

The Pennsylvania State University
The Graduate School
College of the Liberal Arts

KANTIAN COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE RACIAL HIERARCHY

A Dissertation
in
Philosophy
by
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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

December 2015

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Abstract

My dissertation offers an account of Kant's concept of race in the context of his cosmopolitan theory. This account is framed as a critical response to two widely accepted claims: the claim that Kant's work can be separated into distinct periods before and after he allegedly abandoned his thinking about race, and the claim that Kant's views on race are marginal, having no systematic implications for the rest of his philosophy. I contend that the concept of race is an integral part of what Kant sets out to accomplish in the 1790s. His understanding of the cosmopolitan society is built on the theory of inequality, and that theory has its start in the concept of race along two concepts. The first is the idea that the human race must be stratified on the basis of racialized characteristics which are related to *Anlagen*. Second, based on these natural inabilities, certain groups within the species are justified in their inferior status. I show that Kant integrates these two ways of looking at race into a theory of inequality that has a decisive impact on his cosmopolitanism. In turn, my critical approach to the marginalization of Kant's concept of race in recent scholarship is thematic: I examine Kant's texts on race, teleology, and cosmopolitanism as a part of a single coherent narrative about the purpose of race.

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Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank my advisor and mentor, Robert Bernasconi. Robert has always believed in me and in my work, and I am thankful his patience, guidance, support, and understanding. Kathryn Gines keeps me motivated and is one of my biggest cheerleaders. Sarah Clark Miller inspires me and has always been there for me when I needed to discuss some Kant related topic. I am also grateful to Daniel Purdy whose cheerfulness, support, and helpful suggestions made this process very rewarding.

I am grateful to the many professors and mentors who made my time at Penn State memorable and fulfilling. Many thanks go to Grace Hampton, Len Lawlor, Vincent Colapietro, Brady Bowman, Christopher Long, Nancy Tuana, and especially Jennifer Mensch.

As both an undergraduate and graduate student, I had the privilege of being mentored by world-renown scholars. I appreciate the support and encouragement from Leonard Harris at Purdue University, Sylviane Diouf at the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, and Howard McGary at Rutgers University.

My colleagues and friends at Georgia College and State University made my first year as a junior professor smooth and unforgettable. I would like to thank Sunita Manian, Chair of Philosophy and Liberal Studies Department and Jim Winchester, Coordinator of the Philosophy Department. I would also like to thank my colleagues from the Philosophy and Liberal Studies Department, including Warner Belanger, Sabrina Hom, Mark Causey, Sid Littlefield, Juli Gittinger, Henry Wang, and Jim McManmon. My colleagues outside the department have also been important to my success. I would like to thank Karen Berman, Katie Simon, Beauty Bragg, Veronica Womack, Deitrah Taylor, and especially Kristi Papallier (sisters!). I have also received

support from the the Deans of the College of Arts and Sciences, Ken Proctor and Assistant Dean Olufunke Fontenot, Provost Kelli Brown, and President Dorman.

I would never have considered pursuing philosophy especially as a woman of African descent without the encouragement of my undergraduate philosophy professors Paul Boaheng and Matthew Hutcherson. I owe my desire to go into philosophy to them and to my experience at Paine, an Historically Black College. There are many professors and administrators at Paine who were positive influences in my life. I would to thank Janice Trollinger (may you rest in peace), Ronald and Shirley Lewis, Rev. Jerry Poole, Eronini Egbujor, Joseph Tingsley, Ed Rideout, Alderi Onesigun, Akua Kankam, Matthew Atterberry, and Provost Cheryl Evans-Jones.

For this project, I received research support from both the United Negro College Fund/Mellon-Mays Foundation, the Social Science Research Council (Mellon Mays Graduate Initiatives), and the Rock Ethics Institute at Penn State University. The libraries at Penn State University and Georgia College responded to my many interlibrary loan requests in a timely fashion.

Finally, I would like to thank my husband Bourhanou who has been the rock I need in my life. Bourhanou is undoubtedly my biggest cheerleader and I am so grateful for his love. My sister Inetha, brother Harold, and my nephew provided the laughter which I sometimes needed while working on this dissertation. I am also grateful for my cat, Frizzle, who is no longer here, but would always ensure that I took a break by sitting in my books.

I am also grateful to my family in Niger, West Africa, the family of Cheick Aboubacar Hashim Kiota. Thank you for welcoming me into the family and cheering me on. Fofo.

My spiritual family at the Unitarian Universalist Fellowship in Centre County in State College welcomed me in the fold and provided a home for me when I was so far away from

home. The Fellowship was also the first place where I came to believe that we can live in a world where there is racial harmony and a true appreciation for diversity. This project is deeply influenced by Unitarian Universalist values and dreams.

I dedicate this dissertation to my husband, Bourhanou, and to my parents, Harold Shorter and Inga Cook. I also dedicate it to my parents in the spirit, Matthew Hutcherson and Marian Dornell.

Introduction

In recent discussions on the topic of race, my students have often been perplexed as to why one should still talk about race. In recent years, due to the mistreatment of mostly black men that has gotten national and international attention, my students have been hearing the term "race" thrown about more than they would have ever imagined in their generation. Their generation, so they thought, is "post-racial," "multi-cultural," and "diverse." My students "don't see race" but instead see "only people" and it does not "matter to them what color *you* are" because "everyone is *human*." A disclaimer that I always hear before they share anything on the topic of race is that their parents have always told them that all people were equal and to not see race. (These are the same students who admit that both their parents and grandparents are *still* racist, but just do not *show it*.) At first, I truly struggled with how to tell them that race still mattered. As an African American woman who grew up in the "Deep South" region of the United States, despite living in a suburban area and socializing with other middle-class blacks, I had always observed that racism hides within the most liberal ideologies and I did not know how to make these students, who fervently believed in these ideologies see and understand what was missing or wrong about what they thought.

As I have been working on this project, I have come to see the same neglect about the importance of race to be present in Kant studies. The finer articulations about Kant and his racism must be cast aside in order to see the actual claim, which is that "Race does not matter with regard to Kant's work because he later articulated a concept of equality in which stratifying races no longer existed." However, one still reads a Kant who never recanted his claims that Africans were lower than the other races, who still used the term "race" in the 1790s in some form, and who still thought that inequality amongst the species was the best way to understand

how the species progressed. The assumption within Kant studies and more generally is that conversations about race should no longer continue, that they are no longer legitimate. However, achieving true equality means, in part, coming to terms with the history which informs our current articulation of the ideas we value. For this reason, whatever Kant means by equality must be understood in the best possible way that he could have meant it. While he speaks of "Perpetual Peace" he also believes that it can never be achieved; it is, rather, an ideal that one must posit in order to motivate the species toward perfection (AA 6:350).¹ Likewise, I now tell my students that the reason why they cannot make sense of police brutality toward blacks today is because they cannot see how our view of life and of history is also entangled with racism. That is, one's very sense of human progress and equality carries with a sinister, invisible form of racism. Unfortunately, they have been encouraged by those good people who are their parents and grandparents that the best way to overcome the world's racist past is to not see it. It is this desire to understand more about racism and the extent to which it is tied up with notions of equality that motivates me in this project.

When it comes to Kant studies in particular, despite the amount of work that has been done regarding Kant's work on race in recent times,² Robert Bernasconi's claim is still relevant: in the history of philosophy, the racist ideas present in the thinking of canonical philosophers are too often ignored.³ In Kant studies, the crux of this claim rests on the notion that Kant's work on race should be separated from his more central philosophical ideas which are located in his moral

¹ See Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals in Practical Philosophy*, edited by Mary Gregor (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 487. This work will appear henceforth as MM.

² See Emmanuel Eze, "The Color of Reason: The Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology," *Bucknell Review*, 38:2 (1995): 218. While Eze is the first scholar in more recent times to discuss Kant and race, there are others who in earlier decades engaged in this discussion. See references to other scholars in Germany in Robert Bernasconi's discussion in "Will the Real Kant Please Stand Up?" on page 14. See also, Jon Mikkelsen's discussion in *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth Century Writings* (New York, New York: SUNY Press, 2013), 4.

³ See Robert Bernasconi, "Will the Real Kant Please Stand Up?; The Challenge of Enlightenment Racism to the Study of the History of Philosophy," *Radical Philosophy*, Volume 117 (2013): 15.

philosophy and metaphysics in order to smooth over the apparent contradiction between his racist statements and his more universal views. One of the motivations is that in stating the former that the latter should somehow redeem him from being cast as a racist and prevents the even more unfortunate possibility that these purer ideas could be tainted with racism. Whereas Pauline Kleingeld conceded that race was indeed a problematic concept in Kant's work in the 1770s and 1780s which is also when he wrote three essays on the topic of race, she has succeeded in persuading commentators that Kant changed his mind about race when he embraced cosmopolitanism.⁴

It is clear from the 1788 essay "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" that Kant's discussion about race is closely tied to his teleological philosophy. Kant's justification of the enslavement of Africans in the "Teleology" essay is echoed by his remarks on inequality in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). In Kant's pre-critical work, in the context of aesthetics and morality, Kant is known for the statements in the *Observations of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764) where he calls an African stupid from head to toe because he is black (AA 2:55).⁵ Mark Larrimore observes that Kant allowed the essays on race to be republished several times,⁶ and in 1798 was happy to present the ideas on race in the work of Christoph Girtanner as similar to his own (AA 7:320).⁷ Kant's several comments that he makes about Africans, who will be the main

⁴ See Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Volume 57, Number 229 (2007): 574. See also Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Colonialism" in *Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives*, edited by Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 60-65.

⁵ See Immanuel Kant, "On the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime" (1764), in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Robert Loudon and Günter Zöllner (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 61. This work will appear henceforth as OBS.

⁶ See Mark Larrimore, "Race, Freedom, and the Fall in Steffens and Kant," in *The German Invention of Race*, edited by Sara Eigen and Mark Larrimore (New Albany, New York; SUNY Press, 2006), 117 (n 20).

⁷ See Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, edited and translated by Robert Loudon (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 223. The work will appear henceforth as APV. For a selection from Girtanner's book *Concerning the Kantian Principle in Natural History* (1796) see *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth Century Writings*, trans. Jon Mikkelsen (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2013), 209-232.

focus of this project, occurs alongside the other so-called more central ideas of Kant's philosophy. Thus, the extent to which Kant either maintains or changes his position on the racial hierarchy is relevant to *philosophical inquiry* because in the larger scope, the concern is about how these *contradictory philosophies* coexist, relate, and influence one another in Kant's *intellectual development*, thereby constituting at least one reason for why the matter is not only of *historical, biographical* interest.⁸

There are a number of philosophical commentaries that are sympathetic to the idea that Kant, up to his death, believed in the racial hierarchy, but these claims tend to focus heavily on the actual statements that Kant makes as opposed to the ways in which these statements, silences, and omissions reappear in other contexts. While the statements that Kant makes about race are indeed both damaging and problematic, focusing merely on these statements when it comes to making the case for why race is important to Kant's work can lead to further marginalizing race. That is, the significance of race in Kant's work cannot be tied to the presence or absence of statements about race. I am not arguing that these statements are not important; rather, the claim is that whether or not Kant no longer makes them in a particular decade of his work is not an indication that the concept of race does not have an impact elsewhere. It is for this reason that I focus on the concept of race and the extent to which the notions of difference and inequality are an intrinsic part of its *conception*. I am not going to argue, as Emmanuel Eze does that " 'Race,' then, in Kant's view, is based upon an a-historical principle of reason (*Idee*) and moral law."⁹ I am also not saying that Kant's work should stop being read and appreciated because he says

⁸ See Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Colonialism," 65. Kleingeld states that the reason for why Kant changes his mind is a "matter of considerable historical, *biographical* interest. [...] [W]e should not exaggerate the *philosophical* importance of this open question. As a matter of philosophical argument, we know quite well that there were *good reasons* for Kant, given the principles of his 1780s moral theory and his emerging 1790s political theory, to change his views on colonialism."

⁹ Eze, "The Color of Reason," 218-219.

some problematic things about Africans. What I am arguing is that his support of the racial hierarchy, albeit in new and less visible ways has far reaching consequences for Kant's ideas about natural history and the philosophy of history which, in turn, impacts his views on racial equality.

Two widely accepted claims frame my account: the first claim is that Kant's work can be separated into distinct periods before and after he changed his thinking about race in or soon after 1792. The second claim is closely related to the first which is that Kant's views on race are marginal and have no systematic implications for the rest of his philosophy. The first claim is about how to situate his use of the concept of race in relation to the rest of Kant's work whereas the second claim has to do with the political nature of his appeal to the idea of race and how to interpret Kant's work on race given these political concerns. This project attempts to offer a nuanced account of Kant's racial ideas that aims to show the connections between race and the history of philosophy. What makes this project different from that of many scholars is that I contend that the enduring quality of race has a political aspect for him. In this project, I argue that the racial hierarchy is crucial to how Kant conceives of the philosophy of history and teleology in his late work. In spite of the fact that Kant no longer refers to the racial hierarchy explicitly in his late work, it still lingers through the concepts of inequality and difference.

Throughout this project, I will refer to the terms racial hierarchy and/or white supremacy in addition to racial stratification. The context in which I will use racial hierarchy refers to the explicit mention of the supremacy of the white race or statements that emphasize the inadequacies of other races. For example, Kant claims that it is "without any prejudice on behalf of the presumptuously greater perfection of one color <when compared to> another—pronounce

<favor> for the <race> of whites" (AA 2:439; DHR 54) and also that it is the original white race (the noble blond from the Old World) who represents the first race from which all the others are based upon, who have the greatest and richest lands, and who have the ability to be transplanted easily anywhere because of their ability to acclimate to any environment (AA 2:441; DHR 69). The scientific reasons given in the natural history for why the white race is the supreme race is difficult to adjudicate given the presumed audience to which Kant is speaking: in the philosophy of history, Kant continues this theme of white supremacy with regard to the belief that "we," the whites, are civilized, highly cultivated in the arts and will one day give their laws to others (AA 8:29; IUH 119). I see these and other statements as being possible only because of the emphasis that Kant places on racial stratification, a notion that is essential to the concept of race. That is to say, the concept of race is built upon the presence of differences which result from a common origin within the species and not the similarities (AA 8:169; TPP 205). Another important aspect is that racial differences are clearly marked according to preset, permanent characteristics arising from the *Keime* and most importantly, predispositions or *Anlagen*. *Anlagen* are crucial to Kant's justification for stratifying the races and are the means by which he conceives of the progress of the human species as he posits in the philosophy of history. So, by using the term racial stratification, I want to emphasize the divisive nature of Kant's concept of race and its influence on his views of human progress and equality in the natural history and philosophy of history. I show that this account of racial stratification is a precondition of the racial hierarchy and/or white supremacy, but, more importantly, that it persists after the explicit mention of the racial hierarchy.

The Politics of Race and Equality

Race is a contested idea in the context of Kant scholarship especially with regard to its significance in Kant's late work. Charles Mills describes four positions on the topic of Kant and race:

We could distinguish four main positions, even if the first can no longer be taken seriously: (a) Kant never had racial views; (b) Kant did have racial views, but they belong essentially to his pre-critical period; (c) Kant's racial views continue into his critical period, but are then abandoned (different dates for this putative abandonment are given); (d) Kant maintained his racial views throughout his professional life.¹⁰

For Mills, the idea that "Kant never had racial views" is held by "those innumerable Kant scholars in previous decades—and still including some today—who managed to remain unaware of Kant's racial writings"[...]. In contrast, the other positions that Mills names recognize in varying degrees, the idea that race is a part of Kant's work that cannot be ignored. Mills contends that Kleingeld's position in particular "concedes that the racial work is a *prima facie* problem" and that even on their own account, defenders of Kant would have to admit that Kant was a racist, supporter of the enslavement of Africans, and colonialism for most of his professional life, and that he only changed his mind about all this late in life.¹¹

But why is it so hard for some to admit that Kant's views on race are crucial to the rest of his philosophy and why would one want to defend someone with his views? There are at least two ways of answering this question that comprise the major motivations for this project. The first has to do with the nature of the discipline of philosophy. That is, too often, the racist views of *certain* figures in the history of philosophy are excused or diminished. In order to change this perspective, the discipline of philosophy must continue to take large strides in diversifying itself

¹⁰ See Charles Mills, "Kant and Race, *Redux*," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, Volume 35, Number 1–2 (2014): 148.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 149.

both with regard to who can be considered a philosopher, and with respect to becoming open-minded to different perspectives of and methods for challenging the exclusionary views held by some of the canonical figures. These canonized figures are indeed *men* of their time, but the extent to which current philosophers celebrate their work without scrutinizing the views of that time, especially those exclusionary views is, at base, a problematic, albeit a widely accepted practice. The philosophies of these canonized philosophers become canonized themselves; their racist ideas become so widely accepted that they become racist *practices*. This is not only a problem for philosophy, but extends beyond the discipline.

The second motivation has to do with the political nature of the race insofar as closely associating Kant, as a major canonical figure in the history of philosophy with race threatens to mar his *philosophical* legacy. What I mean by "political" is the extent to which discussions about race and the racial hierarchy in particular become a battleground over the place of race in Kant's work. To discuss this point further, my first concern in this "Introduction" is to deal with the question of whether or not Kant's racial hierarchy can or ought to be understood as political. The context of this question arises out the concern that current analyses of Kant's work on race often seek to save Kant from the possibility that he could hold racist views. Questioning the extent to which Kant's position on the status of Africans in his late philosophy can or ought to be understood as political is an almost blasphemous claim. To be fair, it is difficult to reach a conclusion that will be palatable to everyone when it comes to Kant's views on race and its political nature because of Kant's status in the history of philosophy. Regardless, if it is the case that the racial hierarchy has a direct or indirect affect on aspects of Kant's universal philosophy, the task of the philosopher must be to consider the holistic and ethical way to engage Kant's work. That is to say, one cannot disregard the parts of a philosopher that they do not agree with

or makes them uncomfortable in order to salvage the legacy of a philosopher. The reality of the world is that racism still exists in spite of and alongside the ideals of liberty and equality. One way that one can engage and I hope reform this rhetoric is to explore these contradictions in the history of philosophy in order to come to terms with our current conception of racism while also establishing a new concept of equality that is truly extended to everyone.

With regard to understanding Kant as an egalitarian, there is some disagreement about the kind of egalitarian that Kant is, and whether his egalitarianism can be universally applied especially when it comes to race.¹² Scholars who work on the subject of Kant and the concept of race tend to adopt one of three basic approaches. First is the notion that Kant is consistently inegalitarian, which means that race plays a key role in his views on equality, and, so, when Kant says that people are ends in themselves, he only means white people.¹³ The second position is that Kant's views on race change, albeit at different times for different scholars from an inconsistent view of personhood to one that embraces consistent egalitarianism.¹⁴ For example, Pauline Kleingeld argues that Kant "radically revised" his views on race in the 1790s. The last group believes that Kant is inconsistently universalist.¹⁵ For them, Kant makes two competing statements; on one hand, "all" people are to be treated as ends in themselves, however, in other places non-white people seem to not be granted full personhood. Scholars in the third group

¹² See Pauline Kleingeld, in "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," page 575 and in *Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), page 94. Kleingeld presents similar categories to the above regarding the concern about egalitarianism in Kant studies. The reason why I chose not to use those divisions is because I do not see Kleingeld as being different from Sankar Muthu in this respect.

¹³ See Robert Bernasconi, "Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism" in Julie Ward and Tommy Lott's *Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays* (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 145-166 and Emmanuel Eze, "The Color of Reason: The Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology," who argue that Kant is an important figure in the development of a race theory that denigrates the personhood of non-white people.

¹⁴ See Pauline Kleingeld in "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," who argues that Kant's views on race were "radically revised" his views on race in the 1790s. We see evidence of this in the essay on "Perpetual Peace" (1795) and the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) where Kant, on Kleingeld's reading, condemns the African slave trade and argues for the cosmopolitan right of blacks. This cosmopolitan right is meant to protect non-white nations from colonization.

¹⁵ See Robert Loudon, *Kant's Impure Ethics* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 104-106.

argue that the emphasis should be on Kant's universalism and not race, which contrasts with the emphasis on race of the first group. One point can be observed from these three perspectives: that thinkers disagree on the extent to which Kant's notion of equality is indeed universal. Moreover, these viewpoints regarding the correct placement of Kant's concept of race create a separation of his concept of race from the rest of his work.

One of the worries that motivates this project, although it is no different from that of such scholars as Charles Mills, is that Kant's views on equality are not universal and that despite this fact, Kant is still regarded uncritically as one of the leaders of universal equality. However, equality is an important notion to discuss with regard to race because of the views that Kant espouses about slavery and colonialism, which should be seen as contradictory to his thoughts on equality. Moreover, there is the fact that Kant's critical, moral, social, and political philosophies are usually interpreted by scholars as philosophies in which Kant suggests that all people are included in his notion of equality. For example, Pauline Kleingeld cites the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) when considering the contradictory views he holds about race and equality, "The racial hierarchy, defended with a biased reading of travel reports and a teleological race theory, goes against the presumption of human equality which one would expect from someone with a universalist moral theory. After all, the basic moral principle which Kant formulates during the 1780s, the Categorical Imperative in its several versions, is, at least in its wording, addressed to all humans (or, even more broadly, to all finite rational beings)."¹⁶ Kleingeld concedes that Kant does hold contradictory views with regard to the fact that Kant's "universal moral theory" contradicts his "teleological race theory"; however, the Categorical Imperative, Kleingeld emphasizes, is indeed "addressed to all humans."

¹⁶ Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," 574.

Like freedom and justice, equality is difficult to define. Some of the difficulties that accompany the attempt to formulate a single definition for equality arises from the number of questions that it invites. One of these questions is: To whom is equality extended to and on what basis? There are also a number of different frameworks that can be used to define the boundaries of equality, namely, those that pertain to moral, political, and religious considerations. Toward the end of this section I will say more about how I see equality operating in Kant's philosophy of history, but for the moment, I will introduce the notion of equality in the 18th century, and highlight some of the criticisms of its conception.

Jonathan Israel fills a gap in the history of the Enlightenment by providing a genealogy of equality, according to his notion of the Radical Enlightenment. Israel's concept of the Radical Enlightenment is restricted to a particular time during the Enlightenment after the American Revolution where certain basic principles of equality irrespective of gender, race, class, and other "isms" were established based on secular and non-partisan grounds.¹⁷ Early views of equality did not grant equality to all, and had theological reasons for exclusion: "Moderate mainstream Enlightenment generally, then tended to uphold the principles of monarchy, aristocracy, empire and racial hierarchy."¹⁸ This idea had a theological basis couched in the understanding that god had ordained a certain amount of natural inequality in the world.¹⁹ However, in the political arena, urban societies began to question their access to wealth and rights for over a century all over Europe from England to Amsterdam, which created a growing appeal to secular arguments that would challenge the political responsibility of rulers to their citizens.²⁰ By the late 17th

¹⁷ See Jonathan Israel, *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), vii-ix. Ebook.

¹⁸ See Johnathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670—1752* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 548.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.,550.

century figuring out what was the "fundamental principle of equality, irrespective of particular societies and epochs, stemming from humanity's essential attributes"[...] could no longer be avoided.²¹ That is to say, the concern became discovering the ground of equality that would be irrespective of class and other barriers. For Israel, the concept of basic equality that comes out of Spinoza in the Radical Enlightenment is grounded in morality on the idea that both humankind and the animal species have the individual, sovereign, and equal right to pursue their advantages.

Although Israel is careful to observe that the Radical Enlightenment occurred during the time of the struggle for rights of all people (at least as far as Spinoza is concerned), and thereby the notion of equality that was established is one that reflects true universal equality, other scholars point out that the universal sounding nature of equality that one comes across in the social contract theorists creates obstacles for people of color and for women. Carole Pateman in the book, *The Sexual Contract*, claims that a suppressed part of the social contract is what could be called the "sexual contract."²² Pateman's argument is that an inherent part of the original social contract, which Pateman calls the "sexual-social contract" is actually a "story about political right as a patriarchal right or sex-right, the power that men exercise over women." The so-called universal nature of freedom in the social contract is male-centric, whereby, "Civil freedom is not universal. Civil freedom is a masculine attribute and depends upon patriarchal right."²³ Not only are women controlled by men in the sexual contract, they are also excluded from it. Women are not thought to be capable or able signatories to the contract insofar as "natural sexual difference" between men and women that dictates which attributes make either a man or a woman is also that which dictates who should be allowed to participate in making the terms of the contract. In the sexual-social contract, only men have the capacity to enter into a

²¹ Ibid.,551

²² See Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford University Press: Redwood City, CA, 1988), 1.

²³ Ibid.,2.

contract. It follows thus that only men have the natural born condition in which they are born free and considered to be individuals.²⁴ According to Pateman, "sexual difference is political difference" whereby the natural differences that exist between men and women become the foundation for the ideological and political exclusion and suppression of women in society, creating a divide that still impacts the lived experiences of women today.

Deeply inspired by Pateman, Charles Mills in the book, *The Racial Contract*, has similar concerns about the idea of universal equality with regard to the social contract when it comes to people of color in that "the color-coded morality of the Racial Contract restricts the possession of this natural freedom and equality to *white* men."²⁵ The idea is that the social contract excludes people of color despite the fact that the traditional understanding of freedom and equality according to the social contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, appear to promote freedom and equality for all people equally. Mills' Racial Contract is a set of contracts (including meta-ethical contracts, that is, contracts about contracts which establish the validity of the contracts) in which whites, who are identified as full persons relate to non-whites through a contract as subordinates.²⁶ Non-whites have an inferior moral status in this contract and for this reason Mills claims that they are regarded as subpersons or *Untermenschen*. The subordinate status of non-whites in this relationship permits whites to exploit non-whites including their property and their bodies. As in the social-sexual contract, non-whites are not signatories of this contract, and all white people, while some may not be signatories, are always beneficiaries of the contract. One point that Mills makes with regard to the Racial Contract that is also a pressing issue for me in this project, is the argument that the contract "*codifies* a morality that already exists." The idea is that certain moral ideals are woven into the fabric of the universe as objective

²⁴ Ibid.,6

²⁵ See Charles Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 16.

²⁶ Ibid.,11.

and universal thereby establishing a set of presuppositions about people and correlating ideals which, in turn, for me, raises concerns about the extent to which certain people have the capacity to measure up to the ideal.

In this project, I show that Africans are precluded from sharing in equality in spite of the fact that they are human. The idea is that there are built in assumptions regarding the person to whom equality is granted and this person must be an autonomous, rational agent who has the capacity to determine their own moral choices through which they can access equality and equally participate in the cosmopolitan ideal. The only group of people to whom Kant has explicitly given these capacities are whites (AA 2:441²⁷, AA 8: 27; IUH 116). Despite the argument that one cannot assume that these pronouncements on behalf of whites necessarily exclude Africans, it is worth noting that the various statements that he makes with regard to the moral, political, and physical status of Africans dim their hope of ever attaining the same status as whites (AA 8:174 fn; TPP 209). One objection that Robert Louden makes in this regard is that Kant is *logically*, (but not *personally*) committed to the idea that all people regardless of color and gender will *eventually* be ushered into the process of human progress.²⁸ Louden is committed to a gradualistic view in that over time all races will be allowed to have an equal part in human progress. Kant however, is more committed to retaining divisions and disparities in the context of his other writings where, although he does not mention the term "race" or racial hierarchy, keeps with the theme of inequality. In the 1784 essay, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim," Kant mentions "antagonism" as the development of *Anlagen* with the

²⁷ See Immanuel Kant, "Of the Different Races of Human Beings," in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Robert Louden and Günter Zöller (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 95. This work will appear henceforth as DHR.

²⁸ Robert Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics*, 104-106.

goal to create a lawful society (AA 8:21)²⁹ and in the 1786 essay, "Conjectural Beginning of a Human History," he states the necessity of an inward strife that one experiences at the individual level in order to reach their vocation (AA 8:117).³⁰ In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant holds that culture (*Kultur*) is the ultimate purpose of human beings and that the only way to establish culture is through inequality (AA 5:432).³¹ I argue that Kant does not grant equal status to everyone; rather, through his natural philosophy reinforces the necessity, purpose, and function of the racial hierarchy with consequences for his philosophy of history and cosmopolitanism.

This project can be thought of as resting on four claims. First, Kant does not recant his negative views on Africans, that is, those statements he makes regarding their character, intellectual capacity, physical characteristics, or ability to work; rather, these comments are supported by the implications of the racial hierarchy in the late 1790s. Second, these implications go beyond the explicit mention of the racial hierarchy and "race" thereby affecting the status of Africans *vis-a-vis* white supremacy by emphasizing capacities through *Anlagen*. Third, Kant's notion of capacities, namely *Kultur* and skillfulness, retain the divisive aspect of the racial hierarchy in the philosophy of history, teleology, and cosmopolitanism, as does *Anlagen*. Fourth, Kant would have to change his mind about other aspects of his philosophy in order to have proven "a change of heart"; namely the claim that inequality is necessary in order to progress toward the cosmopolitan goal.

²⁹ See Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784)," in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Robert Loudon and Günter Zöllner (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 111. This work will appear henceforth as IUH.

³⁰ See Immanuel Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of a Human History" (1786), in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Robert Loudon and Günter Zöllner (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 169.

³¹ See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (1790) translated by Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 319. This work will appear henceforth as CJ.

Anlagen and the Philosophy of History

My main point so far has been that racial stratification and racial inequality continue to be a part of Kant's cosmopolitan work, *contra* those who argue that Kant holds views of universal equality despite the fact that there is no explicit mention of the racial hierarchy in the 1790s. I am also proposing that the question about whether or not Kant continues to maintain a racial hierarchy is not answered simply by determining whether or not he maintains racial permanency through *Keime*. In addition to *Keime*, *Anlagen* also have an important role to play in supporting Kant's views on racial permanency.

My discussion of dispositions or *Anlagen* and *Naturanlagen* should be distinguished from another term that is sometimes translated as dispositions (moral dispositions to be more precise) and that is *Gesinnung*. In the *Kant Dictionary*, Howard Caygill defines *Gesinnung* as present in Kant's later moral philosophy as "a subjective effect of the moral law and the source of the value of moral actions" in which case it is the "bedrock of Kant's moral philosophy" insofar as it influences the *Willkür* toward accepting the maxims or the will as opposed to inclinations.³² Caygill does not have an entry for *Anlagen* or *Naturanlagen*; however, he does talk about them in his entry on "Humanity."³³ However, it is not clear that Caygill sees that the dispositions that he writes about in this entry are *Anlagen* as opposed to *Gesinnung*. There, Kant refers to *Anlagen* as having three different characteristics that, for Caygill, exemplifies the continuum between animality and humanity (AA 6:26; RR 74).³⁴ While *Gesinnung* can be cultivated by constantly striving for improvement (AA 5:85; CPR 208),³⁵ the difference between *Gesinnung* and *Anlagen*

³² See Howard Caygill, *A Kant Dictionary* (EBSCO Publishing, 2000), 161. Ebook.

³³ *Ibid.*, 230.

³⁴ See *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793), in *Religion and Rational Theology*, edited by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 39-216. This work will appear henceforth as RBR.

³⁵ See the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Robert Louden

is that *Anlagen* are entities that allow the human being to progress toward a universal goal through the peculiar process of *Entwicklung* (development).

The concept of development holds a key position when it comes to understanding the value of both difference and variety with regard to the species. Hence the phrase "*Entwicklung der Naturanlagen*" in the essay, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim" (1784) refers to the progress within the human species. Thus, "All natural predispositions of a creature are determined sometime to develop themselves completely and purposively" (AA 8:18; IUH 109) in which case conflict and the impulse to strive toward a universal achievement become the standard for development within the species. The concept of development, *Entwicklung*, refers to the most basic movement of the universe, which supports the notion that it is crucial to the progress of nature and is vital to the way in which nature organizes itself (AA 1:334; TH 282).³⁶

In the context of the early essays on race, *Keime* and *Anlagen* are a pair of capacities that help races develop and thrive in their natural environments. In 1777, Kant gives *Keime* and *Anlagen* distinct roles: *Keime*, or germs or seeds, are the foundation upon which certain body parts are characteristics of the species. However, when it comes to differences within the species, *Anlagen* allow for other varietal aspects. With the help of nature through the sun and air, certain racial characteristics are demonstrated in races. *Keime* and *Anlagen* are not mechanistic implants that only respond to external factors; rather, they are capacities that according to nature's plan implanted in the original phylum unfold in ways that are beneficial to the races.

and Günter Zöller (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 133-272. This work will appear henceforth as CP.

³⁶ See Immanuel Kant *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens or Essay on the Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Whole Universe According to Newtonian Principles* (1755), in *Kant: Natural Science*, edited by Eric Watkins (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Ebook. This work will appear henceforth as UNH.

Keime are considered to be primarily responsible for the permanency of racial characteristics. However, there is some disagreement about whether or not Kant changes his mind about *Keime*. The different interpretations argue about whether Kant ascribes to epigenesis³⁷ or remains firmly committed to preformation³⁸ after 1790. There are also other scholars whose arguments occupy middle-ground positions, e.g., Zammito, but for the moment, I will focus on the polar opposite ends in order to show the repercussions of this argument on discussions about race.³⁹ Philip Sloan, who argues that Kant adopts epigenesis after 1789, contends that *Keime* drops out of Kant's usage around this time.⁴⁰ In the context of race, this argument has been taken up in order to dismiss the importance of race in Kant's work after the publication of the *Critique of Judgment* (1790).⁴¹ Zammito contends that Kant retains his preformationist position throughout the 1790s.⁴² Moreover, Kleingeld questions the extent to which *Keime* can be said to disappear in Kant's late work as it does still appear in some late texts.⁴³ Another argument that bears mention is that later in Kant's work *Keime* and *Anlagen* are used interchangeably.⁴⁴ However, Philip Sloan argues that the distinct theoretical categories do

³⁷ Epigenesis contrasts with preformation theory. There are two meanings of this theory. The first is vital epigenesis, in which embryonic development is thought to form out of an amorphous matter to a more complex one spontaneously due to an internal force. The second definition of epigenesis is mechanical, which is the assumption that embryonic development occurs due to the movement of particle matter according to such mechanical principles as the laws of nature.

