TIME AND CRITIQUE IN EARLY HEIDEGGER AND DELEUZE

A Dissertation in Philosophy

by

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Abstract

My dissertation is on the influence of Immanuel Kant's notions of finitude and critique on Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’s early works. Heidegger, Foucault and Deleuze, under Nietzsche’s influence, determine that finitude and the concept of critique must be reoriented such that it no longer takes traditional ethical and anthropological assumptions as its starting point. Indeed, this necessary reorientation is both Foucault and Deleuze’s interpretation of the well-known Nietzschean catch phrase “we must overcome man”. In this dissertation, I contend that Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze’s respective ontologies develop or harbor a concept of finitude purposed to furnish a path to a new type of critique, a type of thinking that leaves behind the anthropocentrism of our paradigm. For Heidegger, we must follow the central root of the faculties to their origin in the transcendental faculty of the imagination. It is here that we see the auto-affective emergence of the subject and its temporal horizons. For Foucault, we must maintain the separation between the transcendental and empirical realm and perform a critique of the subject such that it is no longer human, but a historically emerging a priori category. It is after we have let go of the traditional subject that we can finally say we have left the ‘Age of Anthropology’ thereby escaping the ‘Analytic of Finitude’. For Deleuze, whose ontology harbors rather than explicitly develops a concept of finitude, we must realign thought and being. It is after thought and being have been realigned that immanent critique can occur. Ideally such a critique, while occurring from within, is not a critique that reaffirms the self, but reaches what is deformed from the perspective of rational thought and brings what is without assumptions to the fore. Perhaps, then, Deleuze’s ontology – transcendental empiricism –
holds potential to escape the ‘Analytic of Finitude’ described by Foucault and deeply related to Heidegger’s own philosophical fears.

Importantly, various relevant socio-political consequences stem from such an interpretation. These philosophers are not merely concerned with taking up a vague Nietzschean project of overcoming man. What is at stake with moving past anthropology is all that accompanies the overcoming of anthropocentrism. Thus we can say that the overcoming of anthropocentrism is also about identifying the root of racism, sexism, homophobia and other abuses of power. To what kind of finitude has our paradigm been committed? Perhaps thinking finitude faithfully, such that we reach the origin and throw ethical, anthropological, social, and political assumptions aside, leads away from the abuse of power and toward genuinely new thought. While these social and political issues cannot be conflated - their differences obscured - the final merit of the project I will be working on will be to unify what Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze’s concept of critique may bring to discourses on these social political problems. In particular, this dissertation is meant to contribute to the newly developing area of Critical Philosophy of Race. It seems to me that the needs of Critical Philosophy of Race fundamentally stems from problems with traditional ethics and, therefore, call for ethical, anthropological, and socio-political reevaluations. My dissertation will tackle exactly how these philosophers mean to perform such reevaluations. Thus, while my dissertation is on the appropriation of the concept of critique in a “traditional” philosophical context, I intend to extend this research beyond the theoretical context to use my own work in building the methods of critique used to understand, discuss, and challenge race, racism and the effects of these concepts.
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Introduction: The Relevance of Kantian Critique

Statement of the Problem and its Relevance

This dissertation is on the influence of Immanuel Kant's developments regarding time and critique on Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze’s early works. The project was born out of Foucault’s explicit critiques of Kant in *Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology* as well as his *The Order of Things*. Heidegger, Foucault and Deleuze, under Nietzsche's influence, determine that time and the concept of critique must be reoriented such that it no longer takes traditional ethical and anthropological assumptions as its starting point. Indeed, this necessary reorientation is both Foucault and Deleuze's interpretation of the well-known Nietzschean catch phrase “we must overcome man”.

Focusing more closely, the dissertation investigates the concept of temporality and what Heideggerian and Deleuzean temporality can offer the concept of critique today. Insofar as the notion of critique is the cornerstone of any philosophy of truth, a thoroughly developed notion of critique has been one of the most important aspects of every philosopher's corpus, most notably, since Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Today, however, one must wonder whether the concept and act of critique has, in fact, “run out of steam.” Indeed, it seems the act of critiquing is often misused and abused. When the United States declares war on terrorism, when Islamic fundamentalists criticize Western values, when Christian fundamentalists criticize marriage equality and abortion, these critics attack with a suspicious specificity. In such cases critique is aimed at whatever target one wants. Put simply, critique often falls into the trap of serving the interests of the critic. It is this concern that Deleuze has at the heart of his reformulation

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of the concept of critique.

The goal of this dissertation is to interrogate the legacy of Kantian critique in one specific manner. It seems to me that Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Martin Heidegger, as influential interpreters of Kant, all emphasize the importance of Kant's focus on temporality to understand access to truth. It is due to Kant's critiques that Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze take time as their starting point in their respective projects. Moreover, each takes extreme care in the conception of finitude or temporality to which they devote their projects: fundamental ontology, the archaeology of truth, and transcendental empiricism respectively. This investigation of temporality, of course, ultimately aims at formulating the relationship between time and truth according to each Heidegger and Deleuze.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant attempted to confront the problem of the infinite. That is, Kant attempted to secure and stabilize a foundation for truth without recourse to the concept of God. As is well known, Kant's intention was to piece together a path that led neither to dogmatism nor to skepticism – both of which were confounded precisely due to the lack of grounding in an infinite God. Human finitude was interpreted by pre-Kantians as a deficit, a problem for philosophical certainty which could either never be 'overcome' (skepticism) or only be 'overcome' by verifying our representations with the idea of the infinite (dogmatism). The essence of Kant's response to this dilemma is to give power to finitude. He gives the transcendental subject, transcendental finitude, the power to be the source of representations and, therefore, to no longer need divine verification to establish truth. Certainty need not come from what is external to

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\[\text{Footnote}^{2}\]For the remainder of this work, I will refer to the type of finitude that we find in Kant as transcendental finitude. While not all of them dub this concept thusly, each Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze recognize the value of Kant's movement of finitude into the transcendental realm.
transcendental finitude. Hence reason itself, armed in the right ways, has the power to verify itself. However, according to Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze, Kant secretly gives into the infinite once again. He fails at his own project. Each, however, points to this failure at different levels within Kant's opus.

For Heidegger, Kant is simply not confident enough to take the finitude that he discovers to the limit. Due to this, Kant does not really have a faithful concept of finitude but rather appeases himself with the infinite almost immediately after he confronts the dilemma. In the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant distances himself from the insights he developed in the first edition. It is in the first edition that the transcendental faculty of the imagination shows to be the real path to a productive finitude. The transcendental power of the imagination is the site where past, present, and future are created. It is, therefore, the thread that holds together reason and intuition and allows for access to truth. According to Heidegger, though, Kant shrinks back from this insight because it cannot be aligned with the power that Kant bestows to reason alone. At this moment, reason takes the place of the infinite. This failure to follow the path of the power of finitude within the transcendental imagination to its fruition is the subject of my first chapter. I then intend to end this chapter by developing a concept of finitude from Heidegger's early works.

For Foucault, Kant's oscillation between the valorization of finitude and its hidden alliance with the infinite comes to light most clearly in Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Kant's *Critique* establishes transcendental finitude by setting limits on subjectivity so that he can secure objective knowledge. Transcendental finitude

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allows for the reception of intuition and the production of a representation using the categories of the understanding. That this finitude grounds knowledge is an important development in the *Critique* according to Foucault; but in the *Anthropology*, empirical conditions end up being inscribed in the transcendental and, subsequently, grounding knowledge. This development is the moment that the category of the originary is created. Within the category of the originary, the origin and the empirical continuously contaminate each other and thereby obscure an original ground to knowledge. Though Kant does not use the terminology, according to Foucault, he inaugurated the category of the originary. However, it is, rather, phenomenology and existentialism that actually take up and use this category explicitly. My fourth chapter will briefly explore Foucault's critique of Kant and phenomenology as well as develop Foucault's own concept of an a priori historical finitude.

For Deleuze, Kant oscillates by giving reason the responsibility of internal critique while truthfully giving reason, in the form of rational thought, infinite power over the performance of critique. Deleuze will maintain that Kantian critique should perform an immanent critique instead. It is an immanent critique which allows for the critique of reason by what is internal yet foreign to it. Reason, therefore, would remain finite and its truths no longer eternal. Deleuze's ontology of transcendental empiricism, I contend, is meant to give a blueprint for this type of critique, a critique which can think finitude faithfully. Thus, equally for Heidegger, Foucault and Deleuze, the importance of thinking finitude correctly centers upon this fact: if thought continues to rely on the infinite, then thought will neither get rid of the problem of the verification of truth by God nor answer to skepticism. Therefore, instead of relying on divine verification,
Heidegger, Foucault and Deleuze attempt to expose the mistake of allowing the human and human reason to take the place that God was given in pre-Kantian philosophy.

*The concept of critique between Kant and Deleuze:*

The reformulation of Kantian critique and its relationship to finitude is far from exclusive to these three philosophers. Indeed, Hegel and Nietzsche, for instance, develop their own form of critique. Hegel's dialectic, which will be discussed in passing, is interpreted by Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze as an attempt to overcome finitude through the resolution of finite contradictions. It is through sublation that finite truth is overcome to reach infinite truth. However, according to them, this type of critique still succumbs to a two world theory. It still robs finitude of its own truth and, subsequently, makes truth unattainable, or even oppressive and dangerous.

Nietzsche's response to Kantian critique, on the other hand, is to destroy the concept of truth altogether - or at least invert the traditional conception of it. Nietzsche, as we know, is deeply influential on Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze insofar as he challenges metaphysics by demanding a critique of hegemonic values such as religion, morality, and the category of the human. For Nietzsche, the infinite God and the concept of man go hand in hand. Man needed the concept to justify himself - not only his existence and his superiority, but his morality and his bottomless crusades. Thus Nietzsche poses a challenge to the philosopher: What is left of knowledge without God and man? Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze all take on this challenge with the hope that a concept of finitude can answer to skepticism without recourse to concepts that have filled the void of the infinite.
Why Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze?

By now, it should be clear why Heidegger and Deleuze have been chosen for the project of reconstructing the concept of critique in relation to a new notion of temporality. Besides the fact that each use Kantian critique as a means to funnel their own concept of time and form of critique, there is yet another fact that unites these thinkers and makes them most important to this project. These three philosophers are what many would call, 'thinkers of the event'. They are concerned with how to generate new thought, new ways of thinking. Each is dissatisfied, in some way, with the current path of thinking. And so, the construction of critique is meant to harness the capacity to rupture the current paradigm of thought and reveal another path to truth. It is a commitment to such a project that is behind any discontented soul in any field of thought.

Thus, what is the productive outcome of this dissertation? The hopes that I have for this dissertation have to do largely, though not entirely, with its ethical, social and political implications and therefore with how it can be appropriated. In particular, I would like to explore how this dissertation may be of use to the field of Critical Philosophy of Race. What kind of critical method would be most beneficial for it to adopt? For instance, how shall we critique the concept of race? What is this concept's past and what may be its future? What are its current uses and abuses? What kind of progress should it hope for from such a critique? These are some of the concerns I would like to take up in my conclusion and that I hope will make my dissertation into a productive contribution to philosophy.

Hermeneutical Finitude: Time, Truth and Critique

In chapter one, the intention is to look closely at Being and Time (1926), Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929/30). It is in these early writings that Heidegger directly focuses on Kantian philosophy. Heidegger also begins to develop his own concept of finitude in these texts. While finitude had previously been a matter of limitation in time and space, in these texts, finitude is more than just temporal and spatial limitation. No doubt, time and space, especially the development of temporal finitude, is integral to Heidegger's notion of finitude. But time, for Heidegger, is reconceived to express finitude differently than the conception from what he would call “the vulgar” conception of time. In Being and Time, Dasein is not an ahistorical subject with structures that are formed atemporally as in the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather, Dasein discovers itself thrown in the world, concerned with things presently at hand, and in the mode of projecting toward future projects. This means that what Dasein knows and is capable of knowing is structured by what Heidegger calls its 'historicity.' Dasein is within time, within history, in a very specific way. The truth that is accessible to Dasein is a historically structured one. It can be said, then, that Being and Time (and phenomenology in general) historicizes the subject.

In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger focuses more deeply on the manner in which finitude is temporalized and temporalizes. There, he claims that temporality provides access to truth. Thus, most significantly, Heidegger also thinks of temporality as fundamentally related to truth. It is in his reading of truth as aletheia that we see that temporality is an essential structure of truth. Hence, the first chapter both interrogates Heidegger's criticism of Kantian critique and develops the concept of hermeneutical finitude – a temporality that Heidegger believes produces an immediate

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4 Aletheia also continues to show the importance of time as an essential structure of finitude and therefore constantly in relation and influential to truth and interpretation.
relationship to truth – out of Heidegger's early writings. At once I will discuss
Heidegger's assessment of Kant's failure with regard to the relationship between time and
the subject and I will discuss his explanation of the relationship between being and
thought influenced by Kant. After carving out Heidegger’s reading of Kant, I will discuss
finitude as constitutive of time. In the last section, I will discuss its relationship to truth.
Hermeneutical finitude, I maintain, is parallel to Deleuzean Ideas in their relationship to
truth through a particular type of temporality.

Initiating the Reopening of the Question of Being

Heidegger does, in fact, applaud Kant for taking a step toward reopening the
question of Being (Heidegger's own project). Indeed, Kant, according to Heidegger,
recognized what had historically been neglected in metaphysical inquiry - the priority of
human finitude. Kant saw human finitude as fundamental to shaping our approach to
truth. Thus Heidegger, like Foucault, recognizes that it is Kant's movement to the realm
of the a priori that is his most significant achievement. We must shift our focus to
immanent structures of our being before we can say anything of the experience of an
object. But even more so, Heidegger sees that the essential significance of the a priori
marks the shift in inquiry back to the level of being, to what is primary in determining the
direction of that investigation. So, in historicizing the subject with the help of Kant,
Heidegger also attempts to bridge the traditional philosophical divide between being and
thought. I discuss Heidegger’s work on Kant’s explanation of why existence is not a
predicate in order to show how that influences his own conception of temporality and its
relationship to being and thought.
Heidegger's Reading of the Critique of Pure Reason

According to Heidegger, Kant inadvertently secures the power of the infinite instead of giving power to finite beings. Kant's mistake is that he places the power of pure spontaneity in the hands of the transcendental apperception, governed by Reason. Instead, Heidegger maintains that pure spontaneity can only be found in the transcendental power of the imagination. Pure spontaneity within Reason, for Kant, is a matter of mediation while pure spontaneity for Heidegger is a matter of immediacy through the temporalization of subjectivity.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant sets out to determine how human knowledge is synthesized through mediation. For Kant, objects in empirical reality conform to the finite structure of the mind's transcendental faculties. For instance, the transcendental faculty of understanding is supplied with a priori concepts. These a priori concepts allow objects to appear to the mind in conformity with those concepts. Due to this mediation, the mind can never know these object in and of themselves, but we must resign ourselves to trusting that the mediation that the faculties of pure understanding provide bestow a secure and knowable empirical reality.

While on the one hand, the faculty of pure understanding is given precedence in the *Critique*, at the same time, understanding needs intuition in order to yield reality. Therefore, Kant also discusses what makes the representation of intuitions possible. Kant claims that the pure forms of intuition, space and time, are the conditions for the possibility of the appearance of the manifold of intuition. In other words, embeddedness
in time is co-determinative of our experience. But, Kant grounds the possibility of these pure forms of intuition, as he calls them, in the unity of the mind, governed by the form of reason through the understanding. Therefore, it seems even the possibility of experience of a representation of an object is really just the understanding in disguise for Kant. In various sections of his A edition, however, Kant offers an ambiguous site where there is an outside to the understanding at play. It is these sections that provide the source for Heidegger own project in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

Heidegger’s concern is also the relationship of time to the subject. However, Heidegger argues that knowledge cannot come from the mediation occurring due to the understanding. Rather, the transcendental power of the imagination secures the only immediacy to which finite beings have access. The transcendental power of the imagination, then, is the foundation of the finite subject's knowledge. In my first chapter, I maintain that the transcendental power of imagination is responsible for the object = x as a horizon for the possibility of the image of objects in Kant. It is responsible for the moment that truth and time come into existence. I also maintain that Kant’s development, that existence is not a predicate provides a source for Heidegger’s fundamental synthesis of thought, time, and being. I draw parallels between Kant’s “Ontological Proofs for the Existence of God” and *Being and Time*. I conclude, therefore, that existence and temporality, as Kant describes them, are the source for Heidegger’s identification of the level of thought, being, and ontological temporalization as the site of critique that ground fields of knowledge.

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5 This temporal embeddedness goes along with embeddedness in space, but that will not be the focus here because Heidegger focuses solely on time.
Foucault's Archive: Problematizing Kantian Critique and the Phenomenological Method

In connecting Heidegger to Deleuze one should consider Foucault's critique of Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Foucault's critique of phenomenology, and his development of archaeological finitude. The archive is Foucault's concept of the origin in which there is neither any contamination by the empirical (his critique of Kant) nor any ahistorical forms for a subject of truth or for truth itself (his critique of phenomenology). As such, throughout this dissertation several Foucauldian developments are harboring in the background. These developments primarily concern his reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* alongside *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and *The Order of Things*. However, it is also in *The History of Madness, Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things*, and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* that he formulates his concept of the origin as a type of archive and contrasts it most clearly with the problematic notion of the origin that Foucault finds in phenomenology and existentialism.

Conflating the Transcendental and Empirical: Foucault's Critique of Kant

In *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, Foucault characterizes “the very structure of the Kantian problem” as a pondering of “how to think, analyze, justify, and ground finitude in a thinking which does not take the path of an ontology of the infinite and does not find its justification in a philosophy of the absolute”.\(^6\) Put another way, for Foucault the modern problem of identifying origins and the quest for a “veritable” critique stem from the Kantian dilemma that there can be no secure access or guarantee of truth.

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\(^6\) Michel Foucault. *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008), 142.
without claims to eternal universality. Kant proposes his Copernican revolution in order to secure the foundation of knowledge. Kant, it can be said, performs a critique of the object. He secures knowledge of the object by maintaining that the finite subject conditions the domain of knowledge using its own mental faculties.

According to Foucault Kant invents a new form of finitude – transcendental finitude.\(^7\) By this, Foucault means that Kant makes finitude, rather than representations, foundational at the transcendental level. For, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines the transcendental subject as *limited by* the necessary mediating structures that the subject brings to experience. Consequently, the transcendental subject determines the conditions of possible experience and, therefore, the field of knowledge. Thus finitude is transposed from being reliant on representation and correspondence between idea and object for truth.

Yet, what Foucault finds problematic in Kant's corpus is the transition that becomes evident in Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. In Kant's *Anthropology*, according to Foucault, Kant obscures his previous distinction between the transcendental subject and the empirical ego enforced in the first *Critique*. In the first *Critique* the transcendental subject is identified as the origin of knowledge. However, in the *Anthropology*, the origin of knowledge is contaminated. According to Foucault, in the *Anthropology*, Kant bestows the 'I' with both the “fundamental synthetic function” and “the simple status of an object.”\(^8\) In contaminating the transcendental with the empirical, Foucault maintains that Kant creates the category of the “originary”. This category orients the rest of post-Kantian philosophy and is an element of one of the deepest preoccupations of philosophy in the modern era.

Throughout this dissertation, the background focus is on Foucault's position that

\(^7\) Han, Beatrice. “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude” in *Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters*, eds. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 127.

\(^8\) Michel Foucault. *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008), 67
the modern problem of convoluted origins characterizes post-Kantian philosophy. The central concern is Foucault’s argument that this problem is foundational and must be overcome in order to move beyond the age of anthropology that Foucault characterizes in *The Order of Things*. The age of anthropology is a consequence of the confusion between the transcendental subject and the empirical ego. It seems, therefore, that the essence of this problem is that the transcendental subject is defined as man and that the empirical ego ends up surreptitiously retracing the foundational transcendental subject. This, in *The Order of Things*, Foucault dubs the ‘Analytic of Finitude’. I believe much of Deleuze’s early work is a reply to Foucault’s Kantian problematic. My chapters on Deleuze’s form of critique will both set up and be in direct reference to how Deleuze challenges the ‘Analytic of Finitude.’

*Foucault's Critique of Phenomenology*

For Foucault, one of the problems with phenomenology is that it still operates from the starting point of the Cartesian subject. Foucault, of course, thinks primarily of Husserl in this criticism. Yet, Foucault has a strangely ambivalent relationship to Heidegger. This section will discuss Foucault's critique of phenomenology without analyzing the complexities of Foucault's interpretation of Heidegger. Suffice it to say, some of these criticisms are considered relevant to Heidegger’s earliest works, at the very least.

According to Foucault, while the subject is 'historicized' in phenomenology, the subject still maintains an ahistorical form. It is true that phenomenology attempts to progress from Kant by historicizing a hitherto ahistorical subject. Yet, according to Foucault, finitude has not really been thought by historicizing the subject; historicizing the subject is not enough.
I don't believe the problem can be solved by historicizing the subject as posited by the phenomenologists, fabricating a subject that evolves through the course of history. One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.⁹

Even with an explicit rejection of the infinite in phenomenology, Foucault would say that phenomenologists cannot think finitude without slipping in the concept of infinity because they maintain the very concept of subjectivity and therefore silently maintain permanent, ahistorical structures of subjectivity. While Being, indeed all Being for phenomenologist is finite, the question as to whether man takes the place of the infinite as the answer to skepticism can still be posed. This is the problem encompassed by the category of the originary created by Kant and which is the very foundation of phenomenology. Thus it will be by means of the concept of the archive that Foucault purposes to get rid of the ontological form of the subject altogether. With this concept, Foucault takes up Kant's transcendental subject and makes the attempt to remove all traces of empirical and anthropological contamination. The archive, as an historical a priori, takes the place of the power of subjectivity.

_Foucauldian finitude: the Archive_

One of the most important developments Foucault makes is stripping away the permanence of the subject. It is the very assumption of the subject that will always include a “prototype” of the subject and, therefore, an ahistorical blueprint of subjectivity. With such an assumption, no radically new subjectivities are possible. Moreover, if transcendental or ontological finitude reinforces the current reality of empirical man, then

it is reinforcing the hierarchy of power. New positivities, however, disrupt hierarchies of power. Thus Foucault is concerned with powerlessness. This powerlessness should be understood in terms of a new unestablished, irrational form of power. Subjectivities, instead of the traditional subjects of truth, are now historically formed a priori fields of power. Foucault is no longer investigating finitude as constituent of the subject but he is investigating the historical emergence of fields of subjection or ways of knowing. Foucault, therefore, is pluralizing subjectivity in order to speak of historically emergent subjectivities.¹⁰ In this way, Foucault sees himself as thereby stripping subjectivity of its solely anthropocentric connotation.

It seems that at this point, the movement has been from Kant's ahistorical transcendental subject to Heidegger's historical subject, to Foucault's multiplicity of historically emergent subjectivities. Foucault's new way of referring to the origin and finitude now becomes the 'archive'. The archive is a historical a priori that arises due to forces of power rather than due to its creation by human subjects. Its truth, Foucault hopes, is finite while also not dependent on the concept of the human. Deleuze has a parallel but quite different response to interrogating origins, however.

**Deleuze's Assessment of the Kantian Failure and solution to the Analytic of Finitude**

Chapter two through four will discuss the major criticisms of Kant that Deleuze brings to the fore. Several of Deleuze's texts take Kantian philosophy as a central point of influence and contention and those will be the major focus here. In *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Deleuze gives his own thorough and faithful interpretation of Kant's critical project. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze becomes a faithful interpreter of Nietzsche and his criticism of Kantian critique. It is here that we see the beginning of Deleuze's own

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critique of Kant. But it is in *Difference and Repetition* that we see both his fully
developed critique of transcendental idealism and the major contribution that Kant has
made to Deleuze's thinking. There, it is the rupture that the faculties experience through
the senses that makes new thought possible. Chapter two investigates Deleuze’s critique
of Kant while the following chapter focuses on Deleuze’s Kantian inheritances. It is in
that final chapter that I discuss Deleuze’s own reformulation of Kantian critique, and
whether transcendental empiricism and Deleuze’s differential theory of the faculties
harbor a concept of finitude adequate enough to face the ‘Analytic of Finitude’. Facing
the ‘Analytic of Finitude’, I maintain, is a matter of temporality’s break with the
understanding and its access to the realm of Ideas.

*Deleuze's Philosophy of Difference & Transcendental Empiricism*

The intention here is to explore Deleuze's philosophy of difference from out of
*Difference and Repetition*. There, he critiques the history of philosophy for being a
philosophy of identity. It seems philosophy has degenerated into a repetition of the same
rather than a philosophy that can account for difference. It has remained faithful to the
repetition of form rather than attempted to reach the level of deformation. Due to the
philosophy of identity, we reach the ground, but not the foundation that is even more
immanent to what grounds rational thought. Thus, we get a repetition of the same. After
my section on the philosophy of difference, I will cover the ontology of transcendental
empiricism from which Deleuze’s differential theory of the faculties arises.

*The Differential Theory of the Faculties & Deleuze's Concept of the Finite?*

Again, my fundamental question is, specifically, whether transcendental
empiricism and the differential theory of the faculties is an adequate response to the
‘Analytic of Finitude’ and therefore, a reformulation of Kantian critique and the concept

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11 It is important to be aware that we are not only talking about what philosophy can account for but what it
creates and safeguards. Here, I think Deleuze intends one to almost immediately make the step toward the
political. If philosophy (and politics) is committed to identity rather than accounting for, creating, and
safeguarding difference, then it is on the side of the abuse of power.
of finitude. In these sections, then, I continue to discuss Deleuze's ontology of transcendental empiricism and the potential of a concept of finitude that it could endorse. What we should see is that, while both Foucault and Deleuze have different points of departure, they ultimately have similar goals with regard to finitude. That is, both Foucault and Deleuze seek a thought that is not fully determined by empirical values or anthropologically derived. Both are seeking to get out of a paradigm in which thought is enclosed and always already defined by the human – the ‘Analytic of Finitude’.

Therefore, though both Foucault and Deleuze differ in their assessment of the cause of the failure of the Kantian project, the consequences of the proper reestablishment of the Kantian project as they see fit, I propose, are the same. That is, to develop a concept of the finite that accounts for the event of new thought.

The most important sections of Difference and Repetition to bring Heidegger and Deleuze together as well as answer the Foucauldian question about the ‘Analytic of Finitude’ are chapters two and four. Because the answer hinges completely on the relationship of time to the subject, I will focus on how Deleuze breaks from a philosophy of individualism to a philosophy of individuation. In “Repetition for Itself,” Deleuze covers the relationship between the passive synthesis, active synthesis, and consciousness. These syntheses are responsible for the subject’s relationship to time but show the philosopher that the subject’s relationship to time is not her or his own. Indeed, time as the subject knows it is grounded in deeper levels of time, time that reveals the subject’s condition as split. Thus, while Deleuze inherits the relationship of the faculties from Kant, he also inherits what he sees as Kant’s development of the split subject. The spilt subject shows that Nietzschean Dionysian indviduation of forces are at the bottom of any access of truth. Truth, then, does not come from a self-cohering subject. And time’s role, while it does create a subject, stems further than the early Heideggerian

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12 In the case of Deleuze, human reason.
subject.

In the final chapter, I offer a reading of the importance of time in Deleuzean Ideas. Ideas stem beyond concepts, rational truth, and reach the kind of Dionysian truth reminiscent of Nietzsche’s *Birth of Tragedy*. Deleuze identifies the dramatization, a method to reach truth comparable to dialectics, of the Idea with dynamic spatio-temporal processes. These dynamic processes determine the actualization of Ideas because they are dramatized; they dramatize the Idea. They “create or trace a space [and time] corresponding to the differential relation and to the singularities to be actualized.”

Regarding spatio-temporal dynamisms, Deleuze refers again to Kant. These spatio-temporal determinations are synonymous to Kantian schemata, but with one important difference. For Kant, “a schema is indeed a rule of determination for time and of construction for space.” However, in Kant a schema only works in relation to concepts and the logical possibility of those concepts. Again, while the schema constructs space and time, Kant forces it to be determined by logical possibility, interpreted from the point of view of form, dismissed if it forms a contradiction. According to Deleuze, “this is so much part of its nature that it does no more than convert logical possibility into transcendental possibility. It brings spatio-temporal relations into correspondence with the logical relations of the concept.” In other words, Kant uses the schema to instantiate one guiding conceptual rule for the determination of time and the construction of space at the transcendental level. But at the same time, Deleuze notes that Kant describes the schema as residing external to the concept. Insofar as it lies external to the concept, how,

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14 This is one reason Deleuze will oppose Kant’s logic of conditions of possibility to a transcendental empiricism which seeks to account for genesis of real experience undetermined by logical possibility.
15 Ibid 218
Deleuze asks, is it that Kant ensures “its own harmony with the understanding without appeal to a miracle”? The answer is that the schematism possesses the power to “divide a concept and specify it according to a typology.” Without a schematism, concepts are incapable of specifying its point of view or dividing itself. With a schematism, spatio-temporal dynamisms can reveal difference and typology within a concept. Thus, for Deleuze we must make the Kantian schematism plural. Plural schematism would act as “agents of differenciation” which “are the spatio-temporal dynamisms which act within or beneath it, like a hidden art.” And it is with this pluralization of Kantian schemata that Deleuze removes their mediated association with concepts and rather determines their immediate and primary role as dynamisms - dramatizations of Ideas. In contact with the Idea, spatio-temporal dynamisms create new concepts for thought, they bring to life the differential relations and singularities of the Idea.

Deleuze explains:

For if the dynamism is external to concepts – and, as such, a schema – it is internal to Ideas – and, as such, a drama or dream. Species are divided into lineages, Linnaeons into Jordanons, concepts into types, but these divisions do not have the same criteria as the divided, they are not homogeneous with the divided, and they are established in a domain external to that of concepts but internal to that of the Ideas which preside over division itself. Dynamism thus comprises its own power of determining space and time, since it immediately incarnates the differential relations, the singularities and the progressivities immanent in the Idea. The shortest is not simply the schema of the concept of straight, but the dream, the drama or the dramatization of the Idea of a line insofar as it expresses the differenciation of the straight from the curved. We distinguish Ideas, concepts and dramas: the role of dramas is to specify concepts by incarnating the differential relations and singularities of an Idea.

I believe it is the pluralization of schematism that allow for Deleuze’s brand of multiplicity which may, in fact, escape the ‘Analytic of Finitude’ that retraces the

16 Ibid 218
17 Ibid 218
18 Ibid 218
19 Ibid 218 my emphasis
transcendental subject into the empirical subject – a kind of monadistic dualism.

Rewritten Critique for the Sake of What?

