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REDUCING RACIAL BIASES IN LEADERS' DECISIONS ABOUT TO WHOM POWER IS RELINQUISHED

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ABSTRACT

Relinquishing power, or the voluntary transfer, sharing, or abdication of influence and/or control, is an understudied phenomenon. Despite historical examples of relinquishing power (e.g., Lucius Cincinnatus, George Washington), little empirical research has examined the contexts and situations in which leaders willfully relinquish their power. Similar to previous treaties on power, the current research documents the influence of cultural stereotypes on the decision-making of power holders and possible interventions aimed to attenuate race-based biases. Across several studies, people placed into leadership roles showed a preference for relinquishing their power to White men over Black men (Pilot Study, Studies 1 and 3). Thus, in-line with cultural stereotypes about who is fit to lead, leaders showed a tendency to give power to prototypical leaders with positively associated stereotypes regarding leadership (i.e., White men) rather than individuals who are underrepresented in leadership with negatively associated stereotypes regarding leadership (i.e., Black men). In addition, consistent with predictions, experimental interventions like counterstereotypic task framing (Study 2) and other-focused perspective-taking (Study 3) reduced the relinquishing power gap between White and Black co-workers. Together, these results suggest that race-based biases may be malleable and eliminated in relinquishing power decisions depending on conditions surrounding leadership. Furthermore, the current research adds to a growing model of relinquishing power by adding new insight into when, by whom, and to whom power is likely to be relinquished by leaders.

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Chapter 1. GENERAL OVERVIEW

Relinquishing power can be defined as the willful abdication, transference, or sharing of one's power to another individual or group (see Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013; Ratcliff, Vescio, & Dahl, 2015). The amount of power relinquished varies; anchoring the two ends of the spectrum, power holders can relinquish power in part (e.g., sharing power with a co-leader) or in full (e.g., stepping down from one's position of power and forfeiting all influence). Thus, relinquishing power is a process in which a leader's power is diminished by one's own accord and is given to another person or group in potentially various degrees.

Recent research has begun to investigate the phenomenon of relinquishing power. In the first empirical examination of relinquishing power by leaders, Ratcliff and Vescio (2013) examined *when* and *by whom* power is relinquished. Findings revealed that leaders relinquished more power when: (a) their leadership performance was unambiguously poor (vs. good), (b) they had a more interdependent self-construal (i.e., collectivistic-focused) than independent self-construal (i.e., egoistic-focused), and (c) when they were solely responsible for their group's poor performance (i.e., no opportunity to defer blame to another group member). In others words, power holders relinquish power when provided with unambiguous evidence that one's own leadership activities are not forwarding the group toward their collectivistic goals. In addition, subsequent work has investigated *to whom* power is likely to be relinquished when leaders make relinquishing power decisions. Power is relinquished to others perceived to be competent, as influenced by cultural stereotypes about race and gender (Ratcliff et al., 2015). As a result, leaders were more likely to relinquish power to those who belong to groups stereotyped as competent in leadership roles (i.e., White men) more so than to those who belong to groups who are stereotypically perceived to be incompetent in leadership roles (i.e., Black men, White

women). Therefore, in the service of forwarding the collective goals of their groups, leaders show group-based biases in relinquishing power decisions.

This prior work on relinquishing power dovetails nicely with work on power, leadership, and intergroup dynamics. The initial relinquishing power research (Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013) adds to our greater understanding of the responsible uses of power (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Overbeck & Park, 2001) and how leaders manage between group goals and self-interest that often have important consequences for the groups they lead (Blader & Chen, 2012; Maner & Mead, 2010; Vescio & Guinote, 2010). In addition, the work investigating group-based biases in relinquishing power decisions (Ratcliff et al., 2015) further illustrates the stereotypic tendencies of the powerful (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003) and how these biases may contribute to minority underrepresentation in leadership (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Livingston & Pearce, 2009). Of import, these findings suggest that the stereotype-consistent behaviors of the powerful often emerge as powerful people strive toward the common good of the group, allowing for stereotyping to slip by undetected (Vescio, Gervais, Heidenreich, & Snyder, 2006; Vescio, Gervais, Snyder, & Hoover, 2005; Vescio et al., 2003).

The goal of the present theory and research is to examine interventions intended to ameliorate racial biases in relinquishing power decisions (as reported in Ratcliff et al., 2015). The following sections have been organized to lay out the theoretical framework and logic necessary to derive testable hypotheses for the current research. In *Chapter 2*, I present a review that situates the present theory and research on relinquishing power in a broader theoretical backdrop of power research. I note how power has been conceptually defined and discuss how the focus of the vast majority of research has examined how, and with what consequences, power is abused rather than effectively used. In addition, I discuss the individual and group

consequences of power before introducing a theoretical model of relinquishing power; together Chapter 2 provides a theoretical context for considering when, by whom, and to whom power is relinquished. In *Chapter 3*, I present pilot research from a published article which documents racial and gender biases in decisions to relinquish power (see Ratcliff et al., 2015). This work is presented as a chapter of preliminary findings because it demonstrates racial biases in relinquishing power decisions and provides context (e.g., methodologically) to the situations in which these decisions take place. In *Chapter 4*, I present an overview of the present dissertation research. In this chapter, I offer a theoretical backdrop for considering potential interventions (e.g., counterstereotypic priming, perspective-taking) that may ameliorate the racial biases documented in the pilot research. Lastly, the remaining chapters detail a series of three studies and relevant discussions.

Chapter 2. INTRODUCTION

Historical and Empirical Evidence for the Abuse of Power

"…no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it. Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship…The object of power is power."

–George Orwell's 1984 (1949/2007, p. 263)

"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." –Lord Acton

From Emperor Caligula to Napoleon, Josef Mengele to Mummer Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad, there have been numerous historical anecdotes of the corruptive use of power as a means to maintain one's position or secure ever-greater control and influence over others. Some have gone as far to say that the mere experience of power is a metaphoric process that changes a person to pursue selfish ends, inviting unchecked abuse of power (Kipnis, 1976). Accordingly, the abuse of power often manifests itself when a leader uses power for personal gain, by ignoring dissent or questioning of decisions, being insensitive to the needs of subordinates, and a reliance on external status quo maintaining standards to satisfy self-interests. This social reality has inspired a rich and extensive literature examining the ways in which power corrupts. For instance, the experience of elevated power often leads to devaluing the ability and worth of subordinates (Kipnis, 1972), increasingly positive self-evaluation (Georgesen & Harris, 1998, 2000), exploitation (Winter & Barenbaum, 1985), abuse of resource access with lack of surveillance (Mitchell, Hopper, Daniels, Falvy, & Ferris, 1998), and increased stereotyping of

subordinates (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 2000) when it serves relevant goals (Vescio et al., 2003, 2005, 2006). In addition, when power is tenuous or threatened, powerful people pursue goals of self-interest (Maner & Mead, 2010), become more dominant (Morrison, Fast, & Ybarra, 2009), engage in hostile teasing of low-status subordinates (Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, & Heerey, 2001), and are aggressive toward others (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Fast & Chen, 2009).

The empirical focus on abuses of power is partly due to the fact that powerful people control valued outcomes and abuses of power are problematic. For example, the consequences of a leader who pursues their own self-interest (and not collective group interests) are more severe given their decisions affect the outcomes of more people compared to a lower-power subordinate behaving in the same manner. Importantly, however, we also expect power holders to responsibly wield their power as part of the social contract of obtaining power (i.e., the tacit expectation that the leader will look out for the welfare of the group when subordinates confer power to a leader), and thus, power holders who act in socially responsible ways are typically not celebrated.

Historical and Empirical Evidence for the Responsible Use of Power

"Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character, give him power."

–Abraham Lincoln

Over 2,500 years has passed since Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus was made emperor of Rome. During his reign, Lucius was given absolute authority to fight off foreign invaders. Perhaps the main reason why Lucius' name has not been forgotten to antiquity is the fact that he did something quite remarkable as leader; once he had completed his civic duty, Lucius relinquished his power and went back to civilian life as a farmer. Thus, Cincinnatus stayed in

power only long enough to accomplish the group goals he had been tasked to achieve; when he could no longer advance his group's goals, he relinquished his power. Similarly, George Washington is often cited by many historians that his greatest accomplishment, as the first President of the newly-formed United States, was leaving office (a two-term precedence that stood for nearly 150 years), despite calls by many supporters to be America's first king. Like Cincinnatus, Washington stepped down from the Presidency when he believed he would not be advancing the group goals and ideals of the fledgling republic. Specifically, Washington stated that it was for the good of the American republic that he not die in office which was in stark contrast to what had been observed for so long in the monarchies of Europe. Likewise, more recently, Pope Benedict XVI has been heralded for relinquishing his power to serve the common good when it became clear he was unfit to continue advancing his group's interests. As these historical anecdotes illustrate, leaders can use power in responsible ways by relinquishing power when it would advance group goals.

The relinquishing of power can be understood given that the power granted to leaders brings with it the challenge of balancing the tension between two inherently competing goals: using power to serve egoistic goals or advancing collectivistic goals (Vescio & Guinote, 2010). The experience of power allows individuals the opportunity to pursue either goal which, in contrast, is not afforded to the powerless whose choices between goals are more constrained by those in power (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Moreover, these conflicting goals can be resolved when powerful people are attentive to cues—dispositional or situational—that prioritizes collectivistic goals over egoistic goals or vice-a-versa. Consistent with this notion, there are individual differences in the responsible use of power (Chen et al., 2001; Lee-Chai, Chen, & Chartrand, 2001). Powerful individuals with strong other-orientations

are more likely to be benevolent in dispute resolution and procedural justice (Blader & Chen, 2012; Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007), more likely to promote group goals rather than self-interest (Chen et al., 2012; Lee-Chai et al., 2001), and are more interpersonally sensitive to the needs of others (e.g., Mast, Jonas, & Hall, 2009). Situational contexts can also inspire the responsible use of power. The powerful are also less likely to stereotype subordinates when there are outcome interdependences between the relatively powerful and the powerless (Fiske, 1993; Vescio et al., 2003) or when stereotypes are irrelevant to goal attainment (Vescio et al., 2003, 2005, 2006). Finally, powerful people are also more likely to contribute to a common pool of resources when collectivistic norms are salient (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003).

Road Map and Aims of Current Research

Integrating the foregoing points, the goals of the current research are twofold. First, I aim to set forth a theoretical backdrop that articulates the causes and mechanisms of relinquishing power. Toward that end, the following literature review has been structured to answer a series of questions, the answers to which provide a full conceptualization of interrelated constructs. These include: What is power? How is power acquired and maintained? What are the consequences of power? And in regards to the current research, what is relinquishing power? When might it occur? Who is more likely to do so? And importantly, to whom is power typically given? The sections of the literature review are defined by these questions.

Second, after reviewing work that has looked at when and to whom power is relinquished (outlining group-based biases), the current research proposes ways to mitigate bias and discrimination in relinquishing power decisions. To derive predictions and testable hypotheses, I review intergroup bias reduction interventions. Extending prior theory and research, this research tests the effectiveness of various interventions across three studies.

What is Power?

The study of power has had a rich history in social psychology and related social science fields. Theorists have suggested that power and hierarchical arrangement of people is a fundamental aspect of social relations (Fiske, 1992). For instance, Russell (1938) describes power as akin to energy in physics: the laws of social dynamics can only be described in terms of power relations. Consistent with this notion, power has been defined in terms of its influence on others (e.g., Russell, 1938), the potential to influence others (e.g., French & Raven, 1959), or ability to control valued outcomes or resources (Fiske, 1993; Kipnis, 1976; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; for a reviews see Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). In line with these conceptualizations, I define power as one's ability to asymmetrically control valued resources and outcomes, enabling one to influence others in socially meaningful ways (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Fiske & Dépret, 1996). Valued resources and outcomes include, but are not limited to, money, food, safety, material goods, formal positions, opportunities, status, and social acceptance, as a few examples (see Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Importantly, one's ability to wield power is not an innate characteristic one possesses across situations; instead, power is relative, in that a person is powerful to the degree that others depended upon the power holder (Emerson, 1962).

Seminal work on power points to five fundamental avenues (or bases) to power: reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, and referent (French & Raven, 1959). First, *reward power* refers to the ability of a leader to give and withhold rewards (e.g., pay raises, allocation of resources, promotions) to motivate subordinates to achieve a desired goal. Second, *coercive (or punishment) power* is the ability to punish or pose a threat of negative consequences to others (e.g., threaten an employee's job security, pay cut, social ostracism, physical punishment) by using fear as a motivating factor. Third, *expert power* can be described as one's power of

knowledge or skills in a given domain. Individuals such as doctors, lawyers, scientists, accountants have power over others given that they have an expertise or skill set that others lack (but require). Fourth, *legitimate power* is often associated with position power or official power when an individual is legitimately worthy or has the right to influence others. Those with legitimate power are typically granted authority from an organization (e.g., CEO, manager) or based on some legitimacy process valued by a group (e.g., democratic elections of leaders and politicians). Fifth, *referent power* is power based on the ability of an individual to elicit a strong sense of identification or a desire to have such an identity in other people.