³⁸ Preformation theories are pre-existence theories which argue that the essential properties of the species were both created by and bestowed upon them by god. There are many different versions of preformation theory, and it arises in Kant through the concept of the preformed *Keime* and *Anlagen*.

³⁹ See John Zammito, "This Inscrutable *Principle* of an Original *Organization*': Epigenesis and 'Looseness of Fit' in Kant's Philosophy of Science" *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, Volume 34 (2003) :88.

⁴⁰ See Philip Sloan, "Performing the Categories: Eighteenth-Century Generation Theory and the Biological Roots of Kant's A Priori," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 40, Number 2 (April 2002): 248.

⁴¹ Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," 591 fn.

⁴² See John Zammito, "Kant's Persistent Ambivalence Toward Epigenesis," in *Understanding Purpose: Kant and the Philosophy of Biology*, edited by Philippe Huneman (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press for the North American Kant Society, 2007), 58.

⁴³ Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," 591 fn.

⁴⁴ See Robert Loudon, "Cosmopolitical Unity: The Final Destiny of the Human Species," in *Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide*, edited by Alix Cohen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 215.

not dissolve, at least through 1788 until Kant adopts epigenesis.⁴⁵ For Sloan, the importance of *Keime* decreases closer to 1790, but *Anlagen*, in contrast, become more central in Kant's work as 'inner purposive predispositions.'⁴⁶ Similarly, Robert Louden recognizes the purposive nature of these notions: "By means of the crucial concepts of *Keime* and *Anlagen*, Kant is able simultaneously to set biological limits on human development, to account for human unity and diversity (through our shared potential but also our different interactions with the external environment), and to map out our future potential."⁴⁷

In his later discussion of race, Kant is not always as careful as he was in 1777 to distinguish the roles of *Keime* and *Anlagen* (AA 2:434; DHR 63); however, what he does retain in these later essays is the idea that certain aspects of racial characteristics are implanted or preformed and that others develop (*entwickeln*). This language of development is also present in the philosophy of history and the teleology. One example of a place where Kant uses both terms but still holds to two distinct processes is in the context of justifying African slavery in the essay, "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788). There Kant argues that: "I concede that the understanding, or, if one prefers, the spontaneously purposively active nature, indeed paid no heed to a transplanting after germs (*Keimen*) have already developed, yet without thereby justifying the accusation of lacking wisdom and being short-sighted" (AA 8:173; TPP 209).

In the footnote to this claim he argues:

In Hr. *Sprengel's* Contributions, 5th Part, pp. 287-92, a knowledgeable man, adduces the following against Ramsay's wish to use all Negro slaves as *free* laborers: that among the many thousand freed Negroes which one encounters in America and England he knew no example of someone engaged in a business which one could properly call *labor*; rather that, when they are set free, they soon

⁴⁵ Philip Sloan, "Performing the Categories," 244.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 248.

⁴⁷ Robert Louden, "Cosmopolitical Unity," 217.

abandon an easy craft which previously as slaves they had been forced to carry out, and instead become hawkers, wretched innkeepers, lackeys, and people who go fishing and hunting, in a word, tramps. [...] Should not one conclude from this that, in addition to the faculty to work, there is also an immediate drive to activity (especially to the sustained activity that one calls industry), which is independent of all enticement and which is especially interwoven with certain natural predispositions (*Naturanlagen*); and that Indians as well as Negroes do not bring any more of this impetus into other climates and pass it on to their offspring than was needed for their preservation in their old motherland and had been received from nature; and that this inner predisposition (*Anlage*) extinguishes just as little as the externally visible one. The far lesser needs in those countries and the little effort it takes to procure only them demand no greater predispositions (*Anlagen*) to activity. (fn AA 8:174; TPP 209)

Despite the fact that *Keime* and *Anlagen* are not clearly defined in this context compared to Kant's description of them in 1777, what can be taken from this quote is that racial characteristics have aspects that are both preformed and relate to the capacity for development. In this instance, Africans have a peculiar impetus that is interwoven with their *Anlagen* that prevents them from being able to work, but the question remains as to whether the impetus attached to their *Anlagen* can be developed so that they can work.

What has been overlooked in the literature is the aspect of development that comes out of *Anlagen* and especially the way in which it functions in the larger context of Kant's discussion about race. The argument that Kant had a change of heart relies largely on a draft version of "Perpetual Peace." *Anlagen* however, are used in all the contexts of race, history, and cosmopolitanism as a concept which demonstrates that nature and her plan inevitably come to fruition. Understanding *Anlagen* as the foundation for human development solidifies the idea that teleology can be racialized and that this peculiar process of the development of *Anlagen* with regard to Africans makes their inferior status purposeful. The focus on *Anlagen* in this project is an effort to highlight the dual function of racial characteristics in order to show that the process of development as related to *Anlagen* is crucial for whether or not the African race is capable of

meeting the demands of the cosmopolitan goal. Given that Kant is not always consistent with using either *Keime* or *Anlagen* after 1777, I propose that the notion of *Anlagen* be used in a broad sense and in all instances where Kant is describing the development of the human species in order to capture the concepts of human development in history, society, and politics.

In short, I focus on *Anlagen* in this project for two reasons: First, *Anlagen* and the process of development (*Entwicklung*) have been largely ignored with regard to the specific role that they play along with *Keime* in providing a reason and purpose for racial permanency; second, *Anlagen* are what Kant discusses in the natural history, the philosophy of history, and the teleological works as a capacity that plays an important role in determining the extent to which the species can be said to meet the criteria for equal participation in the cosmopolitan society.

Critical Philosophy of Race

Given the fact that this project takes on a canonical figure in the history of philosophy, and that it is interested in pursuing the political questions that surround race, I see this project as contributing to the philosophical framework known as Critical Philosophy of Race. “Critical philosophy of race consists in the philosophical examination of issues by the concept of race and by the persistence of various forms of racism across the world.”⁴⁸ Critical Philosophy of Race is an area of philosophical inquiry that allows for interdisciplinary methods and intersects with other areas of philosophy including ethics. One may wonder why race and racism fall within the scope of philosophical inquiry as opposed to being concerns that rely only on personal experience making them appropriate concerns for such fields as sociology or history. One way that the Critical Philosophy of Race framework provides an answer to this question is by

⁴⁸ See Robert Bernasconi, “Critical Philosophy of Race,” in *Routledge Companion to Phenomenology*, edited by Sebastian Luft and Søren Overgaard (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 551.

showing that there are philosophers whose views on race and racism provide the ideological framework that sustains racist practices that are systemically oppressive.⁴⁹ Moreover, *Critical Philosophy of Race* allows for this kind of exploration because it is motivated to understand the ways in which race and racist ideologies form and persist in the ideas and systems that impact people of color. Kant's views on race and inequality are intertwined with his conception of the philosophy of history and consequently impact his views of human progress and the possibility that Africans are equal to others.

Chapter Descriptions

In chapter one entitled, "Race and Cosmopolitanism in Kant," I discuss the relevant literature on the topic of Kant and race. I emphasize in this chapter that the importance of race in Kantian scholarship experiences a number of shifts due to the political worries about associating Kant with race and racism.

In chapter two entitled, "Resituating the Concept of Race," I argue that a racially systemic view of oppression is integral to Kant's work in the natural history. As I have pointed out in this "Introduction," many scholars would concede that race was an important topic that Kant explored in the 1770s and 1780s, but some may be hesitant to acknowledge the extent to which race has far reaching consequences during the last period of Kant's work. I explore Kant's work on race and its connection to human teleology in the essays, "Of the Different Human Races" (1777), "Determination of a Concept of a Human Race" (1785), and "On the use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788). I show that the concept of race is paramount to Kant's conceptualization of human teleology through a concept of division whereby the racial hierarchy becomes a way for Kant to determine a set of limitations for Africans that are set by

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 557.

nature's foresight (*Vorsorge*) and the desire to set goals for the species. It is in this regard that I contend that focusing merely on the actual comments that Kant makes with regard to race offer a limited view of race in his work, in which case, the racial hierarchy has implications for Kant's work without being explicitly mentioned.

In chapter three "Justifying Inequality through a Philosophy of History," I argue that Kant expands upon the understanding of human purpose through *Anlagen* as a way to determine whether or not one is capable of attaining the cosmopolitan ideal. From the texts, "Speculative Beginning of Human History" (1786), "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim" (1784) and parts of the *Critique of Judgment* (1790), I contend that Kant's view of human teleology stresses the need for inequality amongst people as the human species progresses toward the cosmopolitan state. In Kant's discussion about the Tahitians in the late 1780s, their laziness makes them indistinguishable from "happy sheep" in which case there are concerns about whether their lives are worth living. The role played by antagonism and race in the works discussed in the previous chapters force one to concede (*pace* Kleingeld) that there is continuity between Kant's thought in the 1780s and 1790s.

In chapter four, "Race and the Enslavement of Africans," I focus on Kant's justification of the enslavement of Africans in the essay, "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788). I argue that Kant presents an understanding of purposes in the human species that allows for the subordination of Africans due to their racial characteristics as presented in *Anlagen*. My main focus will be to explain Kant's notions of *Anlagen* and the role that it plays in his racial theory. I explore Kant's understanding of *Anlagen* as primarily inheritable notions that, given their role as both the foundation for natural capacities and their operation within the teleological system set the stage for a racially systemic view of oppression. The fact that Africans are lazy

due to the impetus rooted in their ingrown *Anlagen* is an indication that *Anlagen* are preset capacities that do not change and, thus are clear determiners of a person's racial origin. Moreover, a person's racial characteristics are also influenced by the development of their *Anlagen* in which case the question arises about whether Kant's human teleology requires the social stratification of people in accordance with "nature's plan" based on essential differences. To this end, I investigate the extent to which racial difference goes hand-in-hand with social and moral subjugation.

In chapter five "Inequality in the *Critique of Judgment*," I focus exclusively on Kant's claim that, "It is hard to develop skill in the human species except by means of inequality among people" (AA 5:432; CJ 319). I argue that insofar as Kant sees the relationship between inferior and superior groups as functional for establishing equality that the capacity for skill or the lack thereof legitimizes oppression and inequality. The central question of this chapter has to do with whether or not nature as opposed to culture allows one to have the capacity to overcome one's shortcomings with skill in order to improve themselves. This will aid in the further discussion about whether or not Africans have any hope for improving themselves in spite of the constraints fixed by *Anlagen* that will allow them to join in as equal partners in the establishment of the cosmopolitan society.

In the final chapter, chapter six, "Cosmopolitanism," I argue that Kant's ideal of peace also uses inequality amongst nations so that the world can come to peaceful relations. The discussion of these themes is organized around the essays "Toward Perpetual Peace" (1795), *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), and the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). Pauline Kleingeld has argued that Kant revised his views on race after 1792, a change he indicates by his rejection of colonization and chattel slavery. Kleingeld's conclusion assumes that

Kant's work can be easily separated into periods; namely a race focused Kant in the 1780s versus an egalitarian Kant of the 1790s. However, this analysis fails to recognize the fact that Kant's racial hierarchy endures throughout the 1790s through the racialized view of inequality that impacts Kant's late work in deliberate and in key ways.

Chapter One: Race and Cosmopolitanism in Kant

In this chapter, I discuss some of the seminal works in the English-speaking literature that are a part of the discussion related to Kant and the concept of race. The concerns and questions which guide this discussion start with concerns about the centrality of the idea of race to the rest of Kant's work; whether or not Kant's idea of race has any influence on the rest of his work; and whether his idea of race is a topic that continues to be relevant for scholars today. My own contribution to the literature is the argument Kant is consistent in his exclusion of people of color in his work until the end of his life. Kant's views that both separate and stratify the races within the species start in the natural philosophy and continue to have an impact in his cosmopolitan philosophy. In my explanation of the literature in this chapter, I emphasize the many ways in which race has been situated and resituated as a result of the tensions around race which are also present in these arguments.

It was already established in the 1920s by Walter Scheidt that Kant had the most important view on race in his time.⁵⁰ Since Scheidt's claim, such scholars as Emmanuel Eze and Robert Bernasconi have shown in more systematic ways how Kant's idea of race is instrumental in forming both the history of race and racism. However, other scholars, such as Allen Wood, claim that Kant's views on race should not be given a prominent place in the understanding of Kant, and that rather, Kant, as a man of his time, should not be judged for his negative views on blacks and women. Furthermore, Peter Fenves,⁵¹ Susan Shell, and Pauline Kleingeld have argued in different ways that Kant's views on blacks were problematic until a certain time when his critical and political views trump his previously held disparaging views.

⁵⁰ See Walter Scheidt, "The Concept of Race in Anthropology," in *This is Race*, edited by Earl Count (New York, NY: Henry Schuman, 1950), 354-391.

⁵¹ See Peter Fenves, *Late Kant: Towards another law of the Earth* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), 102.

I discuss these works about Kant and race in three sections. In the first section, I describe some of the early accounts about Kant and the concept of race which not only broke down the boundaries which had previously existed around the topic, but also showed the connection between Kant and the history of race and racism. I will include among these earlier accounts essays by Emmanuel Eze and Robert Bernasconi that have formed the basis for present discussions. In the second section, I shift my focus to the literature which has been concerned about equality, Kant, and race. Some scholars, including Bernard Boxill, have argued that despite the fact that Kant has made problematic claims about race, the focus should be instead on Kant's theoretical claims espoused in his critical and moral work. In the third section, I address Pauline Kleingeld and Susan Shell, who have argued in various ways that although Kant held problematic views about race in the earlier part of his work that at various points in the 1780s and 1790s Kant's position on race "changed." Kant's "change of heart" means too that Kant altered his theory in such a way that it did not contradict the core of his moral and critical work which holds all people regardless of race to be equal. In the conclusion, I give a few remarks regarding how the remainder of the chapters of this project address some of the worries that motivates this project on Kant and race.

Early Views of Kant and Race

In this section, I discuss the early views of Kant and race which encompasses several approaches within the discipline of philosophy.⁵² For example, Walter Scheidt emphasizes the extent to which the idea of race cemented Kant's role in the development of anthropology as a

⁵² That is, in contrast to early discussions about Kant and race in other disciplines such as Comparative Literature. For example, see Ronald Judy, *(Dis)forming The American Canon: African-Arab Slave Narratives and the Vernacular* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

discipline. Scholars Bernasconi and Eze offer another approach which is in large part indebted to Scheidt by arguing that Kant's work on race has contributed also to the history of racism.

One early criticism of Kant and race is written by Walter Scheidt whose essay, "The Concept of Race in Anthropology" was published in the 1924/1925 volume of the journal, *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Biologie, einschliesslich Rassen- und Gesellschafts-Hygiene*.

Scheidt contends that Kant's idea of race is arguably one of the most important of his day and for those who came after him.⁵³ This is true for two reasons: First, Kant is the first person to create the discipline of anthropology in which the idea of race is included;⁵⁴ second, the concept of race is parallel to similar concepts in his epistemology and became, as a result, natural science. What makes Kant's idea of race different from that of his contemporaries is that Kant anchored race by the appeal to generation and heredity.⁵⁵ It is this point which gives race a true definition for the first time. Scheidt's work is also important because it situates Kant amongst other such scholars in the history of race as Buffon, Linnaeus, and Blumenbach.

In 1995 philosopher Emmanuel Eze's essay, "The Color of Reason: The Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology" goes a step further than Scheidt's claim by arguing that not only is Kant's idea of race groundbreaking in the history of race, but that it also makes a unique contribution to the history of racism. Eze provides one of the more systematic accounts of Kant's concept of race and racism. Compared to other accounts today, for example, that of Robert Bernasconi, there are a few of Eze's claims that have been surpassed; however, Eze's work is still central to any discussion about Kant and the concept of race in the English-speaking literature. Eze's central aims in the essay are to analyze three areas of Kant's work: the first being the anthropology and how Kant understood it as "science"; second, the idea of human nature; third, the idea of race and

⁵³ Walter Scheidt, "The Concept of Race in Anthropology," 372.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 373.

more specifically the notion that racial classifications are based on the idea of human nature.⁵⁶

The second part of Eze's essay is to provide a critique of these areas of Kant's work, which lead to the understanding of the connection between Kant and racism.

One area that has been surpassed in Eze's claims is the connection between Kant's idea of race situated in the anthropology and the extent to which it is related to the critical work.

Currently, such scholars as Jennifer Mensch make similar claims, but their work focuses on the form of the idea race as being mirrored in Kant's critical ideas.⁵⁷ Eze's claim is that race affects Kant's idea of a transcendental sense of human nature. That is to say that insofar as Kant articulates both moral feelings and character in universal terms that he inadvertently diminishes the morality and rationality of people of color.⁵⁸ Eze's argument gives the sense that from the outset of his critical, universal thought, Kant articulates an idea of human nature and other feelings related to it in terms of differences. Whether or not Kant actually does define these concepts with regard to difference is now considered to be uncertain, but Eze's contribution to the literature encourages questions about the contradictions between Kant's universal ideals and his more divisive idea of race.

But it is this articulation which has lead to the main criticisms regarding why Eze's work should be discounted. In the Introduction to his book, *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth Century Writings*, Jon Mikkelsen argues that there are at least three problems with Eze's research. First, Eze erroneously attributes Kant's interest in the problem of race to be influenced by Linnaeus and not Buffon, as it is now known. Second, compared to the work of both Bernasconi and Larrimore, the primary sources which Eze draws upon in his analysis is

⁵⁶ Eze, "The Color of Reason," 202.

⁵⁷ See Jennifer Mensch, *Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 106.

⁵⁸ Eze, "The Color of Reason," 220.

very limited. Third, and most importantly for this discussion, Eze's knowledge of Kant's critical work is apparently very limited insofar as he argues that the concept of race constitutes a transcendental category, a claim which has been criticized by Boxill, Hill, and others.⁵⁹

I fully agree that Eze's claim that race is a transcendental category is misleading and is, in fact, rather confusing; however, I do not think that this detail detracts from what I take to be the central point of Eze's work. Also, there are several legitimate reasons why this particular claim is less controversial than Mikkelsen makes it out to be. In taking the second remark first, Eze is a forerunner to the finer articulations of Kant, race, and questions around racial equality. Mikkelsen's review relies on and gives the most praise to the work of Bernasconi and Larrimore. However, they had the work of Eze to rely upon and thus had the opportunity to refine the work on Kant and race. Secondly, Mikkelsen does not take into perspective the lens through which Eze is thinking about these issues in Kant's work. I want to emphasize at the outset that my remark here is not meant to detract from Eze's arguments, but is an attempt to show, as I argued in the Introduction to this project, that a variety of perspectives should be welcomed to the discussion about Kant and race. Eze, in speaking from the perspective of an African philosopher, contributes a unique perspective to the discussion that has become characteristic of the work on Kant and race, despite the fact that the claim about the transcendental nature of race has been surpassed. Both Eze and Serequeberhan (who will be discussed later) articulate Kant and race from a racialized and colonized perspective. Similar to Charles Mills in the *Racial Contract*⁶⁰ Eze attempts to articulate the issues with Kant's race theory in the context of mainstream philosophy. Eze is therefore grappling with a way to find both the language and the concepts needed to share these views, but Mikkelsen does not allow Eze the room to do so.

⁵⁹ Mikkelsen, *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth Century Writings*, 5-6.

⁶⁰ Charles Mills, *Racial Contract*, 4.

I do not think that this particular argument of Eze's is the result of his lack of understanding of the basic tenets of Kant's moral and critical work. Rather, Eze was attempting to articulate the racism which he saw to be at the base of Kant's work on race, and at that time did not have a system which was fully worked out. The most important aspect of what Eze argues is that Kant's critical and moral work is itself racially biased, and this is the concern which continues to frame the work on Kant and race, in spite of the fact that these other approaches may be different from Eze's. The importance of Eze's claim argues that the transcendental and universal sense in which Kant articulates certain aspects of human nature do not allow people of color to have equal opportunities for attaining certain characteristics which are considered to be universal.

"Character," as the moral formation of personality, seems to be that on which basis humans have worth and dignity, and one consequence of this is that those peoples and "races" to whom Kant assigns minimal or pseudo rational-moral capacity—either because of their non-"white" skin color (evidence of lack of "true" *Talent*) or because of the presence of phlogiston in their blood or both—are seriously naturally or inherently inferior to those who have the "gift" of higher rational attainments, evidence of which is seen in their superior "white" skin color, the absence of phlogiston in their blood, and the superior European civilization.⁶¹

Eze's claim about the idea of race and its connection with the transcendental is that race precludes people of color from being able to fully participate in the universal human nature which, for Eze, valorizes European existence. In this regard, "For Kant, then, skin color encodes and codifies the 'natural' human capacity for reason and rational talents."⁶² Eze's claim is that talent (which is an amalgamation of different abilities the species possesses)⁶³, universal moral feeling, and character are all a part of how Kant conceives of the transcendental structure which is responsible for his ideals related to both morality and rationality. Eze argues that Kant believes

⁶¹ Eze, "The Color of Reason," 221.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 218.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

that people of color lack these rational characteristics which constitute full humanity and thus can also be denied full humanity. According to Eze, "Kant's idea of the constitutively anthropological feeling thus derives from his conception of the reality of 'humanity itself, " for "feeling" reveals a specific, universal character of the human essence."⁶⁴ It is a part of the very structure of these transcendental ideas which locates people of color at the bottom of the racial hierarchy with European existence considered to be "*the* humanity par excellence."

Eze argues that Kant is a "normative essentialist" which means that Kant has an essentialized understanding of what man should be living for, that is, what man ought to become. For Eze, these racist statements that Kant makes where he claims that Africans lack talents, "Kant is hereby suggesting that there is an essential and natural 'gift' that those who are 'white' inherently have and those who are 'black' inherently lack—and the evidence for this 'natural endowment' or the lack thereof is the skin color, 'white' or 'black.'"⁶⁵ Eze's argument is that the discussion about the capacity for these talents shows that Kant sees these naturally endowed gifts or capacities as lacking in people of color, and that skin color is an the outer mark for the capacity for natural gifts. "Since skin color seems to be the empirically determining factor of the presence or absence of the natural 'gift' of talent, and talent constitutes the racial essence, it is fair to conclude that the essentialism of Kant's raciology is *biologically* rooted. Thus, Kant's idea of 'race' is not only transcendently hypostatized but also biologically essentialized."⁶⁶ For Kant the idea of race is not only about the essential nature of man and of human nature, but it also relates to understanding the very structure of race. For Eze, the rational aspect of Kant's work on race continues into the rationality of the natural scientist. Kant thereby "elevates" the racial theories of both Hume and Linnaeus by supporting their speculations that, for example, the

⁶⁴ Ibid.,222.

⁶⁵ Ibid.,227.

⁶⁶ Ibid.,227.

Negro is different from the other races by giving "transcendental justifications." By using their reason, natural scientists can come to understand and justify categorizing the species into *a priori*, rational classes like that of race.⁶⁷

For Eze, Kant's contribution to the history of racism is grounded in the fact that "Strictly speaking, Kant's anthropology and geography offer the strongest, if not the only, sufficiently articulated *theoretical philosophical* justification of the superior/inferior classification of "races of men" of any other European writer before him."⁶⁸ Kant's anthropological work was not marginal in Kant's eyes and is thus an area that philosophers should also take to be important. Furthermore, the fact that Kant maintains a contradictory position on human nature which is also affected by his anthropology should add to the relevance of Kant's idea of race. In this instance, on the one hand Kant holds that human nature is conjectural, whereby the future of human history is directed by an ought and the universal standards which direct human activity, but on the other hand, Kant claims that people of color should be organized hierarchically.⁶⁹

Robert Bernasconi develops the idea that Kant's remarks about race are an extension of his interest in anthropology similar to Eze, but the emphasis in many of these essays is also devoted to the extent to which Kant's idea of race contributes to the history of racism. In the essay, "Who Invented the Concept of Race?: Kant's Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race," Robert Bernasconi argues similar to Scheidt that it is Kant who has the most influential idea of race and that in fact it is Kant who invented the concept of race. In "Who Invented?" Bernasconi emphasizes that Kant's idea of race is at base an effort to defend the idea of monogenesis which is the concept of human origin which claims that all human beings come

⁶⁷ Ibid.,228.

⁶⁸ Ibid.,231.

⁶⁹ Ibid.,225.

from a single origin.⁷⁰ Bernasconi argues that the adoption of Buffon's Rule from the monogenist Comte de Buffon is what allows Kant to create an idea of race rooted in the concept of a natural human genus.⁷¹ Kant can therefore articulate a specific and narrow concept of race which both unifies the human species and cements the argument that the entire human species is connected. Bernasconi emphasizes that, "Because Kant clearly locates his concept of race within natural history, it has a radically different theoretical status from that it would have if Kant had located it within natural description instead."⁷² The importance of this idea, which Kant holds to be important with regard to race since 1775 is significant because for Kant, the idea of race is rooted around the fact that the species is connected on the basis of reproduction.

In another essay, "Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism" Bernasconi argues that Kant's concept of race contributes to the history of racism. The main idea of this essay is that in spite of the cosmopolitan ideas which Kant is known for, Kant maintains a "virulent and theoretically based racism, at a time when scientific racism was still in its infancy."⁷³ Kant's case in particular is "puzzling" more so than that of other thinkers in the same era who hold racist views because Kant does not seem to have any direct investment in the current issues related to race. Kant's connection to race contrasts with that of John Locke for example who had tangible connections to the African slave trade, a reason that would seem to justify his interest in maintaining racist thoughts.⁷⁴

Bernasconi's claim is that not only can Kant be said to have invented the scientific concept of race, but that insofar as Kant has a "rigorous" concept of race, it can also be said that

⁷⁰ Robert Bernasconi, "Who Invented?," 21.

⁷¹ Ibid., 22.

⁷² Robert Bernasconi, "Who Invented?," 23.

⁷³ Robert Bernasconi, "Unfamiliar Source," 145.

⁷⁴ Robert Bernasconi and Anika Mann (Simpson), "The Contradictions of Racism: Locke, Slavery, and the *Two Treatises*," in *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*, edited by Andrew Valls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 89-107.

Kant is an important figure in the history of racism. There are three areas in which Kant can or has been associated with racism. The first is that Kant is "silent" on the issue of slavery, never having explicitly opposed the practice. The second area is related to Kant's comments on colonialism in which Kant, according to Bernasconi, despite speaking out against colonialism, still has areas of his philosophy that could lend itself to supporting colonial ideals. The third area relates to Kant's views on race-mixing which according to Bernasconi, is where Kant's major contribution to racism is contained. In this particular area, Kant creates an epistemological framework whereby the political position against race-mixing could be further supported.⁷⁵

I will discuss the last point about race-mixing because the other two areas regarding Kant's silences around the issue of slavery and the contradictory nature of his position of colonialism are taken up in other chapters of this project. With regard to race-mixing, Bernasconi argues that Kant did not contribute directly to these discussions, but that his concept of race justifies provisions against race-mixing.⁷⁶ Kant made the fact of race-mixing central to his concept of race in three ways. First, insofar as human beings can produce fertile offspring together despite their difference in appearance indicates that all human beings are of the same race, and this fact, in turn, supports monogenesis following Buffon's Rule. Second, Kant uses race-mixing as a way to explain other variations in the species which extend beyond the four main races he recognizes. Third, a bi-racial child is the "test" for race and proof that races actually exist. This is because the bi-racial child, in showing equally the characteristics of both parents who are different from one another, proves the fact that racial characteristics are thoroughgoing characteristics which are biologically rooted. (AA 8:96; DCR 149)

⁷⁵ Robert Bernasconi, "Unfamiliar Source,"149.

⁷⁶ Ibid.,155.

The more important question when it comes to Kant's views on race-mixing is whether or not Kant thought of it as desirable. Kant did not see race-mixing as desirable because it contradicted what he saw to be the plan of nature which was to maintain the particularity and purposiveness of the races which can be done only if the races are kept separate. Kant saw that the permanent separation of the races is best in order for the species to fulfill nature's plan.⁷⁷ Bernasconi argues that: "Races were defined in such a way that it is only in the case of race mixing that the diversity at which nature usually aims is frustrated. Kant took this as confirmation that nature opposed race mixing."⁷⁸ Thus, the basis for Kant's argument against race-mixing is based on the racial hierarchy and the fear that intermixing with the white race in particular would lead to their degradation. Bernasconi cites texts that argues that Kant sees the white race as superior to the other races.⁷⁹ Kant was invested in the idea of maintaining a racial hierarchy where the races are to be kept separate from one another.

Kant's position against race-mixing leads to questions about the kind of cosmopolitanism Kant has in mind if the races are to be both separated and arranged hierarchically. This is especially important given the claim that once races have occasioned their racial characteristics the first time in their original environment that they cannot change later. Accordingly, Kant argues that racial groups are best situated when they remain in their original environments. Bernasconi observes that one possible way in which Kant was perhaps thinking about overcoming this disparity is to simply to allow the other races to be extinguished. Kant, in his unpublished work, the *Reflexionen*, suggests that his particular brand of cosmopolitanism did not

⁷⁷ Ibid.,157.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.,159.

mind considering that all the other races of color would be extinguished leaving only the white race behind.⁸⁰

Another key aspect of this essay is the concluding remarks made about the legacy of Kant's idea of race and the impact and influence that it has continued to make in the current understanding of race especially in the philosophical literature. Bernasconi is critical of the ways in which current philosophers desire to edit, restructure, and reformulate the ideas of philosophers that do not fit into the standard agenda. Part of the goal of his essay is to recognize the tension present in Kant's work where Kant's interest in race does not square with the ethical problems which his idea of race raises. As such, the role of current philosophers who study Kant should also pay attention to these statements, albeit uncomfortable, confusing, and contradictory in order to understand more about the contributions Kant makes to racist ideology.

Despite the scholarly work which shows that Kant held racist statements, other scholars argue that these statements made by Kant are not as important to analyzing his work as Bernasconi and others have made them out to be. Allen Wood in the book *Kantian Ethics* concedes that Kant's ideas on race were influential in his time and in the larger context of the idea of race, but insists that these views are still not as important as his more central views which are his critical and moral philosophy. "Some have argued that Kant's theory of race played an influential role in the development of dominant racialist theories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Though I do not pretend to know the details of the intellectual history involved, this seems to me quite plausible."⁸¹ However, part of the problem for Wood has to do with the scholarship of those who are focused on the racist statements. Their work is "never aimed at achieving philosophical insights of any kind. (Often enough, it remains wholly obscure what

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Allen Wood, *Kantian Ethics*, 8.

philosophical conclusions, if any, the attackers intend to draw from their sensational exposés.)"⁸² Part of the problem for Wood is that such scholars as Bernasconi and Eze "sensationalize" these statements on race to the extent to which the *philosophical* message that Kant left is lost. What arises from such a discussion is the notion that Kant's work on race should be tangential to his other, *more philosophical* work. Moreover, he claims that those who do work on Kant and race fail to present Kant's work as a whole simply because they are giving attention to the statements on race.

According to Wood, these scholars who focus on the statements on race are guilty of a misanalogy; namely, these scholars tend to interpret figures in the history of philosophy as they would a politician, in the sense that one always worries as to whether or not a politician is being hypocritical when they make moral statements. In the same way, Wood argues that the judgments these scholars make against Kant with regard to his racist statements are only trying to show that he is morally contradicting himself and that they engage in a war about whether or not Kant was a moral person as opposed to further investigating his philosophical project.

For one thing, great figures in the history of philosophy are often great precisely because their insights into highly abstract matters of principle far outrun the capacity of their own time—and often enough, also their own capacity—to understand fully what these insights mean in practice. To see this gap—either in the case of the philosopher or in the case of the entire age—as a case of simple hypocrisy is to misunderstand badly the relation of important philosophical principles to the historical conditions of their genesis. To a more judicious way of looking at things, it might even be expected that the greatest philosophical insights will be those that furthest outrun the philosophers' own ability to absorb and apply them. Kant's assertion of the equal dignity of rational nature in all persons is a striking example of this, when we come to some of his opinions about the family, political and economic relations, and the concept of race.⁸³

Wood's comments foreshadow similar sentiments about how to read and interpret Kant's work on race properly, thereby presenting a hermeneutical problem, as Pauline Kleingeld

⁸² Ibid. 9.

⁸³ Ibid.

claims.⁸⁴ According to Wood, those who choose to focus on Kant's statements on race simply ignore his more important and philosophical principles and, moreover, it should not matter to the scholar whether or not the philosopher is a moral person. True philosophical investigation should look at the soundness of the theory and that is the only thing that the philosophers should be respected for. Figures in the history of philosophy can teach current scholars something and the issue of their morality should not matter. In the case of Kant, he has very strong moral arguments around morality, and the strength of these views should supersede the racist and sexist statements that he makes.

Earlier scholarly views on Kant and race expose Kant's comments and suggest that race is central to understanding other areas of his work especially with regard understanding of Kant's views on equality. At the same time, there are other interpretations about race and Kant which argue that these statements should not be given a prominent place in his work. Part of the reason for these contrasting statements has to do with the political nature of race and the worry about how to reconcile racist statements with the mainstream philosophy the philosopher is usually known for. Two concerns arise out of this literature which can certainly be seen in the concerns in the other literature I will discuss. The first concern has to do with racial equality in the work of Kant, that is, whether or not his moral and critical work overcomes his racist statements, and the second concern is whether or not Kant's views on cosmopolitanism are affected by his race theory.