Revisiting Critique Today

Heidegger and Deleuze’s respective ontologies and Deleuze’s developments, influenced by Heidegger, develop a concept of time purposed to furnish a path to a new type of critique, a type of thinking that leaves behind the anthropocentrism of the current paradigm. For Heidegger, we must follow the central root of the faculties to their origin in the transcendental faculty of the imagination. It is here that we see the auto-affective emergence of the subject and its temporal horizons. For Foucault, we must maintain the separation between the transcendental and empirical realm and perform a critique of the subject such that it is no longer human, but a historically emerging a priori category. It is after we have let go of the traditional subject that we can finally say we have left the ‘Age of Anthropology’ thereby escaping the ‘Analytic of Finitude’. Deleuze, answering to Foucault, claims we must realign thought and being. It is after thought and being have been realigned that immanent critique can occur. Ideally such a critique, while occurring from within, is not a critique that reaffirms the self, but reaches what is deformed from the perspective of rational thought and brings what is without assumptions to the fore. Perhaps, then, Deleuze’s ontology – transcendental empiricism – holds potential to escape the ‘Analytic of Finitude’ described by Foucault and deeply related to Heidegger’s own philosophical fears.

Thus in the conclusion, various relevant socio-political consequences stem from such an interpretation. These philosophers are not merely concerned with taking up a vague Nietzschean project of overcoming man. What is at stake with moving past
anthropology is all that accompanies the overcoming of anthropocentrism. Thus we can say that the overcoming of anthropocentrism is also about identifying the root of racism, sexism, homophobia and other abuses of power. To what kind of time has our paradigm been committed? Perhaps thinking time differently, such that we reach the origin and throw ethical, anthropological, social, and political assumptions aside, leads away from the abuse of power and toward genuinely new thought. While these social and political issues cannot be conflated - their differences obscured - the final merit of the project I will be working on will be to unify what Heidegger and Deleuze’s concept of critique may bring to discourses on these social political problems. In particular, this dissertation is meant to contribute to the newly developing area of Critical Philosophy of Race. Thus, while my dissertation is on the appropriation of the concept of critique in a “traditional” philosophical context, I intend to extend this research beyond the theoretical context to use my own work in building the methods of critique used to understand, discuss, and challenge race, racism and the effects of these concepts.

Does this Research aid in Critical Philosophy of Race?

The final conclusion of this dissertation involves current research in the field of Critical Philosophy of Race and will seriously consider what this project may or may not have to offer the discourse. My first step in this section will be to discern what kinds of concepts of critique with which Critical Philosophy of Race has been working. Moreover, I will attempt to give some answers to my introductory questions. Again: what kind of critical method would be most beneficial for it to adopt? How shall we critique the concept of race? What is this concept’s past and what may be its future? What are its current uses and abuses? What kind of progress should it hope for from such a critique? Finally, with the answers to some of these questions, I can only hope I will have given a
thorough assessment of critique, finitude, and its capacity for academic as well as socio-political employment. I believe that Deleuze’s developments on time give us a better understanding of intersectionality.
Chapter One: Heideggarian Finitude

Introduction:

In Heidegger’s early writings *Being and Time* (1926), *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), and *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929/30) he develops a deep reading of Kantian philosophy. In these texts he also begins to set up the foundation of his own concept of finitude. While finitude had previously been a matter of limitation in time and space, in these texts, finitude is more than just temporal and spatial limitation. No doubt, time and space, especially the development of temporal finitude, is integral to Heidegger’s notion of finitude. But time, for Heidegger, is reconceived to express finitude differently than the conception from what he would call “the vulgar” conception of time. In *Being and Time*, Dasein is not an ahistorical subject with structures that are formed atemporally as in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Rather, Dasein discovers itself thrown in the world, concerned with things presently at hand, and in the mode of projecting toward future projects. This means that what Dasein knows and is capable of knowing is structured by what Heidegger calls its ‘historicity.’ Dasein is within time, within history, in a very specific way. The truth that is accessible to Dasein is a historically structured one. It can be said, then that *Being and Time* (and Heideggarian phenomenology in general) historicizes the subject.

In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger focuses more deeply on the manner in which finitude temporalizes and is temporalized. There, he claims that finitude provides access to truth. Thus, most significantly, Heidegger also thinks of finitude as fundamentally related to truth. It is in his reading of truth as alethia that we see that
finitude is an essential structure of truth. Hence, this chapter both interrogates Heidegger’s criticism of Kantian critique and develops the concept of finitude – a finitude that produces an immediate relationship to truth (through time and care/Besorge) – out of Heidegger’s early writings. First I will discuss Heidegger’s assessment of Kant’s failure and I will construct an early concept of finitude from his writings on time, metaphysics, and truth. After carving out Heidegger’s reading of Kant, I will discuss finitude as constitutive of time. In the last section, I will discuss its relationship to truth.

Heidegger does, in fact, applaud Kant for taking a step toward reopening the question of Being – Heidegger’s own project. Indeed, Kant, according to Heidegger, recognized what had historically been neglected in metaphysical inquiry – the priority of human finitude. Kant saw human finitude as fundamental to shaping our approach to truth. Thus Heidegger, like Foucault, recognizes that it is Kant’s movement to the realm of the a priori subject that is his most significant achievement. We must shift our focus to immanent structures of our being before we can say anything of the experience of an object. But even more so, Heidegger sees that the essential significance of the a priori marks the shift in inquiry back to the level of being, to what is primary in determining the direction of that investigation.

For Heidegger, however, Kant intends to give power to finite beings, but surreptitiously secures the power of the infinite. Heidegger maintains that this mistake would not have occurred if Kant had focused on the pure spontaneity that can only be found in the transcendental power of the imagination. It is in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that Kant sets out to determine how human knowledge is synthesized. What is significant

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20 Alethia also continues to show the importance of time as an essential structure of finitude and therefore time is always in relation and influential to truth and interpretation.
about this text is the role that mediation plays in structuring knowledge. For Kant, it is because of the finite structure of the mind’s transcendental faculties that empirical reality appears and is knowable in conformity with those concepts. The mind can never know these objects in and of themselves, but we must resign ourselves to trusting that the mediation that the faculties of pure understanding provide a secure and knowable empirical reality. Hence, to describe Kant’s first *Critique*, we can say something like: ‘transcendental idealism yields empirical realism.’

According to Beatrice Han, one can already see a similar (although perhaps not intentional) project to Foucault’s injunction to the Post-Kantian era in Heidegger’s early works. On the one hand, it is clear that Heidegger’s goal is to delimit a kind of human finitude at the same time as he refutes skepticism – the old Kantian project. But Han also insists that *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* focuses on an analysis of Being-in-the-world and shifts from the transcendental to the ontological perspective precisely in such a way that avoids the recurrence of the empirical within the transcendental. Han suggests that in order to “deal with Kant’s ambivalent legacy – the Copernican turn, but also the analytic of finitude – one must start from what Kant himself did not thematize, i.e. the link between existence and our understanding of Being.” This leads us directly to the sections in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that, I propose, influenced Heidegger’s concept of care.

There are three separate arguments in this chapter. First, I discuss how, due to the development that existence is not a predicate in The *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger

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21 Beatrice Han, “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude” in *Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters* ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003) 130-1.
22 Ibid 131
23 Ibid 131
is able to make the movement from transcendental philosophy to fundamental ontology. It is in the section “The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God,” that Kant exposes an ambiguous use of the phrase “existence in itself” and connects it to the concept of Being. This offers us some insight into where Kant was thinking radically about existence but did not formulate it thoroughly. Furthermore, one can identify this as a leaping point for Heidegger. Second, Heidegger interprets Kant’s object = x as the horizon that the transcendental power of the imagination produces. This is because the transcendental power of the imagination is formative of time, specifically the temporal horizon of the future, which is the condition for the possibility of existence as well as truth. It is a finite but formative power. Lastly, perhaps we may ask whether these developments allow Heideggarian finitude to escape the Kantian problem of empirical finitude tracing back into transcendental finitude.

**Existence is Not a Predicate But a Relation**

There are three insights that Heidegger commends Kant for revealing. First, Kant’s critical project creates the transcendental realm. Transcendental subjectivity is an original access point to the creation/formation of truth. For Kant, it is the point at which pure reason, in its spontaneous capacities meets its limitations. These are limitations that will determine transcendental subjectivity’s access to truth and, in Heideggarian terms, its mode of being. Thus Heidegger sees transcendental subjectivity as an attempt to describe a mode of being of Dasein, its most fundamental mode of being.

Heidegger’s own project, several scholars have noted, is largely an attempt to use the developments of transcendental philosophy but by transmuting them into fundamental
ontology correlates, thereby improving their flaws.\textsuperscript{24} An important flaw that Heidegger, while not as explicitly as Foucault, attempts to address is the repetition of empirical finitude within transcendental finitude. Thus the project of fundamental ontology is akin to that of transcendental philosophy in that it attempts to parse out two realms: the transcendental and empirical for transcendental philosophy and ontic and ontological for fundamental ontology. At the same time fundamental ontology tries to correct transcendental philosophy’s faults in three distinctive ways: thematize the link between existence and our understanding Being (which was lacking in Kant), avoid the recurrence of the empirical within the transcendental, correct the emphasis on reason as the source of spontaneity and the site of the creation of truth rather than the transcendental power of the imagination.

One of the ingenious and influential insights in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} is Kant’s establishment that existence, contrary to the belief of previous philosophers and logicians, is not a predicate. It is this point, I maintain, that Heidegger interprets such that he is able to make the move from transcendental philosophy to fundamental ontology. In order to illustrate this transition, this section gives a detailed analysis of Book II, Chapter III, Section 4: “The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God” of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} as well as passages from Book I, Chapter VI, Section 39 of \textit{Being and Time}.

Kant spends section 4 explaining the problem with ontological proofs for the existence of God. They all rely on the idea that existence is a predicate: “[the argument proceeds] ‘all reality’ includes existence; existence is therefore contained in the concept

of a thing that is possible. If, then, this thing is rejected, the internal possibility of the thing is rejected – which is self-contradictory” (A596-97; B624-25). The proof, on the surface level, seems to work because the proof posits the existence of God and explains the concept of God. This proof unifies the subject\textsuperscript{25} (God) and predicate (His concept) in one syllogism. For these logicians, all reality includes existence therefore existence is a predicate. If God includes all reality and therefore existence, then if the concept is rejected, then the entire reality of God is rejected. But Kant maintains that existence cannot be thought of in this manner. Existence, if we give it proper thought, does not operate like a predicate logically. Kant insists that existence is of a different order than the logical predicate. To prove this, Kant first makes a parallel argument. Kant distinguishes the two orders of existence and predicate with the geometrical definition of a triangle: “to posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles” (A595; B623). Additionally, “The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can then arise” (A595; B623). Here, the triangle is the subject of the syllogism and the predicate is the triangle’s three angles. The purpose of Kant’s example here is to illustrate how, in logic, the predicate \textit{belongs} to the subject; it is the subject’s aspect. Therefore, if we negate the predicate, this negation invalidates the subject and, as Kant says, contradiction arises. This predicate, in this situation, is a

\textsuperscript{25} Throughout the section, Kant also refers to the subject of the syllogism as the object. He will call it the subject in itself as well as the object in itself. I take this as further evidence that Kant is losing those distinctions here, himself, and that he is talking about a level of existence that is more fundamental than the logic he critiques. Moreover, he refers to the concept and the subject as two objects in relation to one another. Thus, consistent with Kant, in this section they’re places where I refer to the correlate of the predicate as a subject and sometimes I refer to it as an object.
definitive component of the subject, which, if extricated form the subject, no longer allows the subject logical consistency. In other words, without the predicate, the subject is no longer what it is. Its reality and concept do not match up. However, if the subject is rejected altogether, its existence as such, no contradiction arises because there is no existence of the subject or its predicates to derive contradiction. Existence, therefore, governs both subject and predicate.

Existence goes deeper, so to speak, than the predicate. In the case of the triangle, if the entirety – concept/predicate (angles), subject (triangle) and all – are rejected, no contradiction arises. This means that when existence itself is negated, no logical contradiction arises. Because a contradiction does not arise in its syllogism when existence is rejected, existence is not a predicate and existence does not conform to the rules of predicate logic. Kant explains his answer to the dilemma that this proposes:

There is already a contradiction in introducing the concept of existence-no matter under what title it may be disguised – into the concept of a thing which we profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility. If that be allowed as legitimate, a seeming victory has been won; but in actual fact nothing at all is said: the assertion is a mere tautology. We must ask: Is the proposition that this or that thing (which, whatever it may be, is allowed as possible) exists, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If it is analytic, the assertion of the existence of the thing adds nothing to the thought itself, or we have presupposed an existence as belonging to the realm of the possible, and have then, on the pretext, inferred its existence from its internal possibility – which is nothing but miserable tautology. The word ‘reality’, which in the concept of the thing sounds other than the word ‘existence’ in the concept of the predicate, is of no avail in meeting this objection. For if all positing (no matter what it may be that is posited) is entitled reality, the thing with all its predicates is already posited in the concept of the subject, and is assumed as actual, and in the predicate this merely repeated. But if, on the other hand, we admit, as every reasonable person must, that all existential propositions are synthetic, how can we profess to maintain that the predicate of existence cannot be rejected without contradiction? This is a feature which is found only in analytic propositions, and is indeed precisely what constitutes their analytic character (A597-98; B625-46, his emphasis).

Above, Kant exposes the pretenses of assuming that existence is a predicate. The
very act of smuggling “the concept of existence… into the concept of the thing which we
profess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility” results in a contradiction
(A597; B625). Existence does not equal possibility but the relation between existence and
possibility does have its own logic. They are not unrelated entirely. In other words, Kant
reveals that within such proofs for the existence of God, philosophers make an equivocal
leap from the logic of propositions at the level of possibility to the logic governing
existence. For instance, the concept, or predicate, of a thing expresses what is possible.
Therefore, the concept is of a thing that is possible. If “all reality” includes existence this
means that if I am thinking of the existence of a possible thing and this thing is rejected,
then, as Kant says, “the internal possibility of the thing is rejected” and this is self-
contradictory (A596-97; B624-25). But Kant asserts that this merely equivocates the
meaning of the word existence thereby turning the proposition into a tautology rather
than one that gives us new knowledge. To be specific, the problem is that this syllogism
assumes that all positing is equal. It assumes that the positing of possibility is the positing
of existence.

Thus, Kant maintains that “’Being’ is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is
not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely
the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves,” (A598;
B626). So, here we have Kant’s explanation of how existence operates in propositions.
Again, being is no predicate. Negated, there results no contradiction making the thing or
its aspects invalid. For a thing to exist is not for us to have the concept of the thing and
then to simply add in existence. Rather, ‘being’ is “deeper” than a predicate insofar as it
performs the activity of positing the thing or “certain determinations, as existing in
themselves,” (A598; B626). Predicates are merely an attachment, an aspect. They are, indeed, part of the definition of the thing, but they do not provide nor are they the fundamental support for the thing’s existence in itself. Being does not describe the subject. Perhaps we can even say, in Heideggarian terms, that being is the work of positing the horizon that brings the object into view. “Logically,” then Kant explains, “it [being] is merely the copula of a judgment…” (A598; B626).

The proposition, ‘God is omnipotent’, contains two concepts, each of which has its object – God and omnipotence. The small word ‘is’ adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. No new predicate is attached to the concept of God by the statement ‘God is’ or ‘There is a God’. For Kant such statements “only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept.” Furthermore, for Kant, “the content of both must be one and the same; nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by my thinking its object (through the expression ‘it is’) as given absolutely.” Otherwise stated, the real contains no more than the merely possible. The ‘is’ performs the positing of the subject in its being and as being in relation to a concept. In this positing, which expresses the deepest level of existence, the ‘is’ brings together two homogeneous things: the thing itself and the concept that my understanding has given it. The ‘is’, then, directs us to how the subject in itself is understood in its absolutism. Thus, here, Kant begins to bring existence and understanding together in a way that acknowledges finitude, my thinking of the thing, but attempts to reach beyond finitude. The concept and existence itself are brought into unity. Thus, even Kant links being and thought together in a precursor to the actual
thematization of the relation between being and thought that we see in both Heidegger and especially Deleuze.

We can see this from a different angle by focusing on what Kant says about the word ‘is’. What does it mean for being, existence, the “is” to be a copula of judgment? Kant explains with a proposition: “The proposition, ‘God is omnipotent,’ contains two concepts,” (A598; B626). On the one hand, there is the concept of God being posited, while on the other hand, there is the concept of omnipotence posited. Each of them, God and omnipotence are, at the same time as being concepts, each other’s objects as well. They are brought together, then, with the word “is”. “The small word ‘is’ adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject” (A599; B627). As “the copula of a judgment” the word ‘is’ brings the two concept-objects into relation with each other. The “is” is directional in this way; it tells us in what manner the concept-objects are connected to each other. It is this relationality that begins to tell us what existence is and does. The ‘is’ shows that existence has everything to do with a specific mode of being that is revealed in the concept-objects’ relationality. Existence, therefore, is not a thing, a predicate, an aspect, but reveals the way of being of the thing. As such a relation, the ‘is’ does not describe the thing in terms of what it is about, but how it is.26

Again, Kant explains: “If now we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is omnipotence), and say ‘God is,’ or ‘There is a God,’ we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept,” (A599; B627

26 At this point we can certainly begin to see how Heidegger made the move from fundamental ontology from this position. That being is relation is a fundamental point in phenomenology.
his emphasis). If instead of positing one predicate, we make a statement of just existence, it becomes even clearer how the ‘is’ operates. Kant maintains that in this case, the ‘is’ posits “the subject in itself with all its predicates,” which is to say, the ‘is’ posits an object in its relation to a concept. Thus the subject being posited in itself is the subject being posited as an object in its ownmost relation to a concept. The in itself position, therefore, is a relational position of object to concept to understanding of the thing. Kant explains that “the content of both [object and concept] must be one and the same; nothing can have been added to the concept which expresses merely what is possible, by my thinking,” its object (through the expression ‘it is’) as given absolutely” (A599; B627, my emphasis). This positing of existence shows that, at the level of existence, the subject in itself (object) and all of its predicates (concept) contain the same content. The content of both is identical at this level. Thus, at the level of the positing of existence, for Kant himself, the subject in itself and its predicates become a kind of whole, a totality made of two limits: an object and its concept. Furthermore, it must be emphasized, the concept is an expression of “what is possible.” It expresses the link between what is possible of the concept, my thinking of the concept’s object, and the object as it is given absolutely. Here we see Kant’s own, though barely thematized, connection between the understanding, the existence of the object, as well as the object’s possibilities. In other words, existence, the “it is” offers the level of which the understanding of the existence of the object intersects with “the object as given absolutely.” And it is at this level that the concept of the object expresses the possibilities of the very existence of the object.

At this point, hopefully, one begins to see the relationship between these

27 Transcendental
28 This will directly relate to my discussion of Heidegger and his concept of care – which concerns an understanding of being (Dasein’s thinking of being) below.
statements and the most significant passage of Being and Time. This is the kind of positing that characterizes Dasein’s fundamental existence. Dasein’s thrownness is homogeneous with its projection, its possibilities, but with one caveat. Dasein’s possibilities, it seems for Heidegger, make Dasein heterogeneous. That is, this activity allows Dasein’s possibilities to make Dasein heterogeneous. That is, this activity allows Dasein to posit itself anew, outside of itself, heterogeneously. Dasein can expand its horizon. Thus, the development that Kant makes, that the concept expresses what is possible within the object (if one is thinking the object as given absolutely through the “it is”) has its parallel in Heidegger’s analysis of the existential structure of care. Care is the essential existential which is ontological and not ontic. In section 4 of Being and Time, Heidegger explains:

Dasein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being. Thus it is constitutive of the being of Dasein to have, in its very being, a relation of being to this being. And this in turn means that Da-sein understands itself in its being in some way and with some explicitness. It is proper to this being that it be disclosed to itself with and through its being. Understanding of being is itself a determination of being of Da-sein.* The ontic distinction of Da-sein lies in the fact that it is ontological.29

The distinctiveness that we find in Dasein has to do precisely with its mode of being. While we can see the difference between Dasein and other beings in its ontic activities, the import of this difference lies in the fact that its fundamental relational structure is care, that is, “being concerned about its very being.”30 Dasein is concerned with existence and is in the position, definitively, to think through existence and its relation to Dasein’s ownmost existence. This is, in Kantian language, the fundamental concept of Dasein, that the “understanding of being is itself a determination of being of

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30 Ibid 10
Dasein,” indeed, Heidegger means to say that this is the fundamental determination of Dasein. And this is what makes Dasein ontological rather than solely ontic.\(^{31}\)

Dasein is in the perfect position to develop a concept of the relation of being to its being because that is its ontological designation, its transcendental concept. But it is through the particular function of care that Dasein is able to fulfill its ontological designation. The importance of care is not just that it is concerned with understanding being, but that the existential structure of care is held together by Dasein’s specific mode of temporality. In section 39 Heidegger writes, “Dasein has a mode of being in which it is brought before itself and it is disclosed to itself in its thrownness.”\(^{32}\) Again, Dasein’s particular mode of being allows its being and its relation to being to be disclosed to itself. “But thrownness is the mode of being of a being which always is itself its possibilities in such a way that it understands itself in them and from them (projects itself upon them).”\(^{33}\) Thus, another characterization, no less equal, of Dasein’s mode of being is the activity of temporalization. Dasein is a being which finds itself thrown and projects itself into the future. Being thrown, the temporal category of the past, Dasein is able to find an understanding of itself through thinking on its thrownness it is able to interpret its possibilities, understand itself in these possibilities, and then from this understanding project itself onto (or beyond) its own possibilities. A translation of this seems to resonate with exactly Kant’s explanation of existence. In other words, I maintain that one can draw this relation between Kant and Heidegger: the concept of the subject/object in itself is the same as the predicate-concept, which expresses what is possible of the subject/object,

\(^{31}\) Who knows if anything is solely ontic, however. And Heidegger never really answers these questions although it is safe to assume that he has certain prejudices against “non-Dasein” entities.


\(^{33}\) Ibid 169
is a description of the relationship between thrownness and projection that characterizes Dasein’s mode of being. On the one hand, it is “by my thinking its object (through the expression ‘it is’) as given absolutely” that Dasein understands itself through its thrownness. On the other hand, its existence as is, through this concept, “which expresses merely what is possible,’ by my thinking through what it is in and of itself. All of this allows Dasein to project a concept of its own possibilities. Furthermore, Dasein’s ontological structure matches up with Kant’s description of existence in that “the being of Dasein, which ontologically supports the structural whole as such, becomes accessible by completely looking through this whole at a primordially unified phenomenon which already lies in the whole in such a way that it is the ontological basis for every structural moment in its structural possibility.” The structural whole of Dasein is supported by its very existence. Indeed, that is what being does; it bestows an ontological structure. The manner, then, in which we can access the being of Dasein, is looking at the ontological whole of Dasein. We are able to see the ontological whole of Dasein by analyzing “a primordially unified phenomenon,” such as thrownness, which is, at the same time as being a specific phenomenon, also the “ontological basis” for Dasein in “every structural moment in its structural possibility.” The unified phenomenon is responsible, at the ontological rather than ontic level, every moment of its past present and future. Thus, the phenomenon, which is within its whole, is responsible for Dasein’s concept. In that sense, this whole that we find within Dasein’s being is homogeneous as well as heterogeneous. It is responsible for its past as well as its futural creative capacity. Thus we find an escape from finitude within the very structure of our finitude. Or rather, we find escape through the understanding of finitude.

34 Ibid 170
While we can see some significant influences that Kant's transcendental philosophy had on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, Heidegger still has some significant criticisms for Kant in *The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics*. There, Heidegger criticizes both Hegel and Kant for side stepping the importance of finitude for infinity:

Hegel’s step from Kant to absolute idealism is the sole consistency of the development of Western philosophy. This development is possible and necessary through Kant because the problem of human Dasein, finitude, did not become a real problem for him and thus not a central problem of philosophy because Kant himself – as the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows – encouraged the path of working his way out of an uncomprehended finitude to appeasing himself with infinity… This consistency is necessary and admirable in the consistency belongs to finitude, not as a lack or an embarrassment but as an active force. Finitude makes dialectic impossible, shows it to be illusion. In-consequence, lack of ground and fundamental concealment belong to finitude. 35

On this, Joan Stambaugh explains that Heidegger’s position is that Kant does not take finitude seriously enough. For Kant, finitude is not a characteristic of the human being to be overcome. 36 It is this fact, in Kant, that makes it so easy for Hegel to make the step to absolute idealism. 37 And absolute idealism, as Heidegger interprets it, disposes of finitude altogether Stambaugh writes: “the step from the critical to absolute idealism simply throws out the thing in itself and lets it appear as the development of Absolute Spirit. 38 Instead of guarding against this possible development, Kant’s second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* leads right into it. 39 Finitude is not thematized as this relationship between existence and the understanding, but rather, becomes increasingly associated with solely the understanding – an extension of pure reason. Thus, for

37 Ibid 3
38 Ibid 3
39 Ibid 3
Heidegger, it becomes increasingly evident where Kant’s allegiance actually lies. One can be certain from his two course lectures on Kant and from *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* that Kant gives the understanding sole spontaneous and creative capacity. That creative spontaneity is dictated by the bounds of rational concepts, the categories of the understanding, and is thoroughly homogeneous. Heidegger insists, rather than remain homogeneous, human finitude has the capacity for creative and heterogeneous truth through the power of the transcendental imagination. I maintain, then, that the transcendental power of the imagination leads Dasein to the structural level of existence, where truth is formed.

**Temporal Horizons in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics***:

What is significant about Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* is the role that mediation plays in structuring knowledge. For Kant, it is because of the mind’s transcendental faculties that empirical reality appears and is knowable in conformity with those faculties. For instance, the transcendental faculty of the understanding is supplied with a priori concepts that allow objects to appear to the mind in conformity with those concepts. The mind can never know these objects in and of themselves, but we must resign ourselves to trusting that the mediation that the faculties of pure understanding provide bestows a secure and knowable empirical reality.

While the above implies, which is indeed the case, that the faculty of pure understanding is given precedence in the *Critique*, Kant is sure to assert again and again that the understanding, without intuition, yields nothing. Therefore, he must consider what, in fact, makes the representation of intuitions possible. Most fundamentally, of course, Kant claims that embeddedness in time is a precondition for things to appear to us
the way they do. According to Kant, embeddedness in time is co-determinative of our experience. But, Kant grounds the possibility of these pure forms of intuition, as he calls them, in the unity of the mind itself. Therefore, it seems even the possibility of experience of a representation of an object is really just the understanding in disguise for Kant. It is in his description of the transcendental power of imagination in the A Deduction and Schematism, however, that Kant offers an ambiguous site where there is an outside to the understanding at play. It is these section that Martin Heidegger hones in on for his own project in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

Heidegger, while his concern, like Kant, is the subject's embeddedness in time, will maintain that knowledge cannot come from the mediation occurring due to the understanding. Rather, it is the transcendental power of the imagination which will secure the only immediacy that finite beings can acquire and therefore is the essence of the finite subject's knowledge. In what follows below I maintain that the transcendental power of imagination is responsible for the object = x as a horizon for the possibility of the image of objects in Kant. This, I believe, is the foundation of what Heidegger is capable of revealing in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. There, Heidegger wants to show that the transcendental power of the imagination is fundamental to every faculty's possible unity, and, indeed, to the production of the pure forms of intuition themselves. He proves his position by focusing on the A Deduction and the Schematism. It is the syntheses that are described in these sections that are responsible for the possibility of identification which, for Heidegger, is productive of the transcendental category of the future. Of course, the transcendental category of the future, is responsible for the temporalization of

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40 This goes along with embeddedness in space, but that will not be the focus here because Heidegger focuses solely on time.
the subject and the possibility of experience of the other through transcendence.

**The Three Syntheses and the Schematism:**

In the first edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant affords a privileged role to the faculty of the imagination. In the A Deduction, Kant's goal is to give an account of how exactly the understanding unites with intuition to synthesize knowledge. Intuition as such, however, is not the focal point in the A Deduction. Rather the focus, here, is on the faculties that compose pure apperception, and therefore the understanding, so that Kant can give an explanation of the a priori faculties the mind must have well before experience. These are the a priori faculties which contain nothing “empirical; yet, none the less can serve solely as a priori conditions of a possible experience” (A95). Each faculty produces a representation of an object or presents the capacity to produce a representation prior to the empirical experience of an object. Thus, Kant explains that he is seeking the subjective sources “which form the a priori foundation of the possibility of experience” and “of an empirical object” (A96-97). He continues “if each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and connected” (A97). In other words, Kant's concern is how to give an account of the synthesis of knowledge, or rather, how it is possible for knowledge to be synthesized at all. So, in the A deduction, Kant investigates not the receptivity that makes knowledge possible, but the subjective sources of spontaneity that allow for the synthesization of knowledge. This spontaneity, according to Kant “is the ground of a threefold synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge; namely, the apprehension of representation as modifications of the mind in intuition, their
reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in a concept. These point to three subjective sources of knowledge which make possible the understanding itself – and consequently all experience as its empirical product.” (A97-98).

Throughout my reconstruction of the A Deduction, it is important to note two seemingly secondary but preliminary points made in the deduction.\(^4\)\(^{1}\) Firstly, in order to complete the deduction of the faculties, Kant must use the empirical unity of knowledge as his background for what the makeup of subjectivity must be. Indeed, for each the syntheses of apprehension in intuition, reproduction in imagination, and recognition in the concept, Kant analogizes the transcendental faculty with what we can be sure occurs from observation of the correlating empirical faculty.\(^4\)\(^{2}\) Secondly, because all of our representations, a priori or empirical, belong to time as the “formal condition of our inner sense,” our representations must be “ordered, connected, and brought into relation” within time (A99). This, Kant maintains, is the observation that underlies the rest of his elaborations on the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, and the synthesis of recognition in the concept.

Empirical experience dictates that “the manifold can never be represented as a manifold.” Due to this empirical fact, the synthesis of apprehension in intuition “directed immediately upon intuition,” necessarily unifies the manifold in a single representation. The synthesis of apprehension in intuition allows the mind to unify the manifold in an

\(^{4}\)\(^{1}\) These points are also important to one of the ways Heidegger supports his interpretation that the transcendental power of the imagination is the foundation of the three syntheses in the A Deduction.

