that one be able to bring together, as it were, a number of images in fashioning one plan, though, or course of action…” Phantasia simply provides the images; “deliberation and not imagination” has the active role.

Secondly, because such a reading does make one question why Aristotle would have spoken of a “deliberative phantasia” instead of a “phantastic deliberation,” Wedin translates ἡ βουλευτικὴ φαντασία not as “deliberative phantasia,” but instead as the considerably more cumbersome “imagination connected with deliberation.” None of this is straightforwardly incorrect. However, one does hear a strain in the force of “even” in his concluding sentence: “So again imagination, even deliberative imagination, has no active employment and satisfies the canonical theory’s condition of functional incompleteness.”

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381 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 83.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid., 84.
The central difficulty responsible for the strain in Wedin’s reading can once again be reduced to thinking of phantasia as a dunamis—even an incomplete dunamis—of an embodied soul. Indeed, our account not only escapes Wedin’s particular difficulties, but the general difficulty of accounting for what by the end of III.11 seems to be a proliferation of phantasias. Even if one does manage to determine if deliberative phantasia is more deliberation or more phantasia, one must still grapple with the relationship between these three phantasiae—perhaps especially the sensory phantasia—and the phantasia of III.3, which we earlier called phantasia per se.\(^{384}\) Remembering too that III.3 makes mention also of a metaphoric phantasia, it is easy to see why one commentator concludes that Aristotle can be fairly interpreted as adopting different but complementary vantage-points on a more or less coherent family of psychological phenomena…it would be a triumph of generosity over justice to pretend that he manages to combine his different approaches to phantasia with an absolutely clear head.\(^{385}\)

Our argument, that phantasia is the motion of the intelligible as such, seems readily compatible with sorting these vantage-points into a continuum organized according to the difference in the types of souls that are moved by phantasia. Sensory phantasia, on our reading, is phantasia per se as experienced by those souls without the potency of dianoia; rational/deliberative phantasia is phantasia per se as experienced by those souls with the potency of dianoia. (And we will be in a position to bring metaphoric phantasia into this continuum in Chapter Six.)

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\(^{384}\) It is to be noted that speaking of the phantasia of III.3 as phantasia per se would not even be acceptable to every commentator: Nussbaum’s opening complaint in her essay about Aristotelian phantasia is that too often the focus is on DA III.3, causing the secondary literature to be “one-sided” and for other approaches to phantasia to appear as “parasitic” on this main focus. Aristotle and Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, 221.

There is an equal but opposite difficulty in the secondary literature regarding the process or power responsible for the creation of the noēmata; i.e., just as it is difficult to determine what the “one thing” produced by the rational/deliberative phantasia is, it is difficult to determine what process or ability is to account for the coming to be of the noēma. Gerard Watson articulates this difficulty. He writes:

Aristotle leaves unexplained the details of the conversion of phantasia, the movement which remains in the soul similar to the perception which has caused it, into a phantasma, the image which results from phantasia. What is clear is that the transforming agency of phantasia remains within the realm of sense. In the case of animals the process ends with phantasmata. In the case of men the nous can act on the phantasmata and educe noēmata... Nous, in the case of human beings, transforms the phantasmata into noēmata: how exactly Aristotle does not say... Instead of pointing to deliberative/rational phantasia as being behind the formation of the noēmata, Watson points to nous itself, albeit without the ability to say more clearly how and why this might be the case. In what follows, however, we will have cause to confirm Watson’s suspicion that nous is in some way involved while nonetheless maintaining that the job of “educing noēmata” still may well belong to phantasia. Phantasia need not remain entirely “within the realm of sense” because it affects different soul types differently.

Returning, then, to the analogical table above: while it makes clear all that has been said before, it also, in its vacancies, urges us forward. Is there an analog for the perceptive common sense? Yes; Aristotle discusses it in DA III.7, though he doesn’t name it: here too there is a “last thing acted upon” which is “one thing with a single mean condition” (431a19). And it acts quite analogously to the “common sense,” which is to

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386 Watson, “Φαντασία in Aristotle, De Anima 3. 3,” 110, emphasis mine.
say, it acts on ratios, the only difference being the sorts of attributes it measures according to analogical ratios. For this is how Aristotle discusses it: “So why should the question of how one distinguishes attributes of different kinds be any different from how one distinguishes opposites such as white and black” (431a23-24)? Polansky observes that “just as the five senses lead to a central sense and thus are subfaculties of the sense faculty,” “mind is also a unity,” and is “composed of subfaculties for practical thinking, theoretical thinking, and mathematical thinking.” What Polansky suggests, then, is that the analog to the common sense is in fact simply mind—his translation of nous—itself. Is Polansky right? Could it be nous that handles the relative attributes of the “one thing,” that determines how to measure this one thing against the “greater good” mentioned in III.11? It seems as though at least two other commentators would agree that it is.

It should be noted that these two commentators—Long and Apostle—are heard here neither commenting on the common sense itself, nor even on nous directly. Rather, their comments both attest to the way in which the “greater good” should be considered as an analog for the pleasant sought by animals. More interestingly, their comments are also both made regarding the role of deliberative phantasia. Christopher Long agrees that rational phantasia and deliberative phantasia name the same thing, which he here refers to as a “logistical capacity,” saying that it is “oriented not only by the instrumental good, but also more originally by an apprehension of the “ever beautiful and truly good,”

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which announces itself as something wished.”\footnote{388} By introducing a “logistical, deliberative mode of being appeared to” in *DA* III.10 and 11, Long finds that Aristotle “lends determination” to a “certain way of having λόγος” that serves as the “ground in which what is perceived as painful or pleasant is rooted in a broader context and interpreted in such a way that the beneficial and harmful appear.”\footnote{389} In other words, Long locates “a certain way of having λόγος” as the delineation between a soul’s ability to be appeared to by what is painful or pleasant on the one hand, and by what is beneficial and harmful—good and bad—on the other. And with this, Apostle agrees, saying that “actual desire presupposes the apprehension of the practicable good, which is the immovable mover in animals.”\footnote{390} This fits nicely with Long’s view. Just as there is an “instrumental” (Long) or “practicable” (Apostle) good in that influences the sorts of motions an animal with sensory *phantasia* will undertake, so too is there “ever beautiful and truly good” (Long) or even, more strongly, an “immovable mover” (Apostle) that influences the sorts of “motions” a human with logistical, rational/deliberative *phantasia* will undertake. And what “motions” are these? Aristotle is quite clear in our key analogical passage, and in both directions: when the animal encounters something pleasant or painful, it “pursues or flees it, as though [asserting]\footnote{391} or denying” (431a9). And “for the soul that thinks things through, … when it asserts or denies that something is good or bad it flees or pursues” (431a16-17).

\footnotetext{388}{Long, *Aristotle on the Nature of Truth*, 211–12.}
\footnotetext{389}{Ibid., 92.}
\footnotetext{390}{Aristotle and Apostle, *Aristotle’s on the Soul*, 195.}
\footnotetext{391}{See footnote 375, above.}
The comments of Long and Apostle seem to reaffirm what we heard Polansky suggest, that the analog to the common sense is *nous* itself. Additionally, we have made clear Aristotle’s announced analog for pursuance and flight: we are now in a position to fill in the remaining spaces in our analogical table.

**Table V.2: Comparison of Analogs from III.7’s Key Analogical Passage, Complete**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Human</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Aisthēma</em></td>
<td><em>Phantasma</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>Soul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Phantasma</em> (Many <em>aisthēmata</em> over time, the motion of sensory <em>phantasia</em>)</td>
<td>“<em>One Thing</em>” or <em>Noēma</em> (Many <em>phantasmata</em> over time, the motion of deliberative <em>phantasia</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Sense, determines pleasantness or painfulness according to “mean-state” of perceptive part</td>
<td><em>Nous</em> determines goodness or badness according to the “mean condition”, presumably of the intellective part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal pursues or flees</td>
<td>Human asserts <em>[kataphasis]</em> or denies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But do we have a better idea of what *logos* is here than we did at the outset of this section? It nowhere appears forthrightly in our analogical table. We have, however, caught glimpses of it here and there, lurking in the background. A review of those ‘glimpses’ reveals a clearer outline of *logos*: it emerges with the *noēmata* as the realm in which such *noēmata* can be combined and separated.
The rational/deliberative *phantasia* is the *phantasia logistikē*, and Long emphasizes the importance of this etymological connection by speaking of this experience of *phantasia* as a “logistical” capacity. The creature with such a logistical capacity is the creature for whom the *genesis* of *noēmata* is possible. It is the creature who has not only a common sense, but also a “mind,” *nous*, which can then determine the ratios that cause one to say something is good or bad (beneficial or harmful, just or unjust). It is perhaps easiest to see that for this asserting or denying, in this “saying something about something,” one obviously must “have *logos*.” In this asserting and denying, too, we have evidence of what we heard Randall, Sachs, and Aristotle in the *Politics* say about *logos* as well. *Logos* as “[t]he characteristic human capacity,” emerges not as communication about pleasant and painful things perceived, but rather as a sort of web that connects things perceived with a “greater good.” To leave *nous* out of one’s formulation of what *logos* is would be to once again mistake it for simple communication. *Logos*, then, would seem here to be characterized most of all by two significant components: the ability to be appeared to by the form of forms, the *noēmata*, and the ability to then “pursue” or “flee” these *noēmata*, which is an ability made possible by *nous*. However, in this description of *logos*, one thing is obviously missing: the *saying*. In the formulation of *logos* as the realm in which *noēmata* come to be and are ‘pursued or fled,’ where is the *logos* translatable as “articulation in speech”? *Kataphasis* and *apophasis* obviously have their place, but where is the “simple saying,” the *phasis*, upon which they depend?
Though we may have not yet determined how a thing unfolds into its “articulation in speech,” we do seem to be on the correct path. In Chapter One, we asked not only how entelecheia “unfolds” into “entelecheia,” but also whence it unfolds. ‘Where’ does such unfolding begin? Is there a sort of “spatial intelligibility,” a sort of intelligible ‘sensing’ at work behind the more recognizable “logical intelligibility,” intelligible saying? The key analogical passage indicates that there is: spatial intelligibility can also be characterized as the mental landscape in which the phantasmata appear as perceptible things for the soul that thinks things through. Let us attempt to uncover as much about phasis as we can, knowing that if that attempt fails to show us what it is and what its causes are, we can turn instead to a consideration of spatial intelligibility. Perhaps, between these two different paths, we may finally discover the connection between the motion of phantasia and the way something unfolds into speech.

**Phasis and Logos Apophantikos**

What is phasis? Most simply, it is the saying of a name. According to chapters 3 and 4 of De Interpretatione, there are names that signify without time—nouns—and there are names that signify with time—verbs. Says Christopher Long of these chapters:

Aristotle identifies the noun or name (ὄνομα) and the verb (ῥῆμα) as the parts of a λόγος, each of which signifies meaningfully according to agreement (κατὰ συνθήκη). The noun signifies without time, while the verb signifies with time. Names and verbs are significative expressions, but taken in isolation, they do not signify in the manner of the λόγος. Aristotle designates φάσις, expression or assertion, as the sort of signification of which these parts are capable. When the name ‘fire’ is asserted, something is signified beyond the word itself. When the verb ‘ignites’ is expressed, something is also signified beyond the verb, but now with the additional dimension of time.\(^{392}\)

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Long concludes that “such significations, be they nominal or rhematic, are for Aristotle mere φάσεις, expressions.” Here, Long is referencing the end of De Interpretatione 5, in which he translates Aristotle as saying,

Let the name and the verb be simply an expression [φάσις μόνον], since it is not to speak in such a way that reveals something with the voice with the result that it shows itself forth for itself [ἐπει δὲ έστιν εἶπείς οὕτω δηλούντα τι τῇ φωνῇ ἐστι ἀποφαίνεστοι], whether one is asking a question or speaking spontaneously. (17a15-20)

*Logos apophantikos* is able to let something show itself as itself, and in that capacity is altogether different from the “mere phaseis,” which when “taken in isolation,” simply cannot “signify in the manner of the λόγος.” Further, every *logos apophantikos* is composed of at least one affirmation or kataphasis, and consequently, is that in which both truth and falsity arise (in accordance with the combinatorial theory of truth). Long writes,

If, as Aristotle goes on to insist, an affirmation [κατάφασις] is itself the first declarative saying—λόγος ἀποφαντικός—and what distinguishes a declarative saying from other sorts of saying is that truth and falsity arise in it, the analysis of λόγος into parts destroys its capacity to function as the locus of truth.

These assessments by both Long and Aristotle certainly make it seem as though *phasis* and *logos apophantikos* are extremely different: *logos apophantikos* has a much greater signifying power than *phasis monon*, allowing what is said to show itself as itself, *phasis* “in isolation” barely can be called signifying; *logos apophantikos* is a sort of saying something about something, *phasis* is simply saying; in *logos apophantikos*, truth and falsity can arise, in *phasis*, they cannot. For these reasons, Aristotle and Long—and, for

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393 Ibid., 98.
394 Note that it is this phrase, *phasis monon*, which is referenced in the citation just previous and called “mere *phasis*.” It could, however, just as easily be translated as “simple *phasis*.”
that matter, Heidegger—are more centrally concerned with logos apophantikos than they are with phasis.\(^{397}\) But in this argument, we will have cause to discard these differences, finding that doing so both aids in an understanding of phasis as the essential last piece to the explication of phantasia as the motion of the intelligible, and in bringing phantasia more directly to bear on logos apophantikos. We will propose instead that both phasis and logos apophantikos be considered as the sort of saying that is phanai, the showing of what something is. Phasis, accurately understood, is the simplest sort of this showing; logos apophantikos is the more complicated sort. And phantasia is responsible for both sorts of showing.

It is true that phantasia and logos apophantikos have already been taken up together in a few places in Heidegger. But these appearances are for phantasia little more than cameos; while the connection between logos and apophainesthai is of central importance in Heideggerian phenomenology, phantasia tends to appear on the periphery of these discussions.\(^{398}\) In what has become known as the “Aristotle Introduction,” a 28-page composition that was to preface a book based on Heidegger’s early lectures on Aristotle, phantasia appears only once, and in connection with the logos apophantikos. Nonetheless, this brief mention does give us reason to believe he thought phantasia played an important role in the way being comes to expression. He writes,

The λόγος itself must be taken in its own \textit{intentional} character: it is ἀπόφανσις, an intending arising from the object and drawing upon (ἀπό) it in this addressing and

\(^{397}\) Long, \textit{Aristotle on the Nature of Truth}, 98; Aristotle, \textit{ Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione}.

\(^{398}\) One place where Heidegger does treat phantasia apart from logos apophainesthai is in one of the 1924 Marburg lectures in which phantasia’s relationship to truth and falsity is discussed to bring the truth and falsity of doxa into better view. Martin Heidegger, \textit{Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy}, Studies in Continental Thought; Studies in Continental Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 96–97.
discussing. Accordingly, ἀποφαίνεσθαι is a matter of letting the object “appear” for itself from out of itself (middle voice) as itself. This becomes important for the interpretation of φαντασία, imagination.399

This connection between logos and apophainesthai is echoed elsewhere, but it is rare to find mention of phantasia in this connection.400 One such mentioning, though, directly affirms the etymological connection between apophaninesthai and phantasia, and in so doing also draws out a very brief indication of what Heidegger takes Aristotelian phantasia to be, saying that it “pertains not so much to ‘images’ as it does to ‘coming to the fore,’ or ‘coming to presence.’”401 This assessment is entirely friendly to our own, which fact is easier to see now than it was when we were only concerned with phantasia as that according to which images become present for us. For from this vantage point, we can now see how phantasia as the motion behind the eventuation of noēmata themselves can understandably be summarized as a sort of ‘coming to the fore’ or a ‘coming to presence.’ However, if such an understanding of phantasia is to be productively brought into conversation with the logos apophantikos, it must be through an understanding of phasis—through a broader understanding of phasis than that of a “mere expression” that is uttered in isolation. This is for two reasons: firstly, because there is more substantive textual evidence to turn to in linking phantasia to phasis, as we shall see, but also because it is possible that logos apophantikos can be read as a sort of phasis insofar as both share a curious position with regards to truth and falsity. Let us begin, then, with this second point.