⁸⁴ See Pauline Kleingeld, "The Development of Kant's Cosmopolitanism," on page 60 and Marcia Baron "Reading Kant Selectively," in *Kant Verstehen/Understanding Kant*, edited by Dieter Schönecker and Thomas Zwenger (Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001), 32-46.

Kant, Racism, and Equality

One problem which arises over the work of Kant and race is a turf war. The two sides are characterized by, on the one hand, the work of scholars who focus on the race comments and, on the other, scholars who argue that it should not be considered a prominent aspect of Kant's work. Bernard Boxill and Thomas Hill, Jr. observe this fact in the introduction to their essay, "Kant and Race." With regard to the criticisms about Kant and race, "Understandably, the enhanced attention paid to Kant's later writing has evoked a response from non-Kantians. [...] Specifically, feminists and African American philosophers raise objections focused on Kant's writing on law, politics, history, and anthropology."⁸⁵ In a tone similar to that of Allen Wood, who claims that Kant's work on race should not be judged, Boxill and Hill suggest that scholars who work on Kant's race comments automatically engender a different and negative interpretation of Kant which is different from that presented by Kantians. They claim that these non-Kantians as "foes" of Kant, are engaged in an illegitimate work on the philosophy of Kant, a kind of "tabloid philosophy." This contention provides an important backdrop for understanding what is at stake when it comes to discussing Kant's work on race and how the professional and scholarly boundaries are created around this problem. For example, of all the approaches that I will discuss in this section, all of these authors with the exception of Thomas Hill, Jr. and Allen Wood, are African-American male philosophers.

Boxill and Hill in their essay, published in 2001, argue that the charges of racism which have been placed against Kant "do not reach Kant's deep theory or undermine its potential for guiding deliberation about the problems of race."⁸⁶ The "deep theory" of Kant is, of course, his moral and critical philosophy, areas of his work which are contrasted with the other areas which

⁸⁵ Bernard Boxill and Thomas Hill, Jr., "Kant and Race," 448.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

are considered to be marginal, i.e., the anthropology. Boxill and Hill's claim is that Kant's critical and moral theory supersedes his comments on race because Kant emphasizes that all people regardless of race have the capacity for deliberative reason. Deliberative reason is powerful enough to create a new, racially conscious ideology that can bring about the eradication of racism. There are two worries which frame Boxill and Hill's account. The first is that other philosophical accounts which are critical of Kant's idea of race, i.e., Eze, claim that Kant's philosophical work is racist or contributes to a racist agenda. Second, Boxill and Hill worry that Kant's work will no longer be respected because of the attention given to these racist statements. Their approach in this essay offers a way to address these "exaggerated charges of radical and deep racism" because, as it stands, Kant's critical and moral philosophy is not infected with racism.⁸⁷

Their essay rests on four claims. First, with Eze in mind, Boxill and Hill contest that despite the fact that Kant makes racist statements, they are not of the radical nature that Eze gives to them. There are two problems with Eze's conclusions. The first is that Eze contends that Kant does not think that people of color are human, and second, Eze misinterprets Kant insofar as he thinks that Kant's racist statements are directly related to his critical philosophy. Second, Boxill and Hill address the concern that Kant's moral philosophy holds a prejudice against people of color. Their contention is that Kant's praise of industry and reason are activities which Kant saw as being a part of the good life. For this reason, Kant's disparaging comments about the Tahitians should not be misconstrued as racist since Kant thought that the ability to work is a necessary attribute for people to have in general. Rather, Kant's comments should be understood as over-valorizing reason. Third, deliberative reason is necessary in order to solve the problems of social justice, but this should be understood as a separate problem from the comments about

⁸⁷ Ibid.

reason presented in the second claim. Namely, in spite of the fact that Kant should be criticized for being excessive about the use of reason, Kant is right that the attitude of the Tahitians would not be conducive to a good life; however, the use of deliberative reason has a place in the development of one's life. Their fourth claim is that Kant did not realize the impact that his statements would have on "gut-level" feelings often associated with race. Rather, Kant is guilty of exaggerating the power of reason to overcome human nature which is partly responsible for the views against the Tahitians. Kant's work must be reconstructed in such a way that retains the emphasis on deliberative justice by incorporating racially conscious views which should also lead to the revamping of social institutions that tend to oppress people of color.⁸⁸

Boxill and Hill contend that Eze's comments suggest that Kant's moral and critical work are tainted with racism. They grant that Eze should be commended because he points out that Kant's work on race should be considered an important part of his philosophical work due to the fact that Kant did think that the white race was the most talented race. However, Boxill and Hill claim that Eze's other claims are invalid; namely, that Eze is wrong to think that Kant's central work is tainted with racism, that his transcendental philosophy helped to formulate his racial theory *a priori*, that Kant thought that non-whites lacked dignity, and that they could not morally self-develop. According to Boxill and Hill, Eze's conclusions are based on a number of misinterpretations and misunderstandings about Kant's idea of race. Most importantly, their claims rest on the notion that Kant's general philosophical principles are not responsible for the racism which is argued to be the result of his racial theory.

The central part of their essay focuses on Kant's views of the Tahitians in which Kant claims that they are so lazy that their existence is no better than that of beasts. This claim is made in the mid-1780s in a review of a book by Johann Herder, Kant's interlocutor and former student.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*,451.

While it is not clear that Kant understood which race the Tahitians were, Kant contends that the lazy ways of the Tahitians shows that they lack the necessary skills of both industry and reason to make their existence worthwhile. Boxill and Hill claim that Kant should have known better than to make these comments, especially since we know that Kant was well aware of the explorations going on in the Pacific Islands by Captain James Cook, who, in fact, guided another one of Kant's interlocutors, Georg Forster. The findings which were subsequently published by Forster and his father do not paint the Tahitians in such a bad light as Kant describes them. However, Kant is consistently uninterested in empirical facts, and he was also probably well aware of the European audience to whom he was writing would not have accepted these more positive views. Regardless, Boxill and Hill contend that the claim that Kant should have known better is not the same as considering whether or not these claims about the Tahitians would have made a difference in his moral and critical theory.

Boxill and Hill in their recapitulation of what they take to be the standard argument that the feminist, African American, postmodern, and others contend, is that Kant must see the Tahitians as being inferior to the Europeans because they are lazy. The "several exaggerations and oversights" of these "foes" of Kant include that the development of one's talents is an imperfect duty and is to be done in accordance with the ability and reason that one has. Thus, the fact that Kant complains about the Tahitians means that he sees them as having talents. Second, the duty to perfect one's talents is a duty to oneself which cannot be externally legislated or is the business of others. To this end, Kant is worried about the accounts of anthropologists in the affairs of other cultures, albeit that he is not always careful to respect other cultures himself. Third, Boxill and Hill claim that not everything Kant has said about the Tahitians comes from

the values he attaches to reason. Unsocial sociability is also another, albeit empirical concept which allows for the progress of the species through competition.

An objection which Boxill and Hill consider is that Kant's claims are based around his views of human progress. Namely, one could argue that the way in which Kant values the ability to work in the context of his teleology proves that Kant values Europeans more than he does people of color, and so they are unable to progress in the same way as whites. In response, Boxill and Hill contend that the tenets of Kant's moral philosophy do not depend on his teleology. Rather, the core parts of Kant's moral theory require the strong "demand of reason" in which rationality is used to create a world in which justice, peace, and respect are attributes that are upheld in every person for the benefit of all.⁸⁹ Thus, deliberative reason, which is different from the exaggerated reason which Boxill and Hill are critical of, is important for forming the basic theory of Kant's idea of humanity. When it comes to the Tahitians, the point is that all people, regardless of their culture or race, ought to aspire to develop their talents. Thus, Kant is arguing that for everyone, regardless of cultural affiliation, deliberative reason is necessary for the progression of the species.

In the conclusion of their essay, Boxill and Hill argue that Kant's moral work should be valued because it does provide the theory necessary for healing the world from racism. It follows from the previous points made about the role of deliberative reason in helping one to realize that the world should maintain the respect of others that reason will also help in the eradication of racism. That is, individuals have a duty to develop the reason necessary to oppose these racist views which, in turn, should also lead to the reconstruction of our social attitudes and institutions which allow racism to persist. The power of deliberative reason, as described through the basic

⁸⁹ Ibid.,463.

ideas of Kant's moral theory means that Kant's theory extends beyond even what Kant would have realized himself.⁹⁰

Similar to Boxill and Hill, Arnold Farr seeks to vindicate the Categorical Imperative. According to Farr, the Categorical Imperative and Kant's other universal ideals are erroneously rejected because of the attention given to Kant's racist statements. In the essay, "Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?" Farr's worries are framed by the claim that critiques against Kant about his racist and sexist remarks negatively destabilize "our philosophical tradition." Farr's concern is that these critiques have, in fact, too often been "confused with critique" to the extent to which some have been led to reject parts of Kant's work and many of his principles, especially those that "may be necessary for an effective emancipatory philosophy and politics."⁹¹

Unlike the critiques of Boxill, Hill, and Wood, Farr's essay is not directed at the work of philosophers, in spite of the fact that he is a philosopher and would have had the work of philosophers available to him. Regardless, I have chosen to include this essay in this literature review because I want to emphasize the number of critiques in which Kant's moral and critical philosophy is being defended on the basis of the ideals that it is supposed to uphold. Furthermore, Farr's essay characterizes the political aspect of the work on Kant and race with regard to the territorial attitude which comes almost automatically with this sort of critique.

Farr's claim is that commentators who focus on Kant and race are being merely "uncritically critical" especially when they attack the universality of Kant's moral claims. Farr does concede that it is important to approach any universal views with caution, but those critics who focus on the sexism and racism present in Kant's work fail to realize that all theory that

⁹⁰ Ibid.,468.

⁹¹ See Arnold Farr, "Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?" *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Volume 33, Number 1(Spring 2002): 17.

advocates equality (to include the aspirations of the Kant sex and race critics) are themselves advocating some sort of universal standard. For Farr, the Categorical Imperative, as a "first principle" requires that people of color be considered as people in themselves outside of the marker of race.⁹² This claim, as it has been with Boxill and Hill, is that Kant's moral philosophy ensures that all people regardless of color are not precluded or excluded from the ideals which allow them the freedom and status that is also granted to whites.

The tenor of the critiques directed against further investigation of Kant's racist and sexist statements is that Kant's core principles, his moral and critical philosophy, are not affected by his negative views of races nor do they have negative effects on his views on humanity and its progression. Such scholars as Boxill, Hill, Wood, and Farr contend that Kant's moral and critical philosophy is able to fully pardon Kant's racist statements, which means, in turn, that one should not take these comments so far as to reject or re-examine Kant's work because of his racism.

In the comments that follow, I will discuss views of those who, *contra* Boxill, Wood, and Farr, are more concerned with the status of people of color in relationship to Kant's universal views, and how Kant's universal claims should be re-interpreted in light of this fact. These claims are different from those held earlier by Eze's account in the sense that his work explores race, tries to situate race in Kant's work, and speculates the limits of universality with regard to Kant's comments on race. In contrast, these later criticisms of Kant's racism call for a re-examination of these universal principles and critique the very context in which his principles emerge. Moreover, these critiques do not call for a rejection of Kantian principles as Wood, Farr, Boxill and Hill have contended, but rather see that engaging Kant's racism might allow for a more nuanced exploration of the ways in which Kant's eurocentrism has influenced today's racism.

⁹² Ibid.,29

These new criticisms are more political in nature, and seek to establish a theoretical basis for racism insofar as Kant is understood to be an important figure in the history of racism.

Tsenay Serequeberhan devotes one chapter in his 2007 book, *Contested Memory* to Kant and race. In the chapter entitled, "Eurocentrism in Philosophy: Immanuel Kant," Serequeberhan's claim is that Kant's transcendental views legitimates eurocentrism and supports the barbarous acts of European domination. Serequeberhan's comments are similar to those of Emmanuel Eze because he sees Kant's racism as both insidious as an *a priori* concept. He also emphasizes the Eurocentric historical context and ideology that inevitably informs Kant's thoughts. For Serequeberhan, eurocentrism is the belief that European existence is far superior than other ways of life, and it is this belief that is at the core of Kant's so-called universal and transcendental concepts. Eurocentrism goes far beyond racism and ethnocentrism; it is also a metaphysical idea which operates in covert ways in the world psyche in that any and all ways of life, from academia to Hollywood, all valorize Eurocentric values.

Serequeberhan departs from Boxill, Hill, and Farr by arguing that Kant's universal views implicitly denigrates the cultures of others.⁹³ In fact, Serequeberhan is skeptical of Kant's universality, contending that Kant maintains the semblance of universality for the sake of argument: "Nonetheless, Kant has to maintain the appearance of universality for his discourse to ring true, since it is not an empirical or phenomenal accounting of the rationality of the rational in differing human-historical contexts."⁹⁴ This claim is worth emphasizing because of the fact that in many of these arguments there is a second debate about how to understand Kant's idea of human progress. For example, I mentioned that Boxill and Hill claim that Kant's morality is not affected by his teleology, and this vindicates Kant from the worry that aside from whether or not

⁹³ See Tsenay Serequeberhan, *Contested Memory: The Icons of the Occidental Tradition* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 2007), 35.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*,33.

he grants that people of color have the same rational abilities as whites that they nonetheless have the same capacity to progress in the species.⁹⁵ Serequeberhan's claim points out that there is a contradictory, but parallel argument occurring in Kant about human progress. The first part focuses on the ideal which unifies the species, the universality, whereas the second part focuses on the capacity of humans to morally progress. Serequeberhan's approach is that the so-called universal position which Kant is presumed to take in his discussion of history actually valorizes one form of history, namely, European history.⁹⁶ To this end, for Serequeberhan, the importance of Kant's comments on race is that they *jeopardize* his universal standards.⁹⁷ Kant's quoting of Hume in the *Observations* show that Kant's references to blacks consider, "ordinary bias as *evidence*, and conversely, trite prejudice (as reported by Hume) is *validated* by philosophy."⁹⁸ According to Serequeberhan, these quotes which can be found throughout Kant's work in the anthropology, philosophy of history, and other areas indicate that Kant valorized European existence over the cultures of the rest of the world.⁹⁹

Laurence Thomas is another philosopher who takes up the question of what kind of person Kant understands blacks to be. In the essay, "Moral Equality and Natural Inferiority" Laurence Thomas claims that Kant thought of black people as persons, but what *kind* of person is uncertain.¹⁰⁰ Thomas argues that Kant perhaps thought that blacks were a *difference in kind* from whites due to their innate psychological inferiority and, as a result, do not deserve the same moral respect from whites as they would give to one another.¹⁰¹ Thomas argues this point from

⁹⁵ Boxill and Hill, "Kant and Race," 462-463.

⁹⁶ Serequeberhan, *Contested Memory*, 33.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁰⁰ See Laurence Thomas in "Moral Equality and Natural Inferiority," *Social Theory and Practice*, Volume 31, Number 3 (1995): 399.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

the standpoint of moral psychology whereby it is psychologically difficult for a majority group, which is in this case whites, to give another group that is taken to be psychologically inferior moral respect, which is in this case blacks. For Thomas, one can see how seeing one as a person in Kantian terms can be granted to people of color, but is not the same thing as being extended the same kind of personhood that whites receive. Thomas argues that Kant would hold that blacks and whites should be equally treated; however, because one deserves to be equally treated does not mean one deserves equal moral respect.¹⁰² Likewise, in dealing with children, one would not think that it is right to beat a child to death or to starve them; however, one does not allow children to vote for government officials or drive cars. Children are not at the mental level where they can make sense of responsibility and be held accountable for their actions. This is the why children ought to be protected. According to Thomas, Kant sees black people as childlike insofar as they are not considered to have the ability to self-determine as autonomous white men. Thomas contends that the perceived psychological inferiority of blacks is indicative of their inability to know what respect is, and/or the capacity to act in ways that would exercise responsibility with the respect given to them. Thus, it does not make sense for a white person to give blacks moral respect as they would a white counterpart who is perceived as an equal.¹⁰³

A more sympathetic reading of personhood favoring people of color is given by Allen Wood. Wood distinguishes between the *treatment* of inferior (non-white) people and the idea of *morally respecting* inferior (non-white) people. Wood claims that there are persons in the “strict sense” namely, those people Kant takes to be fully autonomous, rational and free beings. Persons in the “strict sense” are different from persons in the “extended sense,” for example, children. As already discussed, children cannot be trusted with making significant moral decisions, nor can

¹⁰² Ibid.,398,399.

¹⁰³ Ibid.,394-395.

they be morally responsible for their own actions among other things.¹⁰⁴ Regardless, children are to be treated with the same moral respect that would be given to persons in the strict sense, at least until they are psychologically mature enough to do for themselves.¹⁰⁵ That is, if Kant does see black people as children, this status does not mean that they do not deserve the same moral respect as in Thomas' reading.

The seminal work on the topic of Kant, race, and personhood is presented in an essay by Charles Mills entitled "Kant's *Untermenschen*." Mills' argument is that the title of "persons" is one that is extended only to Europeans, thus making the title persons racially exclusive in the same way that feminists have stated with regard to gender. The term *Untermenschen* is used by Mills to be provocative; it is borrowed from the Nazi regime and literally means "subpersons" in German. Mills also suggests that "racism should be seen as a normative system in its own right that makes whiteness a prerequisite for full personhood and generally [...] limits nonwhites to "subperson" status."¹⁰⁶ Mills' point is that the understanding of persons requires a certain normative understanding of the freedoms which these persons ought to be extended and presumes that all persons are on the same normative playing field as one another.¹⁰⁷ Mills goes on to argue that the use of "person" is in actuality a technical term in which Europeans are not seen as persons but as savages. Thus, the ideals of modern universalism and egalitarianism contain racism insofar as these ideals were never meant for people of color in the first place.¹⁰⁸

In the decade since the publication of "Kant's *Untermenschen*," Mills' essay has come under criticism. In the essay, "Kant and Race, *Redux*," Mills responds to three of his critics, Kleingeld, Fleischacker, and Bernasconi. Before I turn to Mills' defense of *Untermenschen*, I

¹⁰⁴ Allen Wood, *Kantian Ethics*, 96.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹⁰⁶ Charles Mills, "Kant's *Untermenschen*," 170.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 171.

address Mills' response to those who are, generally speaking, critical of the work on Kant and race.

Mills clarifies for critics of the work on Kant and race that Kant's race comments have a theoretical character which systematizes race, providing both a scientific and philosophical basis for it. Mills sees racism as having a theoretical structure. For Mills, racism is what lies at the intersection of these three claims: "(1) that the human race is subdivided into discrete "races"; (2) that these races are hierarchically arranged; and (3) that this hierarchy is grounded in particular racially differentiated traits and tendencies."¹⁰⁹ Taken together, these claims constitute *theories* which have been used throughout history, and this is the sticking point for Mills. Mills claims that it is this notion that mainstream philosophers do not admit readily. They rather prefer to understand racist ideas as only a sub-problem of the larger theory in question, taking these statements to be non-propositional and non-theoretical prejudices, thereby failing to understand the degree to which these racist statements constitute arguments that in fact parallel the same philosophical arguments that are being discussed.¹¹⁰ The other part to this argument is that racism is also something that is demonstrated through practices, both in institutions and through individual interactions. This point, Mills emphasizes, goes beyond the mere mistreatment of the inferior group, but also validates the notion that the inferior group "do not reach *some threshold level* taken to be a minimal prerequisite for meriting equal treatment" which is a part of the societal psyche. Thus, Mills is drawn to the modern period of philosophy because on the one hand, it signaled the birth of robust discussions about liberalism and moral egalitarianism, but, on the other, racism played an especially important role, a theoretical role in "legitimizing racist practice, especially institutional practice, on the grounds of the failure of the 'inferior' races to

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*,127.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*,128.

attain the normative threshold."¹¹¹ For Mills, Kant, as one of the modern period philosophers known for his views on egalitarianism, is also the founder of the modern concept of race and should be seen as a racist theorist.¹¹²

In response to his critics regarding the term *Untermenschen*, Mills claims that the idea behind the term is that it is meant to be a "formal concept to denote a category *already tacitly present* in the dominant varieties of liberal thought in modernity, thereby making explicit the actual division in the ranks of humanity historically presupposed by most liberal theorists, but now covered up for being too revealing of the real imperial and racist history."¹¹³ Thus, despite the fact that people of color are considered to be human, they are still considered to be lower than the other races and do not deserve equal normative status as whites.

Critics of Mills' argument contend that Kant's theory has no conceptual room for the category of subpersons (Kleingeld), that Mill is denying the basic tenet of Kant's theory of race, which is that the species is, at base, unified (Bernasconi), and that insofar as Kant regards non-whites as human, Mills' solution is misleading (Fleischacker).¹¹⁴ Mills defends his position by underscoring the fact that the term "human" is in use both for its scientific and moral designations. The latter also assumes a normative threshold and consequent treatment of the person. "So merely having humanity does not preclude one's being viewed and treated as less than human; on the contrary, it is defining of monogenetic racism."¹¹⁵ Mills' concept of *Untermenschen* is not claiming that Kant sees that the species is in actuality divided from the start of human origin, as in polygenesis. Rather, Mills' concept is creating the conceptual space for the political, moral, and social separation and inferiority which is the result of Kant's

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*,130.

¹¹² *Ibid.*,130.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*,138.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*,139-140.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*,143.

theorizing about race. I concede, and I agree to some extent that the problem with *Untermenschen* is that, when translated, means subpersons, and understanding this idea in the context of liberalism becomes more of a reconstruction of what Kant is interpreted as doing in his work as opposed being to an actual criticism of his work. For this reason it can be hard to accept Mills' account because the conceptual language Mills is using is not what Kant uses himself and furthermore, Kant does not make the distinction between humans and persons *explicitly*. However, as I will point out, this does not mean that Mills is necessarily wrong or that his notion is any less helpful for creating an invaluable conceptual space to discuss inferior beings.

I agree with Kleingeld that the notion of subpersons is not present in Kant, *per se*, but this does not mean that the structure of the idea is not present. Mills offers an account that reconstructs (although he does not call it that himself) the inferior political, moral, and social status of certain human beings. The notion *Untermenschen* helps to articulate this structure in Kant's work that reflects the idea that some people are inferior. For example, in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant claims that it is only men of a certain social standing who are able to represent their own views in the public sphere. Women and domestic servants must have one of these men represent them. Kant goes on to say that the inferior political status of these women and servants is not a reflection on their status as human beings, for in that way they are equal to the men (AA 6:314-315; MM 458). This is an instance where Kant claims almost exactly the view Mills' is proposing: there are some human beings who meet the normative political, moral, and social standards and there are others who do not. Regardless, Kant maintains that at base everyone is human.

Kant, Racism, and Cosmopolitanism

In recent years, the interest in the Kantian influence on cosmopolitanism has become an important aspect of the discussion around racial equality. This is mainly because of the presumption that Kant takes all people to be equal in his cosmopolitan philosophy during the second half of the 1790s because he does not mention race (at least very much) and because the legal provisions that he gives in his cosmopolitan work show that all people are beneficiaries. The reason why these debates are an important part of this literature review is because they have tended to focus on the question of whether or not the late Kant is still a racist. That is, some maintain that Kant changed his mind between the 1780s and the mid-1790s. In the 1780s, Kant wrote both the last two essays on race and the essays on history where he supported concepts which divided the species. In the 1790s, he introduced his moral cosmopolitanism. The question scholars have been posing is whether the racial hierarchy that Kant fervently defended in the 1780s continues to have relevance for him in this last decade of his life.

The most prolific of these authors is Pauline Kleingeld. This argument, which I am calling the "Cosmopolitan Years" argument, is not the only variety of the contention that Kant changed his mind about race at some point in his work. Robert Loudon (*The Gradualist Argument*), Susan Shell (*The Critique of Pure Reason Argument*), and Philip Sloan (*The Blumenbach Argument*) each offer a version of this. However, Kleingeld offers the most systematic, extensive, and well known version. Some of the details which are a part of this argument will be discussed more thoroughly in other chapters, but the outline of Kleingeld's argument is that in the 1780s Kant held racist views and more specifically, the racial hierarchy; but that after 1792, and especially in "Perpetual Peace," the various arguments against colonialism and slavery indicate that Kant had changed his mind about the racial hierarchy.

Despite the fact that Kant did not make it explicit that he had changed his mind there are characteristics in his writing which indicate that he might have done so. Kleingeld's conclusion is that Kant in his later years abandoned his racist ideology in favor of his moral theory.

Another version of this argument is made by Susan Shell in the essay, "Kant's Conception of a Human Race." She claims that after the "A" edition publication of the *First Critique*, which is when Kant discovers the autonomy of reason, he is no longer guilty of making "unqualified" statements on race. These "unqualified" statements refer to those that Kant made in his earliest philosophy in such works as the *Observations*. After 1781, Kant is skeptical of the empirical accounts provided by anthropologists on their observations of people of color, and presents instead instances where he respects the autonomy of people of color.

To be clear, Shell is not arguing that Kant no longer makes statements about race after 1781; rather it is that after the publication of the *First Critique* that Kant's statements can no longer be taken as unquestionably racist. For example, in the 1780s, Kant challenges the reliability of travelogues, which he heavily depended on for his account of race. After 1781, Shell claims that Kant's respect of the autonomy of people of color "imposes an unconditional moral duty on all human beings whatever their physical make up or temperament."¹¹⁶ She also argues that this is Kant's *final* position on the status of autonomy because it includes all people. The discussion of knowledge in Kant's anthropology is "pragmatic" knowledge which, "is concerned, not with what men should do, or with what they will do, but with what they can and should make of themselves."¹¹⁷ In the context of non-white people, Shell argues that what they make of themselves is their own concern, a matter for which there is no moral or political repercussions and is something that is developed according to their own capacity. Since the

¹¹⁶ Susan Shell, "Kant's Conception of a Human Race," in *The German Invention of Race*, edited by Sara Eigen and Mark Larrimore, (Albany, NY:SUNY Press, 2006), 56.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

moral development of people of color is based on the one hand on their individual desire, but, on the other, is set by inherent limits, Shell states that Kant holds an ambiguous position when it comes to people of color and their ability to develop morally. This discussion of the enslavement of Africans in 1788 in the essay, "On the Teleological Principles in Philosophy" is one instance in which Kant does not blame Africans for their inability to labor on their own, but rather locates the problem in their nature. According to Shell, insofar as Kant ties the impulse to labor to an inner *Anlage*, which means that the inability to labor is a congenital trait, he is in no way blaming the Africans for being unable to work.

For Shell, not only does Kant's ambiguity on the extent to which one has control over their moral development help one understand more about non-white races, but it also points to an even larger issue with the ground of reason. This point is crucial to a theme that has been discussed in this chapter which has to do with the corroboration of Kant's moral work. Namely, according to scholars Wood, Hill, and Farr, the positive values of justice, unity, and respect, given that they are the result of the use of reason and, by extension, the moral and critical philosophy, are thereby ideals of human nature intended to be applied universally. Shell, however, indicates that Kant is tentative regarding whether or not people can actually exercise these values within their own power. Shell's point is that insofar as one must work to cultivate the rewards of reason, the fact that non-whites are not always able to do so suggests that the ability for moral self-development is in part tied to *Anlagen*. Thus, the human species is not able to take credit for all of its ability for moral self-improvement, albeit that some of this ability can be attributed to human efforts.

While Kant's argument about race is not a central part of his argument, Philip Sloan's perspective on the use of *Keime* in Kant's work has received attention regarding the question of

whether or not race has a continued presence in the latter decade of Kant's philosophy. In the essay, "Performing the Categories: Eighteenth-Century Generation Theory and the Biological Roots of Kant's *A Priori*," Sloan argues that close to 1790, Kant changed his position on preformation and *Keime* because he was deeply influenced by the work on epigenesis by Blumenbach so much so that Kant "dramatically weakened his appeal to the preformation of germs." Generally speaking, scholars have taken the idea of *Keime* to be primarily responsible for racial permanency in Kant's work. *Keime* is also closely associated with Kant's preformationist views, in that it is both preexisting and embryonic, giving the sense that it is a concept which predetermines and keeps certain characteristics fixed. According to Sloan, there are two indications in Kant's work which shows that this happened. First, the number of times that *Keime* is mentioned in the *Critique of Judgment*, published in 1790, is only a few, and second, the use of *Keime* is sharply decreased in other works after 1790.

One of the classic essays which covers the Kant/Blumenbach influence is Timothy Lenoir's essay, "Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German Biology," but I am not choosing to focus on that work here because Lenoir's argument focuses on the extent to which Kant influenced Blumenbach.¹¹⁸ For similar reasons, I will not engage the essay, "Kant and Blumenbach on the *Bildungstrieb*: A Historical Misunderstanding,"¹¹⁹ where Richards argues that Kant and Blumenbach came to a "remarkable agreement."¹²⁰ Zammito however, in contrast to Lenoir and Richards, presents a contrasting argument from Sloan's by contending that Kant remained ambivalent to epigenesis.¹²¹ Zammito explains that in Kant's own use of the term,

¹¹⁸ See Timothy Lenoir, "Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German Biology," *Isis*, Volume 71, Number 256 (1980): 77-108.

¹¹⁹ See Robert Richards, "Kant and Blumenbach on the *Bildungstrieb*: A Historical Misunderstanding," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, Volume 31, Number 1 (2000): 11-32.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹²¹ See John Zammito, "Kant's Persistent Ambivalence Toward Epigenesis, 1764-90," 52.

which he took from Herder, he made his own by asserting that even epigenesis required preformation so that the development of the species occurs with some restrictions. Thus, Kant's epigenesis conceptualized the natural world in two different, but interconnected ways; it was both preformed but operated based on mechanical or epigenetic means.¹²²

In the essay, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race" Kleingeld speculates that if in fact Sloan's argument can be justified (Kleingeld mentions that the *Keime* do continue to appear in several texts after 1790), then this would be one reason why race is not mentioned much in Kant's later work.¹²³ Robert Bernasconi argues that the interpretation that Kant abandons *Keime* is because of the fact that scholars have tended to simplify these complicated debates to the point of distortion and, most importantly, have chosen to ignore relevant discussions about race which is also an important part of these debates.¹²⁴ Thus Sloan's argument is another iteration of the claim that Kant changed his mind about race. By arguing that Kant changed his racist views to more equitable ones at a particular point in his work, the assumption is that Kant had the presence of mind to know that his racist views contradicted his moral and critical philosophy and consequently decided to correct himself, thereby making all of his work consistent. In the end, these arguments that Kant "changed his mind" are no different from the previous arguments which rallied against the importance of race in Kant's work in general, held by Boxill and others. All of these arguments are in the same in this regard: Kant's moral and critical philosophy are the most important work that Kant has done and that his work on race should remain at the margins.

Not all of these critiques contend that Kant switched from divisive and racist views to a more equitable theory at a specific time. A progressive version of the argument that Kant

¹²² Ibid., 60.

¹²³ Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," 591 fn.

¹²⁴ Robert Bernasconi, "Heredity and Hybridity in the Natural History of Kant, Girtanner, and Schelling during the 1790s," in *Reproduction, Race, and Gender in Philosophy and the Early Life Sciences*, edited by Susanne Lettow (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2014), 237.

changed his mind is held by Robert Loudon, who concedes to the idea that Kant held some disparaging views about both women and people of color, but argues that Kant's human teleology gradually allows for the equal inclusion and progression of these minorities in the cosmopolitan society. In the book *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings*, Loudon concedes that Kant held negative views about people of color and women in many of his anthropological works. He also acknowledges that Kant holds that western and European people possess superior talents and moral character. He thinks that Kant is consistently disparaging people of color because aside from scattered discussions about the South Sea Islanders, Kant is less descriptive about the moral characteristics of other races.¹²⁵ The crucial question which Loudon raises is that of who is considered to be a part of human progress. In spite of the fact that Kant does hold negative views about women and people of color, Kant is clear that all people regardless of race and gender will progress toward the moral destiny of the species.¹²⁶ Loudon provides three arguments to support this claim.

The first argument is that the entire human family is unified. Kant sees the relationship between human beings as "naturalistic" insofar as they can produce fertile young with one another in accordance with Buffon's Rule. Respectively, their natural relations indicates the close relationship human beings have with one another as a part of one species. According to Loudon, this means that both women and people of color are also a part of this unity of the species. This naturalistic point of view also means that the function of racial characteristics is that it allows that one is able to reach moral perfection in their own way.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Robert Loudon, *Kant's Impure Ethics*, 102.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 103.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 104.

Louden's second point is that "Kant stresses repeatedly that the *entire* species must eventually participate in the progress toward perfection."¹²⁸ Emphasis on the "entire species" means that Kant pays no regard to gender or race, thus allowing women and people to color the ability to progress as active and not passive participants in the progression of the species. This point is also consistent with what Kant claims in his moral work in the sense that each member of the species is able to better itself.

Louden's third argument is that the entire species will progress toward full moral development insofar as all people are able to spread to all places over the earth. Louden argues that Kant is committed to a gradualist argument whereby there will be the eventual positive growth of nations throughout the world who, by building proper structures in their nations will encourage morality to take root in the world everywhere. One caveat is that Kant does entertain the idea that this more positive growth of nations will come at the expense of the dying out of weaker sub-groups of people.