Given power's fundamental role in social relations, power needs to be differentiated from four related constructs (see Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). These include: social status, privilege, dominance, and authority.

Social Status. Social status is typically viewed as the evaluation of social attributes in others that produces differences in appraisals of respect, admiration, prominence, and regard for these individuals (Blader & Chen, 2012; Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 2012; Keltner et al., 2003). Status cues often inform expectations of others in regards to their behavior or abilities which can determine the corresponding allocation of resources or conferring of power (e.g., Berger, Cohen, & Zeldich, 1972; Ridgeway, 2001). Thus, those who are high in status are often highly regarded in society and are often found in prestigious positions within social hierarchies. However, the concepts of power and status are orthogonal. For instance, it is possible to have power without status (e.g., prison guard) and status without power (e.g., Queen of England, see Fast et al., 2012).

Privilege. Privilege can be defined as the unearned advantages one receives by virtue of membership in a high-status group (e.g., being born into a rich family; McIntosh, 1988; Powell,

Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005). However, one could be privileged and not necessarily have much power (e.g., being born into an affluent family but barred access to family funds or decisions).

Dominance. Dominance describes behavior intended to lead to the acquisition of power as its primary goal (e.g., shoving in line to get tickets, most sports competitions). However, power can be attained without direct dominance when leaders attain positions via cooperative and egalitarian styles (e.g., Keltner et al., 2003).

Authority. Authority (akin to French and Raven's legitimate power) refers to power that is derived from institutional roles or arrangements from a legitimate governing entity (Henry & Pratto, 2010; Weber, 1947). In addition to having the legitimate right to exert power, authority also adds the idea that power must be acknowledged and commands should be obeyed (e.g., military general, religious leader). Acceptance of authority implies that one has already agreed to be influenced or persuaded by a legitimate power holder. However, power can arise (often spontaneously) in informal groups and does not necessitate formal structure or acknowledgment.

How is Power Acquired and Maintained?

"Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding. You cannot subjugate a nation forcibly unless you wipe out every man, woman, and child. Unless you wish to use such drastic measures, you must find a way of settling your disputes without resort to arms."

-Albert Einstein (Speech to the New History Society, December 14, 1930)

Power acquisition. Power is not innate but acquired or conferred in reference to others. Moreover, power has been suggested to be a fundamental human motive that all strive to acquire and maintain (Frank, 1985; McCelland, 1975; Winter, 1988). Not only have personality researchers linked power as a fundamental component describing personality traits (Moskowitz,

1994), but dominance (vs. submissiveness) has been cited by social cognitive theorists to be a key dimension of judgment during person perception and impression formation (e.g., Knutson, 1996; Wocjciszke, 1997; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Importantly, however, the way in which power is acquired and maintained (not necessarily mutually exclusive) varies in regards to interpersonal styles or approaches.

Initial treaties on power acquisition largely centered on dominance and coercive behavior as the means to rise to powerful positions (e.g., Buss, 1999; Hollander, 1985; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996). From these perspectives, individuals more adept at gaining access to important resources (via physical strength or other coercive means) should emerge toward the top of dominance hierarchies and, by implication, reap the rewards of controlling group activities and have their needs met without dependence on others. At first glance, a dominance theory of power acquisition seems parsimonious because it can explain many animal hierarchies and human leaders who are domineering, authoritarian, and controlling (e.g., Bass, 1990).

However, more recent analyses of power acquisition suggest that power is typically conferred to leaders on the basis of sociability and legitimacy rather than dominance (e.g., Bass, 1990; Boehm & Flack, 2010; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; for a review, see Van Vugt, 2006). In fact, dominance measures do not predict emergence of leaders (Kremer & Mack, 1983) and subordinates are less likely to choose and/or stay with a domineering leader (Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper-Schneider, 1992), even in times of crisis (Rutte & Wilke, 1984). Moreover, power is typically granted from followers to leaders, serving as an implicit social contract whereby followers give up control of resources in exchange for reduced uncertainty at the direction of a competent, collectively-focused leader (Boehm & Flack, 2010; Keltner, Gruenfeld, Galinsky, & Kraus, 2010; Mead & Maner, 2012). Recent research seems to indicate that individuals who are

competent, confident, take the initiative, have social intelligence, and who act in a group's best interest, are likely to emerge as leaders (e.g., Ames & Flynn, 2007; Chemers, Watson, & May, 2000; Flynn, 2010; Keltner et al., 2010; Van Vugt, 2006; Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008).

Power maintenance. Regardless of whether power differentials are originally acquired through dominance or legitimacy, power differentials are more effectively maintained through legitimacy (Boehm & Flack, 2010; Jackman, 1994; Van Vugt et al., 2008). Although there are instances in which the powerful do maintain power with aggressive and coercive behavior (e.g., Bargh et al., 1995; Fast et al., 2011; Kipnis, 1972; Maner & Mead, 2010), effective power holders seem to act closely in line with socially responsible goals to perpetuate their continued position in power (Boehm & Flack, 2010; Jackman, 1994; Overbeck & Park, 2001). In fact, social scientists have suggested that overt, coercive acts of dominance represent a failure of power (see Jackman, 1994) and in response to such acts, subordinates often form alliances to work together to control and prevent abuses of power (see Boehm & Flack, 2010). However, it should be noted that subtle, coercive behavior can slip by undetected when the controlling behavior of leaders is masked by their benevolent concern (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Jackman, 1994; Vescio et al., 2005). Subverting certain groups and/or acting in ways that promote social inequality can often be justified as being in the service of the common good via the maintenance of the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

Furthermore, the way in which power is maintained is influenced by both person and situational factors. On the individual level, there is an essential tension between competing egoistic motives to serve self-interest goals and collectivistic motives to better the welfare of one's group (Maner & Mead, 2010; Vescio & Guinote, 2010). Given that power frees people from the press of the situation, or normative social pressures (Galinsky et al., 2008), this

experience of power allows for a shift in focus inward toward personal goals and dispositions (e.g., Blader & Chen, 2012; Galinsky et al., 2008; Guinote, 2007; Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012; van Dijk & DeCremer, 2006). Likewise, a power holder with a greater dispositional focus on self-interest goals will be more likely to abuse their position of power compared to one with internalized goals that are geared to benefit their group as a whole (Blader & Chen, 2012; Chen et al., 2001).

On a situational level, powerful people act in an egotistic manner when selfishness is normative and act in a socially responsible manner when collectivistic goals are salient within the context of the situation or social environment. More specifically, power holders take more from a common pool of resources when egoistic norms are salient, but give more to a common pool when collectivistic norms are salient (Galinsky et al., 2003). Moreover, across situational contexts, it does *not* seem that power is an inherently corrupting force on cognition (cf. Kipnis, 1976); rather, power represents a situational affordance through which a person's primary cognitions can influence behavior and decision-making (egoistic focus vs. collectivistic focus). Therefore, whatever mental content is currently available (either temporarily salient or chronically activated) leads powerful people to rely more on it (DeMarree, Briñol, & Petty, 2012; Guinote et al., 2012).

What are the Consequences of Power?

The experience of power can carry with it many consequences both for the perceiver and the groups that a power holder has in their charge or influence over. The following review outlines the possible desirable and undesirable consequences of power and distinguishes how they affect individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, this section serves as an important aside because it is critical to the theory development of power and relinquishing of power.

Power, it seems, provides affordances to leaders that can shape how leaders perceive and interact with their environment (DeMarree et al., 2012). For instance, the experience of elevated power leads to more social distance (Magee & Smith, 2013), more abstract thinking (Smith & Trope, 2006), easier goal setting (Guniote, 2007), a greater ability to avoid irrelevant information (Guinote, 2008), and a greater tendency toward action (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003). Of importance, however, power can magnify internal dispositions (Guinote et al., 2012). Individuals with power often must balance between competing egoistic and collectivistic goals. Moreover, if one goal becomes more salient than the other—either because it is chronically or situationally salient—leaders will act in line with the that goal (Guinote, 2007; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008).

The experience of elevated power has both positive consequences (e.g., arouses social responsibility concerns and focus on collective goals) and negative consequences (e.g., disconnects one from others and enhances focus on egoistic goals) for individuals who hold power. Illustrating the undesirable consequences, powerful people are less like to adopt the perspective of others (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; van Kleef et al., 2008), less likely to individuate subordinates (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Goodwin et al., 2000; Fiske & Dépret, 1996), have increased levels of implicit prejudice (Guinote, Willis, & Martellotta, 2010), and increased risk-taking tendencies (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). In contrast, feeling powerful can also lead to socially desirable outcomes as seen in the pursuit of group goals (Boehm & Flack, 2010; Chen et al., 2001; Guinote, 2007), increased confidence and regard of the self (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010; Georgesen & Harris, 2000), more efficient stress management (Rivers & Josephs, 2010), and greater individuation of subordinates when activities are framed

cooperatively (Overbeck & Park, 2001). Thus, the experience of power can have both positive and negative effects on the perceiver.

The experience of power, and the way in which it is wielded, can also have many important implications for groups; people directly under the influence of power holders and people within the larger context of a social organization can be greatly affected by the decisions that power holders make. According to many social theorists, power differences are believed to play a large role in the structure, stability, and perceived legitimacy of societal systems of organization (e.g., Henry & Pratto, 2010; Jackman, 1994; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Nadler, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Not only do institutionalized power dynamics offer certain affordances to power holders (see Henry & Pratto, 2010), but also encourage that the status quo be maintained and resolutely justified as a fair system of organization to reduce chaos and uncertainty for all members—leaders and followers alike (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Consequently, the desire to maintain such hierarchical systems (often wrought with inequality and injustice between social groups) can often provide justification and necessity, by the powerful, for their continued existence, thus perpetuating the status quo.

The notions of status quo maintenance, social dominance, and system justification of the powerful have largely been assumed by social theorists to occur, but only recently tested empirically. Building evidence suggests that power increases the perception of social distance between groups (Magee & Smith, 2013), reduces sensitivity to the distress of others (Hogeveen, Inzlicht, & Obhi, 2014; van Kleef et al., 2008), and to maintain the status quo, power holders often seek proximity to potential power threats (see Mead & Maner, 2012). Furthermore, power holders also show biases toward subordinate social groups; those in powerful positions often show group-based biases when making jurdic and hiring decisions (Dovidio, Kawakami,

Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974) and more broadly, power has been linked to increased levels of prejudice (Guinote et al., 2010)—especially amongst those with less socially responsible motivations (Chen et al., 2001).

Of importance, in stereotyping and prejudice research, those in power have been shown to use cultural stereotypes as a justification for discrimination and biased judgments in decision-making (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; Goodwin et al., 2000; Guinote et al., 2010; Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009; Vescio et al., 2003; 2005). Goodwin and colleagues (2000) suggested that the powerful may be more prone to stereotyping both due to easing the greater cognitive demand of overseeing more subordinates (i.e., stereotyping by default) or, perhaps more insidiously, to maintain one's position in the hierarchy by preventing stereotyped groups from ascending to positions of power (i.e., stereotyping by design). Indeed, past research has found some support for the idea that those in power are more likely to stereotype subordinates (Fiske, 1993; Guinote & Phillips, 2010). However, more recent work has documented that the link between power and stereotyping may be more complex and multifaceted. Research finds that the powerful stereotype low-power others when cultural stereotypes match and inform their goals (Overbeck & Park, 2001; Vescio et al., 2003; 2005). Moreover, the powerful will stereotype others when stereotypes provide contextually relevant information (e.g., information about a group's social status or abilities) to the goals of powerful people. Consequently, even for leaders with good intentions (i.e., relying on stereotypic information to inform and achieve group goals), stereotyping can slip by undetected.

The primary focus of the current work is to examine stereotyping and subtle acts of discrimination within the context of relinquishing power decision-making. Given previous work on the propensity of the powerful to use stereotypes, the current research seeks to investigate if

cultural stereotypes will be used when considering *to whom* one gives power and also, potential interventions that might reduce or eliminate group-based biases during this process of power transference. Thus, ultimately, this research endeavors to add to our understanding about how power holders can be prevented from perpetuating stereotypic assumptions that can eventually become social reality via status quo maintaining behaviors when leaders make relinquishing power decisions.

A Typology and Working Model of Relinquishing Power

To help conceptualize when and to whom power might be relinquished, it is helpful to take a step back and define key constructs related to the process that leaders may go through when making these decisions. Therefore, the following sections are designed to layout key assumptions and findings related to four major components of a relinquishing power model: (a) What does it mean to relinquish power? (b) When is power relinquished? (c) By whom is power typically relinquished? and (d) To whom is power relinquished? Below a review of theory and research of relevance attempts to answer these questions, which provide the basis for the hypotheses of the present research.

What is Relinquishing Power?