\(^{4}\)\(^{2}\) Importantly, Heidegger changes the syntheses from synthesis of to synthesis as for his own project. We will see more about this later. Furthermore, this analogizing is important to how Heidegger proves that all of the faculties have imagination as their root. It is because empirical imagination brings together representations of objects experienced that the transcendental imagination can be said to bring together the representations of space and time.
empirical intuition by distinguishing “time in the sequence of one impression upon another.” It gives an absolute unity to an intuition out of a manifold by apprehending each sequential now. In other words, the pure synthesis of apprehension provides the possibility of apprehending a single moment. The apprehension of a single moment is what allows for the empirical representation of an object to be apprehended and synthesized as a unity in a present moment. Moreover, “in order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held together” (A99). This is precisely what the synthesis of apprehension in intuition performs, according to Kant. The empirical synthesis of apprehension produces the unified object of representation. Thus, in order to have the representations of space and time, “this synthesis of apprehension in intuition must also be exercised a priori... in respect of representations which are not empirical” (A99). As pure, the synthesis of apprehension produces the ontological temporal space of the “now”. Kant concludes that the pure intuitions of space and time are produced “only through the synthesis of the manifold which sensibility presents in its original receptivity” (A100).

As with his explication of the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, Kant begins his explication of the synthesis of reproduction in imagination with its description in empirical experience. According to empirical experience, the imagination associates representations “and so [these representations] are set in a relation whereby, even in the absence of the object, one of these representations can, in accordance with a fixed rule, bring about a transition of the mind to the other” (A100). The synthesis of reproduction in imagination offers consistency in what is intuited by producing the image of the object.
By synthesizing an image, reproduction provides the object without the presence of the object itself. In other words, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination makes an image of the object and holds onto that image so that, in the absence of the intuition of that object, the mind is still able to carry over and associate the representation of that object with another, present, synthesis of the intuition of the object. If a transcendental faculty that is capable of producing a reproduction of a previously intuited object in the form of an image did not exist “our empirical imagination would never find opportunity for exercise appropriate to its powers” such as carrying over the color red of cinnabar, as Kant suggests, from moment to moment, previous instant to the next instance. Kant continues, “Nor could there be an empirical synthesis of reproduction, if a certain name were sometimes given to this, sometimes in one way, sometimes in another, independently of any rule to which appearances are in themselves subject” (A101). In other words, experience necessarily “presupposes the reproducibility of appearances” (A102). The synthesis of reproduction in imagination holds onto the thought of the preceding representations in order for an association between past and present representation to be able to be obtained. Hence, the empirical reproduction in imagination synthesizes an image of the object past. The possibility of this synthesis is the synthesis of reproduction in imagination and is the precise synthesis that Kant dubs “the transcendental faculty of imagination” (A102). It is image forming in that it creates the ontological temporal space for which a space and time, as previous instances, are held.

While the synthesis of apprehension in intuition synthesizes the present intuition of an object from the manifold and the synthesis of reproduction in imagination synthesizes the past image of the intuition of an object, the synthesis of recognition in a
concept synthesizes sameness and identity. Again, experience dictates that the mind must have the a priori capacity to be able to recognize “that what we think [now] is the same as what we thought a moment before” (A103). In order for this recognition to occur, the mind must have a concept of the object to perform the necessary identification. It is this concept that can finally synthesize all that occurred in the synthesis of apprehension in intuition and the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. Therefore it is this synthesis that actually takes priority. It creates a “unity of rule” which “determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make unity of apperception [the “I think”] possible” (A105). If not for this synthesis, the other three would be in vain; they would not be able to converge into consciousness of a rule and of the object of representation.

Here, we must remain clear regarding the fact that the concept is the concept of “an object of representations” (A104). The object, as Kant states, is not a Ding an sich, an object “capable of existing outside our power of representation” even though it is, indeed, a “sensible representation” (A104). The concept of an object of representations which Kant speaks of, instead, he broadly describes as “something in general = x” or “the representation of the object = x” (A104, A105). It is this concept, the backdrop that this concept provides, that allows for the final unity of a whole and identifiable object of intuition; it gives the rule that allows for the determination the object. It is due to this synthesis that

We find our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori... For in so far as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object (A104-105).

The synthesis of recognition in the concept, then, creates the ontological temporal
space to identify the object of representation. This synthesis provides the final unity that allows for the recognition of past and present representation.

Importantly, Kant introduces consciousness here. Here consciousness introduces “the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations” (A105). It is this unity of consciousness that is the transcendental condition that imparts necessity according to Kant (A106). At this point in the text, he names it transcendental apperception and it is equal to the understanding itself. The unity of apperception is the consciousness of myself as an original apperception unifying time and space through these syntheses. For Kant it takes precedent over the imagination because it imparts the final unity of the entire three levels of synthesis. The imagination, though is not without its prioritized space in that it is responsible for the possibility of the unity between the syntheses of apperception, reproduction, and recognition. It is in the Transcendental Schematism that Kant gives a description of the imagination's role in producing the schematism.

In the schematism, Kant reintroduces the power of the imagination not simply as governing the reproductive synthesis but as producing a mediating representation which is pure, “void of all empirical content” and at the same time both intellectual and sensible (A138/B177). Indeed, Kant quickly states that “the schema is in itself always a product of imagination” (A140/B179). The schema is the one thing “which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category [of understanding], and on the other hand with the appearance [the representation], and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible” (A138/B177).
While the schema is distinguished from the image produced in the reproduction in the imagination, it is still produced by the transcendental power of the imagination. Kant explains the difference:

If five points be set alongside one another, thus,......, I have an image of the number five. But if, on the other hand, I think only a number in general, whether it be five or a hundred, this thought is rather the representation of a method whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be represented in an image in conformity with a certain concept, than the image itself. For with such a number as a thousand the image can hardly be surveyed and compared with the concept. This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept (A139/B178).

The schema of a concept, then, is the general concept that allows for the image of particular concepts. Indeed, the manner in which Kant speaks of it is is akin to the description he gives of the transcendental object = x. He explains, “the schema of sensible concepts, such as of figures in space, is a product and, as it were, a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible” (A142/B181). In other words, the transcendental schema is the ground of the possibility for any of the three syntheses to create images at all. Furthermore, “these images can be connected with the concept only by means of the schema to which they belong”(A142/B181). Therefore, Kant continues, “it is a transcendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the determination of inner sense in general according to conditions of its form (time), in respect of all representations, so far as these representations are to be connected a priori in one concept in conformity with the unity of apperception” (A142/B181).

While Kant prioritizes the schema to unify all images in perception, he maintains that the unity which the schema makes possible must always be in final conformity with the unity of apperception. As we will see, Heidegger not only continues but extends the
priority that Kant gives to the transcendental power of the imagination. Heidegger maintains that the unity which the transcendental power of imagination makes possible is more fundamental than the unity of apperception to which Kant is committed. Furthermore, as productive of mediating representations that allow for the production of the representations of space and time, the transcendental power of imagination, truthfully, allows for immediacy.

**The Priority of Intuition, the Power of the Imagination, and, therefore, the Future:**

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger concludes that temporality is the a priori transcendental condition for there to be care which is meaning making, intelligibility, identification as such - Dasein's own distinctive and finite mode of Being. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger's goal is to establish that the transcendental power of imagination, as time, is the ground for finitude and therefore the receptivity and spontaneity of the subject in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In doing so, Heidegger is showing Kant's implicit phenomenological commitments. Throughout the text Heidegger maintains that the transcendental power of imagination is the essential ground for all ontological knowledge. Ultimately, Heidegger attempts to reveal the transcendental power of imagination as the root of transcendence, the finite subject's way of knowing objects in the world. His final claim, then, is that the transcendental power of imagination gives the object by, precisely, giving itself in the form of time. He can only prove this, however, by focusing on the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition as producing the ontological temporal space (horizon) which reveals “time as such has the

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character of selfhood."

Heidegger must address several concerns for this project. Or, rather, his project warps several concerns into one. If he makes the power of the imagination the root of both sensibility and the understanding then he must also make it the unity that brings subjectivity together and makes knowledge possible. In other words, the transcendental power of imagination, fundamentally, does what the pure apperception did in Kant's *Critique*. Heidegger must also show this power's connection to the pure forms of intuition, namely time. He must reveal how it is the foundation for the very creation of time. But, as he has established in *Being and Time*, subjectivity is temporalization and so he must show how the power of the imagination is the source of temporalization in order for it to be the root/ground of finitude. He does so by identifying at every synthesis of time that “the power of imagination represents not just one faculty among others, but rather their mediating center,” a mediating center, though, which allows for immediacy.

In order for us to see the essence of the finitude of knowledge, we must come to a “general characterization of the essence of knowledge." Kant, says Heidegger, gives this general characterization with his explanation that knowing relates to objects by means of intuition which relates itself immediately to objects, "and upon which all thought as a means is directed." Heidegger interprets the above as meaning that "knowing is primarily intuiting." This is definitely not Kant's explicit intention. As stated above, Kant thinks knowing, while dependent on intuition, is primarily understanding. It falls under the necessary domain of pure apperception. Yet, Heidegger

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44 Ibid 133
45 Ibid 15
46 Ibid 15
47 Ibid 15
claims that "all thinking is merely in the service of intuition." For Heidegger, the "interpretation of knowledge as judging (thinking) violates the decisive sense of the Kantian problem" unbeknownst to Kant. Thinking serves intuition or rather "that to which intuition is primarily and constantly directed." Thinking serves that which is not it but outside of it. Thus, Heidegger maintains that "if thinking is to be essentially relative to intuition " then both intuition and thinking must have “a certain inherent relationship that allows their unification.”

Heidegger goes on to explain his interpretation of representation in the Critique. In the Critique, "knowing representing is either intuition or concept. The former relates immediately to the object and is single; the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things can have in common." But, Heidegger attempts to find a way for us to step outside of the mediation Kant has set up with transcendental idealism but by also taking into account our extreme finitude. For Heidegger, that representing is immediate with relation to intuition and mediated with relation to the concept means that there is a particular balance in the relationship between inuiting and thinking such that we can really call knowing "intuitive thinking." So, "intuition constitutes the authentic essence of knowledge and "despite the reciprocity of the relationship between intuiting and thinking, [intuition] does possess authentic importance." Intuition is the essence of the finitude of knowledge precisely because we have finite intuition. Our very finitude, for Heidegger, is why finite intuition, rather than the understanding, is primary. For

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48 Ibid 15
49 Ibid 15
50 Ibid 15
51 Ibid 15
52 Ibid 16
53 Ibid 16
instance, if we were to compare divine knowing and finite knowing we see that "Divine
knowing is representing which, in intuiting, first creates the intuited being as such. But
because it immediately looks at the being as a whole, simply seeing through it in
advance, it cannot require thinking. Thinking as such is thus already the mark of
finitude."54 But thinking is the mark of finite intuition and is, therefore, secondary to
intuition as an explanation of the essence of human knowing. It is when intuition is finite
that intuition comes before thinking and brings thinking into being. Thus, the essential
difference between these kinds of knowledge lies primarily in intuiting itself: An
understanding of the finitude of human knowledge must be sought in the finitude of its
own intuition.

According to Heidegger, finite knowledge is noncreative intuition; it “takes things
in stride” and therefore must allow the object to be given. This fact, however, does not
mean that finite intuition is not spontaneous and productive. It is not resigned to pure
receptivity. Specifically, Heidegger writes, "Finite intuition cannot take something in
stride unless that which is to be taken in stride announces itself. According to its essence,
finite intuition must be solicited or affected by that which is intuitable in it."55 The object
must announce itself. It is in this announcing, solicitation, and affection (Heidegger will
specifically hone in on the word affection) that we find the specific spontaneity,
productivity, and hence, immediacy that Heidegger's finite intuition is capable of
creating. And this spontaneity will be found by Heidegger in using the same
transcendental route Kant used in the Critique of Pure Reason.

54 Ibid 17 my emphasis
55 Ibid 91
Space and time are considered "original representations," by both Kant and Heidegger. Whereas in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant does not give a precise definition of original but rather associates it with the transcendental, Heidegger must redefine original in order to associate it with the pure power of imagination. For Heidegger, the pure intuitions are dubbed original not because they are innate or immediately at hand.\(^{56}\) Rather they are called original because of the way space and time as representations are represented. The pure intuitions:

are formative in the peculiar sense that they pro-pose the look of space and time in advance as totalities which are in themselves manifold. They take the look in stride, but in itself this taking-in-stride is the formative self-giving of that which gives itself... presentations of what is intuitable which allow [something] to spring forth. Pure intuition, therefore, can only be "original" because according to its essence it is the pure power of imagination itself which formatively gives looks (images) from out of itself.\(^{57}\)

While Kant does not explicitly maintain this, one of Heidegger's basic assumptions is that what must be intuited in pure intuition as such is an *ens imaginarium*, i.e. a product of the imagination.\(^{58}\) Heidegger can make this assertion because what is intuited in the pure forms of intuition is a something which is not an object, as Heidegger emphasizes in section 28 of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.\(^{59}\) Indeed, as Kant states in the schematism, it is the transcendental power of the imagination which is responsible for intuitions that are *something*, but *not images or objects*. Hence, says Heidegger, “on the grounds of its essence, pure intuiting is pure imagination.”\(^{60}\)

According to this reading, the transcendental power of the imagination is the origin of pure, sensible intuition, and therefore, the transcendental power of the imagination is the

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\(^{56}\) Ibid 99  
\(^{57}\) Ibid 99  
\(^{58}\) Ibid 101  
\(^{59}\) Ibid 101  
\(^{60}\) Ibid 101
Heidegger, however, must also reveal that the transcendental power of the imagination is the foundation for the understanding as well. Heidegger specifically shows that the transcendental power of the imagination necessarily grounds the understanding by going through the three syntheses of the A Deduction: the synthesis of apperception in intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, and the synthesis of recognition in the concept. His conclusion will be that time, itself, as "pure intuition springs forth from the transcendental power of imagination" and is the therefore subjectivity itself.  

Time and the power of imagination are not separate entities. It is because of this that Heidegger concludes that time cannot be understood as an "arbitrary field which the power of imagination just gets into for purposes of its own activity, so to speak." Time is not simply there as a given because time cannot be given as a whole and entire object, especially in the Kantian sense, as a succession of nows. In such a case, the mind would never have a concept of time or the capacity to distinguish past, present, and future. Instead, the form of time as a totality must be given. In order to do so, the power of the imagination must bestow it, and "accordingly, time must indeed be taken as a pure sequence of nows in the horizon within which we "reckon with time"" (123). It is the power of the imagination that provides the horizon within which we "reckon with time," it “allows time as sequence of nows to spring forth, and as this letting-spring-forth it is therefore original time" (123). Therefore, Heidegger sets out to prove in sections 31 through 34 of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* precisely that “the working out of the

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61 Ibid 101  
62 Ibid 122  
63 Ibid 123
inner temporal character of the three modes of synthesis should produce the ultimate, decisive proof for the fact that the interpretation of the transcendental power of imagination of the transcendental power of imagination as the root of both stems is not only possible, but also necessary.**64

As mentioned above, Heidegger takes seriously Kant's preliminary statement that one must keep in mind that even when an empirical explanation of the representation of objects is given in order to analogize the transcendental syntheses, the transcendental representations are of the pure intuitions of space and time.**65 Thus, whereas “empirical intuition is directly concerned with the being which is present in the now,” the synthesis as apprehension in intuition “is concerned with the now, i.e. with the present itself.”**66 The pure apprehending synthesis first “forms precisely the life of the now and the sequence of nows.”**67 What pure apprehending does is produce “what the pure intuiting offering (forming as giving a look) produces (forming as creating) is the immediate look of the now as such, i.e., always the look of the actual present as such.”**68 The pure apprehending synthesis forms the temporal space of the present from out of itself. It is what allows empirical objects to be experienced in a now. It “offers the “present in general” and in that sense is time-forming, productive of the present as an aspect of time as the pure form of intuition. Accordingly, as Heidegger states “the pure synthesis of apprehension in itself has a temporal character.”**69 As synthesis of the present, the pure synthesis of apprehension unifies the present in order to make way for an object of empirical

64 Ibid 123  
65 Again, Heidegger specifically focuses on time for his project.  
66 Ibid 126  
67 Ibid 125  
68 Ibid 126  
69 Ibid 126
representation.

The synthesis of reproduction in imagination, however, performs “the bringing-forth-again”-reproduction—and, too, is a kind of unifying, according to Heidegger. This synthesis represents the object of representation insofar as it “represents the being represented earlier in a more actual unity.” The ability to retain, of course, is found in this synthesis, just as the ability to apprehend (produce) was found in the last one. Heidegger explains:

Beings experienced earlier, however, can only be retained if the mind “differentiates time” and thereby has in view such [temporal distinctions] as “earlier” and “at that time.” The being experienced earlier would constantly be lost completely with each now, if it were not in general retainable. Hence, if empirical synthesis in the mode of reproduction is thereby to become possible, the no-longer-now as such must in advance and prior to all experience have been brought forth again and unified with the specific now. This occurs in pure reproduction as a mode of pure synthesis.

Thus the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination is productive in the sense that it “it forms the possibility of [empirical] reproduction in general.” According to Heidegger, the synthesis of reproduction creates it the temporal space, the horizon, “of the earlier into view and holds it open as such in advance.” Thus, he maintains that this mode of synthesis forms the horizon of the past, the” having-been-ness [Gewesenheit] as such.” While the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination was explicitly identified as the transcendental power of the imagination by Kant because it produce the possibility of retention of an image past, Heidegger as we have seen and will continue to see, identifies all of the syntheses, because of their creation of temporal space, as grounded in

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70 Ibid 127
71 Ibid 127
72 Ibid 127
73 Ibid 127
74 Ibid 127
the transcendental power of the imagination. None, however, is grounded so fundamentally in the imagination as the synthesis as pure recognition.

As with the previous two syntheses, Heidegger maintains that Kant is really grounding the pure synthesis as pure recognition in the transcendental power of the imagination. He does so, again, by emphasizing Kant's explanatory remarks which analogize empirical recognition to the transcendental synthesis of recognition. Kant writes that “without consciousness of the fact that what we are thinking is the same as what we thought an instant before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain” (A103). To this Heidegger replies, that “when the mind returns from its going-back-into the past, when it returns again to the directly present being in order to set the former in unity with the latter, who then tells it that this being which is now present is the same as that which it previously abandoned.”\(^{75}\) The pure synthesis as pure recognition creates the place for what the unity of apprehending intuition and reproducing imagination present as unified and the same. According to Heidegger, the synthesis of recognition in the concept provides the ontological temporal space for which the synthesis as the apprehension and synthesis as reproduction are essentially meant. The synthesis as the apprehension and synthesis as reproduction are “already oriented in advance toward the being as something which has presence in sameness?”\(^{76}\) Heidegger continues:

\(^{75}\) Ibid 129  
\(^{76}\) Ibid 130
{representing this unity as conceptual representing} is what unifies the manifold, which is intuited again and again and which is then also reproduced, into one representation.\textsuperscript{77}

The synthesis as the recognition of a concept, which produces the concept of the representation of concepts and the object = x, allows for pure identification. As stated above\textsuperscript{78}, the synthesis of recognition in the concept does, in fact, create the ontological temporal space to identify the object of representation.\textsuperscript{79} In doing so it creates out of itself the horizon “of being-able-to-hold-something-before-us in general,” and Heidegger interprets this capacity as creative of the horizon of the future.\textsuperscript{80}

Heidegger then goes on to claim that the synthesis of recognition in the concept, as that which produces the future, has priority over the other two syntheses. As he had established in \textit{Being and Time}, then, Heidegger carries over his prioritization of the future over past and present. The future is that which allows time itself to spring forth and thus the transcendental power of the imagination as “the most original essence of time... is developed primarily from the future.”\textsuperscript{81} It is the future, the always remaining open possibility of recognition and identification that is the essence of the finitude of the subject and the very possibility of the understanding itself.\textsuperscript{82}

Thus, Heidegger ventures “to grasp the selfhood of the self as inherently

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} Ibid 130
\item \textsuperscript{78} See page 7 above.
\item \textsuperscript{79} In that section I explained that the synthesis of recognition allows for the identification of the object as the same. Heidegger, however, will interpret this as the creative of the category of the future because it allows for the horizon of holding out against and in opposition to, i.e. a kind of difference.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid 130
\item \textsuperscript{81} Ibid 131
\item \textsuperscript{82} In \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger concludes that temporality is the a priori transcendental condition for there to be care which is meaning making, intelligibility, identification as such - Dasein's own distinctive mode of Being).
\end{itemize}
temporal.” He brings sensibility and reason (pure) together as the essence of this specific finitude of the human subject and inherently temporal. Heidegger follows Kant's statement that time “apart from the subject is nothing” and interprets it to imply that Kant himself actually makes time “everything in the subject, that is, time and the subject” as “one” (A35, B51).

The power of the imagination as the essence of time, then, is pure taking in stride which produces the subject itself. As established through the synthesis as recognition of the concept, “time [as the power of the imagination in the synthesis as recognition] necessarily affects the concept of the representations of objects.” It creates the horizon of “the letting-stand- against as such, i.e., as pure turning-one's attention- to..., pure affecting, means: to bring something like an “against it,” the Being-in-opposition, into opposition to it in general; “to it” - to the pure letting-stand-against of..., but that means to pure apperception to the I itself.” The power of the imagination affects time as a horizon which presents the possibility for a thing to stand in opposition to the subject at all. It creates the subject and the ontological space for the object. This escapes the mediation of Kant's transcendental idealism because the transcendental creation of the subject does not create the object. Indeed, what Heidegger proposes is that the transcendental power of the imagination's creation of the horizon is performed only to allow the object to be present, to be given and not to be structured itself. He continues, “Time belongs to the inner possibility of their letting-stand-against of... As pure self-affection, it forms in an original way the finite selfhood, so that the self can be something

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83 Ibid 133
84 Ibid 132
85 Ibid 133
like self-consciousness.”\textsuperscript{86} It is the Transcendental Ego itself. The production of time in the form of self-consciousness is actually the production of separation and difference from the finite self. It is the essential form of the possibility of distinction from self and distinction from sameness. Thus, time as self-affection presents the capacity to take things in stride as they are rather than as the self. And, “The finitude of knowledge [of the object of intuition] rests on the finitude of intuiting, i.e., on taking in stride.”\textsuperscript{87}

Thus, time as pure self-affection formed out of the transcendental power of the imagination cannot be secondary to the understanding. For it is the transcendental power of the imagination as “finite intuition [sense, such as inner sense] which bears and makes possible in general the pure concept (the understanding) that stands in essential service to intuition.” Hence, Heidegger concludes in section 34:

\begin{quote}

\begin{center}
time and the “I think” (pure apperception) no longer stands incompatible and incomparably at odds; they are the same. In other words, pure apperception and the transcendental power of the imagination are one. The transcendental power of the imagination gives the possibility of the pure apperception in the form of the “I think.”\textsuperscript{88}
\end{center}
\end{quote}

\textbf{Conclusion:}

Kant makes the faculties mediating structures in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. These mediating structures are classically interpreted as creating the object of representation and evidence of Kant's being stuck in idealism. Heidegger, however, by showing Kant's implicit phenomenological commitments, bestows the possibility of immediacy to the intuition of the object. It is the power of the imagination that creates the space for the object to appear rather than creating the object in and of itself. Of course,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid 133
  \item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid 133
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid 135
\end{itemize}
this point does not completely lead us to the Ding an sich, but for Heidegger, it opens up the possibility that the experience of objects is not absolutely ideal. Time, for Heidegger, is a kind of self-affection that provides the possibility for hetero-affection, the entrance of “the other.” In that sense, it is, as Heidegger states, “the innermost essence of transcendence.”

It seems Heideggarian finitude may, in fact, sidestep the homogeneity and contamination of the Kantian category of the originary as Foucault describes it. Heidegger seems to ensure this by linking existence and understanding at the level of ontological rather than ontic experience. The truths of existence, then occur at a level accessible to Dasein, but only through the level in which Dasein has reached the structural level of existence. That is Dasein must reach the level of the creation of time – its temporal horizons – in order to secure access to truth. Thus means that Heidegger links existence and thought even closer than Kant seems to. While Kant seems to think of existence as a kind of objective given that can be conceived of separately from Dasein’s disclosive abilities, Heidegger ties finitude even closer to the creation of existence.

Furthermore, there is no more of an opposition between empirical and transcendental time. Both seem to be replaced by ontological (ecstatic) temporality, thus, it is no longer a physical succession nor a pure interiority but now is an ecstatic process generated by Dasein as being in the world. The central points we must grasp from Heidegger’s works on Kant are these: The fact that existence is not a predicate means that existence does not submit to logic, but for Heidegger it can only be understood as a creation formed by

89 Ibid 133
90 Beatrice Han, “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude” in Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 143.
91 Ibid 144
finite ontological power. Thus finite ontological power derives its power from its own ecstatic possibilities. That is, finitude derives its critical power from its own ontological concept – that it is thrown, understands itself as thrown, and determines its future as distinct from and against its past.

For Heidegger, Kant’s influence comes from more clearly defining existence, linking existence with possibility and the understanding – which is another rendition of linking thought and being – and providing the ground for developing a finitude that temporalizes. Most importantly, access to truth comes through finitude’s escape from itself toward the horizon that it creates through the temporalization of the future. We can think of this in terms of fields of knowledge such that a field is defined by the horizon that is out of reach but defines that field nonetheless. Thus truth must be a positing at the boundaries of fields of knowledge rather than a reiteration of knowledge within the field as already known. But, at the same time, this temporalization, this horizon, is immanent to the very temporalization. This relationship between limits and knowledge is quite central to Deleuze’s work on Kant and the history of philosophy. For him, Kantian Ideas, reformulated, break with the limits of knowledge, allowing us to know objects other than ourselves. Deleuze, too, intends to heal the separation between being and thought that hinders the break with limits and access to truth that comes from repetitive or representational knowledge.
Chapter 2: Eternal Return as Critical Element

“Truth expresses a will: who wills truth?”

Introduction:

Much like Immanuel Kant’s project, Deleuze’s thought and work is an attempt to overcome the opposition between realism and idealism. It is an attempt to create an ontology that is, on the one hand, transcendental, and on the other hand not limited to the form of the objects of experience. Rather, Deleuze’s ontology is engaged in thinking these transcendental objects in their materiality.\(^\text{92}\) To reformulate, Deleuzean ontology – transcendental empiricism – thinks the objects of experience in their materiality through the conditions of the possibility of our experience of them. Transcendental empiricism thinks the objects of experience, rather, through a differential, typological and genealogical interpretation of their genesis. Therefore, it is the objects themselves, if thought correctly\(^\text{93}\), that determine the experience of them and all possible discourse regarding them. Thus, Deleuze replaces Kantian idealism with Nietzschean perspectivism in order to yield both transcendental and empirical realism. During this chapter, I maintain that it is this replacement, made possible by the metaphysical doctrine of the Eternal Return, that allows Deleuze to treat the Eternal Return Doctrine as a thinking through becoming at the level where unformed forces exist at the maximum of their critical, ethical, and political power. For Deleuze, it is the fold of time as well as the passage of time (through the prioritization of the present) that brings unformed forces to the fore. Unformed forces, subsequently, allow truth to be grounded in heterogeneity.

At the political level, it is the subject of values that is most important when we


\(^{93}\) This occurs through perspectivism and the split subject (see Chapter 3).
turn to Nietzsche and Deleuze’s critique of Kantian critique. In one of the most surprising
comments in Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze declares that Nietzsche’s
*Genealogy of Morals* is a rewriting of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.94 The plan of the
*Genealogy of Morals* is, in fact, to thoroughly describe and trace the problem of reactive
forces as well as the method of how to critique those forces. For Deleuze, the answer, to
the problem of reactive forces, how we extend toward a positive critique of them, is the
Eternal Return Doctrine. Therefore, one difference between Heidegger and Deleuze is
that Deleuze believes that Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will, his Eternal Return Doctrine,
is not merely a repetition of the same metaphysics.95

Like Heidegger, Deleuze’s philosophical goal is to ground truth in heterogeneity.
Indeed, seeking genuine ontology, their goal is to think being without resorting to “the
one.”96 They propose an ontology that can think being as pure multiplicity. Again, this
presents a stark contrast from how Kant grounds epistemology in reason as
homogeneous. Kantian critique depends on the transcendental unity of consciousness. It
is a given fact that human consciousness is a single group of experiences, for Kant.
Following from this fact, then, the experiences must have a single common subject
(A350); and the consciousness that this subject has of represented objects and/or
representations must be unified. Consciousness of experience and of self is made possible
due to the components of transcendental apperception, i.e. the three syntheses that make
up the understanding as mentioned in chapter one. As seen, Heidegger attempts to infuse
an ontology of heterogeneity into these three syntheses. Deleuze, however, takes a

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95 Lawlor and Sholtz “Heidegger and Deleuze” 5.
96 There are many names for this: the infinite, the ideal. I will speak using several different names for this
thinking being by resorting to “the one.”
different course to incorporating heterogeneity into the Kantian enterprise.

Several scholars recognize both the similarities and differences between
Heidegger and Deleuze on heterogeneity and its location at the core of being as a
question. Miguel De Beistegui states that “for Heidegger (as well as for Deleuze)
on ontology begins with difference, and that the “question” of being is entirely that of its
difference from the entity or of being as difference. Being is the movement of difference
as such, the spatio-temporalizing movement or operation through which “there are”
entities.” But at the same time, he contends, as does Leonard Lawlor and Janae Sholtz,
that the striking differences between Deleuze and Heidegger become apparent in each of
their uses of Nietzsche, specifically Nietzsche’s Eternal Return Doctrine. Indeed, Deleuze
interprets Heidegger as dismissing the Eternal Return Doctrine as a doctrine of
sameness.

In this chapter, I cover three discussions from Deleuze’s Nietzsche and
Philosophy. Firstly, I set up the historical problems with critique. Deleuze spends the bulk
of his “Critique” chapter distinguishing Nietzsche’s own conception of the will to power
and the question of being. Nietzsche interlocks the history of the concept of the will with
the history of the question of how to inquire into the essence of being. The concern here, I
maintain, is that the method of questioning determines the degree of the power to think
becoming – being’s real essence. According to Deleuze, an improper form of questioning
being leads to an answer that cannot get around its own presuppositions. The form of
questioning accesses the ground of the answer. So, we can say the form of questioning is

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98 Lawlor and Sholtz “Heidegger and Deleuze” 5.
tied to the grounding of the foundation in heterogeneity. It is an improper form of
questioning that inaugurates the logic of representation that will then dominate the
interpretation of the will to power, what the will is, until Nietzsche.

Secondly, we shall see how Kant continues to valorize this logic of representation
while at the same time stumbling onto a form of critiquing this very type of reasoning.
Instead of critiquing reason, however, Kantian critique remains homogeneous, as we saw
with Heidegger. Lastly, then, I will discuss why the Eternal Return Doctrine is hailed by
Deleuze to be the critical element. What is it about the Eternal Return that can
supplement and complete Kantian critique? The Eternal Return Doctrine is able to think
becoming because of its temporal character.

**The Problem: Deleuze’s Philosophical History of Contradictions in the Will**

Deleuze maintains that, according to Plato, “the opposition of essence and
appearance, of being and becoming, depends primarily on a mode of questioning, a form
of question.”