The conclusion Louden draws from these three arguments is that Kant is logically committed to the view that the entire human race will move toward perfecting their morality, but not that he is personally committed to this idea. The difference is that Kant's moral and teleological philosophy maintains the idea that all people regardless of race can morally self-develop; however, this does not mean that Kant believed in this fact in his own personal life. Thus, Kant is consistent with regard to equality insofar as people of color are able to morally self-develop. At the same time, Kant is also personally consistent in his racist views which are scattered throughout his anthropological work with what one can expect from a philosopher writing and thinking during his time. For Louden, Kant's theory of equality wins over his racist and divisive statements: "But Kant's theory is fortunately stronger than his prejudices, and it is

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

the theory on which philosophers should focus. We should not hide or suppress the prejudices, but neither should we overvalue them or try to inflate them into something they are not."¹²⁹

Similar to what I described in the first section of this chapter with regard to Wood and others, the claim is that Kant's work on race, albeit problematic, should not be "overvalued" or taken to be so powerful that it affects his "theory." It is also noteworthy, as has been a point which I have been making throughout both the "Introduction" and in this chapter which is that these interpretations of Kant often come with an admonition: that there is a way in which one *should* be reading Kant. In this instance, one *should* read Kant's work on race in such a way that does not overshadow the more important theory which is Kant's critical and moral philosophy.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to show the different positions that have been taken with regard to the topic of Kant and race. I have demonstrated that the literature aligns along one main contention which is over the centrality of race to Kant's work. Some scholars consider the work on race to be central to understanding other areas of Kant's work such as his moral philosophy and his anthropology. However, other scholars think that race is being overvalued by the scholars in the first group and that Kant's moral and critical philosophy is most important. This means that part of the debate about the centrality of race in Kant's work has to do with how one ought to read Kant, thus making the issue one that extends into the freedom with which one can interpret texts and professionalization in the discipline of philosophy.

My own work on the topic of Kant and race, as I demonstrate in the rest of this project, argues that Kant's work on race is not only central to the rest of his work, but that in particular the racial hierarchy continues to be relevant to his work and especially in the understanding of

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 105.

cosmopolitanism. This perspective is not only meant to address concerns about the importance of the concept of race in Kant scholarship, but also underscores the political issues that come with race which comprise one of the worries about why it *should* not be associated with Kant. My work has at least one limitation which is that I do not claim that race has *influenced* the other such areas as the philosophy of history and teleology that I will explore in this project. Rather, I am looking for parallels between the racial hierarchy and its basic elements which are inequality and racial separatism as opposed to claiming that there is a direct influence between these areas.

Thus, my goal in this project is to encourage others to take the racial hierarchy in Kant's work more seriously, challenging the various ways in which conceding to the claim that "Kant changed his mind" is a viable argument. This means that the work on the racial hierarchy should continue to explore the ways in which the polarization of race from the rest of Kant's philosophy affects the interpretation of philosophy and the professionalization of philosophers. Kant's work on race should not be pushed aside because his moral and critical "theory" is enough. Charles Mills, in the essay, "Kant's *Untermenschen*" says it best. Charles Mills refers to an example of what one's reaction might be if they found out that the theory of a thinker whose work should simply be accepted turns out to be Adolf Hitler:

But the point I am trying to bring home is that there is something very strange about dismissing the issue of who gets counted in the moral community as merely a matter of incidental detail. We rightly think that the whole burden of Hitler's moral theory, if it deserves the name, is that it is racially exclusionary, and that once you extend it beyond 'Aryans' then obviously it is not the same theory. Even if Hitler had never come to power, even if the Holocaust had never occurred, we would still see this fact of racial restriction deeply pernicious and as profoundly shaping the theory. How then can it be denied that—whatever their epistemological foundation—these claims about the scope of the populations to which the principles are supposed to extend are indeed philosophically 'central' (in theory, and unquestionably in practice)?¹³⁰

¹³⁰ Charles Mills, "Kant's *Untermenschen*," 182.

Whether or not Kant's work on race should be considered central to his work will most likely continue to be debated in the literature. In the "Introduction" to this project I argued that the amount of reverence given to Kant's work because of his position in the history of philosophy is one of the main reasons why any serious attention given to race is almost scandalous. Regardless, there still seems to be a lot that can be gained from situating Kant's work on race in the context of his other philosophy.

Chapter Two: Resituating Race

While it may seem that ascribing liberty, freedom, and equality to all people directly contradicts racism, these liberal ideals have a past entangled with racism. My point is that the more we focus our search for racism on its more noticeable forms, the more we overlook the fact that racism is subtly ingrained beneath the surface in our ideologies. In the context of Kant studies, the standard for dealing with Kant's views on race has centered around the question of whether or not Kant explicitly mentions the racial hierarchy or the term "race" in his late work. In this project, I propose a more nuanced approach for exploring the racial hierarchy in Kant's work.

In the "Introduction" to this project I talked about the three different ways in which the question of whether or not Kant should be interpreted as an egalitarian is focused on race and its centrality to his work. There I mentioned Kleingeld's argument that Kant "changed his mind" about race in his late years which, for me, raises the question about the visibility of the racial hierarchy and the degree to which Kant can be said to hold racist views beyond the explicit mention of "race." In this chapter, I focus on the two essays on race and the essay on race and teleology of the 1770s and 1780s where the racial hierarchy is the most prominent. Starting this discussion in Kant's essays on race both provide a context for understanding the concept of race generally; in addition, the race essays are an introduction to the racial hierarchy, an idea that remains crucial to how Kant conceives of his natural philosophy, philosophy of history, and human teleology. In this chapter, I argue that the racial hierarchy is justified by Kant in terms of inequality and difference, and that these notions allow the racial hierarchy to linger in the 1790s without being explicitly mentioned.

Kant's Concept of Race

*The 1775 Course Announcement and the 1777 Essay on Race*¹³¹

Kant's interest in race is an extension of his interests in classifying the human species and his desire to provide a pragmatic education to his students. The 1775 essay on race was in effect an advertisement meant to entice prospective students to Kant's classes on physical geography, a course that he taught some forty-eight times between 1755 and 1796. This course announcement was published in an revised and extended version as an essay two years later in Johann Engel's journal, *Der Philosoph für die Welt*. Holly Wilson contends that Kant's goals in teaching classes on the physical geography were to encourage students to become more introspective and to learn more about other human beings, skills that he saw as beneficial for critical thinking and moral development.¹³² Kant's interest in the human species is also important for another reason: it occurs at a critical moment when, in this "silent decade," Kant begins to work on his critical project and move away from the "popular philosophy" that he had become known for in the *Observations of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764) and also in *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* (1766). In the 1770s, Kant published only three essays and at the beginning of the next decade would publish what came to be known as the "A" edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781.

While the 1777 essay on race does not have many changes from the 1775 course announcement, there are a few noteworthy differences on which I will focus. The first is his discussion of foresight; the second is his extended discussion about racial difference in 1777; the

¹³¹ See Immanuel Kant, "Of the Different Human Races: An Announcement for Lectures in Physical Geography in the Summer Semester 1775" translated by Jon Mikkelsen in *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth-Century Writings* (Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 2013), 41-54. See also "Of the Different Human Races" translated by Jon Mikkelsen in *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth-Century Writings* (Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 2013), 55-72. These works will appear henceforth as DHR.

¹³² See Holly Wilson, "The Pragmatic Use of Kant's *Physical Geography* Lectures" in *Reading Kant's Geography*, edited by Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (SUNY Press: Albany, NY, 2011), 167.

last is an addition in 1777 regarding moral attributes and racial characteristics in the context of Africans.

The problem that Kant sets out to address in these essays pertains to classification which can be done in either one or two ways: the first being a system for memorization according to physical similarities as in Linnaeus' system, which Kant calls artificial classification. The second kind of classification is in accordance with a system of laws, a method that can in this context be determined only by the reproductive connection between the generations, which Kant calls a system for the understanding (AA 2:430; DHR 60). Kant uses Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon's Rule as the basis for his own rule of classification. Comte de Buffon, a French naturalist, argues that animals that produce fertile offspring across generations with one another belong to the same physical genus. For Kant, since all human intermixing results in fertile offspring, despite having physical differences from one another, Buffon's Rule becomes the basis for the argument that there is a "common reproductive power" present in the human species that supports monogenesis, the idea of human origin that human beings come from a single cause. Another popular theory of human origin was polygenesis, the theory that different racial groups are the product of different localized creations. Kant argues that classification according to the protocol for reproduction in Buffon's Rule, is superior to categorizing animals based on appearances because, it shows that despite physical differences, all human beings are the result of the same cause, and are of the same family. Kant thereby extends Buffon's Rule which locates the relationship of one generation to the next in the reproductive capacity.

Race emerges as a specific kind of inheritable difference present in a single line of the species whereby deviations are preserved invariably over many generations (AA 2:430; DHR 60). Races retain their characteristics in the following generations despite transplanting and

interbreeding with other animals in the species that may have different characteristics. Thus, whites and blacks are of the same species, but constitute different races. "<Races are deviations> preserved invariably over many generations, both in all transplantations (displacement to other regions) and in interbreeding with other deviations of the same lineal stem stock, that always produce half-breed offspring" (AA 2:430; DHR 60). According to Robert Bernasconi, Kant formulates a concept of race fashioned out of Buffon's Rule that is not itself found in Buffon's work¹³³ and thereby Kant can be said to be the inventor of the scientific concept of race.¹³⁴

In order to account for human differences despite the fact that they come from a single cause, Kant introduces the concept of germs or seeds (*Keime*) and dispositions (*Anlagen*, or natural dispositions, *Naturanlagen*) to show nature's foresight with regard to equipping the species with the capacity to thrive in their native environments. Nature's goal in equipping the species is to protect them:

This provision of nature to equip her creature through hidden inner provisions for a variety of future circumstances to the end that <the creature> might preserve itself and suited for the difference of climate and land is certainly admirable and with the migration and transplantation of plants and animals apparently produces new kinds, which, <however>, are <really> nothing other than deviations and races of the same species whose germs and natural endowments have, in the long course of time, only now and then developed in different ways. (AA 2:435; DHR 64)

In 1777, Kant describes germs as the preformed grounds that determine an animal's specific development in response to the climate. Germs establish continuity within the species with respect to body parts, i.e., all birds have wings; but they cannot account for other differences *within* the species, i.e., whether the wings are long or short. Kant has another notion to explain these other kinds of differences. Kant's *Anlagen* captures nature's generative force by helping to explain the emergence of characteristics that enable populations to thrive in different

¹³³ See Robert Bernasconi, "Who Invented?," 21.

¹³⁴ See Robert Bernasconi, "Unfamiliar Source," 147.

natural conditions. Kant sees *Anlagen* as having preset the development of certain characteristics because they were present in the original phylum. *Anlagen* are either actualized or held back in the original ancestors in response to the climate, as it is the only force that can permanently alter the characteristics of a race (AA 2:436; DHR 65). *Keime* and *Anlagen* however, are not mechanistic implants that simply react to external factors. They are powers of nature that through her guidance allow for the right characteristics to emerge in human beings in response the climate thereby forming the original races. The difference is that physical-mechanical causes are occasional and will not render the changes in the same ways as *Keime* and *Anlagen* are capable of, given that they are a reproductive or generative power (AA 2:435; DHR 50). Thus, germs and *Anlagen* are race-specific because their goal is to help a race develop the necessary characteristics to help them survive their particular environment.

Kant uses two different German terms for nature's foresight.¹³⁵ In 1775, Kant uses the term *Vorsorge*, or provision, but in 1777, he uses *Fürsorge*, or precaution or welfare. *Vorsorge* has the sense that nature *gifts* the species with certain *Anlagen* by having seen into the future; it is the sense that nature knows beforehand what the species needs to thrive in all climates and then equips the species with those attributes. The second sense, however, has a more precautionary feeling as if nature's provision of *Anlagen* is presented to the species as something that they would have to access on their own accord.¹³⁶ In the first sense, I mean that it may simply be a matter of time regarding whether or not the species will have the ability to use their *Anlagen* to their full potential. In the second sense, full use of *Anlagen* is a question of *access*; namely, that whether or not *Anlagen* can be used by the species is determined according to the

¹³⁵ See the uses of "foresight" in *Kant and the Concept of Race* and "Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen, zur Ankündigung der Vorlesungen der physischen Geographie im Sommerhalbenjahre 1775" in *Concepts of Race in the Eighteenth Century*, Volume 3 (Bristol, England and Sterling, VA; Thoemmes Press, 2001), edited by Robert Bernasconi.

¹³⁶ I am using Jon Mikkelsen's translations for foresight.

work of the human being through merit, hard work, or other means. These two different senses of the same idea poses the concern of whether it is nature or culture that allows one to develop in the way that nature intended. This is one of the concerns that will continue to be brought up in the other chapters of this project. For the moment, I discuss *Keime* and *Anlagen* in the context of human progress in Kant's early work on race.

Jennifer Mensch observes that the goal orientating nature of *Anlagen* has always been a part of its conception. Mensch shows that Kant establishes the language for germs and *Anlagen* for human progress and development in several writings in the 1770s. In both the "Moscati Review" (1771) and in the Essays on the Philanthropinum Schools (1776, 1777), Kant argues that the development of germs is the first step toward progress in society (AA 2:425; MR 81-82;¹³⁷ AA 2:448; PH 101).¹³⁸ However, the connection with race is noteworthy. Mensch contends that the 1775 essay is only an extension of what Kant asserts about *Anlagen* in the "Moscati Review": the purpose of germs is to help humans develop toward their destiny.

According to Mensch:

The discovery worth announcing in 1775 — which can be recognized as the clear backdrop for Kant's interest in the Philanthropinum school — was thus an increasing sense on Kant's part of the positive explanatory role that could be played by teleology in the search for a rationally unified order, for something that was at work in the nature of the human being as much as it was in "Nature herself."¹³⁹

Thus, Kant's 1775 course announcement on race is, in part, Kant's first treatise on nature's exercise of foresight in the human species. Kant describes this unique undertaking as an

¹³⁷ See Immanuel Kant, "Review of Moscati's work *Of the Corporeal Essential Differences between the Structure of Animals and Humans*," in the *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Robert Loudon and Günter Zöllner (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 78-81. This work will appear henceforth as MR.

¹³⁸ See Immanuel Kant, "Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum" in the *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Robert Loudon and Günter Zöllner (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 98-104. This work will appear henceforth as PH.

¹³⁹ Jennifer Mensch, *Kant's Organicism*, 106.

exploration that would provide a "game for reason" in terms of understanding nature's method of classification that would also investigate why nature classifies in the first place (AA 2:429; DHR 45). Hence, race is a concept to help philosophers gain a better understanding of what nature is doing by differentiating members of her species. Likewise, race will later be the first step toward understanding the formal purpose of human beings in nature (AA 8:96; DCH 149). Thus embedded in all of Kant's essays on race is what would become his teleological project, but it is not clear how far *Anlagen* play a part in human progress at this point in his work. For this reason, I depart from Mensch's stronger use of the term "teleological" with regard to human beings this early in Kant's work, as I see the 1785 essay on race as his major introduction to human teleology in the context of race.

There are four different races: the white race, the Negro race, the Hun (Mongol or Kalmuck) race, and the Hindu or Hindustani race (in the 1785 essay, he claims that the American Indians, the copper-red Americans, are a race, see AA 8:93; DCH 147). The white and the black races constitute the "base races" because all of the other races are a some combination of the two. However, in 1777, Kant offers a new way of classifying races in addition to the aforementioned list of races that directly ties each race to its geographical location and climate. There, Kant puts the Asians and Indians together into one race and debuts another race, the Native Americans. In 1775, Kant writes that the Native Americans are a kind of Hunnish race that are either degenerate or have not fully acclimated (AA 2:433; DHR 48), in which they have a "half-extinguished life power" which contributes to their inability to do hard labor (AA 2:433, 438, DHR 62, 67). The new summary of the races are as follows.

Lineal root genus
White of brownish color

First race
Noble blond (northern Europe)
from humid cold

Second race
Copper red (America)
from dry cold

Third race
Black (Senegambia)
from humid heat

Fourth race
Olive-yellow (Asian-Indians)
from dry heat

AA 2:441, DHR 69

Races in this new classification are directly associated with the particular climate that can best support their racial characteristics, which Kant sees as present in skin color so that, "similar regions and climatic zones surely do not include the same race" (AA 2:441; DHR 70). In this context, Kant's fascination with the Negro, while not an interest that makes him so different from other thinkers during this time,¹⁴⁰ arises as the best example of nature's purposiveness as demonstrated through having different races that are separated based a particular temperate zone and geographical location. Kant infers a sense of purposiveness from the racial characteristics from the Negro and their isolated location, especially since they are "peculiar only to Africa (<and> in its greatest perfection in Senegambia)" (AA 2:442; DHR 70). Robert Bernasconi writes:

But the most important consequence of Kant's interest in the question of the color of Africans was that it seems to have kept him focused on the question of the adequacy of mechanistic explanations offered in isolation from teleology. In Kant's first essay on race the purposive nature of racial (which meant for him color) differences was assumed but not argued on the basis that because neither chance nor mechanical laws could have brought about the developments that

¹⁴⁰ Robert Bernasconi, "Who Invented?," 25-26

enabled organic bodies to adapt to the climates into which they first moved, those developments that must be construed as preformed.¹⁴¹

The Negro supports Kant's claim that different races are located in different climates which offer support for their racial characteristics. Kant argues that once a race's ancestors have become long acclimated to a region, no other climatic changes encountered by the race, i.e., transplanting can alter their racial characteristics. "This race, however, when it has once taken root and stifled the other germs, resists all <further> transformation for just this reason: because the character of the race has previously become preponderant in the generative power" (AA 2:442; DHR 70). Thus, there is a kind of natural racial separatism that is a part of the concept of race in that both the climate and geography dictates that the races need to be separated in order to develop properly the races' *Keime* and *Anlagen*.

Observing that racial differences are maintained by nature lead Kant to defend his concept of the natural history as a "separate science that could well serve to move us gradually from opinions to rational insights" (AA 443; DHR 71). Despite the fact that the term "natural history" was already in use by Buffon, Bernasconi observes that by Kant's use of "natural history" he meant something very different from Buffon.¹⁴² Kant's appeal to natural history is an attempt to make sense of the "manifold diversity of human deviations." One origin is responsible for the many different ways in which a species presents itself.

Kant's discussion of race in 1777 observes four things; nature exercises foresight with regard to having perfectly acclimated races to the climate in which they originally lived; the observer of nature can infer that racial characteristics are purposive; an implication of nature's purposiveness is racial separatism according to climate and geographical location; racial difference and permanency are maintained in part by *Keime* and *Anlagen*.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 26

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 23

1785 Essay on Race

The standard interpretation of the 1785 essay on race is that Kant advances his interest in race by asserting that the purpose of racial characteristics is to help the race thrive in a particular climate. Commentary has tended to ignore the teleological theme that begins to emerge with regard to seeing race as the means by which natural history is created:

The concept of race is therefore: *the classificatory difference of the animals of one and the same phylum in so far as this difference is unfailingly hereditary.*

This is the determination (*Bestimmung*) that was my proper intention in this essay; the rest can be seen as belonging to the subsidiary intention or mere addition, and can be accepted or rejected. I consider only the first matter to be proven and moreover useful as a principle for investigation in natural history, because it is susceptible to an *experiment* that can safely guide the application of the concept, which would be shaky and uncertain without it. [...]if this product of their mixing is *always* half-breed, then that conjecture becomes certainty. (AA 8:101; DCR 154)

In the previous section I have already emphasized the fact that nature exercises purposiveness by separating the races according to climate and geographical location. I also argued that Kant has a concept of teleology in 1775/77 essays on race in his discussion of foresight, albeit weak compared to his later work. I see this emerging in the 1785 essay in two ways; first is the emphasis on the *a priori* unity as the theoretical foundation based upon the relationship between the part and the whole in which variety has a purpose in the teleological system. According to McFarland, Kant connects the teleological perspective with race through an analogy between the whole and the parts, thus, "according to a prior idea, is [in] our own reason and will when we plan and produce artifacts; and such artifacts are purposive because we design them with some end in view"¹⁴³ By establishing an *a priori* origin for racial differences, Kant creates a teleological system in which race plays a role. Relatedly, I emphasize that the purpose of racial difference goes beyond physical purposes which lead Kant

¹⁴³ See J.D. McFarland, *Kant's Concept of Teleology*, (London: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970), 64.

to a human teleology that is both moral and political at base. As Ginsborg observes, the use of the concept of purpose is meant to aid humans with understanding the intention of the organism.¹⁴⁴

Second, Kant captures the sense of an *a priori* unity and purposiveness by emphasizing the unfailing nature of inheritable characteristics as the necessity which establishes the purpose of the unity of the species. Thus, Kant understands it to have a theoretical significance for "all unity is mere natural necessity [...] For on this view we must think of all things as purposes, so that being a thing and being a purpose are one and the same, and so basically there is nothing that especially deserves to be presented as a purpose" (AA 5: 393, 394; CJ 275). In this context, the concept of a common unity is essential to the concept of race, but at the same time it refers to the idea that the cause and purpose of the organism cannot be separated from the organism itself. In other words, the concept of race demonstrates in nature the work of the theoretical unity whereby the purpose of the thing and the thing itself belong together.

Following the law of the "necessary half-breed generation" Kant poses the question about heredity. The fact that certain hereditary characteristics occur unfailingly across generations supports the claim that an *a priori* cause is responsible for having caused the species within the original phylum, but lies outside the species. As in the earlier essay on race, Kant continues to rely on monogenesis to offer support for his racial theory. Bi-racial progeny are able to demonstrate the boundaries of natural science with regard to the unfailing racial characteristics of both parents that they inherit (AA 8:96; DCR 150). These considerations about heredity elevate the concept of race from the anthropological or physical geographical context which was more prominent in 1777 to a teleological one. Thus, in order to understand this system better,

¹⁴⁴ See Hannah Ginsborg, "Kant on Understanding Organisms as Natural Purposes," in *Kant and the Sciences*, edited by Eric Watkins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 235.

Kant proposes looking to reason. Formulating a maxim of reason will help to derive a concept fit for human understanding. Two maxims are key to answering the question about heredity. The first maxim is that heredity is a direct result of the powers of nature or created *Anlagen* in accordance with the rule that principles are not to be multiplied beyond necessity, *principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda*. The second maxim is that in all *organic* nature, despite changes in an individual creature will remain unchanged, *quaelibet natura est conservatrix sui* (AA 8:96; DCR 150).

The first maxim is one of nature's principles that refers to the diversity of nature as a unity under a few principles (AA 5:183; CJ 22). Angelica Nuzzo explains that Kant uses this principle in order to secure the idea of formal purposiveness that brings human cognition and nature's variety together, a point that Kant will expand in the *Critique of Judgment*.¹⁴⁵ The maxim shows that nature has only a few principles that when understood enable human cognition to have a better grasp of how she operates and which will show that human beings embody purposiveness that can also be inferred from the activity of *Keime*. The idea is that a glimpse into nature's systems of diversity reflects onto human cognition in order to ascertain that the prior unity of humanity is the basis for human teleology. In this reflective process, human cognition can begin to see the human species in a larger light in which the purpose of the human being is to work toward an ultimate goal. This point becomes enlarged in the *Critique of Judgement* where observing the diversity of nature becomes the starting point for the humans' own understanding of his role in the world. The observation of diversity allows one to see the single goal for the species. Kant's point is that having one single origin for all human diversity provides a single direction and goal for the species no matter how diverse it is. That is to say, by establishing an

¹⁴⁵ See Angelica Nuzzo, *Ideal Embodiment: Kant's Theory of Sensibility* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 241.

origin for the variety, one can establish knowledge of the concept that orchestrates the system and attain a sense of the rules that govern it. What arises here is the importance of establishing the concept of variety based on a single origin.¹⁴⁶ This idea of the unity and the manifold, as Kant describes in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1787) is that "By this pure synthesis I understand that which rests upon a basis of *a priori* synthetic unity. Thus our counting, as easily seen in the case of larger numbers, is a synthesis according to concepts, because it is executed according to a common ground of unity as, for instance, the decade. In terms of this concept, the unity of the synthesis of the manifold is rendered necessary" (AA 3:B104/4:A79).¹⁴⁷

The second maxim accounts for nature's rule of preservation in the human species. That is, if the original implanting in human beings were to change, it would be difficult to understand what nature had originally implanted or what implanting would come about in the future. Thus, it is a waste of the human imagination to consider how to change nature's process of generation by creating external means with the intent to make the alterations inheritable. In today's time, Kant would most likely be against genetic testing, mutation, and perhaps plastic surgery. Rather, nature's self-preservation and self-imposed integrity with regard to heredity should be left to the effect of germs and *Anlagen* that lie in the species (AA 8:97; DCR 151).

These principles are the reason why there are only a limited number of races that can be known with certainty and strictly preserved by nature. Skin color is the outer mark of nature's act of preservation of the human species (AA 8:98; DCR 152). Regardless of where a race is transplanted or becomes mixed with another race, nature will make sure that the racial characteristics of these *four races* will be preserved in the generation according to the rules of heredity. It is for this reason that the monogenist theory adds to the the claim that racial

¹⁴⁶ Jennifer Mensch, *Kant's Organicism*, 12.

¹⁴⁷ See Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1965), 112. This work will appear henceforth as CPR.

characteristics are *permanent*. Kant connects the causal explanation of the species to the permanence of racial characteristics in order to show the determination of the species. That is to say, there would be no need for a necessary unfailingly inheritable characteristic if each race were the product of its own creation. Rather, nature deploys herself through *Anlagen* and exercises her foresight by a strictly maintaining the diversity of the human species:

Thus the organization of one phylum has an entirely different end from that of the other; and the fact that, in spite of this, the generative powers of both should be so well matched, even in this point of their characteristic difference, that an intermediary sort not only *could* originate but *had* to result unfailingly – that cannot be comprehended at all in the case of different original phyla. [...] From such inevitably hereditary properties, which are hereditary even in the mixing with other classes by producing half-breeds, one is forced to conclude their derivation from one single phylum, because without the latter the *necessity* of the hereditary would not be comprehensible. (AA 8:98, 99; DCH 152)

Thus, the concept of heredity is crucial to understanding the function of racial characteristics. The concept of race is defined in two parts. The first is that race assumes a common phylum and the second is that the concept of a necessarily unfailingly hereditary character which remains in the progeny is the reason why the species is divided into classes (AA 8:99; DCH 153). Kant has three claims regarding the importance of one phylum which shapes his concept of determination. First, the teleological principle is already embedded in the concept of race because it is "necessarily attached to the generative power, because it was required for the preservation of the kind" as an unfailingly inheritable characteristic (AA 8:98; DCH 152). Hence, Kant's use of "determination" in the 1785 essay refers to the teleological account of humanity. Chad Wellmon underscores that Kant's use of "determination" or *Bestimmung*, with regard to race means "destination, connotes a determination not only as something but toward something through an appeal to a teleological structure (here *Endzweck*)."¹⁴⁸ (*Endzweck* means

¹⁴⁸ Chad Wellmon, *Becoming Human: Romantic Anthropology and the Embodiment of Freedom* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University, 2010), 140.

the "final end" of humanity). Second, this means that germs and *Anlagen*, despite the latter actualizing in response to climate, develop naturally on account of nature's relationship to reason and not simply from external factors or artifice. Third, nature in this teleological sense transcends nature understood as a compilation of living things or through the lens of natural science but rather toward the view of nature attuned to a concept of unity or reason. This also means that germs and *Anlagen* in particular have an impact on the trajectory of human generation.

With regard to the purposive character of racial differences in terms of heredity, or race, the best example of nature's exercise of foresight or providence is to be found in the Negro race. Negro bodies function in particular ways that allow them to thrive well in their native land, Africa, which is a hot temperate zone. For example, the phlogiston that is responsible for the black in human blood is particularly strong in the blood of Negroes. As a result, a foul odor emanates through the skin that cannot be cleaned enough to eradicate it and their lungs work differently in order to dephlogistize the body in the swamps of Africa where the *true Negroes* live. Nature was so wise to ensure that Africans could dephlogistize themselves through the skin, whereas whites cannot (AA 8:103; DCR 156).

I want to underscore these three points with regard to the 1785 essay on race. First, with regard to classificatory differences, presuming a common human phylum is an important step in order to understand the concept of hereditary differences that are unfailingly carried through the generations. Second, Kant reiterates that germs and *Anlagen* are responsible for the diversity in the human species which are understood to have been present in the original phyletic species and only diversify in the first generation as a means to propagate their own kind. Third, assuming the common phyletic unity is a prerequisite for understanding the purposive character of nature,

especially with regard to the organization of nature which will later become the main theme of the *Critique of Judgment*.

1788 Essay on Race and Teleology

Kant's 1788 essay, "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" is considered to be Kant's last essay directly on race but it is also his first essay explicitly on teleology. The immediate occasion for this essay is Kant's need to respond to the concerns of two men of "excellent talent, youthful power, and blossoming fame" Johann Herder, a former student of Kant's, and Georg Forster, a German naturalist — both of whom challenged Kant's understanding of race, *Anlagen*, and teleology. In both his reviews of Herder's book, and in the essay, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" (1786) Kant responds to Herder's many concerns which will be the topic of the next chapter of this project. For now, I will focus on Kant's engagement with Forster, who is his main interlocutor in this essay. In order to defend himself against Forster, the main goal of this essay is to discuss the role of teleology within nature in which race, as a teleological concept, marks the difference between a description of nature and natural history.

The previous sections of this chapter have covered the other two essays on race, focusing on the extent to which race is a teleological concept that warrants the racial hierarchy in which whites are the supreme race. In this last section, I continue this theme by assessing Forster's concerns in the essay, "Something More about the Human Races" (1786),¹⁴⁹ in three aspects; first, Forster's worries about Kant's concept of race understood teleologically; second, Kant's

¹⁴⁹ See Georg Forster, "Something More about the Human Races," in *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth-Century Writings*, translated by Jon Mikkelsen (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013), 143-168.

response to Forster which supports his monogenist agenda while introducing a human teleology; third, Kant's views regarding racial purposiveness including the revival of racial separatism.

Forster's Argument

Georg Forster (1754 — 1794) was a well-respected German natural historian who had traveled the world as a young adult with his father and Captain James Cook. As a polygenist, Forster believed that different groups of human beings are the result of different local creations. He thought that there were at least two different creations responsible for the variety of human beings.¹⁵⁰ Forster read two of Kant's essays in preparation for his response; namely, "Determination of the Concept of a Human Race" (1785) and the "Speculative Beginning of a Human History" (1786). In "Something More about the Human Races," (1786) Forster expresses two worries about Kant's concept of race as a teleological principle. The first worry is that Kant manipulates (and does not know) the facts about the races he describes and in writing about these races only uses the "facts" advantageously in order better articulate his teleological system. Second, Forster does not agree that *Anlagen* demonstrate nature's foresight, in which case the way in which they operate does not give strong support for monogenesis. This latter concern will be described in more detail in the next chapter, but for the moment I will focus on Forster's concerns about the concept of race which I will consider in three parts. First, Forster contends that Kant's need to determine a principle that can be a guide in the investigation of nature is an unreliable and lofty approach when empirical observation of nature is more accurate and familiar. Second, when defining race as an unfailingly inheritable characteristic through interbreeding, there are other ways in which racial difference within and between individuals can be demonstrated that do not require mating. Last, in cases where interbreeding does occur, the

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 164.

racial characteristics that result can never be predetermined and are never uniform, in which case the race principle is hard to apply accurately in all cases.

Forster's first worry is that the appeal to abstraction in the context of natural history, such that one must first search for a principle by which to understand nature, can lead one astray when the principle is applied to the concept.¹⁵¹ The observer of nature can acquire a one-sided understanding of the concept in question due to the desire to find something that they need, in which they erroneously "find" something that is not actually there.¹⁵² Forster is concerned that Kant is trying to be novel when he should rely on the empirical observation of nature. Instead, Forster goes so far as to call Kant a heretic by proposing this way of thinking — "heretics are evil-minded people. They are driven by a mania for innovation."¹⁵³ It is for this reason that Forster favors the work of Linnaeus, whose categorization of animal, plant, and insect life relied on similarities and dissimilarities of the organism obtained through empirical observation.¹⁵⁴

When it comes to the concept of race, Forster thinks that Kant's appeal to skin color is misleading. Forster first argues that Kant does not know the color of the South Sea Islanders on account of both having misread, (on Forster's reading) Carteret's travelogues and his inability to determine correctly how much of their color has been given to them by nature as opposed to the climate. Forster contends that some skin colors that are not the result of interbreeding can also be arrived at by other means. The climate can have similar altering effects on an individual's skin color; for example, whites who travel to Senegambia become darker in color, and blacks who travel to colder climates eventually lose their darker color.¹⁵⁵ Thus, Abbot Demanet was correct in saying that the "Negro is, strictly speaking, a regular Negro only in his fatherland"

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 147.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 148.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 167.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 147.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 152.

furthermore: "The Negro born in Europe is like a hothouse plant, a modified creature."¹⁵⁶ In his next example, Forster's thought experiment looks at the intermixing between a Kaffir and an Abyssinian, the first of which Kant seems to present as separated from the Negroes.¹⁵⁷ If, according to Kant that the Kaffir and the Abyssinian come from different lines of descent, then in using the principle of interracial mixing, the child born to them should show that the two lines of descent crossed. However, the child born to them has the same color as both parents, of which happens to be no different than the color of the parents in the first place. Forster believes that this experiment shows that the problem with appealing to heredity in support of the concept of race is that interbreeding does not guarantee uniformity of transmission. That is to say, the racial features that a child may get from their parents may favor one parent over the other. Thus in the example of the Abyssinian and the Kaffir, the fact that children may not always show their parents features in a measured, predictable way should be proof enough that Kant's concept of race should be rejected.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, while the lines of descent did indeed cross, the skin color of the child does not reflect the principle in the way that Kant intended, in which case relying on skin color as the "outer mark" is "badly chosen and objectionable."