Relinquishing power refers to the voluntary sharing, transfer, or abdication of one's influence or control to another person or group (Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013; Ratcliff et al., 2015). To relinquish power is to simultaneously reduce one's own power while increasing another's power; relinquishing power is a process in which a leader's power is diminished by one's own accord and is given to another person or group. Relinquishing power is not necessarily, however, an all or nothing process where a leader either retains full control within their position or

completely steps down into a subordinate role. Decisions to relinquish power can take many forms that vary in the degree that one yields influence or control over a group or organization.

This research derives from a theoretical framework that conceptualizes the ways in which power may be relinquished as varying across the two dimensions of outward (i.e., public) relinquishing power and amount of actual power or influence yielded (see Figure 1). On one end of the spectrum, lower right quadrant of Figure 1, a power holder could retain full power, thus, publicly not relinquish power and have a high degree of influence regarding their position. In complete contrast, as shown in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1, a leader could fully abdicate power, relinquishing all power and allowing others to decide a successor.

Because the outward relinquishing power dimension and the actual power yielded dimension are orthogonal, further means of relinquishing of power can be mapped across the four quadrants of Figure 1. These include the symbolic relinquishing of power for public appeasement shown in the upper right quadrant of Figure 1; stepping down from a position and choosing a favorable successor over one has much influence (e.g., mentee, nepotism), a leader can retain power by proxy by maintaining a role of "puppetmaster" over a successor one can easily control. Alternatively, near the intersection of public relinquishing power and actual yielding of influence, a power holder can dilute their power by distributing it to others via power sharing. In this method of relinquishing power, a leader could promote others to leadership positions who have equal power over a group (e.g., an oligarchy) or the leader could direct these lesser-leaders (who presumably preside over other subordinates) and retain veto power or strong influence into leadership decisions (e.g., owner of a business or president of board of directors). Lastly, in the lower left quadrant of Figure 1, little power could publicly be relinquished but the

position becomes stripped of any actual power resulting in a “figurehead” title (e.g., Queen of England, Emperor of Japan).

Figure 1. A two-dimensional model on how power can be relinquished.



In addition, unlike hiring and promotion contexts where the leader’s power remains relatively constant (i.e., new hire remains in a subordinate), relinquishing power decisions allow for the possibility that subordinates could become a peer or superior. Even in situations in which a collective group makes hiring decisions regarding an elevated position (e.g., committees to hire university presidents or department heads), the final decision is usually made by an individual or group with higher authority (e.g., board of trustees) who presumably would hold power over the new hire. Thus, relinquishing power is a unique process in which leaders decrease their own

power to others and is a novel process that may have interesting implications for group disparities and intergroup dynamics.

Of importance, relinquishing power serves a critical social function, permitting the non-contentious transfer of power for the good of the group. That is, since leaders are often conferred power under the presumption that they will forward group goals (Keltner et al., 2010; Van Vugt et al., 2008), relinquishing power provides a means by which unsuccessful leaders can peacefully transfer power while maintaining face and group harmony. Without a means to smoothly transfer power, groups could become unsuccessful and fractured under an ineffective leader who retains power and is no longer perceived as a legitimate authority figure.

When is Power Relinquished?

Given historical anecdotes of relinquishing power (e.g., Lucius Cincinnatus, George Washington, Pope Benedict XVI), one might ask: why anyone would be willing to give up their power voluntarily? What types of situations, people, or conditions might influence the relinquishment of power? These questions are interesting due to the fact that the rich history of empirical research on the concept of power has mostly examined the motives, the personality characteristics, and situations that lead to its acquisition and abuses of power.

Importantly and as previously noted, power is typically conferred to leaders as a means to achieve and advance group goals, values, or resources. Even when power is initially taken by force, power is effectively maintained by legitimacy, as low power people form alliances to fight corrupt power holders (Boehm & Flack, 2010; Mead & Maner, 2012). Thus, to effectively maintain power, one must reasonably advance the needs of the group. If a leader is not advancing group objectives or is unable, then the best way for the leader to serve their group would be to relinquish power to another person or the group.

Overarching Prediction: Power holders will be more likely to relinquish power when doing so would be for the good of the group.

It is generally assumed that power holders constantly juggle the competing goals of serving personal needs or the collective needs of the group (Vescio & Guinote, 2010). When collective goals are salient (either situationally and/or dispositionally), the powerful tend to strive toward the interests of their group. The current theory predicts that power is most likely to be relinquished when it would serve to achieve group goals (toward which they are striving) that could not be reached if the current power holder retains power. Given the primary function of leadership under a legitimacy-based perspective (i.e., to forward group goals), leaders should only be motivated to relinquish power when they believe that doing so would serve the good of the group. Moreover, these beliefs about when relinquishing power would serve the greater good should be shaped by the following (non-exhaustive) list of factors: personal characteristics of leaders (e.g., group/personal focus, age, health, self-efficacy, temporal focus), situational pressures surrounding leadership (e.g., leadership performance, group stability, subordinate engagement), and available recipients of power (e.g., subordinate competence and/or sociability).

Model Prediction 1: Power holders are more likely to relinquish power when they are no longer able to forward the goals of the group.

Model Prediction 1a: Power holders will be more likely to relinquish power when their leadership performance is unambiguously poor (vs. good).

As one way to test the overarching theoretical prediction, my empirical work has created situations that indicate that a given leader is not forwarding the goals of the group by providing unambiguously poor performance feedback (Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013; Ratcliff et al., 2015). We predict and find that power is likely to be relinquished when the performance of a leader is determined to be poor.[1] In addition, not only is it necessary for the leader to be aware of their apparent inability to forward the group's goals given their poor performance, but also, the leader must take responsibility for the group's poor performance. Toward that end, performance feedback in our prior work has been presented as unambiguously poor and/or from a trustworthy source (e.g., objective third-party). By preventing scapegoating, participants in our experimental studies have been prevented from mitigating feelings of responsibility for negative leadership outcomes (cf. Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 2012). Thus, supporting Prediction 1a, we found that power was relinquished more following poor leadership performance feedback than ambiguous or good leadership performance feedback (Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013). Moreover, a linear trend of performance was found between good, ambiguous, and poor performance; as performance feedback became less positive, more power was relinquished by leaders. Notably, relinquishing power was particularly pronounced for leaders with an interdependent (vs. independent) focus, who did not have the ability to scapegoat. Together, these results offer initial

[1] From a legitimacy-based perspective, power is expected to be willfully relinquished when leadership performance or group performance is poor. When a leader cannot forward or achieve group goals, then power should be relinquished so that someone else can do so. However, this theory does allow for leaders to be motivated to relinquish power when they are performing well. The historical anecdote about George Washington, for example, notes that he relinquished power after two terms of a successful first presidency. Yet, Washington decided not to seek a third term because he wanted to set a precedence that the top leader of the new American republic should not stay in office until they die or are overthrown by a military coup. Thus, in this example, although Washington's performance was good, he forecasted that staying in office would harm America's new democratic ideals. Similarly, a senior leader in an organization may be performing quite well but may decide to retire early and step aside to allow for more growth in the company by younger employees and to avoid potential poor performances that could come due to old age ("getting out while you are ahead"). Thus, even well-performing leaders may relinquish power when they believe not doing so would result in their own poor performance or undesirable consequences for the group they lead.

support that situations in which performance is poor places a situational pressure on leaders to relinquish power.

By Whom is Power Relinquished?

The extent that power is relinquished should also be determined by the situated nature of the power holder. To answer the question: "*By whom* is power typically relinquished?" it is important to examine the psychological focus and dispositions of leaders making potential relinquishing power decisions. As previously mentioned, people in power must balance an essential tension between competing egoistic (e.g., personal) and collectivistic (e.g., group) goals (see Maner & Mead, 2010; Vescio & Guinote, 2010). In the absence of strong situational pressures, leaders tend to act in line with their internal dispositions (e.g., Guinote et al., 2012), influencing whether egoistic goals or more collectivistic goals are pursued. Thus, the current theory predicts that power is most likely to be relinquished by individuals with a chronic focus on group goals (e.g., other-focused, collectivistic, interdependent) compared to those with a greater focus on personal goals (e.g., self-focused, egoistic, independent).

> **Model Predication 2**: Power holders who value group goals (vs. personal goals) will be more likely to relinquish power.

> **Model Prediction 2**a: Power holders with an interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal will be more likely to relinquish power.

Model Prediction 2b: Power holders with an interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal will be more likely to relinquish power when performing poorly as leaders.

Supporting Predictions 2a and 2b, people with interdependent (vs. independent) self-construals are more likely to relinquish power, especially when faced with situational pressures of poor performance (Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013). Specifically, using an interdependent self-construal measure (i.e., sense of social connectedness) to approximate the degree to which people are group-focused (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994), leaders who were highly interdependent (vs. low) were more likely to relinquish power overall and when placed in situations in which their leadership performance was diagnostically poor. Moreover, these findings were consistent with previous research that suggests that people with more interdependent self-construals are more likely to adopt the perspective of others (Sheldon & Johnson, 1993), be motivated to pursue the goals of close others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and importantly, that interdependent leaders tend to act more benevolently when resolving disputes with low-power competitors (Howard et al., 2007). Therefore, our findings offer initial empirical support for the prediction that a leader with a group focus (i.e., concern for advancing collective, group goals) might be more likely to relinquish power when it could serve the collective good (Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013).

To Whom is Power Relinquished?

"Competence, like truth, beauty, and contact lenses, is in the eye of the beholder."

–Dr. Laurence J. Peter, *The Peter Principle* (Peter & Hull, 1969)

The foregoing theory and research have addressed when and by whom power may be relinquished, but of particular import to the present theory and research is the question of *to whom* is power relinquished when leaders decide to step down or share power? Consistent with prior theory that power is relinquished when it would advance group goals, we believed leaders would be likely to relinquish power to others that they perceived could advance the group goals in which they were striving to achieve (Ratcliff et al., 2015). Specifically, we assumed that power would be relinquished to competent, well-intention people who could potentially further group goals. Therefore, giving power to someone who cannot function as a leader (i.e., incompetent) or someone with malevolent intent would not be a wise decision for advancing positive group (or even personal) outcomes.

Moreover, this assumption is consistent with research documenting two key dimensions in person perception—competence and warmth (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Knutson, 1996; Wojciszke, 1997). This assumption is also consistent with findings that power is bestowed to sociable–or agreeable and affiliative–people who are motivated in the group's best interest (Keltner et al., 2010) and to people who are capable of advancing these goals (Flynn, 2010; Van Vugt et al., 2008). However, given that competence is closely associated with notions of task ability (and task performance being a critical aspect of previous findings; Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013), it was believed that cues of competence to be of primary consideration when determining to whom to relinquish power in task-driven leadership roles. Accordingly, competent others may be experts (e.g., those with previous leadership experience), favorable others (e.g., ingroup members, family members), or prototypical others who are stereotypically normative for positions of power (e.g., high-status, Whites males).

Of import, and critical to the predictions of the current work, perceptions of competence and intent are often informed by cultural stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002). Additionally, in line with previous work on power and stereotyping, in the absence of diagnostic information about subordinates, stereotypes may inform leader's decisions about subordinates (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 2000; Vescio et al., 2003, 2005), including decisions about to whom power should be relinquished. Theorists have suggested that the powerful might be prone to stereotyping as an efficient process to meet the overwhelming cognitive demands of leadership (see Goodwin et al., 2000). Furthermore, a more nuanced account of power and stereotyping suggests that the powerful might be inclined to stereotype when doing so is relevant to a task or achieving group goals (Overbeck & Park, 2001; Vescio et al., 2003, 2005). Thus, the powerful may use stereotypes in well-intention ways (e.g., when stereotypes are task relevant) that allows for subtle biases to slip by undetected.

> **Model Prediction 3**: Power holders will be more likely to relinquish power to others that are stereotypically perceived as highly competent (e.g., Whites, men, members of high-status groups) versus not competent (e.g., Blacks, women, members of low-status groups).
>
> **Model Prediction 3a**: Power holders will be more likely to relinquish power to White men compared to Black men.

Given the linkages between power and stereotyping (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 2000; Vescio et al., 2003, 2005), the current work suggests that leaders' decisions about to whom

power will be relinquished may be informed by cultural stereotypes. Cultural stereotypes related to the status of one's social group (e.g., age, race, gender) can serve as a cue to one's abilities or competence (see Berger et al., 1972; Berger & Fişek, 2006; Ridgeway, 2001); and stereotypes of competence are often derived from a group's perceived status (see Fiske et al., 2002). For high-status groups, status leads to expectations of high competence whereas for low-status groups, the competence component of stereotypes linked to status can lead to negative expectations regarding abilities to achieve goals. Therefore, in an effort to relinquish power to others that are best equipped to advance group goals, leaders may relinquish power using stereotypes related to competence as a well-intentioned justification for allowing stereotypes to slip by undetected (cf. Vescio et al., 2005).

Model Prediction 4: Leaders high and low in group focus would similarly relinquish power to stereotypically competent others because it would serve neither group nor personal goals to give power to a potentially incompetent other.

Model Prediction 4a: Leaders high and low in interdependent self-construal would similarly relinquish power to White men (vs. Black men) because it would serve neither group nor personal goals to give power to a potentially incompetent other.