In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates maintains that the question “what is
beauty?” leads the inquirer to the essence of beauty rather than to the distraction of
appearance. Appearance, in the Platonic dialogues, is not necessarily unrelated to
essence, but there is an inherent “opposition of essence and appearance, of being and
becoming.” This leads the Platonic dialogues to oppose the “what is…” form of
questioning to all other forms of questioning. “What is beauty?” for Socrates, asks for
beauty itself rather than examples of its manifestation. Thus, the answer to the “what
is…” form of questioning is never “the one that is….” Socrates is not looking for a
particular example as representative of the essence of beauty. Indeed, Socrates interprets

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100 Ibid 76
the nature of examples as appearances and representatives rather than essences. “The one that is” is merely a representative of the essence of the thing itself. Hence Socrates sees himself as asking a question regarding the essence of beauty itself, its being, and not an example of its becoming. The irony, however, is that this logic of understanding examples is what sets the history of philosophy up for thinking through representations rather than being able to think being itself. What is clear about this interpretation is that Plato puts being on the side of essence and becoming on the side of appearance. Appearance, then, becomes a type of derivative of essence and we interpret becoming as a derivative of being. Deleuze, however, gives becoming a direct relationship to essence. Appearance, for him, is not a derivative of essence but a perspective of essence with particular coordinates of its own.

It is not clear that the “what is…” form of questioning actually leads to essence according to Deleuze, following Nietzsche. Indeed, while Socrates is aware of the existence of the relationship between being and becoming, his concern is with a consistent being as an answer to what the essence of a thing is; all other answers are merely pointing to an object as an example and may not clarify the consistency of the essence of the ideal in question itself. But Nietzsche and Deleuze question this belief that drives Socrates’ opposition of the “what is…?” to the “which one?” The question “which one?” “does not refer, as Socrates believed, to discrete examples, but to the continuity of concrete objects taken in their becoming, to the becoming-beautiful of all the objects citable or cited as examples.”

What Socrates desires through the “what is…?” form of questioning, what is presupposed in this particular way of thinking, is that the ossified essence of the thing in question is an eternal answer to the question of its being. But what

\[101\] Ibid 76
this line of questioning actually does is forsake the recognition of the point of view of the form of questioning and therefore the perspective of the answer as well. In fact, it is the “what is…?” question, despite its attempt to overcome such a result, that makes the essence an empty representation of essence rather than an active interpretation of the moment of essence. It makes a permanent archetype of the essence of beauty rather than seeking essence in the singularity of each manifestation of beauty. In contrast, it is the question “which one…?” that is able to answer for the essence of a thing. This question knows that being, and therefore essence, is nothing but “the continuity of concrete objects taken in their becoming.” In that sense, it is the reverse of the “what is…” form of questioning. The “what is…” form of questioning takes the ideal of the thing as the ossified continuity of the essence of its manifestations rather than the continuity of the objects in their relationship to each other in space and time and, therefore, as a perspective in its becoming. Objects cited as examples in this form of questioning do not take the role of representing the essence of beauty but take their place in their concrete temporal and spatial relation to beauty in its active becoming. Their point of view, and therefore relation – spatial and temporal distance from – to the question itself is the object of determination rather than an ideal or objective view of being.

According to Deleuze, everything, every question, answer, object has a sense and a value, which is its essence. It is because essence is sense and value that the question of the point of view of the form of the question and answer become a concern for Deleuze.

In other words, essence is inextricably linked to interpretation for both Deleuze and

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102 Ibid 76
103 Platonic reversal that Nietzsche suggests and both Heidegger and Deleuze endorse as a result.
104 I say “consistency” because Socrates is looking for an example but what strings the examples together in such a way that allows them to reach, at whatever their level, the ideal of Beauty. What consistent essence links all of the examples that are representations of Beauty itself?
Nietzsche. Deleuze writes, “according to Nietzsche the question “which one?” (qui) means this: what are the forces which take hold of a given thing, what is the will that possesses it? Which one is expressed, manifested and even hidden in it?” The question of the point of view of the question and answer will tell us if the forces that “possess it”, that determine the desire of the question, are active or reactive. Therefore, the question of perspective will lead us directly to Nietzsche and Deleuze’s critique of Kantian philosophy.

Deleuze continues, as “essence is merely the sense and value of the thing” essence, therefore “is determined by the forces with affinity for the thing and by the will with affinity for these forces.” In other words, it is a question of which forces, from which differential, typological, and genealogical coordinates form a relation with this thing, this question. Moreover, the concern regards the will’s relation to this question because the will answers or asks from either a reactive or active position, an active or reactive affinity for the thing. These designations of the principles of interpretation of the eternal return overlap but each have their own product. The differential is the relationship of space, time, and element. So, we can further clarify: typology interprets forces based on quality (active/reactive, affirmative/negative) and genealogy interprets forces based on their origin in a certain will to power (becoming-active, becoming-reactive).

Deleuze explains:

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105 Ibid 77
106 Desire vs. intention for Deleuze: Of course, Deleuze, like so many of his continental counterparts, will not use the language of intention due to its subjective and anthropomorphic connotations. It is important, then, that I use the word desire here for various reasons. 1. Desire is pre-individual. 2. Desire cannot be interpolated into reason. 3. Desire is the main subject of Anti-Oedipus. 4. The will does not want power as a representation but that does not mean it does not desire.
107 Each of their criticisms of Kant has to do with the value Kant ascribe to reason, morality, religion and man.
108 Ibid 77
When we ask what beauty is we ask from what standpoint things appear beautiful: and something which does not appear beautiful to us, from what standpoint would it become so? And for a particular thing, what are the forces which make or would make it beautiful by appropriating it, what are the other factors which yield to these or, on the contrary, resist them.\textsuperscript{109}

The standpoint of the will has nothing to do with the logic of representation according to Deleuze. “What a will wants [its standpoint and answer to the question] depending on its quality [which constitutes its type as active or reactive], is to affirm its difference or to deny what differs [active and reactive forces respectively].”\textsuperscript{110} A will does not want an object or objective truth. What a will wants, Deleuze insists, is a type rather than an object of representation, even if that object of representation is taken as an essence. In other words, the will wants or has an affinity to either reactive or active differential forces of power.

In order to understand the eternal return doctrine we must understand what the will to power is. The will to power is a principle of the Eternal Return. Deleuze attempts to clarify and distinguish the will to power from other concepts of the will as well as various interpretations of the will to power. The rejection of the logic of representation is central to the clarification of Nietzsche’s will to power. In interpreting the will to power, Deleuze asks, “what does “will to power mean?” and answers that it is “not, primarily, that the will wants power, that it desires or seeks out power as an end, nor that power is the motive of the will.”\textsuperscript{111} Power is not an objective, goal, or telos of the will to power. In such an interpretation, the difference between power and representation themselves becomes obscured. Power becomes representation and representation becomes power. There is no excess or outside to the logic of representation when the will to power is

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid 77
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid 78
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid 80
interpreted as the desire for power and power interpreted as an object of representation. Difference is obscured and power simply becomes the desire for recognition. It becomes a force driven by lack and the need for the outside rather than a force driven by its own determination. As driven by lack, the will now needs external recognition and measurement in order to be determined, in order to know itself. However, the problem is not simply that there must be an outside, an externality to the logic of the will, but that externality and internality must be problematized altogether. Thus, Deleuze’s own understanding of the will generates a new concept of externality. Deleuze explains how this deficient kind of “will to power” can be seen throughout the history of philosophy.

In Hobbes, man in the state of nature wants to see his superiority represented and recognized by others. In Hegel, consciousness wants to be recognized by another and represented as self-consciousness… In all these cases power is always the object of a representation, of a recognition which materially presupposes a comparison of consciousnesses. It is therefore necessary for the will to power to have a corresponding motive which would also serve as the motor of comparison: vanity, pride, self-love, display or even a feeling of inferiority.

Not only does an interpretation of the will as driven by the desire for power turn the will into a lack driven by a need to be fulfilled, but this need is a nothingness whose measure can only be defined by a comparison. The will is not defined in its own right but through something other, a foreign logic, whether it be an emotion or an object. Value then, is conferred upon the will insofar as it conforms to that to which the will is being compared. Under such circumstances, where the will desires something defined in comparison to another thing, the will seeks an object of representation. And, insofar as the will is interpreted as seeking power, power itself is an object of representation that

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112 Not unrelated, Deleuze will devote entire sections of *Difference and Repetition* to the problem with the logic of recognition. Here the problem stems from submitting one form of power to another, in order to be recognized by a particular logic, rather than allowing each form of power to present itself as itself. In *Difference and Repetition* the problem will be quite similar.

113 Ibid 80
can only be recognized as something other to itself. Its real meaning, essence, is covered up or rather made to conform to the logic of the hegemonic type of reason, that reasoning which is *recognized*.\textsuperscript{114} Every object is forced to be an object of the logic of representation of the only type of power that is recognized. According to Nietzsche it is an essentially reactive will to power that would ever seek to recognition or seek power as an object of recognition.

The contradiction that philosophers place within the will when they interpret the will’s desire as infinite occurs because, as power of the object of representation, the will becomes exactly what they intend it not to be: both essence and appearance, with neither difference nor distinction. After a brief explanation of contradiction in Hobbes, Deleuze writes, “Hegel insists on the unreality of the situation of the master, for the master depends on the slave for recognition. Everyone puts contradiction into the will and also the will into contradiction. Represented power is only appearance; the essence of the will does not establish itself in what is willed without losing itself in appearance.”\textsuperscript{115} While power becomes object of representation and the object of representation becomes a recognition of power, this as the essence of the will to power can never be fulfilled. Its desire to fulfill its essence is left infinitely unfulfilled on its own terms and, rather, as we have seen continuously depends on subsuming another for its own recognition, the fulfillment of its will. Thus this will, in reality, is infinitely lacking in power. This leads Deleuze to conclude that this is the reason why “philosophers [must] promise the will a limitation, a rational [in the case of Hegel] or contractual limitation [in the case of Hobbes] which is the only thing which will be able to make it livable and resolve

\textsuperscript{114} The critique of values and the logic of representation are intimately linked in Deleuze’s reappropriations of Kantian critique.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid 83
Thus the history of philosophy has deeply misunderstood the nature of the will, according to Deleuze.

What this misunderstanding calls for is a radical rethinking of the object of philosophical investigation, namely, the phenomenon, which is no longer to be thought of as an appearance but as a sign that finds its sense or meaning in some existing play of forces. We must think in terms of forces. Deleuze writes: “All force is appropriation, domination, and exploitation of a quantity of reality. Even perception… is the expression of forces which appropriate nature… nature itself has a history. The history of a thing, in general is the succession of forces which take possession of it…” 117 Thus, ahistorical metaphysical theories will never be adequate for the interpretation of the phenomenon. Indeed there is a multiplicity of senses for every event and phenomenon and we must take a pluralistic and perspectivist approach to interpretation in order to reach the being of objects of experiences, these objects in their becoming. Truth, for Deleuze, is unproduced and unformed, a brand of thought that is incomprehensible to the dogmatic metaphysics of Kantian transcendental philosophy.

**Values: Nietzsche and Kant**

Here, we turn to the perspective of the foundation of socio-political values to distinguish false critique from true critique. Deleuze identifies Kant's first *Critique* as a necessary turning point in philosophy. He argues that Kant invents the internal critique of reason in order to ground truth, but like Foucault, maintains that Kant's project limits itself. Deleuze has three criticisms that, I believe, are directed at the same eventual purpose. On the one hand, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze argues that Kant's

\[116\] Ibid 83

\[117\] Ibid 43
internal critique of reason fails because it is not an immanent critique. In order to understand this, it must be clear that Deleuze defines internal critique as the critique of reason by reason, but his fundamental question is: What gives reason the legitimacy to critique? Reason, for Deleuze is not the most immanent manifestation of itself. Rather, thought, at the level in which it reaches indistinguishably with being, is the true level of immanence. It is the level of pure becoming. In Kantian philosophy, because reason is allowed to define and ground itself, thought becomes synonymous with reason in that reason becomes the origin and end for all knowledge. In such a case, reason does not undergo a complete and total critique of itself. On the other hand, however, Deleuze criticizes Kant for reproducing the image of thought that characterizes western philosophy when Kant seeks the conditions for the possibility of experience rather than the conditions for the genesis of real experience. But it is in developing an ontology which seeks the conditions for the genesis of real experience\textsuperscript{118} that, according to Deleuze, allows for a more fundamental account of what thought is apart from reason. It is transcendental empiricism that Deleuze identifies as an ontology capable of such an account of the thought of becoming. Thus, Deleuze is concerned that if a critique of human reason is carried out by human reason, then the genesis of thought or destruction of the orthodox image of thought cannot occur.

Deleuze's last criticism of Kant is that Kant simply presumed the existence of knowledge and morality as “facts” and then sought their conditions of possibility in the transcendental. Deleuze's principal reason for claiming that the orthodox image of thought is a profound betrayal of what it means to think is that it sustains a complacent conception of thought which is incapable of criticizing established values. Kant is his

\textsuperscript{118} This, as we will see in chapter 3, occurs at the level when thought and being are indistinguishable.
prime example of a thinker who proposed an all-encompassing critique but who in the end settled for compromise. His version of critique proved incapable of questioning the value of knowledge, faith or morality as Deleuze will state “there has never been a more conciliatory or respectful total critique”\textsuperscript{119}. The reason is that the value of knowledge, morality and beauty is presupposed by the manner in which Kant understands the different systems of collaboration among the faculties under the model of recognition and common sense. Thus, this section examines Deleuze’s remarks on Kantian critique and the development of a new image of thought in order to lead up to understanding why the eternal return is equated with the critical element. These sections will directly lead into chapter three’s focus on Deleuze's time as integral to critique as well as his response to Kant in the form of transcendental empiricism and the removal of the opposition between thought and being. For Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, according to Bryant, "is an attempt to formulate an ontology - not an epistemology or theory of knowledge - that locates intelligibility at the level of the aesthetic or sensible itself."\textsuperscript{120} In \textit{Difference and Repetition}, Deleuze will redefine thought by removing the opposition between thought and being, and maintain that thought arises in strict opposition to established human reason.

As we saw, power must never be understood as something represented or even interpreted. According to Deleuze, “it is “the one that” interprets, “the one that” evaluates, “the one that” wills.”\textsuperscript{121} It is the authority and cannot be scrutinized and measured by outside authority. It creates a way of interpreting, evaluating, willing. What

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid 89
\textsuperscript{120} Levi R. Bryant, \textit{Difference and Giveness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence}. (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 12.
\textsuperscript{121} Gilles Deleuze \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 85.
the will to power wills is the genetic/plastic element, “a particular relation of forces, a particular quality of forces. And also a particular quality of power: affirming or denying. We will turn back to this point at the end of the chapter. However, as we have seen, for both Heidegger and Deleuze, ontological difference, becoming, is the foundation of being. Moreover, there is an equivalency between ontological difference and questioning. Thus, the thinking of the origin of being occurs through a form of questioning which welcomes difference. Lawlor and Sholtz explain, “as equivalent to a question, being actively constitutes beings as differences, as if they were so many different answers to a question that remains open and consequently unanswerable.” As interpretive measure, the will to power is the one that answers as well as the one that questions, thereby opening and reopening ontological difference.

Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals*, then, forms a critique insofar as it is a “key for interpretation in general and… analysis of the reactive type in particular.” If the form of critique found in *Genealogy of Morals* is an active response to reactive forces then it is a demystification of the ideals that have sedimented in society as reality. This concept of critique, in fact, deeply informs Deleuze’s own theory of the real. For Deleuze it is the virtual that is real and actualized through proper critique. At the time of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, the virtual is the site of metaphysical forces that can either become active or reactive wills to power.

Deleuze dissects *The Genealogy of Morals* into three themes corresponding to the

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122 Lawlor and Sholtz “Heidegger and Deleuze” 3.
123 The choice of word, “welcome,” here, should not be misread as peaceful. In fact, as we shall see in the following chapter, the welcoming of the thought of difference welcomes a violence that deforms the foundation of reason, even if only to recreate and ground that very foundation.
124 Lawlor and Sholtz, “Heidegger and Deleuze” 3.
126 See De Beistegui *Truth and Genesis*, Levi Bryant’s *Difference and Giveness*, and Joe Hughes’ *Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition* for more on the relationship between the virtual and the real.
problem of determining metaphysical truths in Dialectic in *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

Deleuze contends that the ressentiment essay, ressentiment itself, implies a paralogism. He explains that ressentiment is nothing but “the paralogism of force separated from what it can do (GM I 13).”¹²⁷ This means that what ressentiment is, the force within it, is an illogical form of reasoning from the point of view of its own goals. It is a form of reasoning that takes its revenge, critiques and negates by relying on a fiction, relying on the “negative as something imaginary.”¹²⁸ Ressentiment is, in fact, a power, a type of critique. It interprets the positive, the current values, in order to critique them. But ressentiment critiques current values by means of a reversal rather than a reevaluation of those values.¹²⁹ It does not give creative power to the negative, but rather all power of the real is given to positive established values. The real is not what the will can manifest through critique but ressentiment allows established social formations to limit and define its method of critique. Nothing new comes from this reversal of values. Thus, ressentiment separates itself from what it can do, that is, separates itself from the transformative power of the negative. It, then, relies on a fiction insofar as it claims this reversal of positive values as the true order of the world. For example, as well all know from *Genealogy of Morals*, the priest do not create new values but simply replace noble virtues that had overpowered the weak. Priests valorize the meek instead of reevaluating the very powers that had overpowered them. Thus they mystify the very origins of their own values and deny the fact that these values rely on those that came before.

The second hidden Kantian theme in the *Genealogy*, Deleuze says, is found in the

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¹²⁷ Ibid 87
¹²⁸ Ibid 87
¹²⁹ By reversal, here, I do not mean the positively coded reversal that we see Deleuze ascribe to when he, following Nietzsche and along with Heidegger, demands a reversal of Platonism. That is what I call reevaluation here.
second essay which “underlines the fact that bad conscience is inseparable from “spiritual and imaginary events (GM II 18).” Deleuze describes bad conscience as an antinomy, a contradiction seen through “expressing a force which is turned against itself.” In the Genealogy bad conscience arises as a consequence of an unhealthy Christian morality that turns an evil eye towards natural inclinations. So, bad conscience is antinomic insofar as it signifies a contradiction within the will, a contradiction which Christian morality promotes. Of the third essay in Genealogy, Deleuze claims, “the ascetic ideal refers to the deepest mystification – that of the Ideal.” This misuse of active force, resulting in a mystification “includes all the others [reactive forces which misuse activity], all the fictions of morality and knowledge.”

Real critique performs without recourse to the “mind, self-consciousness, the critic himself” man, in other words. All forms of critique that are not the eternal return “avoid asking the preliminary question: “Who must undertake critique, who is fit to undertake it?” They talk of reason, spirit, self-consciousness and man; but to whom do all these concepts refer?” That is, what is being presupposed with the language of reason, spirit, self-consciousness and man? Deleuze’s answer is that they “hide forces which are ready to be reconciled with any kind of power, with church or state. It is forces that are active that are truly able to undertake critique and posit a new order.” It is in this “who” that Deleuze sees the tension between Kant's critical project and his results Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy. There, Deleuze suggests that Nietzsche completed and inverted Kantianism. Nietzsche does so by supplementing critique with a

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130 Ibid 87
131 Ibid 87
132 Ibid 88
133 Ibid 88
134 Ibid 88
genealogical approach. According to Nietzsche, and as we have seen from the method questioning he espouses, to truly critique any position one must fundamentally ask who or what is the source of the will behind this very position. It is asking this question that one can bring critique to bear, not simply on false claims to knowledge or morality (as Kant claims to), but on true knowledge and true morality, and on the proposed foundation, truth itself. Therefore, Deleuze quite explicitly contrasts Kant's critique with Nietzsche's genealogy, arguing that Nietzsche radically inverts and completes Kantian critique. Deleuze maintains that Nietzsche's problem is that Kant's critique is not a true critic of the values that he assumes in his own project.

One of the problems with Kant, according to Nietzsche is that “For Kant, what legislates (in a domain) is always one of our faculties: understanding, reason.”\footnote{Ibid 86} Even though Kant makes us the legislators by means of the Copernican revolution:

> We are legislators only insofar as we submit to one of our faculties, as it were the whole of ourselves. But to what do we submit in such a faculty, to what forces? Understanding and reason have a long history: they are instances which still make us obey when we no longer want to obey anyone. When we stop obeying God, the State, our parents, reason appears and persuades us to continue being docile because it says to us: it is you who are giving the orders. Reason represents our slavery and our subjection as something superior which make us reasonable beings.\footnote{Ibid 86}

Thus, rather than grounding truth, Kant, contrary to what he himself would believe, grounds the value system of an established authority.\footnote{Ibid 86} Knowledge, morality and beauty are, then, presupposed by the terms of Kantian critique. Thus, for Deleuze in the footsteps of Nietzsche, the nature of critique itself must be transformed in order for knowledge, morality or aesthetic value themselves to be put under question.

\footnote{No doubt, in “Was ist Aufklärung” Kant maintains that the goal of enlightenment in the form of critique is to escape the shackles of authority.}
What is particular about Nietzsche's genealogy, as Deleuze understands it, is that it is an immanent critique, in which a principle which is not itself in form but in primordial force is the measure by which to evaluate. The only measure is the will to power as a principle of internal genesis, both of values and of thought. Deleuze states in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, “only the will to power as genetic and genealogical principle, as legislative principle, is capable of realizing internal critique.”¹³⁸ Therefore, Deleuze attributes to Nietzsche an ideal of thought which should also be considered the goal of his own philosophy, namely a “thought that would affirm life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life... Thinking would then mean discovering, inventing new possibilities of life.”¹³⁹ This is the thought of pure becoming.

Deleuze writes:

Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to morality, but not on morality itself. Thus total critique turns into the politics of compromise.¹⁴⁰

It is in prioritizing common sense, according to Deleuze, that Kant misrecognizes what is “properly transcendental empiricism” and substitutes for transcendental empiricism “a tracing of the transcendental from the empirical.”¹⁴¹ Common sense relays the identity of the object under the form of recognition and therefore the orthodox image of thought. The faculties reproduce these empirical interests according to the model of recognition which “fixes good usage [of the faculties] in the form of a harmony between

¹³⁸ Ibid 91
¹³⁹ Ibid 101
¹⁴⁰ Ibid 89
the faculties determined by a dominant faculty under a given common sense.”142 The faculties reproduce knowledge, morality, reflection, faith, and the status quo of political power in Kant. What common sense and, consequently, the model of recognition give us then is the condition for the possibility of experience as it currently is. What Deleuze wants, however, is an ontology that does not yield a common sense but a creation of new forms of experience. In other words, Deleuze maintains that Kant begins the first Critique by believing in what he criticizes: the fact of knowledge.143 Kant fails to perform a full critique precisely because he merely commits himself to describing the conditions of possible experience rather than the genesis of real experience.144

What Deleuze wants, specifically, is a new image of thought to replace the one dominated by recognition and representational thinking. It is production and reproduction of human reason rather than the definition of man where Deleuze determines the problem lies. And, therefore, it is from a type of irrationalism, one in which the faculties become disjointed, that thought, real thought can come into being once again.145 For reason, according to Deleuze will always be characterized by recognition and representational thinking. “Reason is receptive, reactive.”146 But unbeknownst to Kant, “it is reason which receives and expresses the rights of that which dominates thought, thought reconquers its rights and becomes a legislator against reason.”147

In this form of transcendent(al empiricism, too, Kant fails at giving true

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142 Ibid 137
143 This criticism of Kant, of course, extends to the other two critiques, namely, in Kant believing in the fact of morality and religion.
144 We will discuss this at length in chapter four where I cover Deleuze’s words on common sense in Difference and Repetition.
145 In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze describes irrationalism as the legislation of thought against reason.
147 Ibid 93
transcendental principles, then. For what is transcendental is unrecognizable from the point of view of reason. In her essay, “Critical Incorporations,” Jill Marsden suggests that one of the Nietzschean developments Deleuze finds most important is that Nietzsche invents a kind of “transcendental unconscious” defined by the immanence of its criteria.”

It is a transcendental unconscious that locates forces in the body rather than prioritizing the mental capacity of the human. Citing Nietzsche Marsden notes, his characterization of the body. The body, for Nietzsche, has a history or rather is “an economy of immanently self-organizing constitutive [historical] processes.”

These constitutive processes are “alive” in the body in the forms of desires “material flows or “libidinal drives” which orientate the forces of life.”

She rightly contrasts this with the Kantian conception of desire. Kantian desire, as seen in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Critique of Practical Reason*, is a derivative and irrational form of action. The subject has an intentional goal and manipulates the situation, whether objects or subjects, in order to achieve her or his goal. Moreover an external influence (natural appetite, for instance) has placed this goal within the subject and created this desire. For Nietzsche, however, these desires are ateleological and pre-representational and thus “operate independently of transcendent control structures, [they] are inherently plastic and freely admit substitution in their “objects.”

It is through “genealogical diagnosis” then, that we are able to interpret their “trajectory” a priori. Indeed, this relationship of body to transcendental forces Deleuze takes up quite clearly in his chapter “Active and Reactive Forces”.

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148 Jill Marsden, “Critical Incorporations”, *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* No. 16 (Fall 1998), 38.
149 Ibid. 38.
150 Ibid. 38
151 Ibid. 38.
There is a reciprocal relationship between bodies and the eternal return. Real thought occurs at the level where thought and being collide as we will see in the following chapter. It is at their transcendental site, where forces meet body, become body, that the will to power as principle of eternal return is able to make contact with the eternal return as critical element. Thus, one of the consequences of Deleuze’s interpretation is that within Kant and phenomenology, the transcendental is never made truly transcendental. That is, neither Kant nor phenomenologists are able to free the transcendental structures of thought from empirical acts of psychological consciousness.

The Eternal Return as Critical Element

Like Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, Deleuze appropriates the Eternal Return for a theory of time as a metaphysical theory. It is important to realize in thinking pure becoming, being is not opposed to becoming but incorporated into it in its very expression of difference. Keith Ansell Pearson reads Deleuze’s use of the Eternal Return Doctrine as an ethics of the event. Reading *Bergsonism*, he interprets Deleuze’s task: “To open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman (durations which are inferior or superior to our own), to go beyond the human condition: This is the meaning of philosophy, in so far as our condition condemns us to live among badly analyzed composites, and to be badly analyzed composites ourselves” is Bergsonian inspired.¹⁵² Moreover, Pearson identifies Deleuze’s use of the eternal return as specifically anti-anthropological, ‘seeking to remove them [the questions of life and death] from the restrictive economy of an existentialist or personalist ethics (an ethics of the ‘I’ and the self, Je and Moi) in order to open up the human to the over-human.’¹⁵³

¹⁵³ Keith Ansell Pearson, “Living the Eternal Return as the Event: Nietzsche with Deleuze,” *Journal of
Force is to describe the being of the will at a preindividual and therefore prehumen level. It designates what is outside of human knowledge but yet grounds the truth of that knowledge. This is why Deleuze uses the different designations of *fond*, *fondement*, and *fondation* in his *Difference and Repetition*. Force is at the level of the fond, the very bottom – unformed and chaotic. It is able to found the foundation of a truth. It is true then, that force is as Pearson describes “At the origin then, force is difference: difference from itself, for it is becoming, but not becoming Something; and difference from other forces for, as distinct entities within the multiple, they cannot be identical.” In the *Will to Power*, Nietzsche writes “duration, identity with itself, being are inherent neither in that which is called subject nor in that which is called object: they are complexes of events apparently durable in comparison with other complexes.”

Force, like the will to power, can only be understood in its difference, its relationship to other forces and not in its permanence – in identity, subject and object. Thus force operates at a metaphysical level where identity, faculties of the subject and the forms of the objects of experience are lost but empirical material and its context still exist. Yet, force does still respond to those very formations such that new formations can arise. This is not a true and separate world. It is a world very much in relation and response to the forms of experience, but at the same time not dictated by them. Therefore, in its response to political, social and ethical formations, force operates at a pure level of the relationship between the ethical, political social – the critical. This is what Deleuze does with the Eternal Return Doctrine as a metaphysical doctrine. As such a metaphysical doctrine, it is unlike any metaphysics that seek stable structures to identify reality.

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154 Ibid 66

The Eternal Return Doctrine, however, does make certain claims to truth: that active forces are better than reactive forces and that persepectivism is truer than idealism. How is it, then, that the Eternal Return can make such claims to truth? Like the Hegelian dialectic, but through a different “logic” altogether, we can say that the Eternal Return must be thought as a synthesis. The Eternal Return is a kind of synthesis, and as James Leigh poignantly describes “it is a function of becoming and multiplicity.” In that respect, to quote Deleuze, essentially the Eternal Return is “a synthesis of time and its dimensions, of the diverse and its reproduction and of both becoming and being which affirms itself in becoming.” While we have already discussed the synthesis of the diverse and its reproduction and that the Eternal Return reestablishes the essential relationship of becoming to being, we have yet to discuss as a synthesis of time and its dimensions. Indeed, the Eternal Return is a transcendental exercise that reveals the untimely to the will to power. That the Eternal Return forces us to think becoming means that it forces us to “think” time in its purity.