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400 For example, in one of his 1924 Marburg lectures, Heidegger says “The genuine function of the λόγος is the ἀποφαίνεσθαι, the bringing of a matter to sight.” (Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, 14.)
In both Aristotle’s and our own account, *phasis* and *kataphasis* have served to clearly demarcate the difference between the two different types of truth discussed in *Met. IX*(Θ). The contact theory of truth applies to “things that are not compound,” and these are the things “the very being of which is being-at-work” (1051b18, 1051b30). Because “it is not possible to be deceived about anything the very being of which is being-at-work, “one either grasps or does not grasp it…” (1051b30-32). And it is this grasping or touching which Aristotle also compares to *phasis*, as we have seen. This is echoed by Aristotle’s remarks in *De Interpretatione* I.4:

The word ‘human’ has meaning, but does not constitute a proposition, either positive or negative. It is only when other words are added that the whole will form an affirmation or denial. But if we separate one syllable of the word ‘human’ from the other, it has no meaning; similarly in the word ‘mouse’, the part ‘ouse’ has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound. (16b26-32)

One only grasps or touches truth if one says “mouse,” not if one says “ouse.” There is simple saying, which is true, and there is simply not saying, which isn’t really false, but which certainly isn’t true. On the other hand, of course, is the combinatorial theory of truth, which Aristotle likens to the “saying something about something” of *kataphasis* (and, to be fair, of *apophasis*, which is better summarized as “saying something from something”). This is the more typical sense of truth and falsity, and a thing to which this sense is applicable will be said to be true or false depending on the way its component parts come together. And in the *De Interpretatione*, *kataphasis* continues to be just this sort of thing. “The first class of logos apophantikos,” Aristotle tells us, “is *kataphasis*,

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402 It is worth noting that Sachs here is rather more liberal with his translation than usual, providing talk of grasping and not grasping when none is at hand in the Greek. “ὅσα δὴ ἐστιν ὑπὲρ ἐξαίτην τι καὶ ἐνέργεια, περὶ τὰ δέ τα ὑπὲρ ἐστὶν ἀπατηθῆναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἦ νοεῖν ἡ μὴ.”

the next, the *apophasis*” (I.5, 17a8-9). And it is only the *logos apophantikos* to which truth and falsity apply.404

The difficulty, though, is apparent when we look again at what Aristotle says about the truth of the simple name. If “mouse” has meaning, and is thus true according to the contact theory of truth, “ouse” does not have meaning, and in uttering it, one has failed to touch the truth, and has instead uttered “merely a sound.” But where is the analog for “merely a sound” in the case of the *noēma*? There is none. “The true is the contemplative knowing of these things [those which either are or are not], and there is no falsity, nor deception, but only ignorance…” (1052a1-2). Here, there is no equivalent of “ouse:” one either contemplates a thought, or one does not. But what of the case of the *aisthēma*? Here is an analog that is illustrative. Recall the stipulation that Aristotle must make for the ability of perception to be true or not true, instead of being false: perception must be “engaged accurately with some perceived thing,” and it is only “always truthful” “when directed at its proper objects” (*DA* III.3 428a3-4, 427b12-13). In perception, one can make what is equivalent here to “merely a sound,” and this is the result of not being accurately engaged with what is perceptible. Here, too, it is not just a matter of either touching or not touching the truth, but rather something more like touching and being more or less close to touching. One can miss the mark and yet still have an idea, if even a loose idea, of where the mark is. This is why it seems that *phasis*, like perception, would seem to always have some part of it that depends on being true of something else for it to be true. It is true that the *aisthēma*, the *phantasma*, the *noēma* do not refer outside of

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404 “…ἀποφαντικὸς δὲ οὐ πάς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅ τὸ ἁληθεύειν ἢ πλάσσεται ὑπάρχει…”Aristotle, *Catologiae et Liber de Interpretatione.*
themselves, do not point elsewhere, do not attach to or relate to anything else. But in the case of the \textit{aisthēma}, before it arises, there is a possibility that perception misses—but still recognizes—the mark. The connection between what is encountered and our ability to be worked on by what is encountered can occasionally be characterized as something like a near miss, which is not properly a connection, but which is also not entirely ‘not being,’ ‘not touching.’ Implicit to the \textit{aisthēma} is the fact that a connection has accurately been made between what is perceived and the power of perception; implicit to the \textit{phasis} (as opposed to “merely a sound”) is the fact that a connection has accurately been made between, one presumes, the thought of a mouse and the saying of “mouse.” “Mouse” as a genuine \textit{phasis} works only if it points beyond itself, to the thought of mouse, and this is quite apart from whether or not there is or is not a mouse at hand when “mouse” is uttered. The “mere” \textit{phasis} which is uttered, as it were, in isolation, can still never be uttered in isolation from the thought behind it that gives it its truth and its meaning.

On the other hand, regardless of how complicated the makeup of logos \textit{apophantikos} gets (for Aristotle tells us that there is such a thing as simple or “first” logos \textit{apophantikos}—simple \textit{kataphasis}—and that even \textit{apophasis}, let alone compounded propositions, are more complicated than this first sort), isn’t it always an attempt to speak simply to the \textit{tode ti} of a subject—to name it? Certainly such an attempt also sometimes misses the mark, but when it manages to name the \textit{tode ti} of, say, justice, how is this any different than naming the \textit{tode ti} of the thought of mouse? Couldn’t such a simple statement serve, in a way, as the name of a thing? Long provides a thorough and
refreshing treatment of a line in the *De Interpretatione* that seems to speak to this overlap between *phasis* and the *logos apophantikos*. The line in his translation reads, “Each λόγος is significative, not as a tool, but as was said, according to agreement [κατὰ συνθήκην].”405 His remarks center on how one is to understand κατὰ συνθήκην, which he goes on to argue does show that here “Aristotle underscores the connection between the significative function of the λόγος and that of the name.”406 And here he cites Heidegger as also agreeing with this connection when he insists, “The word [i.e., λόγος] originally was a naming, but not that of a mere name, but rather something that is in the world is addressed as it is encountered.”407 But again: can there be a mere name? Can a name be a name without in some way pointing to what is named? And if what we take as the world in which things can be pointed to and encountered has been effectually enlarged so as to include the *phantasmata* as ‘perceptible things,’ how can one utter a name *without* having it be in some way contextual and thereby concrete? Isn’t it true that we are the only beings for which the mere name, the name in isolation even arises as a possibility? That we are the only beings who can overlook the way the intelligible is itself ‘perceptible’ simply because they get too involved in what is intelligible? *Phasis* and *logos apophantikos* are alike insofar as they both function as naming what is there, if we only take care to understand that “there” can also mean ‘there.’ Certainly these remarks may seem to disregard the difference, up until now so carefully safeguarded in this project, between the two different sorts of truth. But where would one expect them to be ambiguous, if not in the very appearing of things as they are? Let us come at this

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406 Ibid.
line of reasoning from another direction, this time considering *phasis* in connection to *phantasia*.

**Phanai and Phantasia**

*Phasis* makes a most interesting appearance in our key analogical passage, directly at the beginning: “And perceiving [*αἰσθανέσθαι*] is similar to simple declaring [*φάναι*] and to thinking contemplatively [*νοεῖν*]…” (431a7). This appearance is truly an appearance; we do not have the word itself, but instead one of its etymological relatives that bears a striking resemblance in this context. Like *aisthanesthai* and *noeîn*, *phanai* is also a present infinitive, coming from *φημί*, “to say.” *Phasin*, the third person plural form, “they say” has evolved to a more idiomatic form, “*phasis,*” from which is derived the nounal “*phasis.*” ⁴⁰⁸ Clearly it is *phasis* that is meant: the force of the “and” with which the line opens points backwards to the preceding argument, and this has pertained to the similar ways in which the second potencies of both knowledge and perception, in coming to work, are not motions, but are instead “being-at-work in the simple sense,” as something complete (431a6). This hearkens back to III.6, the preceding chapter, in which the central topic has been precisely these sorts of simple and complete ways of being-at-work, which characterizes both those things that are (as found in Chapter Two) epistemologically primary (cat, olive, horse) and those which are logically primary (being, unity, incommensurability).⁴⁰⁹ And even outside of its contextual back-

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⁴⁰⁸ Liddell and Scott, *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon.*

⁴⁰⁹ “Every act of saying something about something, and likewise of denying, is also either true or false, but this is not so with every act of intellect, but thinking what something is, in the sense of what it keeps on being in order to be at all, is true, and is not one thing attached to another. But in the same way that the seeing of something proper to sight is true, but seeing whether the white thing is a human being or not is not always true, the same thing holds also with thinking the things that are without material” (*DA*)
grounding, this line obviously calls to mind the more pointed discussion of the contact theory of truth of *Met. IX.(θ).

It is true that the morphological forms of \( \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \alpha \nu \epsilon \sigma \theta \alpha i \) and \( \nu o\epsilon \iota \nu \), as infinitives, are not nearly as similar as one would wish to “aisthēma” and “noēma.” But taken together with the fact that *phasis* itself appears here as not just morphologically different, but different in its very naming, we may find a similar occurrence to the apparent shifting of names identified in Chapter One. In the comparison of the όμοιωματα or παθήματα of *DI* 16a3-8 to the *phantasmata* of *DA* III.3, we observed that Aristotle seems to refer to the same thought in different places with different names. Here, as there, we can again perhaps take the difference in vocabulary as an illustration of just how one thought can be caught up by different names. Such an illustration need not have been intentional to be effective: indeed, perhaps even the opposite is true. If Aristotle can be seen to unintentionally shift the way in which he names the same simple thoughts, this could very well indicate a sensitivity to an awareness of such thoughts themselves first and foremost, and not to the words he uses to catch them up.

The appearance of *phasis* under the name *phanai* is doubly fascinating, though, because it is doubly accurate to say that *phasis* here makes an appearance: *phanai* is both the present active infinitive of φημι, “to say,” as we noted above, but it is also the aorist active infinitive of φαίνω, “to bring to light, make to appear.” *Phainō*, of course, means “to bring to light, cause to appear,” in what Scott and Liddell call a “physical sense,” but

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III.6.430b25-31).

410 Recall that these last two terms indicate the activity of perceiving and thinking, not just the capacity to do either. (See footnote 192).
also “make known, declare” in a metaphorical sense. It has an analogical meaning with regards to the hearable and sound: in a physical sense, it can mean “to make it clear to the ear, to make it ring clear,” which has its own metaphorical rendition in “to set forth, expound.”\(^{411}\) And, of course, *phainō* is the mother-verb of the verbal adjective ἀποφαντικός, and also of the present participle “*phainomena,*” not to mention something like the step-mother-verb of *phantasia* itself.\(^{412}\) How, then, to handle such plurivocity? Almost certainly by embracing it: perhaps it is *phanai* as *phainō,* as “to have made clear, to have made known,” and neither *phasis* nor *logos apophantikos* that should be considered as we attempt to connect *phantasia* to saying. This is awkward insofar as it entails replacing a noun with an aorist active infinitive, but truly the awkwardness was already in *phasis* insofar as it is the child of the mother-verb *phēmi* and thus inherits some of the interrelatedness of *phēmi* and *phainō*.

Consider what such a shift might mean for our understanding of the passage in which Aristotle forthrightly claims a connection between a voice that can carry meaning with *phantasia.* In *DA* II.8, the chapter devoted to the sense of hearing and the phenomenon of sounding, Aristotle makes the following distinction regarding voice and mere sound:

And so the voice [φωνή] is the striking against the so-called windpipe of the air that has been breathed in, by the action of the soul in these parts (for not every sound of an animal is a voice, as was said—for it is also possible to make a noise with the tongue or in the way people do when they cough—but it is necessary for


\(^{412}\) As was suggested in Chapter Four in the words of Malcom Schofield, the more likely mother verb for *phantasia* is *phantazo,* though Scott and Liddell also point to the middle passive *phainomai* as a possible parent. Ibid.
the part that causes the striking to have soul in it and some sort of imagination
[φαντασίας τυño] with it, since the voice is some sort of sound that is capable of
carrying a meaning), and it is not, like a cough, a striking by the air that is
breathed in, but by means of this the animal makes the air in the windpipe strike
against the windpipe. (DA II.8 420b28-421a2)

What this passage makes clear is that it is not logos that is required for significative
voice, but only phantasia. Animals without logos are presumably able, then, to utter
something similar to simple saying, to phasis.413 But Aristotle is clear: voice requires not
phantasia simply, but “some sort of imagination.” The first half of this chapter nicely
suggests what sorts of phantasia are here meant: there may well be a sort of significative
voice that is accompanied by a sensory phantasia, and there may also be a sort of
significative voice that is accompanied by the logistical phantasia. What if the first sort
of phantasia results in something like simple saying, like phasis, and the second sort in
something more like logos apophantikos? Something like the “pre-predicative” or
“nascent” logos which we claimed along with Wedin was being used in Posterior
Analytics II.19? We could easily group both this nascent logos and this more fully-
fledged logos together as acts of phanai. And as acts of phanai we can very confidently
declare both to be those things that have been made clear or declared, which is to say, as
phainomena. More, if we return to Met. IX.(Θ), this understanding is confirmed. We
have cited already 1051b23-25 in translation. Let us do so again, this time paying closer
attention to what lies behind the translations “affirming”:

Rather, just as the true is not the same thing for these [simple, uncompounded]
things, so too being is not the same for them, but the true or false is this: touching
and affirming [phanai] something uncompounded is the true (for affirming
[phasis] is not the same thing as asserting a predication [kataphasis])… (Met.
IX.(Θ) 1051b23-25).

413 Long provides a nice review of places in Aristotle’s works in which the possibility of animal voice and
communication is raised. Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 79ff.
What is lost in the translation is that what is first translated as “affirming” is in fact not *phasis*, but is the considerably broader *phanai*, and that *phasis* only appears in the parenthetical remark, in which it is contrasted with *kataphasis*, but also taken as an illustration of *phanai*. What if what is meant here is that the true and the false of simple, uncompounded things is akin to touching and “having been made clear”? It seems, then, considerably more accurate to speak of *phanai* as that which should be grouped with the *aisthēma*, the *phantasma*, and the *noēma*.