Of importance, in light of previous work looking at interdependent self-construals as a dispositional motivation to relinquish power (see Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013), the current research would not expect that individuals high or low in interdependence to differ in relinquishing power

to stereotypically incompetent others. It is assumed that giving power to a competent other would be of primary importance to both highly interdependent leaders (e.g. focused on group goals) and leaders low on levels of interdependence (e.g., focused on personal goals). Thus, giving power to a stereotypically incompetent other would not advance group goals of importance to leaders high in interdependence (e.g., the welfare of the group could be in jeopardy with an incompetent leader at the helm) or advance more personal goals of importance to less interdependently focused leaders (e.g., maintaining power and maximizing personal rewards).

For this dissertation, *to whom* leaders relinquish power will be of primary focus. This research proposes that cultural stereotypes of competence will bias relinquishing power decisions toward groups that have traditionally been framed as competent (e.g., White men). Furthermore, if subtle biases in relinquishing power behavior do occur, this dissertation aims to test interventions that might ameliorate or eliminate such bias when deciding to whom to give power. To initially examine the possibility of stereotype-consistent relinquishing power decisions, a pilot study was conducted which examined decisions to give power to either stereotypically competent or incompetent co-workers (see Ratcliff et al., 2015). The following chapter outlines this pilot study which provides the basis for this dissertation.

Chapter 3. PILOT STUDY: ESTABLISHING THAT RACIAL BIAS OCCURS IN RELINQUISHING POWER DECISIONS

Cultural stereotypes associated with the competence of Blacks (vs. Whites) should inform relinquishing power decisions (Ratcliff et al., 2015). Specifically, when leaders are faced with decisions to relinquish power, they should be less likely to relinquish power to those stereotyped as incompetent (i.e., Blacks vs. Whites). Moreover, in the absence of individuating information about co-workers, leaders should choose others who are believed to be competent and, therefore, best equipped to take on the duties of leadership and advance group goals. In this manner, stereotyping slips by undetected when leaders (with good intentions) rely on stereotypes to meet group goals (i.e., selecting a competent successor to receive power).

Why might Blacks be linked to stereotypes of incompetence? Historically, due to membership in a relatively low-status social group, Blacks have been stereotyped in ways that suggest shortcomings of relevance to leadership and are underrepresented in positions of power (Livingston & Pearce, 2009; Rosette, Leonardelli, & Phillips, 2008). For instance, Black Americans comprise 13.0% of the U.S. population and 11.4% of the labor force, but only make up 6.3% of managers and 3.5% of CEOs (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007). Thus, the lower relative social status of Black Americans is a social reality that most Americans are aware of and have cognitively internalized (Blair, 2001; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Haromon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Vescio & Biernat, 1999; Wittenbrink & Henly, 1997). In fact, cultural stereotypes of Blacks are so pervasive that they have been found to be internalized by low-prejudice, as well as high prejudice, individuals (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997), as well as being internalized by Blacks (e.g., Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Plous & Williams, 1995; Vedantam, 2005).

Integrating the foregoing points and extending prior research, we assumed that (a) cultural stereotypes of low-status groups are pervasive and internalized by all people, (b) the powerful are particularly likely to utilize cultural stereotypes, especially when they can inform current goals, and (c) powerful people will be more likely to give up power to competent, well-intentioned others who are perceived as well equipped to handle the mantle of leadership. Taken together, we predicted that Black men would be less likely than White men to have power relinquished to them because Black men are stereotypically perceived to be less competent in leadership roles.

We tested these ideas in a pilot study (Ratcliff et al., 2015, Study 1a). Accordingly, to set forth the experimental paradigm, manipulations, and measures, as well as familiarize the reader with the magnitude and direction of effects, the pilot study is detailed here in full (see Ratcliff et al., 2015, Study 1a).

Method

Participants. Participants were 78 undergraduates of The Pennsylvania State University (53 women, 25 men, M_{Age} = 19.24; self-reported ethnicity: 62 White, 5 Black, 7 Asian, 3 Hispanic, 1 Undefined), who participated in return for course credit. Participants who quickly responded to relinquishing power decision options (<1.5 SD below mean; 5.53 seconds) were not included in the analyses (n = 5). No significant gender effects were observed (all *p*s > .65) and thus, will not be discussed further. Sample size was determined using a rule of thumb of 40 participants per group when considering a mixed design with small expected effects.

Design. The pilot study employed a Leader Performance (Good vs. Poor) × Co-Worker Race (White vs. Black) mixed experimental design. Leader Performance was manipulated as a between-participants variable and Co-Worker Race was a within-participants variable.

Procedure and materials. Participants were welcomed into a lab in groups of five and seated at individual computers. Before starting, participants were informed that they would be interacting with other students using the internet as part of a study on leadership and decision-making. To determine who would be team leaders versus team members, participants took a “leadership skills test” (see Appendix A). After the computer analyzed participant responses, all participants were informed that they had been assigned a leadership role based on their "superior" leadership skills.

As team leaders, participants were told that they would be solely responsible for making leadership decisions in a virtual capture-the-flag competition against other groups. Specifically, participants would be making decisions in a game in order to win the competition against other groups for a monetary prize of $25.00, which as leaders, they could distribute as they see fit. Participants were informed that they would be in a double elimination competition in which a second loss would mean that their group would no longer be in the running for the prize (for a similar procedure, see Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013).

Co-worker race. Before beginning the game, participants ‘connected’ to an online server where they were told that they would be placed as a leader of four other participants. Once groups had been assigned, participants were asked to check to see if they had any messages from the other co-workers. The computer then appeared to be receiving messages before displaying a message from each of the four co-workers (see Appendix B). The purpose of these messages in the design was twofold: (1) they led participants to believe that they were truly interacting with other participants who were actively involved in the study by watching the leader’s decisions and (2) they allowed for the manipulation of co-worker race. Co-worker race was manipulated within-participants by altering the names of the co-workers, such that participants saw two

stereotypically White male names (i.e., Eric, Matt) and two stereotypically Black male names (i.e., Lamar, Tyronne) that had been previously tested for how stereotypical each name was to a given racial group.

After brief introductions to their co-workers, participants made a series of strategic decisions on a virtual map; decisions included indicating where they wanted to put their team's flag, where they thought the other team's flag was located, and where they would like to send attackers and place defenders (see Appendix C). Participants believed that these strategic decisions would be pitted against the decisions made by the competitor in a simulation and used to determine a winner.

Performance feedback. Once participants made strategic decisions, the computer presumably analyzed and compared team strategies and performance feedback was provided. Across studies, performance was manipulated as a between-participants factor. In the *good performance condition*, participants read that the set of strategic decisions they had made for their team results in victory more than 90% of the time and that they won the first round. In the *poor performance condition*, participants read that the set of strategic decisions that they made for their team results in defeat more than 90% of the time and that they lost the first round.

Relinquishing power. After leadership performance was given, participants were told that they would be indicating the degree to which they would relinquish power in reference to each specific member of their group. Participants considered each of four co-workers, in turn, and selected one of five response options that indicated the degree to which they would feel comfortable relinquishing power to each White and Black co-worker (see Appendix D). Specifically, considering each co-worker, participants indicated whether they wanted to (1) keep leadership position with full control within the group, (2) keep leadership position but get

feedback from this co-worker, (3) choose this co-worker as a co-leader to assist in making decisions, (4) relinquish power to some unspecified co-worker (i.e., "give up leadership position within the group and choose new leader from other [four] co-workers"), or (5) give up leadership position within the group and allow this co-worker to be leader. To form variables indicating relinquishing power to White co-workers and Black co-workers, decisions were averaged across the two White co-workers and the two Black co-workers, respectively.

After making relinquishing power decisions, participants completed the interdependence self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994) and several demographic items. Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed at the study's conclusion.

Results

Relinquishing power scores were averaged across co-worker race and were submitted to a Leadership Performance (Poor or Good) × Co-Worker Race (White or Black) mixed-model ANOVA. Analyses were first conducted in regression including interdependent self-construal as a continuous variable. However, consistent with predictions, interdependent self-construal did not interact with leadership performance or co-worker race (*p*s > .38). Given lack of moderation by interdependent self-construal, subsequent analyses were performed using a Leadership Performance × Co-Worker Race mixed-model ANOVA.

Several significant findings emerged from analysis of relinquishing power. First, the main effect of leadership performance was significant, $F(1, 71) = 14.66$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .171$, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) = [0.285, 0.905]; participants relinquished more power following poor performance feedback ($M = 2.71$, $SD = 0.84$) than good performance feedback ($M = 2.11$, $SD = 0.37$). Second, the effect of co-worker race was marginally significant, $F(1, 71) = 3.18$, $p = .079$, $\eta_p^2 = .043$, 95% CI = [-0.008, 0.143]; participants relinquished more power to White co-

workers (*M* = 2.47, *SD* = 0.77) than Black co-workers (*M* = 2.39, *SD* = 0.71). In addition, leadership performance also interacted with co-worker race, $F(1, 71) = 8.68$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .109$ (see Figure 2). Simple effects tests were performed to examine the magnitude of the race effect within level of performance feedback. In the poor performance feedback condition, more power was relinquished to White co-workers (*M* = 2.79, *SD* = 0.87) than Black co-workers (*M* = 2.62, *SD* = 0.85); $F(1, 71) = 12.01$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .145$, 95% CI = [0.076, 0.283]. By contrast, as predicted, little power was relinquished in the good performance condition and, what power was relinquished, did not vary as a function of co-worker race, $F = 0.63$, $p = .429$. No other effects reached significance.

Figure 2. Mean relinquishing of power by leadership performance and co-worker race in pilot study (Ratcliff et al., 2015; Study 1a). Error bars represent a 95% confidence interval (CI).



Discussion

These findings provided initial evidence of racial biases in leaders' decisions about to whom to relinquish power. Specifically, supporting Prediction 3a, people were less likely to relinquish their power to Black co-workers than White co-workers. These results suggest that when making decisions about to whom one could give power, leaders are likely to favor co-workers from stereotypically competent (vs. incompetent) groups. In addition, supporting Prediction 4a, there was no evidence that these patterns of relinquishing power varied as a function of leaders' interdependent self-construals. This suggests that personal and collective goals may overlap when deciding to relinquish power to others belonging to groups that are stereotyped as incompetent. In sum, the pilot study established that when making decisions to relinquish power, stereotypes can slip by undetected and lead to bias when deciding to whom one gives power.[2]

[2] Similar findings were observed when co-worker race was manipulated as a between-participant factor (Study 1b). In addition, White male co-workers were also more likely to be relinquished power compared to White female co-workers (Study 2); suggesting that similar relinquishing power biases appear for other negatively stereotyped groups. Furthermore, participant gender did not qualify any of the results with co-worker gender which suggested a general stereotyping explanation for findings compared to an ingroup/outgroup explanation (see Ratcliff et al., 2015).

Chapter 4. OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION RESEARCH

The present research tests the effectiveness of various interventions employed to ameliorate racial biases in decisions about to whom power is relinquished. Although elevated power is sometimes likened to increased stereotyping (e.g., Goodwin et al., 2000), stereotyping is not ubiquitous among the powerful (Chen et al., 2001; Overbeck, & Park, 2001; Vescio et al., 2003; 2005; 2006). Furthermore, although most people are aware of and have cognitively internalized cultural stereotypes of Blacks, implicit stereotypes are malleable in certain contexts (see Blair, 2002). To consider possible interventions that may ameliorate racial biases in relinquishing power decisions, below I briefly review the interventions shown to effectively reduce intergroup biases and stereotypes.

Reducing Stereotyping and Intergroup Bias

Theorists and scholars long have assumed that the categorization of people as ingroup versus outgroup members underlie intergroup bias and stereotyping (for a review, see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Social categorization is the process of classifying people into groups based on appearance or prototypic group traits. Compared to individuation and/or personalization (i.e., the processing of people based on unique characteristics), social categorization has been conceptualized as a quick, efficient process that is often engaged automatically and outside our conscious control (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Once categorized, there is an accentuation of similarities among members of a given group and an accentuation of differences between groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Stereotypes are widely believed to follow from categorization and function as a means to help the mind navigate through a complex and conflicting environment to avoid effortful ambiguous situations that can be difficult to understand or process (see Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Thus, when stereotypes are activated,

individual group members can be imparted with judgments based on group membership and expectations (Berger et al., 1972; Ridgeway, 2001).

Prejudice reduction interventions stress the importance of intergroup contact (e.g., Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Williams, 1947), reframing groups as cooperative (e.g., Hewstone & Brown, 1986), and modifying how members of stereotyped groups are categorized (e.g., Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Of importance, research shows that implicit attitudes and internalized stereotypes are malleable using various prejudice reduction interventions (Blair, 2002; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Olson & Fazio, 2002; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). For instance, the activation of internalized stereotypes is dependent upon social context (e.g., Black/church vs. Black/street corner background; Wittenbrink et al., 2001) and classical conditioning can reduce stereotypic associations (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2002). Mental imagery of counterstereotypic exemplars also reduces the activation of stereotypes (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001) and taking the perspective of a negatively-stereotyped group member can reduce stereotype activation (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) and reduce prejudice (Batson et. al., 1997b; Paolucci, Sechrist, & Vescio, 2003).