In order to understand how the thought of pure becoming is both a metaphysical and critical doctrine, we must understand how it grounds the Eternal Return. Deleuze claims that “All we need to do to think this thought is to stop believing in being as distinct from and opposed to becoming or to believe in the being of becoming itself.” Of course, we saw above how the Platonic ideal conditions philosophical thinking into believing being is distinct from and opposed to becoming. We saw how the “which one…” form of questioning leads the inquirer to essence because it seeks the perspective

158 Ibid 54
159 See pages 4 through 7.
from which the object is seen. This perspective is dictated by temporal, spatial and elemental context and is in flux. Thus, Deleuze continues, “What is the being of that which becomes, of that which neither begins nor finishes becoming? To return: the being of that which becomes. “To say that everything returns is to approach at the maximum the world of becoming and the one of being: the peak of contemplation” (VP II170/WP617)" 160

The problem of contemplation, however, Deleuze says can be formulated from another side as a series of questions and affirmations about time. In asking “how can the past constitute itself in time? How can the present pass?” Deleuze answers, “the passing moment could never pass if it had not already passed in the same time as being present, and to yet come in the same time as being present. If the present did not pass by itself, if it was necessary to wait for a new present in order for the former to become past, the past in general would never constitute itself in time, nor would this present pass.” 161 What Deleuze is describing here in temporal terms is what Lawlor and Sholtz describe as “the fold” and relates to what Deleuze himself also describes as “the fold” in his texts on *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* and *Foucault*. In these texts the concept of the fold allows Deleuze to think about the synthesis of subjectivity. At the level of pure time and pure becoming, however, ultimately he is concerned about the possibilities for, and synthesis of, ‘non-human’ forms of ‘subjectivity’. Therefore, we can say that the fold is a critique of traditional accounts of the production of subjectivity and the synthesis of time. It is a critique of accounts that assume a simple interiority and exteriority. The fold complicates the concepts of interiority and exteriority. Here, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* time is

160 Ibid 54
161 Ibid 54
conceived without separation between past, present, and future. Therefore, there is really neither interiority nor exteriority with this temporal schema. For, like the difference between appearance and essence, being and becoming, the fold announces that the inside is nothing more than a fold of the outside. Therefore, as Lawlor and Sholtz suggest, the fold indicates no dualism. At the same time, however, this does not indicate a sameness nor continuity of identity.\textsuperscript{162}

It is as if the past, present, and to come are folded upon one another when one thinks pure becoming and therefore think time in its precise relationship to the thing in its singularity.\textsuperscript{163} The time of every singularity has its own precise relationship to the fold of time – a relationship to past, present, and future at once holds constitutes its essence. And when we think becoming in this way, a becoming-active will to power occurs, a will to power of ethical and political dimensions opens up. Deleuze explains that in seeking an active relationship to time, “we cannot wait, \textit{it is necessary} that the instant be at the once present and past, present and to come, in order that it passes (and pass to the benefit of other instants).”\textsuperscript{164} Moreover, “\textit{it is necessary} that the present coexist with itself as past and as to come. It is the synthetic relationship of the instant with itself as present, past and to come that founds its relationship with the other instants. The eternal return is, therefore, a response to the problem of the passage”\textsuperscript{165}\textsuperscript{166} Here Deleuze describes this thinking of time as a passage. It is a passage that allows the present, past, and future instants pass to the benefit of “the other” instants. There is clearly an ethical and political

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\bibitem{162} Lawlor and Sholtz, “Heidegger and Deleuze” 1
\bibitem{163} I will fill this in, after going over Foucault and The Fold, with a bit of an explanation.
\bibitem{164} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche et la Philosophie} [Nietzsche and Philosophy], (Paris: Presses universitaires de Fran, 1962; Wudrige Grands testes edition, 2010) 48, my emphasis and translation
\bibitem{165} Ibid 48 my emphasis and translation
\bibitem{166} Tomlinson removes all of the imperatives, the “il faut” in French. I believe Deleuze is expressing an imperative to think the Eternal Return.
\end{thebibliography}
undertone in this thought of time. This thought affirms each and every instant to the equal benefit of each instant. Moreover, Deleuze succeeds in maintaining the coordinates of space and difference as each instant is in passage, blocking the time and space of the event, that thought becomes reactive, denying the perspective of the singular instant.

In the auto-affective relationship of this folding of past present and future, then, heterogeneity can arise:

And in this sense, it must not be interpreted as the return of something that Is, that is One or that is the Same. In the expression “eternal return”, we make a misinterpretation when we understand: return of the Same. This is not the being which returns, but the becoming itself constitutes being such that it affirms itself in becoming and in that which passes. This is not the one which recomes, but the recoming itself is the one which affirms from the diverse or from the multiple. In all cases, the identity of the eternal return does not designate the nature of the which recomes, but on the contrary the fact of recoming in order for that which differs. That is why the eternal return must be thought as a synthesis: synthesis of time and of its dimensions, synthesis of diversity and of its reproduction, synthesis of the double affirmation. The eternal return, then, depends itself on a principle which is not identity but which must, in all regards, fulfill the exigencies from a veritable sufficient reason. ¹⁶⁷

This is why Bryant suggests that Deleuze is a hyper-rationalist. It is due to the fact that Deleuze’s genesis of real experience is, in fact, the discovery of intelligibility within the given itself.¹⁶⁸ For Deleuze the sufficient reason of the given is to be found in the differentials of being that determine the genesis of the given.¹⁶⁹ Since the differentials themselves are “intelligible, rational structures governed by rule-like processes”, Deleuze is able to eradicate the oppositions between the sensible and the intelligible, passivity and activity, finitude and infinity.¹⁷⁰ As we have seen, Deleuze interprets the Eternal Return

¹⁶⁷ Ibid 55, French 48
¹⁶⁹ A discussion of this occurs in Difference and Repetition and thus I will return to sufficient reason as differential and difference in degree in Chapter 4.
as a heterogeneous power. What returns in this fold of time is what has not yet come: it is the reproduction of the new – what comes out of past present and future communicating to one another. But to be clear, Deleuze makes sure, we cannot interpret what comes from the eternal return as a thing, a being that has a different “nature”. What we are calling the identity of that which returns from the Eternal Return is “the fact of recoming in order for that which differs”. It is the becoming something else, which is affirmed with the Eternal Return. It is an ethical, critical, and political becoming/thought all at once. The recoming comes in order for that which is other to come. And, I maintain, Deleuze emphasizes that the Eternal Return designates “the fact” of this passage for another precisely because the Eternal Return, for Deleuze, is a kind of imperative for the philosopher, the thinkers of the present.

All of this finally puts serious light on the role of the philosopher for Deleuze. The eternal return is a transcendental element and untimely, but the problems it deals with are material and empirical in the present. The return in the eternal return is of the unthought, a difference that has not been seen. Time equals the problem of contemplation, which is critical, metaphysical and then political and ethical insofar as it is critical, insofar as it is the philosopher responding to her or his own time. Deleuze explains, “if philosophy’s critical task is not actively taken up in every epoch philosophy dies and with it die the images of the philosopher and the free man.”171 Philosophers must not content themselves with merely analyzing the past. While philosophers must be historians, their job is not completed with historical analysis alone. Indeed, it is the philosopher’s task to respond to present because “stupidity and baseness are always those

of our own time, of our contemporaries, our stupidity and baseness.”\textsuperscript{172} It is necessary that the philosopher interpret the problems of her or his own time and undergoes the imperative to extend beyond the limitations of the present. Deleuze employs the words “stupidity” and “baseness” here instead of the word “error” due to the very explanations we have discussed above. Error is part of the language of representation and ahistoricality. He states:

Unlike the atemporal concept of error, baseness is inseparable from time, that is from this rapture of the present, from this present condition in which it is incarnated and in which it moves. This is why philosophy has an essential relation to time: it is always against its time, critique of the present world. The opposition in terms of which philosophy is realized is that of present and non-present, of our time and the untimely (UM II “Use and Abuse of History” Preface). And in the untimely there are truths that are more durable than all historical and eternal truths put together: truths of times to come.\textsuperscript{173}

Thus, it is crucial to interpret the Eternal Return as a categorical imperative unlike scholars have maintained.\textsuperscript{174} However, the Eternal Return is a very certain type of imperative for the thinker. The Eternal Return does not demand that we universally submit to a set of rules, but rather that the philosopher submit to the problems of the present and to becoming, submit to “the fact of recoming in order for that which differs.” In this interpretation, Deleuze is both a pure metaphysician as well as demanding that philosophy be materialist and empirical.\textsuperscript{175} We must think these forces in relationship to the topology that dictates their singularity.

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid 107
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid 107
\textsuperscript{174} Leigh explains in his essay “Deleuze, Nietzsche and the Eternal Return” the various misunderstanding of the Eternal Return that can be found in secondary literature. He discusses one of Walter Kaufmann’s criticism of interpreting the Eternal Return Doctrine as a kind of categorical imperative.
\textsuperscript{175} Why is there no contradiction here? Asks De Beistegui: “because the materialism in question is also an idealism, and the empiricism is transcendental.”
**Conclusion:**

As Deleuze asserts, “thinking depends on certain coordinates.” These coordinates make up the topology of the fold by which this thinking is affected. This is Deleuze’s meaning when he writes “we have the truths that we deserve depending on the place we are carrying our existence to, the hour we watch over and the element that we frequent… We only find truths where they are, at their time and in their element. Every truth is truth of an element, of a time and a place: the minotaur does not leave the labyrinth (VP III 408)” Here, Deleuze already begins to use parallel terminology to his later works. Insofar as the fold is continuous, the truths found are immanent to “the labyrinth”, and therefore never eternal nor infinite. Yet, as the subject is itself a temporal fold, and the fold an indication of finitude, the fold’s power to be affected and affect change in the subject marks its infinitude.

Heidegger, too, makes use of the image of the fold. “Yet,” according to Lawlor and Scholtz, “for Deleuze what is at issue is how Heidegger conceives the relation between thought and what is to be thought. Deleuze claims that the later Heidegger remains attached to “the primacy of Same.”” For, Deleuze, despite the fact that Heidegger rejects the eternal return doctrine due to its metaphysical character, Heidegger remains a metaphysician himself. This “primacy of the same” that Lawlor and Sholtz speak of is described as a kind of “homology” between thought and what is to be thought. Thus there is a stark difference between Heidegger and Deleuze by Deleuze’s own accounts. While what is to be thought is an intellectualization of the thing, as Bryant puts it, this hyper-rationalization of the empirical is still totally other to the thought that

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176 Ibid 110
177 Ibid 110
attempts to think it. Lawlor and Sholtz explain, “For Deleuze, however, the fold must be understood as a fold between two kinds of forms, as if being and beings, thought and the object of thought, and between things said and thing seen, as if all of the doubles are formalized. These two forms are not homologous but heterogeneous and different from one another; the fold is in fact a “non-relation” (F 117/109).” As established, the thought is between two forms of thought, indeed, but the forces that allow thought to communicate is a formless chasm. Thus, while there is no dialectical relationship between thought and the thought of the other, the relationship is one of absolute difference. In order to interpret the “other side” of the fold, so to speak, thought must cross a violent and formless “non-relation” destroying its own preconceptions in order to reestablish the point of view of the “other side.” This also means that the between, the formless chasm between each “side” is the primary relationship within the fold; it is the violent encounter that gives rise to form.

In the closing few pages of his “Critique” chapter, Deleuze emphasizes a certain temporal relationship with which the philosopher must reckon. In stating that “the opposition in terms of which philosophy is realized is that of present and non-present, of our time and the untimely.” Deleuze is not saying that the philosopher deals with the relationship between being and nothingness, between positive and negative, or between the finite and infinite. He, as we already know, speaks of no dialectic. Indeed, the untimely does not equal the infinite – a position we try to achieve at the same time as escaping finitude. The present and non-present, time and untimely occur simultaneously, across the same fold, and are in degree rather than kind. The present thought reaches the

180 Lawlor and Scholtz, “Heidegger and Deleuze,” 3.
untimely not by escaping time, but through the differential, genealogical, and typological interpretation of the present time. Thereby, the (virtual) possibilities of the present time can be made (actualized) present. Thus, the untimely does not designate the opposite of being, existing in time, but what can come into being through critique of the present time. Therefore, I propose that infinitude is Deleuze’s term for knowledge that is in the position of the untimely.

It is in this way that Deleuze will be able to overcome the distinction between finitude and infinitude, and show how the finite differs only in degree, not kind, from the infinite. Bryant explains, “If this distinction collapses, then this is because the ability to create objects (givens) through thinking them is no longer understood as belonging solely to divine, infinite beings such as God, but is a property shared in degree by finite creatures as well.” Thus, Deleuze’s singularity and difference from transcendental philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism and other post-structuralists is that he retains the active power of all finitude rather than a certain type of finitude. If the position of infinitude, which creates being, is a matter of degree from all finite positions, no one being is prioritized while, at the same time, a certain relationship to thought is prioritized. We thus find a position of evaluation within a seemingly relative and valueless philosophy.

The Eternal Return is a certain synthesis unlike any other. It is not the Kantian synthesis of the transcendental unity of apperception, which synthesizes time in order for a homogeneous mind that creates its objects. For Deleuze, the Kantian synthesis does not reach the real transcendental and thus cannot have knowledge of real material and

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182 This important development I will discuss in chapter 4.
empirical existence. The Eternal Return equals time as past, present, future folded upon each other. This is what allows time to be a passage. Therefore, the will (the one who interprets; its method of interpretation) has a certain relation to time that allows a value, politics, ethics, social formation to return anew. It is this relationship to time that allows the will to be active. Thus the difference between active and reactive is its passage through time (and space). In doing so, it opens other possibilities that rupture from this folded relationship. A relationship to time that separates past, present, and future, that interprets time through representational concepts such as eternity and infinity will not complete the Eternal Return.

The Eternal Return is a “metaphysical” doctrine dealing with transcendental elements but only insofar as we see those transcendental elements in relation to material and empirical objects. Hence, the philosopher responds to the present. By that Deleuze means the material present. The philosopher responds to the empirical problems of our time. And he or she thereby traces the virtual problematic field within the actual field of solutions in order to answer those problems. At the same time, the material is generated through this idealism/perspectivism that Deleuze espouses. Time and place coordinates are both empirical and transcendental and, hence, immanent. Through such an interpretation, objects bestow a kind of intelligibility, which is not a representation. This intelligibility allows us to experience real objects and speak of real objects. Thus, Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism is both a real transcendentalism (dealing with the virtual, forces, unformed as real) and a real empiricism (dealing with the realm of identity and discourse as real).

Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that we must undergo thought that “we
are not going to think unless as we are forced to go where the forces which give food for thought are, where the forces that make thought something active and affirmatic are made use of.”184 Whereas Heidegger also emphasizes the powerlessness of the experience of thought, Deleuze interprets Heidegger’s encounter with being as a kind of harmony between thought and encounter. But it is necessary, for Deleuze, that thought be forced through a violent encounter. This violence is necessary, or rather, is simply the case, for Deleuze, because real thought begins with a destructive moment. Real thought begins by unraveling socially, politically and ethically hegemonic forms of reason. Thus, the fold is the proper image for the synthesis of time and its relationship to contemplation because each movement of the fold shifts the entire form of reality. What was known before must be seen from a new perspective. Moreover, it is through this violent force that throws thought into formlessness that real thought is capable of affect and being affected. Indeed, this is why Deleuze’s theory differs from rationalists in terms of method. He states to distinguish himself from Kant, Cartesians and the like, “thought does not need a method but a paideia, a formation, a culture. Method in general is a means by which we avoid going to a particular place, or by which we maintain the option of escaping from it (the thread of the labyrinth).”185 In other words, method as Kantian and Cartesians understand it is the antithesis of the fold. And, insofar as method remains on the side of the thinker – the subject – method fails because it presupposes the need to reach the position of the infinite rather than infintude.

184 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) 110
185 Ibid 110
Chapter 3: The Order of Time

“Repetition is never a historical fact, but rather the historical condition under which something new is effectively produced.”\textsuperscript{186}

Introduction:

In Logic of Sense, Deleuze espouses a theory of time that is not chronological. Though we cannot read Logic of Sense into Difference and Repetition, we can see the beginning of such a theory of time in Difference and Repetition, which also began in Nietzsche and Philosophy. The theory of time that Deleuze seeks is one in which all empirical content is emptied out of it. The repetition that occurs is not of material; it is of a pure and empty form. The fold of time is a pure and empty form that, at the same time, is the order for the event. Deleuze also puts this in mathematical terms. In mathematics, cardinal numbers indicate how many of something there are such as one, two, three, four, five. Cardinal numbers are quantitative. An ordinal number tells the position of something in a list, such as first, second, third, fourth, fifth. The pure order of time is ordinal; it is not just qualitative, but qualitatively quantitative. In my first sections I discuss quantity and quality, passive synthesis and active synthesis. In sections one and two, I maintain that the ordering constructed through the contraction and contemplation of difference by the passive syntheses constitutes continuity as such.

In several sections of Levi Bryant’s Difference and Giveness, he discusses the Deleuzean event as an ethical action conditioned by a certain type of temporality. Bryant explains that Deleuze gives us a transcendental distribution of time because this is the necessary condition for the relation between past, present, and future belonging to the subject. The experience of the ethical action that is “too big for me” is dependent upon

\textsuperscript{186} Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 90
the past that has never been present.\textsuperscript{187} While in this chapter I am not concerned with the ethics of action, nor of a Deleuzean theory of action at all, I am concerned with the relationship of the transcendental distribution of time to the subject. The goal of this chapter is to find an answer to the questions: Why is the present prioritized in Deleuze? In what specific way is the present prioritized in distinction from past and future? This all rests on at least two contradictions. On the one hand, the past, which is contained in the living present, determines real ethical action only through a “past which was never present”. At the same time, this past, which was never present, is the structure of the future. These are the guiding questions for this chapter, specifically, the third and fourth sections. In my last section, I will discuss the concept of critique and its relation to Deleuze’s concept of time. The Deleuzean critique and potential result of critique is the subject of chapter four.

\textbf{Passive and Active Synthesis:}

In order to begin to understand the dense statements above, we must begin with the difference between passive synthesis and active synthesis. Deleuze describes passive synthesis as operating through contraction. Indeed, the role of the imagination, which governs contraction, is the “faculty” of passive synthesis. This means that Deleuze, too, maintains the separation and prioritization of the imagination over the understanding as Heidegger did in \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics}. Thus, “contraction is not a matter of reflection.”\textsuperscript{188} It is not an operation of the understanding. Deleuze says, “properly speaking, it forms a synthesis of time.”\textsuperscript{189} In this operation of contraction, difference - a


\textsuperscript{188} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 70.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid 70
change in the mind - is drawn from the repetition of instants. This is how time itself is constituted, according to Deleuze. Again, like Heidegger, for Deleuze “a succession of instants does not constitute time any more than it causes it to disappear: it indicates only its constantly aborted moment of birth. Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants.”190 And this synthesis of the imagination “contracts the successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present. It is in this present that time is deployed.”191 Contraction is not a matter of consciousness reflecting on instants, recognized as different, and continuing constituted and recognized as succession. Contraction is a matter of constituting the relations between instances and therefore the relationship between continuity and difference in the mind, eventually interpreted by the active mind.

According to Joe Hughes, the crucial word in these descriptions is contracted.192 Hughes interprets contraction as the creation of quality from quantity.193 He contends that quality is nothing but contracted quantity, a synthesis of quantity. So, in the passive synthesis of time, cases, elements, instants (1, 2, 3… ; AB, AB, AB, A…) are contracted and grounded in “an internal qualitative impression” from which differences are drawn.194 Indeed, Hughes affirms, the “job” of the three passive synthesis of time is to put differences (elements, cases, occurrences, instances) in relation to one another.”195 It is the third synthesis, which is converted into an active synthesis, however, where quality emerges from the Idea, according to Hughes. This is the moment of affirmation that is

190 Ibid 70
191 Ibid 70
192 Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (New York: Continuum, 2009) 146.
193 Ibid 146
subject to a genesis, or rather results in one. So, if quality is contracted, synthesized quantity, putting quantities in relation to one another, then the passive syntheses puts temporality in relation to itself. Each synthesis produces a new qualitative level of temporal experience. Although this sounds as if quantity, the cardinal, the successive, is primary, Hughes neglects to note that this qualitative contraction is more profound than its quantitative moments.

In a description similar to that of the three passive syntheses, Deleuze separates difference into three depths. According to Hughes, the lowest kind of difference is distance, the second kind is difference that envelops distances, while the third kind is “intensity which was constructed upon the other two series and linked together by means of affirmation.” These three differences, of course, are parallel to the three passive syntheses of time. In fact, it is the three passive syntheses of time that do the work of contraction in order to put these differences in relation to one another. This work of contraction thereby causes the change in the mind. Hughes maintains that intensity in the third synthesis is a difference that is no longer caught between matter or between the different levels of memory. It is a pure temporal (as well as spatial) relation between two terms with all empirical content emptied out. All empirical content, all memory is surpassed in a pure difference which is related only to other differences. It is the spatio-temporal dynamism of the Idea as we will see in Chapter Four.

How, then, does the passive synthesis operate in distinction from active synthesis in order to create the present? As stated, the passive “synthesis contracts the successive

\[\text{196 Ibid 160} \]
\[\text{197 Ibid 160} \]
\[\text{198 We will come back to the subject of intensity, the result of the third synthesis, in Chapter Four.} \]
\[\text{199 Ibid 160} \]
independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived or living present” and “it is in this present that time [itself] is deployed.” Here, the word to emphasize is constitutive. This constitution is not active; “it occurs in but is not carried out by the mind” in the sense that the active synthesis is. Thus, again, like Heidegger, Deleuze understands the mind and constitution of time as a coinciding happening or development. For Deleuze, repetition is a matter of subjectivity, specifically the movement or transformation in subjectivity. Deleuze credits Hume with the development of this concept of repetition. For Hume, as for Deleuze, each presentation to the mind is perfectly independent. Each has its own logic and therefore each presentation is discontinuous with the next. Thus, continuity must be constituted. How continuity is constituted when “repetition disappears even as it occurs” is the subject of “Repetition for itself.” Repetition has no “in-itself” or rather, this ordering or continuity has no “in-itself” and at the level of passive synthesis “changes nothing in the object or the state of affairs” though there is “something new in the mind.”

Going further, it is the passive synthesis of time that “imparts direction, moving from past to future in the present and from particular to general.” For Deleuze, memory and the understanding as faculties of the active synthesis are secondary to the imagination and therefore are supported by the deeper passive synthesis. When the passive synthesis performs each contraction, “passive synthesis constitutes a sign which is interpreted or deployed in active synthesis.”

To see the difference between passive synthesis and active synthesis most clearly,

\[201\] Ibid 70
\[202\] Ibid 70
\[203\] Ibid 71
\[204\] Ibid 73
we must study Deleuze’s example of the phenomenon of need from the point of view of passive synthesis and the point of view of active synthesis. In his analysis of need, Deleuze explains, “It is correctly said that those who do nothing tire themselves most. Fatigue marks the point at which the soul can no longer contract what it contemplates, the moment at which contemplation and contraction come apart.”

The relationship between fatigue, contraction and contemplation is that fatigue marks the moment in passive synthesis where contraction and contemplation are completely distinct. Fatigue, then, enables us to see the parallel development of contraction and contemplation within passive synthesis as well as its relationship to active synthesis. Deleuze continues:

We are made up of fatigues as much as of contemplations. That is why a phenomenon such as need can be understood in terms of ‘lack,’ from the point of view of action and the active synthesis which it determines, but as an extreme ‘satiety’ or ‘fatigue’ from the point of view of the passive synthesis by which it is conditioned. More precisely, need marks the limits of the variable present. The present extends between two eruptions of need, and coincides with the duration of a contemplation.

The passive synthesis is the positive, affirmative point of view of the phenomenon of need. It is at the level of passive synthesis that we are closer to the temporally defined truth of a sign (the interpretation of a case, element, instance). Thus, the understanding often misinterprets need as lack when, truthfully, at the level of passive synthesis it is a fullness: satiety or fatigue. This positivity is what conditions the interpretation of need. What Deleuze believes this phenomenon reveals is the temporal tensions within the present that are one and the same with contemplation. It reveals the activity of the contraction of elements occurring alongside contemplation that produces the present. It marks each “side”, the limit, of each element of interpretation, producing the present.

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205 Ibid 77
206 Ibid 77
207 Rather than the side of reactivity and representation as is seen in active synthesis.
To illustrate further and more concretely, Deleuze explains that, “a scar is the sign not of a past wound but of ‘the present fact of having been wounded’.” It is active synthesis that interprets a scar as a sign of a past wound. The wound, however, expresses the living present; it is the result of the activity of contemplation and contraction, passive synthesis as foundation and therefore the source of all signs, all interpretation. Deleuze continues:

We can say that it is the contemplation of the wound, that it contracts all the instants which separate us from it into a living present. Or rather, that we find here the true meaning of the distinction between natural and artificial: natural signs are signs of the present, referring to the present in which they signify. Artificial signs, by contrast, are those which refer to the past or the future as distinct dimensions of the present, dimensions on which the present might in turn depend. Artificial signs imply active synthesis – that is to say, the passage from spontaneous imagination to the active faculties of reflective representation, memory and intelligence.

Deleuze maintains that the difference between understanding the scar as a past wound and understanding it as the present fact of having been wounded can tell us about the important distinction between artificial and natural, which correspond to active and passive synthesis respectively. The scar is the wound as living present, a sign of the wound as living present. It is not a sign of the past as distinct from present nor as past where the wound was, truly, present. Thus, presence takes priority here because it is the foundation of all interpretation. It is the only point at which we can speak of an “origin” in any sense. Thus natural signs are signs where we begin interpretation from the present and “refer to the present in which they signify.” They are associated with passive synthesis because it is passive synthesis that creates the living present. It is active synthesis, then, that operates under the understanding, through the logic of representation,
reason, and memory as recognition.\textsuperscript{210} Thus, intensity, a pure difference rattles the connection between passive synthesis and active synthesis. It is not, however, that passive synthesis is good and active synthesis bad. Indeed, passive synthesis may fall into the trap of habit which no longer contracts differences into intensities able to be pure differences of the Idea.

Deleuze analyzes the phenomenon of need because “Need expresses the openness of a question before it expresses the non-being or the absence of a response.”\textsuperscript{211} Here, too, we see the fundamental positivity of the phenomenon of need rather than the fundamental lack that it is interpreted to signify. What is primary in need is need as fullness and as result and evidence of the living present. Thus, Deleuze affirms, “To contemplate is to question.” He continues, “Is it not the peculiarity of questions to ‘draw’ a response? Questions present at once both the stubbornness or obstinacy and the lassitude of fatigue that correspond to need. ‘What difference is there…?’ This is the question the contemplative soul puts to repetition, and to which it draws a response from repetition.”\textsuperscript{212} The phenomenon of need is the site of the opening of the question of repetition (What is the difference between this instance and this instance?), the negative moment of lacking a response, and the creative activity of a response (It is “this”). Thus, Deleuze says “Contemplations are questions, while the contractions which occur in them and complete them are so many finite affirmations produced in the same way as presents are produced out of the perpetual present by means of the passive synthesis of time.”\textsuperscript{213} Questions express the interpretation and continuity of time by means of the passive

\textsuperscript{210} This is memory for passive synthesis.  
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid 78  
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid 78  
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid 78
synthesis. It is active synthesis, then, that signifies the “constitution of problematic fields in relation to questions.”\textsuperscript{214} Active synthesis limits the openness of the question to a problematic field, thereby defining it, rightly or wrongly.

**Three Passive Syntheses and The Three Paradoxes of Time:**

In “Repetition for Itself”, Deleuze describes the three paradoxes of time. The paradoxes concern what Deleuze calls the pure past. Following Bergson, he states that Bergson “explained the domain of this transcendental synthesis of a pure past and discovered all its constitutive paradoxes.”\textsuperscript{215} Again, like Heidegger, Deleuze finds the successive interpretation of time inadequate as an explanation of how time actually moves. The interpretation of time as a succession of points cannot account for past, present and future and the relationship between past, present, and future. Specifically, time understood as a succession cannot explain the three paradoxes of time: the contemporaneity of the past with the present that it was, the paradox of co-existence, and the paradox of pre-existence. In other words, a pure, a priori past is necessary as a ground\textsuperscript{216} for Deleuze’s interpretation of time. And it is this pure a priori past that is the transcendental passive synthesis, which, as Deleuze says, “bears upon this pure past from the triple point of view of contemporaneity, coexistence and pre-existence.”\textsuperscript{217}

All of the passive syntheses correspond or link up with active synthesis.

According to Hughes, each of the first two passive syntheses actually grounds an active

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid 78  
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid 81  
\textsuperscript{216} In Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*, ground (French: fond) is the transcendental level deeper, below, the foundation; it is, similarly to what we discussed in chapter 2, the level that allows for the level of recognition, but yet is unrecognizable. It does not resemble the foundation, yet it is the ground for the foundation. Thus, this is the level where thought resides and where critique must reach.  
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid 82
synthesis.\textsuperscript{218} He explains that the “drive” and “direction” of the first synthesis is to contract fragmented undefined instances toward the creation of a ‘real object,’ a determinate representation from the point of view of active synthesis. This is what Deleuze calls Habitus, This is the first order of time; it is time being constituted. It allows for instances. As always, we must be careful to distinguish this from what Heidegger would call the vulgar concept of time. For time understood as the succession of instants to be accurate, the past must be “constituted after it has been present, or because a new present appears.”\textsuperscript{219} In such a case, a new present is required “for the past to be constituted as past,” yet at the same time it would be inconceivable for the former present to pass and the new one to arrive.\textsuperscript{220} In Deleuze’s words, “no present would ever pass were it not past ‘at the same time’ as it is present; no past would ever be constituted unless it were first constituted ‘at the same time’ as it was present.”\textsuperscript{221} Thus, Deleuze admits, we meet upon a “paradox of the present.”\textsuperscript{222} Time must be constituted at the same time as passing in time that is constituted. Indeed, “although it is originary, the first synthesis of time is no less intratemporal. It constitutes time as a present, but a present which passes.”\textsuperscript{223}

Deleuze draws the conclusion that the intratemporal nature of the first synthesis necessitates that the first synthesis of time, that in which instances are constituted, must occur in another time. In other words, there must be a second synthesis of time that supports the contraction of instances and creation of a determinate representation.

\textsuperscript{218} Joe Hughes, \textit{Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition} (New York: Continuum, 2009), 161.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid 81
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid 81
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid 79
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid 79
occurring in the first synthesis of time. This second synthesis also is a passive synthesis and “sub-representational.” According to Hughes, Deleuze identifies this as Mnemosyne, a pure past or a ‘having-been-ness’.\textsuperscript{224} Thus, this second synthesis grounds \textit{empirical} association and the reproduction of past presents in order for active synthesis to engage in memory as recognition.\textsuperscript{225} Deleuze also calls this second synthesis ‘Eros’, the search after memories, or our ‘attending-to’.\textsuperscript{226} Together, Deleuze defines the first passive synthesis as habit, the originary synthesis of time and therefore the foundation of time. He designates the second synthesis, which allows the passing present to past and be past at the same time, as the ground of time. It constitutes the being of the past while habit constitutes the life of the living present. It is the third synthesis, however, which constitutes the future as the past which was never present. In order to understand this we must study it alongside the Deleuze’s understanding of the Kantian “split subject.” Hughes too, sees the distinction between self and I, intensity and virtuality, sensation and thought, will to power and eternal return as the basis for understanding the third synthesis of time.\textsuperscript{227}

\textbf{Split Subject and Past Which was Never Present:}

In his \textit{Difference and Givenness}, Levi Bryant maintains that Deleuze overcomes the assumption that Continental philosophers continually attempt to reach outside. Deleuze escapes the primacy of the subject with respect to his transcendental empiricism.\textsuperscript{228} Bryant also carves out Deleuze’s own position within a critical philosophy.