And yet, *phanai* still seems an obvious outlier in this group: the three share not only morphological make-up, but a clearly hierarchical relationship. But if *phanai* can occur for both those beings with and those without *noēmata*, it is likely not to be understood as yet another step in a chain of the continually distillation of *eidos*. But this was clear even before taking into account the passage from II.8: the further refining or abstraction of the *eidos* that has been distilled into a *noēma* is not *phanai* because such refining has already been named as further *noēmata*. Our discussion of the ontological status of the *phantasma* in Chapter Two took up the *prōta noēmata*, and with them, the necessary distinction between two different types of primacy. The *prōta noēmata* we found to have epistemological primacy, meaning that they are the thoughts of those things we encounter first in experience, and which as a consequence are the most likely to be confused with the *phantasmata* that give rise to them. Such, we can imagine, are the like of ‘perceptible things’ in the soul. However, we went on to discuss the way in which a thought may also have what we called logical primacy. These are the things that are not first in experience, but which are first in knowability. In *Physics* I.1, we heard Aristotle
speak of the connection between the two as a “natural road” from “what is more familiar and clearer to us,” to “what is clearer and better known by nature,” and clarify the two types of primacy thus: “for it is not the same things that are well known to us and well known simply” (184a16-19).\footnote{Aristotle, Aristotle, 1957, 11; Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 57.} It seems likely, then, that the *prōta noēmata* are to subsequent *noēmata* just as the *aisthēmata* are to the *phantasmata*: gathered together, they give rise to something to which they are formally—but not materially—identical. Such abstraction, or better, *refining* of form likely occurs until we have arrived not just at the *noēmata* that have logical primacy, but at the *noēma* that has logical primacy (or perhaps as close as we can come to it.) This is the completely immaterial, unmixed *nous poietikos* of III.5.

With this “natural road,” it is possible to articulate a larger vision for the motion of *phantasia* as we have described it in this project. If the natural road leads from the *aisthēmata* and ends with the *nous poietikos*, could the motion by which we experience travel along it be named *phantasia*? Both the beginning and end of this road, as well as the various stops along the way that are *phantasmata* and *noēmata*, are characterized by “thinking what something is, in the sense of what it keeps on being in order to be at all;” each is, to use Wedin’s terminology once more, “formally identical” to each other (\textit{DA} III.6 430b25-26).\footnote{Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 43.} Above, we saw that it is possible to distinguish sensory and *logistikē phantasia* as the same sort of *phantasia* being experienced differently by souls with different potencies; the animal with the *dunamis* of perception is necessarily moved by *phantasia* in a different way than the human with both the *dunamis* of perception and that
of dianoia. Perhaps, then, nous poietikos names the motion of the intelligible as it affects the fifth dunamis, that of contemplative thinking. Aristotle’s comparison of both phantasia and nous poietikos to light supports this possibility. But as enticing as this vision is, still one thing is clear: Nowhere along this road that proceeds from the perceptible to the intelligible do we hear mention of any sort of saying, simple or otherwise. If we ask the question again, but this time by broadening what we are searching for from phasis to phanai, are we more successful? Yes. And here, the awkwardness of substituting an aorist infinitive for a noun, if even a noun with verbal parentage, is justified. If we look to the natural road that connects the perceptible with the intelligible, and ask “where is the ‘having been made clear, having been made known’?” an answer emerges: it is in traveling of the road backwards, from the intelligible to the perceptible. Recall again that phainō means “to bring to light, cause to appear,” in what Scott and Liddell call a “physical sense,” but also “make known, declare” in a metaphorical sense, and that this same relationship between a physical and a metaphorical sense obtains analogically to the hearable and sound: in a physical sense, it can mean “to make it clear to the ear, to make it ring clear,” which has its own metaphorical rendition in “to set forth, expound.” To make clear, bring to light, make clear to the ear is such as phanai is for animals, those beings of the physical, perceptible realm. But to make known, to declare, to set forth, to expound: this is the analogical sort of phanai that can be undertaken by humans, those wanderers of the metaphorically perceptible realm.

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416 Liddell and Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon.
This difference would speak to the lived experience of the way in which in the physical, perceptible realm we struggle to name what only appears to be a thing while in the intelligible realm, we can name a thing and still not be clear on just what that thing is; that is, it speaks to the way in which logos apophantikos is something of a higher order naming. Both are ways of making a thing clear—that is to say, separate—in speech.

Both phasis and logos apophantikos are the unfolding of things, the disclosing of things into speech; both allow things to show forth kata logos, as Sachs recognizes in translating the phrase in that way at DA II.1 412b11 and 412b20. Indeed, the phrase “kata ton logon” appears in two other places in the De Anima, and it seems likely that in these places too a case could be made for the same sort of translation. For something to be kata ton logon is for it to be unfolded, disclosed, or separated in speech. But not everything is easily disclosed in speech. Throughout this project we have discussed many named things without at first being clear what each is; phantasma and phantasia are chief among them. And here, in this chapter, this is certainly the way we have handled logos. We have said it, and have said this and that about it, but even now, how closely have we understood it—how clearly has it shown itself as what it is? We have relied primarily upon a certain web of words (Aristotle’s analogy between the perceptible

417 “About the part of the soul by which the soul knows and understands, whether it is a separate part, or not separate the way a magnitude is but in its meaning [ἄλλη κατά λόγον], one must consider what distinguishing characteristic it has, and how thinking ever comes about” (DA III.4 429a10-13). Also: “For this reason, those who think the soul neither has being without a body, nor is any sort of body, get hold of it well, for it is not a body but something that belongs to a body, and this is why it is present in a body and in a body of a certain kind, and those earlier thinkers did not think well who stuck it into a body without also distinguishing which bodies and of what sort, even though there is no evidence that any random thing admits just any random thing within it. And this happens in accord with reason [οὐτῷ δὲ γίγνεται καὶ κατὰ λόγον], since the being-at-work-staying-itself of each thing naturally comes to be present in something that is it in potency, and in the material appropriate to it. That, then, the soul is a certain being-at-work-staying-itself and articulation of that which has the potency to be in that way [καὶ λόγος τοῦ δύναμιν ἔχοντος εἶναι τοῦ ὑποτάσσει], is clear from these things” (DA II.2 414a19-28). This second instance, given the discussion about the soul’s connection with the body, could more productively be translated as “and the soul thus comes to be separate/present/unfolded in speech, since the being-at-work-staying-itself of each thing naturally comes to be present in something that is it in potency…”
and the intelligible) in an attempt to better catch it up, to try to bring it to light. The phasis for logos is indeed “logos.” But to show forth more clearly, “logos” requires something more, requires a logos apophantikos. And this we do not yet have. We have found an appearance of it as that which comes to be along with the noëmata and as that which seems put to work when such noëmata can be combined and separated, but we have not made plain what the image is that lurks behind these appearances. We have not yet grasped—or perhaps, been grasped by—it. It is this experience that would seem most of all to testify to a way in which there must be a sort of sensing at work, before saying. We can sense that this saying is not enough. We can tell when a thing has not been entirely unfolded or disclosed in speech, can tell that we have missed the mark. And so we try again. There are other webs of words one can turn to with hopes of better touching the thought behind the simple saying “logos.” Let us, with the help of one David Hoffman, turn to an examination of the etymology of “logos.”

Hoffman’s central claim is that “the word logos meant “a gathering or composition” in Homeric Greek and that it retained this sense through the fifth century BCE.” He finds that logos is something of a novelty in Homer, and suggests that this is due to its being “at a very early stage of its life, having just separated from the verb legein,” which fact is in turn interesting, since “at the time of [“logos”] birth, its mother-verb still had “to gather” as a primary meaning.” “Logos” itself appears only twice in Homer, and in contexts which speech is clearly meant (Iliad 15.393; Odyssey 1.56).

But its “mother-verb’s” appearances in all of Homer are not only much more numerous

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419 Ibid., 30.
(56 in all), but appear 4/5’s of the time in contexts which mean “to lay” or “to gather.”

There are but 11 instances in which legein designates acts of speaking, and most often, speaking is spoken of using a different verb altogether ("mutheomai") or “formulations involving epos.” Hoffman makes a convincing case for the claim that even though both mother- and child-words’ meanings gravitate towards meanings involving speech or reason as Greek literature approaches the fifth century BCE, the root meanings were “not necessarily lost” in such gravitation, but rather that the root meanings were “simply being extended into new contexts.”

In support of this, he says:

One can understand how a word that means “to lay” comes to mean “to gather” and then “to speak” and “to reckon” with relative ease. Laying things together is gathering, and to gather is to count and so to reckon. To gather is also to compose: when speaking or writing one gathers one’s words into a composition… These new contexts of gathering—namely, gathering words and gathering thoughts—do not preclude the basic sense of gathering, in fact they depend on it…The fact is that one can read gathering, in the sense of composing, for the act of speaking, but one can not read speaking for gathering.

How does this sense of logos as “a gathering of words” speak to what we uncovered about it in the process of further detailing our key analogical passage? What is interesting about thinking of logos as “a gathering of words” is that it can refer both to what has already come to be gathered, but also to the action of gathering. Seen this way, we can restate the action of animals that pursue the pleasant and flee the painful. Certainly such pursuit is made with the intention of gathering the pleasant into oneself. And, on the other side of the analogy, we can see such gathering is also at work, though perhaps not as easily as on the first side. For it is tempting to say that through kataphasis...
and *apophasis*, the analogs to pursuit and flight, we gather the good to ourselves and flee the bad. But this is only half of the story.

To see this analogical gathering, it is necessary to back up a bit, and to see how gathering has been at work in the motion of *phantasia* from, as it were, the very beginning of “the natural road” of *Physics* I.1; what is the “distillation” of *eidos* if not a gathering together of it? The *phantasma* results when many *aisthēmata* have been gathered together, a *prōta noēma* results when many *phantasma* have been gathered together, and subsequent *noēmata* are gatherings of antecedent *noēmata*. At each stage, the principle according to which the gathering has been made becomes clear. It would seem that the emergence of this principle, which is the *eidos*, is the gathering that is *logos*. When the criteria according to which gatherings are brought together are themselves only intelligible and no longer perceptible, we have entered the realm in which the good and the bad as such appear. But still, this is not saying. Through some mechanism that is as of yet not entirely clear, we reverse this process and make the intelligible perceptible by naming, saying, making clear these thoughts. This naming is certainly testimony to the gathering that has happened. “*Entelecheia,*” as an example, is dependent first upon the gathering together of the thought of an organizing principle of a thing such that that thing continues to be what it is, which in turn is dependent on the gathering together of the thought of souls common to humans, to animals, to plants, and that gathering is in turn dependent on having already gathered together the perceptible creatures that make up humans, animals, plants. But who—or *what*—has accomplished this gathering? Again, Aristotle nowhere remarks upon “*entelecheia*” in such a way as to
lay claim to it: it is not his creation, and he did not bring it to be. In this gathering, it is evident that the “gatherer” is not immediately apparent. This is why we have spoken with care about phantasia as being the motion by which we experience the travel along the road. It is also why we have tried diligently to make phantasia as a kinēsis distinct from a dunamis. In the gathering of form, we are not the gatherers; we are the gathered. We do not grasp the truth, but we are, in Klein’s words, what is grasped by it. Phantasia is not the motion by which we move along the natural road, but is the motion by which the natural road moves through us. The ramifications of this shift in thinking are enormous: Consider Hoffman’s observation about the transformation of logos in the works of both Isocrates and Aristotle. Hoffman first cites the same line from Aristotle’s Politics that we cited above, 1253a11-2:

Logos serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse, and it therefore serves to declare what is just and unjust. Man…alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and unjust, and of other similar qualities; and it is association in these things which makes a family and a polis.\footnote{The similar passage from Isocrates that is cited comes from the “Hymn to Logos” in Nicocles 5-9: Isocrates’s logos has “laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things base and honorable; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with each other.” Ibid., 35.} He then observes: “Logos went, in both Isocrates and Aristotle, from being a gathering of words, to being the words that gather the community.”\footnote{Ibid., 35.} But in our concluding chapter, it will be enough to gesture to how it might be that phantasia can, as it were, reverse the trip from Thebes to Athens, and to reflect a bit more on just who or what makes the journey.
Chapter Six: The Birth of Nameless Things

**Metaphoric Phantasia and “Bringing Before the Eyes”,** page 237

**“Bringing Before the Eyes” and Metaphor**, page 249

**Ana-Logos, Kata Logos: Spatial Intelligibility and Nameless Things**, page 263

**“Something Like the Middle Voice” and The Life of Words**, page 274

This project has attempted to account for phantasia’s appearances throughout the *De Anima* by allowing a unified understanding of phantasia to show itself. Thus far, it has found many of these appearances to be meaningfully described as the motion by which the intelligible comes to be out of the perceptible. With the exploration of saying and voice in the preceding chapter, however, we have uncovered the possibility that there is a phantasia that works, as it were, “backwards,” allowing what has been revealed as intelligible to become perceptible. We have already mentioned that such a turning is not without precedent in Aristotelian thought by pointing to the analogy that Aristotle uses in *Physics* III.3 of the road between Thebes and Athens. This analogy is especially appropriate at this juncture because Aristotle includes it to illustrate the central difficulty that arises when one speaks of a motion, a *kinēsis*, which we explored at length in both Chapters Three and Four: by speaking of a motion, does one speak of the mover or the thing moved? One commentator explains the analogy in this way:

In *Physics* III.3 Aristotle argues that the change [*kinēsis*], which the patient undergoes, is the actuality of both the agent and the patient. Although the change occurs in the patient and not in the agent, there is a single actuality of both… He suggests that the change is like a road, which can be regarded as two journeys [an equally possible translation of ὅδος]: a road from Athens to Thebes, and a road from Thebes to Athens (202a18-21). Although the journeys are one because they
follow the same path, they are not the same in being or account... the journey from Athens to Thebes and the journey from Thebes to Athens start and end at different locations, and they feature signposts in a different order-- for example, one journey might be uphill and the other downhill. So Aristotle claims that, although there is one road, different properties belong to it depending upon whether it is described as “the road from Athens to Thebes” or as “the road from Thebes to Athens.”

So too could we point to Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric as summarized by Joe Sachs. The Rhetoric opens with the pithy observation that “[r]hetoric is a counterpart [antisrophos] of dialectic,” and Sachs explains that an antistrophe in Greek drama is “a stanza in a choral ode chanted in the same metric pattern as the preceding stanza, and danced in the same steps, but in the opposite right or left direction across the stage” (1354a). He further explains this metaphor by pointing to what Aristotle says of happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics versus the list of four types of happiness included in the Rhetoric:

The first item listed is roughly equivalent to the definition in the Ethics, in simpler terms, but the next three descend from there to become progressively more crude, ending up by identifying happiness with having a lot of money and slaves. Here the metaphor of an antistrophe becomes almost visual: we can practically see the steps of the strophe, the upward dialectic in the Ethics, being danced in reverse in the Rhetoric. (1360b14-18)

In this final chapter, our task is to further substantiate the possibility that phantasia, as a motion, can be considered from the point of view of both Athens and Thebes, can be a dancing from either side of the stage. How does phantasia go from being the sort of motion by which we experience the unfolding of the intelligible from the perceptible to being the unfolding of something perceptible out of the intelligible? This further

427 Ibid., 19.
examination of the way a thing, say, *entelecheia*, “unfolds into speech” or is “disclosed in speech”—the way in which a thought becomes distinct and separate *kata ton logon*—will also help us to articulate the difference between saying and sensing thoughts. Thus will we also come to the end of the two ancillary lines of inquiry begun in Chapter One; not only does such a distinction mark the difference between spatial and logical intelligibilities, but it makes clear the connection between these intelligibilities and the *logike* and *phusike* methodologies. At the chapter’s end, we will have sketched the outline of a unified Aristotelian *phantasia* that serves in turn to unify the two different methodologies as the single road by which what is intelligible travels through us to be brought before the eyes and ears.

**Metaphoric Phantasia and “Bringing Before the Eyes”**

Let us once more begin by returning to our central passage.