Extending and integrating prior theory and research, the present research seeks to examine the effects of priming counterstereotypic information (e.g., Blair et al., 2001; Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999) and the use of different perspective-taking methods (Batson, 2009; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) as a means of reducing bias in relinquishing power decisions. To consider this possibility, I review these two stereotype reduction strategies in turn.

Reducing Bias with Counterstereotypic Information

Stereotypes are generalized beliefs or expectations about how members of a given group think or behave (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvolo, 1990). Stereotypes can influence person perception by focusing attention on information that is consistent with a given stereotype, confirming stereotype-based expectations (Darley & Gross, 1983; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Word et al., 1974). In contrast, when counterstereotypic information is salient, perceivers focus on information that is consistent with the activated counterstereotype rather than stereotype-consistent information. As Blair and Banaji (1996) note, counterstereotypic expectancies may operate to disconfirm a stereotype by increasing the accessibility of counterstereotypic information which could prevent (i.e., inhibit) the subsequent processing or application of a stereotype in a current situation. Attention to counterstereotypic information (e.g., Blair & Banaji, 1996; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Monteith, 1993) or repeated efforts to control activation of internalized stereotypes (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Park, Glaser, & Knowles, 2008) may decrease stereotypic responses and shift expectations. In fact, repeated pairings and rehearsal of counterstereotypic associations (e.g., ‘Woman’-‘Strong’, ‘Woman’-‘Practical’ & ’Man’-‘Weak’, ‘Man’-‘Sensitive’) have been shown to weaken implicit association effects (e.g., Implicit Association Test; IAT) and other automatic stereotypes (see Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Kawakami, Dovidio, & van Kamp, 2005, 2007).

Consistent with this theoretical framework on counterstereotype activation, people carry counterstereotypic subtypes of members of groups. Subtypes can be described as individuals who run stereotypically contrary to the superordinate group they belong. For instance, a general stereotype of Black males relates to incompetence. However, subtypes of Blacks (e.g., business professionals) carry more specific and often counter-information about competence at their

respective profession (e.g., being assertive to get tasks complete). Of importance, empirical evidence suggests that the priming of counterstereotypes (e.g., a strong women; Blair et al., 2001; Wittenbrink et al., 2001) or positive exemplars of a negatively stereotyped group (e.g., Colin Powell; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001) can reduce the accessibility and application of internalized stereotypes.[3]

To illustrate how counterstereotypes reduce implicit stereotyping, Blair and colleagues (2001) conducted a study where participants were asked to form mental images of a woman who, as a member of a low-status group (i.e., women), can often be stereotyped as being weak and unassertive (Eagly & Carli, 2007; Eagly & Karau, 1991). In the neutral imagery condition, participants imagined what a vacation would be like in the Caribbean. In contrast, in the counterstereotypic imagery condition, participants were asked to imagine "what a strong woman is like, why she is considered strong, what she is capable of doing, and what kinds of hobbies and activities she enjoys." The findings revealed that participants who engaged in counterstereotypic mental imagery produced weaker implicit stereotypes compared to others who imagined neutral imagery because the counterstereotypic image made counterstereotypic information more salient (inhibiting stereotype-consistent information). Furthermore, in

[3] Of note, Maurer, Park, and Rothbart (2005) make a conceptual distinction between subtyping and subgrouping. In their research, subtyping is a process in which a person thinks of a subset of atypical (i.e., counterstereotypic) group members of a superordinate group and then fence these individuals off as "exceptions to the rule" and allow for a more homogenous and stereotype-consistent perception of the superordinate group. In contrast, subgrouping refers to a process in which one considers atypical group members in ways that are perceived to disconfirm and confirm subordinate group stereotypes. The result of this integrative perception allows for an increase in perceived variability of the superordinate group and weakens superordinate group stereotyping. Although Maurer and colleagues (1995) only found decreases in stereotyping for subgrouping framing and Blair and colleagues (2001) found decreases for subtyping manipulations, one key distinction between these lines of research is the Maurer findings were obtained with explicit stereotyping measures (e.g., perceived similarity of group members) while the Blair findings were associated with implicit measures of stereotyping (e.g., implicit association test). Since the current work hangs its theoretical hat on more implicit, internalized cultural stereotypes as a mechanism for relinquishing power bias, it is believed that the subtyping framework described by Blair and colleagues (i.e., counterstereotypic interference with superordinate stereotypes) is a better way to frame interventions than the more explicit reduction of stereotypes observed by Maurer and colleagues (i.e., explicit stereotypic and counterstereotypic information increases superordinate group variability).

subsequent studies, Blair and colleagues found that the reduction of stereotype associations (as measured by an IAT) from counterstereotypic imagery emerged for unrelated tasks separate from the stereotype assessment and importantly, showed greater stereotype reduction when compared to stereotype suppression instructions (i.e., assigning people to actively suppress internalized stereotypes). Taken together, Blair and colleagues' findings suggest that thinking about counterstereotypes can decrease the accessibility of stereotypes, making it less likely that stereotypes are applied in both stereotype relevant and stereotype irrelevant domains.

> **Model Predication 5**: Priming of counterstereotypic information related to negatively stereotyped groups will reduce group-based bias in relinquishing power decisions toward those groups.

> **Model Predication 5a**: Priming of counterstereotypic information related to Black men will attenuate or eliminate relinquishing power biases between White men and Black men.

Building on the aforementioned theory and research (Blair et al., 2001), I predict that the priming of counterstereotypes will reduce the likelihood of stereotype-consistent relinquishing power decisions. Although cultural stereotypes about low-status groups tend to be widely known and cognitively internalized (Devine, 1989), this research examines the possibility that the influence of stereotypes in relinquishing power decisions can be reduced with the priming of counterstereotypes (e.g., Blair, 2002; Blair et al., 2001; Hugenberg, Blusiewicz, & Sacco, 2010). Moreover, the presentation of counterstereotypic information is assumed to make cultural

stereotypes less accessible and, subsequently, less likely to be applied in relinquishing power decisions.

Summary of counterstereotype studies. In sum, two studies examined different ways of inducing counterstereotypes in an effort to influence relinquishing power decisions related to co-worker race. In Study 1, participants were asked to evaluate an advertisement depicting a counterstereotypic Black man (i.e., Black man in a business suit) or an advertisement showing no Black man (i.e., just a business suit) before making relinquishing power decisions. In Study 2, the effectiveness of shifting the framing of a leadership task as being stereotypically or counterstereotypically White was examined. More specifically, for half of the participants, the capture-the-flag task was framed as stereotypically White (i.e., sports intelligence based); for the other half of the participants, the capture-the-flag task was described in counterstereotypically White terms (i.e., athletic performance based). Across both studies participants were asked to make relinquishing power decisions to White male and Black male co-workers. Taken together, it was predicted that the priming of a counterstereotypic exemplar (Study 1) or viewing tasks in a counterstereotypic manner (Study 2) would attenuate or eliminate race-based biases in relinquishing power decisions, by presumably decreasing the accessibility of cultural stereotypes.

Reducing Bias with Self-Focused and Other-Focused Perspective-Taking

Encouraging people to adopt the perspective of another may also be an avenue for reducing bias in relinquishing power decisions. In fact, people high (versus low) in power are not as likely to take the perspective of others (e.g., Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005) and often do not readily see pain in subordinates (e.g., Hogeveen et al., 2014; van Kleef et al., 2008). Encouraging leaders to perspective-take may be a means for leaders to better understand subordinates and reduce the likelihood of stereotyping. Perspective-taking is a fundamental aspect of social

functioning and is associated with increased levels of social competence and self-esteem (Davis, 1983). Perspective-taking also shifts attributions of perceivers. Typically, observers are more likely to attribute shortcomings of other actors as rooted in dispositional characteristics rather than influenced by situational/contextual forces (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1971). However, as past research has noted, having observers take the perspective of others can reduce these default attributions; observers who perspective-take will make attributes toward other targets that resemble ones they would make for themselves (e.g., Regan & Totten, 1975; Storms, 1973). Thus, the act of perspective-taking seems to shift attributions of others to more closely match our own in terms of explaining behavior.

Of particular import, encouraging people to adopt the perspective of an outgroup member can reduce prejudice. Daniel Batson has documented that perspective-taking is an effective means to reduce prejudice (see Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997a; Batson et al., 1997b). More specifically, Batson encouraged people to adopt the perspective of an outgroup member, feeling the full impact of what is described by that person, which lead to empathy arousal. I will here refer to Batson's typical perspective-taking method as *other-focused perspective-taking*.

Alternatively, imagining one-self in the shoes of others has been shown to impede stereotype activation. More specifically, in contrast to the traditional Batson method of perspective taking, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) introduced a more cognitive, self-focused approach to perspective-taking. In this approach, perspective-taking is conceptualized and manipulated by having people imagine themselves in the shoes of members of stereotyped groups. Galinsky and Moskowitz argue that by placing the self in the shoes of another, people are found to perceive that the self and the target of perspective-taking are overlapped in their cognitive representation and thus, similar to one another. Thus, this approach suggests that

stereotyping can be reduced (i.e., not activated) due to increased perceptions of self-other overlap which often inhibits stereotype activation/application for those viewed as similar to the self. I here refer to this type of method of perspective-taking as *self-focused perspective-taking*.

As Batson and colleagues (1997a) note, there are perspective-taking differences between imaging another's plight and how you would feel in their shoes. Both can produce sympathy, however, imagining yourself in another's shoes also produces personal distress. Personal distress evokes egoistic (self-protective) motivation rather than altruistic (other-protective) motivation (see also Batson, 2009). Accordingly, this differentiation between methods of perspective-taking has been reported across numerous experimental paradigms (Batson et al., 1997a, 2003) and even evinced in neural brain activation of areas known to be associated with empathic concern (see Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). Therefore, group-based bias may be reduced with self-focused perspective-taking via similarity in cognitive representations of the self and target, while other-focused perspective-taking may engender empathy arousal of the target individual that may generalize to the group the target has membership in. I now discuss each of these approaches in turn and how they may inform predictions regarding relinquishing power decisions.

Self-focused perspective-taking. Perspective-taking by imagining one's self in another's shoes is an egocentric process. The more one takes the perspective of another, the greater degree to which the self and the target will merge together conceptually and become more similar to one another (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). Indeed, Davis and colleagues (1996) found that after perspective-taking with a target, observers were more likely to ascribe self-descriptive traits to the target than when just thinking of the target as a typical observer. Moreover, these findings were not due to increased liking of the target per se, but suggested to be a function of increased cognitive accessibility to one's self-

concept. The act of perspective-taking (or placing one's self in another's shoes) allows for the self-concept to be more accessible and thus easier to ascribe to another target.

Self-focused perspective taking has been implicated as a method to reduce stereotyping accessibility and application as well. Theorists have posited that increased self-other overlap after perspective-taking can lead to more positive evaluations of a target, very similar to the positive benefit of extending the self to one's ingroup (see Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). In addition, perspective-taking might also make the self-concept a more accessible source of information when categorizing other social targets, winning out over competing stereotypic information (Bruner, 1957; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Miline, 1995). Thus, the increased salience of the self-concept (via perspective-taking) may reduce the extent to which other stereotypic information is accessible and ultimately applied when considering a stereotyped target.

Empirical work has noted that perspective-taking can reduce the use of stereotypes in many different types of judgments and evaluations (Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky et al., 2005; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). For example, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) conducted a study in which they asked participants to think about an old man sitting on a bench pictured in a photograph. For control participants, no additional instructions were given. For participants in the perspective-taking condition, they were asked to adopt the perspective of the pictured individual and "imagine a day in the life of this individual as if you were that person looking at the world through his eyes." Following this perspective-taking manipulation, participants completed a lexical decision task that tested the response times toward elderly stereotype consistent words (e.g., forgetful, lonely) and stereotype irrelevant words (e.g., jumpy, scheming). Findings revealed that perspective-taking reduced the accessibility and application of elderly

stereotypes and this process was largely explained by the extent to which participants felt self-other overlap with the pictured target.

Model Prediction 6: Attempting to take the perspective, by imagining oneself in the shoes, of a person from a negatively stereotyped group will reduce bias in relinquishing power decisions toward members of those groups.

Model Prediction 6a: Attempting to take the perspective, by imagining oneself in the shoes, of a Black man will attenuate or eliminate relinquishing power biases between White men and Black men.

The current research predicts that self-focused perspective-taking will reduce the likelihood of stereotype-consistent relinquishing power decisions. Insofar as self-focused perspective-taking increases the sense of self-other overlap between leaders and negatively-stereotyped group members, it is assumed that the accessibility of cultural stereotypes will be reduced along with subsequent stereotype-related bias when choosing who to relinquish power. Thus, self-focused perspective-taking with a Black man is predicted to ameliorate or eliminate relinquishing power bias between White men and Black men. Study 3 tests this possibility.