Second, on Forster's account, the concept of race cannot be located within the taxonomic rubrics that have been given, in the sense that it is hard to determine whether race comes under a variety or a species in the Linnaean system. He considers Kant's claim that if this question is to be settled by asserting a common parentage for the human genus, then one would need to prove it with an historical record which cannot be found. Likewise, in an earlier part of the essay,

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 153.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ See Robert Bernasconi, "True Colors: Kant's Distinction Between Nature and Artifice in Context" In *Kloffehtereien Missverständnisse Widersprüche?: Methodische und Methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster-Kontroverse*, edited by Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening, 191-207. (Munich, Germany: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2012), 198.

Forster contends that one cannot know the ways in which nature has organized itself due to the fact that its organization did not happen before human eyes.¹⁵⁹ For Forster, Kant's appeal to "Natural history in this sense might, however, possibly be only a science for the gods and not for human beings."¹⁶⁰

Kant's Response

Kant's defense of his natural history, in response to Forster, is that a determinate principle is absolutely necessary in order to observe nature. The organization of the species is not limited to mere empirical observation; rather, it goes beyond that to a cause that lies outside the physical presence of the species. "I myself derive all organization from *organic beings* (through generation) and all latter forms (of this kind of natural things) from laws of the gradual development of *original dispositions*, which were to be found in the organization of its phylum (AA 8:179; TPP 214). Natural history is able to make this full connection which Kant describes as "tracing back, as far as the analogy permits, the connection between certain present-day conditions of the things in nature and their causes in earlier times according to the laws of efficient causality, which we do not make up but derive from the powers of nature as it presents itself to us now" (AA 8:161-162; TPP 197). To this end, if one understands nature as having laws that pertain to everything that exists, then there are two possible paths that an exploration of nature can take: theoretical/physics or teleological/metaphysics. The teleological/metaphysical route offers the best means to reflect on ends of nature so that one can see these ends realized in the world. The latter route is preferred by Kant because it complies with reason in its unconditioned nature and is more suited to pure practical reason and thus in the investigations of nature, morality, and human freedom in which the highest good in the world is attained through

¹⁵⁹ Forster, "Something More," 156.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

the exercise of human freedom (AA 8:139).¹⁶¹ Thus, the main idea of this essay is to discuss a principle that can be found in nature that will guide the observer of nature in their investigation that will ultimately allow the individual to understand the goal for the species.

Kant presents race as a "radical peculiarity indicating a common phyletic origin" (AA 8:163; TPP 199) of which does not fit in a description of nature and cannot be located in nature. That is to say, race cannot be empirically observed in the same way as other divisions, and thus cannot be categorized according to the Linnaean classification system.¹⁶² Race is also not something that can be pointed to in nature as a thing-in-itself, which supports the idea that race is a *concept* which Kant has not argued has a *real* existence. Robert Bernasconi argues that, "Kant did not *see* race. He was not color blind in the conventional sense of being free from discrimination on the basis of appearance, but he knew enough not to trust what he seemed to see. Race as he understood it was ultimately not a matter of simple description. It belonged to natural history, which meant that it required a special kind of investigation to reveal it."¹⁶³ The fact that Kant does not "see race" does not mean that Kant is not guilty of having racist ideas about Africans. In fact, this point makes it all the more important that Kant continues to discuss a concept of race in the context of his teleology, presenting a strong and robust concept of race. For Kant, race goes far beyond skin color, but all the while it maintains its peculiar appeal to difference that deepens the more the emphasis on skin color falls away.

Kant must be able to demonstrate the certainty of the principle that race is a radical peculiarity that is unfailingly inheritable by establishing a concept of heredity and by emphasizing difference. Kant concedes to Forster that it is difficult to determine the skin color of

¹⁶¹ See Immanuel Kant, "What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?"(1786), in *Religion and Rational Theology*, edited by Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 12. This work will appear henceforth as OOT.

¹⁶² Kant, however, states that he would most closely associate race with subspecies.

¹⁶³ Robert Bernasconi, "True Colors," 205.

an individual, which is why the question of what nature has given to the individual is a crucial one. He also concedes that climate also has an effect on skin color, which is why the question of what one's natural skin color is, that is, the color that *nature* has given to them is so fascinating. This is where Forster misunderstands Kant's position about race: because it is so hard to determine the natural skin color of anyone, mere observation is not enough. Rather, one must embark on a guided investigation in order to discover it and in order to understand how and why nature demonstrates these colors. The fact of the matter is that regardless of the natural skin color of the children, they will always show the features of both parents in which their natural skin color will always, by *principle*, be intermediary. This is why the experiment of a child born to parents of different races must be conducted in a foreign climate in order to determine the child's natural skin color (AA 8:172; TPP 207). Races are observable only in contexts where the blending together of different races take place without the interference of environmental factors that assure racial characteristics. It is for this reason that the principle of race is judged by differences along the lines of heredity and not similarities.

The second innovation of race to his account in 1788 is Kant's need to show the purpose behind having different races within the monogenist agenda in a stronger manner than before. I see Kant strengthening this position by appealing to racial difference in two ways; by drawing on the concept of the unity and the manifold and through emphasizing the role of *Anlagen*, the latter of which will be the topic of the next chapter in this project. Robert Bernasconi observes that when it comes of the question of "What is race?," Kant relies on the larger framework of his critical philosophy, and does more than defending his concept of race against Herder and Forster.¹⁶⁴ I have already mentioned the concept of the unity and the manifold in the context of the 1785 essay on race where the concept of race provides an explanation for human variety

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 199.

based on an *a priori* unity located in the common phylum, which, in turn, allows one to see the purpose of that variety. That is to say: "Yet all of that is so far merely an idea of the way in which the greatest degree of manifoldness in the generation can be united by reason with the greatest unity of phyletic origin" (AA 8:164; TPP 200). Having an understanding of the principle that supports the manifold, that is, believing in the monogenist agenda, is the only way that one can gain access to what Kant means by race. The idea is that a direct result of the *a priori* unity is that racial difference has a purpose. Racial difference takes on another face that goes beyond skin color: at base, racial difference is supported in the same moment where Kant defends the *a priori* unity. Kant's appeal to monogenesis and his strong need to defend it bolsters the idea that racial differences must be deep, natural and brought about by *Keime* and *Anlagen* that work on behalf of nature to maintain these differences. To the extent to which Kant makes *this* concept of race exclusive to the monogenist agenda and nearly untranslatable to any other system of origin or system of classification, the relationship between both unity and the manifold in this context establishes a strong purpose for difference. The idea is that Kant gives racial difference a strong theoretical foundation that goes beyond a superficial concept of racial discrimination. For Kant, race is not observable only at the level of skin color; it is an idea that must be grasped intellectually. Therefore, it is necessary to have a principle to help make sense of the relationship because it allows one to "*observe*, i.e., to pay attention to that which could indicate the phyletic origin, not just the resemblance of characters, since in that case we are dealing with a problem of natural history, not of the description of nature and of mere methodical nomenclature" (AA 8:164; TPP 200).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I approached Kant's two essays on race and the essay on race and teleology in order to lay the foundation for this project which focuses on the extent to which the racial hierarchy continues to have an impact on Kant's philosophy of history. I have attempted to show that racial difference has a purpose that is a direct result of Kant's defense of monogenesis. This emphasis on difference is the part that outlives the explicit mention of the term "race" and the racial hierarchy. In the next section I explore the boundaries of difference and the extent to which it becomes further rooted in the philosophy of history systematically.

Chapter Three: Justifying Inequality through a Philosophy of History

Scholars who discuss Kant's late works often equate his *cosmopolitanism* with a contemporary social and political definition of equality by giving the argument that Kant's cosmopolitan ideals allow for all people regardless of race to have equal status in the cosmopolitan state.¹⁶⁵ The problem with this analysis is that in his own description of the cosmopolitan society, Kant did not envision that it was a state of equality for all; it is rather a state where human beings reach their human vocation in accordance with their *Anlagen*. Thus, for some groups within the species, they are precluded from being able to join in the cosmopolitan society because they are unable to fulfill the basic requirements of the human vocation.

My argument is that Kant creates a normative concept of the person who is able to fulfill the human vocation while he simultaneously describes the attributes one must have in order to equally participate in the cosmopolitan society. Thus, in areas of his work where race is not mentioned, but inequality and separatism are evoked, the racial hierarchy still operates in the background; the person who can work (*Arbeit*) is the person who has the potential to fulfill the human vocation and participate in the cosmopolitan society.

In this chapter, I explore Kant's published works from the 1780s by focusing on key discussions about *Anlagen* and its role in the development of the species. In the first section, I discuss Kant's essay, "Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim" (1784) in order to get a clearer picture of the function of *Anlagen* in Kant's philosophy of history. I argue that Kant uses antagonism to not only measure the progress of the species, but as a means to racialize groups in accordance with their *Anlagen*. In the next section, I set out to challenge the common

¹⁶⁵ Robert Loudon, *Kant's Impure Ethics*, 101-106.

interpretation that Kant's cosmopolitan society is also a state of equality. I argue that Kant's cosmopolitan society rather maintains inequality and disenfranchises certain groups of people by exploring Kant's intellectual exchanges with his former student Johann Herder in the critique of Herder's *Outlines* written in 1785 and in the essay "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" (1786).

Kant's Philosophy of History

Kant's philosophy of history attempts to discover and to describe the "guiding thread" which becomes a way to systematize human development throughout history. Not only is this systematization an attempt to understand human events up to the present, but it is also a way in which to understand and prepare for the future in accordance with reason. Yovel explains that Kant's philosophy of history is actually a history of reason in that in order for "history to have a rational significance, reason itself—or so it seemed—must be construed to allow for its possible historization."¹⁶⁶ Yovel interprets Kant's philosophy of history as embodying a rationality of its own that is transcendental but is unlike that of pure reason.¹⁶⁷ As such, Kant's philosophy of history has a problematic albeit necessary connection with empirical history yielding two points: "[O]ne is the history of reason reshaping the *world*, and the other is the history of reason becoming known and explicated to *itself*. The first aspect of the history of reason is mainly practical; it is the process whereby human reason imprints itself upon the actual world, reshaping its empirical organization in light of its own goals and interests. In this practical sense, rational history is an open-ended process, moving toward an infinitely remote ideal."¹⁶⁸ The reason for why this "thread" is so important is because in spite of the chaos and disorganization that is ever

¹⁶⁶ See Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

present in the human species it is important to realize that there is still a grand plan of nature in place and an ultimate goal which orients the species.

The cosmopolitan society is, according to Kant, the final end which allows for the full development of *Anlagen* in the species (AA 8:29, IUH 118). However, one area that has been overlooked in the literature is how the cosmopolitan state as it is conceived in the philosophy of history accepts the minority or the inferior. Namely the minority, and in particular Africans and Native Americans, are incapable of doing labor on their own. This presents an obstacle, perhaps an insurmountable obstacle when it comes to the possibility of their equal participation in the cosmopolitan state. Throughout Kant's philosophy of history the ability to labor is crucial to being able to fulfill the human vocation. In both Propositions Three and Four of "Idea for a Universal History" and in Kant's discussion of the Tahitians in his "Review" of Herder's *Outlines*, he mentions that without the ability to labor, one's value is not more than that of beasts. One objection to taking these statements literally could be that Kant does not actually mean that some humans can be at the same status as beasts. Regardless of whether one chooses to take these statements literally or not, they certainly suggest that Kant has some problematic views on the degree to which lazy people can be thought of as persons who are able to both reach the human vocation and equally participate in the cosmopolitan society.

In each one of these three essays, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim," "Review of Herder's *Outlines*," and "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," Kant presents inequality as a necessary attribute that motivates human beings toward self-improvement. The kind of equality described in this chapter is the inability to labor which is freely ascribed to Europeans but not to Africans. This disparity has a direct link to race insofar as the inability that Africans have for labor is one of the obstacles which prevents them from having

equal status in the cosmopolitan state. To be clear, I am not claiming that race has a direct influence on the philosophy of history as I am not able to prove that this would be true; rather, I am arguing that Kant's claims about racial inequality which is in the natural history is also present in the philosophy of history. It is by analyzing the parallels between these areas in his work that it will provide more insight into the extent to which race plays a key role in Kant's philosophy of history. For example, in his review of Herder's *Outlines*, Kant raises doubts as to whether the Tahitians' lives (which are racially ambiguous at the time, especially in the eyes of German audiences¹⁶⁹) are worth living because they are lazy. In the case of the Tahitians, Kant ponders about whether their existence is worthwhile, and in the case of Africans, he claims that their inferior status as enslaved people is justified because they lack the impetus to work, an inability which is related to their *Anlagen*.

Herder's Outlines, Race, and the Tahitians

Kant's intellectual engagement with Johann Gottfried Herder is a catalyst for his own work in the philosophy of history, and particularly with regard to *Anlagen*. Kant writes to Herder in 1768 that: "My principal aim is to know the actual nature and limits of human capacities and inclinations, (*die eigentliche Bestimmung und die Schranken der Menschlichen Fähigkeiten und Neigungen*)[...]" (AA 10:74-75; CO 94-95).¹⁷⁰ Kant states in this letter that he has interest in discovering the purpose of human capacity in the context of human society. Twenty years later, Herder is an important interlocutor of Kant's with regard to how Kant articulates a concept of humanity. Herder's own engagement with Kant's works, and, more specifically, the 1784 essay

¹⁶⁹ See Vanessa Agnew, "Pacific Island Encounters and the German Invention of Race," in *Islands in History and Representation*, edited by Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), 91.

¹⁷⁰ See Kant's Correspondence with Herder (May 9, 1768) in *Correspondence*, edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 94-95. This work will appear henceforth as CO.

on history, came out in his volumes *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*. Kant's reviews of the book appear in 1785. While Kant did not review the third and fourth parts of Herder's *Outlines*, he extends his comments of Herder's work in the essay, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" (1786).

My analysis will focus on the second review of Herder's *Outlines*, which is the place where Kant defends his positions related to race and *Anlagen*. Like Kant, Herder is a monogenist, but takes the position that insofar as all human beings come from one origin, the differences from one another indicate only superficial variations that are not embedded in having different origins and so the concept of a race is void.¹⁷¹ This is because, according to Herder, "Race refers to a difference of origin, which in this case does not exist"¹⁷² that is, while he acknowledges that there are indeed different characters that may define a people, be it language, complexion, etc. still, "This originality of character extends even to families, and it's [sic] transitions are as variable as imperceptible."¹⁷³ Robert Bernasconi summarizes the differences between Herder and Kant's views on race in this way:

Herder understood peoples as the fundamental units of history and, although he primarily conceived of them in cultural terms, their biological basis was retained in his works, as when he wrote of the "original root-character of a nation" [...]. Whereas Kant was among those who advocated a division into only four or five kinds, Herder advocated recognition of the diversity of human peoples: whereas Kant focused on color divisions, Herder saw continuity: "the colors run into one another" [...]. [...] Herder believed that if we only knew more about the different peoples, we could perhaps complete the shadings of the portraits of these peoples without finding a single break [...]. Whereas Kant regarded the division of races as permanent, according to Herder, "the characters of peoples are gradually extinguished in the general run of things" [...].¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ See Johann Herder, *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*, translated by T. O. Churchill (1800) (London, England: British Library, No Year of Publication Given), 166.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 166

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ Bernasconi, "Who Invented?," 28.

Herder, for reasons similar to the ones that Forster will use later, ends up rejecting Kant's concept of race because skin color is not a good indication of origin. In fact, there are no different origins of the human species; rather, the human species is all one.¹⁷⁵ When it comes to looking to skin color as an indicator of origin, Herder states that, "Complexions run into each other: forms follow the genetic character: and upon the whole, all are at last but shades of the same great picture, extending through all ages, and all over all parts of the earth. They [races] belong not, therefore to properly to [the] systematic natural history, as to the physico-geographical history of man"(additions in brackets mine).¹⁷⁶ Herder also rejects the deep connection that Kant attempts to make between origin and the philosophy of history. Instead the differences between human beings is to be taken as an indication of the bounty of nature, as having, in part, an aesthetic value: "It appears, that every thing possible to be on our Earth was actually to exist on it: and then only shall we be able sufficiently to explain the order and wisdom of this copious plentitude, when advanced a step farther, we perceive the end for which such variety was ordained to spring up in the great garden of Nature."¹⁷⁷

To this end Herder does not see the value in *Keime* as Kant understands them, because no one has seen them.¹⁷⁸ At best, *Keime* should not be seen as preformed, that is, lying in wait to occasion, neither should they be understood to act according to epigenesis, which Herder takes to be a kind of external evolution of the animal. It is not that Herder wants to completely reject the notion that something internal to the animal is responsible for its development, but whatever that thing is it should be understood to be a formation, a genesis, which acts internally in relationship to nature. Despite the fact that Herder rejects the idea that implanted *Keime* are responsible for

¹⁷⁵ Johann Herder (Translated by T.O. Churchill), *Outlines*,164.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*,93.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*,111.

the permanency of certain characteristics, he does think that the climate has an impact on the degree to which people retain their national characteristics.

For Herder, although he does not state how, people reflect certain national characteristics that are indicative of their region. The climate (which Herder takes in its broadest sense, to include plants and animals) is something that is malleable in the hands of human beings, something that they can affect by their own art. However, in ways similar to Kant, there is a direct and important relationship that groups of people have with the climate in the sense that their characteristics are indicative of their geographical location. These original characteristics tie these groups of people back to their home countries, and these original characteristics will always remain the same. "[T]hus every one bears the characters of his country and way of life on the most distant shores"¹⁷⁹ and "Wherever an arab is found, on the Nile or the Euphrates, on Libanus or in Senegal, nay even in Zanguebar or the island of the indian Ocean, if a foreign climate have not by length of time changed him into a colonist, he will display his original arabian character."¹⁸⁰ Although Kant had already formed his ideas about the effect of the climate on national or natural characters before Herder makes this statement, it is worth pointing out that the emphasis on certain characteristics that are not skin color and the degree to which it indicates one's origin becomes a point of major emphasis of Kant's in 1788 that was not as prominent before.

Kant responds to Herder's concerns by first addressing what he sees as a problem with Herder's method. According to Kant, Herder proceeds his philosophy of history with mere conjectures or fantasies in that Herder uses his gift of poetry to create myths instead of forging

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 169.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 168.

toward the discovery of truth (AA 8:61; HR 138).¹⁸¹ Kant states that he would prefer a more systematic treatment of history in which the philosopher has carved out the proper contours of universal history. Kant sees this approach as necessary to keep one from rehashing one-sided accounts about human beings which appear to come primarily from travelogues (AA 8:61; HR 139). Kant, of course, relies on travelogues himself when it comes to many observations that he makes about race (be they entirely accurate or not), and so this comment may seem contradictory; however, the point that he is making is that in discovering the various ways in which different ethnographers describe the same people, one should try to find the one principle by which to make sense of multiple accounts. Kant's first goal is to defend his position about the philosophy of history. That is, one can see clearly that there is both a reason and a purpose to the differences that one observes in nature, thus making these differences something that must be philosophically accounted for instead of simply stating that these differences are various shades of the same origin. Kant looks to race to support his argument. Africans and Native Americans lack the mental predispositions (*Geistesanlagen*) that the other races have but their other *Anlagen* are equal to everyone else's (AA 8:62; HR 139). How does one explain this? Kant's point is that a philosopher can choose to focus on similarities or differences when it comes to creating a theory, but the focus on *differences* will allow the observer better access to understanding nature's systems which would lead us to accept the Kantian understanding of the philosophy of history.

With regard to Herder's understanding of the climate and its relationship to the human species, Kant understands Herder's position to be that nature is a "genetic force" in the human species. Kant attempts to summarize what he believes Herder to be saying: neither mechanism

¹⁸¹ See "Review of J.G. Herder's *Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity*. Parts 1 and 2" in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Robert Loudon and Günter Zöllner (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 121-142. This work will appear henceforth as HR.

nor evolution are responsible for changes in the species; rather, there are internal capacities that make it possible for the species to respond to external effects. Kant agrees with this way of thinking with one crucial exception: "[O]ne could call this natural vocation (*Naturbestimmung*) of the forming nature also "germs" or "original predispositions," [...] merely as limitations, not further explicable, of a self-forming faculty, which latter we can just as little explain or make comprehensible" (AA 8:62; HR 140). There are two important points to make here. The first is that Kant's use of *Naturbestimmung* in this context refers to the same point that he will make in 1788: That the role of germs and *Anlagen* is to retain the original, racial characteristics of their ancestors and in so doing, they perform according to nature's plan, which is to preserve those characteristics for generations. My second point will be to revisit what Kant means by these capacities, as the terms *Keime* and *Anlagen* get fused at this point in his work.

I will take the second point first. Louden argues that Kant does use the terms "*Keime* and *Anlagen* interchangeably in less technical anthropological discussions about human development"¹⁸² but the same is true of these essays on history. This particular passage of Kant's does underscore the notion that the two ideas are not as distinct in his later work, but this does not negate the point that these capacities retain their sense of purpose. This sense of purpose is what I mean by looking to the development of *Anlagen* as an umbrella idea for purposive nature of these capacities as argued in the Introduction to this project. In fact, another way to understand the coalescing of both *Keime* and *Anlagen* is to see *Keime* as becoming more purposive too, as opposed to having the position of being responsible for only the permanency of racial characteristics.

Likewise, *Naturbestimmung* or the natural vocation of these capacities supports the notion that these capacities have a natural or intrinsic job or goal that they are to be operating for

¹⁸² Robert Louden, "Cosmopolitical Unity," 215.

and toward. What this means is that these capacities do not operate arbitrarily, but rather in accordance with the plan of nature. Günter Zöllner in the essay, "Kant's Political Anthropology" remarks that *Naturbestimmung* is "culturo-political, to be promoted by natural means, and to be fulfilled in the natural order."¹⁸³ For Kant, this means that these capacities (*Keime und Anlagen*) have specific goals that they must fulfill in accordance with nature's plan. Thus, they cannot ever deviate from their original makeup if they are to fulfill nature's plan in her special way. Thus, it is important that these capacities occasion only once and that the species live comfortably only in those locations where their capacities occasioned.

Kant's next set of concerns has to do with Herder's concept of culture. What Herder claims in Book Eight of the *Outlines* is that both the metaphysician and the philosopher of history attempt to make what they observe about humans fit their narratives which can lead to some erroneous conclusions. In contrast, Herder sees himself to be "[I]nstead of launching out into the ocean, I shall rather coast along the shore; or to speak in plain terms, confine myself to undoubted facts, or such as are generally considered to, distinguishing them from my own conjectures, and leaving it to those who are more fortunate, to arrange and employ them in a better manner."¹⁸⁴ Kant understands Herder's position on culture to be an activity which happens outside the human being as something that develops so long as one learns more about other cultures through learning the value of different languages and cultural practices. Kant however, does not know what to make of this understanding of culture philosophically because it has nothing to do with nature or the use of reason. Rather, culture is created inwardly as the result of hard work at the sacrifice of happiness. While may be "easier" for human beings to have happiness as their vocation (an external feeling); they must work toward the human vocation as

¹⁸³ Günter Zöllner, "Kant's Political Anthropology," *Kant Yearbook*, Volume 3(2011): 154(fn).

¹⁸⁴ Johann Herder (Translated by T.O. Churchill), *Outlines*, 188.

an internal realization which will not be a happy process. Kant's point is that the labor that one puts into their lives has a moral value and is also that which justifies one's existence.

But what if the genuine end of providence were not this shadowy image of happiness, which each makes for himself, but rather the always proceeding and growing activity and culture that is put in play by it, whose greatest possible degree is only the product of a state constitution ordered in accordance with concepts of human right, and consequently something that can be a work of human beings themselves? (AA 8:64; HR 141).

Kant argues that a kind of happiness resides in each epoch of humanity, but that the actual concern must be not about the condition of one's happiness, but instead about the value of existence. Kant thus reiterates the moral importance of one's existence and capacity to make the choice to develop themselves toward the human vocation. This is a theme that persists in Kant's understanding of human history in the sense that human beings must be capable of self-development and self-improvement in order for their existence in human history to be considered valid. Moreover, here again, Kant underscores the fact that the development of skill and culture *produces* the civil constitution that is the highest form of the work of human beings.

To illustrate this point about how important labor is to justifying one's existence, Kant's remarks that the Tahitians are so lazy that they are indistinguishable from an isle of "happy sheep."

Does the author really mean that if the happy inhabitants of Tahiti, never visited by more cultured nations (*gesittetern Nationen*), had been destined to live for thousands of centuries in their tranquil indolence, one could give a satisfying answer to the question why they exist at all, and whether it would not have been just as good to have this island populated with happy sheep and cattle as with human beings who are happy merely enjoying themselves? That principle is therefore not as *evil* as the author thinks. – Even though it might have been an *evil man* who said it. (AA 8:65; HR 142)

During this time, Pacific Islanders were not readily assigned a race. In the 1785 essay on race, Kant, who relied heavily on skin color for racial identification uses them as an example of

the difficulty of identification because of uncertainty about their skin color (AA 8:92; DCH 146). According to Vanessa Agnew, because the Pacific Islanders occupied "intermediary positions in these polarities [between white and black races], the Pacific islanders were not readily assimilable into this framework."¹⁸⁵ Due to the fact that Kant did not see the Pacific Islanders as an ethnic group of one of the four races, or as having a race at all is crucial to the idea that Kant racializes groups and justifies an unequal and inferior status outside the boundaries of the four races. This means that Kant, at least in the case of the Tahitians, did not always operate within the construct of the four races but that he did use the same or similar reasons to justify why certain races are lower than others. Thus, in the same way, it is highly likely that in other contexts where Kant is stratifying the species based on ability even without the explicit mention of race that the racial hierarchy is still present.

In the 1786 essay, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," one prominent theme is the ability to labor in human progress. Kant begins the essay by reiterating his problem with Herder's method, in that while it may be necessary to have a conjectural history to make sense of the gaps that are present in actual history, it is wrong to formulate a history based on them, which would be mere fiction (AA 8:109; CBH 163). Rather, the best approach is to chart the history of freedom from the development of original dispositions (*Anlagen*) that lie in the nature of the human being. In other words, one approach to history pays attention to records, that is, a history of freedom and its progression whereas the better approach is to identify the guiding thread that runs through history (AA 8:110; CBH 163). Toward the end of this section I will return to the issue of labor, but, for the moment, I will discuss the four steps of the narrative which are crucial to my these later remarks.

¹⁸⁵ Vanessa Agnew, "Pacific Island Encounters and the German Invention of Race," 91.

Kant's conjectural account of history takes readers on a "mere pleasure trip" in which the Christian Bible (Chapters 2-6 of Genesis) is the map of the philosophy of history because both stories operate with the same concepts.

The development of the narrative occurs in four steps. In the first step, Kant presents the beginning of human history as having started from a single, heterosexual, adult couple who are able to propagate.¹⁸⁶ The purpose for having only one couple to start human history is to keep war from arising immediately and to reduce the jealousy that would arise from nature's different means of provision for them (AA 8:110; CBH 164). Kant restates that the ultimate goal of human beings is to eventually come together in a unity, or sociability of which is possible in the final end only because of *a priori* unity. However, what is most important in this step of human history is that Kant "consider[s] this couple only after it has already taken a mighty step in the skill of making use of its powers [...] The first human being could, therefore, *stand* and *walk*; he could *speak* (Genesis 2:20), even *discourse* [...] hence *think*" (AA 8:110; CBH 164).¹⁸⁷ He continues to assert that these are skills that the human being was responsible for acquiring because if they were in fact innate, they would also have to be inherited. These skills are necessary to have in order for the human being to make moral decisions (AA 8:111; CBH 164, 165). While one could argue about whether walking, speaking, discoursing, and thinking are inherited or not, the concept that is at work here is that these skills, for Kant, are not innate and must be acquired as first steps for moral deliberation. He sees a relationship between the acquisition of skills and morality.

¹⁸⁶ While Kant's telling of the Biblical story of creation is meant to only describe the contours of human history, the emphasis on the single, heterosexual, fertile couple leaves him open to debate regarding Kant's views of the LGBTIA community and, most importantly, the question of who does Kant include in the development of human history. Another point to be made has to do with the emphasis on propagation as a crucial aspect of human history.

¹⁸⁷ The emphasis on a particular kind of cognitive ability at this stage of discussing human history raises concerns about the role of the mentally challenged and children and their roles in the development of human history.

The second step of human history is the use of instinct and the stirring of reason. Instinct is encouraged by the voice of God and it provided the human being with some access to nourishment, or food, but also kept other things away from them. While the inexperienced human being is able to do well for themselves by simply obeying the voice of God, reason begins to stir at this level as a means to extend human knowledge of what could be gratifying beyond the limits of instinct (AA 8:111; CBH 165). The stirring of reason also impacts the other instincts of sexual desire in that human beings came to learn to refuse and hold off acting upon their natural impulses. Through this, human beings developed the moral character of propriety, a character in which others are influenced to have respect for one another which also becomes the foundation of sociability making the human being a moral creature (AA 8:113; CBH 166-167). This is also the first step of culture and the other two steps follow from this one.

The third step of reason is having an expectation of the future. This faculty does not remain in the sense of enjoying merely what is in the present, but is also worried about how to best prepare for the future. This sense is important as a means to becoming more aware of what one's ultimate vocation ought to be, but it is also the source of great worry as well. Both the man and the woman loathed the extent of their very difficult work, but the hope of seeing themselves live on into the future motivates their work.

The fourth step of reason distinguishes human beings from animals in that they are capable of understanding that they are the only end of nature. This realization is understood by all human beings and is taken to be the reason why they must work together to build a society. Relatedly, human beings realized that the goal of their lives should never be to satisfy their natural desires. This step toward human sociability is combined with the release of the human being from nature's womb, in which nature, as a mother, allows the human being to develop so

that they can worry about themselves and work on their own behalf. There is the constant wish for rest and paradise, but:

But between him and that imagined seat of bliss is interposed restless reason, which drives him irresistibly toward the *development of the capacities* placed in him and does not allow him to return to the condition of crudity and simplicity out of which it had pulled him (*Genesis* 3: 24). It drives him on nevertheless to take upon himself patiently the toil that he hates, and run after the bauble that he despises, and even to forget death itself which he dreads, on account of all those trivialities he is even more afraid to lose. (AA 8:115; CBH 168; italics mine)

Thus, the urge to develop one's capacities because of the stirring of reason is the motivation for understanding the value in toiling. It is also the first step toward moving beyond the crude nature in which human beings find themselves. Having the vision of the future, however, helps to make toil worthwhile. It is here where Kant extends the concept of work into one that has moral value because of its relationship with the future by helping to prepare human beings in their progress toward the future. Thus, Kant understands the "history of freedom" as human progression toward an ultimate goal for the entire human species through the development of *Anlagen* (AA 8:116; CBH 169). What comes out of this development is the cultivation of culture, an issue that, inspired by Rousseau, develops in order to enable the moral species toward their vocation so that humanity can reach its potential with regard to its moral standard at which will no longer be in conflict with itself and with nature.

The development of *Anlagen* is crucial to the human species and its progress throughout history. It is at this point that Kant joins natural history together with the history of freedom, resulting in a tension "[B]ut these predispositions (*Anlagen*), since they were aimed at the merely natural condition, suffer injury from progressing culture and injure culture in turn [...]" (AA 8:118; CBH 171). The development of *Anlagen* occurs within a tension which is characterized by the fact that on the one hand these *Anlagen* want to cause destruction and chaos because they

are directly related to the inclinations that human beings have for self-improvement, but, on the other hand, they feel the need to also develop themselves toward culture in order to fulfill the plan of nature.

This idea is what Kant calls "antagonism" which is a tool of nature which helps to bring about the full development of *Anlagen* so that a lawful society is possible. Kant describes antagonism as "unsociable sociability," which is the "propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society. The predisposition for this obviously lies in human nature" (AA 8:19; CBH 111). There are at least two different ways in which to understand antagonism. Schneewind takes the teleological approach by arguing that unsocial sociability is an inward impetus that pushes human beings both as individuals and as a species toward moral improvement.¹⁸⁸ However, Wood emphasizes that the chaotic nature of antagonism also means that it is a source of evil in the species and is something that must be curbed.¹⁸⁹ Thus, reason must come in as the "only one escape from this fearful development. This consists in the use of reason, not to serve instinct but to master it. Man is progressively compelled to move on this avenue of escape."¹⁹⁰

Most importantly, the moral and teleological component of antagonism changes the species for the better in that it "awakens all the powers of the human being, brings him to overcome his **propensity to indolence**, and, driven by ambition, tyranny, and greed, to obtain for himself a rank among his fellows, whom he cannot *stand*, but also cannot *leave alone*" (AA 8:21; IUH 111, bolding mine). Without this natural feeling for antagonism there would be no

¹⁸⁸ See J.B. Schneewind, "Good out of Evil: Kant and the Idea of Unsocial Sociability," in *Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide*, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 104.

¹⁸⁹ See Allen Wood, "Kant's Fourth Proposition: The Unsociable Sociability of Human Nature," in *Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide*, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 116.