\textsuperscript{224} Joe Hughes, \textit{Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition} (New York: Continuum, 2009), 161.
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid 161
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid 161
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid 161
\textsuperscript{228} Levi R. Bryant, \textit{Difference and Giveneness: Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of
He maintains that Deleuze thoroughly blurs the distinction between critical and speculative philosopher as a result of Deleuze’s reading of time.\textsuperscript{229} Bryant explains that, in fact, we can say that Deleuze performs a third "Copernican revolution." "If such a move is necessary, then this is because Deleuze must demonstrate how it is possible to overcome the premises of representation founded in the supposed passivity of the subject and its finitude."\textsuperscript{230} Deleuze must at once reject the primacy of the subject and use this inherited primacy in order to reach finitude not as a negative describing the human and to be overcome, but describing all things – time itself. Thus Deleuze reaches an infinitude, a limitation that is precisely a transgression. It is because a past which was never present is the creative ground for the future that Deleuze can perform such a Copernican Revolution. And it is time understood in such a manner that is the explanation for the split subject itself. This complicates what Joe Hughes says in his \textit{Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition} when he explains that the future, the third passive synthesis, is the foundation for present and past – first and second passive synthesis respectively.\textsuperscript{231} It also complicates my initial position that the present is prioritized in Deleuze. These considerations are central to this section. In order to address these concerns and understand the split subject through Deleuze’s understanding of time, I will briefly discuss the past which was never present, the split subject, and finally return back to an analysis of the relation between the two.

As stated above, successive time cannot account for the paradox of the contemporaneous with itself as present that enables the passing of the present, in favor of

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\textit{Immanence} (Chicago: Northwestern University, 2008) 175
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid 175
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid 176
\textsuperscript{231} Joe Hughes, \textit{Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition}, (New York: Continuum, 2009), 164.
\end{flushright}
a new present. In other words, the pure past of the present is contemporaneous with its present. A new past does not arise with every new successive present. But, rather the past of the present always already exists as the ground of each present and each new present. Due to the necessity of the contemporaneity of the past with the present that it was, the “second paradox emerges: the paradox of coexistence.”232 This is the paradox of the necessity of the second synthesis alongside the first synthesis of time. Because “each past is contemporaneous with the present that it was, then all of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past.”233 But, we must interpret this carefully. This does not mean that the past is ‘in’ a second present or that it occurs ‘after’ a first present. Deleuze credits Bergson with this idea of time. According to Deleuze, Bergson understands each present present as “the entire past in its most contracted state.”234 In other words, not only must the past be contemporaneous with the present, grounding the movement of present presents, but the past must co-exist with the present.235 The past does not pass or move forward, according to Deleuze. By co-existent, Deleuze means that the being of the past exists as such, as a priori, at the same time that the present is constituted by the first synthesis. Deleuze states, “For this reason the past, far from being a dimension of time, is the synthesis of all time of which the present and the future are only dimensions. We cannot say that it was. It no longer exists, it does not exist, but it insists, in consists, it is.”236 This is the transcendental passive synthesis of the pure past of which I spoke above. It grounds all of time; it is the pure, a priori past as such.237 The

233 Ibid 81-82
234 Ibid 82
235 By ground I do not mean cause present presents to pass. Deleuze explicitly speaks against this.
236 Ibid 82
237 Ibid 81
past is not a dimension of time for Deleuze; it is not “located” in one area of the totality of time, but grounds the totality of time. Because the past is not a dimension of time, it is not located in what is understood as the past by active synthesis, the past tense. Indeed, its purity is not a matter of existence but being. Deleuze continues, “It insists with the former present, it consists with the new or present present. It is the in-itself of time as the final ground of the passage of time. In this sense it forms a pure, general, a priori element of all time.”

Deleuze distinguishes existence from insistence and consistence. No doubt, he uses this language to call to mind ethical imperatives and the openness of the question. Heidegger and Derrida use the language of the call and the demand as well. The past insists with the former present; it demands, commands, dictates, or is even resolute. The past remains present with the former presents and demands our attention with them. At the same time, it consists with the new presents. While repetition has no in-itself, no continuity, the synthesis of time as the pure a priori past is the in-itself of time, allows for the passage of time, the continuity of time. Thus it supports as well as connects differences. We will return to this point at the end of this section.

Thus, Deleuze affirms:

In effect, when we say that it is contemporaneous with the present that it was, we necessarily speak of a past which never was present, since it was not formed ‘after’. Its manner of being contemporaneous with itself as present is that of being posed as already-there, pre-supposed by the passing present and causing it to pass. Its manner of coexisting with the new present is one of being posed in itself, conserving itself in itself and being presupposed by the new present which comes forth only by contracting this past.

As is already foreshadowed in the paradoxes of contemporaneity and co-existence of the past, “the [third] paradox of pre-existence thus completes the other two: each past

238 Ibid 82
239 Ibid 82
is contemporaneous with the present it was, the whole past coexists with the present in relation to which it is past, but the pure element of the past in general pre-exists the passing present.”240 So, it seems at this point the past, the a priori past, takes priority in Deleuze’s oeuvre. As a pure element, and a ground for the passing present, the past must pre-exist the passing present. It is the past which is the condition for the possibility of time as passage. Deleuze understands this past in a very particular way, however. This past is “a substantial temporal element” and is a “Past which was never present” which plays “the role of ground.”241 Thus, this synthesis of time, this kind of ground, “is not itself represented.” It is purely a priori, and pure difference, unformed, an empty form.242 The paradox that Deleuze does not fully make explicit is that this a priori pure element, is, in fact, the future. “The transcendental passive synthesis bears upon this pure past from the triple point of view of contemporaneity, coexistence and pre-existence. By contrast, the active synthesis is the representation of the present under the dual aspect of the reproduction of the former and the reflection of the new.”243

Part B. The Future; The for-itself/for-us

In Deleuze’s quest for the third synthesis, he analyzes the Kantian Critique’s contribution to the relationship between thought and being above and beyond the determination of the Cartesian Cogito. He claims that Kant objects against Descartes’ position that “it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined.”244 Here, determination stands in for the ‘I think’ while the undetermined is the ‘I am’. Thus, the conflict is the relationship between thought and being. Deleuze

240 Ibid 82
241 Ibid 82
242 Ibid 82 see page 1
243 Ibid 82
244 Ibid 85
explains “the determination (‘I think’) obviously implies something undetermined (‘I
am’), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undetermined is determinable by the ‘I
think’: ‘in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself, although
nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.’” The role of the activity of thinking is
to determine or locate something other to thought. The question is, as Deleuze points out,
how can what is other to thought be determinable, justifiable or at all, by thought. The
fact that consciousness of myself and myself as being itself are of two different orders not
collapsible into one or the other suggests that there may, in fact, be an unbridgeable
divide between thought and being. Kant, himself, actually responds to this dilemma. It is
in the Kantian response that Deleuze finds a shred of transcendental empiricism from
which Kant, subsequently backs down. Deleuze explains, because of this seemingly
unbridgeable divide, “Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or
rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination).”
This third logical value is the creation of a form out of the attempt to bridge the divide
between two purely different values. Thus, the determinable is the result of the attempt to
bring thought and being together. Thus, “this third value suffices to make logic a
transcendental instance.” To be specific “it amounts to the discovery of Difference – no
longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations but in the form
of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines;
no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an
internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation between thought and being.”

245 Ibid 85
246 Ibid 85
247 We will speak more of this later in the chapter.
248 Ibid 85
It is this pure, a priori form of an internal Difference that is the empty form of time and the spatio-temporal dynamisms which are in contact with the Idea in the third synthesis. Again, we will speak in depth and at length of the Idea and the spatio-temporal dynamisms in chapter four.

Kant’s answer to the gulf between thought and being of course is similar to Deleuze’s. Indeed for Kant, “the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the ‘I think’ is that of time.”249 This is the basis of the split self and the evidence of the drive of difference within that self.

The consequences of this are extreme: my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time… As a result, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the ‘I think’ cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought – its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I – being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which represents that activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself. To ‘I think’ and ‘I am’ must be added the self – that is, the passive position (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determinable and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, namely time.250

As Bryant says, for Deleuze, then, the transcendental turn, the critical turn, comes when we seek to determine how things and subjects conform to time rather than time to things.251 Thus, this leads us to the caesura within the self that perpetuates thought itself. Deleuze writes, “It is as though the I were fractured from on end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time.” Time itself “signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a passivity in the self and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I

249 Ibid 85
250 Ibid 85-86
251 Levi R. Bryant, Difference and Giveneness: Deleuze's Trancendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence (Chicago: Northwestern University, 2008) 185.
constitutes the discovery of the transcendental element of the Copernican Revolution.”

If subjects and things conform to time, then time governs subjects and things. This decenters the Kantian transcendental control center completely. But, this decentering holds profound potential. If subjects and things conform to time, then their being is communicated through time at the level where thought and being are indistinguishable. This was Kant’s true discovery, but, not unlike Heidegger’s criticism of Kant, Deleuze determines that he does not follow through on the potential of the fractured I.

Deleuze calls to attention two literary works in order to illuminate his theory of time. Firstly, in order to discuss reminiscence, the past’s relation to the future, Deleuze considers Combray from Marcel Proust’s Swann’s Way. There, “it is within Forgetting, as though immemorial, that Combray reappears in the form of a past which was never present: the in-itself of Combray.” Leonie’s habit of dipping a madeleine into her tea will become the focal point of the narrator’s attempts to conjure up the past. This passage about Aunt Leonie represents a perfect example of how Proust uses seemingly insignificant autobiographical details about peripheral characters to establish important thematic and stylistic considerations. This is Deleuze exemplar example of reminiscence. Indeed Deleuze claims, “if there is an in-itself of the past, then reminiscence is its noumenon or the thought with which it is invested.”

To distinguish reminiscence, on Deleuzean terms, is not the activity of remembering a former present, an origin in the past that we identify in the present. In this way, Deleuze would say, reminiscence has absolutely nothing to do with psychoanalysis which refers living moments to archetypal

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253 Ibid 85
254 Ibid 85
origins such as the Oedipal Complex.\textsuperscript{255} Thus, in this reminiscence, “the relation between passing presents does not account for the pure past which... [takes] advantage of their passing in order to reappear underneath representation.” So, Deleuze concludes that the order of time beyond the present and the known past lies a pure past underneath those representations, “lies the never-lived reality of the Virgin.”\textsuperscript{256}

Deleuze also refers to Hamlet in order to unfold his theory of time. Indeed, Deleuze believes Kant and Hamlet are onto the same problem of temporality. Hamlet says “time is out o joint.”\textsuperscript{257} The joint of time, what Deleuze calls the cardo, which equalizes moments, ensures “the subordination of time to these properly cardinal points through which pass the periodic movements which it measures.”\textsuperscript{258} In other words, the joint bridges the Difference that we see in the passage of time through the temporal syntheses and makes time a succession of moments: 1, 2, 3 – quantitative. However, when time is out of joint, time is “freed from the events which made up its content, its relation to movement overturned.” This is time as an empty pure form, when “Time itself unfolds (that is, apparently ceases to be a circle) instead of things unfolding within it (following the overly simple circular figure).” And for Deleuze, at this point time “ceases to be cardinal and becomes ordinal, a pure \textit{order} of time.”\textsuperscript{259} Time ceases to be a circle, ceases to be cardinal and becomes ordinal. At this point, the bridge equalizing past, present, and future as successive becomes ordinal – a time that is qualitatively quantitative. Past present and future are not quantitatively equal but reveal insurmountable qualitative differences – they no longer coincide.

\textsuperscript{255} Perhaps most poignantly in his later work, i.e. \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid 85
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid 88
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid 88
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid 88
It is necessary, and we will see this even further in chapter four, that time is “distributed unequally on both sides of the ‘caesura’” no longer allowing beginning and end to coincide.\(^{260}\) Indeed, this inequality, this moment and space of inequality\(^ {261}\) is the site of the creation of a form from the unformed, a function. The inequality of both sides is necessary in order to produce the form or function. Deleuze states, “we may define the order of time as this *purely formal distribution of the unequal* in the *function* of a caesura.”\(^ {262}\) Deleuze suggests that the past and future may be distinguished from each other in inverse proportion based on this function. However, in regard to this proportionality, it is not of content; “the future and the past here are not empirical and dynamic determinations of time; they are formal and fixed characteristics which follow a priori from the order of time, as though they comprised a static synthesis of time.”\(^ {263}\) The past and future, as transcendental orders of time, are purely static; they are not changed by empirical events or elements. In this sense, though Deleuze espouses a transcendental empiricism, time is considered purely a priori, unaffected by anything empirical. Just as time was pure and a-empirical in Kant and Heidegger.\(^ {264}\) Deleuze explains further that “The synthesis is necessarily static, since time is no longer subordinated to movement; time is the most radical *form* of change, but the form of change does not change.”\(^ {265}\) Time is necessarily empty of everything empirical because otherwise change cannot be ensured. As the most radical form of change, however, it must be static. This gives time an eternal quality for Deleuze. Indeed, transcendental time is a certain kind of infinity.

\(^{260}\) Ibid 89
\(^{261}\) I.e. The spatio-temporal dynamism
\(^{262}\) Ibid 89, my emphasis
\(^{263}\) Ibid 89
\(^{264}\) It is in chapter four that we will discuss the empirical side of transcendental empiricism. This, I maintain, is what sets Deleuze apart from Kant and Heidegger.
\(^{265}\) Ibid 89, my emphasis
Moreover, the synthesis is necessarily static because the transcendental relationship between time and movement is altogether different from the empirical relationship between time and movement. When content has been emptied out of time, movement is no longer the measure for time. For example, succession, the vulgar interpretation of time, in other words, is representative of the subordination of time to movement. Indeed, even in ancient philosophy, time is measured through movement and therefore, Deleuze maintains, the ancients did not think temporal difference sufficiently. Thus, while static seems to mean infinite and eternal in the sense that Continental Philosophers attempt to avoid, here it simply means that time is free from being defined through movement rather in itself.

Time released from being defined through movement also means that “time is defined not only by a formal and empty order but also by a totality and a series.” While time is not infinite and eternal in previous senses, time, understood as pure, a priori, and transcendental is a whole, a totality; it is not incomplete. It is the caesura, however, that constitutes this whole, this totality. In other words, the fracture of time is responsible for time as a complete entity. Deleuze himself states that we must understand the totality of time according to the function of the caesura. He writes, “the caesura, of whatever kind, must be determined in the image of a unique and tremendous event, an act which is adequate to time as a whole.”

Here, Deleuze gives us language that seems inconsistent with what he will say in his “Image of Thought” chapter. The “Image of Thought” concerns the destruction of images; indeed, the image is representational. But, the event, an act, which is adequate to time as a whole, also forms an image. “This image itself is

\[\text{\textsuperscript{266} Ibid 89}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{267} Ibid 89}\]
divided, torn into two unequal parts. Nevertheless, it thereby draws [past and future]
together the totality of time.”\textsuperscript{268} The caesura, then, is both the condition and the limit to
forming the image of time as a whole. Therefore, in drawing together this totality, it also
“creates the possibility of a temporal series,”\textsuperscript{269} any active interpretation of the image of
the world.

Deleuze uses the Odyssey and Hamlet in order to continue to illuminate. He shifts
to the language of action not because \textit{Difference and Repetition} gives us a theory of
action, but because the experience of the caesura of time, the fractured I is the basis of
creative action, creative intuition. This action can be read parallel to the three syntheses
of time:

Oedipus has already carried out the act, Hamlet has not yet done so, but in either
case the \textit{first} part of the symbol is lived in the past, they are in the past and live
themselves as such so long as they \textit{experience the image of the act as too big for
them}. The \textit{second} time, which relates to the caesura itself, is thus the present of
metamorphosis, a becoming-equal to the act and a doubling of the self, and
projection of an ideal self in the image of the act (this is marked by Hamlet’s sea
voyage and by the outcome of Oedipus’ enquiry: the hero becomes ‘capable’ of
the act). As for the \textit{third time in which the future appears}, then signifies that the
event and the act possess a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; that
they turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to
pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by
the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: what the self has become
equal to is the unequal in itself. In this manner, the I which is fractured according
to the order of time and the Self which is divided according to the temporal series
correspond and find a common descendant in the man without name, without
family, without qualities, without self or I, the ‘plebeian’ guardian of a secret, the
already-Overman whose scattered members gravitate around the sublime
image.\textsuperscript{270}

The “problem,” so to speak, with the first two syntheses of time is that they do not
reach beyond the coherence of self, the reaffirmation of representation. What is
experienced at the level of the caesura, reaching the moment of action that creates a

\textsuperscript{268} Ibid 89
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid 89
\textsuperscript{270} Ibid 89-90 my emphasis
future according to a past which was never present, is the dissolution of self. This is the experience of the coincidence of thought and being which is the ground for critique for Deleuze. I maintain, however, that because the act must be carried out according to the occurrence of the caesura, because this is the result of an experience of the image of an act too big, Deleuze, in truth, relies on the present as the driving force for the dissolution of self, and the creative act.

**Critique and Genesis:**

As we have seen, Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition uses many* resources from the history of philosophy in the hopes to construct a genuine “philosophy of difference” taking into account an ontology of transcendental empiricism. The hope is that this philosophy of difference will not fall back into the dogmatic image of thought that actually characterizes the history of philosophy. For instance, and not without importance here, Deleuze follows Salomon Maimon's critique of the Kantian project of providing the universal and necessary conditions for possible experience. Like Maimon, rather than seeking the conditions for possible experience, Deleuze wants to provide an account of the genesis of real experience, that is, the experience of this concretely existing individual here and now. Moreover, to respect the demands of the philosophy of difference, the genetic principle must itself be a differential principle.\(^{271}\)

Additionally, Deleuze believes that he differs fundamentally from Kant (and much of the history of philosophy) in his rejection of what he calls the dogmatic image of thought that characterizes western philosophy. The dogmatic image of thought takes the model of recognition and representational thinking as its foundation for the distribution of

\(^{271}\) This aspect of the critique is not focused on in depth here.
the empirical and transcendental. The distribution of the transcendental and the empirical is determined and judged according to the model of recognition. “Recognition” according to Deleuze, “may be defined by the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object: the same object may be seen, touched, remembered, imagined or conceived.” The model of recognition, then, is faithful to the concept of sameness rather than difference, the conformity of the object to that which is already experienced rather than that which could be otherwise. For instance, “an object is recognized when one faculty locates it as identical to that of another, or rather when all the faculties together relate their given and relate themselves to a form of identity in the object.”

This model of recognition leads to a kind of representational thought that is not capable of grasping the singularity of an object. Rather, the object is always forced into identity with the concept or a prior identified object. It is this type of circularity that does not allow for real difference or real experience of an object. Thus, contrary to a philosophy of the model of recognition, the philosophy Deleuze will espouse is one in which the transcendental identity of the object is unrecognizable, deformed, and not in conformity with what is identifiable in empirical experience.

Yet, despite these particular departures, Deleuze is by far largely supportive of and influenced by Kant. As we have seen, Difference and Repetition is still a transcendental approach. For Deleuze as for Kant the terms “transcendent” and “transcendental” have opposing significations. As is the explicit chastisement harboring in the Critique of Pure Reason, transcendental philosophy critiques the pretensions of other philosophies to transcend experience by providing strict criteria for the use of

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272 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 133. my emphasis
syntheses immanent to experience. On this score, at least, Deleuze aligns himself with
Kant's critical philosophy.

In addition to being a transcendental philosopher, Deleuze fully endorses the
doctrine of faculties. Indeed, that the faculties of the imagination, understanding, and
reason exist is not under question for him. What is under question is whether it is proper
that the faculties come under the determination of common sense and, ultimately, the
understanding. For Deleuze, that the faculties come under the determination of common
sense in Kant is problematic precisely because common sense is the result of empirical
terms. Deleuze asserts, “Kant's enterprise multiplies common sense” rather than
renouncing “the implicit presuppositions [of common sense].”

He describes common
sense as “the norm of identity from the point of view of the pure Self and the form of the
unspecified object which corresponds to it.” In Kant, common sense, therefore,
“contributes the form of the Same” to the object. While it works together with good sense
to “constitute the two halves of the doxa” of the orthodox image of thought, Deleuze
clearly maintains it is from common sense that the model of recognition “follows in
turn.”

Common sense contributes “that which is to be recognized: object of knowledge,
moral value, aesthetic effect.” Common sense, then, essentially works under the
influence of empirical interests. Empirical interests preserve the orthodox image of
thought and maintain it within the realm of the transcendental.

The tension between Kant's project and his results Deleuze specifically speaks to
in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. As we have seen, Deleuze suggests that Nietzsche

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274 Ibid 136
275 Ibid 133
276 Ibid 134
277 Ibid 137
completed and inverted Kantianism. Nietzsche does so by supplementing critique with a genealogical approach. According to Nietzsche, to truly critique any position one must fundamentally ask who or what is the source of the will behind this very position. It is in asking this question that one can bring critique to bear, not simply on false claims to knowledge or morality (as Kant claims to), but on true knowledge and true morality, and on the proposed foundation, truth itself. Therefore, Deleuze quite explicitly contrasts Kant's critique with Nietzsche's genealogy, arguing that Nietzsche radically inverts and completes Kantian critique. Deleuze maintains that Nietzsche's problem is that Kant's critique is not a true critique of the values that he assumes in his own project. One of the problems with Kant, according to Nietzsche is that “For Kant, what legislates (in a domain) is always one of our faculties: understanding, reason.” Even though Kant makes us the legislators by means of the Copernican revolution:

We are legislators only insofar as we submit to one of our faculties, as it were the whole of ourselves. But to what do we submit in such a faculty, to what forces? Understanding and reason have a long history: they are instances which still make us obey when we no longer want to obey anyone. When we stop obeying God, the State, our parents, reason appears and persuades us to continue being docile because it says to us: it is you who are giving the orders. Reason represents our slavery and our subjection as something superior which make us reasonable beings.

Thus, rather than grounding truth, Kant, contrary to what he himself would believe, grounds the value system of an established authority. Knowledge, morality and beauty are, then, presupposed by the terms of Kantian critique. Thus, for Deleuze in the footsteps of Nietzsche, the nature of critique itself must be transformed in order for knowledge, morality or aesthetic value themselves to be put under question.

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279 Ibid 86
What is particular about Nietzsche's genealogy, as Deleuze understands it, is that it is an immanent critique, in which there is no external measure by which to evaluate. The only measure is the will to power as a principle of internal genesis, both of values and of thought. Deleuze states in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, “only the will to power as genetic and genealogical principle, as legislative principle, is capable of realizing internal critique.”

Therefore, Deleuze attributes to Nietzsche an ideal of thought which should also be considered the goal of his own philosophy, namely a “thought that would affirm life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life... Thinking would then mean discovering, inventing new possibilities of life.”

Deleuze writes:

Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to morality, but not on morality itself. Thus total critique turns into the politics of compromise.

It is in prioritizing common sense as seen above, according to Deleuze, that Kant misrecognizes what is “properly transcendental empiricism” and substitutes for transcendental empiricism “a tracing of the transcendental from the empirical.”

Common sense relays the identity of the object under the form of recognition and therefore the orthodox image of thought. The faculties reproduce these empirical interests according to the model of recognition that “fixes good usage [of the faculties] in the form of a harmony between the faculties determined by a dominant faculty under a given common sense.”

The faculties reproduce knowledge, morality, reflection, faith, the status quo of political power in Kant. What common sense and, consequently, the model

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280 Ibid 91  
281 Ibid 101  
282 Ibid 89  
283 Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 143 my emphasis  
284 Ibid 137
of recognition give us then is the condition for the possibility of experience as it currently is. What Deleuze wants, however, is an ontology that does not yield a common sense but a creation of new forms of experience. In other words, Deleuze maintains that Kant begins the first Critique by believing in what it criticizes: the fact of knowledge.\footnote{285} Kant fails to perform a full critique precisely because he merely commits himself to describing the conditions of possible experience rather than the genesis of real experience.

Already, one sees the resonance of Foucault's concerns within Deleuze's “Image of Thought” chapter in Difference and Repetition.\footnote{286} Yet Deleuze maintains that, already within Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, one can find a tracing of the transcendental from the empirical.\footnote{287} This, according to Deleuze, is what makes us attempt to grasp the transcendental “from the point of view of common sense,” from what “measures the empirical operation of all the faculties according to that which pertains to each, given the form of their collaboration.”\footnote{288} The problem is that a designated form given by common sense and the homogeneous collaboration of the faculties is the rule that defines the transcendental. They are the empirical values that surreptitiously give the conditions for the possibility of experience. They do not account for the conditions of the genesis of real experience. These values, rather, align themselves with a repetition of “existing forms of experience.” They trade the singularity of an object for the circularity of representation and recognition.

**Thought and Being:**

One of the fundamental reasons Kant can only give the conditions of the possibility of experience rather than the genesis of real experience is Kant's maintaining of the separation of thought and being in the first Critique. For Deleuze, in the Critique of

\footnote{285} This criticism of Kant, of course, extends to the other two critiques namely in Kant believing in the fact of morality and religion.\footnote{286} This is the only chapter in Difference and Repetition in which Deleuze footnotes The Order of Things.\footnote{287} Ibid 143\footnote{288} Ibid 143
Pure Reason, it is evident that thought functions as a representation of being and therefore mediately related to being, rather than as productive of being and standing in immediate relation to being. It is evident that this critique goes hand in hand with the critique that Kant merely begins by believing what he critiques. This is a critique that emphasizes more deeply the fact that Kant, while committed to internal critique, does not reach a level of immanent critique. For, while the understanding is reliant upon intuition, one finds that intuition in the Critique is truthfully dependent upon the understanding rather than on the being of experience itself.²⁸⁹ Bryant sums this up succinctly in his *Difference and Givenness*:

thought finds itself most frequently dependent upon obscure and confused intuitions in its thinking. In other words, in most cases we are unconscious of the productive rules governing our intuitions and must thereby have recourse to receptive affectivity - which consists only of the effects of these rules - in order to arrive at a knowledge of being.²⁹⁰

In other words, thought actually finds itself dependent upon the image of thought, the form of recognition. Due to the above, Deleuze claims to commit himself to the project of overcoming the opposition between being and thinking such that “thought is no longer conceived of as a representation of being but is instead productive of being itself.”²⁹¹ For Deleuze, instead of thought being merely reproductive of the image of thought. For Deleuze, intuition is not a repetition of the concepts of the understanding, but will be reliant on differentials or rules that function as productive principles.

²⁸⁹ This is where we find Heidegger's commitment to showing Kant's phenomenological undertone. Heidegger attempts, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, to show that the understanding is, actually, reliant on the finite intuition of being produced by the transcendental power of the imagination. The transcendental power of the imagination, Heidegger contends, is capable of this immediate relationship to being.


²⁹¹ Ibid 12
In order for the production of the principles to occur, the Kantian faculties actually must reach a disharmonious state in which a differential can be produced. To see this, we must turn to the transcendental exercise of memory in the “Image of Thought” and the violence which it causes to the Kantian faculties. Deleuze writes that, “the violence of that which forces thought develops from the sentiendum to the cogitandum.” Deleuze maintains that in order for thought and being to reach the level at which they are deformed and in immediate relation to one another common sense itself must no longer be able to determine the transcendental faculties:

Each faculty is unhinged, but what are the hinges if not the form of a common sense which causes all the faculties to function and converge? Each one, in its own order and on its own account, has broken the form of common sense which kept it within the empirical element of doxa, in order to attain both its ‘nth’ power and the paradoxical element within transcendental exercise. Rather than all faculties converging and contributing to a common project of recognizing an object, we see divergent projects which, with regard to what concerns it essentially, each faculty is in the presence of that which is its ‘own’. Discord of the faculties, chain of force and fuse along which each confronts its limit, receiving from (or communicating to) the other only a violence which brings it face to face with its own element, as though with its disappearance or its perfection.

What must be done in order for thought and being to come into immediate relation is the form of recognition which common sense operates under, which maintains reason's relation to established empirical authority, must be dislodged. Rather than each faculty operating under the rule of the understanding, each faculty can reach its own differential. Each faculty is able to reach a level immanent to itself rather than being directed by an outside force. It is in this way there is a passage from thought to sensibility and sensibility to thought, the condition that allows for the genesis of real experience and, thus, a truly immanent critique. The faculties, common sense and the form of recognition,

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293 Ibid 143
however, only operate coherently if the split self and the caesura of time go
unencountered. Thus it is the encounter – the conflict of the faculties – that results from
split self and the removal of representation revealing the caesura that is the ground of the
possibility of interpretation.

**Conclusion:**

The passive synthesis of habit, the first synthesis, constitutes time by contracting
instants and thereby creating the present while the active synthesis of memory, coupled
with the passive synthesis of habit, constitutes the present as “the embedding of presents
themselves.”

As we surmised in the three syntheses section, “The whole problem is:
with respect to what?” Deleuze explains that it is “with respect to the pure element of the
past, understood as the past in general, as an a priori past, that a given former present is
reproducible and the present present is able to reflect itself.”

Thus the past must be
presupposed by every representation rather than being derived from the present. He
continues:

In this sense, the active synthesis of memory may well be founded upon the
(empirical) passive synthesis of habit, but on the other hand it can be grounded
only by another (transcendental) passive synthesis which is peculiar to memory
itself. Whereas the passive synthesis of habit constitutes the living present in time
and makes the past and the future two asymmetrical elements of the present, the
passive synthesis of memory constitutes the pure past in time, and makes the
former and the present present (thus the present in reproduction and the future in
reflection) two asymmetrical elements of this past as such.

These syntheses of time are activities of the mind. Unfortunately, the ground is
not enough for pure difference to evolve from these synthesis. Indeed, Deleuze maintains

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294 Ibid 81
295 Ibid 81
296 Ibid 88
that the ground has a shortcoming. The ground always “remain[s] relative to what it
grounds.” Instead of being fundamentally creative, the second synthesis “borrow[s] the
characteristics of what it grounds.” Thus, Deleuze maintains, if we stick within the
second synthesis, it creates a circle. What we hope for is to connect being and thought;
the second synthesis, however, “introduces movement into the soul rather than time into
thought.” So, the second synthesis, the in-itself of time, is still (even if not entirely) a
correlate of representation. The second synthesis, then must lead us beyond itself (the in
itself) toward a third synthesis (a for-itself/for-us) in order for us to get out of the circle.

In the *Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, we are told that in Kant’s rejection of
the immediacy of “I think therefore I am,” Deleuze finds that Kant adopts transcendental
empiricism. This, of course, is not the entirety of the first Critique; it occurs for an
instant and is covered up, dismissed. But in this Kant has the ability to discover the pure
difference internal to the relation of determination. Thus Deleuze takes this as his
mission: to show how this difference establishes an original relation between thought and
being that is deeper than the relation between concept and given.