Other-focused perspective-taking. Although placing one's self in someone else's shoes is predicted to reduce stereotyping and stereotype-related bias in relinquishing power decisions (Study 3), this form of self-focused (cognitively-based) perspective-taking may not be sufficient to reduce bias and stereotyping. To reduce bias, leaders might need to feel empathy with the target of perspective-taking. Taking the perspective of another and imagining their emotional

experience can increase empathetic arousal allowing for a shared experience of emotion (see Batson, 1991). From this approach, one who takes the perspective of another leads to empathy arousal (understanding the target's circumstances and feelings) that may generalize to the group to which the individual belongs. Thus, understanding the plight and difficult situational circumstances of another can induce empathetic responses that can form a stronger connection between an observer and a target of perspective-taking.

Not surprisingly, other-focused perspective-taking has also been shown its ability to reduce prejudice and stereotyping. For instance, there is empirical evidence that other-focused perspective-taking (vs. self-focused) can increase moral decisions to be fair (Batson et al., 2003), increase positive attitudes toward stigmatized groups (Batson et al., 1997b), and increase behavioral action toward stigmatized groups (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002).

Model Prediction 7: Attempting to take the perspective, by understanding one's plight or experience, of a person from a negatively stereotyped group will reduce bias in relinquishing power decisions toward members of those groups.

Model Prediction 7a: Attempting to take the perspective, by understanding one's plight or experience, of a Black man will attenuate or eliminate relinquishing power biases between White men and Black men.

The current research predicts that other-focused (or empathy inducing) perspective-taking will reduce the likelihood of stereotype-consistent relinquishing power decisions. Insofar as other-focused perspective-taking increases empathy between leaders and negatively-stereotyped

group members, it is assumed that the accessibility of cultural stereotypes will be reduced along with subsequent stereotype-related bias when choosing whom to relinquish power. Thus, other-focused perspective-taking with a Black man is predicted to ameliorate or eliminate relinquishing power bias between White men and Black men. Study 3 also tests this possibility.

Summary of perspective-taking study. In sum, Study 3 examined different ways of inducing perspective-taking in an effort to influence relinquishing power decisions related to co-worker race. In Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In a self-focused perspective-taking condition, participants were asked to imagine themselves in the shoes of a Black target (cf. Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). In an other-focused perspective-taking condition, participants were asked to emphasize and understand the plight of a Black target (cf. Batson et al., 1997b). Lastly, in a control condition, participants were not asked to perspective-take with the pictured Black target. Across all three conditions, participants were asked to make relinquishing power decisions to White male and Black male co-workers. Taken together, it was predicted that perspective-taking (self- and other-focused) would attenuate or eliminate race-based biases in relinquishing power decisions, by presumably decreasing the accessibility of cultural stereotypes.

Chapter 5. STUDY 1 OVERVIEW:

COUNTERSTEREOTYPIC EXEMPLARS IN ADVERTISEMENTS

Study 1 was designed as an intervention to reduce stereotyping and bias in relinquishing power decisions via the priming of counterstereotypic exemplars. In Study 1, after completing a round of the capture the flag task used in the pilot study (see Chapter 3; Ratcliff et al., 2015) but before receiving feedback on their performance, participants were presented with an ad showing either a Black man in a business suit or a suit without any person present. Participants were tasked to evaluate the ad. In reality, the study was designed to examine whether the priming of a counterstereotypic exemplar (i.e., Black man in a business suit) reduced race-based biases in relinquishing power decisions.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 133 undergraduates of The Pennsylvania State University (27 men, 106 women, M_{Age} = 18.77, self-reported ethnicity: 93 White, 4 Black, 22 Asian, 7 Hispanic, 7 Undefined). Study 1 employed an Ad Type (Control vs. Counterstereotypic) × Co-Worker Race (White vs. Black) mixed experimental design. Ad Type was manipulated as a between-participants variable and Co-Worker Race as a within-participants variable. Given the small to medium magnitude of effects observed in the Pilot Study, for Studies 1-3, a sample size of 35 participants per cell was used.

Procedure and materials. The procedure for Study 1 was the same as the pilot study (see Chapter 3; Ratcliff et al., 2015), with one exception. An advertisement evaluation task was added after participants made capture-the-flag decisions and before they learned of their performance on the capture-the-flag task. The advertisement evaluation task was framed as an unrelated study in collaboration with faculty in the marketing department. Participants were told

that marketing researchers are interested in testing the effectiveness and potential consumer buying behavior based on wording and imagery used in ads. Moreover, participants would have a print advertisement selected (at random) to evaluate and provide feedback based on their impressions of the ad. Following these instructions, participants viewed a screen that presumably selected the topic of their ad to review at random. However, for all participants, the "Executive Suit Ad" option was chosen.

During the executive suit ad evaluation, participants were randomly assigned to see one of two ads. In the *Control Suit Ad Condition*, participants were shown an ad that featured a suit displayed on a headless mannequin. In addition to the pictured suit, text within the ad stated "For those looking for a suit that exudes strong leadership, worn by many top executives in the Fortune 500 and by popular leaders around the world", "Looking to make a statement? This suit lets others know that the wearer is capable and ready to achieve", and an endorsement by a CEO stating that "In this suit, I feel I can handle anything thrown my way" (see left panel Figure 3). In the *Counterstereotypic Ad Condition*, the ad was exactly the same as the control condition with the exception that the suit was being modeled by a Black male target (see right panel Figure 3).

After reviewing the ad, participants were asked four questions regarding their impressions of the ad. Using a five-point Likert scale (1 = *Strongly disagree*; 5 = *Strongly agree*), participants answered the following questions: 1) the ad I saw was effective at sparking my interest, 2) the ad I saw was visually appealing, 3) the ad I saw was unique, and 4) I would be likely to buy a suit from a company using the ad I saw. Following the ad evaluation questions, participants were all given poor performance feedback on their capture-the-flag task decisions and then asked to indicate how much power they would give to each of their White and Black co-workers (see Appendix D).

Figure 3. Ad stimuli used in Study 1. Control ad in the left panel and counterstereotypic ad in right panel.



Results

Ad evaluation. Ad evaluation questions were submitted to independent-samples *t*-tests to determine if the two ad conditions differed on any of these evaluative questions. Results of these analyses revealed that no significant differences were found for any of the ad questions (all *p*s > .163).

Relinquishing power. Relinquishing power variables were submitted to an Ad Type (Control vs. Counterstereotypic) × Co-Worker Race (White vs. Black) mixed-model ANOVA. This analysis only revealed a marginal main effect of co-worker race, $F(1, 131) = 2.78$, $p = .098$, $\eta_p^2 = .021$, 95% CI = [-0.013, 0.148]; across conditions, participants were more likely to give power to White co-workers ($M = 2.88$, $SD = 0.97$) than Black co-workers ($M = 2.81$, $SD = 0.99$). No other effects, including the predicted interaction, approached significance (*p*s > .517; see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Results from counterstereotypic ad study (Study 1). Error bars represent a 95% CI.



Discussion

In Study 1, it was predicted that the priming of a counterstereotypic exemplar would reduce racial bias toward Black men in relinquishing power decisions. The results of Study 1 replicated the pilot study (see Chapter 3; Ratcliff et al., 2015); across conditions, more power was relinquished to White co-workers than Black co-workers (see Prediction 3a). Therefore, Study 1 replicates previous studies showing group-based biases in relinquishing power decisions. However, failing to support Prediction 5a, the priming of a counterstereotypic exemplar in an ad (suit-wearing Black man) did not seem to influence the degree to which leaders gave power to White versus Black co-workers.

It is unclear why a counterstereotypic exemplar (vs. control) did not moderate the results in Study 1, but there may be a couple possible explanations for this null finding. First, perhaps having a counterstereotypic ad with a Black man in a suit was not a powerful enough exemplar

to affect relinquishing power decisions. In the context of the ad, perhaps participants merely regarded the target as a Black man modeling a suit and not a true counterstereotypic exemplar of a Black leader. If the Black man in the ad was labeled as Fortune 500 CEO or government leader, then perhaps this would make the Black man more associated with leadership which could have a greater bearing on the relinquishing power decisions that followed. Second, having participants generate their own counterstereotype by asking them to think of a strong Black leader (cf. Blair et al., 2001) could be a more powerful way to make the counterstereotype more accessible and applicable in relinquishing power decisions concerning White and Black co-workers. It is possible that a self-generated exemplar might be more influential to participants than one that is provided to them.

Chapter 6. STUDY 2 OVERVIEW:

COUNTERSTEREOTYPIC LEADERSHIP TASK FRAMING

Study 2 was designed as an intervention to reduce race-based bias in relinquishing power decisions via the framing of leadership tasks in a counterstereotypic manner. In previous work, researchers have found that the way a task is framed can affect how stereotypes are applied in actual behaviors (e.g., Stone et al., 1999). For example, Stone and colleagues (1999) found in a study of stereotype threat that when a golf putting task was framed as a sports intelligence task (i.e., those with a high degree of sports intelligence typically do well), White participants outperformed Black participants. In contrast, when the golf putting task was framed as a natural athletic ability task (i.e., those with a high degree of natural athletic ability typically do well), Black participants outperformed White participants. Therefore, there is evidence that the way in which a task is stereotypically framed can influence behaviors within the task. Moreover, in Study 2, the online capture-the-flag strategy task was framed as either being stereotypically White (i.e., sports intelligence) or counterstereotypically White/stereotypically Black (i.e., natural athletic ability) with the prediction that a counterstereotypic framing of the leadership task would reduce the degree of race-based biases in relinquishing power decisions.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 133 undergraduates of The Pennsylvania State University (15 men, 118 women, M_{Age} = 18.65, self-reported ethnicity: 119 White, 14 Black).[4] Study 2 employed a Task Frame (Sports Intelligence vs. Natural Athletic Ability) × Co-

[4] An initial analysis of the data revealed a 3-way interaction with participant race (F = 4.18, p = .003, η_p^2 = .10). Accordingly, only White and Black participants were used in analyses due to the stereotypic nature of the manipulation, tailored for stereotypic White and Black frames. Thus, 35 participants were excluded from primary analyses (22 Asian, 7 Hispanic, and 6 other).

Worker Race (White vs. Black) mixed experimental design. Task Frame was manipulated as a between-participants variable and Co-Worker Race as a within-participants variable.

Procedure and materials. The procedure for Study 2 was exactly the same as the pilot study (see Chapter 3; Ratcliff et al., 2015) except for the instructions that framed the capture-the-flag task just before participants began the task (cf. Stone et al., 1999). In the *Sports Intelligence Condition*, participants were told that the capture-the-flag task was designed to measure personal factors correlated with sports intelligence and those who do well on the task seem to possess a high degree of sports intelligence. Sports intelligence was defined as "one's ability to think strategically during complex tasks that requires critical thinking, such as insight, problem solving, intuitiveness or the implementation of ideas." By contrast, in the *Natural Athletic Ability Condition*, participants were told that the capture-the-flag task was designed to measure personal factors correlated with natural athletic ability and those who do well on the task seem to possess a high degree of natural athletic ability. Natural athletic ability was defined as "one's natural ability to perform complex tasks that requires hand-eye coordination, such as shooting, throwing, or hitting a ball or other moving objects."

The capture-the-flag task was modified with the addition of six reaction time responses to give some credibility that athleticism could be a component to the task in addition to the strategic decision options (e.g., flag placement, attack routes). For example, these reaction time responses included decisions where participants had to press a button quickly to line up two moving shapes, set a meter to be a highly desired value, or overlap a shifting cone on the right area of the screen. Taken together, these reaction time responses were presumably supposed to set different attributes to the attackers and defenders in the capture-the-flag simulation (e.g., speed, agility, visual acuity, tagging ability, alertness).

After completing the capture-the-flag task, all participants received poor performance feedback and were asked to indicate how much power they would relinquish to their White male and Black male co-workers. Lastly, participants answered a few questions regarding how well they thought someone with a high degree of sports intelligence and natural athletic ability would perform on the capture-the-flag task (1 = *Not very well*; 5 = *Very well*) and as a manipulation recall check, were asked to indicate whether those with sports intelligence or natural athletic ability were cited in the instructions as being able to do well on the capture-the-flag task.

Results

Framing beliefs. Framing belief questions were submitted to independent-samples *t*-tests to determine if the two framing conditions differed on beliefs about who would perform better on the capture-the-flag task (i.e., people with a high degree of sports intelligence or natural athletic ability). Results of these analyses revealed that more people believed that individuals with natural athletic ability would perform better on the capture-the-flag task when the task was framed as a natural athletic ability task (M = 3.69, SD = 0.92) versus a sports intelligence task (M = 3.29, SD = 0.97), $t(131) = 2.44$, p =.016, d = 0.425, 95% CI [0.076, 0.726]. By contrast, more people believed that individuals with sports intelligence would perform better on the capture-the-flag task when the task was framed as a sports intelligence task (M = 4.32, SD = 0.82) versus a natural athletic ability task (M = 4.05, SD = 0.87), $t(131) = 1.81$, p =.073, d = 0.316, 95% CI [-0.026, 0.561].