Now if imagination is that by which we speak of some image as becoming present to us, rather than anything we might call imagination in a metaphorical way, is it some one among those potencies or active states by which we discriminate something and are either right or wrong? (*DA* III.3 428a1-4)

This time, however, we intend to focus not on *phantasia* as that according to which an image becomes present to us, but rather on that which “we might call imagination in a metaphorical way.” What is this metaphoric *phantasia*? We have heard already in the third section of Chapter Four several astonishingly diverse possibilities. Frede, “Philoponus,” and Brann suggest that it is an active or “voluntary” use of *phantasia* and as such is not of any concern in the *De Anima* (Frede and Philoponus), or in fact in
Aristotle at all (Brann). We also heard Hicks and Polansky suggest (and Hamlyn rather half-heartedly agree) that metaphoric *phantasia* is quite the opposite; that it names a “wider” and more passive *phantasia* by which we can speak of the soul’s ability to be passively appeared to or affected by anything, and as such is not of any concern since Aristotle wishes us to focus upon a *phantasia per se* by which the soul may be said to produce images. These are not at all the only interpretations of metaphoric *phantasia*; the diversity of possibilities multiplies as one works through the secondary literature. This multiplicity is likely due to the peripheral nature of metaphoric *phantasia*’s mentioning: the apparent point of this five-word subordinate clause is to set something aside, after all, and there is no indication as to how long such bracketing is to remain operative.

Interpretations of metaphoric *phantasia* thus tend to be brief, rather haphazardly supported, and a matter of “considerable divergence.” And while Nussbaum’s account is more thorough and nuanced than most (not a difficult distinction, as the topic is more than once found only in a footnote), she concludes that it does not much matter what one makes of the line. “It can just as well be seen as a parenthetical aside,” she says, and “need not lead us to form any other view concerning Aristotle’s interests and projects.

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429 Aristotle and Hicks, *De Anima*, 460–1.
430 In addition to these five accounts and those of Nussbaum and Freudenthal discussed in the next paragraph, consider the view of “Simplicius,” with which Wedin agrees: we use “imagination” metaphorically “when we use imagination in connection with what appears as well as with sense-perception and opinion.” Wedin explains that in these cases, “φαντασία-related language” is “extended beyond this strict or proper domain to τὰ φανόμενα or whatever appears to us to be the case.” Simplicius and Blumenthal, *On Aristotle’s “On the Soul 3.1-5,”* 66; Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, 69.
than that suggested by the evidence in general.” Ultimately, Nussbaum (and, for that matter, Watson) will go on to agree with Freudenthal, and will claim that metaphoric phantasia refers to something like “mere show,” though she seems not entirely satisfied with this conclusion. In this interpretation, though, she both speaks against the interpretation of Hamlyn, Hicks, and Polansky, saying that “[m]ost commentators have taken this to be a bracketing of the general use connected with phainetai, and a limiting to the cases where the creature has a mental image. This seems suspect for several reasons...” Chief amongst her list of three reasons is her stance that phantasma cannot mean a “mental image;” we have answered this charge in Chapter Two. But she also points out that, were metaphoric phantasia to refer simply to appearances, to the way a thing phainetai, why then would Aristotle go on to speak of appearances so frequently after just ruling it out? This is a persuasive point, and one with which we can easily agree. And lastly, she turns to Aristotle’s understanding of metaphor itself to discount this interpretation. Responding specifically, it seems, to Hicks’ claim that metaphoric phantasia refers to the “wider” use of phantasia, Nussbaum observes

It is odd, and at variance with Aristotle's usual procedure, to speak of a word's basic and central ordinary use as being kata metaphoran. He uses this expression

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432 Aristotle and Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, 254.
433 She writes:
“Aristotle is precise about linguistic relationships. If he had meant, “and not as the many use it,” or “and not in its non-scientific sense,” he might easily have said so. Instead he seems to be saying, “Assuming when we say phantasia we mean the faculty in virtue of which we are appeared to in such-and-such a way, and are not using the transferred sense according to which it means (mere) show, then it can be said that in virtue of phantasia we tell truth or falsehood—whereas to say, ‘in virtue of ostentatiousness we tell truth or falsehood’ would be silly.” It will be objected [by Nussbaum herself, perhaps] that this is a trivial point. But for Aristotle it is never trivial to recognize all the senses of a word and to indicate carefully those with which he is concerned...”

Nussbaum’s logic is sound and convincing here; it is her support of Freudenthal’s reading of metaphoric phantasia that is problematic, and which is corrected by our own reading. Ibid., 254; Watson, “Φαντασία in Aristotle, De Anima 3. 3,” 105, fn.9.
434 Aristotle and Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, 252.
precisely and consistently throughout his work to designate a transfer or extension of a term to an area where it does not strictly apply -- a conscious shift away from the basic ordinary usage. (It often indicates a shift of realm away from the one in which the predicate strictly applies, but may also indicate an extension to members of the same realm that cannot be truly denoted by the predicate used literally.)

She goes on to provide a convincing list of examples. What if, then, we were to take her insight that kata metaphoran designates “a transfer or extension of a term to an area where it does not strictly apply” seriously? What if we were to look for a way in which metaphoric phantasia names something like phantasia per se, but operative in a realm other than the one in which the latter “strictly applies”? In short, what if phantasia names how the intelligible comes to be from the realm of the perceptible, and metaphoric phantasia names how the perceptible comes to be from the realm of the intelligible?

Here we find immediate support in Frede’s cautious “suspicion” that metaphoric phantasia names something that looks like an “active use of the imagination,” and which appears in the first half of DA III.3:

without wanting to be over-confident on this much debated question, my suspicion is that this active use of imagination, the eidōlopoiein in 427b20 (that is up to us and is neither true nor false) is the sense of phantasia that is ruled out in 428a2 as kata metaphoran…

*De Anima* III.3 427b20 constitutes the very beginning of Aristotle’s focused explication of phantasia. In it, he makes several references to phantasia as being something that not only sounds active, but something that is clearly “available to us whenever we want it” (427b18). In these lines, phantasia is involved in making “something appear before the

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435 Ibid., 253.
436 Ibid.
eyes [πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἐστὶ τι ποιήσασθαι],” in making “images to fit things into a memory-assisting scheme [οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες].”

More, in experiencing this sort of phantasia one is said to be in “the same condition” as when one beholds “terrifying or confidence-inspiring things in a painting” (427b25). This is altogether different from the phantasia in III.7 by which one sees a moving signal light and recognizes it as an enemy: in that case, “by means of the imaginings and thoughts in the soul, just as if one were seeing, one reasons out and plans what is going to happen in response to what is present,” resulting quite possibly in one fleeing what is imagined to be terrifying (431b4-10). This last comparison in particular suggests that what has announced itself as difference with regards to voice is in fact a difference with regards to agency, and which we shall continue to further draw out as in fact a difference in direction. Metaphoric phantasia is not the more active partner to a passive phantasia per se, but is something more like the motion of intelligibility as begun by the embodied soul as opposed to the motion of intelligibility by which the soul is moved, or which “goes up to the soul.” Consider these lines from DA I.4:

For it is better, perhaps, not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks things through, but that the human being does these things by means of the soul, and this not in the sense that the motion is in the soul but that it sometimes goes up to the soul and sometimes comes from it; for example, sense perception comes from these things here, but calling something back to memory goes from the soul to the motions or stopping places in the sense organs. (408b14-18, emphasis mine)

When we feel ourselves to be the image-makers, when we feel that the motion “goes from” our own souls, our experience of phantasia is comparable to looking at a painting; when phantasia works on us, when it is a motion that “goes up to the soul,” our experience of phantasia can be considerably less comfortable.
Why might *DA* III.3 begin with a consideration of a sort of *phantasia* that is only the metaphorical partner to that with which Aristotle is more centrally concerned? It seems likely that this sort of *phantasia* would have been more immediately recognizable within Aristotle’s academic community. If so, it would make sense that the discussion of *phantasia* would begin by taking up a *phantasia* that would already be familiar in both the Lyceum and Academy. Indeed, the tone of *phantasia*’s introduction does seem like an appeal to a common understanding already at hand. But as Aristotle gets deeper into *DA* III.3, his analysis of *phantasia per se*, he has to set this metaphoric sense—or as Nussbaum has it, this “transfer or extension” of *phantasia* to “an area where it does not strictly apply”—aside. “This understanding of *phantasia* is all very well,” he seems to say, “but if instead of considering what is, in effect, this *metaphoric* sense of *phantasia*, we turn instead to an understanding of *phantasia* that seems much more fundamental, we shall discover that it is that according to which *phantasmata* come to be for us.” The shift in focus in our central passage allows Aristotle to provide a more thoroughly naturalistic account of *phantasia*, to show how it comes to be and how it operates. It allows him to show that a native Athenian only gets, as it were, from Thebes back to Athens if she has already gone from Athens to Thebes. He can thus be seen to uncover

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438 For instance, Silverman in investigating Plato’s use of *phantasia* finds it to be overtly active: “given Plato’s analysis of ἄνθησις and its objects, there exists a huge gulf between what the best philosophical and scientific account reveals that we do in fact sense, and what in our everyday life we report or describe as sensible. We actually sense only the special sensibles, and yet we think we sense colored objects and their properties. I believe that Plato posits the faculty of *phantasia* to fill this gap. *Phantasia*’s role is to link the limited irrational findings of ἄνθησις to the conceptual faculty of belief. In keeping with its Protagorean heritage, *phantasia* becomes for Plato the faculty responsible for the rich tapestry of what is apparently sensible.” Allan Silverman, “Plato on ‘Phantasia,’” *Classical Antiquity* 10, no. 1 (April 1991): 133, doi:10.2307/25010944.

439 In this light, see: Lycos, “Aristotle and Plato on ‘Appearing.’”

440 What we are here calling “phantasia per se” is equivalent to what Castoriadis calls the “second imagination,” and regarding the establishment of this “second imagination” in III.3, he says it “constitutes a decisive advance in relation to Plato, a change of the space in which the phantasia and phantasma are thought.” Castoriadis, “The Discovery of the Imagination,” 227.
the basis upon which metaphoric *phantasia* is operative at all. If this is so—if metaphoric *phantasia* is Aristotle’s way of naming the sort of *phantasia* operative in instances of “making something appear before the eyes” and in “making images to fit things into a memory-assisting scheme”—we should expect to find uses of *phantasia* in works pertaining to such image-making, and this is the case. In what follows, we look at a total of four passages taken from the *Rhetoric*, the *Poetics*, and *De Memoria* to see whether something like metaphoric *phantasia* is evident. The goal in turning to these works is not to make a comprehensive review, but rather to point to how metaphoric *phantasia* may be clearly seen to bring even these appearances of *phantasia* into the unified sense proposed by this project.

Turning to the *Rhetoric* is warranted; the word ‘*phantasia*’ appears therein nine times, and “its cognates are used throughout.” This has led one rhetoric scholar, Ned O’Gorman, to claim that *phantasia*’s “importance to Aristotle's conception of rhetorical affect and style is evident upon a close reading of the text.” One of these appearances is pivotal in Freudenthal’s (and thus Nussbaum’s and Watson’s) understanding of *phantasia*’s “transferred meaning” as “mere show,” as we noted above. This occurs at *Rhet.* 1404a11 in III.1, and regards the matter of wording [λέξις] in a speech. Of such wording, Aristotle observes that “one should aim at nothing more in a speech than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure,” and that “everything else that is beside demonstration is

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442 Ibid., 18.
superfluous”(1404a3-7). “[N]evertheless,” he continues, wording and style is “of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer.” For this reason,

it does make a difference, for the purpose of making a thing clear, to speak in this or that manner; still, the difference is not so very great, but all these things are mere outward show for pleasing the hearer; wherefore no one teaches geometry in this way. (Rhet. III.1.6)\footnote{The translation cited here is that of John Henry Freese as made available at the Perseus Project website; Sachs’ translation cannot be used to support Freudenthal or Nussbaum’s translation of these lines as he translates phantasia differently. Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric: With an English Translation by John Henry Freese, trans. John Henry Freese (Heinemann, 1939). http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1:3.1.6.}

The translation of “mere show” is understandable: something is being slighted here, but phantasia is not it. Rather, it is the very fact that attention to wording is necessary because of the corrupt condition of the listener; phantasia is here invoked as being necessary to wording “for the purpose of making a thing clear,” and is thus necessary to speech-making in a way in which it is not necessary to geometry.

And yet, it does seem as though phantasia is also necessary to geometry, although not in the same way. It is still necessary for a thing to be made clear, but not so overtly clear that even a “corrupt” listener can see it plainly. In fact, Aristotle’s claim in De Memoria about the necessity of phantasia to the considering of a triangle goes beyond finding phantasia essential to the consideration of geometrical figures, and finds it more generally essential to all thinking.

And following what was said before about imagination in the writings on the soul, it is not possible even to think without an image. For the same condition goes along with thinking which goes with drawing a diagram, since there, while making no use of the triangle’s being of a definite size, still we draw it definite in size; and in the same way, one who is thinking, even if one is thinking of...
something that is not a quantity, sets a quantity before one’s eyes [τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων], though one does not think it as a quantity, but if the nature of it is among things that have a quantity, but an indefinite one, one sets out a definite quantity, but thinks it just as quantity. (Mem. 449b31-450a7)

Phantasia here is not at all the phantasia by which phantasmata come to be for us, but is instead the way in which we put intelligible thoughts into the relatively more material and more concrete (and thus more perceptible) phantasmata with which we ground our thinking. The way in which these images are “put before the eyes” does not require paper or papyrus; it is like drawing a diagram, but within the soul. Still, the directionality of phantasia seems here to be reversed. The wording and style of a speech that aims to make something clear for a “corrupt hearer” is “ἀλλ᾽ ἄπαντα φανοσία ταῦτ’ ἐστί, καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν,” is “all a matter of imagination, and all relative to the listener,” and no one needs to worry about such wording in making clear the workings of geometry.445 Nonetheless, geometry—as well as all mental deliberation—is still very much a matter of a phantasia that seeks to make clear or “definite” what is intelligible. It is a matter of “putting something before the eyes.”

The phrase “putting before the eyes” [τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων] is similar to the phrase “make appear before the eyes” [πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιήσασθαι] at DA III.3427b18-19, and if we return to the Rhetoric, we find it occurs there as well. We have already heard Aristotle observe at the outset of Book III that wording and style is “all a matter of phantasia.”446 In the balance of Book III, he goes on to analyze wording and style and seems to emphasize that one particular technique is of unparalleled use to the orator who wishes to make himself clear. This is the creation and implementation of metaphor, and

446 Ibid.
while *phantasia* does not appear in this discussion (nor, for that matter, in any other place in Book III), the phrase “bringing-before-the-eyes” (which is similar to the phrase “for the purpose of making a thing clear” in *Rhetoric* III.1) is of central importance.\textsuperscript{447} Even before discussing the ways in which it is so, we may fairly anticipate what will be said by recalling what has thus far been posited about *phantasia* as it relates to *phanai* at the conclusion of Chapter Five. There, we suggested that *phantasia* as related to the significative voice is a matter of *phanai*, of making something clear for either the eyes or the ears. The discussion of “bringing before the eyes” in the *Rhetoric* not only confirms the importance of making something clear, but also clarifies how one might go about doing this. Rhetoric scholar Sara Newman argues that “bringing-before-the-eyes” is used in the *Rhetoric* to clarify the way in which some metaphors are more successful than others. The phrase appears at *Rhet.* III.2.1405b12, III.10.1410b33, and gets its fullest explanation at the beginning of III.11, where Aristotle says

Now it has been stated that elegant things are said as a result of metaphor from analogy and by putting things before the eyes [πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν], but it needs to be said what we mean by “before the eyes,” and what makes this happen. I mean that all those things that signify activity [energeia] put something before the eyes; for instance, saying a good man is a square guy is a metaphor, since both are perfect in their kinds, but it does not signify activity [energeia]. But there is activity [energeia] with “having the prime of life coming into full bloom,” and “you, like a free-ranging animal,” and “as the Greeks shot to their feet”; “shooting” is an activity [energeia] and a metaphor, since it means something is quick. And there is the way Homer has made use of metaphor in many places to make lifeless things come to life [τὸ τὰ ἄσωσι ἐμφασαὶ ποιεῖν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς]. In them all, the way he produces active presence [ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν] is highly regarded… *Rhet.* III.11.1411b22-34

\textsuperscript{447} On the central importance of metaphor to rhetoric, see 1405a3-10, where Aristotle first refers the reader to the *Poetics* to learn more about metaphor generally before saying “But it is in speech that one needs to work all the harder on metaphors, to the degree that speech, compared to verse, has fewer elements to help it achieve effects. *It is metaphor most of all that has in it something clear, pleasant, and unfamiliar*, and it is not something one can get from anyone else…”
From this, then, we learn that “bringing before the eyes” is a matter of bringing *energeia* before the eyes.