What comes out of investigating the fold of time? Joe Hughes may guide us a bit
further:

Both intensity and virtuality are produced in the third synthesis. Even so they are
not identical. The two are separated, you could say, by the line of time. The
passive subject, the will to power, is gathered in a *hohe Stimmung*, in a violence
which goes beyond the initial series and which initiates the genesis of thought in
the *order* of time. The caesura expresses the unbalanced unity of thought in the
totality* of time. When the caesura attempts to directly determine the self in the

297 Ibid 88
298 Ibid 88
300 Ibid 92
301 Ibid 92
series of time, both dissolve and give rise to the gross Gedanke, to the eternal return, or to the thinker of Ideas. It is as if there were three syntheses in the third synthesis alone. The first is a failed synthesis with regard to the object (order of time). The second is a failed synthesis with regard to the subject (series of time). The third, the only successful synthesis, is that of the eternal return, or the ideal synthesis of difference.\textsuperscript{302}

As we will see below, once the thinker thinks Ideas, the syntheses no longer fail. Ideas bring unity to both the subject and the object. The processes of individuation and actualization describe the way in which a unified subject thinks a unified object.\textsuperscript{303} The result of the final synthesis’ contact with Ideas is what Deleuze calls descriptive notions. He uses this language in order to attempt to escape the language of the concept which is entrenched in the history of philosophy as dogmatic thought.

It is important, however, that one understand that Deleuze’s Kantian inheritance has, fundamentally, to do with accepting the necessity of characterizing experience in terms of conditions and limits. But, as Bryant points out, Deleuze clearly rejects the discourse of finitude in order to discuss such conditions and limits. Of course, for Deleuze, we do not have immediate experience of the infinite and unconditioned. Deleuze’s problem, as Bryant so clearly points out, is that finitude is always traced back to the subject. Thus the language of finitude is absent from Deleuze’s works and the language of limits characterizes time and the spatio-temporal dynamisms/differentials themselves. Thus, productive intuition is possible without the Heideggarian subjectivity we see in Chapter One.\textsuperscript{304}

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\textsuperscript{302} Joe Hughes, \textit{Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition} (New York: Continuum 2001), 163.  
\textsuperscript{303} Ibid 163  
\textsuperscript{304} Ibid 185
\end{flushleft}
Chapter 4: Disrupting the ‘Analytic of Finitude’ with Deleuzean Ideas

Introduction:

No doubt, nineteenth and twentieth century continental philosophy continually departs from and returns to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Deleuze and Foucault, the modern problem of identifying origins and the quest for a “veritable” critique stem from the Kantian dilemma. Beatrice Han characterizes that dilemma thusly: “in a bereaved world in which God is no guarantor of eternal truths anymore and can only be construed as a postulate, how can a finite being step beyond the boundaries of its empirical limitations and know anything with a legitimate claim to universality?” The result, of course, is Kant's Copernican revolution in how to secure the foundation of knowledge. Kant, as we have stated, performs a critique of the object. He secures knowledge of the object by maintaining that the finite subject conditions the domain of knowledge using its own mental faculties.

Even more connected to Deleuze’s concerns, one can understand Han’s characterization as the question of grounding the previous foundation of knowledge in representation. It is questioning this foundation that marks the epistemological inheritance with which Kant breaks. That is, according to Foucault the great “turn” in modern philosophy occurs when Kant questions whether ideas do in fact represent their objects and how they may do so. In other words, with Kant, ideas are no longer taken as the absolute and unproblematic foundation of knowledge; it is now possible to think that knowledge might have roots in something other than representation. As Foucault states:

the Kantian critique marks the threshold of our modernity; it questions representation… on the basis of its rightful limits… It thus uncovers a transcendent field in which the subject, which is never given to experience (since it is not empirical) but which is finite (since there is no intellectual intuition) determines in its relation to an object = x all the

305 Beatrice Han, “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude” in Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, eds. Foucault and Heidegger : Critical Encounters (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, c2003) 127.
formal conditions of experience in general.306

What Foucault finds singular about Kant's response to the dilemma is Kant's invention of a new form of finitude – transcendental finitude.307 By this, Foucault means that Kant makes finitude, rather than representations, foundational at the transcendental level. For, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines the transcendental subject as limited by the necessary mediating structures that the subject brings to experience. It is in this way that the transcendental subject determines the conditions of possible experience and, therefore, the field of knowledge. Thus finitude is transposed from being reliant on representation and correspondence between idea and object for truth. When finitude is defined as the universal and necessary organization of our faculties, as Han emphasizes “it becomes the precondition of our knowing the world: rather than being mere strictures imposed on him by his mortal nature, man’s former limitations can now be construed as a priori foundation in the sense that any epistemic content will have to be mediated through them to be known at all.”308

However, what Foucault finds problematic in Kant's opus is the transition that becomes evident in Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. In Kant's Anthropology, according to Foucault, Kant elides the previous distinction between the transcendental subject and the empirical ego enforced in the first Critique. Whereas in the first Critique the transcendental subject is identified as the origin of knowledge, in the Anthropology, that origin becomes convoluted as Kant bestows the 'I' with both the “fundamental synthetic function” and “the simple status of an object.”309 In doing so, Kant creates the category of the “originary”, according to Foucault. This category orients

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307 Beatrice Han, “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude” in Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, eds. Foucault and Heidegger : Critical Encounters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, c2003) 127.
308 Ibid 128
309 Foucault, Michel, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology (Semiotext(e)/Foreign Agents: Los Angeles, 2008), 67.
the rest of post-Kantian philosophy and is an element of one of the deepest preoccupations of philosophy in the modern era. In my first section, I focus on Foucault's position that the modern problem of convoluted origins characterizes post-Kantian philosophy and maintain that this problem is foundational as the one that must be overcome in order to move beyond the age of anthropology that Foucault characterizes in *The Order of Things*. We entered the age of anthropology due to the very developments Kantian philosophy makes. The age of anthropology is a consequence of the confusion between the transcendental subject and the empirical ego. It seems, therefore, that the essence of this problem is that the transcendental subject is defined as man and that thus the empirical ego ends up surreptitiously retracing the foundational transcendental subject. This, in *The Order of Things*, Foucault dubs “the analytic of finitude”. It is due to these implicit developments, which Foucault points out, that in this first section I will maintain that Foucault really believes that Kant subsequently does not evoke real finitude in the realm of the transcendental. I will focus on Foucault's critique of Kant's project in his earliest works rather than the influence of Kantian critique in Foucault's later works.

Deleuze, too, identifies Kant's first *Critique* as a necessary turning point in philosophy. He argues that Kant invents the internal critique of reason in order to ground truth, but like Foucault, maintains that Kant's project limits itself. Deleuze has three criticisms which, I believe, are directed at the same eventual purpose. On the one hand, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze argues that Kant's internal critique of reason fails because it is not an immanent critique. In order to understand this, must be clear that Deleuze defines internal critique as the critique of reason by reason, but his fundamental question is: What gives reason the legitimacy to critique? Reason, for Deleuze is not the most immanent manifestation of itself. Rather, thought, at the level in which it reaches indistinguishably with being, is the true level of immanence. Because reason is allowed to define and ground itself, thought becomes synonymous with reason in that reason becomes the origin and end for all knowledge. In such a case, reason does not undergo a
complete and total critique itself. On the other hand, however, Deleuze criticizes Kant for reproducing the image of thought that characterizes western philosophy when Kant seeks the conditions for the possibility of experience rather than the conditions for the genesis of real experience. But it is in developing an ontology which seeks the conditions for the genesis of real experience that, according to Deleuze, allows for a more fundamental account of what thought is apart from reason. It is transcendental empiricism that Deleuze identifies as an ontology capable of such an account of the. Thus, Deleuze is concerned that if a critique of human reason is carried out by human reason, then the genesis of thought or destruction of the orthodox image of thought cannot occur.

As we see in chapters two and three, Deleuze's last criticism of Kant is that Kant simply presumed the existence of knowledge and morality as “facts” and then sought their conditions of possibility in the transcendental. Deleuze's principal reason for claiming that the orthodox image of thought is a profound betrayal of what it means to think is that it sustains a complacent conception of thought which is incapable of criticizing established values. Kant is his prime example of a thinker who proposed an all-encompassing critique but who in the end settled for compromise. His version of critique proved incapable of questioning the value of knowledge, faith or morality as Deleuze will state “there has never been a more conciliatory or respectful total critique’. The reason is that the value of knowledge, morality and beauty is presupposed by the manner in which Kant understands the different systems of collaboration among the faculties under the model of recognition and common sense. Thus, I will focus on Deleuze's critique as well as his response to Kant in the form of transcendental empiricism and the removal of the opposition between thought and being. For Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, according to Bryant, "is an attempt to formulate an ontology - not an epistemology or theory of knowledge - that locates intelligibility at the

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310 This, as we will hopefully see, occurs at the level when thought and being are indistinguishable.
level of the aesthetic or sensible itself.” Deleuze will redefine thought by removing the opposition between thought and being, and maintain that thought arises in strict opposition to established human reason.

What we should see is that, while both Foucault and Deleuze have different points of departure, they ultimately have similar goals. That is, both Foucault and Deleuze seek a thought that is not fully determined by empirical values or anthropologically derived. Both are seeking to get out of a paradigm in which thought is enclosed and always already defined by the human. Therefore, though both Foucault and Deleuze differ in their assessment of the cause of the failure of the Kantian project, the consequences of the proper reestablishment of the Kantian project as they see fit, I propose, are the same.

**Kant's transcendental empirical divide elided and the problem of origins:**

In *The Order of Things*, Foucault argues that from Descartes up to Kant, representation was simply identified with thought: to think was to employ ideas to represent the object of thought. On the other hand, in his “The Limits of Representation” chapter, Foucault maintains that Kant gives the relation of representations “its foundation and justification”. Kant founds representation anew precisely by creating transcendental finitude as the very condition which renders representations possible:

Instead of basing the connections between representations on a foundation arrived at by a sort of internal hollowing-out process, which gradually whittles it away until there is nothing left but the pure impression, he establishes it on the conditions that define its universally valid form. By directing his inquiry in this direction, Kant avoids representation itself and what is given within it, in order to address himself to that on the basis of which all representation, whatever its form, may be posited. It is therefore not representations themselves that, in accordance with their own laws, could be deployed and, in one and the same movement, decomposed (by analysis) and recomposed (by synthesis): only judgments derived from experience or empirical observations can be based upon the contents of representation. Any other connection, if it is to be universal, must

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313 In the case of Deleuze, human reason.
have its foundation beyond all experience, in the *a priori* that renders it possible. Not that it is a question of another world, but of the conditions in accordance with which any representation of the world in general can exist.315

Previously, thought and sensation were synonymous in representation. Their immediate relation was the only path to ensure the truth of knowledge. Hence knowledge was founded in the representation of the object of thought, in the pure impression. Kant, however, puts representation exclusively on the side of sensation, empirical content, and experience. Instead, what supports the possibility of representations are the conditions that the transcendental subject bring to experience. It is in this way that the roots for knowledge shift from representation to the judgment of the finite subject. As Foucault states, due to this movement, Kant is able to escape the problem of representation without bestowing intellectual intuition to the subject. He founds the possibility of representation in a finitude “beyond all experience,” though not in an infinite or other world entirely. Thus, the transcendental subject is what allows knowledge of the world to exist at all. And so, representations are produced or constituted by the mind. Representations are not, however, produced by the mind as a natural or historical reality, but as belonging to a special epistemic realm: transcendental subjectivity. Kant thus maintained the Classical insistence that knowledge cannot be understood as a physical or historical reality, but he located the grounds of knowledge in a domain (the transcendental) more fundamental than the ideas it underlies and opposed to the empirical ego with which it is coupled.

Whereas the Critique inaugurated the transcendental- empirico split that is man, the *Anthropology* deeply obscured that divide. In Foucault's *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, Foucault argues that Kant's *Anthropology* repeats the *Critique* in the form of a negative, in an inverse analogy.316 Though there is a difference in level between the *Critique* and *Anthropology* one can, in fact, engage in a structural comparison. As the *Anthropology* is “a collection of empirical observations” it would seem that the

315 Ibid 242
316 Michel Foucault, *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology* (Semiotext(e)/Foreign Agents: Los Angeles, 2008), 66.
conditions of possible experience are foreign to it. But Foucault's main thesis of his text is that “this essential difference [between empirical observation and conditions of possible experience] is not of the order of a non-relation” but of an “anthropological-critical repetition.”\textsuperscript{317} For instance, “in the Anthropology, the relationship between synthesis and the given are the mirror-image of how they appear in the Critique.”\textsuperscript{318} The standpoint in the Critique is that subjectivity in the form of the 'I' maintains its distinction from the empirical ego. In Foucault's words, “the 'I' can never be the object, only the form of synthesis.”\textsuperscript{319} That is, the transcendental 'I' that Kant develops in the Critique is a fundamental synthetic function which is not a given, but an “a priori of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{320} It is the process of a finite subject that is the foundation for knowledge. While in the Anthropology, Foucault states, “when the 'I' is considered in its fundamental synthetic function, it also assumes the simple status of an object.”\textsuperscript{321} In Kant's Anthropology, the 'I' becomes both the transcendental founding 'I' and its empirical object correlate. This 'I':

is the empirical and manifest form in which the synthetic activity of the 'I' appears as a figure already synthesized – a structure that is at once first and second: it is not given to man from the beginning... but when it does appear, inscribing itself as already having been there, like the irreducible content of a thought which can operate only once that figure of experience is constituted: it is in this 'I' that the subject will become aware of its past and carry out the synthesis of its identity.\textsuperscript{322}

Kant's Anthropology shifts the 'I' from an exclusively transcendental function to an empirical object that is already there. Rather than simply a synthesis of truth, it is an irreducible truth of the a “a priori of existence.” The “a priori of knowledge” appears, though, as a specific temporal truth. What happens in this movement is what Foucault identifies as Kant's invention of the originary. The invention of the originary is precisely

\textsuperscript{317} Ibid 66 & 69
\textsuperscript{318} Ibid 66
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid 66
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid 67
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid 67 my emphasis
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid 67
what the inverse analogy of the *Anthropology* is. Foucault asserts that this structure, the structure of the “already there” reveal the “originary dispersion of the given” which is, at the same time, always already reduced.\textsuperscript{323} What the above means is that:

the structure of the relationship between the given and the a priori in *Anthropology* is the opposite of that revealed in the *Critique*. The a priori, in the order of knowledge, becomes, in the order of concrete existence, an originary which is not chronologically first, but which, having appeared in the succession of figures of the synthesis, reveals itself as already there; on the other hand, that which, in the order of knowledge, is a pure given, is, in the reflection on concrete existence, lit up by muted lights which give it the depth of the already occurred.\textsuperscript{324}

To repeat, Foucault identifies “the necessary character of the emergence of the transcendental” not as a structure and security of truth, phenomenon and experience, “but as one of the concrete marks of finitude.”\textsuperscript{325} But, according to Foucault Kant ambiguously designates “the order of concrete existence” as “natural” at the same time that he designates “the order of knowledge,” which is the “fundamental for of the relationship to the object,” as the “nature” in human nature.\textsuperscript{326} Consequently, what Foucault calls “the anthropological illusion,” is not seen for what it is, a surreptitious smuggling of the universal and eternal in the form of the definition of man into the context of a reflection on knowledge. Foucault writes:

it had become the truth of truth – henceforth, truth would be always present and yet never given; thus the illusion had become both the raison d'être and the source of critical thinking, the origin of that movement by which man loses sight of and is incessantly recalled to truth. The illusion henceforth defined as finitude would become above all else the retreat of truth: that in which truth hides and in which truth can always be found.\textsuperscript{327}

Truth, anthropology and the category of the originary become interlocked and

\textsuperscript{323} Ibid 67
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid 68
\textsuperscript{325} Ibid 122
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid 122
\textsuperscript{327} Ibid 122
incapable of real critique. Subsequently, Kant creates the convoluted category of the
originary that smuggles in the empirical definition of man into the transcendentual. This is
nothing but the anthropological illusion that characterizes the analytic of finitude, which
is the fundamental definition of finitude, in *The Order of Things*. In “Anthropological
Sleep,” Foucault explains that since this very moment in Kant, anthropology has
thoroughly characterized modern thought. It became a necessary moment for Kant
because, essentially, while he placed finitude in the transcendental realm, he still bestows
man with absolute power, the place of the King. In other words, “at the moment when
representation lost the power to determine, on its own and in a single movement, the
interplay of its syntheses and analyses” it became necessary to use man as both the origin
and the telos of thought.

Foucault's last statement in his *Anthropology* is that we must “undertake a
veritable critique of the anthropological illusion.” And he points to Nietzschean
genealogy as the site of a proper critique. He, too, points toward Nietzsche in *The Order
of Things* wherein he states that “It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in
the void left by man's disappearance. For this void filled. It is nothing more, and nothing
less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think.” The space
simultaneously opened up and closed off by Kant is precisely the invention of this new

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328 *The Order of Things* chapter “The Place of the King” I will not discuss in depth here. What is essential is
that Foucault returns to his previous analysis of Velasquez's painting in which he describes how, in the
classical age, man assumed the position within the painting, a mere object in the mirroring relationships of
representations in the painting. In the modern age, however, man assumes the place of the king: “At once
object - since it is what the artist represented is copying onto his canvas - and subject - since what the
painter had in front of his eyes, as he represented himself in the course of his work, was himself, since the
gazes portrayed in the picture are all directed towards the fictitious position occupied by the royal
personage, which is also the painter's real place, since the occupier of that ambiguous place in which the
painter and the sovereign alternate, in a never-ending flicker, as it were, is the spectator, whose gaze
transforms the painting into an object, the pure representation of that essential absence” (*OT* 307). Now
man is now defined as the subject and the object which is no longer genuine evocation of finitude.

1994), 340
position for the subject of knowledge, that of Man, which according to Foucault generated the analytic of finitude and, as mentioned, eventually resulted in the “anthropological sleep” criticized at the end of The Order of Things. What is needed is the opening of a space for thinking outside of the confines of man as the subject and object of knowledge, to overcome the analytic of finitude initiated by anthropology.

Thus, in these early texts, Foucault questions Kant on the ground that his reinterpretation of representation actually remains dogmatically anthropological and circular rather than a real evocation of finitude. In that sense, Foucault's critique of Kant is that there needs to be a complete critique of the subject, rather than simply a critique of the knowledge of the object. As such this is a critique of the form of thinking that has characterized the entire modern age in order to open up the space for a new form of thinking. It is my position that Deleuze's conception of an immanent critique that generates real experience is essentially the same critique but from a different angle of the problematization of Kantian critique.

From a comparison of Foucault and Deleuze's concerns about and appropriations of Kantian critique, it becomes apparent that each of their insights are not incompatible. Foucault's goal, as we saw above is to critique the concept of the subject by contesting the very origin of the subject. He imagines that this critique takes place specifically by critiquing the category of the originary that inaugurates the anthropological definition of man. Essentially, Foucault criticizes Kant for surreptitiously supplying empirical determination for the transcendental definition of man rather than maintain the distinct separation between the two realms. Thus the knowledge we attain of man ends up being a repetition of him as an empirical being determined by empirical conditions. Due to this,
real transcendental knowledge, therefore is contaminated. The only recourse, then, is to question the very anthropological category itself. In this case, Foucault follows Nietzsche's critique of Kant along the lines that the category of the originary (and consequently, the man as the analytic of finitude) must be destroyed in order for there to be space for a different determination. This different determination would, then, redefine the transcendental and empirical levels anew.\footnote{Whereas it is clear that Foucault makes these assertions during the beginning of his philosophical career, this proposition of Foucault's can be seen too, in his works toward the latter years of his life in “What is Critique” and “What is Enlightenment”. In these texts he argues that it is a certain formation and governing of the self, an attitude, that brings about true critique.}

Deleuze's critique of Kant is somewhat different but with the same basic goal. While Deleuze does not focus on the Anthropology for his main objection to Kantian critique, Deleuze already finds the definition of the transcendental and empirical in the Critique of Pure Reason problematic. Here, as Foucault maintains of the Anthropology, Deleuze claims that Kant contaminates transcendental knowledge with empirical values. It revolves around each's critique of representation. Whereas Foucault praises Kant because Kant puts representation on the side of the empirical, for Deleuze, Kant really puts representation on the side of the transcendental, which is ultimately implicitly traced by the empirical. Furthermore, though representation for Deleuze is indeed based in a finitude beyond all experience, the experience of representation is merely the possibility of representation. Since it is not the genesis of representation (experiences), the finitude beyond all experience is ideal and convoluted rather than transcendental and immanent to finitude.

What Deleuze wants, specifically, is a new image of thought to replace the one dominated by recognition and representational thinking, as we have seen in chapter three.
It is production and reproduction of human reason rather than the definition of man where Deleuze determines the problem lies. And, therefore, it is from a type of irrationalism, one in which the faculties become disjointed, that thought, real thought can come into being once again.\footnote{In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* Deleuze describes irrationalism as the legislation of thought against reason.} For reason, according to Deleuze will always be characterized by recognition and representational thinking. “Reason is receptive, reactive.”\footnote{Ibid 93} But unbeknownst to Kant, “it is reason which receives and expresses the rights of that which dominates thought, thought reconquers its rights and becomes a legislator against reason.”\footnote{Ibid 93}

Both philosophers, in the end, seek “A thought which thinks against reason”\footnote{Reason as a consequence of the anthropological illusion, for Foucault.} rather than a thought that believes itself to be legislative because it is subject to reason alone.\footnote{Ibid 93} While Deleuze explicitly states that “a new image of thought means primarily that truth is not the element of thought” one can be sure that Foucault would maintain the same thing.\footnote{In his Foucault Deleuze explains that Foucault's real concern throughout his works is (along with Deleuze's own concern) what thinking really is: “In truth, one thing haunts Foucault – thought. The question: 'What does thinking signify? What do we call thinking?'” Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 116.} For both a true critique and the formation of different forms of thinking are synonymous. Different forms of thinking, for both, come into being through thorough questioning of established forms of reason. For Foucault and Deleuze, critique, therefore, must be in the name of the transformation of historical designations and categories.

But still, another Kantian development preoccupies Deleuze. For Deleuze, the Kantian “split self” betrays Kant’s own resolve to secure the “I” with the transcendental
subject. Deleuze. The Kantian account of determination, as we saw in chapter three, reveals the self as immersed in time that inhibits it from thinking without a caesura within itself. Thus, the activity of thinking is not the being of thinking. The transcendental subject attempts determination of the being of the self (“I am”) by its own thinking activity (“I think”). But because this determination happens in time, the being that is determined is different from the being that is determinable. The latter, by definition, is not thought and cannot be thought, and yet it is precisely what is to be thought.\textsuperscript{337} This is the production of difference that Deleuze finds in Kant. Through thinking, the I produces difference. The activity of thinking as different from thought itself. And the task is born: the being of thought is both what must be thought and what cannot be thought.\textsuperscript{338} While we have discussed the “resolution” of this through the production of a new image of thought. In this final chapter, the goal is to understand this “resolution” through the genesis of what Deleuze calls Ideas.

**An Answer to the ‘Analytic of Finitude’; Deleuzean Ideas:**

As substance and Idea, multiplicity is more than a combination. Deleuze attempts to move beyond the discourse of monadism or dualism or a pluralism derivate of those two. We must make multiplicity a substantive in and of itself. Thus monadism and duality would be derivative of multiplicity. We can say that Deleuze is trying to reconceptualize substance. Indeed, for him, we should not even associate it with concepts. He states, “Multiplicities must not designate a combination of the many and the one, but rather an organization belonging to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in


\textsuperscript{338} Ibid 82
order to form a system.”

The unity Deleuze speaks against, here can be thought of as the Kantian unity that ensures a whole thinking being. The unity of the faculties, for instance, which systematically produces a rational truth. The many as a substance is not this kind of combination because “the one and the many are concepts of the understanding” which Deleuze maintains “makes up the overly loose mesh of a distorted dialectic which proceeds by opposition.”

Opposition, Deleuze contrasts with dramatization. This contrast maps onto the difference/contradiction distinction. Contradiction, as we know, proceeds by opposition: thesis, anti-thesis yields synthesis. We know too, that the basic tenet of Deleuze’s philosophy is that difference is the ground that allows for the foundation of any perspective, as truth. Therefore, difference is deeper, more profound than Hegelian dialectics of contradiction. As contradiction proceeds by opposition, difference proceeds by dramatization. While “contraries may be combined, contradictions established” according to Deleuze, contradiction never reaches “the essential” and “the essential” here is not the traditional Platonic or Leibizian essential. Rather here, as we have discussed in Chapter 2, the essential is not defined as the thing in its purity, the thing separate from its particular cases. The essential must be understood through Nietzschean perspectivism. The essential is, in fact, the ‘how many’, ‘how’, and the ‘in which cases’. Leibniz’s essential, his subject is a combination of predicates, but for Deleuze this “lacks a substantive” and therefore misses the Idea. In other words, when contraries thesis and antithesis are combined to establish a

340 Ibid 182
341 Ibid 182
342 Ibid 182
synthesis, but the Idea, what is substance, is not these things. It is neither thesis nor antithesis. Moreover, it is not their combination. The Idea, the substantive, remains between. The how and the how many refer to the measure between predicates and this between, this “how far”, “how long” determines the perspective from which we can interpret a thing; this “how far”, “how long”, “how many” distances, times, cases determines the truth of a thing. And, at this essential level, is where we can discuss the individuation that is the Idea.

In order to understand the moments of the Idea in its individuation, one must understand the conditions which define the moment at which the Idea emerges. Deleuze explains that first “the elements of the multiplicity must have neither sensible form nor conceptual signification, nor, therefore, any assignable function. They are not even actually existent, but inseparable from a potential or a virtuality. In this sense they imply no prior identity, no positing of a something that could be called one or the same. On the contrary, their indetermination renders possible the manifestation of difference freed from all subordination.”

We saw earlier in last chapter how the sensible and the rational reach an indistinguishable being at the level of thought. And here, Deleuze repeats, that, at the level of thought, we are not talking about identifiable existents even if this level, importantly, is inseparable from the virtuality that manifests them. The Idea remains at the moments between determination. And, it is this indeterminate state that is the realm of difference (perspectivism, dramatization). It is at the level of identity and representation that difference becomes subordinated to identity.

At the end of chapter 4 of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze explains this

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343 Ibid 183
moment of the Idea (and the other moments) through embryology. He uses embryology to illustrate that it is the “kinematics”, the in between and indeterminate movements of the egg before it can be divided and identified into parts, a combination of parts, that determine the embryo. It is, what he calls the dynamics of the egg, the spatio-temporal dynamisms, its method of dramatization that make it manifest, not the sum of its parts. In illustrating, Deleuze explains “types of egg are… distinguished by the orientations, the axes of development, the differential speeds and rhythms which are the primary factors in the actualization of a structure and create a space and a time peculiar to that which is actualized.” So, in fact, the spatio temporal dynamisms are made up of differences, dynamics. These speeds, rhythms movements themselves determine the indeterminate but more determinate spatio-temporal dynamisms. They are its processes, prior to identity. They are primary rather than division into individual parts being primary. If we look at embryology this way, we look at it through the elements of difference and can see the true becoming of the embryo.

Deleuze identifies a second moment in the emergence of the Idea. He writes “These elements must in effect be determined, but reciprocally, by reciprocal relations which allow no independence whatsoever to subsist. Such relations are precisely non-localizable ideal connections, whether they characterize the multiplicity is intrinsically defined, without external reference or recourse to a uniform space in which it would be submerged. Spatio-temporal relations no doubt retain multiplicity, but lose interiority; concepts of the understanding retain interiority, but lose multiplicity, which they replace by the identity of an ‘I think’ or something thought. Internal multiplicity, by contrast, is

344 Ibid 214
characteristic of the Idea alone.”\textsuperscript{345} Continuing on with the example of embryology, the elements of the multiplicity while they are indeterminate, they are in a process of reciprocal determination. Therefore these elements are not independent but interdependent and, as stated above, dynamic. Because these relations are dynamic, they are, as Deleuze states, “non-localizable ideal connections.” Proceeding, however, Deleuze distinguished a multiplicity as such, from the spatio-temporal relation. The multiplicity has an interiority which intrinsically defines it or rather, the multiplicity of the Idea is internal. The Idea, while not static, is self-sufficient. It has no external determination. This is what allows for its pure differentiation, its lack of boundary in order to make it uniform.\textsuperscript{346} To understand this we must look at Spatio-temporal relations and concepts in contrast. Deleuze explains that spatio-temporal relations are external; they loose their interiority but retain multiplicity. Concepts, on the other hand, have interiority but lose multiplicity altogether. So, in the example of the embryo, the space and time created by the axes of development, the movements, speeds and rhythms which are Ideas, intensities unto themselves – quantitatively qualitative differences - this space and time becomes exteriority, where the embryo is immersed. It no longer has the folded dimensions that made it the Idea proper. Concepts, then, as we can gather, have interiority but no difference, according to Deleuze at this point in his career. Concepts are contained; they do not extend and immerse the thing into them. But they are not varieties; they do no contain multiple elements or multiple avenues of manifestation. The concept is sameness.

The third moment of the Idea is that “A multiple ideal connection, a differential relation, must be actualized in diverse spatio-temporal relationships, at the same time as

\textsuperscript{345} Ibid 183
\textsuperscript{346} Is there any other Idea than time space thought?
its elements are actually incarnated in a variety of forms. The Idea is thus defined as a structure. A structure or an Idea is a ‘complex theme,’ an internal multiplicity – in other words, a system of multiple, non-localizable connections between differential elements which is incarnated in real relations and actual terms. In this sense, Deleuze concludes “we see no difficulty in reconciling genesis and structure.”

In the third triad of moments, the Idea gains external actualization, becomes a phenomenon. The Idea is actualized into spatio-temporal relationships and through such actualization, what was formless from the point of view of sense and rationality takes form. The Idea takes form according to a rule given by the differential relation that governs its previous moments. Therefore, the Idea’s genesis and structure are one and the same. Its genesis produces its structure and its structure allows for its genesis. The Idea is at once non-identifiable non-localizable relations of differential elements and its manifestation, its produced form, which takes shape in “real relations and actual terms.” It is in this sense then, that the ground resembles nothing of the form, while at the same time the ground is immanent to the form; the transcendental is both unidentified and immanent to the empirical, the noumenon immanent to the phenomenon. Thus, because the structure of the Idea is reciprocally determined by its genesis, the traditional opposition between structure and genesis is irrelevant at the level of the Idea. Because it is “the dynamic processes which determine the actualization of Ideas”

For Deleuze, determination operates internally to the thing such that the determination of the thing is no broader than the thing itself. What I am trying to figure out is what time has to do with all of this and its distinction from Heidegger on time. It is important that the noumenon is internal to the phenomenon and produces the

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347 Ibid 183
phenomenon immanently. What Deleuze is talking about is not the sensible being but the being of the sensible. It is the being of the sensible which is qualitative and intensive. Deleuze is looking for where the transcendental and empirical are separate but one.

Genesis and structure are very important themes in *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze develops these themes by means of Salmon Maimon’s critique of Kant. Beth Lord gives a brief analysis of Deleuze’s Maimonian inheritances in *Difference and Repetition*. She explains how Maimon, having been influenced by Spinoza and Leibniz, claims that real experience is the product of a genesis occurring within the understanding. This genesis is based on rules for generating qualities called ‘differentials’. These differentials are the underpinning of the spatio-temporal dynamisms we will discuss below.