Relinquishing power. Relinquishing power variables were submitted to a Task Frame (Sports Intelligence vs. Natural Athletic Ability) × Co-Worker Race (White vs. Black) mixed-model ANOVA. This analysis revealed two significant effects. First, there was a marginal effect of co-worker race $F(1, 131) = 2.90$, p = .091, η_p^2 = .022, 95% CI = [-0.012, 0.161]; across

conditions, participants were more likely to give power to White co-workers (*M* = 2.98, *SD* = 0.83) than Black co-workers (*M* = 2.90, *SD* = 0.99). Second, as predicted, task frame and co-worker race interacted, $F(1, 131) = 4.69$, $p = .032$, $\eta_p^2 = .035$ (see Figure 5). Simple effects tests were performed to examine the magnitude of the race effect within level of task frame. In the sports intelligence condition, more power was relinquished to White co-workers (*M* = 3.09, *SD* = 0.82) than Black co-workers (*M* = 2.87, *SD* = 0.98), $F(1, 131) = 6.72$, , $p = .011$, $\eta_p^2 = .049$, 95% CI = [0.040, 0.299]. In contrast, in the natural athletic ability condition, there were no differences in the amount of power relinquished to White (*M* = 2.89, *SD* = 0.83) or Black co-workers (*M* = 2.92, *SD* = 1.00), $F = 0.12$, $p = .729$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$, 95% CI [-0.136, 0.095]. No other effects reached significance.

Figure 5. Results from counterstereotypic task framing study (Study 2). Error bars represent a 95% CI.



Discussion

In Study 2, it was predicted that framing the leadership task in a counterstereotypic manner would reduce racial bias toward Black men in relinquishing power decisions. The results of Study 2 replicated and extended the findings of the pilot study (see Chapter 3; Ratcliff et al., 2015); the findings of Study 2 show that when the leadership was framed as a stereotypically White, sports intelligence task, participants were more likely to relinquish power to White co-workers compared to Black co-workers, supporting Prediction 3a. Importantly, and consistent with Prediction 5a, relinquishing power differences between White and Black co-workers were eliminated when the task was framed as a counterstereotypically White, natural athletic ability task. In other words, race-based biases were eliminated when leadership tasks are framed as counterstereotypically White/stereotypically Black.

Together, the findings in Study 2 suggest that the way in which leadership is framed can influence the likelihood that biases in relinquishing power decisions are made. Moreover, the way in which leadership and leadership duties are discussed and framed may be an area in which groups and organizations can reduce the chances of group-based biases. To potentially limit stereotype-consistent biases in leadership, perhaps organizations should use language that is more stereotype-neutral when discussing the tasks and abilities necessary for leadership roles (e.g., driven, sociable) instead of using more traditional descriptions of leadership (e.g., smart, agentic).

Chapter 7. STUDY 3 OVERVIEW: SELF-FOCUSED PERSPECTIVE-TAKING AND OTHER-FOCUSED PERSPECTIVE-TAKING

Study 3's intervention design had people perspective-take with a Black target via either self-focused perspective-taking (e.g., placing one's self in another's shoes) or other-focused perspective-taking (e.g., focus on understanding of plight and circumstances). The aim of this study was to see if perspective-taking with a member of a stereotyped group would reduce race-based bias in relinquishing power decisions. Furthermore, Study 3 was designed so that the potential unique effects of varying types of perspective-taking (self-focused vs. other-focused) could be parsed out in a single study design. Specifically, a self-focused perspective-taking task was used to increase perceived self-similarity with Black targets (cf. Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) as well as a task that induced other-focused perspective-taking task meant to arouse empathy with Black targets (cf. Batson et al., 1997b), both of which were designed to reduce race-based biases in relinquishing power decisions.

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 166 participants who were undergraduates of The Pennsylvania State University (24 men, 142 women, $M_{\text{Age}} = 18.41$, self-reported ethnicity: 118 White, 7 Black, 29 Asian, 4 Hispanic, 8 Undefined). Study 3 employed a Perspective-Taking (Control vs. Self-Focused vs. Other-Focused) × Co-Worker Race (White vs. Black) mixed experimental design. Perspective-Taking was manipulated as a between-participants variable and Co-Worker Race as a within-participants variable.

Procedure and materials. The procedure for Study 3 was similar to Study 1, in that after the capture-the-flag task participants were told that they would be completing an unrelated study while waiting on their results. This unrelated study was framed as a collaborative study with

faculty in the communications department looking at language processing. Specifically, researchers were interested in people's abilities to construct life-event details from visual information alone. Participants were told that they would be shown a photograph (selected at random from a pool of photos) and be asked to write a short narrative essay based on the scene depicted. Following these instructions, participants viewed a screen that presumably selected the photo to review at random. However, for all participants, the "Man on Bench" option was chosen.

During the language processing task, all participants were shown a black and white photograph of a Black man sitting on a bench (see Figure 6) and were randomly assigned to one of three instruction conditions. All participants were told to "please spend the next few minutes to write a short narrative essay about a typical day in the life of the individual pictured below." In the *Control Condition*, no further instructions were given. In the *Self-Focused Perspective-Taking Condition*, participants were also told to "please adopt the perspective of the individual in the photograph and imagine a day in the life of this individual as if you were that person, looking at the world through their eyes and walking through the world in their shoes." In the *Other-Focused Perspective-Taking Condition*, participants were told to "please adopt the perspective of the individual in the photograph and imagine how the individual pictured feels about their life, things that have happened, and how it has affected them. Try to feel the full impact of what this individual has been through and how they feel as a result."

Figure 6. Man on bench stimuli used for perspective-taking task (Study 3)

Following instructions, participants spent about five minutes typing their narrative essays. Once finished, participants indicated how close they felt to the person they just wrote about (choosing from seven increasingly concentric circles) using an inclusion of other in self scale to measure cognitive self-other overlap (cf. Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; see Figure 7). Also, to measure empathy (cf. Batson, 1991), participants were asked how much they experienced the following emotions during the task with six empathy adjectives (i.e., “Sympathetic”, “Compassionate”, “Soft-Hearted”, “Warm”, “Tender”, and “Moved”) using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = *Not at all*; 7 = *Extremely*).

Lastly, all participants received poor performance feedback and were asked to indicate how much power they would relinquish to their White and Black co-workers.

Figure 7. Self-other overlap with perspective-taking target measure (from Aron et al., 1992).



Results

Dependent variables (relinquishing power, empathy, and self-other overlap) were submitted to separate Perspective-Taking (Control vs. Self-Focused vs. Other-Focused) × Co-Worker Race (White vs. Black) mixed-model ANOVA. The only significant effect to emerge from these analyses was a significant main effect of co-worker race on relinquishing power, $F(1, 163) = 4.00$, $p = .047$, $\eta_p^2 = .024$, 95% CI = [0.001, 0.147]; across conditions, participants were more likely to give power to White co-workers ($M = 2.99$, $SD = 0.96$) than Black co-workers ($M = 2.91$, $SD = 1.00$). Although the predicted interaction between perspective-taking and co-worker race did not reach significance on relinquishing power, $F = 1.28$, $p = .282$, simple effects tests revealed some effects that are consistent with predictions (see Figure 8). In the control condition, White co-workers ($M = 3.06$, $SD = 0.93$) were marginally more likely to be given power than Black co-workers ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 0.98$), $F(1, 163) = 2.75$, $p = .099$, $\eta_p^2 = .017$, 95% CI = [-0.020, 0.227]. In the self-focused perspective-taking condition, White co-workers ($M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.01$) were more likely to be given power than Black co-workers ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 1.07$), $F(1, 163) = 3.95$, $p = .048$, $\eta_p^2 = .024$, 95% CI = [0.001, 0.254]. By contrast, in the other-focused perspective-taking condition, there were no differences in power relinquished to White (M =

2.80, *SD* = 0.93) and Black (*M* = 2.81, *SD* = 0.96) co-workers, *F* = 0.02, *p* = .885, η_p^2 = .000, 95% CI = [-0.138, 0.119]. No other effects reached significance.[5]

Figure 8. Results of perspective-taking study (Study 3). Error bars represent a 95% CI.



Discussion

In Study 3, it was predicted that perspective-taking with a negatively-stereotyped individual (i.e., a Black man) would reduce racial bias toward Black men in relinquishing power decisions. The results of Study 3 brought mixed conclusions. On the one hand, supporting Prediction 3a, power was more likely to be given to White co-workers versus Black co-workers overall and in the control condition, replicating the pilot results (see Chapter 3; Ratcliff et al.,

[5] A follow-up study (*N* = 220) was conducted using the exact same procedure as Study 3 with one exception. In this study, a traditional control was used; participants did not view a picture of a Black man or write about it narratively in the control condition. Thus, after completing capture-the-flag decisions, participants received poor performance feedback and made relinquishing power decisions with each of their co-workers. Furthermore, the results of this follow up study did not reveal any significant results regarding perspective-taking or co-worker race, *F*s < 1.51, *p*s > .220.

2015). In addition, Prediction 7a was supported in the other-focused perspective-taking condition; no differences were observed in preferences to give power to White and Black co-workers. By contrast, however, Prediction 6a was not supported in the self-focused perspective-taking condition; power was more likely to be given to White co-workers versus Black co-workers. Taken together, this suggests that other-focused, or empathy based, perspective-taking might be effective at reducing race-based biases in relinquishing power decisions. Nonetheless, it is difficult to draw meaningful inferences from these simple effects given the overall interaction between conditions did not reach statistical significance.

There may be several explanations for the inconclusive findings in Study 3. First, given the small effect sizes for relinquishing power biases, it may be difficult to observe interactive effects. Larger sample sizes may help increase the sensitivity for detecting small effects and any possible attenuation in comparison conditions. In addition, perhaps the perspective-taking was too unrelated for it to have a strong bearing on the leadership scenario the participants were in. It may be possible that perspective-taking with a fictionalized target would not engender an experience that is potent enough to spillover into actual relinquishing power decision behaviors. However, if the perspective-taking of leaders was directed in a more situationally relevant way (e.g., considering a bio about a current Black co-worker), then perhaps this would be an experience that is more powerful at reducing stereotypes associated with the targets one is actively perspective-taking with and considering giving power.

Chapter 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION

Aims and Findings

The aim of the current work was to assess the effectiveness of interventions designed to ameliorate racial biases in relinquishing power decisions that have been documented in pilot work (see Chapter 3; Ratcliff et al., 2015). Specifically, three studies were conducted to test whether counterstereotypic ads (Study 1), counterstereotypic task framing (Study 2), or perspective-taking (Study 3) would reduce the biased preference for White co-workers over Black co-workers in relinquishing power decisions.

Across studies, the results of only Study 2 offered conclusive evidence for an elimination of race-based relinquishing power biases. In Study 2, as predicted, the way in which the leadership task was framed (i.e., sports intelligence vs. natural athletic ability) influenced the degree to which leaders relinquished power to White and Black co-workers. When the leadership task was framed as intelligence-based, findings replicated prior work showing that more power was relinquished to White co-workers than Black co-workers (see Chapter 3; Ratcliff et al., 2015). In contrast, when the leadership task was framed as athletic-based, the race-based relinquishing power bias was eliminated—no differences were observed in the amount of power given to White co-workers compared to Black co-workers.

The task framing findings of Study 2 allow for two important inferences to be made about biases related to whom power is relinquished. First, these findings suggest that preferences for prototypic leaders (e.g., White men) are malleable in relinquishing power decisions. For leaders, cultural stereotypes related to leadership ability might not be applied when task information is not relevant or runs counter to group-based stereotypes. Thus, when confronted with counterstereotypic information, stereotypes may become weakened or not be perceived as a

useful consideration in decisions regarding leadership candidates. Second, these findings suggest that the way in which leadership tasks or duties are framed can influence who is given power. The language and terminology used to describe leadership seems to affect leaders' preferences for leadership. Specifically, when leadership is counterstereotypically framed, leaders do not seem to show stereotypic preferences regarding to whom they are willing to relinquish power. Of importance for organizations, this finding may suggest that the language surrounding leadership (roles, duties, tasks, goals) should be framed in a stereotype-neutral manner that does not unfairly diminish the candidacy of certain social groups from being considered for leadership positions.

Despite a general preference for relinquishing power to White (vs. Black) co-workers found in Studies 1 and 3, which replicated pilot findings, the interventions in these three studies did not produce a reliable reduction of race-based biases. For these two studies, there are some plausible explanations for null findings.

First, it could be the case that the counterstereotypic information about Blacks was not strong enough to override pervasive cultural stereotypes about Blacks in leadership positions. For example, in Study 1, only a Black man in a suit was used to prime counterstereotypes about Black men in leadership and/or high-status positions. This priming strategy might have been more robust if a leader-related context was given to the Black man in the suit ad (e.g., saying the man was a CEO or manager explicitly, showing him being dominant or leader-like over co-workers, perhaps, specifically White co-workers).