¹⁹⁰ See Emil Fackenheim, "Kant's Concept of History," *Kant-Studien*, Volume 48(1956): 395.

progress and the talents of the species "would, in an arcadian pastoral life of perfect concord, contentment and mutual love, remain eternally hidden in their germs (*Keimen*); human beings, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would give their existence hardly any greater worth than that of their domesticated beasts; they would not fill the void in creation with regard to their end as rational nature" (AA 8:22; IUH 112). This feeling which is characterized by a strong desire to be apart from others is necessary in order to feel both superior and competitive with others in the species as a way to progress the species. Schneewind contends that this feeling never leaves the species, "Kant allows—indeed, he insists—that progress toward the perfection of the species is nowhere near an end. Our unsocial drives never disappear, even when society improves."¹⁹¹ By stratifying human beings, the species will become more moral and more refined or more cultured:

Thus happen the first true steps from crudity toward culture, which really consists in the social worth of the human being; thus all talents come bit by bit to be developed, taste is formed, and even, through progress in enlightenment, a beginning is made toward the foundation of a mode of thought which can with time transform the rude natural predisposition to make moral distinctions into determinate practical principles and hence transform a *pathologically* compelled agreement to form a society finally into a *moral* whole. (AA 8:21; CBH 111)

The cosmopolitan aim is the goal of nature whereby the human species can fully develop itself (AA 8:29; CBH 118). However, this aim can be accomplished only in accordance with *Anlagen* with the understanding that the degree to which the *Anlagen* are perfected allows for the instantiation of the cosmopolitan state (AA 8:27 and 8:29; CBH 116 and 118). Thus, Kant's philosophy of history is more concerned with chronicling human action and the ways in which it eventually conforms with the plan of nature than it is with defining a sense of equality. The only way in which this happens is through the efforts of the human species. In Proposition Three,

¹⁹¹ See Schneewind, "Good out of Evil," 104.

Kant argues that nature has willed that whatever human beings gain from their experience in the world is that it be because of their own efforts, free from instinct and in accordance with reason.

The invention of his means of nourishment, his clothing, [...] should be entirely his own work. In this it seems to have pleased nature to exercise its greatest frugality, and to have measured out its animal endowment so tightly, so precisely to the highest need of an initial existence, as though it willed that the human being, if he were someday to have labored himself from the greatest crudity to the height of the greatest skillfulness [...]. But it appears to have been no aim at all to nature that he should live well; but only that he should labor and work himself up so far that he might make himself worthy of well-being through his conduct of life (AA 8:21; IUH 110).

In order for the species as a whole to work toward their human vocation, it requires both time and space. The full development of *Anlagen* occurs for the entire species and not for an individual because one human lifespan does not give the generation enough time to learn all its insights. Thus, nature must use more than one generation of human beings to work with in order to perfect itself. These generations of human beings are a series in which the enlightenment of one generation can be passed down to the next through the germs propelled forward to the next generation, as a "germ of enlightenment" for future generations (AA 8:30; IUH 119).

The moral of the story is that human beings have the ability and moral imperative to contribute to their own history, and that that must be a history shaped by a deliberate contribution toward the development of culture (AA 8:123; CBH 175). Thus, labor has a direct moral and practical impact. However, one cannot be lazy: the growth of reason is a constant reminder that the wish for a golden age in which one does not have to work "brings in laziness as a counterweight to reason's reminder that he should give his life its worth through *actions*" (AA 8:122; CBH 174). It is at this point where Kant also claims that inequality and chaos serve a purpose in history. The key point is that : "[I]nequality among human beings, this rich source of so much evil, but also of all good, and it increased even further" (AA 8:119; CBH 172). Despite

misgivings about war that come natural to the human being, war serves a purpose, "war is an *indispensable* means of bringing culture still further; and only after a (God knows when) completed culture, would an everlasting peace be salutary, and thereby alone be possible for us" (AA 8:121; CBH 173-174, italics mine). Kant sees inequality as an instrument that moves toward a cosmopolitan whole. For this reason, the inherent inequality of the races in the examples of such minorities as the Africans and Tahitians come into focus as a site for questions regarding the function of *Anlagen* in the philosophy of history.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that the development of *Anlagen* (*Entwicklung der Naturanlagen*) that Kant lays out in his philosophy of history impacts his idea of striving for perfectibility which is at the forefront of Kant's cosmopolitan ideal especially as it concerns racial equality. I did this by tracking the term *Anlagen* within Kant's natural history and philosophy of history in an effort to show that the development of *Anlagen* requires that groups in the species are unequal to one another and that this inequality is legitimized through certain natural inabilities within the species.

Part of what I wanted to demonstrate in this chapter is that Kant's cosmopolitan ideals do not present an idyllic view of equality but rather have inequality as a key part of the process toward perfection. In this regard, the common interpretation that Kant's commitment to cosmopolitan ideals are tantamount to a commitment to universal equality must be reevaluated. What is missing from these scholarly analyses is the fact that Kant's *cosmopolitan(ism)* takes seriously the imperfect process of human progress.¹⁹² Rather, Kant's own aim of cosmopolitanism is to provide the human species with a direction and an ultimate purpose. This

¹⁹² See Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment Against Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 173-174.

would rescue the meaning of human action and supply the reason why human beings need a "master" whose task is to bring their actions under a universally valid will (AA 8:23; IUH 113).

My analysis of Kant's three essays on the philosophy of history show that labor is a necessary characteristic that a race needs in order to progress in human history. However, there are some groups that are unable to cultivate the impetus for work which is limited by their natural capacities or *Anlagen*. I want to make the distinction between those who cannot labor at all such as the Tahitians, Gypsies, and Native Americans from those who can be forced to labor, as in the case of Africans. Insofar as all of these groups cannot labor, Kant excludes, or at least limits their ability to participate in the cosmopolitan state equally to that of whites. For Africans, who can be forced to labor, Kant sees that justifying the institution of slavery is appropriate or at base permissible, given their faulty impetus. The association of slavery with Africans also shows that not only is this separation amongst different capacities explicitly racialized, Kant uses this scheme as a means to legitimate oppression in the other contexts where race is not mentioned explicitly.

In the case of Africans in particular, one objection could be that the ability or inability to work is acknowledging a fact of human nature and is not necessarily a negative observation. Perhaps Kant is simply acknowledging the fact that different people have different abilities, and this does not necessarily have to mean that certain groups are at a major disadvantage because of their inability to do something. More importantly, because a group lacks a particular ability that another has does not mean that they are somehow less important or unable to develop in other ways.

One reply to this objection is that the ability to labor is tied to other claims that Kant makes with regard to the species' ability to progress themselves morally, socially, and politically.

This happens to be especially important in the case of Africans, given that their inferior status as enslaved people is justified. I have argued in this chapter that there is a normative concept of the human being that is also being simultaneously created alongside the discussion of labor. It is also important to keep in mind that this ability to labor is more akin to the ability of a person to self-improve, which is a necessary capacity if one is able to become more moral. With special regard to both Africans and the Tahitians, Kant questions their ability to show that their existence matters as much as the rest of the species. The claim is that the inability of these races to labor not only affects how one is able to understand their particular development as a race, but it also affects their ability to contribute to human history as a whole. Second, the incapacity for labor justifies their inferior social, political, and moral status. Thus, Africans become a kind of naturally born slaves (AA 15:878)¹⁹³ which, in turn, justifies their place near the bottom of the racial hierarchy as one of the lowest of the races (AA 8:176; TPP 211). Most importantly, it is not just the idea that Africans lack the inherent incapacity for industry, but that their incapacity *requires* a social and political corrective. Insofar as Kant understands the development of *Anlagen* to be necessary in progressing the human species toward the cosmopolitan ideal, the species must be able to work on their own accord. The fact that certain groups of people cannot labor places in jeopardy their ability to set moral and political ends for themselves and equally help to achieve the cosmopolitan state.

¹⁹³ See Immanuel Kant, *Reflexionen*, compiled by Universität Duisburg-Essen, <http://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/kant/aa15/878.html> (accessed June 11, 2015).

Chapter Four: Race and the Enslavement of Africans

One of the inspirations for this project, as explained in the Introduction was a comment that Kant made in 1788 in the essay, "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy." In a footnote, Kant made the claim that Africans who were enslaved in European countries perhaps preferred the status, waiting on their masters instead of doing hard labor and going into business for themselves. Kant borrowed these claims from James Tobin, an Englishman whose work, *Cursory Remarks upon the Reverend Mr. Ramsay's Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the Sugar Colonies* was translated into German, but the fact that Kant chose these claims as opposed to those of James Ramsay (whose work as I will show, was also available to Kant) raises some question. First, what was it in Tobin's work that drew Kant to adopt his account of Africans? Secondly, what evidence is there that Kant subsequently abandoned this account?

Kant's comment on African slavery is a crucial moment in his discussion about the racial hierarchy. In this chapter, I argue that Kant's discussion of the enslavement of Africans in 1788 offers a *racialized account of Anlagen* which strengthens the idea that inequality and racial stratification are the basic characteristics of the racial hierarchy. In turn, this racialized view has a unique impact on Africans: their status as enslaved persons is justified in perpetuity and the social and political institution of slavery solidifies their inferior status. I discuss in more detail what I take Kant to mean by racializing *Anlagen* the process of human development which I see as encompassing the notion of inequality and separation of the species based on natural inequities of any kind. I aim to show that when he talks about inequality in such texts as the *Critique of Judgment*, he does not have to use the term "race" to describe what he means: *Arbeit*

alone and the capacity for self-improvement encodes the idea that only certain races are able to fulfill the human vocation.

In the first section of this chapter, I complete my discussion of Kant and Forster's debate from chapter two in order to situate the 1788 essay and to show that as a response to Forster, Kant created his strongest defense for *Anlagen* and for race. As a result, Kant's remarks on African slavery must be read in a way that shows how important *Anlagen* and its auxiliaries, i.e., impulses are to the development of the species according to the specific plan of nature. In the second part of this chapter, I flesh out Kant's statement where he justifies the enslavement of Africans and argue that the impetus for labor which is interwoven with *Anlagen* is responsible for the inability of Africans to fulfill the human vocation.

1788 Essay on Race and Teleology, Part Two

In chapter two, I focused on Forster's concerns about Kant's idea of race. In the essay, "Something More about the Human Races" I have already discussed two of Forster's worries about Kant's idea of race: First, the concept of race forces a principle into a system of teleology where it does not fit. Second, Forster is unconvinced that one should accept that race is an unfaillingly inheritable characteristic because relying on interracial interbreeding is an unreliable method for determining race (if one wants to accept the term race at all). In this chapter, I will discuss further Forster's other critiques; namely, Forster's skepticism about *Anlagen*, and his concerns about monogenesis and the morality of enslaving Africans. My aim in this chapter is to show that Kant's response to Forster is a crucial and critical *defense* of his racial hierarchy.

With regard to *Anlagen*, Forster offers an internal critique of them, stating that they do not show nature's Providence. Since Kant argues that *Anlagen* do not allow for change in racial

characteristics once they have occasioned the first time (AA 8:99; DCR 152) Forster's point is that nature's "Providence" in this context is a mute point because if she did have foresight, she would make it possible for a race to acclimate a second time to a new environment.¹⁹⁴ Forster identifies what he takes to be a contradiction in Kant's claims; namely, that nature is so wise to consider that groups of people who are geographically situated need special or racial characteristics in order to survive in an environment and so, as a result, the race develops these characteristics in response to the environment. However, Kant's other, opposing claim is that these racial characteristics occasion only once for the race, and if the race was to relocate to another environment it would not be able to thrive as well in the new place because their *Anlagen*, working in accordance with nature's Providence, does not allow them to acclimate a second time.

For reasons related to nature's Providence, Forster also rejects the term "race." For Forster, the terms "race" and "variety" are the same and so the former should not be accorded a special status. At best, the term "race" should be reserved for groups of people of who have a completely different origin from other people who may be close to them geographically.¹⁹⁵ However, it is no different to say that the origin of these people is simply undetermined or unknown. Thus to say as Kant does that "race" can be defined and traced by observing certain inheritable characteristics is both inconsistent and nearly impossible because in most cases racial characteristics are not always visible, nor are they always present in the next immediate generation. It is also the case that animals can always produce different kinds of inheritable differences that may not always be consistent with the characteristics that we expect to see.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Forster, "Something More," 162.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 164.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 164.

Forster's rejection both of the Providence of nature and the term "race" centers around one point: Forster does not see the validity of the human being as having a special goal, that is, a human *telos* that separates human beings from the rest of the species. To the contrary, it is this claim that becomes the main sticking point for Kant's defense of race in 1788; namely, that one's racial characteristics not only comprise their particular response to nature helping them to develop in the way that nature intends, but that these characteristics are what defines them as a race *indefinitely*. The fact that these permanent racial characteristics are what define a race and give it purpose becomes Kant's way of demonstrating that nature has a specific plan for the species, a specificity that follows through all generations of the race. The point that Forster rejects the special nature of humans is clear: "If, on the other hand, every region produced the creatures which were fitted to it, and, to be sure, in the relationship to one another which was so indispensable for their security and preservation, how is it possible that defenseless *human beings* should here be an exception?"¹⁹⁷ For similar reasons Forster also rejects the cornerstone for the Kantian idea of race which is distinction between description of nature and a natural history where the latter alone is concerned with the origin of race. On Forster's account, since one cannot determine the actual origin of the races, then the distinction between the description of nature and the natural history no longer makes sense.

This critique of Kant's attempts to determine the origin of the races becomes the basis for the last comments of Forster's essay. Forster brings the debate back to the central theory related to race that he and Kant disagree upon, which is the debate about monogenesis and polygenesis. For Forster, neither account has a privilege in the ethical discussion: "After all, I see not even a single difficulty more when we assume that there are several original human lines of descent

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.

[polygenesis] than <when we assume> the hypothesis of a single pair [monogenesis]" (addition within brackets mine).¹⁹⁸ He continues:

Do we not, then, when we separate the Negro from whites as an originally distinct line of descent, cut through the last thread by means of which this ill-treated people might be connected with us and find still some protection and mercy from European cruelty? Let me ask if the thought that blacks are our brothers has ever, anywhere, even once, caused the raised whip of the slave driver to be lowered? Has <the slave driver> with the mania of a hangman and devilish joy <ever> been tormented <because he was> fully convinced that the <black slaves>, <these> poor, patient creatures, might be of his own blood? *Human beings from one line of descent who were sharing in the unrecognized blessing of a cleansed moral philosophy do not show themselves for this reason <to be any> more tolerant and more loving toward one another.* (165-166, emphasis mine)

Forster's exclamations show that there were articulations during Kant's time that did not accept African slavery, or, at least questioned its morality. Thus, the common claim that Kant should be excused because he was a man of his time, which suggests that many during Kant's time accepted slavery, is not completely true. More importantly, however, Forster's words challenges both theories with regard to the fact that at least one of them should help to solve the moral question about slavery; however, neither theory is helpful in this respect.

Justifying the Enslavement of Africans

Kant's endorsement of African slavery occurs in the midst of the attempt to defend *Anlagen* against Forster's complaints. Kant contends that Forster's main problem is that he misunderstands how *Anlagen* are dispersed. Kant reiterates that *Anlagen* were not dispersed to the different races at the beginning of time, but that all of the different variations of *Anlagen* were originally present in the first couple. When the first groups of people started to find their original homes, it was only then when they also began to develop corresponding racial characteristics in response to the climate. For this reason, a race is said to be particularly suited

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 165.

to a climate because the race's response to the climate occurred only once in the early days of generation (AA 8:173; 208).

With regard to Forster's complaints about Providence and *Anlagen*, Kant reiterates the point that nature acts providentially because races develop corresponding racial characteristics that will help them thrive in a particular environment. Despite the fact that *Anlagen* occasion only once and only in the early generation of a race does not mean that nature is shortsighted. Rather, nature exercises an "arranged suitability to the climate" and this fact "has hindered its exchange" in that there is a good reason why races are uncomfortable in other climates. "For it is exactly this poor match of the new region to the already adapted natural character of the inhabitants of the old region that all by itself keeps them away from the former" (AA 8:173; TPP 209). Kant's point is that races are better able to fulfill their inner sense of purpose by living in the places to which they first migrated because Nature has already arranged where they should live by instilling in their *Anlagen* the capability to live there. Additionally, however, the different groups within the species are separated by one another by default. Not only has Nature created the human being so comfortable to live in their homes, they are also deterred from leaving there.

In this context, Kant resorts to an example which he thinks will make it clear to Forster about the function of *Anlagen*. Kant's example, like Forster's remarks, is about the enslavement of Africans. However, whereas Forster raises questions about the ethics of African slavery, Kant uses the example of African slavery as proof of the fact that *Anlagen* are purposive: "But those who were driven there have never been able to bring about in their progeny (such as the Creole *Negroes*, or the *Indians* under the name of the gypsies) a sort that would be fit for farmers or manual laborers" (AA 8:174; TPP 209). It is here where Kant inserts a footnote which begins with a curious, cautionary note:

The last remark is not put forward here in order to prove something but is nevertheless not insignificant. (fn AA 8:174; TPP 209)

There are two things that can be said about this note. The first is about what is it that Kant fears will be understood or misunderstood in this footnote? Does he have in mind Forster's final comments about the enslavement of Africans? Is Kant worried about his own contradictory position about the enslavement of Africans and slavery in general? Regardless, despite Kant's fears the note is "significant" nonetheless because it justifies the enslavement of Africans because of the impetus related to their *Anlagen*.

However, the second point that can be made is that this opening is illustrative of the worries Kant has about observing other races and the reliability on travelogues. For Kant, the "proof" one gathers from travelogues fails to constitute as conclusive proof of anything. Kant states earlier in the essay that "it is undoubtedly certain that nothing of a purposive nature could ever be found through mere empirical groping without a guiding principle of what to search for; for only *methodically* conducted experience can be called *observing*. I do not care for the mere empirical traveler and his narrative [...]" (AA 8:161; TPP 197). Essentially, Kant wants readers to exercise some caution when it comes to his later remarks in the footnote. It is for this reason that Susan Shell claims, as I will explain later, that Kant has an ambiguous position when it comes to the extent to which Africans are responsible for their impetus to work.¹⁹⁹ For me, the ambiguity that surrounds this note only shows how problematic Kant's later remarks are insofar as his defense of the enslavement of Africans is corroborated philosophically and not empirically.

In the next section, I will discuss the footnote in more detail. Because of its length, I have chosen to divide it into three parts and give remarks after each part.

¹⁹⁹ Susan Shell, "Kant's Conception of a Human Race," 67.

The Negro Preference

In Hr. *Sprengel's Contributions*, 5th Part, pp. 287-92, a knowledgeable man, adduces the following against Ramsay's wish to use all Negro slaves as *free* laborers: that among the many thousand freed Negroes which one encounters in America and England he knew no example of someone engaged in a business which one could properly call *labor*; rather that, when they are set free, they soon abandon an easy craft which previously as slaves they had been forced to carry out, and instead become hawkers, wretched innkeepers, lackeys, and people who go fishing and hunting, in a word, tramps. The same is to be found in the gypsies among us. The same author notes on this matter that it is not the northern climate that makes the Negroes disinclined for labor. For they would rather endure waiting behind the coaches of their masters or, during the worst winter nights, in the cold entrances of the theaters (in England) than to be threshing, digging, carrying loads, etc.

The majority of the points made in the footnote are not in Kant's own voice, but are rather points that he endorses from two sources he encountered in Matthais Sprengel's magazine *Beiträge zur Völker-und Länderkunde* where in the same issue both William Marsden and James Tobin's pieces appear. The few pages of Tobin's remarks that Kant cites in "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" is a paraphrased translation into German of what Tobin argues in the English version. James Tobin's *Cursory Remarks upon the Reverend Mr. Ramsay's Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the Sugar Colonies* (1785) is a commentary concerning the English debates around slavery. James Tobin writes his treatise in response to another Englishman on the topic of the enslavement of Africans, James Ramsay, who argues that improving the social and moral conditions of the enslaved Africans would be "politically profitable, as it is religious and humane."²⁰⁰ Ramsay states in his book, *An Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies* (1785) that with better life conditions, the slaves would become more productive and be able to take on more fiscal responsibility through their trades. Overall, the slaves would contribute more than they had in the past to public revenue that would ultimately benefit the colonies. Ramsay believes that

²⁰⁰ James Ramsay, *An Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies* (1784), (Google Ebook), 113.

freeing the slaves would instill in them a sense of pride and responsibility that they would defend, which would be a great benefit to the Islands.²⁰¹

James Tobin retorts that Ramsay's "hypothetical situations" in which he envisions freeing the slaves to benefit both the islands and the slaves is ridiculous. Rather, when slaves are freed, they become useless to society. Tobin observes slaves in both the English and French islands and claims that he never saw a freed black or mulatto hire themselves out for work, especially in the skilled trades that Ramsay claims they will. Rather, it is "universally known" that despite having the experience in skilled trades such as blacksmithing, that they only turn to folly after being freed. "[S]oon after they acquire their freedom; they therefore generally turn [into] hucksters, pedlers, fishermen or domestic servants; or, which is worse, they keep little, low dram-shops, or set up destructive negro gaming-houses; and not a few, becoming arrant vagabonds, maintain themselves entirely by cheating and pilfering."²⁰²

The debate between James Tobin and James Ramsay was pivotal to the English discussion about abolitionism in its day. For example, Olaudah Equiano, in his narrative,²⁰³ cites Tobin and writes a review of his book in England's *Public Advertiser*.²⁰⁴ It is not clear from the text that Kant understood the importance of their debate, but what is certain is that he saw Tobin's argument as convincing enough to give weight to his own debate with Forster over the function of *Anlagen*. In fact, Kant's own comments regarding the reason why transplanted Africans are justifiably enslaved echo Tobin's words almost exactly. Kant takes Tobin's claims as

²⁰¹ Ibid., 115.

²⁰² James Tobin, *Cursory Remarks upon the Reverend Mr. Ramsay's Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African Slaves in the Sugar Colonies* (1785) (Ebook), 116.

²⁰³ See Olaudah Equiano, *The Interesting Narrative and Other Writings*, edited by Vincent Carretta (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2003), 109. On page 273, in the appendix, the author reprints sections of Ramsay's text where Equiano is mentioned in Ramsay's texts.

²⁰⁴ "To J.T. Esq. Author of the Books called Cursory Remarks and Rejoinder," *The Public Advertiser*, Monday, January 28, 1788.

a way to offer support for his own point that *Anlagen* acclimate only once for the first generation. Similar to Tobin, Kant argues that upon encountering free Negroes no one has ever seen them "engaged in a business which one could properly call labor (*Handwerk*)." Rather, free Negroes in America and in England live the lives of "tramps," becoming "wretched innkeepers, lackeys, and people who go fishing and hunting."

Predispositions and the Impetus for Labor

Should not one conclude from this that, in addition to the faculty to work (*Vermögen zu arbeiten*), there is also an immediate drive to activity (*Trieb zur Thätigkeit*) (especially to the sustained activity that one calls industry), which is independent of all enticement and which is especially interwoven with certain natural predispositions (*der mit gewissen Anlagen besonders verwebt ist*); and that Indians as well as Negroes do not bring any more of this impetus into other climates and pass it on to their offspring than was needed for their preservation in their old motherland and had been received from nature; and that this inner predisposition extinguishes just as little as the externally visible one. The far lesser needs in those countries and the little effort it takes to procure only them demand no greater predispositions to activity. (fn AA 8:174; TPP 209)

Kant's claims are that Africans i) lack the drive for work (*Arbeit*), which he characterizes as industry (*Emsigkeit*); ii) their children are unable to ever develop this drive; iii) this drive is an aspect of one's *Anlagen*. The institution of slavery is somehow justified through the idea that Africans and Native Americans are not able to work in contexts where they also live with Europeans. Kant's understanding of work (*Arbeit*) in this passage has two features. The first characteristic is that one must have an immediate drive for *Arbeit*. This immediate drive or impulse is "interwoven" with one's dispositions. The idea is that Africans and Native Americans do not possess different dispositions from other races aside from *Geistesanlagen* or mental faculties (which is no less problematic), (AA 8:62; HR 139) but rather that the impulses other races have which helps them to work is lacking in both Africans and Native Americans. The claim is not that Africans cannot work *at all* because they can certainly be forced to do *Handwerk* but Kant considers this to be an "easy craft" perhaps because waiting behind the

master's coach does not require any hard labor or skill. Rather, Africans lack the capacity for motivating themselves to do any hard labor or go into business for themselves. The second characteristic is that Africans lack the industry for work. This is to say that Africans and Native Americans do not possess the basic power or capacity that would even allow them to work on their own.

Kant's justification of African slavery is the result of racializing *Anlagen* which he had to do in order to give a strong defense of it against Forster. What one sees is that *Anlagen* had to be shown in such a way that one could observe and rationalize that they were both both permanent and purposive. This also means that *Anlagen* is responsible for maintaining racial permanency and so this is not a function limited only to *Keime*. However, *Anlagen* supports the idea of racial permanency in a different way and for a different reason. Namely, *Anlagen* must ensure that racial characteristics are permanent so that the human species can function in the way it was meant to. This is the racial aspect in which valorizing human capacities adds to the already purposive notion of *Anlagen* which comes from the natural history and the philosophy of history.

Kant is able to accomplish the goals of defending *Anlagen* by making *explicit* that racial characteristics did complement particular races in empirical modes which could be rationalized, i.e., skin color, which he takes to be the outer mark of race. Thus particular races had to show specific and permanent racial characteristics which made them distinctly different from other races. For this reason, Kant's choice of Africans in this passage reflects his position that Africans are uniquely purposive. It also happens to be convenient that both he and Forster agreed on this point. At the same time, however, Kant also had to encode racial characteristics in a form that was *implicitly* racialized, which is done through emphasizing the impetus for labor so that one could identify a race regardless of their actual skin color (*contra* Forster). Most importantly,

there must be some outer mark of race which follows through generations, holding for all progeny, and for the purpose of identifying the race. The fact that these markers had to be observable is an attempt to satisfy Forster's complaints about the observability of race. Additionally, Kant's justification of African slavery made use of of a well-known phenomenon which Kant took to be a relevant, sustainable, and believable example of the permanency of racial characteristics. For this reason, the consequences of Kant's justification of African slavery is much more than a worry about Kant's racial prejudice; I am also worried about the fact that African slavery both encodes and hides racism behind the valorization of industry and self-improvement. Since Africans cannot bring themselves to work because they lack both the faculty and the impetus to do so, Kant simultaneously creates the normative person who can work toward the human vocation.

Kant does not describe the extent to which such moral characteristics as industry relate to the broader notion of racial characteristics. Mikkelsen observes that the degree to which racial characteristics comprise both moral and physical attributes is representative of Kant's work on race that can also be seen from texts as early as the "Observations."²⁰⁵ Africans are thus twice impacted insofar as their inability to work is a trait that carries through their race and is a marker that distinguishes them from other races. The congenital nature of labor strengthens Kant's position in the sense that the inability to labor follows through later generations thus supporting his original claim about race; however, this claim also justifies the perpetual unequal relationships between Africans and Europeans in particular: "Indians as well as Negroes do not bring any more of this impetus into other climates and pass it on to their offspring than was needed for their preservation in their old motherland and had been received from nature [...]"

²⁰⁵ Jon Mikkelsen, *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth-Century Writings*, 58-59.

(AA 8:174; TPP 209). Thus, African children cannot escape from the fact that they too *ought* to be enslaved, despite their own efforts to work against laziness.

Susan Shell argues that Kant's understanding of work in this passage points to the ambiguous position that Kant holds regarding the degree to which one can be held accountable for their moral development. With regard to Africans and concerns around race, Shell argues that Kant is equally as ambiguous about whether or not they are able to work toward self – improvement in spite of their natural limitations. Shell states that:

Kant's formulation has it both ways: insofar as industry or *Emsigkeit* is called a "drive" (*Trieb*), it is distinguished from "natural *Anlagen*," with which it is said merely to be "interwoven." Insofar as *Emsigkeit* is deemed an "impulse" (*Antrieb*) on the other hand, it is itself identified as an "inner *Anlage*" (and, indeed, as one that is passed on invariably). [...] [H]uman virtue is a function of one's willingness to make an effort, a willingness the precise moral status of which remains obscure. [...] The responsibility of the inferior races for their lack of development—their unwillingness, so to speak, to make an effort—is no less morally ambiguous.²⁰⁶

Kant does use rather ambiguous language to describe precisely what the impetus to work is an *how* it is a part of *Anlagen*. However, this does not mean that he has an ambiguous position regarding the degree to which one is able or unable to develop themselves. Kant is certainly sure of the fact that this drive for labor is something that Africans and Native Americans are never able to develop even in later generations. This latter point underscores the idea that Kant sees these races as having a permanent inability that also affects their future, making it unlikely that the ability that these races have with regard to merely "willing" themselves to make an effort is a possibility for them. In contrast, the role of having industry is in fact clear in that capacity to work is both a necessary characteristic of personhood *through the development of Anlagen* that marks both moral progress and progress toward the human vocation.

²⁰⁶ Susan Shell, "Kant's Conception of a Human Race," 67.

One objection could be that Africans are able to set ends for themselves in other ways that may not require that they have an impetus for labor. My response to this objection will focus on the institutional nature of slavery as an added perspective to what I have been discussing up to this point which focused only on the the capacity for industry. That is, the institutional nature of slavery prevents Africans from actualizing their dispositions in spite of what potential one thinks that they possess. The idea is that not only do Africans have to contend with the racialized account of *Anlagen* that dictates to them what they are capable of, they also have an institutional barrier that limits their mobility as well. Thus, Africans are not able to exercise and practice agency even if they were capable of working. Further adding to this is the notion that the children of Africans are to be enslaved even before they are born because enslavement is the status of Africans into perpetuity; it is a status that follows throughout generations. The point is that the social and political constraints of enslavement are an insurmountable obstacle when thinking about the kind of agency that Africans actually have within the institution.

Relatedly, it becomes clearer that the claim that Kant can be somehow forgiven of his position about Africans and their potential to become cosmopolitan citizens in the 1790s is not possible to concede. Africans are not capable of the kind of self-improvement that would legitimize their potential to become cosmopolitan citizens. Because Africans cannot bring themselves to work, they are humans "whose predispositions do not allow for real work and who therefore lack the bases for cultural advancement."²⁰⁷

There are two points to make with regard to Kant's discussion of work. The first is that despite the claims that Kant gives up the racial hierarchy later in his work, Kant's emphasis on the impetus to work and the degree to which it is a lack for only African and Native Americans

²⁰⁷ See Wolf Hund, "It must come from Europe: The Racisms of Immanuel Kant" in *Racisms Made in Germany*, edited by Wolf Hund, Christian Koller, and Moshe Zimmerman (Zürich, Germany: LIT Verlag, 2011), 85.

(the two races which he already takes to be at the bottom of the racial hierarchy) reinvigorates the racial hierarchy in a much stronger, naturalized, and racialized sense. Since the ability to develop one's dispositions is so crucial to the development of the species and the move toward the human vocation, the fact that Africans are unable to develop themselves and lack the basic capacity to do so means that they are already limited in their contribution to human history.

Where industry meets *Anlagen* is the same moment where *Anlagen* become a measurement of development. To further this point, the justification of slavery for Africans adds a social and political element that institutionalizes their inferior, unequal, and separate status.

Nature, not Artifice

— Here I would like to cite something from *Marsden's* thorough description of Sumatra (see Sprengel's Contributions, 6th Part, pp. 198-9). "The color of their (the Redjangs) skin is ordinarily yellow without the admixture of red which produces the color of copper. They are almost consistently somewhat lighter in color than the mestizos in other regions of India. —The white color of the inhabitants of Sumatra *in comparison with the other peoples of the same region* is, on my view, a strong proof that the color of the skin does not at all depend immediately on the climate. (He says the same about the color of the skin of children of Europeans born there and of Negroes in the second generation, and conjectures that the darker skin of the Europeans who have stayed there a long time is a consequence of the many bilious illnesses to which everyone there is exposed.) — Here I must also note that the hands of the natives and the mestizos are usually cold in spite of the hot climate" (an important circumstance, which indicates that the peculiar constitution of the skin cannot stem from superficial external causes). (fn 8:175; TPP 209-210)

Kant's final remarks in this footnote are taken from William Marsden, an English orientalist who wrote *The history of Sumatra: containing an account of the government, laws, customs and manners of the native inhabitants, with a description of the natural productions, and a relation of the ancient political state of that island* (1784). An excerpt of this text is printed in the fifth section of Matthias Sprengel's "Contributions" along with James Tobin's piece.

Marsden observes that some of the Sumatra, an Indian ethnic group, did not share the same color as others in their same region and ethnic group. Kant mentions Marsden in order to reiterate the

most salient aspect of the concept of race in this context; namely, that racial characteristics are the result of the power of nature and not artifice which is the point that Forster fails to understand.²⁰⁸ Kant does not think that external factors such as the environment and temperature should be solely responsible for changes in human beings.

Conclusion: Implications of Kant's Justification of the Enslavement of Africans

In this chapter, I have focused on Kant's comments about the enslavement of Africans in the essay "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" where Kant creates his strongest defense of *Anlagen* and the idea of race. As a result, Kant also presents his strongest defense of the racial hierarchy by justifying the enslavement of Africans. Kant's claim is that Africans lack the capacity for industry which is interwoven with their *Anlagen*. Since Africans cannot bring themselves to work, their enslavement is justified. The problem with this statement is that it is not only illustrative of the problematic comments that Kant makes about people of color, but that this statement also encodes a different and new racism that follows through Kant's thoughts about human teleology.