And, as one might expect, Aristotle has some suggestions about how one goes about “bringing something before the eyes” of an audience: it involves a certain sort of seeing things “vividly” to begin with. This is put most succinctly in the *Poetics* when Aristotle advises those who wish to write tragedies “to put [the stories] before [their] eyes” [πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθήμενον] as much as they can, “in order to organize the stories and work them out with their wording.” The reason? “For one who sees things most vividly [ἐναργέστατα] in this way, as if he were among the very actions taking place [[ὁ] ὁρῶν ὀσπερ παρ’ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς], would find what is appropriate and would least overlook incongruities” (*Poet.* 17.1455a21-25). He warns that failing to do so can lead to something “falling flat” on stage. What, though, does it take to see things vividly, to see them in such a way that one can then present them in such a way as to “signify *energeia*”? Aristotle’s answer is consistent between the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*. The ability to form metaphors “can not be grasped from anyone else and is a sign of natural gifts, since to use metaphors well is to have insight into what is alike” (*Poetics* 22.1459a7-8). This is reiterated in the *Rhetoric* when Aristotle summarizes the main points about metaphor as made in the *Poetics*, and finds this to be one of them: “…and it is not something one can get from anyone else” (III.2 1405a9-10). One cannot make clear what one has not seen.
The passages from both the Poetics and the Rhetoric seem to suggest that both the poet and the orator must be centrally concerned with attempting to use their words to “bring something before the eyes” as clearly as possible. In the case of the Poetics, though, the result of doing so is never said to be metaphor, even if the conversation there resonates easily with the discussion of the ideal metaphor in the Rhetoric and turns in a very natural way, three chapters later, to a more pointed discussion of metaphor. More, while the passage from the De Memoria clearly discusses “putting something before the eyes,” metaphor is not mentioned at all. Is “bringing something before the eyes” the same as expressing something via metaphor? No: Rhet. III.11 clearly says that there is such a thing as a metaphor that does not manage to put something before the eyes, and extols Homer as a master of using the best sorts of metaphor in which such putting/bringing is done the most successfully. Rather, “bringing something before the eyes” can occur (or fail to occur) in the presenting of a tragedy, can occur (or fail to occur) in the orator’s metaphors, and must occur for all thought. How can we learn more about it, so as to discern more clearly how it pertains to a metaphoric phantasia? We cannot turn to a more pointed discussion of “bringing before the eyes” in Aristotle, as none exists. We can, however, turn to a more pointed discussion of metaphor with hopes of uncovering more about how some metaphors succeed in “signifying energeia,” about how some metaphors “bring something before the eyes,” for this discussion does exist, and is in the Poetics.

The observation that a poet must “bring things before the eyes” in working out a story is found at the beginning of chapter 6, and Sachs connects this passage in a footnote to the discussion of “bringing before the eyes” as central to metaphor formation in the Rhetoric III.11. However, discussion of metaphor itself in the Poetics does not occur until chapter 21. Aristotle and Joe Sachs, Aristotle: Poetics (Focus Publishing/ R. Pullins Co., 2005), 45, fn.43.
**“Bringing Before the Eyes” and Metaphor**

So far we have spoken of metaphor in two different contexts. Firstly, we spoke of metaphor in wondering what Aristotle may mean at *DA* III.3 427a by *phantasia* *kata metaphororan*. In this context, we heard Nussbaum observe that Aristotle often uses metaphor to “transfer or extend” a name to an area where it does not strictly apply. But we have also spoken of metaphor—have heard Aristotle himself speak of the ideal metaphor—as a type of saying in which a thought is put before the eyes by “signifying *energeia*.” and this was in the context of seeking to identify what metaphoric *phantasia* may be said to do. In this section, we seek to discover in what way these contexts may be taken together. How may metaphoric *phantasia* be said to be the *phantasia* by which the most successful of metaphors (and more generally, the “bringing before the eyes” of *energeia*) comes about?

Not coincidentally, Aristotle expounds most pointedly on metaphor in two of the three works with which we have invoked here. Thus in the third book of the *Rhetoric*, he cross-references the earlier and more detailed discussion of the nature of metaphor in the *Poetics*. This discussion begins in earnest in chapter 21 in which Aristotle both delineates the genus of metaphor as well as four different species. “A metaphor,” he tells us, “is a carrying over [*epiphora*] of a word belonging to something else” (1457b6-7).

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449 “What each of these things is, how many forms of metaphors there are, and that metaphor is the most powerful element in poetry and in speech as well, have been stated in the *Poetics*...” (III.2.7 1405a3-6). Aristotle, Plato, and Sachs, *Plato’s Gorgias & Aristotle’s Rhetoric*.

450 In a comprehensive and richly-sited article, classicist John T. Kirby provides an excellent overview of how *epiphora* in this definition need not make the definition a tautology, as well as a summary of *epiphora*’s very many published translations. “With *epiphora* we are on slightly different ground [than as with *metaphora*]. *Epi-* as a prefix may designate movement over or beyond boundaries. Too, it may have a sense of addition, or (as per LSJ s.v. *epi* G.1.4) “accumulation of one thing over or besides another.” Thus *epipherein* may mean to put, or pile, something on top of something else...Hence with cumbrous exactitude we might translate it “additional assignment”...” John T. Kirby, “Aristotle on Metaphor,” *The
The four different species of metaphor specify the four different ways in which such a carrying over may happen, and Aristotle gives an example of each. The four types are, briefly, such that the “carrying over” of the name goes “from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or by analogy” (1457b10). The bulk of the discussion pertains to the last of these four types, that of the metaphor by analogy. As to why, we agree with classicist Glenn Most when he suggests that the “privilege [Aristotle] bestows upon analogical metaphors is due to the fact that these provide the clearest case of the fundamental structure underlying all metaphors,—that is, that the other three kinds of metaphor can be reduced to special cases of metaphors by analogy.” Most explains this reduction via a figure, which we include here though we need not provide a logos of it since we agree with Most: the “more interesting question, and one deserving of closer examination, is how, according to Aristotle, metaphor fundamentally operates” (see Figure VI.1). This, Most argues, can be uncovered by focusing on what Aristotle says about the metaphor by analogy. In short, he determines that “[t]here are thus two stages that must be performed if metaphor is to come about, both equally indispensable: first a set of ratios must be constructed; then the metaphor itself is created by an act of substitution.”

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452 Ibid., 21.
To make these two steps clear, Most prepares to provide us with another illustration, but before doing so, justifies this inclination by reminding us of Aristotle’s explicit understanding that “analogy” so used in this discussion is itself metaphorical: in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle is clear that “his use of the concept [analogy] in such passages represents a (metaphorical) transference of a technique from the domain of mathematics, where it has its source and more properly belongs, to another domain, one
in which the elements that enter into ratios with one another are not numerical.” Thus emboldened by analogy’s indigenousness to mathematics generally and geometry in particular, Most diagrams the example of metaphor-by-analogy Aristotle himself provides (“the cup is the shield of Dionysus” and “the shield is the cup of Ares”) as ratios. Building these ratios is the “indispensable preliminary step” in metaphor formation:

![Figure VI.2: Metaphor Formation, Step One: Ratio Building](Source: Most, “Seming and Being: Sign and Metaphor in Aristotle,” p.21)

The ratios thusly constructed “in principle may be extended further by other examples (here E and F),” but are governed by “the generic terms indicated as X and Y.” It isn’t until we accomplish the second step, though, that the metaphor itself is created. This is

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453 It is worth noting that in this passage, there are two places where Most seems to fight an inclination to make language the analogous domain to mathematics: firstly, he speaks of analogy’s use in “such passages” instead of “in language,” and secondly, of ratios that “are not numerical” instead of ratios “in language.” Most’s resistance here, if that is what it is, may be seen to speak to what we will try to go on to articulate: it doesn’t seem quite appropriate to speak of analogy as operating “in language,” but somehow outside of language.

The passage Most points to is *NE* IX.3, 1131a29ff. “Justice, therefore, is a certain kind of proportion [analogon], for proportion is not merely something peculiar to the numbers of arithmetic, but belongs to number in general, for proportionality is equality of ratios, and in four things in least terms…” The passage continues to detail the way in which such analogies work, stating, “Mathematicians call this sort of proportionality geometrical, for in a geometrical proportion, it follows that the whole [formed by the antecedents] is to the whole [formed by the consequents] as each antecedent is to its consequent…” Ibid., 21, emphasis mine.; Aristotle and Joe Sachs, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Newburyport, Mass.; Cardiff: Focus ; Drake, 2003), 84–85.

the step of “substitution,” wherein one of the terms is moved to the other side of the equation, with this result:

**Figure VI.3: Metaphor Formation, Step Two: Substitution**
(Source: Most, “Seming and Being: Sign and Metaphor in Aristotle,” p.21)

About this diagram, Most explains:

Here C designates the word that is the metaphorical term itself, and A the meaning of the metaphor, which would normally be absent, unexpressed in the text but understood by the reader. B, on the other hand, symbolizes the context within which the metaphor occurs: it can of course be explicitly supplied as in the phrase “shield of Dionysus,” but it need not be; it is only necessary that the general context evidently refer to Dionysus for the word shield to be understood in this case as signifying not a shield, but a cup.456

What we can take from this is that “the metaphorical term itself,” C (here “shield”) is a way of naming (or perhaps of renaming) that which has the more literal name “cup.” “Cup,” the “meaning of the metaphor,” is absent, and its spot is occupied by a name that suddenly takes on a new meaning. This substitution only functions thanks to what Most goes on to describe as “a specific kind of forgetting.”456 To grasp this metaphor, one must forget the normal meaning of “shield,” must, we might add, also forget that the thought here named by “shield” has a more conventional name, “cup.”

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455 Ibid., 22.
456 Here, Most references Lacan’s *Ecrits* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), 497ff., saying that “this necessary forgetting is symbolized here by the bar that separates D and puts it in the denominatory: this is Lacan’s bar of suppression, indicating that D must be repressed into the unconscious if the metaphor is to work.” Ibid.
After providing this analogical example, Aristotle provides another: “old age is to life as evening is to a day; accordingly, one will call evening the old age of day, or, as Empedocles does, call old age the evening of life, or the sunset of life” (*Poet.* 1457b23-24.) Most diagrams this one too. But regarding the example given next, Most is largely silent, which is unfortunate, as it is an example of what after Aristotle’s time would come to be called catachresis, the type of metaphor used to name something otherwise nameless. Most does mention catachresis in another context, though without making mention of this substitution of a new, metaphoric name for a “forgotten” conventional one, but one wonders if catachresis isn’t in this respect the analogical metaphor par excellence. This is the case in which the name in the position of A, which above was “cup,” is not in need of being forgotten simply because it does not exist; the thing—the thought—that occupies position A is nameless. To return again to the *Poetics:*

For some of the things said by analogy there is no word laid down, but it will be stated in a similar way nonetheless. For example, to scatter seed is to sow, but there is no word for scattering flame from the sun; but this has to the sun a relation similar to that of sowing to seed, and hence “sowing the god-created flame” is said. (*Poet.* 1457b27-30)

This sort of analogy is also referred to in the *Rhetoric,* but obliquely. It garners mention only insofar as it is part of Aristotle’s broader advice to the orator that he speak only in “fitting metaphors” (1405a10). Here, however, he is clear as to what the function of this sort of metaphor is: “…we must give names to things that have none [μεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὀνόμασμένως] by deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same kind…” (1405a35-b6).\(^{457}\) Catachresis is the use of metaphor to name that which is

\(^{457}\) Freese’s translation is here cited because it draws out the participial use of ὀνόμασμένως instead of the adverbial use of same, as with Sachs: “…Further, one ought to take metaphors that are not remote but drawn from things that are related and similar in form to the nameless things being named, so that it is clear as soon as it is spoken what the relation is” (1405b35-38). Aristotle, Plato, and Sachs, *Plato’s Gorgias &
nameless. But Aristotle then easily goes along to how metaphors relate to riddles, and then to the importance of beauty in making metaphors… The ease with which he mentions and discards this “curious and important use of metaphor” easily surprises the modern reader.\textsuperscript{458} It seems, in fact, like Aristotle is rather comfortable with the possibility that “there will be cases when our only semiotic recourse will be to metaphor,” that there will be cases in which we entertain thoughts, noēmata, without necessarily having named them.\textsuperscript{459} Perhaps catachresis, then, is not a notable occurrence for Aristotle simply because he is comfortable thinking about nameless things.

A brief review of the multitude of instances in his works where he finds a thing to be anōnumos would seem to confirm this suspicion: that something is nameless does not seem to bother Aristotle very much. Further, it seems that this designation seems to arise in precisely those places in which Aristotle has in mind a sort of analogical table that is at work behind or within his logos, which is surprisingly frequently. We have already spoken to the way in which the De Anima is an excellent example of this sort of approach. It seeks first to consider four (perhaps five) potencies of soul, and within the second potency, five sub-potencies of senses. For every potency and sub-potency, he further specifies the object and activity that are proper to each \textit{(DA I.1 402b9-16, DA II.4 415a14-22)}. In Chapter 3, we saw Polanksy recognize this latent analogical table by recreating one himself. But not only does Aristotle regularly employ extended analogies that can easily be presented in table form; he frequently holds a place in that argument for something that may be anōnumos. As an example, we may consider a place where...

\textit{Aristotle’s Rhetoric}; Aristotle, \textit{The “Art” of Rhetoric}.
\textsuperscript{458} Kirby, “Aristotle on Metaphor,” 542.
\textsuperscript{459} Ibid.
Aristotle actually includes such a table in his work, *Eudemian Ethics* 2.1221a. Here, he presents the virtues of character in a table that places each with respect to its status as a mean between an excess and a deficiency, as well as with respect to its inclusion in the group of virtues of character. One of the “cells” is filled only with the word “ἀνώνυμος.” This is different from a vacant spot. Consider, for example, Polansky’s chart, on page 103: it includes two vacancies, and in interpreting these vacancies, one is not sure if there are mediums for the potencies of nutrition and imagination. The spots are simply blank. By filling a vacant spot with the name “nameless,” Aristotle indicates that something—some thought—fills that spot, but it has no name of its own. And the table in the *Eudemian Ethics* is not at all the only place in a larger analogy in which Aristotle uses this word. It occurs in his comparison of objects/activities/potencies in *De Anima* (417b32, 418a27, 421b, 426a13-16, likely others), in the *Politics* within a comparison of political communities of various size (1253b), in the *Poetics* when attempting to organize the various types of poetry and music into an orderly system (1447aff.), and in so many places in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that it would be excessive to include them all here.