Second, counterstereotypic priming might have been more powerful for participants if they were asked to generate their own counterstereotypic prime. Perhaps asking participants to imagine a competent Black leader they admire would have engendered a stronger exemplar for

participants to act upon when making relinquishing power decisions regarding Black co-workers. Similarly, in Study 3, asking participants to emphasize or perspective-take with a self-generated target or fellow co-worker in the study could have increased the impact of the intervention task.

Third, over the course of data collection for Study 3 and the follow-up study noted in the results of Study 3, there were high-profile media cases regarding race. These media cases chronicled the killing of unarmed Black men by White police officers. Thus, it is possible, that due to a history effect, collecting data on race-sensitive topics when race is salient in the social consciousness of participants could have impacted participants' willingness to show racial biases under all intervention conditions.

In addition, during this same time period, a fourth study (n = 139) was run using an alternative manipulation of framing (cf. Study 2). Specifically, the framing of the relinquishing power decisions was manipulated by having leaders adopt strength- or weakness-focused social influence strategies (see Vescio et al., 2003, 2005). In previous work, the degree to which leaders stereotype has been shown to depend on their social influence strategy (Vescio et al., 2003, 2005); leaders who adopt a weakness-focused strategy tend to focus on how subordinates may thwart or imped goal attainment while those who adopt a strength-focused strategy focus on subordinate attributes that may enhance goal striving. Taken together, leaders who adopted a strength-focused (vs. weakness-focused) social influence strategy were less likely to stereotype when choosing subordinates for valued tasks (Vescio et al., 2003, 2005). Therefore, in line with prior work, it was predicted that leaders who adopt a strength-focus (vs. weakness-focus) social influence strategy would be less likely to rely on cultural stereotypes and subsequently, show race-based relinquishing power biases. However, no significant effects emerged from analyses in

this study (all *p*s > .465). In fact, relinquishing power differences between White and Black co-workers that had been previously documented across four studies were not observed ($p = 1.00$).

Given this plausible history effect explanation, ongoing work examines gender biases in relinquishing power because gender might be a less socially sensitive social category for study. Moreover, current and future data collection will examine whether task framing effects (Study 2) and perspective-taking effects (Study 3) observed with co-worker race might also be observed with co-worker gender. First, framing the leadership task as stereotypically feminine (e.g., people who are high in emotional intelligence typically do well on this task) could prompt an attenuation of gender biases when contrasted with a stereotypically male frame (e.g., sports intelligence task), similar to the attenuation of racial biases observed in Study 2. Second, perspective-taking with a female target might also attenuate gender biases similar to the pattern found for racial biases in Study 3.

Limitations and Future Directions

As with any research there are limitations that could be addressed in future studies. Below I outline three methodological and/or theoretical areas of interest that could be improved or expanded upon in future research.

First, across studies, only stereotypical White and Black names were used to indicate the race of co-workers participants were leading. Moreover, this research does not directly address whether the access to more rich, individuating information about co-workers (e.g., via photographs, bios, or greater interpersonal communication) would influence the likelihood of race-based relinquishing power biases. Of importance, however, given spreading activation models of stereotypes (e.g., Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Lepore & Brown, 1997), it is expected that similar findings would emerge if race were manipulated via other means (e.g., racial

identification on job applications, photographs, confederates). In addition, future research should also investigate whether racial biases in the relinquishing of power persist when leaders have access to stereotype relevant and irrelevant individuating information about others. This concern is relevant given that prior work shows that stereotypes often exert their strongest effect in ambiguous situations where perceivers view others in the absence of interrelated interests, interactions, or power differentials (e.g., Biernat & Vescio, 2002). Yet, even in research examining interactions between people, findings indicate that powerful people often behave in ways that elicit evidence of stereotype confirmation from Blacks (e.g., Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Word et al., 1974); for instance, asking biased interview questions that extract evidence of stereotype confirmation (e.g., Vescio et al., 2003, Study 1). Thus, it is generally expected that racial biases in relinquishing power would continue to emerge in the presence of greater amounts of individuating information, but acknowledge that future research should examine when individuating information is relatively more or less influential.

Second, this dissertation research only investigates biases related to a specific underrepresented group (Black men) using a predominately homogenous participant population (undergraduate White women). Although the theoretical underpinnings of this research would predict that other underrepresented groups (e.g., Hispanic, poor, disabled) would also be less favored (vs. White men) in relinquishing power decisions, future work should investigate to see if these biases extend to other negatively-stereotyped groups. Likewise, future research should also more closely examine whether Black men and women show similar biases in relinquishing power decisions. While Ratcliff and colleagues (2015) provided evidence that women show biases against other women in relinquishing power decisions, it remains unclear if this stereotype-based preference occurs within other underrepresented groups.

Furthermore, future research should examine the interplay of multiple social identities as it pertains to relinquishing power decisions. From an intersectionality perspective (for a review, see Shields, 2008), group identities are not merely additive but unique combinations of identities. For example, individuals possessing multiple low-status social identities (e.g., Black women) might be regarded differently than individuals who possess only a single low-status identity (e.g., Black men, White and Asian women). For this question in particular, intersectionality research offers two competing possibilities. On the one hand, an individual with multiple low-status social identities (e.g., a Black woman) might not be considered a prototypical exemplar of any single identity (e.g., being Black or being a woman) and consequently, may escape from many of the negative outcomes that befall exemplars of either low-status identity (see *intersectional invisibility*: Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Sesko & Biernat, 2010). On the other hand, individuals with multiple low-status social identities might have a heightened disadvantage when considered for leadership since neither social identity is stereotypically congruent with leadership roles (see *double jeopardy*: Almquist, 1975; Settles, 2006). For instance, although Whites and men are perceived as typical leaders (vs. Blacks and women, respectively), neither a Black woman's race nor gender overlap considerably with what is expected in a 'typical' leader. Consequently, due to low congruency between these dual social identities and expectations for leadership, individuals with these dual identities might be less likely to be evaluated favorably in leadership roles. Likewise, Rosette and Livingston (2012) found that when evaluating leaders in the context of organizational failures, Black women were more likely to be evaluated negatively when compared to both Black men and White women, suggesting a double jeopardy situation for Black women. Taken together, future investigations looking at the intersectionality of social identities (e.g., race and gender) in relinquishing power decisions might examine whether

possessing a dual low-status identity buffers against relinquishing power bias or alternatively, increases its likelihood.

Third, future research should explore other potential intervention strategies that may mitigate group-based biases in relinquishing power decisions. Given the promising results of Study 2 looking at task framing, future work should examine other ways in which counterstereotypic framing of leadership may ameliorate biases. For instance, describing a leadership role/task as "requiring diverse thought and thinking outside-the-box which is typical of non-traditional leaders" may be another way to frame leadership that would reduce stereotyping and bias in relinquishing power decisions. In addition, other bias reduction techniques such as counterstereotypic training or highlighting leadership competency of underrepresented groups may reduce leadership bias. The use of counterstereotypic training has been well-documented to reduce the application of stereotypes (e.g., Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008; Hu et al., 2015; Kawakami et al., 2005, 2007). For example, Kawakami and colleagues (2007) found evidence that counterstereotypic training, associating counterstereotypic words with male and female photographs, eliminated a male (vs. female) preference for a supervisory role when compared to a no training control condition. Thus, having leaders engage in a series of counterstereotypic associations with a photograph of a Black target before making relinquishing power decisions may reduce the likelihood of race-based biases. Furthermore, highlighting the leadership competence of a Black co-worker might also be effective at reducing leadership biases. For instance, informing leaders that the next best co-worker on your team, who scored just below you on the leadership skills test, is a Black co-worker might increase perceptions of leadership ability of Black co-workers and the likelihood that they are relinquished power. Thus, taken together, future work should assess whether the

training of counterstereotypes or highlighting leadership competency of Blacks may reduce relinquishing power biases.

Broader Impacts and Building a Theoretical Model of Relinquishing Power

This work is important to our understanding of relinquishing power and the potential for this process to further perpetuate the status quo where stereotypically low-status groups are underrepresented in positions of power. By examining the context of relinquishing power behaviors, we are able to recognize that group-based biases also occur in this leadership context similarly to other domains of leadership acquisition (e.g., hiring and promotion contexts). Furthermore, this research adds to a developing model on relinquishing power behavior by considering additional situations (e.g., leadership task framing) and factors (e.g., characteristics of available recipients of power) that influence the relinquishing of power (see Figure 9).

The theoretical model for relinquishing power suggests that leaders will relinquish power when they perceive that it will forward the goals of the group to which they are striving. Accordingly, previous work has been consistent with this theoretical perspective (Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013; Ratcliff et al., 2015). For instance, prior work has provided evidence that leaders are likely to relinquish power when leadership performance is perceived to be unambiguously poor (see Assessment of Power Holder), when leaders are interdependently-focused (see Psychological Focus of Power Holder), and when performance is solely attributable to leaders (see Consideration of Assessment; Ratcliff & Vescio, 2013). Moreover, *when* and *by whom* power is relinquished is contingent on whether performance goals (performing poorly) or chronically accessible goals (being interdependently-focused) are related to forwarding the collective good of the group. In addition, in work examining *to whom* power is relinquished, findings suggest that leaders are likely to relinquish power to those who are believed to be

competent in leadership roles to forward the collective goals of the group (see Available Successors; Ratcliff et al., 2015). Specifically, power is given to those framed by cultural stereotypes as stereotypically competent (White men) versus incompetent (Black men, White women). As documented in the current research), however, counterstereotypic task framing can meaningfully influence whether or not leaders show preferences for White men (vs. Black men) in relinquishing power decisions (see Chapter 6, Study 2).

Figure 9. Working relinquishing power model.



Conclusion

In sum, studying the process of relinquishing power is important to our understanding of power and how it may be transferred in a willful manner when leaders are not living up to their obligation toward collective group goals or ideals. Of importance, the phenomenon of relinquishing power is an understudied topic in the field of social power. Although research has

investigated conditions in which power is conferred to subordinates in hiring and promotion contexts, these examinations preclude the possibility for the leader to give up power or share power in a way that subordinate becomes the leader's equal or superior. Thus, investigating when leaders are likely to step down or diminish their power (willingly) is a worthwhile endeavor to help our understanding of leadership in ways that prevent abuses of power and/or situations in which the group suffers from an ineffective leader. Clearly, "willingly" being a key point of emphasis due to the undesirable outcomes that befall groups when power must be taken back from leaders by more forceful means (e.g., uprisings, revolutions, assassinations). Hence, to avoid such outcomes, knowing the types of leaders and situations that signal leaders to relinquishing power is important to our boarder conceptual understanding of power and group dynamics.

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Appendix A

Leadership skills test (all studies):

1. I make others feel good to be around me.
2. I express with a few simple words what we could and should do.
3. I enable others to think about old problems in new ways.
4. I help others develop themselves.
5. I tell others what to do if they want to be rewarded for their work.
6. I am satisfied when others meet agreed-upon standards.
7. I am content to let others continue working in the same way as always.
8. Others have complete faith in me.
9. I provide appealing images about what we can do.
10. I provide others with new ways of looking at puzzling things.
11. I let others know how I think they are doing.
12. I provide recognition/rewards when others reach their goals.

Appendix B

Message received from co-workers (all studies):

The members of your group sent you the following messages:

Received from **Participant 21**: I'm Eric.

Received from **Participant 05**: My name is Lamar.

Received from **Participant 78**: Hey, I'm Matt.

Received from **Participant 14**: This is Tyronne.

Press the SPACEBAR to be given the option to reply back to your group.

Appendix C

Capture the flag task (all studies): 1) Choosing own team's flag location, 2) Choosing likely location of opposing team's flag, 3) Choosing attack routes for two attacking group members, and 4) Choosing defensive locations for two defending group members.



Appendix D

Example of relinquishing power decision option for a target co-worker (Pilot Study):

If this person [**Lamar**] was the alternative for leader what would you likely do?

1: Keep leadership position with full control within the group.

2: Keep leadership position but get feedback from this group member.

3: Choose this group member as a co-leader to assist in making decisions.

4: Give up leadership position within the group and choose new leader from other group members.

5: Give up leadership position within the group and allow this group member to be leader.

Press the NUMBER on the keyboard to make your response.

*Keep in mind, once you make your decision, it will be in effect throughout the rest of the game and if your group receives a prize, it may influence who chooses to allocate and receive different levels of the prize money.

Example of relinquishing power decision option for a target co-worker (Studies 1-3):

If [**Participant 21 "Eric"**] was the alternative for leader what would you do?

1: Keep leadership position with full control within the group.

2: Keep leadership position but get feedback from this group member.

3: Choose this group member as a co-leader to assist in making decisions.

4: Give up leadership position within the group and choose this group member to be a co-leader with another group member.

5: Give up leadership position within the group and allow this group member to be the sole leader.

Press the NUMBER on the keyboard to make your response.

*Keep in mind, once you make your decision, it will be in effect throughout the rest of the game and if your group receives a prize, it may influence who chooses to allocate and receive different levels of the prize money.

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