Kant offers what I take to be a racialized account of *Anlagen*. To racialize *Anlagen* is an attempt to flesh out the idea that certain races are limited in their ability to contribute to the human species because of their capacities related to *Anlagen*. My aim in this chapter was to broaden the scope of stratifying the species so that the different ways in which Kant uses the racial hierarchy is not limited to contexts wherever the term "race" or only certain races are mentioned. Rather, the idea is that Kant's stratification of the species happens for reasons related to the capacities associated with *Anlagen* that are needed to fulfill the human vocation. In the context of the enslavement of Africans, what one finds is that this stratification is presented as a

²⁰⁸ Robert Bernasconi "True Colors," 201-204.

means to justify the idea of race insofar as racial characteristics can be observed as permanent and stable throughout generations. Thus, the fact that Africans are incapable of labor on their own is a racial characteristic which distinguishes them from some other races and is a trait that is carried down the generations. In his desire to both defend *Anlagen* against Forster and strengthen his position on race, Kant fortifies his racial hierarchy, presenting the idea that slavery is a natural status for Africans.

Chapter Five: Inequality in the *Critique of Judgment*

Little attention has been given to the claim: "It is hard to develop skill in the human species except by means of inequality among people" (AA 5:432; CJ 319) and its connection to the racial hierarchy. What has been overlooked in the literature is the extent to which Kant's discussion of *Geschicklichkeit*, or skill affects the minority and its ability to self-improve toward the cosmopolitan goal. In contrast, Kant's understanding of culture has been interpreted as allowing the races to express themselves individually. My concern in this chapter is to explore the extent to which Kant's own understanding of culture retains a sense of inequality. What I aim to show is that Kant sees inequality and separatism along the lines of natural divisions and that natural incapacities are necessary for bringing about the cosmopolitan whole in the same as in the racial hierarchy. The idea is that despite the fact that the term "race" is not present in *Critique of Judgment*, the parallels which can be drawn between Kant's discussion about race and inequality suggest that a second look is needed in order to understand the relationship between the racial hierarchy and the *Critique of Judgment*.

In the first part of this chapter, I explore the interpretation of culture (*Kultur*) by Pauline Kleingeld and Sankar Muthu who argue that culture allows for a personal autonomy that comes from individual cultural expression and practices, albeit within boundaries pertaining to Kant's moral philosophy. Kleingeld and Muthu offer a contemporary and anachronistic interpretation of Kant's notion of culture. In the second part of this chapter, I address concerns about the absence of race in the second part of the *Critique of Judgment* and argue that there are parallels which can be drawn between the racial hierarchy and the discussion of inequality in this text, despite the fact that the term "race" is nominally absent. Likewise, I argue that Kant's understanding of culture is less like the sociological one Kleingeld and Muthu argue for and is rather the idea that

culture is something that must be acquired through hardship, sacrifice, and struggle. Thus, Kant's view of culture makes it difficult for the minority to achieve the same status as the majority in the cosmopolitan whole. Instead, the minority is to be both separate from and oppressed by the majority. Last, I show that Kant's own understanding of *Geschicklichkeit* justifies both inequality and oppression. I emphasize that Kant's perspective on culture does not allow the minority group to progress on their own merit due to their inferior status; rather, their inherent incapacity for culture prevents them from being able to participate equally in the cosmopolitan whole.

Entwicklung der Menschheit, The Development of our Humanity

One of the ways in which Kant is thought to have opened up to a more diverse world is through the acceptance of different cultures and their individual practices and beliefs. Pauline Kleingeld and Sankar Muthu contend that Kant's understanding of culture allows for a cultural autonomy whereby an individual discovers their own ends by drawing upon their own cultural practices. In this section, I will discuss this interpretation of culture in more detail, and I argue that this anachronistic understanding of culture is less equitable than is believed.

In the book *Enlightenment Against Empire*, Sankar Muthu argues that Kant's notion of culture is a *cultural agency* in which Kant is understood to allow for the diversity of other cultures to both inform and empower the species: "[F]or it indicates both the freedom and the context from which such freedom is exercised; moreover it incorporates Kant's own use of the term *Kultur* in association with the distinctive aspects of reason and freedom that, for him, fundamentally constitute humanity."²⁰⁹ For Muthu, the first aspect of freedom is that which: "Kant's view is that these human skills involved the use of reason and freedom in a manner that

²⁰⁹ Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment against Empire*, 174.

depends, for their orientation, upon our surrounding experience—a diverse, plural, and often socially informed experience. The cultural capacities that distinguish the human species, then are embedded in, and necessarily draw upon, the world of experience."²¹⁰ A crucial aspect of defining freedom for Muthu is that the use of human reason which necessarily draws from personal experience, namely, a culturally rich experience that can never be abstracted from the life of the human being. Thus, Kant has a "distinctively human character of reason and freedom through which cultural differentiation is itself produced and transformed" which means that Kant "understands humans as constitutively social and cultural agents who diversely reflect upon, make choices according to, and transform the concrete and plural worlds of experience in which they are born."²¹¹ Thus Kant does not conceptualize human beings as "fundamentally disembodied, metaphysical beings, who are free of social and cultural attachments."

Muthu concedes that Kant never recants his racial hierarchy but in the essay on "Perpetual Peace," develops a:

[...] distinctively human freedom (i.e., of cultural agency) and concomitantly his sociological account of human diversity displaced both the cognitive and the hierarchical assumptions and arguments of race theory in his late moral and political works in which he explicitly defended non-European peoples and the equality of varying collective lifestyles (including pastoralism and nomadism) and vehemently attacked European empires and conquest.²¹²

Not only is culture for Muthu an idea that draws from the different cultural practices of human beings and the use of individual reason shaped by one's culture, *Kultur* is also sociological insofar as Kant focuses on the different practices that human beings have on account of their culture. Muthu's claim is that insofar as Kant describes and admires the different ways in which different cultural practices are done, this means that he allows for a particular kind of

²¹⁰ Ibid., 173.

²¹¹ Ibid., 123-124.

²¹² Ibid., 184.

human freedom in which individuals and different cultures are able to draw from their own practices as a viable means of freedom.

Similarly, in the chapter, "Kant and Forster: Race, Culture, and Cosmopolitanism," in the book, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship*, Pauline Kleingeld argues that Kant embraces a kind of cultural pluralism after he gives up the racial hierarchy.²¹³ Kleingeld argues that Kant's version offers a third reason for valuing cultural diversity that sits in between an instrumental position and an intrinsic one. Namely, on Kleingeld's reading, Herder and Forster valued cultural pluralism intrinsically for aesthetic reasons whereas the instrumental position values cultural diversity because such human activities as language are valuable in order to preserve the diversity of the species.²¹⁴ As an aside, Kant did argue for the preservation of different languages, but he saw them as necessary in the promotion of human reason. This third view, however shows that the:

[...]only thing that is intrinsically important is freedom; that freedom includes the freedom to pursue one's projects and to pursue one's projects in different ways, depending on one's own choice, as long as these choices are compatible with the principles of morality and right; that, given the empirical fact of anthropological diversity, people make different choices; and therefore, that the freedom to choose differently (again, within the parameters of morality and right) is valuable in itself as an instantiation of (intrinsically valuable) freedom. On this construal, cultural pluralism is what freedom demands given that humans differ in their legitimate preferences.²¹⁵

Similar to Sankar Muthu, Kleingeld points to statements where in Kant's description of diverse cultural practices related especially to agriculture are proof of fact that Kant allows for cultural diversity within the species while realizing and celebrating the idea that people are free to use their own discretion when it comes to how they want to live. Unlike Muthu however, Kleingeld seeks to maintain the more commonly accepted interpretation that freedom is abstract

²¹³ See Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship*, 92-120.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 121.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 122

as it relates to human choice. On Kleingeld's reading, Kantian freedom is at work in the context of culture insofar as "any cultural pluralism must remain within the limits indicated by the principles of morality and right [...] cosmopolitan egalitarianism trumps cultural pluralism if the two come into conflict."²¹⁶ Kant's cultural pluralism does not allow for the full acceptance of all cultural practices because certain "immoral" cultural practices should not be practiced because they go against the universal moral code as dictated by "cosmopolitan egalitarianism."

The more difficult question is where would Kant draw the line between celebrating certain cultural practices as a form of human freedom and trumping other practices because they are immoral. If one accepts the interpretation that Kant's view of culture allows for the diversity of human practices one problem is that Kant's views on morality is built upon built upon a set of preconceived "oughts" that are to be held objectively and universally and that must be followed without any attention to the subjective. Kant condemns certain practices at the outset because they are immoral, e.g., lying and suicide because they go against the Categorical Imperative. This rigid view of morality means that there is the strong possibility that certain cultural practices which are conceived as culturally void and morally inferior have no means of attaining the respect that cultural pluralism is supposed to provide. This also raises the question about the value of cultural pluralism; namely, what is the worth of cultural pluralism for Kant if certain cultural practices will not be accepted? The issue of acceptance challenges the standard of the universal ideal.

One objection is that the ability to reason should make it such that all people who use their reason will come to the same conclusions when faced with a moral dilemma. Thus, one way to read Kleingeld and Muthu's understanding of culture (rather generously, I might add) is to assume that all people, despite their cultural practices would most likely come to many of the

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 122

same conclusions anyway. However, the idea that Kant's cultural pluralism allows for "individual reason" and the exercise of human freedom informed by individual cultural practices means that certain provisions must be made for people when their individual reason goes against that of the *normal, rational* people. Regardless, the notion of individual reason based on cultural practices goes against the emphasis on reason that leads only to the objective and lawful which is the core concept in Kant's moral work. It is nearly impossible to ascribe to the concept of reason as being able to supply universal answers while at the same time contending that cultural pluralism for Kant allows for the full acceptance of different cultural perspectives on life. If one concedes that Kant's cultural pluralism sees that only certain cultural practices are morally permissible, it follows then that Kant's concept of culture demoralizes certain people who are seen as inferior and unable to achieve high or skillful culture based on natural inequities. The fact that cultural pluralism accepts certain practices and excludes others creates insurmountable obstacles for people who engage in practices that fail to meet the universal standard. Thus, my claim that this concept of culture (sociologically understood) is not open to all cultures and the particular ways in which individual people see the world cannot be a part of Kant's understanding of rationality.

In the article, "Bridging Nature and Freedom? Kant, Culture, and Cultivation" Inder Marwah argues that Muthu (and I would add also Kleingeld) "misinterprets" Kant's understanding of culture and the reasons for why culture should be valued.²¹⁷ I would also add that Muthu's interpretation of culture presents another way in which to sidestep the complicated and unfortunate consequences of Kant's understanding of culture in the sense that his notion of culture undervalues minority cultures but upholds others as superior and thus capable of

²¹⁷ See Inder Marwah, "Bridging Nature and Freedom? Kant, Culture, and Cultivation" *Social Theory and Practice*, Volume 38, Number 3 (July 2012): 385-406.

fulfilling the human vocation. My contention is that Kant's cosmopolitanism and the extent to which it is taken to be universally egalitarian must be qualified because his notion of culture does not allow for the equal respect of some cultures. In contrast to Muthu, Marwah asserts that Kant's notion of culture should be understood as "a form of collective life articulating our freedom as 'cultural agents'—is for Kant, a transitory good, a necessary formative influence pushing humanity toward its natural end: the perfection of our moral capacities."²¹⁸ Thus, the function of culture in the human species is to push them to realize their ultimate goal which is to perfect their moral capacities so far as their dispositions will allow. For Marwah, the purpose of freedom through human activity is all about practicing high cultural values in order to reach the goal of perfection. Marwah sees the value of culture in Kant's work as prizing only certain cultures that uphold reason thereby debasing the other cultures, those "bad cultures" of primitive, savage people who are unable to attain the status of high culture. Insofar as savage and primitive societies do not have the capacity to move toward moral ends,²¹⁹ Marwah's claim is that the value that Kant places on culture has a negative impact on the moral and political notion of personhood as it relates to people of color. Thus, Kant's notion of culture is not the culturally celebratory and sociological definition upheld by both Muthu and Kleingeld.

Drawing on Marwah, I argue that the interpretation of culture by Kleingeld and Muthu relies on a contemporary understanding of the term that cannot have been used by Kant. Kleingeld and Muthu have an anachronistic reading of Kant's idea of culture that is more akin to a contemporary understanding of it, i.e. Mexican-American or African American culture. There is at least one implication on Kant's late work regarding his understanding of culture: the

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 386.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 402-403.

emphasis on inequality based on the natural inability to attain culture is present in Kant's work with regard to achieving a *cosmopolitan* whole.

Race in the Critique of Judgment

In the previous section, I argued against the contemporary interpretation of culture held by Muthu and Kleingeld in which they contend that Kant's notion of culture is a cultural autonomy whereby individuals rely on their own cultural practices. Aside from some cultural practices which are considered immoral, according to Kleingeld and Muthu, Kant's openness to a variety of cultural practices also means that he respects equally all cultures and most cultural practices. The argument about Kant's view of culture is related to the contention that Kant changed his mind about race that he abandoned near 1790. A third and similar argument occurs in the scientific literature. Philip Sloan, for example, argues that Kant changed his position about *Keime* prior to the *Critique of Judgment* and such scholars as Pauline Kleingeld have used this claim to explain why the term "race" is not present in the work.

In this section, I address the relevance of race in the *Critique of Judgment*. Kant is claimed to be "silent" about race in this book because he does not mention it *explicitly*. This characteristic of the *Third Critique* has led some scholars to argue that the omission of "race" in this book means that it wanes in this decade of Kant's work.²²⁰ In both this section and in the next, I will show how Kant's discussion of progress in the species is parallel to similar discussions that he has about stratifying the species in the context of race. My contention is that despite the fact that race is not mentioned explicitly in the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant's appeal to inequality and stratification of the species based on the natural abilities of the species is another iteration of the racial hierarchy. Thus understanding Kant's continued appeal to stratifying the

²²⁰ Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment Against Empire*, 184.

species supports the claim that I have been making which is that Kant's notion of progress, *contra* the interpretation that it allows for the equal progression of all in the species, valorizes only those who have the ability to progress, an ability which is limited to Europeans.

The concern around whether or not race is relevant to Kant's work in the *Critique of Judgment* can be in part settled by understanding some of the basic concepts which comprise the notion of human progress in the *Critique of Judgment*. Before I move to these comments, I will describe the argument from the scientific literature which is another iteration of the claim that Kant changed his mind about race near 1790. I show that both the arguments about culture and *Keime*, taken together, corroborate the claim that Kant had a change of heart with regard to race.

The basis of the scientific argument rests on the interpretation of Kant's positions on preformation and epigenesis. The general view of preformation and epigenesis is that they are rivaling biological and metaphysical theories about form and development. Preformation is the idea that form is already present at the beginning of an organism's development period and simply grows over time. Epigenesis is the idea that form changes gradually over time. Kant in his early work is understood to be a preformationist, and this is especially present in his notions of *Keime* and *Anlagen* which he takes to be preformed insofar as they are both present in the species at the beginning and are occasioned in response to the climate but in predetermined ways. On this interpretation, *Keime* is understood to be the culprit with regard to why racial characteristics are permanent. Thus, if and when Kant changes his mind about the preformationist nature of *Keime*, then he also must have dramatically changed his views about racial permanency and racial stratification on the basis of race.

Philip Sloan argues for the position that Kant abandoned *Keime* close to the 1790s. Although Sloan does not discuss race in the essay, "Performing the Categories: Eighteenth-

Century Generation Theory and the Biological Roots of Kant's *A Priori*," Sloan argues that Kant *dramatically* adopts epigenesis because Kant sees Blumenbach's criticisms of *Keime* and preformation to be so influential.²²¹ Kant's change of heart occurs immediately before the publication of the *Third Critique* which also explains why the *Keime* are not mentioned in the latter half of the text. While *Anlagen* continue to be discussed, Sloan argues that they take on a dramatically different role from before to becoming fully purposive. In fact, for Sloan, Kant's embracing of epigenesis leads him to revamp *Anlagen* all-together, described as a "preformation of *Anlagen*."

The idea is that insofar as *Keime* is responsible for the initial showing of various racial characteristics within the animal, *Keime* is closely associated with racial permanency. However, since Kant uses *Keime* infrequently especially in the *Critique of Judgment* then he must have changed his position on *Keime* due to new intellectual pursuits. One will notice that the form of this argument is similar to the argument that Kant "changed" his mind about race. Not all scholars who argue about whether or not Kant changed his position about preformation discuss race in this context, but the argument is important to understanding the claims that race is not relevant to the *Critique of Judgment*. However, insofar as some scholars take the infrequent use of *Keime* as an indication that race was less important to Kant in this decade, this argument is essential to the understanding of race in the *Critique of Judgment*.

In contrast to Sloan, who contends that Kant abandons preformation entirely, John Zammito takes a more moderate position regarding Kant's adoption of epigenesis. Zammito claims that Kant was always "ambivalent" about epigenesis, insofar as Kant does not give a clear indication of the relationship between epigenesis and his critical philosophy.²²² Similarly, Robert

²²¹ See Philip Sloan, "Performing the Categories," 248.

²²² See John Zammito, "Kant's Persistent Ambivalence toward Epigenesis, 1764—90," 65.

Bernasconi argues that Kant thought that "a certain epigenesis implied a certain preformationism"²²³ but, unlike Sloan and Zammito, he stresses the influence of race on the entire argument. For Bernasconi, Kant's commitment to race became only broader in the wake of *Bildungstrieb* which allowed him to see the race as only more purposive than before.²²⁴ Kant's silence on conceiving race as an idea of separatism and permanency does not mean that he necessarily changed his position on race or that he stopped caring about it, but that he merely adopted a wider position on race that he could still present in the *Third Critique*, despite not being mentioned explicitly.

To reiterate, the argument in this chapter is to show that there are parallels between the racial hierarchy and the ways in which Kant describes inequality in the *Critique of Judgment*. Pointing out the relationship between these two areas of Kant's work is intended to create a framework that will be used in the chapter on cosmopolitanism to evaluate the commonly accepted idea that Kant's cosmopolitanism should be taken to be his statement that all people are equal and especially in the work toward human progress. The remainder of this section will focus on some of the main concepts in the *Critique of Judgment* which show that Kant's use of inequality in this text subordinates parts of the species which lack the necessary capacities for full development. I show that in the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant is more concerned that the species reaches a level of moral excellence as a first step toward progression in human teleology. I will focus on four main concepts regarding what constitutes the final purpose of humanity: judgment, purpose, happiness, and education.

²²³ See Robert Bernasconi, "Kant and Blumenbach's Polyps: A Neglected Chapter in the History of the Concept of Race," in *The German Invention of Race*, edited by Sara Eigen and Mark Larrimore (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012), 80.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 80-81.

The main purpose of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* is to discuss the nature of judgement, namely, the ability to subsume the particular under the universal. Judgments are a part of Kant's epistemological framework and refer to the intermediary step of rationalizing whereby one is able to hold an object in the mind (AA 4 A69/ 3 B94). There are two different types of judgments that Kant recognizes, the first are reflective and the second are determinative judgments. Determinative judgments subsume the particular under the universal which means that the concept holds enough information to determine the particulars. Reflective judgments however, refer to instances where only the particular is given and there is no accompanying universal; rather, the latter must be sought after. Relatedly, since determinative judgments already have the universal in place, they also do not need to locate any accompanying laws to complete the relationship between the universal and the particular. Reflective judgments however, need to locate both the laws and the universal. With regard to reflective judgments, two things must be kept in mind: the only *a priori* laws supplied by the pure understanding relate to the possibility of nature as a sense object, and given that nature is so diverse and has so many different forms that are themselves undetermined, then laws must also be located for these forms (AA 5:179-180; CJ 19). The first point emphasizes the diversity of nature and the need to discover its larger purpose and organizational scheme. The second point stresses that reflective judgments aid the human being in understanding both nature and themselves, thereby producing a means for the human to orient themselves with regard to nature. The main point is that there is a teleological function of judgment and a purpose for the diversity of nature.

The laws that nature is capable of giving are empirical laws which means that they hold contingently for the human understanding. This claim relates to what was said earlier with regard to these laws in that they relate to the possibility of nature suggesting the limits of human

cognition in being able to determine with certainty the connection between certain laws and nature. Although these laws may not be enough to determine the universal, it is still necessary to posit these laws in order to make sense of the concept of the unity of diversity. Reflective judgments thus require a principle that cannot be located in experience in order both to organize and to subsume these empirical principles systematically. The transcendental principle used to accomplish this organization and subsumption is presented as a law is given as a law, *to itself* in order to organize and subsume its own laws. This law is given to itself because if the law were to be taken from elsewhere it would be determinative. Also, this law is not capable of prescribing a law to nature because the human being's reflection on nature is governed by nature itself. As a result, these particular and empirical natural laws are taken to be a unity that helps "cognitive powers by making possible a system of experience." The defining characteristic of reflective judgments is that human beings are forced to locate their ultimate purpose outside of nature (which is understood to be a sense object) (AA 5:431; CJ 318). Kant is not claiming that the human being can understand the full extent of their relationship to nature; rather, it is through this cognitive process that their reflection allows them to understand their place in the world.

Nature is a system of purposes, albeit not fully understood by human beings. To have purpose refers to the concept of the thing and the extent to which it simultaneously contains the basis for its own actuality (AA 5:180; CJ 20). Something is purposive when it is in harmony with its character that is possible only through purposes. The purposiveness of nature refers to the idea that nature is based upon the concept that there is unity in nature's diverse empirical laws. This law or rule which states that nature is purposive is an external, transcendental principle used to organize and subsume the myriad of nature's empirical laws as a part of reflective judgment (AA 5:181; CJ 21). The purposiveness of nature belongs to the transcendental principles because it is

used as the *a priori* basis for an investigation of nature without having the capacity to reveal anything about nature because it is limited to the level of human cognition in relationship to the diversity of nature. However, human recognition of the fact that nature is purposive in its diversity allows for the process of reflective judgment whereby the human being is able to judge nature for themselves.

Taken together, diversity and the notion of purpose allow the human being to understand the interrelationship of things in nature insofar as the diverse species on earth are related to one another by extrinsic relations relating to one another in an organized, systematic fashion (AA 5:427; CJ 314). From this, human beings are able to derive their final purpose on earth.

The final purpose of the human being is himself.²²⁵ Man is the only being in the world "who can form a concept of purposes and use his reason to turn an aggregate of purposively structured things into a system of purposes" (AA 5:427; CJ 314). In pursuing his purpose, man achieves it through his own aptitude for skill, his culture (*Kultur*). Man cannot say that he is simply going to be happy, as that would mean that he is conceding to only an idea of happiness which is his own creation possible only under empirical conditions (AA 5:430; CJ 317). The problem with happiness is that it can be created and assumed in many different ways so that it is never a stable concept. Building an idea of human purposiveness on happiness will mean that man will never reach any goal because the desire to be "happy" can never be reached. As an aside, Kant makes similar comments regarding happiness in the context of morality in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, for example. In both the moral and teleological contexts, Kant posits happiness as contrary to achieving any goal related to the human species; rather, human beings must use their skill in order to move toward their purposes.

²²⁵ I am deliberately choosing to stay with the pronoun "him" in this context, and this is because I do think that Kant truly meant male persons who are also white, heterosexual, and able-bodied.

Thus the cultivation of culture is important to achieving man's final purpose. It is not the case that the cultivation of culture is effortless, as man does have the option to pursue happiness if he so chooses. The point is that the cultivation of culture comes deliberately with some help from nature. These *Anlagen* encourage man to oppress others in his species through forms of domination and war (AA 5:430; CJ 318). Nature is not able to achieve her purpose if happiness was ever posited as the goal of the species: "Hence even if nature outside us were utterly beneficent, its purpose would not be achieved in a system of nature on earth if that purpose aimed at the happiness of our species, because nature within us is not receptive to it" (AA 5:431; CJ 318). In contrast, because of the fact that *Anlagen* must grow and develop according to nature's goals, they move constantly toward the destruction of the human species in the spirit of antagonism present in Kant's work as in the essay "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim." Since man is the ultimate purpose of nature because he can see that his choices allow him to set his own purposes, the final purpose of man is not located within nature (as happiness would be) but outside of it. In order to achieve this goal, man is prepared to fulfill his final purpose through culture.

The idea is that man must acquire the necessary skills which will allow him to become cultured; hence, the true measure of human progress comes by acquiring education (*Ausbildung*).

Though our natural predisposition is quite purposive[ly adapted] to [the satisfaction of] our inclinations pertaining to our animal characteristics, the inclinations interfere very much with the development of our humanity (*Entwicklung der Menschheit*), and [so]their discipline is the second requirement of our culture. But in this regard too we find nature acting purposively, for it strives to give us an education (*Ausbildung*) that nature itself can provide (AA 5:433; CJ 321, brackets are translator's).

Education is crucial to becoming cultured; in fact, Kant sees the two as the same in his *Lectures on Pedagogy* (AA 9:444).²²⁶ It is in Kant's discussion about *Bildung* in his other works where he explains how *Bildung*/culture is created which is an important aspect to understanding culture, but is missing from the *Critique of Judgement*. There are three characteristics of *Bildung*/culture that are important to underscore: First, there is the influence of nature in the creation of *Ausbildung*; second there is the understanding that *Bildung*/culture refer to particular values of refinement; third there is the reliance on inequality and separatism for the creation of culture/*Bildung*. What I want to show is that Kant's understanding of culture/*Bildung* focuses on the notion that the purpose of man is to become more culturally refined as opposed to celebrating man's cultural diversity understood sociologically. Other men who are from cultures that are primitive, savage, and unrefined would need assimilate themselves in some way to the majority culture in order to become cultured, moral, and able to fulfill the human vocation.

Education of the fine arts and sciences in particular is supposed to make man not only elegant and refined, but also moral and civilized (AA 5:434; CJ 321). The specific kind of education that Kant refers to in this context in the *Critique of Judgment* and in the essay, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" (which I have chosen because of the emphasis on the development of the human species) is *Ausbildung*. In German, *Ausbildung* refers to the process of education that happens by apprenticeship. To this end, *nature* teaches humanity insofar as "we find nature acting purposively, for it strives to give us an education that makes us receptive to purposes higher than those that nature itself can provide" (AA 5:433; CJ 321). Similarly, according to Kant's account of human history, men answer the "call of nature" and in the second

²²⁶ See Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy* (1803), translated by Robert Loudon in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, edited by Robert Loudon and Günter Zöllner (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 434-485. This work will appear henceforth as LP.

step of their development develop propriety as the "first hint toward the formation (*Ausbildung*) of the human being as a moral creature" (AA 8:113; CBH 166-167).

Kant's notion of *Bildung* refers to the acquisition of education in its broadest sense.²²⁷ Kant thinks of *Bildung* as moral education which is crucial to the development of the species and the goal of inner moral perfection. Education or *Erziehung* for Kant has four parts: care, discipline, instruction, and formation (*Bildung*) (AA 9:437; LP 437). Discipline is that which changes the nature of human beings from an animal-like to a true human (moral) nature. This discipline is the same concept of discipline that is also present in Kant's discussion of culture. Discipline is a negative force that makes it possible for human beings to deny their natural instincts and cultivate themselves toward culture/*Bildung*. The most important aspect of education is that the human being, by its own efforts, is responsible for bringing out the full capacity of their *Anlagen*. This process is not supposed to start out in perfection: "One can see the first beginnings of education in either a crude or in a perfect, developed state. If the latter is assumed to have preceded and come first, then the human being must, however, afterwards have once more grown savage and fallen into a raw state" (AA 9:442; LP 437). In this sense, the process of education is not a smooth and painless transition, but is filled with hardship. This point reiterates the notion that man's ultimate goal is not to be happy, but to acquire more culture despite causing himself discomfort.

Acquiring education comes through a specific process of transference from the educated group to the non-educated. Kant says: "The human being can only become human through education. He is nothing except what education makes out of him. It must be noted that the human being is educated only by human beings, human beings who likewise have been educated" (AA 9443: LP 439). This point is essential for two reasons: First, this notion of

²²⁷ I am using the definition of *Bildung* as described in Kant's "Lectures on Pedagogy."

transference makes the point clear that the minority, the group that must be educated must get close enough to the majority (perhaps by some form of assimilation) in order to cultivate their culture because they are not capable of acquiring culture/*Bildung* on their own. Second, this point shows that *Bildung* is a capacity that is limited to an elite group. Thus, one can see that Kant's notion of culture is not about embracing one's own cultural viewpoint and practicing a "cultural agency"; rather, acquiring culture refers to valuing refinement. Thus, people who are a part of cultures that are considered to be primitive and savage are not able to meet this standard set for culture nor are they capable of progressing toward culture on their own without being in close proximity to and in a secondary/apprenticeship relationship to the elite learned group.

What these concepts show is that in the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant is more concerned with the progress of human beings and the ability of man to improve himself in order to fulfill his human vocation and take part in the cosmopolitan society. The only way in which man can do this is to improve himself through his own efforts by denying himself happiness and acquiring skill. Kant does not leave room for the improvement of beings who are taken to be inferior and lack the necessary ability for self-improvement. Neither does Kant allow for the self-expression through culture as Kleingeld and Muthu argue. Rather, Kant requires that the human species be able to self-develop through the denial of oneself and the ability to do so.

Developing Geschicklichkeit

In this section, I will focus on the notion of *Geschicklichkeit* (skill, high culture) in order to show the extent to which Kant emphasizes inequality as a necessary means to establishing the cosmopolitan whole. Little attention has been given to the connection between the cultivation of skill for the inferior and oppressed group and the attainment of the cosmopolitan whole. I propose that the creation of two groups in which one is oppressed challenges the widely held belief that Kant's notion of equality in his cosmopolitanism is truly

accepting to all. Rather, my analysis shows that certain groups have immense obstacles to overcome that is *if they are able to overcome them* before they can be equally considered in attaining the cosmopolitan goal.

In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant connects *Geschicklichkeit*, inequality, and the cosmopolitan whole:

It is hard to develop (*entwickelt*) skill (*Geschicklichkeit*) in the human species except by means of inequality among people. The majority take care, mechanically as it were and without particularly needing art for this, of the necessities of life for others, who thus have the ease and leisure to work in science and art, the less necessary ingredients in culture. These others keep the majority in a state of oppression, hard labor, and little enjoyment, even though some of the culture of the higher class does gradually spread to the lower also. (AA 5:432; CJ 319)

Kant defines *Geschicklichkeit* as the highest subjective aptitude that a human being can ascribe to in order to promote purposes and locate the final purpose within themselves (AA 5:431; CJ 319). However, the culture of skill, or *Geschicklichkeit*, does not work alone for it is not enough to help the will make choices that will be fit for attaining skill. The culture of discipline is the negative skill whose function is to tear the will from its own desires so that it can become capable of doing its own selecting. The two different kinds of skill work together to form a human being who, in accordance with discipline, does not fall for the desires of the human existence but rather acts in accordance with reason.

Kant's concern with culture focuses on the ability of the human species to move toward achieving a moral goal. In 1786, Kant looks to Rousseau to clarify this point: "[H]e seeks again to solve the harder problem of how culture must proceed in order properly to develop the predispositions of humanity as a *moral* species to their vocation, so that the latter no longer conflict with humanity as a natural species" (AA 8:116; CBH 169). The human species is in constant conflict with their own *Anlagen* which pull them in the direction of destruction of one

another while simultaneously dealing with the need to develop their culture which is the only way in which they can fully develop themselves. From Rousseau, Kant argues:

From this conflict (since culture, according to true principles of education of human being and citizen, has perhaps not yet rightly begun, much less having been completed) arise all true ills that oppress human life, and all vices that dishonor it; nevertheless, the incitements to the latter, which one blames for them, are in themselves good and purposive as natural predispositions, but these predispositions, since they were aimed at the merely natural condition, suffer injury from progressing culture and injure culture in turn, until perfect art again becomes nature, which is the ultimate goal of the moral vocation of the human species. (AA 8:116-117; CBH 169)

There is an internal conflict that results from the divide between nature and freedom in the case for the development of *Anlagen* and the drive toward culture. For Kant, the two coalesce in human history and are both to be understood as having a function whereby conflict is necessary in order to produce culture. The idea is that culture is nature's way of educating the species in the ways of morality in which a number of points can be raised; namely, the forces that allow one to be cultivated toward the ultimate goal is only for those who are capable of attaining the education needed; the ability to meet one's goals is due to the work of culture and not nature (as a kind of natural, spontaneous activity); diversity in nature is supposed to teach one something about how to achieve the unity found in the cosmopolitan whole. Thus, Kant's understanding of culture is one that takes on an active role in the achievement of human goals as opposed to the more passive means that scholars attribute to his understanding. In other words, culture is something that must be worked for in a specific way and assumes certain abilities to achieve it.