461 “Throughout his works, Aristotle often observes that there are gaps in our classifications. In many instances things lack names, something which is most apparent where there is a principle of classification that is not fully applied—only some of the things to which the principle applies have names, the others remaining nameless (ἀνώνυμα). Hence, although Aristotle speaks of things without names in practically all his works, the concern with nameless things is most prominent in the practical and biological disciplines—disciplines where classification plays an important role or where name giving is often based on obvious principles of classification.” For a more detailed list and an interpretation of some of the nuances that emerge in the list, see §Inexactness and Lacunae in Classification in Georgios Anagnostopoulos, *Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 127ff.
table is not at all uncommon for Aristotle, so too is this result—something being anōnumos.

While naming something “nameless” may, for Aristotle, be of no special importance, for we who seek to understand how it is that a thought may be intelligible in a way other than how it is said, the possibility of catachresis is of truly pivotal importance. For here, with catachresis, can we most clearly see the way in which the phantasia that has allowed the intelligible to come to be from the perceptible turns around and allows the intelligible to become perceptible: it is precisely in catachresis, in the analogical metaphor in which a nameless thing is named, that we most clearly can see the way in which “bringing before the eyes” is operative in Aristotle.

Most’s only mention of catachresis furthers this claim: he saves it for the second of two questions raised by his conclusion, which takes up Aristotelian phantasia. As we might expect, given the survey this project has made of many accounts of phantasia, Most too recognizes it as more or less tied to sense perception, saying

It is quite true that what Aristotle calls φαντασία does not have the same degree of absolutely creative capability that some modern theories of the imagination, particularly various romantic theories of the poetic imagination, ascribe to that faculty, and we can readily understand why interpreters of Aristotle frequently warn us not to think of his φαντασία as poetic imagination.

And yet, Most is one of those few commentators that nonetheless see in Aristotelian phantasia something else, something more active: “But to stop here,” he says, before exploring how phantasia and the “poetic imagination” may be somehow related, “is to
remain on the surface of his doctrine.” In closing, he poses two questions to suggest how one might begin to get a deeper understanding. The first points to the “structural homology between metaphor and φαντασία,” which both Long and Wedin point to as well, and perhaps more articulately (since their cases do not rest on further diagrams, as Most’s does). In Long’s words,

If the color of each thing capable of being seen is itself seen through light, then the εἰδος of each thing capable of being thought must itself be thought through φαντασία. Yet the visual metaphor must itself be understood in terms of a certain µεταφέρειν, a way of carrying something of the thing over from one place to another. In vision, an attribute of the thing is carried over into perceiving by the medium of light; in thinking, the way each thing “is seen” (εἰδος) is carried over into thinking, the “place of forms,” by the medium that is the φαντασία.

Long summarizes this thought by saying, “The work of the φαντασία in Aristotle is precisely this work of metaphorical signification. It is able to translate what is at work in perceiving into the idiom of the intellect.” And Wedin goes even further with this thought, saying that phantasia not only allows for the “carrying over” of the “is seen” (εἰδος) into thinking, but that by allowing us to do such carrying over, it gives us the very structure for such representation:

We may come to the perceptual scene endowed with a good deal of potential, but we do not come armed with innate [re]presentational structures. There are no innate ideas in Aristotle’s universe but only the innate capacity to develop into a system that has ideas, and this requires that we be innately able to develop or acquire structures for [re]presenting a wide array of objects in a wide array of acts. Imagination enables us to do this.

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463 There is nothing wrong with diagramming this homology, and in fact, Most’s diagrams are quite astute at drawing out an analogy between the literal and the metaphorical on the one hand, and perception and imagination on the other. However, here it seems better to follow the articulation kata logos of Long and Wedin, since doing so lends greater specificity to our discussion. Ibid., 27.
464 Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 140.
465 Ibid., 141–142.
466 Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, 40.
It is *phantasia* that provides “the minimal structure required for an entity to be capable of acts involving [re]presentation of objects.” Long, in his remarks, concludes his observation that *phantasia* is itself a sort of *meta-pherein* by further noting that “This conveyance into thinking is… a natural movement belonging to the nature of things,” that “[t]hings lend themselves to thinking.” But what if this “natural movement belonging to the nature of things” can be taken up, as it were, by humans? What if humans can make use of the “structural homology” between *phantasia* and *metaphorein* for the purpose of “[re]presenting a wide array of objects in a wide array of acts”? This leads to Most’s second question:

Might not that other variety of metaphor, those to which no literal expression corresponds and which a later tradition learned to call catechreses [sic.], provide, if translated back into the epistemological register, that eye of the needle through which, into Aristotle’s seemingly closed system, could pass the idea of an imagination providing images to which no object of sensation could ever correspond, and thereby supply us with an implicit ancient precursor for romantic theories of the creative imagination?

In other words, might our ability as namers, as those who may make clear what something is by means of naming it as in *phasis*, as in *logos apophantikos*, or even by means of metaphor, by means of tragedy, by means of diagrams or drawings—might this ability be itself given to us by our experience of *phantasia per se*? We have already heard Aristotle describe the sort of seeing implicated in this sort of making clear as being of the “most vivid” sort, as thereby resulting in being able to “signify *energeia*” (*Poetics* 17.1455a21-25, *Rhetoric* 11.1411b24). And if we recall that this sort of seeing is an “insight into what is alike,” and “can not be grasped from anyone else and is a sign of natural gifts,” (*Poetics* 22.1459a7-8) is “not something one can get from anyone else”

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467 Ibid., 42.
(Rhetoric III.2 1405a9-10), it seems all the more likely that *phantasia* is here implicated. One can only “bring something before the eyes” if one has experienced *phantasia*, if one has had insight into the ways in which things are alike, into the way thoughts may be gathered together. One can only experience metaphoric *phantasia* if one has first experienced *phantasia per se*.

This possibility is further supported if we consider “bringing something before the eyes” and “signifying *energeia*” as only possible if one has seen something “vividly.” The word translated as “vividly” in the passage from the Poetics is “ἐναργέστατα” the superlative adverbial form of the adjective “ἐναργής,” which is literally “in the marketplace.” Aristotle further specifies that seeing things in such a fashion is tantamount to “[ό] ὁρῶν ὀσπερ παρ’ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς,” to seeing something *happen*. This focus on activity, on the *happening* within what is said, obviously connects this advice with that given to the orator regarding the bringing of *energeia* before the eyes. While it is true that *entelecheia* is not used, *energeia* nonetheless signifies such activity that when Homer succeeds in producing such “active presence,” Aristotle observes that “τὸ τὰ ἄψυχα ἐμψυχα ποιεῖν δία τῆς μεταφορᾶς,” that “through metaphor he makes what is un-souled [apsuche] ensouled [empsuche].” In Chapter Four, we suggested that the way a thought is said is formally identical with the *noêma*, the *phantasmata*, and the *aisthêmata* that gave rise to it. In the case of the last three things, it was easy to see that this formal identification means that the *eidos*, the *entelecheia*, is present in each. And now, in this last chapter, it is also easy to see the way in which these may also be formally identical with the result of *phanai*...and how they may not.

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469 This translation is my own.
One may name something more or less well, may make a more or less successful metaphor, present a tragedy that succeeds or one that “falls flat,” may even sketch out a diagram more or less accurately. And of the ones that succeed, we may now safely say that they do so because they have managed to be formally identical with the noēmata ‘behind’ them: the entelecheia of the thing is in these phanai. Just as Socrates, acting as a self-professed ‘midwife’ to his interlocutors, says to one of them, “let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg,” so too may we examine any of the ways in which the intelligible becomes perceptible for evidence of viability. By the end of this project, this will be even more apparent: What makes metaphoric phantasia successful, no matter what material it uses to make a thought perceptible, is the presence of entelecheia. And this, as we heard in Aristotle’s assessment of Homer’s use of metaphor just above, but also in our inquiry about the “wondrous conclusion” in DA II.1 in Chapter One, may well be said to be tantamount to the presence of a sort of soul.

The fact remains, however, that the entelecheia of the intelligible can be more or less captured in the perceptible: there are not just live offspring and “wind-eggs,” but

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470 “Wind-egg” translates “ἀνεμιστών,” “unfertilized egg.” This term appears three times in the Theaetetus, and an examination of those three instances would be a productive extension of this project. The instance cited here, from 151E, is made in direct connection with Theaetetus’ having made an apophantical declaration: “χρὲ γὰρ οὖτος ἀποφαίνομενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτό κοινή σκεψόμεθα, φόντιμον ἢ ἀνεμιστῷ τυγχάμα δὲ.” It also appears at 157D: “…and when your own opinion is brought to light [ἀναφανήσεται], I will examine it and see whether it is a mere wind-egg or a real offspring…” and again at 161A. In this last instance, Socrates first compares Theaetetus’ opinion to be a “newborn child,” and refers to the Athenian practice of “Amphidromia,” literally, the “runaround,” which constituted the naming ceremony of newborn babies. In this ceremony, a newborn would be carried around the hearth of the home before being presented to family and guests. The amphidromia was delayed by a period of days after a baby’s birth, since the viability of the baby was not at all certain. Socrates says, “…and now that it is born, we must in very truth perform the rite of running around with it in a circle—the circle of our argument—and see whether it may not turn out to be after all not rearing, but only a wind-egg…” Plato, Theaetetus (Loeb Classical Library), trans. Harold North Fowler (Harvard University Press, 1921), http://www.loebclassics.com/view/plato_philosopher-theaetetus/1921/work.xml.
something like a range of liveliness, of viability. It is precisely this happening—that a thing may be named more or less accurately—that both indicates that such a turning in direction is operative in *phantasia* and that there is thereby a “space” between a thing and that in which it is “brought before the eyes,” its ‘name.’ It is this space that is responsible for the difficulty with easily situating *phanai* with regards to the two different theories of truth, which we encountered in the third section of Chapter Five. When something is truly “brought before the eyes,” there is no falsity, just as with the *aisthēma*, the *phantasma*, the *noēma*. But when it is not *entirely* brought before the eyes, it is because some part of the naming has failed to say accurately what is ‘there,’ and is thus false; here we have something like a “wind-egg.” In the phenomenon of the more or less accurate name or saying, then, we find evidence of both types of truth operating at one. “Bringing before the eyes,” and thereby *phanai*, cannot strictly be a matter of abiding by the contact theory of truth if we can touch the truth more or less well given the name we use and the facility with which we use it.

Further evidence of this turning, this fact that a thing may be named more or less well, is nowhere more overt than in Aristotle’s treatment of things that are *anōnumos*. Indeed, how could it be otherwise? If he, or we for that matter, may name a thing “nameless,” certainly what is indicated is a gap between the name we have for the thing and our understanding of what that thing is. But what we will find is that in those instances in which Aristotle finds a thought to be *anōnumos*, catechresis is always at work: the *anōnumos* thing only ever appears in the context of the analogy. And the context of the analogy, we will go on to argue, is spatial intelligibility: our ability to
understand “nameless” as an inaccurate name stands or falls with our ability to understand things apart from the way they are said, and we can most clearly find evidence of this ability by attending closely to analogy. Spatial intelligibility is here found to name the experience in which thinking is more ‘sensing’ than saying: it names the experience of thinking that is more properly described as *ana-logos*, and not as *kata logos*.

**Ana-Logos, Kata Logos: Spatial Intelligibility and Nameless Things**

We have seen already that Aristotle readily acknowledges that a thing may be nameless, and that this designation seems frequently to be made within the larger context of an analogy. The formation of such an analogy is what Most identified as the first step in making an analogical metaphor, which he found to be the sort of metaphor to which the other three types could all be reduced (see Figure VI.2: Metaphor Formation, Step One: Ratio Building on page 252.) But finding, for instance, that the mean state between “Envy” and “Righteous Indignation” is “*anōnumos,*” as in the table from the *Eudemian Ethics,* is not tantamount to catachresis. Catachresis is not the establishing of an analogy, even an analogy in which one of the terms is unnamed, but is rather the *use* of an analogy as a metaphor to name what is nameless. It is indeed common to find analogical structures within Aristotle’s arguments that often contain nameless thoughts, but this use of analogy in Aristotle is not at all the most common sort cited throughout this project: we have seen Aristotle turn to analogy in the *De Anima* with remarkable frequency, but overwhelmingly, these turnings have occurred when the power of simply saying what
needs to be said—saying what is “there,” as with Randall—falters. That is, Aristotle has consistently turned to analogy when confronted by what cannot be defined logically: the soul to the body is as the cutting to the axe; the first sort of *entelecheia* is to a thing as knowledge is to a human; the second sort of *entelecheia* is to a thing as actively contemplating is to a human; the first sort of *dunamis* is to the second sort of *dunamis* as an infant is to a grammarian not yet contemplating; the first sort of *dunamis* is to the second sort of *dunamis* as a child is to an adult ready to become a general; *phantasmata* are to the soul that thinks things through as the perceptible things are to the soul that perceives; *phantasia* is to the *phantasmata* as light is to colors; *nous poietikos* is to forms as light is to colors…. These analogies are not employed simply as analogies, but rather as catachretic analogical metaphors.

If it is not immediately clear where the nameless thing in each of these examples is, that is because, strictly speaking, “anōnumos” does not appear here. Each of the elements of each of these analogies has a name, a simple *phasis*. The difficulty is that in each case, one of the names is unable to be defined. Aristotle turns to analogy to try to say what soul is, what *entelecheia, dunamis, phantasmata, phantasia, nous poietikos* are. These thoughts are not at all nameless things that can nonetheless be defined, as with the mean between envy and righteous indignation in the *Eudemian Ethics*. No; in fact, the

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471 The consideration of Anagnostopoulos, cited above, provides an interesting analysis of the prevalence of instances in Aristotle’s works in which “anōnumos” appears in the context of analogy in which logical definition—a *logos apophantikos*—of all terms included is possible, but not all terms are named. In such situations, Anagnostopoulos finds Aristotle arguing that “the existing linguistic data or actual names do not give an accurate representation of the facts,” and exhibiting a drive to find and give correct names in such cases.” For instance, he cites Aristotle in the *Parts of Animals* remarking that “There is no common name which is applied to all animals that have lungs. But there ought to be: because the possession of a lung is one of their essential characteristics” (669b10). Aristotle is Anagnostopoulos, *Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics*, 127ff., 128, 130.
situation here is quite the opposite. These thoughts have names; it is the defining statement, the *logos apophantikos* they lack. In *DA* II.2, Aristotle is quite clear as to what such a definition should entail: “the defining statement not only needs to make clear what something is, as most definitions do, but also needs to include and display the cause *[aitia]*” (413a13-16). By *aitia*, Aristotle likely means not just one, but all four types of cause or “responsibility” (as with Sachs). Given that these are, in Sachs’ summarization, “the responsibility as material, as form, as origin of motion, and as end or completion,” it becomes easier to see just how the list above taxes one’s efforts in providing an adequate definition.⁴⁷² We have, in that list, words that in themselves attempt to name just these sorts of causes: soul and *entelecheia* are form, *dunamis* is material, *phantasmata* somehow both, *phantasia* is itself a sort of motion, and *nous poietikos* would seem to be a way of naming what it ultimate and is thus an end or completion of what is knowable. As Polansky says about *dunamis* and *energeia/entelecheia*, and which we could easily extend to each of the terms above, these are “perhaps the most fundamental of all Aristotle's notions,” and

> their full clarification pertains to first philosophy since actuality and potentiality apply to all beings as being, and as encompassing every genus of being are incapable of easy definition in terms of genus and difference. Yet much can be said about them, especially through analogy…⁴⁷³

Aristotle turns to analogy by means of catachresis, because the definition—the *logos apophantikos*—for each of these terms is not possible.