In his Essay, Maimon explains his perception of the Kantian problem. He asks, “How can the understanding submit something (the given object) to its power (to its rules) that is not in its power?” And concludes “In the Kantian system, namely where sensibility and understanding are two totally different sources of our cognition, this question is insoluble.” Lord draws out problem of genesis quite articulately as well. Though Kant discovers that thought differs from its own being, 1. He covers over this internal difference with the identity of the subject and therefore, 2. He cannot show how the structures of thought are really and internally connected to the given. Under such conditions, thinking can only apply itself to its own representations and is thus stuck in the ‘Analytic of Finitude’. But if finite understanding, akin to an infinite intellect, produces its objects in intuiting them, then the pure differentials provide intensities,

intensive qualities called “ideas of understanding” for Maimon – Deleuzean Ideas. Thus, to overcome the problem, Maimon attempted to investigate the genesis of qualitative sensations rather than the conditions of possible experience as we see in transcendental idealism.  

In his turn, Deleuze makes the Kantian “real of sensation” the product of a Maimonian genesis immanent to thought. For Deleuze as for Maimon, the real transcendental conditions of the given are ideas, within which intensities flow and surge.  

**Dramatization and Kantian Schematism:**

Deleuze describes the method of dramatization through various avenues in both *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze takes the method, within some modifications, from Nietzsche’s body of works. Affirmatively, we can say that the method of dramatization governs inquiry and is pluralist and immanent. It is the fact that it is pluralist and immanent that allows, Deleuze writes, “this investigation [to] find the scientific rule that constitutes it as a semiology and an axiology, enabling it to determine the sense and value of a word.” Indeed, Deleuze maintains that “according to Nietzsche’s method the concept of truth must be dramatized.” Thus the method of dramatization allows us to properly investigate signs and symbols and their use or interpretation. It offers us an axiology, a philosophical study of value as either the collective term for ethics and aesthetics or the foundation for these fields. I would like to say that it is the foundation for these fields. Additionally, what I would like to do in this short presentation is discuss some peripheral comments that Deleuze makes about theatre.

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350 Ibid 85  
351 Ibid 87  
352 Ibid 88  
354 Ibid 95
and the method of dramatization in both *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition*. My goal is to synthesize these comments in order to bring something new to the well known, indeed all too well known, Nietzschean declaration: ‘God is dead.’ I think Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche as a philosopher of theatre and dramatization can, in fact, give us more insight into what is meant by this statement as well as what Deleuze means by the method of dramatization. For, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze states that ‘God is dead’ is the dramatic proposition par excellence. He maintains this because this statement allows time and movement to enter into the stable and atemporal concept of God. In these early texts, Deleuze valorizes Nietzsche for putting “metaphysics in motion, in action.” In doing so, he believes metaphysics is able to carry out immediate acts based in the singularity of the specific spatio-temporal moment rather than mediate acts based in a legal, moral, or rational law. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze tells us that above all, “it is a question of producing… a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation; it is a question of making movement itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for mediate representations.” Thus, every concept, God, self, person, human, man, woman, or otherwise (as well as their possibilities), must be understood as the result of what Deleuze calls spatio-temporal dynamisms that dramatize and actualize the Idea. It is through the dramatization and actualization of Ideas that verily new paths for these concepts can be created.

Deleuze describes the dramatic proposition as “synthetic, [and] therefore essentially

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356 Ibid 7-8
pluralist, typological and differential.”\textsuperscript{357} Deleuze is not interpreting God or the statement “God is dead” from the point of view of its form. In other words, the idea and statement is not about existence or non-existence and thus it is not judged on the basis of whether the idea of God’s existence or non-existence results in a contradiction. Instead, “God is dead” depends on a synthesis. The phrase synthesizes the idea of God with time and therefore with a relative determination of space and time.\textsuperscript{358} This new position does not seek an absolute determination of opposing existence and non-existence. The idea of God can no longer be absolute because “God [as with Reason] cannot be made the object of synthetic knowledge without death entering into him.” \textsuperscript{359} Thinking through objects, events, with the method of dramatization, escapes the absolute dichotomy of existence and non-existence in favor of the relative determination of the difference between life and death, the determination of what perspective a problem is interpreted. It is this very general but crucial point of bringing death into life that allows “God is dead” to be the dramatic proposition par excellence. From Deleuze’s description, “God existed and he is dead and he will rise from the dead, God has become Man and Man has become God,” we can see that it is no longer a matter of God existing absolutely, but a question of from what spatio-temporal perspective we can interpret the concept. At what historical interpretation does the concept become relevant, at what point is it irrelevant? These are the dynamics that govern inquiry when interpreting and creating concepts.

Insofar as Deleuze connects dramatization to thinking, Deleuze gets the radical

\textsuperscript{357} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 152.
\textsuperscript{358} I would say, while space and time are often mentioned separately, they should not be absolutely separated when we are speaking of the method of dramatization and therefore death entering into a concept.
\textsuperscript{359} Ibid 152
position of giving the capacity of thought to all things from Nietzsche as well.\textsuperscript{360} Thus an indispensable aspect of the method of dramatization is removing the anthropological character from the forces that generate thought. In fact, because reactive forces constitute man, “the whole method of dramatization aims to discover other types expressing other relations of forces, to discover another quality of the will to power capable of transmuting its too-human nuances.”\textsuperscript{361} Deleuze continues “according to Nietzsche the inhuman and the superhuman – a thing, an animal or a god – are no less capable of dramatization than a man or his determinations.”\textsuperscript{362} As it indicates pre-individual forces at work “the method of dramatization surpasses man on every side.”\textsuperscript{363} It is because the concept of man is a representation and the type of thought that runs through the concept of man is representational that human thought cannot found the method of dramatization. Human thought, then, cannot ground the interpretation of signs and ethics and aesthetics themselves, either.

Within pages of the introduction of \textit{Difference and Repetition}, Deleuze discusses the importance of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Peguy for seeking anti-representational thought, opposing them all to Hegel. Deleuze first opposes their interpretation and presentation of theatre to that of Hegel’s. For Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Peguy, “theatre is real movement, and it extracts real movement from all the arts it employs. This is what we are told: this movement, the essence and the interiority of movement, is not opposition, not mediation, but repetition.” According to Deleuze, Hegel prioritizes “the

\textsuperscript{360} I think this offers a fruitful point of contact between Deleuze and Foucault. A point at which we can refer back to chapter nine of Foucault’s 1966 text, \textit{The Order of Things}. It is in the ‘Age of Anthropology’ that man takes the place of God. Thus to locate this method in the human is as problematic as interpreting the Idea of God from the point of view of form.

\textsuperscript{361} Ibid 79

\textsuperscript{362} Ibid 79

\textsuperscript{363} Ibid 79
abstract relation of the particular to the concept in general” over “the true relation of the singular and the universal in the Idea.”364 What this means is that any singularity within the particular is reduced and subsumed under the concept. The repetition of the instance of the particular is the very same as the generality of the concept. Moreover, by abstract, the concept is given a trans-temporal and spatial ‘Truth’. Thus, if the form of the particular does not correspond to the logic of the concept, there is no value to the particular, its existence is either impossible or irrelevant.365 Hegel offers no movement outside of the laws of nature and of rationality. He merely “proposes an abstract movement of concepts instead of a movement of the Physis and the Psyche… and thus remains in the reflected element of ‘representation’, within simple generality. He represents concepts instead of dramatizing Ideas: he creates false theatre, a false drama, a false movement.”366

While theatre and drama, repetition and difference, cannot be separated, Deleuze consistently describes theatre as though it leans toward the side of repetition and describes drama as on the side of difference. “Movement,” he says “is repetition and… this is our true theatre.”367 By this he means that repetition is understood through “theatrical space, the emptiness of that space, and the manner in which it is filled and determined by the signs and masks through which the actor plays a role which plays other roles.”368 In short, the actor fills up the space of a role that is always in relation to other roles and a distinctive point in relation to several historical access points.369

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365 These two things are not mutually exclusive, especially if we are thinking of the value of the particular at the political level.
366 Ibid 9
367 Ibid 9
368 Ibid 9
369 As mentioned above, it is impossible to speak of space without time.
integral, however, is that movement is enacted without mediation, without intermediary. This capacity for immediacy is precisely what opposes the theatre of repetition and the theatre of representation. In the theatre of repetition, “we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organized bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters – the whole apparatus of repetition as a ‘terrible power’.”

Explaining what produces movement, Deleuze defines Nietzsche’s eternal return as movement endowed with a force. Indeed, repetition is grounded in the eternal return on the basis of “both the death of God and the dissolution of the self.” As is well known, the death of God and the dissolution of the self are the requirements for force to select, to destroy and produce rather than reiterating the return of the Same in general, the false, abstract, logical and mediated movement of Hegel. Without the self and God as mediating steps, as recourses to already represented concepts, “the form of repetition in the eternal return is the brutal form of the immediate, that of the universal and the singular reunited, which dethrones every general law, dissolves the mediations and annihilates the particulars subjected to the law.” Deleuze identifies, here, a ‘formalism’ which goes beyond Kantian formalism, beyond the repetition of a rational moral law, for instance. He identifies an ethics occurring from a repetition, a test, and a ground “itself the only form of a law beyond morality.” It is the point of a suspension, a thought that is beyond good and evil. Hence, repetition, which produces difference (both of which are

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370 Ibid 9-10 my emphasis
371 Ibid 10
372 Ibid 10
373 Ibid 10
bound up in the process of dramatization) is identified with Being but Being insofar as this being is opposed to “every legal form, to the being-similar as much as to the being-equal.” Only there do we find the immediate identity of the singular. And it is in Deleuze’s fourth chapter of *Difference and Repetition* where he will discuss this inequality as the sufficient reason for the ground of the dramatization of Ideas.

Instead of a theatre of the thing represented, a theatre of the particular subsumed under concepts, Deleuze proposes the dramatization of Ideas. The dramatization of Ideas is generated by “a theatre of problems and always open questions which draws spectator, setting and characters into the real movement of an apprenticeship of the entire unconscious, the final elements of which remain the problems themselves.” The Idea, for Deleuze as for Kant, is beyond the concept but still an element of (pre-individual) thought. And, it is the movement of theatrical repetition which produces “internal differences which dramatize an Idea before representing an object.”

Deleuze identifies the dramatization of the Idea with dynamic spatio-temporal processes. These dynamic processes determine the actualization of Ideas because they are dramatized, because they dramatize the Idea. They “create or trace a space [and time]

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374 Ibid 10
375 I will not be going into inequality/disparity as the sufficient reason for Ideas directly in this presentation.
376 Ibid 192. Notice Deleuze says an apprenticeship of the entire unconscious and not of consciousness. Consciousness would refer back to recognition and the theatre of repetition. Also, as an apprenticeship, this theatre of repetition and method of dramatization is associated with learning. Indeed, Deleuze speaks of learning earlier in the paragraph from which this quotation is lifted. It is a matter of learning and bringing something new to consciousness. Not a matter of memorization and recognition.
377 Ibid 216
378 Ibid 216
corresponding to the differential relation and to the singularities to be actualized.”

Indeed, Joe Hughes explains that the process of the actualization of Ideas begins with Deleuze’s ‘spatio-temporal dynamisms’. According to Deleuze, spatio-temporal dynamisms are “the actualizing, differenciating agencies.” They are the actualizers, the differenciaters that dramatize the Idea. They are agents, but they perform a role given to them by the Idea. To be precise, a spatio-temporal dynamism is not an unorganized movement in space and time. It moves throughout space and time according to the rules given in the Idea.

To clarify what he means by spatio-temporal determinations, Deleuze refers to Kant. These spatio-temporal determinations are akin to what Kant called schemata, but with one important difference. Like spatio-temporal dynamisms, as we know, “a schema is indeed a rule of determination for time and of construction for space,” however, in Kant a schema only works in relation to concepts and the logical possibility of those concepts. Again, while the schema constructs space and time, Kant forces it to be determined by logical possibility, interpreted from the view of form, dismissed if it forms a contradiction. Deleuze explains “this is so much part of its nature that it does no more than convert logical possibility into transcendental possibility. It brings spatio-temporal relations into correspondence with the logical relations of the concept.” In other words, Kant uses the schema to instantiate one guiding conceptual rule for the determination of time and the construction of space at the transcendental level. But at the

379 Ibid 216
380 Ibid 214
381 Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (New York: Continuum, 2007), 147.
382 Ibid 147
383 This is one reason Deleuze will oppose Kant’s logic of conditions of possibility to a transcendental empiricism which seeks to account for genesis of real experience undetermined by logical possibility.
384 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press), 218
same time, Deleuze notes that Kant describes the schema as residing external to the concept. Insofar as it lies external to the concept, how, Deleuze asks, is it that Kant ensures “its own harmony with the understanding without appeal to a miracle”?\footnote{Ibid 218} The answer is that the schematism possesses the power to “divide a concept and specify it according to a typology.”\footnote{Ibid 218} Without a schematism, concepts are incapable of specifying its point of view or dividing itself. With a schematism, spatio-temporal dynamisms can reveal difference and typology within a concept. Thus, for Deleuze we must make the Kantian schematism plural. Plural schematisms would act as “agents of differenciation” which “are the spatio-temporal dynamisms which act within or beneath it, like a hidden art.”\footnote{Ibid 218} And it is with this pluralization of Kantian schemata that Deleuze removes their mediated association with concepts and rather determines their immediate and primary role as dynamisms - dramatizations of Ideas. In contact with the Idea, spatio-temporal dynamisms create new concepts for thought, they bring to life the differential relations and singularities of the Idea.

Deleuze explains:

For if the dynamism is external to concepts – and, as such, a schema – it is internal to Ideas – and, as such, a drama or dream. Species are divided into lineages, Linnaeons into Jordanons, concepts into types, but these divisions do not have the same criteria as the divided, they are not homogeneous with the divided, and they are established in a domain external to that of concepts but internal to that of the Ideas which preside over division itself. Dynamism thus comprises its own power of determining space and time, since it immediately incarnates the differential relations, the singularities and the progressivities immanent in the Idea. The shortest is not simply the schema of the concept of straight, but the dream, the drama or the dramatization of the Idea of a line insofar as it expresses the differenciation of the straight from the curved. We distinguish Ideas, concepts and dramas: the role of dramas is to specify concepts by \textit{incarnating the differential relations and singularities of an Idea}.\footnote{Ibid 218}
Through Deleuze’s descriptions of the Kantian schematism we can see that the method of dramatization of Ideas is a matter of making concepts plural and immanent – our two guiding affirmative statements above. Or, rather, it is a matter of allowing death to enter a given concept in order for that which is singular to break free of subsumption under conceptual generalities and engender a new thought. It is evidently important that time (and space) be understood dynamically and as a point of view in and of itself. It is not linear time that can kill God and resurrect him over and over again. It is only a heterogeneous time and space that can account for truth that is based in pluralism. At the same time, however, this heterogeneous space and time is not truthless. For Deleuze, immanence always accompanies pluralism. Insofar as immanence accompanies pluralism, the selection and valuing of a singularity is most poignant when its being is one that allows for its death in order to affect new thought. In other words, the very power of singularity is the power of dramatization, not the power to solidify into an atemporal concept. It is necessary, then, that death enter into the concept of God, man, self, human, woman, in order to engender life. It is only the incessant synthesization of death into conceptual laws that we can carve an avenue to a more ethical life. In that sense, the method of dramatization is the foundation for ethics and aesthetics.

Conclusion:

Deleuze overcomes the ‘Analytic of Finitude’ with his use of Kant’s split subject, Maimon’s differential of Ideas and the pluralization of the Kantian schematism. Through these three developments, Deleuze escapes the mistake of empiricism which is “to leave external what is separated,” as well as the mistake of dogmatism – to fill the gap between a determinable object and its conceptual determination either by arguing for
the a priori complete determination of the former by the latter (Leibnizian rationalism) or by showing that they necessarily collapse into a new indeterminate unity (Hegelian idealism).\textsuperscript{389} Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism considers how determination, and the crucial relation between determinable and determinant, operates internally to the thing, such that the determination of the thing is no broader than the thing itself.\textsuperscript{390} He succeeds in developing a philosophy that shows the formless noumenal being of thought within the formed phenomenal activity of thinking. For Kant, the noumenon is the indeterminate thought of an intelligible ground. However, for Deleuze the noumenon is the being of the sensible which is both determinable and determining and can only be sensed or encountered. The being of the sensible is not represented. The object of encounter which “forces us to think… is not a sensible being but the being of the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given.”\textsuperscript{391} Rather, the encounter is forced into the sensible realm by the intensity of the differentials of each moment of the actualization of the Idea. This is a real (but not empirically real) transcendental condition (but not of possible experience). The moments of intensity are neither representations nor thinkable concepts. Moreover, the fact that we cannot see, understand, or sense intensity by the empirical exercise of the faculties of “common sense” does not make it unintelligible. Rather, the intensity of the Idea is the given rule that is internal to thought and, for Deleuze, must be thought. This is not conceptual thought applied to an already-given object; it is the thought that if forced on us in the encounter, in the giving of the given.\textsuperscript{392}

\textsuperscript{390} Ibid 86
\textsuperscript{391} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Difference and Repetition} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 139-40
Conclusion: Critique, Time, and Critical Philosophy of Race

As we have seen, Heidegger’s main concern is with delimiting a type of finitude. This finitude must be grounded in heterogeneity in order for it to access things in themselves. Truth must be grounded in heterogeneity in order to access things in themselves because this allows for definition to not produce self sameness. Rather truth is produced through difference at the ontological level. This, of course, is the bulk of both his influence and critique of Kant. For Heidegger, it is Dasein as an ontological being, and with the existential structure of care, who is capable of this relationship to Being. Its specific temporal orientation structures Dasein’s form of understanding. Its temporal orientation allows for its access to the future as a horizon of possibilities defined at the ontological level. This, early Heidegger proposes, leads us out of metaphysics and toward a thing’s true ontological ground. Rightly, however, philosophers critique Heidegger time after time on his prioritization of the human in this access. Indeed, Dasein models human existence. Thus, how heterogeneous can Heidegger’s grounding really be if human care can only access it? In this case is truth not defined by the dominant in a similar way we see in Kant?

Deleuze attempts to give us a roadmap out of the logic of sameness which continually prioritizes the human. Like, Heidegger he wants to ground truth in heterogeneity. Deleuze, however, wants to leave the language of finitude behind in his search for a critique of metaphysics. Three main developments push Deleuze’s early

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393 As defined as, for example, Dasein for Heidegger. When the human is prioritized, this leads to the establishment of a hierarchy of what it means to be human. As has been discussed in continental philosophy and feminist philosophy and race studies, leads to a prototype to designate what human is. This occurs to the exclusion of “others”. This complex relationship between defining the human and excluding otherness shows up frequently in Deleuze’s later collaborations with Guattari. It will be discussed briefly below.
theory further than Heidegger. What these three developments fall under is the attempt to completely redefine thinking. Indeed, Deleuze does not confine the level of thought to human activity or a Dasein like entity. We cannot completely delimit what does and does not fulfill these criteria.

Deleuze’s first central demand is that questioning be approached through preconceived notions rather than a neutral in and of itself. Indeed, the question of “which one” approaches every truth through the activity of perspectivism. Similar to the result of Heidegger’s critique of Kantian finitude, the “which one” perspective offers a specificity to the logic of the thing in itself. For this reason, Deleuze commends as well as reformulates Kantian Critique. Immanent critique is a necessary element of the “which one” formulation of a question. Immanent critique demands that critique come from within the thing itself, ensuring that measurement is not external or based on foreign logic. Of course, this at once presents a problem. Is this not critique of the self by the self? Sameness wrapped up in itself? Deleuze escapes this criticism by defining two levels of critique. Immanent critique is the deepest level. Internal critique, what Kant proposes, merely critiques the same with the same or also chooses the dominant from which to externally critique an object. Immanent critique, however, critiques from a ground within the object of critique at the empirical level. It is this development that allows Deleuze to escape the category of the originary as defined by Foucault. Immanent critique is at once within the object of critique but takes the object of critique as a transcendental subject. It does so while the transcendental and empirical reams remain separate and distinct. It does so because of the complex temporal character of the activity

394 The definition of through here does not mean “by means of” but refers to the activity of going through a medium to reach another side or its depth.
of true critique.

**Heidegger and Deleuze on Time:**

In considering all the touchstones between Heidegger and Deleuze, time is one of the most important. While throughout Heidegger’s career, he transitions from prioritizing the future and the past, he primarily focuses on the future as a dimension that allows for the very subjectivity that grounds truth. At the same time, this temporalization, which is synonymous with subjectivity, seemingly extends beyond itself in the temporalization of the future. Pure spontaneity within reason, for Kant, is a matter of mediation while pure spontaneity for Heidegger is a matter of immediacy through the temporalization of subjectivity. Compared to Deleuze, however, Heidegger still allows for subjective control over objects – he has not escaped the Kantian Copernican Revolution. In Deleuze, immediacy comes through subjects and objects conforming to time and therefore acquiring their own differentials that govern their logic at the level of thought and being.

Moreover, for Deleuze consistent prioritization is much more difficult to identify. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, he clearly prioritizes the present. The present is the dimension – specifically, politically and socially – to which the philosopher must critique and respond. The present, then, exemplifies the full disclosure of subjectivity insofar as it can make a break with that subjectivity, its political and social context. In *Difference and Repetition*, the story is much more evolved. While the present provides the phenomenon, the encounter of forces, the event that transforms and reveals the split nature of the self, the past is the foundation for the present and the future is the ground of these events. Moreover, the future is defined in terms of the past, as the past that never was. Thus, it is not without intertwined involvement with the past. Thus, for Deleuze, we cannot
prioritize any of the dimensions of time but, specifically, we cannot do so insofar as the
dimension of time is primarily a representation of phenomena. The defining character of
time that steps to the fore in Deleuze’s prioritization is the relationship between present,
past and future to what they are not. The relationship these dimensions harbor to the
negative of critique is the site for political and social scrutiny. Thus, all of dimensions
have their place in the critique and creation of new images of thought.

What is distinctive about Deleuzean Ideas, as opposed to the Heideggarian
horizon, is that Deleuze’s Ideas exemplify access to the encounter with the thing itself
through a displacement of the logic (of representation) that hinders this communication
and through affirmation of differences in the self and in the thing. That is, communication
occurs through their differentials. And the differentials of a thing are indistinguishable as
thought from the differentials of human thought. In short, at the level where human
reason decomposes completely, all things think. At this level those thoughts and their
 corresponding logics expose themselves. Most importantly, it is their conformation to
time and the caesura of time that generates this thought at the level of forces rather than
selves. Thus, Deleuze goes beyond Heidegger by affirming the logic of things
themselves. It is only if the self breaks with its own walls, that this logic can be accessed.
From this, I believe we can see a quite relevant logic of critique of racism.

**Deleuze’s Critical Relevance:**

The activity of immanent critique gives several directions of opportunity for the
critique of systems of oppression. Firstly Deleuze, along with many other 20th Century
Continental Philosophers, is presenting a valorization of powerlessness.\(^{395}\) Those

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\(^{395}\) We must not take the 20th Century obsession and valorization of powerlessness without criticism. It stands to be questioned whether placing powerlessness ahead of power transcendentally actually means
dominated forms of existence, rather than being victims outright who have no voice, are
where more fundamental truth lies. Indeed, they have their own truths that are not defined
by the hegemonic state of social political realities. While these truths are not entirely
separate, each has its own logic distinct from the other. The transcendental thought of the
powerless as opposed to the transcendental though that yields the reason of the dominant
is a logic of singularities Therefore, each empirically experience system of oppression
cannot be conflated into each other at the transcendental level. Each has its own logic and
therefore logic of critique. Thus while what some scholars call global racism is not
completely dismissed at this point in Deleuze’s work, one would use his position to
discuss racism at very specific social temporal and political contexts. The racism of the
21st century is not the racism of 1895, is not the racism of 1950 or even 1964. Deleuze
therefore demands that social critique of racism takes singularities as their starting points.

The logic of singularities also speaks on the individual level. And in this sense all
beings have an element of powerlessness in them. For instance, an ideal qua ideal,
however, closely one reaches it, is never achieved. Indeed, if everything and everyone is
a singularity, then any dominance and any categorization is unjust. This certainly is the
meaning of the well known statement in *Difference and Repetition* “Univocity of being
thus also signifies equality of being. Univocal Being is at one and the same time nomadic
distribution and crowned anarchy… that sort of crowned anarchy, that overturned
hierarchy which, in order to ensure the selection of difference, begins by subordinating
the identical to the different.”396 Any group or entity that speaks for another, in place of
another, is not real democracy or real equality.

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396 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* pp.37&41
It is important, though, to thoroughly think through this kind of condemnation of domination and categorization to determine how Deleuze could really offer a critique of these social realities. On a positive note, categorization as a form of domination should be destroyed because categorization can be a reduction of a singularity to a concept. Precisely what we wish to avoid. On the other hand, however, categorization can be used as an element of the logic of singularity that tangentially touches upon the very same logic. This type of categorization is not being critique here. This type of categorization, I propose, is a site of Deleuze and Race studies to be developed further. A parallel albeit inadequate sister to this idea is the concept of intersectionality. Intersectionality proposes that no person falls whole within one group. It is an attempt to take into account particularities of individuals. One woman, for instance, to take as full of an account of her identity as possible, we may try to look at her as a particular intersection of the identities of woman, mixed race, heterosexual and lower middle class. While this concept of intersectionality is a great step forward from absolute configuration and the dismissal of specified experiences, intersectionality still takes each category as an identity and still succumbs to the logic of representation; it still describes the intersectional subject by means of identifying all of these categories. What categorization by means of the logic of singularities brings to the fore is precisely that these are not identities in any traditional sense. Even an intersection of identities does not amount to the logic of singularities. In agreement with Suzana Milevska and Arun Saldanha, Deleuze’s theory suggests that race must also be thought on a transcendental level in order to grasp the biopower that is stored up by the very process of its institutionalized forgetting.  

Categorization, in the Deleuzean sense, would be the means of formation in order to form a critique. The logic of singularities, however, does not define an identity. Furthermore, it allows for identities to be in becoming. Nationalism and racism fundamentally prevent becoming and affirmation exactly by insisting on negation (of otherness), identity (of the majoritarian society to be defended) and, most metaphysically, being (an alleged essence and substance of identity is discovered underneath the complexities of social change).\footnote{398} Categorization in the Deleuzean sense, then, does not throw a handful of hegemonically defined identities together and call it an intersection. As Claire Colebrook poignantly reveals, the real “problem with racism is not that it discriminates, nor that it takes one natural humanity and then perverts it into separate groups. On the contrary, racism does not discriminate enough; it does not recognize that ‘humanity,’ Caucasian’ and ‘Asian’ are insufficiently distinguished.”\footnote{399} In contrast, the logic of singularities points to what each category leaves out, what each cannot say. In that sense, it points to the powerlessness element within anything and its authority against those categories. Thus, this categorization would be the activity of assembly in order to form a critique and descriptor of experience and not a means of identity formation.

**Placing Deleuze in Dialogue with Critiques of Race and Racism:**

Briefly, I’d like to discuss these developments alongside Deleuze and Race scholarship especially on his later work – drawing a few connections. Perhaps we can synthesize with Deleuze’s later comments with Guattari on race, racism as a transcendentental form. There are very few endeavors to understand Deleuze’s works as an aid to or a dialogue with Critical Philosophy of Race. However, significant works have

\footnote{233}{Suzana Milevska and Arun Saldanha, “The Eternal Return of Race” in Deleuze and Race, 230}  
\footnote{398}{Colebrook, Claire, “Face Race” in Deleuze and Race, 36.}
been written using Deleuze’s quite explicit socio-political racial concept of facialization.

As Deleuze’s socio-political concept for the subjugation of bodies to a racialized ideal, facialization is a correlate to the logic of representation that Deleuze rails against in his early work. The racialized ideal is the concept of the face as defined as the “white man face”. It is the subjugation of the logic of singularities and categorization by means of calcified institutional structures. Thus, the result of facialization is that bodies become visible through the dominant system of interpretation that interprets and values them solely based on their degree of separation from the “majoritarian face”. According to Simone Bignall, White supremacy in a multicultural society operates through the creation of a national ideal that maps “a whole series of positions and the relations between them… That is, the dominant in the national field do not only have an ideal of themselves in the field, but also an ideal of all the positions in it, that is, an ideal of the field itself which they struggle to impose (1998:65-6).” Therefore, all positions of power within a white supremacist nation can only be attained through manipulating one’s position within the ideal of the field “by accumulating whiteness as cultural capital and thus by aligning one’s identity with the majoritarian ‘White-man face’. This manipulation of one’s position in order to achieve a position of political power, however, is merely inscribing oneself within the very field of the idealized ‘White-man face.’” As a result, the body is taken from the subject, as Deleuze [and Guattari] explain throughout A Thousand Plateaus. There they state that the power of multiplicity within the woman and child’s bodies are taken from them. Indeed, with the dominant schematism of meaning, while no one actually fulfills all criterion of the ideal of the ‘White-man face’, all are subjected to

400 Bignall, Simone, “Dismantling the White-Man Face: Racialization, Faciality and the Palm Island Riot” Deleuze and Race 77.
401 Ibid 77
it. Thus, through facialization, the state apparatus takes over the body’s power for becoming. These bodies lose the power to become-other than how they are mapped into the dominant system of meaning. The state apparatus attains this control through manipulating and dominating the interpretation of time and space, specifically. Yet at the same time, it is through the process of facialization itself that one is able to reveal that this dominant system is neither natural nor necessary. Indeed, if facialization is possible, dismantling the face is a transformative politics which calls for one to intimately know the context and process of one’s own subjection to facialization. Facialization, then, calls for a critique of race that begins exactly as described throughout this text – an investigation into the spatially and temporally contextualized logic of subjugation, an investigation that reaches the transcendental differentials of its logic.

Final Thought:

In the end, however, it is necessary to ask where the responsibility or hope lands for Deleuze’s critiques of oppression. Is the responsibility on the oppressor or the oppressed? The fact is that Deleuze complicates these terms and their logic. They are no longer valid. Indeed, these terms themselves rely on an artificial binary logic. It seems the burden of responsibility is everywhere, for Deleuze, then. Both imperatives will always be in play. Those with more political power must critique the system that provides them with privilege. Those with no political power must critique the system that strips their power. And only with continual critique will we know what is meant to return, what passes the test of the eternal return.

402 To be sure, in order to approach the level of differentials, one must pass through the systems of the logic of representation and in that way, this binary logic, however, must be wrestled with, even if their underlining truth must be addressed as well.
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