We began this investigation with hopes of clarifying what it means for *entelecheia* to be “*kata ton logon,*” which we heard Sachs translate as both “unfolded” and “disclosed

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In Chapter Five, we considered the way in which such unfolding in speech can occur in the simple name, *phasis*, but also in *kataphasis* (or *apophasis*) of the *logos apophantikos*, which we there called a “higher order naming.” But here, Aristotle’s use of catachresis suggests that there is a sort of *phanai* by means of something other than the saying of logical formulation: the naming by means of an analogy, which makes it possible to make clear—or at least clearer—those things that one struggles to say, either because they have no name, or because they have no definition. These are the things that one has difficulty fully accessing *kata ton logon*, the things that have not been, or have not been *fully* “unfolded” or “disclosed” in speech. In both the case of the *anōnumos* thought that has a definition and in the case of the undefined but named thought, something appears as something without appearing clearly as what it is. In this way, it is strikingly similar to the verbal *phainetai*, an “it appears,” that has not yet risen to the level of the more nounal, named *phantasma*, “an image.” We can sense it, even if we cannot say it, or say it fully. It is because of our ability to sense it, even apart from its saying, that we can both distinguish from other things around it and recognize when it is well or poorly named. One is aware that space separates it from other things, that it has a sort of set of related appearances that signify that something unified is behind them. This awareness is an ability to respond to the spatial intelligibility of things.

However, neither the ability to create nor to understand such analogies is the same as spatial intelligibility, just as the ability to say or understand the word “red” is not the same as perceptibility. Just as there is what is perceptible on the one hand and our power

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474 *DA* II.1 412b11, 412b20
of perception on the other, so too does it seem accurate to speak of the intelligibility of things—even the spatial intelligibility—as being distinct from our power of intellect.

Randall reminds us that

\[\text{nous}\] meant to the Greek “intellectual vision,” and the verbs associated with it, like \textit{theorein}, or \textit{eidenai}, are sight words, conveying the flavor of “seeing” something. The function of \textit{nous} is to lead to \textit{theoria}, the kind of aesthetic spectacle properly beheld in a “theatre,” the natural abode of \textit{theoria}.

And so our experience or even creation of the analogical table is indicative of the intelligibility responsible for it: we can sense almost in one glance the way the terms are both separate from each other and dependent on each other. But so too can we have the same sort of experience in encountering diagrams and sketches, such as those used in Chapter Three and Four to illustrate the ways in which the two different ways of being-in-potency become the two different ways of being-at-work. And these sorts of diagrams are also not uncommon to find described—and perhaps even included outright—in Aristotle’s works. The stronger claim, of course, would require much research into ancient papyrology. For our purposes it is enough to observe how frequently Aristotle dictates the terms of a geometric scenario requiring the careful labeling of various segments, circles, or angles; or how often he speaks of “making a sketch” of what he intends to examine before he examines it. Both of these clearly correlate with the sort

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475 Randall, \textit{Aristotle}, 90, fn.13.
476 The \textit{De Anima} itself provides one example. At the conclusion of II.1, he says, “let this stand as marking off and sketching out \textit{ὑπογεγράφθω} in an outline \textit{τύπῳ} what concerns the soul” (413a9-10). In III.9, he returns to what is a slightly more detailed sketch—a summary of the various parts of the soul—in a manner that we have elsewhere described III.9 as Aristotle’s “return to the drawing board.” That is, here he revisits the various ways in which the soul can and has been sketched, and seems to wish for a dimensional model in which parts could overlap [for example, he says the perceptive part “one could not easily place either as irrational or as having reason, and also the imaginative part, which in its being is different from all the rest… and in addition to these the appetitive part which would seem to be different from them all both in its articulation and in its potency…” (432a30-b4).] One here might envision a three-dimensional model of the brain, where the relationships between the various parts can be described in more than simple linear terms. The “sketch” of the soul suggests that what is spatially intelligible has depth beyond what the
of “making clear” that we posited in the last section as being the result of metaphoric phantasia, and it is hardly surprising that Aristotle, seeking to make clear his arguments to his fellows, can be seen to engage in either of them. Perhaps another project can undertake the daunting task of compiling a list of all the places in which Aristotle turns to geometric sketches and can seek out what can be said about them. And yet, the analogy does seem to capture something essential about the sense of spatial intelligibility that diagrams, sketches, and even models fail to capture, and this is the sense of the interrelatedness and dynamism of the various parts: in the analogy, there is a sense of the analogy in its tabular form is—or the geometric illustrations are—able to capture.

The Nicomachean Ethics begins the discussion of human happiness in a similar way, and also indicates that such a sketch is only a first step: “So let the good have been sketched in outline [περιγράφθω] in this way, for presumably one needs to rough it in first [ἰσογράψωσαι] and then inscribe the details [ἀναγράψαι] later. And it would seem to be in the power of anyone to carry forward and articulate things that are in good shape in the outline [περιγράφη], and that time is a good discoverer of such things, or makes the work easier; in fact the advances in the arts have come from this, since it is in anyone’s power to add what is left out” (1098a21-26). This “inscribing of details” and “carrying forwards and articulating of things that are in good shape in the outline” seems similar to the statements that begin DA II.2, immediately after Aristotle’s “marking off and sketching out in an outline what concerns the soul” at the conclusion of II.1: he reminds us that what is “clear and more knowable by reason arises out of what is unclear but more obvious,” and indicates that the sketch is a good start, but that one is seeking the defining statement that makes “clear what something is…but also [includes]…the cause [aitia],” as we cited above.

477 Or, alternately, one could pursue an account of the extent to which Aristotle’s logos so very often seems to take its direction from mathematics, specifically from geometry. See an interesting discussion by one Sir William Hamilton which not only comments on the likelihood of the inclusion of actual geometric diagrams in Aristotle’s manuscripts, but goes further to make some claims about the operation of a geometric mindset operable within Aristotle’s idea of logic. In this last vein, Sir Hamilton takes it upon himself to provide—or perhaps reconstruct—geometric diagrams meant to illustrate the various types of syllogism as outlined in the Prior Analytics. “Aristotle undoubtedly had in his eye, when he discriminates the syllogistic terms, a certain diagrammatic contrast of the figures,” he claims, and provides here a footnote: “Aristotle everywhere manifests his addiction to Mathematics and Geometry; as is observed especially by his Greek commentators. Ammonius, in his commentary on the Prior Analytics (Ed. Trinc. f. 17b), speaks of the Philosopher as πανταχοῦ φιλογεωμετρῆς ἄνω, and again, (f.23a), as acting κατὰ τὸν ξῆλον γεωμετρικὸν. Aristotle, in fact, in his evolution of Logic into Notions, --Enunciations,--Reasonings, follows the evolution of Geometry into Points,--Lines,--Figures. He also frequently,--indeed, as often as he can, borrows his Logical nomenclature from the language of Geometry; as, ὅρος, ἀκρον,--διάστημα, πρότασις,--σχῆμα. Even the word Syllogism (συλλογισμός) is mathematical, --a computation. Ammonius also, once and again, supposes Aristotle to refer to certain Geometric diagrams, in his exposition of the syllogistic figures; diagrams, which Pacius thinks to have been lost by the negligence of the transcribers.” To this litany of mathematically inspired vocabulary, of course, we may also add analogon, as Aristotle himself makes clear in the Nicomachean Ethics, and which we noted above. Sir William Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform: Chiefly from the Edinburgh Review; Cor., Vindicated, Enl., in Notes and Appendices (Blackwood, 1866), 662ff.
whole, and by touching a part, one touches the whole. When one is attuned to the intelligibility within things in a spatial manner, one easily allows for suggestive possibilities, allowing for multiple “what-ifs” to be posited while one waits, as it were, for the dust to settle and for things to clear up. This means that with this sort of awareness in which one makes sense of things by means of the spaces between them, one also is attentive to the very motion of thoughts, the way in which they draw nearer and further away from each other, line up in different ways. And what is such attention to the space and connections between things other than the sort of understanding operative in analogy? When we cannot understand something kata logon, then, we may yet still understand it by analogy: ana-logon.

Prepositions generally are the sort of words that tend, in their less physical senses, to lead to a proliferation of meanings. Indeed, how could the words that indicate the spatial relationship of things in the perceptible realm not struggle to say what they mean when applied in a less physical sense? For this reason, it seems here appropriate to revert to the more physical or “radical” sense of each: kata means “down, downwards;” ana-means “up, upwards.” The specific way these translations, radical as they are, may be said to apply to the relationship between kata logon and ana-logon is not immediately clear. But even if it isn’t clear what something like “up logos”/“up to logos” and “down logos”/“down to logos” means, two observations are immediately evident: the two prepositions can here be seen as opposed in some way, but they are nonetheless attached to one term, logos. Instead of trying to make these prepositions say what they mean,

478 Liddell and Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon.
479 For instance, could it be that we have here arrived at another way of describing induction (ana-logon?) and deduction (kata logon?)?
perhaps we will do better if we attempt to ‘sense’ what they mean by means of our own analogical sketch.

If phantasia is akin to light, is a motion by which the intelligible becomes something we can ‘sense’ in a ‘mental landscape,’ and logos is how we gather the good to ourselves (or perhaps are gathered by it, which possibility we have yet to fully consider), conceivably it is possible to ‘touch,’ if even through a medium, the ‘perceptible’ things in the intelligible realm. Certainly the prōta noēmata, for instance, are within easy reach, and thus are ‘touched’ even by the youngest of the intellective souls; not even a philosopher’s child speaks of entelecheia before, say, the cat. But just as certainly, there are thoughts that we struggle to ‘touch’ with our words; we may sense them, may be attuned to the way in which the phantasmata that make them up are at work in our mental landscape, and still yet we struggle to touch them, and frequently fail to do so. Some, certainly, are such that they cannot be named so simply as can the cat, and require logos to stretch beyond the confines of one word in our quest to touch them: these we describe via so many circumlocutions, but may yet fail to name. We may say something about them that is more or less accurate, we may say something like ‘where’ they are. The many words one uses to gather up the thought of, for instance, the quality that forms all things insofar as they are things, that makes them have a certain movement within them by which they hang together, even if they are not actively changing… when so many words, stretched out one after the other, succeed in bringing us to touch, or
nearly touch, \textit{entelecheia}, to capture that \textit{noēma} in our grasp by saying \textit{“entelecheia”}… here, the intellective potency feels itself very much at work being itself.\footnote{But again, the trouble here is that it is not clear whether that intellective potency belongs to us, or whether we may somehow belong to it. In that naming, do we grasp the higher \textit{noēmata}, or do they grasp us?}

This is why the analogy is ever more at home in a table than it is in the comparatively slow and mincing steps of semantic sentences. Saying is more precise, but also more tedious. It is more like walking through the mental landscape. With saying something about something, one draws nearer to the good… one step at a time. It is easy to lose one’s way, to become disoriented, to wander. If only one had a map, could see more of how the land lies than one can see here, close at hand! The ability to do that—to \textit{fly} from one closed in place to see so much more of the whole—this is the ability to access a spatial intelligibility. Of course, such vision from above has its own drawbacks. First and foremost, one cannot touch the thoughts that are now so far away. Likely, the path connecting one thought to another is occasionally obscured and difficult to make out. But the general shape of the whole area does come better into view in this way. It is obvious that one who wishes to explore thoroughly such a landscape does so by having both abilities. Without walking the land, one cannot be truly said to know it: knowing requires one to be \textit{down} amongst the things named. But when one can’t find a way forward, how helpful to be able to access something like a map—even if it is less precise—to be able to picture the landscape from \textit{up above}, and at a distance!
Here, then, it becomes easier to speak of the way in which the spatial and logical intelligibilities, and with them, the phusike and logike methodologies are but two sides of the same thing. Without logos, there is no ‘mental landscape,’ and without our attempts to say, and to say something about something within that landscape, we cannot navigate that landscape, and thereby cannot gather the good to ourselves (or be gathered by it.)

In Chapter One, we discussed the differences between Aristotle’s two different modes of inquiry, reviewing the ways in which this difference has been received. What we found in the cases of Owen, Shields, and Irwin was an inclination to find that Aristotle treats the endoxa or legomena as some sort of sub-class of phainomena. We asked instead the opposite question: how it is that we may find phainomena at all when engaged with things chiefly intelligible, and not perceptible? Following the motion of phantasia, we have found that intelligible ‘phainomena,’ the results of metaphoric phantasia, are indeed possible, but that some of these come to be clear according to speech, kata logon, and that others of them come to be clear according to analogy, ana-logon. To make a thought clear in an analogical way is to be the naturalist, is to be the one “concerned with all the work done by and things done to a certain kind of body or material,” because it is to be attentive to the space between things (403b9-12). The naturalist, we should recall, not only pays attention to the way in which the space between things serves to distinguish one thing from another, but also to the interactions and cooperative movements that occur between things thusly distinguished. We heard Randall summarize that the naturalist attends to a thing in its “genesis and operation,” which means watching how it is seen “co-operating with other things in the world of natural processes.”

481 Randall, Aristotle, 60, 61.
the spatial intelligibility behind it, is comfortable with dynamism and movement among
the terms involved; what influences the meaning of one term effectively changes the
meaning of all involved. This was demonstrated in Chapter Two with the raising, but not
the determinate answering of the various questions regarding the *phantasmata*.

On the other hand, to make a thought clear by means of or according to language,
*kata logon*, is to be the logician, is to pay attention to the way truth and falsity arise in the
way things are said to be. To return again to Randall, who more than any of those we
appealed to in Chapter One best articulated the difference between—and the
interdependence of—the naturalist and the logician—to understand thoughts *kata logon*
is to “express what is there.” It is to let what is there show itself as itself in such a way
that we feel that we touch it. And yet, Aristotle “always finds that this linguistic analysis,
clarifying and essential as it is, sooner or later reaches a point where it raises questions
that cannot be answered through the analysis of language alone.” Ultimately, we do
arrive at terms that cannot be said or touched, but can only be sensed as relatively nearer
or farther from where we find ourselves. Thus might we begin to understand the insight
behind Woodbridge’s surprising conclusion that “[l]ogic with Aristotle is thus more a
study of language than it is a method of inquiry. This view of the matter has been forced
upon me by the study of him. It was not a view I expected to find from that study.”
Perhaps the logician is best understood not as following out a line of inquiry that is
separate or opposed to that of the naturalist, but is rather something like a specialized

482 Ibid., 60.
483 Ibid.
naturalist: one that is attentive to the way things get said. Thus does Woodbridge say, “[w]hen the Logic of Aristotle is read in this fashion,” i.e., in such a way the way a thought is said is the end of its natural career, “it becomes a part of his physics, or better perhaps, a part of his entire doctrine of nature.”485 The way a thing gets said can be thus seen as “one of nature’s supreme products, the product in which all other products find articulated linkage.”486

“Something Like the Middle Voice” and The Life of Words

We arrive at last at the end of a consideration of *phantasia* that has reviewed, among other attributes, its ability to be interpreted according to two different oppositions. The first of these oppositions to emerge was whether *phantasia* is active or passive. This distinction receded as we began, at the end of Chapter Four, to understand *phantasia* as a middle-voiced activity, and a new distinction—one of agency—emerged. This chapter, in suggesting that *phantasia per se* is a motion that goes “up to” the soul, and that metaphoric *phantasia* is thus one that proceeds “from” the soul, seems to embrace this distinction. It has been tempting to speak of the motion of *phantasia* as on the one hand motivated by the things around us, maybe even by “nature,” and on the other as motivated by us ourselves. Such a distinction harmonizes well with a certain prevailing understanding of what Aristotle may mean when he says in *Physics* II.2 that art imitates nature, which understanding is more accurately glossed as the *artist* imitating nature. This can easily have the effect of opposing humans to nature, and in the case of *phantasia* and metaphorical *phantasia*, making the latter seem somehow derivative and diminutive in

485 Ibid., 24.
486 Ibid.
scope. We have not pressed this point, though, because while replacing the opposition of voice with that of agency may seem to get closer to the truth, it seems likely that it is not altogether correct either. If phantasia per se is a motion belonging to and originating with the very intelligibility within things, it does not follow that metaphoric phantasia must therefore be a motion belonging to and originating with us. The “natural road” identified in these pages connects not the perceptible with us, but the perceptible with the intelligible itself; not the perceptible with the intellect of the embodied soul, but the perceptible with the intellect of “all soul.” Finding in phantasia’s possible bidirectionality evidence of a distinction in the agency of nature versus humans is tempting, but it ignores the grammatical provenance of phantasia just as much as does the temptation to characterize phantasia as purely active or passive. However, it does get us a bit closer. In these final pages, we shall consider phantasia in light of what we might call a philosophical understanding of the middle voice. This philosophical understanding is itself based upon a more technically accurate grammatical understanding of the middle voice than one that thinks of it as some combination of both active and passive voices.

What can we gain by considering phantasia alongside this philosophically understood middle voice? Perhaps it is easier to answer in terms of what we would lose: the necessity of thinking that behind every action is a subject.

Recalling that phantasia was noted by Schofield (as well as others) to have a middle and passive etymological inheritance passed along by phantazō, “to make apparent,” it is somewhat curious that extensive considerations of what it would mean for Aristotelian phantasia to be thought of in the middle voice are difficult to find:

Christopher Long’s was the only one identified here. This is more remarkable given the proclivity of Aristotle to discuss phantasia in terms of gignesthai, which itself has a considerable middle voice inheritance. The grammatical middle voice—or, as we shall see, something like the grammatical middle voice—has become a philosophical focal point via the work of Derrida.\footnote{However, we must of course acknowledge that Heidegger had already prepared the stage. Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time: A Translation of Sein and Zeit} (State Univ of New York Pr, 1996), sec. 7, 74, 75, 78, 80 et. al.} We say something like the grammatical middle voice because Derrida himself makes such a distinction, saying that “something like the middle voice” is “announced” or “recalled” by différance.\footnote{See footnote 334 for the passage in its entirety. Derrida, \textit{Margins of Philosophy}, 9.} What is this “something like the middle voice?” First, what is the grammatical middle voice itself? John Llewelyn notes that “Greek and Sanskrit grammars do not manage to come up with a definition that is both strict and helpful,” and so turns to the following “unstrict but helpful” definition of linguist Jan Gonda. This definition is “unstrict” because it extends beyond a grammatical consideration into a more general consideration of subjects and processes:\footnote{The “grammatical consideration” is limited insofar as “there is little that is shared by all the various examples they [the Greek grammarians] catalogue other than the negative property of being expressed neither by the active voice nor by the passive.” John Llewelyn, \textit{The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighborhood of Levinas, Heidegger and Others} (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1991), 238.}

\begin{quote}
the ‘original’ or ‘essential’ function of the medial voice was... to denote that a process is taking place with regard to, or is affecting, happening to, a person or a thing; this definition includes also those cases in which we are under the impression that in the eyes of those who once used this category in its original function some power or something powerful was at work in or through the subject, or manifested itself in or by means of the subject on the one hand and those cases in which the process, whilst properly performed by, or originating with, the subject, obviously was limited to the ‘sphere’ of the subject. (Jan Gonda, 'Reflections on the Indo-European Medium', \textit{Lingua}, IX (1960), p. 49)
\end{quote}

Llewelyn goes on to analyze this definition by emphasizing that the “crucial words here are ‘power,’ ‘process,’ ‘through,’ ‘by’ and ‘subject’”: each of these needs to be thought
in an atypical way when one is considering what “something like the middle voice” may mean. If the middle voice names a power, it names a “notion of power which does not merely pass through the subject,” and if it does somehow affect a “subject,” it requires a notion of subject which is neither merely a conduit or passage (the ‘through’ of pure passivity) nor the conductor entirely in charge of a performance (the ‘by’ of pure agency) but is performed by as much as it performs the process...  

The middle voice, or something like it, requires that we step outside of our usual presupposition that a subject must predate an action or process if that action or process is to be performed. It is, then, more than simply thinking active and passive voice together, but problematizes the sense of agency upon which these voices are predicated.

According to Charles Scott, there are two significant reasons to pay particular attention to the intransitive use of the grammatical middle voice, in which the subject “is neither the active subject nor the passive object of the action.” Firstly, the intransitive use “plays a significant role in contemporary efforts to think outside of the domain of subjectivity,” that is, the intransitive use easily lends itself to the broader consideration of “something like the middle voice,” extending beyond the realm of grammar, forming the foundation of what we are here calling the philosophical understanding of the middle voice. Secondly, the intransitive use “is one form of the middle voice that is difficult to retrieve in our languages now.” Scott points to two such instances of grammatical middle-voiced intransitivity, and, coincidentally, the first is *phainesthai*, which he renders as “to appear appearing,” and the second is *gegonesthai*, or “to become becoming.”

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492 Ibid.  
494 Ibid.
When we try to grasp these meanings, we often resort to the reflexive form, which is in Scott’s view “not entirely appropriate.” He writes,

We are inclined by our structures of expression to speak of an action’s doing something in relation to itself and thereby to indicate an incipient subject-relation in the verb’s action. We are inclined to say appearing shows itself or becoming itself becomes.\textsuperscript{495}

We must remove the reflexive return, “of itself,” that attempts to provide a “self-relational structure,” for in the middle voice, “there is no distance of self-relation or self-objectification.” The middle voice “can indicate a whole occurrence’s occurring as a whole without self-positing,” and this is difficult for us to grasp. The subject does not activate a process, nor does the subject passively undergo a process. The subject cannot properly be said to predate the process, but nor can the process be said to predate the subject. The “wishing” or “willing” of \textit{boulomai}, or the “becoming” of \textit{gignomai}, comes about at the same time as the subject with which it is associated, and is somehow due to a certain state or condition in which the subject exists, albeit in an inactive way. It is this “state” that “issues in active choosing” in the case of \textit{boulomai}, it is this “state” that yields in becoming in the case of \textit{gignomai}. In short, Scott concludes, “to think of a state that of itself” desires or yields “is both an awkward thought for us and a mark of the middle voice.”\textsuperscript{496}

If \textit{phantasia}, the motion of the becoming of the intelligible, is a middle-voiced motion, we may have at long last arrived at a more forthright way to articulate an aspect of \textit{phantasia} that has, thus far, only appeared in footnotes throughout this project. This is

\textsuperscript{495} Ibid., 747.
\textsuperscript{496} Ibid., 748.
the relationship between *phantasia* and the possibility of an Aristotelian notion of “self.” We first noted Owens remarking that Aristotle has “strictly speaking, no noun for “self”,” nor does he have a term for “person,” in the context of our exploration of Aristotle’s methodology.⁴⁹⁷ This comment at that juncture was meant to reinforce the idea that Aristotle is not a Kantian, and that there can be no radical divide between the world of perceptible things and the “subject,” in no small part because there is no “subject” to divide from those things. (See footnote 55.) In fact, Aristotle is so far from positing a rift between subject and object that the grammar of the three terms that have appeared here as most central to a consideration of *phantasia* as a motion—*aisthēma*, *phantasma*, and *noēma*—themselves indicate an identity between said “subject” and “object.” Refer again to Table III.2: Wedin’s Ingredients of Perception and Imagination on page 105 and to the footnote therein: there we remarked on the important distinction between “*aisthēton*” (or “*noēton*”)—the verbal adjectives formed by adding the Greek suffix –*ton* to the verbal root—and “*aisthēma*” (or “*noēma*”), which are neuter nouns formed by adding the Greek suffix –*ma* to the verbal root. The verbal adjective ending –*tos*, –*tē*, –*ton* creates a word that “expresses possibility,” and so the *aisthēton* is “a perceptible thing”—a thing about which perception is possible.⁴⁹⁸ This expression of possibility should be kept distinct from the correlating nouns, *aisthēma* and *noēma*, which do not express the possibility of an action, but the state of the action itself. Thus does Wedin translate “*aisthēma*” as “perceptive state.” In footnote 192, we observed that

the actual being-at-work of perception or of contemplation, the activities of these potencies.

In these perceptive and intellective states, the “subject” becomes identical with the “object.”

This identity seems relatively straightforward insofar as it applies to the *dunameis* of perception and intellection. Aristotle has himself on more than one occasion made the claim that “what the perceiving and knowing capacities of the soul are in potency are the same things that are either known or perceived” (*DA* III.8 432b27-28). But how may the suffix –*ma* be said to apply to the *phantasma*? We have not pushed this point because, until now, we did not have the framework within which to do so. That the perceptive or intellective (as apart from the contemplative) state involves the identity between the perceptive/intellective capacities and the perceptible/intelligible things is sufficiently clear, because we are comfortable understanding the perceptive/intellective capacities, these *dunameis* of the embodied soul, to be indicative of a “subject.” But if *phantasia* is not a *dunamis* of the embodied soul, but is a motion of the intelligible itself—is perhaps, it seems, a motion of the fifth, separable *dunamis* of contemplation that is not embodied and yet remains part of the soul…what is the *phantasma*? Does it also indicate the state of an activity being enacted? The grammatical make-up of the word suggests yes: but here we cannot rely upon the tentative connection between a *dunamis* of the embodied soul and the modernist construction of “subject” to explain this state of activity. The *phantasma* is the state of the intelligible having come to be intelligible. We saw Scott observe above that “to think of a state that of itself” desires or yields, as in the case of *boulomai* and *gignomai* “is both an awkward thought for us and a mark of the middle
voice.” In the *phantasma*, we have evidence of a state that “of itself” thinks, or begins to think. In *phantasia*, thought begins to think itself.

Here, then, is evidence of the intellect “coming in” from “outside” the (embodied) soul, as indicated in the *De Generatione Animalium*. But it also seems likely that in such a “coming in” we also see the beginning of what we might be tempted to call an Aristotelian notion of self. Insofar as a creature comes to have a *phantasma* that has arisen from something in perception, that creature has begun to experience what, in footnote 188, we heard Velkley/Benardete call “the double nature of *phantasia*:

> Just as the *De Anima* essay approaches self-thinking mind, and therewith being, through the double nature of *phantasia*, the *Metaphysics* essay approaches mind and being through the double nature of knowledge. Each essay reflects on the feature of otherness to itself, or duality, that mind must have in order to be self-knowing. What may seem at first to be only an imperfection of mind is in truth essential to it.

It is due to this double nature that we have self-consciousness. Joseph Owens writes, “Aristotle’s epistemology allows no direct self-knowledge to the human cognitive agent,” and that consequently “[h]uman cognition is always directly of something else,” “always takes place on the model of its basic object, namely external sensible things.” But Klaus Oehler argues that to reduce self-consciousness to consciousness of other things is not Aristotle’s intention: while “the divine Mind knows itself not incidentally but as its only object, whereas the human mind knows itself in so far as it is conscious of its object,” it is nonetheless important to realize that “[s]elf-consciousness is consciousness

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500 “…in the human embryo, everything belonging to the soul develops along with the body except the intellect, which comes in from outside” (736b 27-29). Aristotle and Peck, *Generation of Animals, with an English Translation by A.L. Peck*. (Cited previously; see footnote 280.
501 Velkley, “Prelude to First Philosophy: Seth Benardete on De Anima,” 189-90.
of itself, and this is by no means identical with consciousness of an object, which it has become." But if self-consciousness is not identical with the consciousness of an object, in which almost certainly a phantasma is present in some manner, what or where is it?

Here let us briefly consider the possibility that the common sense—and its analogical partner that we determined in Chapter Five to be, in some way, nous itself—may be, or be somehow related, to this self-consciousness. The mean by which a creature determines the relative pleasure or pain possible in what it encounters, the mean by which a human determines the relative goodness or badness in what it encounters… certainly this mean is developed over time, and is a result of what one has experienced. What if the common sense, and with it, nous, is something like a collection of the various phantasmata/noēmata that one has experienced? This might explain the fact that what appears to one person to be one thing, appears to another person to be another thing: What appears for a given soul is a function of what that soul has already encountered. This gives us a reasonable way in which to explain the relationship between the phantasma and the phainetai or phantasai. And in fact, there is an instance of phantasia in the Nicomachean Ethics which would seem to attest to this possibility:

But suppose someone were to say that all people aim at the apparent good, but they are not in control of how things appear [phantasias], but rather whatever sort of person each one is, of that sort too does the end appear to anyone. So if each one were in some way responsible for one’s own active condition, then each would be in some way responsible oneself for how things appear [phantasias]…(1114a30-1114b20)

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Sachs’ move to translate *phantasia* here as “how things appear” while elsewhere in the *Ethics* he uses “imagination” demonstrates that a certain sort of self- or character-formation is indicated by the way one engages in—or now, we can more forthrightly and accurately say—is engaged by—*phantasia*.

And so again: where would Aristotle say that “entelecheia,” as a spoken name, comes from? It comes from the motion of the intelligible itself. It comes to be in the same way that metaphors come to be, out of an ability that cannot be taught, but only experienced, as Aristotle says in the *Poetics*. It comes to be in the same way that Socrates’ interlocutors are delivered of ideas they themselves did not even know that they held. “Entelecheia” comes to be just as all things intelligible come to be, moving as it were, through us. The intelligible becomes intelligible withstartlingly little regard for us as subjects, even if our materiality is essential for this becoming, even if without it, the intelligible cannot gather itself into itself, and cannot gather us into itself.

If we return to Sachs’ translation of the “wondrous conclusion” regarding the soul at *DA* II.1, we may note one last nuance of his translation. “So what soul is has been said in general, for it is thinghood as it is unfolded in speech, and this is what such-and-such a body keeps on being in order to be at all.” Where is the definite article that specifies *psuche*? Of course, it is in the Greek, but here, Sachs opts not to translate it as he so readily does in other places. Perhaps what Sachs seeks to indicate via this omission is that Aristotle’s conclusion here is not meant to summarize the nature of the *embodied* soul, but rather the nature of *all* soul, which is, it seems now, the same as entelecheia. In
which case, Chapter One’s questioning regarding the absence of *entelecheia* in this line is easily resolved: it is not absent, but is in fact present. If *phantasia* is the motion by which the *entelecheia* of a thing comes to be, first as the *phantasma* out of the *aisthēmata*, and then as the *noēma* out of the *noēmata*, and lastly, as the *phasis* of “entelecheia,” then *phantasia* is more than the motion by which a thing unfolds in speech: it is the motion by which all soul perpetuates its life.
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