In the discussion about skill, Kant moves from a theoretical description of *Geschicklichkeit* to an explanation about how it works between people and its role in the establishment of a cosmopolitan society. People who lack *Geschicklichkeit* are oppressed by

those who have it (AA 5:432; CJ 319); but what Kant does not explain is the function of oppression in this relationship. Specifically, does oppression serve as a motivator for the oppressed group to obtain culture? Kant does say that: "These others keep the majority in a state of oppression, hard labor, and little enjoyment, even though some of the culture of the higher class does gradually spread to the lower also" (AA 5:432; CJ 320). At base, the relationship between the higher and lower class is a relationship where culture can be "shared" and obtained to some degree by the lower class. When it comes to the secondary, oppressed group, their close proximity to the higher class raises the concern about whether their oppression is also an apprenticeship whereby there is some transference of culture in that "It is hard to develop skill in the human species except by means of inequality among people" (AA 5:432; CJ 319). However, this problematic relationship is also a part of nature's plan and purpose to move human beings toward a civil society. This does not mean that all human beings will be a part of that civil society. I see the function of oppression as a way to motivate those without culture toward *Kultur* and consequently toward a civil society:

And yet this shining misery has to do with the development of man's natural predispositions, and [so] nature still achieves its own purpose, even if that purpose is not ours. The formal condition under which nature can alone achieve this final aim is that constitution of human relations where the impairment to freedom which results from the mutually conflicting freedom [of the individuals] is countered by lawful authority within a whole called *civil society*. For only in this constitution of human relations can our natural predispositions develop maximally. (AA 5:432; CJ 320; parentheses and italics are the translator's)

The two groups are compelled to enter into a relationship which causes misery on both sides. Misery increases as culture increases, and all the while both groups share with one another their feelings about their access to culture: "For the lower class the trouble results from violence from without, for the higher from insatiability within" (AA 5:432; CJ 433). Nature will always accomplish her goals in spite of what the human species believes is their goal. The way in which

she does this is by attempting to bring the human species into such conflict "which results from the mutually conflicting freedom [of the individuals] is countered by lawful authority within a whole[...]" (AA 5:432; CJ 320; parenthesis is translator's). The idea is that the conflict of personal freedoms that each group has is necessary in order to bring them to the realization that a higher order of unity is crucial to the establishment of peace. For, without the cosmopolitan whole, there will always be war (AA 5:433; CJ 320). At the moment, however, war also serves a purpose: "Though war is an unintentional human endeavor (incited by our unbridled passions), yet it is also deeply hidden and perhaps intentional endeavor of the supreme wisdom, if not to establish, then at least to prepare the way for lawfulness along with the freedom of states, and thereby for a unified system of them with a moral basis" (AA 5:433; CJ 320).

This wider position on race includes more complex discussions about inequality and separatism that I see as related to *Geschicklichkeit*. Kant still appeals to inequality and separatism in section 83 in the *Critique of Judgment* as he does in the context of race. The parallels between the two passages show that the minority, that is, the group of people who lack the same abilities as the superior majority, are placed low on the hierarchy of the species and separated from them. Their inferior placement is justified because of the fact that they lack the moral and subsequently teleological potential of the rest of the species. The fact that Kant still needs the two notions inequality and separatism, which I see as an extension of the racial hierarchy in order to create the cosmopolitan whole, shows that he valorizes certain inherent abilities which enable some to attain the cosmopolitan whole. To this end, the capacity to contribute to the cosmopolitan whole is not open to minorities. To be clear, my aim is not to prove whether or not Kant has Africans in mind as he is writing this passage, despite the similarities between the passage on inequality in this part of the *Critique of Judgment*, with that

of enslavement of Africans in 1788. Rather, I am arguing that simply because race is not mentioned in this passage does not mean that Kant might be thinking of Africans in this context. Most importantly, the fact that race is not mentioned in this text supports the point that race and its political nature, i.e., that which pertains to inequality, can be reinvented and used in other areas of Kant's work. What these remarks show is that while "race" is not mentioned in this passage, a hierarchical system based on natural inequalities, that is, a racializing hierarchy, performs an important function in Kant's teleology and cosmopolitan work. Thus, Kant's discussion of the racial hierarchy does not have to use the term "race" explicitly to not have some influence in other areas of his work.

The personal freedoms that some scholars see as liberating for people in Kant's discussion of cosmopolitanism are understood by Kant to be fodder for conflict and oppression. Kant does not see culture as tied to a concept related to cultural diversity, and he does not take it to be a positive idea, that is, in a way that is liberating to savage and primitive societies or as a means to celebrate the beauty and diversity of the world. Rather, culture is about the ability of the species to develop itself through conflict, struggle, and inequality in order to push human beings toward a cosmopolitan whole.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that in the *Critique of Judgment* despite the fact that Kant does not explicitly mention the term "race," Kant still refers to inequality and separatism as important in order to reach the cosmopolitan goal. Kant's racial hierarchy reinvents itself in other areas of Kant's work by promoting the idea that inequality and separatism based on natural inequities is in part dictated by nature so that her goals in the human species can be fulfilled. Thus, the idea that

culture promotes the equality and the sharing of particular cultural insights is not Kant's own understanding of culture; rather, culture maintains an oppressive and unequal social order whose purpose is to further the species.

Six: Cosmopolitanism

Commentators have argued that despite the fact that Kant's concept of race sets out to provide a theoretical basis for the natural divisions within humankind, the *cosmopolitan thoughts* of his late work are indeed universal. Robert Louden emphasizes that Kant “stresses repeatedly that the entire species must eventually participate in progress toward perfection.”²²⁸ Similarly, Sankar Muthu suggests that Kant espouses a liberatory, instrumental view of human beings in terms of how he accounts for diverse ways of life in “cultural agency.”²²⁹ My concern is that these commentators are on the search for a clear statement of the racial hierarchy in Kant’s late writings parallel to those found earlier in his work and, after not finding one, conclude that he abandoned his prior, negative views of race. What they overlook however, is the possibility that the racial hierarchy informs Kant's late work covertly.

I set out to address the view that Kant changed his mind about race after 1792.²³⁰ I argue that Kant is not critical of inequality in his late decade because of its value in his cosmopolitan work. In both the essay, "Toward Perpetual Peace"(1795) and in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), unequal relationships that occur in both the private and the public spheres are situated as necessary and inevitable challenges that the human species must contend with in order to enjoy the cosmopolitan society. Kant's continued recognition of "tribes," "savages," women, and slaves indicate that he still saw these and other groups of people in opposition to Europeans and the new world order. Additionally, the legal provisions that Kant extends to people of color shows that he did not have the "change of heart," that is, a moral change in his thinking which would rectify his racism. Thus, Kant does not present his cosmopolitan society as a place where all people are equal and for this reason Kant's cosmopolitanism warrants a

²²⁸ Robert Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics*, 101-106.

²²⁹ Sankar Muthu, 173-174.

²³⁰ Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race,” 586.

more generous understanding of what he means by equality. I am exploring the boundaries of what Kant means by equality and/or cosmopolitanism as it is not clear that Kant saw the two as equal to one another.

In the first section of this chapter, I discuss some of the most common perspectives taken by scholars about Kant and cosmopolitanism. In the second section, by highlighting "Perpetual Peace" (1795),²³¹ I draw out the idea that human progress toward legal goals is most important to Kant when it comes to the cosmopolitan ideal and that this often means forced inequitable interactions between groups. I will also focus on the role of women, slaves, serfs, and prisoners in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) all of which are examples of people whose inclusion into society and politics is limited because of their inherent, inferior status. In their case, Kant sees the disparity between these groups of people and their superiors as crucial to maintaining the society. What I show is that there is no evidence that even in the last decade of his life and writing, Kant does not "change his views" on the concept of inequality, nor does he change his position about how to best solve human inequities. Thus, Kant's understanding of equality is indeed tied to his concept of inequality and oppression.

Kant's "Change of Heart"

What is cosmopolitanism? There are different scholarly approaches to cosmopolitanism as a theory, and I will not be able to engage all of them here.²³² I am limiting my discussion of cosmopolitanism to that of Kant, and more specifically, to the ways in which contemporary scholars view Kant's cosmopolitanism. My reason for doing this is to understand better the

²³¹ See Immanuel Kant "Toward Perpetual Peace" in *Practical Philosophy*, edited by Mary Gregor and Allen Wood (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 317-351. This work will appear henceforth as PP.

²³² See for example, Kwame A. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2006) and John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

connections between the racial hierarchy, equality, and how one comes to understand cosmopolitanism in Kant's published work. Thus, I am less concerned here with contemporary understanding of cosmopolitanism, even though the extent to which Kant influences some current interpretations of cosmopolitanism and equality, raises questions, including how the cosmopolitanism of current scholarship can overlook the problems of racism in Kant.

Cosmopolitanism is a form of universalism. "It is the view that all human beings share certain essential features that unite or should unite them in a global order that transcends national borders and warrants their designation as 'citizens of the world.' " ²³³Theoretically speaking, it is the attempt to understand universalism and the fact that one and all other humans are both related to and responsible for it. ²³⁴ Nussbaum, in the essay, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," argues that Kant's cosmopolitanism is deeply influenced by the Stoics which gives his own cosmopolitanism three distinct features. First, Kant includes the notion that free and rational human beings are a part of a kingdom in which they are treated with dignity and respect. Second, Kant includes the idea that rational human beings each participate in the law constituting the foundation of the claims and obligations that act as a virtual polity. The third characteristic is that Kant follows the Stoics in their views of morality. For example, Kant shares similar views regarding the importance of justice in political life and hospitality. ²³⁵ For me, the important features of Kant's cosmopolitanism are the idea that the relationship between human beings as citizens of the world requires that they interact with others in such a way that promotes universal justice and respect amongst all people. Furthermore, it is also the idea that human beings must

²³³ Pauline Kleingeld, "Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Volume 60 (1999): 505.

²³⁴ See James Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013), 23.

²³⁵ See Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, Volume 5, Number 1(1997):12-13.

work together to build and maintain a world order which upholds these basic beliefs about human respect. These tenets of cosmopolitanism are shown through the different kinds of cosmopolitanism including moral, international, and cultural providing social, legal, and commercial provisions for states and individuals. Both Kleingeld²³⁶ and Cavallar²³⁷ acknowledge that there are several different kinds of cosmopolitanisms in 18th century Germany and that many of these are also present in the work of Kant.

Kant's influence on cosmopolitanism is extensive. Kant "is also the most common source [...] of three key elements of nearly any contemporary cosmopolitanism [...]." ²³⁸Also, with regard to the resurgence in interest in cosmopolitanism: "References to Kant are frequent, since he is usually seen as a typical representative of 18th century cosmopolitanism."²³⁹ This is in large part because of Kant's position on universalism that allows for the individual development of the human being which consequently formulates perpetual human freedom under the ideal of perpetual peace.²⁴⁰ For this reason, what comes to mind with regard to cosmopolitanism especially as it relates to Kant is moral cosmopolitanism.²⁴¹ The idea is that Kant's cosmopolitanism, insofar as it ensures equality for all, asserts that all people are valuable in the cosmopolitan society.²⁴² This claim is often understood to be an extension of what Kant argues for in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*²⁴³ where in the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative no one should be treated as means to an end because all are human;

²³⁶ See Pauline Kleingeld, "Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany," 505-524.

²³⁷ See Georg Cavallar, "Cosmopolitanisms in Kant's Philosophy," *Ethics and Global Politics*, Volume 5, Number 2 (2012): 95-118.

²³⁸ Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics*, 15.

²³⁹ Cavallar, "Cosmopolitanisms," 95.

²⁴⁰ Ingram, *Radical Cosmopolitics*, 15.

²⁴¹ Cavallar in the essay, "Cosmopolitanisms" (page 95) argues that scholars tend to focus on Kant's legal or political cosmopolitanism. However, this is still with regard to how and why Kant appears to see people as equally valuable in his system. It is for this reason why the moral cosmopolitanism, I think, tends to stand out more.

²⁴² Pauline Kleingeld, "Six Varieties," 505

²⁴³ Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," 574.

rather, human beings should be treated as ends-in-themselves, as beings with inherent dignity and worth. Also, the culmination of likeminded rational beings constitutes a Kingdom of Ends whereby each person on their own merit becomes a leader in the universal Kingdom. For this reason, a common interpretation of race and cosmopolitanism is that Kant abandons his racial hierarchy in his late work. For Kleingeld, the legal provisions which Kant extends specifically to people of color proves that Kant changed his mind from a racist and divisive understanding of human relations to a unified and equitable position.

The problem with this notion is that Kant systematically appeals to inequality in his cosmopolitan decade, and he does so for the same reasons that he used in the context of race: inequality furthers the goals of cosmopolitanism. In order to get to the a semblance of unity (as perpetual peace is not promised to the species) the human species must work toward breaking down the boundaries that separate it. However, Kant also still acknowledges groups of people who lie at the margins of his discussion about cosmopolitanism. They must function in the background of ongoing political progress unless they can overcome their shortcomings; their lower position, however, is simply a part of how the society must operate. To this end, there is a discrepancy between the claim that Kant includes all people into his cosmopolitan ideas and what Kant actually says in his work. Namely, given the claim that Kant makes structural and fundamental changes to his cosmopolitan theory because he recognizes his own shortcomings in terms of racial prejudice, this "change of heart" merits equally affective changes with regard to the moral problems created by the racial hierarchy. The legal provisions that Kant extends (and only to a degree) toward people of color does not answer the concerns about whether or not Kant changes his position about the value that people of color add to the cosmopolitan society. In contrast, the fact that Kant still recognizes "tribes," "savages," and "ignorant" original inhabitants

only strengthens the idea that in his late work his racist views are so much a part of Kant's ideology that they simply need no further explanation. One cannot say with certainty that Kant "changed his mind" with regard to race in his late work and this is in large part because Kant does not articulate any reason for why he would change his position. In more recent years, some scholars have conceded to this point. Robert Loudon argues:

In recent years, several theorists have argued that Kant's hierarchical account of peoples and races "disappears in his later published writings" [...] (Sankar Muthu), and that he changes "his earlier views on the status and characteristics of non-whites" [...] (Pauline Kleingeld). But we have seen that he continues to emphasize the crucial importance of struggle and delayed gratification even in the 1798 *Anthropology*, and, as his chapter on "The Character of the Peoples" in that same work indicates, he continues to believe that some peoples have the necessary inherent drives to advance culturally and other do not. Regarding the Spaniard, for instance, Kant notes that he "remains centuries behind in the sciences" and "is proud of not having to work"[...]. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that Kant changed his mind on this matter.²⁴⁴

In both the chapter on slavery and the philosophy of history, I argued that Kant appeals to the capacity for industry as a way to further describe and define racial characteristics. I also argued that Kant justifies the separation and stratification of the species by emphasizing the impetus for labor insofar as he argues that only certain parts of the species have this impetus. My goal in those chapters was to show that Kant provides another way in which to stratify people in the species that does not explicitly use the term race while still justifying the inferior status of people of color. Following Loudon's comments, I frame my remarks in this chapter that it is an open-question as to whether or not Kant can be said to have changed his mind after 1792. I argue that in fact, he did not.

The Racial Hierarchy and Kant's Cosmopolitanism

In this section of the paper, I investigate the claim that Kant changed his views on race in

²⁴⁴ Robert Loudon, "Cosmopolital Unity," 224.

the 1790s because he "makes significant structural changes to the relevant parts of his political theory during the 1790s, when he gives up his hierarchical view of the races."²⁴⁵ In "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," and *Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship*, Pauline Kleingeld argues that Kant held views on cultural pluralism which trumped his prior views supporting the racial hierarchy.²⁴⁶ At least in the 1780s, Kleingeld considers Kant to be an inconsistent universalist. This is because Kant holds universal values about people on the one hand, while on the other, holds disparaging views about people of color. According to Kleingeld, Kant's change of heart occurs after 1792 (after the Dohna lectures which are dated around 1792 and still contain some racist statements) and before 1795. To be clear, Kleingeld's claim is not that Kant abandons the idea of race in general, but rather that Kant does not appeal to a hierarchical concept of the races and that as a result, the term "race" is "less prominent" in the late decade.²⁴⁷ The two main areas where these "changes" can be found are colonialism and chattel slavery. Within these contexts there are six indications which show that Kant changed his mind about race:

1. Kant develops a cosmopolitan right which gives full juridical status to people of color. One of the mandates of the cosmopolitan right is that Europeans cannot go to a foreign land inhabited by people of color and colonize it.²⁴⁸

2. Kant recognizes and honors the fact that people of color have rights to their land and that Europeans must first gain permission from them in the form of a contract in order to take control. Thus, people of color are recognized as legitimate contract holders. This point relates also to the next point in that because Kant honors the contracts of people of color, he also has to

²⁴⁵ Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," 584.

²⁴⁶ See Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 95, 122.

²⁴⁷ Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," 591.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 586.

think that slavery is wrong. This is because the enslaved would have no rights in which they could be contract holders.²⁴⁹

3. Kant opposes chattel slavery.²⁵⁰

4. Kant allows for the migration of all races and not just Europeans to all parts of the world.²⁵¹

5. Kant changes in his discussion about the mental characteristics of people of color and sees them as having the same mental capacities as others.²⁵²

6. As the result of points one through five, the concept of race essentially disappears from Kant's published writings.²⁵³

The idea is that these legal provisions which Kant outlines in "Perpetual Peace" indicate that he grants non-whites liberties that they did not have before in the 1780s. Thus, Kant recognizes them as equally valuable in his cosmopolitan society. As such, Kant has essentially redeemed himself from racist allegations which no longer hold true for him in the 1790s.

The complexity of Kleingeld's argument lies in the fact that Kleingeld is not arguing that Kant's racism has not or could not have some effect on his work: "Kant's principles are race-neutral in their formulation, but that his racism still makes its influence felt in his theory by affecting the articulation of intermediate principles and the selection of central problems to be addressed."²⁵⁴ The main focus for the moment is on the phrase "intermediate principles." These "principles" (for which there are no examples) are the ones that, while can be affected by racism, are also the ones that can be easily traded out for the egalitarian principles related to

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 587.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 589.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 584

cosmopolitanism. However, Kleingeld asserts that race does "really play" a role in the 1780s which one can observe by the fact that Kant makes corresponding "structural changes" to his work in the 1790s. These changes are not to be taken as revisions to the practical philosophy nor are they "inessential" but somewhere in between. Since according to Kleingeld the concept of race is not central to the whole of Kant's work, it seems to be that the placement of Kant's racism at the intermediate level of his thoughts allows for it to be easily revised or removed from Kant's later work. On Kleingeld's account, in order for one to understand better the sense in which Kant changes his mind, one cannot worry about whether or not he is consistent. If one is concerned about Kant's racism, one should not see his work as having been colored by racism:

These examples are indicative of the fact that in order to eradicate racism from a theory, often more is needed than merely deleting explicitly racist statements, because the aim will often require introducing additional positive changes as well. Even if racism is not seen in the core principles (such as the Categorical Imperative), it may have influenced the intermediate principles which together make up 'the theory,' or it may express itself in omissions such as Kant's failure during the 1780s to criticize non-white slavery. Moreover, if present day Kantian theorists take over the structure of Kant's 1780s moral or political theory and the set of issues he deemed salient (together with the concomitant blind spots), without realizing that their articulation has been influenced by racist assumptions, they are likely to prolong racism's distorting affects.²⁵⁵

On the one hand, Kleingeld concedes that racial prejudice has possibly had some effect on Kant's work; however, on the other hand, one cannot go so far as to take racism to be at the core of Kant's work, because this would only allow racism to proliferate. Kleingeld's view that Kant's racism in the 1780s should be kept separate from the 1790s follows from her argument that Kant's philosophy of history undergoes a change. Thus, for Kleingeld, Kant's work of the 1780s and 1790s should not be considered as a unity.²⁵⁶ In the essay, "Kant's Changing

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 585-586.

²⁵⁶ See Pauline Kleingeld, "The Development of Kant's Cosmopolitanism," in *Political Philosophy Now: Politics and Teleology in Kant*, edited by Paul Formosa, Tatiana Patrone, and Avery Goldman (Cathys, GBR: University of Wales Press, 2014), 60. Ebook.

Cosmopolitanism" Kleingeld argues that the cosmopolitanism Kant espouses in the 1780s is centered around the coercion of the states rallied by antagonism, whereas the cosmopolitanism of the 1790s describes a voluntary league of states.²⁵⁷ Not only does this mean that the cosmopolitanism of the 1780s and the 1790s is interpreted as being very different from one another, it also follows that, "[T]here are clear dangers associated with the tendency, in much of the literature on Kant's cosmopolitanism, to take his work from the 1780s and 1790s as a unity."²⁵⁸ Thus: "[W]hen one passage seems to contradict another, more often than not the debate is still over the question of *whether Kant is consistent*, rather than over the question of *whether Kant changed his mind*."²⁵⁹ Thus in both Kleingeld's reading of race and cosmopolitanism in general, the view is that Kant was of two different mindsets, the former of which he forsook.

However, not only does Kant continue to use inequality systematically in his cosmopolitan work, taking this liberal view of his work does not help one to understand one contradiction that Kleingeld points out: Kant's change of heart liberates black people, but not *women*.²⁶⁰ One question that arises is what can be said about the kind of equality that Kant espouses in the 1790s if women are excluded? Kant does not attribute women's incapacities to *Anlagen* or to *Keime* as he does for people of color, but they are still considered to be unequal to men and must rely on men to represent them in public. Also, Kleingeld's discussion of women does not include women of color or some other intersectional perspective. Since women of color

²⁵⁷ See Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Changing Cosmopolitanism," in *Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim: A Critical Guide*, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 178.

²⁵⁸ Pauline Kleingeld, "The Development of Kant's Cosmopolitanism," 59.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

²⁶⁰ See Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*, 111. See also, "The Problematic Status of Gender-Neutral Language in the History of Philosophy: The Case of Kant," *The Philosophical Forum*, Volume 25, Number 2 (Winter 1993): 146. In this essay, Kleingeld talks about the ways in which Kant's work in the critical period uses gender exclusive language. In order to point out this tension in scholarly work, one should only use gender-neutral language in cases where it is only when it is clearly visible that Kant is being gender-neutral.

carry both (or more) identities, then the claim that Kant's revised views on race liberate all people of color must be reevaluated.

One point where I do agree with Kleingeld is that looking *only* at Kant's *racist statements* obscures the larger picture of racism that looms below the surface of Kant's project. However, by disconnecting decades of work from one another does not get at the problem of racism present in Kant's work and neither does it demonstrate the possible connections race has with the rest of his work.

"The Beloved Community"

In this section, I show that in the work Kant publishes after 1792 including "Perpetual Peace," and the *Metaphysics of Morals* that he continues to uphold views of inequality and separatism. Thus, Kant does not "change his mind" with regard to racial equality and that the legal provisions that he does extend to people of color is not because he had a change of heart. My aim is to underscore that Kant did not make any changes to his position about racial inequality. Consequently, the interpretation that Kant's cosmopolitanism ensures racial equality is also in question.

As Kleingeld concedes, there is no proof that Kant changed his views on the racial hierarchy. Kant did not claim that he made such a change and moreover, Kant's contemporaries did not note this "change." In 1798 in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* in the section "On the Character of the Races" Kant refers his readers to Christoph Girtanner's work if they want to know more about his ideas about race (AA 7:320).²⁶¹ There is some speculation about the extent to which Kant knew of Girtanner's work, but in Girtanner's text, "Concerning

²⁶¹ See Christoph Girtanner *Concerning the Kantian Principle in Natural History* (1796) in *Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth Century Writings*, translated by Jon Mikkelsen (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2013), 209- 232.

the Kantian Principle in Natural History: An Attempt to Treat this Science Philosophically (1796)" he essentially repeats many of Kant's statements on race including the phrases about *Keime* and *Anlagen*²⁶² and on the different characters of the races.²⁶³ One may wonder why it is important to worry about why Kant would have changed his mind; that is, is it not enough to account for changes on the basis that the racial hierarchy, at least superficially, is not present in Kant's late work? One response is that in his descriptions of the racial hierarchy from the 1780s Kant gives detailed reasons as to *why* a particular race is placed at a certain level of the hierarchy. For example, in his justification of African slavery, Kant points out that they should be enslaved because the impetus related to their *Anlagen* prevents them from being able to work. In his cosmopolitan work, in spite of the fact that Kant relies on such others as Girtanner to fill in the blanks about his own concept of race, this amounts to only a silence or carelessness about the topic and not a recantation his thoughts. Finding out *why* Kant "changed his mind" is imperative to the understanding whether or not he actually did do so. Perhaps it is the case that Kant's position on the racial hierarchy became such a part of his thoughts that he no longer needed to make it explicit. Most importantly however, the fact that Kant does not rectify his own racism explicitly and that there are passages where he still celebrates inequalities between people is another reason to reconsider what is Kant's final position on the racial hierarchy.

The essay "Perpetual Peace" is often said to be the central essay in which Kant is thought to espouse these "changed" ideas. I will describe first the main characteristics of "Perpetual Peace" and then I will address the topics of colonialism and chattel slavery. Broadly speaking, perpetual peace is a moral condition whereby states are guided by various articles that include

²⁶² *Ibid.*,216.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*,226.

banishment of standing armies and intrusion into the affairs of other states. One purpose of perpetual peace is to ensure the individual rights of the human being to their moral purpose (AA 8:365; PP 334). The relationship between the idea of perpetual peace and cosmopolitanism in this essay is that the cosmopolitan relationship between nations is supposed to both bring about and maintain peace throughout the world. To be clear, it is not that Kant believes that the world *will* experience perpetual peace, but it is nonetheless an idea that must be posited in order to bring about some semblance of peace and unity throughout the world for all humanity (AA 6:350; MM 487).

To the degree that this goal toward perpetual peace is so far away and actually unattainable is a crucial point which has a direct relationship with the fact that the federation is a voluntary league of states which maintain separate identities. Part of the reason for individual state autonomy has to do with the idea that the state must be thought of first as a moral individual (AA 8:353; PP 325). Thus preserving state individuality is important so that the act of coming together as a federation creates a federation of nations and not one fused nation (AA 8:354; PP 326). These nations come together out of choice to establish peace. This trope about individual state autonomy leads to another important point, namely, that the voluntary nature of this federation also establishes some normative guidelines for inclusion into the federation. For example, one of the ways in which Kant identifies nations and states is by their governmental structure (AA 6:313; PP 457). Furthermore, since these states are considered to be moral individuals, then their choosing to be a part of the voluntary league of states is a gauge for how progressive they are. To this end, Kant recognizes that there are some groups that fall short of having the capacity to join the federation. Thus:

[T]he difference between the European savages (in which Kant may perhaps be thinking of the state of nature) and the American savages consists mainly in

this: that whereas many tribes of the latter (the American savages) have been eaten up by their enemies, the former (the European savages) know how to make better use of those they have defeated than to make a meal of them, and would rather increase the number of their subjects, and so too the multitude of their instruments even more extensive wars, by means of them (AA 8:354; PP 326, additions mine).

After 1792, Kant still recognizes "savages" and claims that they are unable to make proper judgments when it comes to ruling themselves. Savages *ought* to have the desire to leave their lawlessness and give themselves over to "a lawful coercion" of the federation rather than to rule themselves without such leadership. Moreover, the group formation of these savages constitute tribes and not states or nations (AA 6:343; MM 482). Moreover, the citizens of the states and nations who see one another as family consider the savages to be inferior to them (AA 6:343; MM 482). The only group formations that can become a part of the federation are states and nations which are characterized by a particular government structure (AA 6:311-318; MM 455-461). That Kant recognizes that there are other, savage groups in his cosmopolitan work after 1792 suggests that he envisions that some groups cannot be a part of the federation. It also suggests that there are certain characteristics nations should have in order to become a part of the federation. Moreover, Kant still holds the same disparaging views about the Native Americans who are evoked in this passage, and so his views on them have not changed at all.

To this end, Kant's federation of states does not appear to include such "nations" ruled by people of color as in Africa, South Asia, and others. Alyssa Bernstein's remarks offer support for this:

It can be hard to determine whether something is or is not a state, or whether a population does or does not constitute a people. Since Kant defines a state in terms of the idea of laws of right, not every purported state is one. Not every powerful person or group of persons who purport to govern by law actually do so; not every political structure actually performs the function of determining

and securing what is mine and what is yours. A powerful entity that dominates a territory's population and meets none of the requirements of right to any significant degree, is not classifiable as a state and its population does not constitute a people (in the political sense).[...] Although he argues that the form of government that best fulfills the function of a state is republican, he does not argue that only republican political societies are states, and he does not offer minimal requirements of governmental legitimacy as criteria for determining whether what appears to be a state of a people really is one.²⁶⁴

Kleingeld assumes that the various conglomerates of people throughout the world have the potential to contribute to the federation of states without acknowledging, as Bernstein has done, the fact that Kant defines that which constitutes a nation, people, or state is obscure. Because of the fact that Kant still sees some groups as savages or as groups of people lacking governmental structure, it is unclear whether Kant would extend the same normative standards to these groups who are outside of the federation of states. The argument that I am raising here about the nature of nations is two-fold; first, it is an attempt to show that the federation of states is not universally inclusive, and furthermore, that it excludes nations of people of color. Insofar as Kant recognizes that there are states that lie outside of the ones who could easily be a part of the federation, then it is also possible that the various guidelines that he gives in the beginning of the essay do not apply to these outlier states aside from the rules that he places on the federation with regard to colonialism. However, these latter provisions do not address the concerns about whether Kant values people of color in his cosmopolitan society, and furthermore, these provisions only address superficial problems related to race and culture, as I will describe soon.

Another indication that Kant's federation contains only European nations is when questioning the efficacy of such a federation, Kant only mentions Europe (AA 8:321; OCS

²⁶⁴ See Alyssa Bernstein, "The Rights of States, the Rule of Law, and Coercion: Reflections on Pauline Kleingeld's *Kant and Cosmopolitanism*," *Kantian Review*, Volume 19, Number 2 (2014): 238-239.

309).²⁶⁵ Kant also gives an example from history explaining that European nations attempted at one point to create a voluntary federation akin to the one which he describes in "Perpetual Peace" although they failed, Kant states that they had a vision of their federation which was superior to the way that even America formed its states (AA 6:350; MM 488).

Kant's federation is not universal in the sense that it includes all nations and states throughout the world. To be clear, it is not that Kant does not want it to be a world-wide federation or that it should be, but he realizes that leaving the federation voluntary is the only way in which it can occur:

In accordance with reason there is only one way that states in relation with one another can leave the lawless condition [...] and so form an (always growing) *state of nations (civitas gentium)* that would finally encompass all the nations of the earth. [...]. [...] [I]n place of the positive idea *of a world republic* only the *negative* surrogate of a *league* that averts war, endures, and always expands can hold back the stream of hostile inclination that shies away from right [...] (AA 8:357; PP 328).

Those states who are and choose to be a part of this federation are charged to follow six guidelines that, if implemented, will assure perpetual peace. The first is that there must be no reservation of goods for a future war (AA 8:343; PP 317). The second is that no independently existing state should be overtaken by another through inheritance, exchange, or purchase (AA 8:344; PP 318). The third is that standing armies (armies preparing for a future war) should be abolished (AA 8:345; PP 318). The fourth is that nations should not incur debt (AA 8:345; PP 319). The fifth is that no state should force themselves into the business of another state (AA 8:346; PP 319). The sixth is that no state should engage in unethical war tactics such as treason, assassinations, among others (AA 8:346; PP 320). In addition to the six guidelines, Kant also provides articles. These articles mandate that the states within this federation are themselves

²⁶⁵ See Immanuel Kant, "On the Common Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, but it is of no use in Practice" (1793) in *Practical Philosophy*, edited by Mary Gregor (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 273-310. This work will appear henceforth as OCS.

republican states (AA 8:349; PP 322). Second, the federation is composed of nations who choose to take part in it, and are to be identified, despite being a part of a larger federation, as individual states (AA 8:354; PP 326). Third, the cosmopolitan right of these states is limited to only hospitality (AA 8:357; PP 328). Moreover, perpetual peace has to be established (AA 8:348; PP 342).

Out of the provisions given in these various guidelines, Kant is argued to have changed his mind with regard to colonialism and chattel slavery. Kleingeld argues that Kant's formulation of the cosmopolitan right extends certain rights to people of color that was not present in the 1780s. According to Kleingeld, the cosmopolitan right shows that Kant is critical of the common practice of Europeans who would go to foreign countries of people of color and take the lands by force. This does not mean that Kant is against all forms of creating colonies even when it comes to countries of color. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, it is acceptable to form a colony on a foreign land so long as the the new colony is far from the original inhabitants and the land they occupy is currently not being used (AA 6:353; MM 490). The reasons that Kant gives for this provision against colonists is that they should not take advantage of the inhabitants' "ignorance" and must take the land only by contract. The colonists cannot excuse illegitimate forceful taking of the land on any account, e.g., that the savages would be better off under colonial rule, because the use of such force is doing only an injustice against the original inhabitants.

Kleingeld argues that Kant's criticism of colonialism establishes a "normative standard" which instantiates the moral standards set on human behavior from the practical philosophy in the cosmopolitan decade.²⁶⁶ However, not only does Kant call these inhabitants ignorant with epithets similar to those used in the 1780s in the context of Native Americans and Africans, but

²⁶⁶ See Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Colonialism," 55.

also the main reason why Kant is against colonialism has to do with the potential profits that could be made from an equitable, although superficial, relationship. Thus, the argument that Kant argues against colonialism is less about the ethical nature of colonialism, but rather takes advantage of the inhabitants. With regard to Kant's position on colonialism, Nussbaum argues that it is on this rule where Kant departs from the Stoics. Unlike the Stoics who attempted to find ways in which to justify Roman colonialism, Kant argues against it. "But we should observe that what Kant objects to in colonialism is the oppressive and brutal treatment of the inhabitants, more than the fact of the rule itself" [...].²⁶⁷ I am not suggesting that one should downplay the fact that Kant takes the brutal treatment of people of color, a practice that too often accompanied European conquest, to be morally wrong, but I want to underscore that Kant does not argue against colonialism because he believes that people of color meet the same normative standard as the European colonizers. Kant does not provide an argument against colonialism which would suggest that he wants to protect the inherent dignity and worth of the inhabitants. For this reason, it is not certain that Kant gives people of color the same political status which would allow them the capacity to be cosmopolitan citizens.

Kant's own view of the cosmopolitan right is a right of hospitality which allows foreigners the right to visit a country anywhere in the world in order to establish commerce (AA 8:358; PP 329). In fact, the cosmopolitan right is established *only* to the extent that a country could possibly engage in commerce, "that is, the authorization of a foreign newcomer—does not extend beyond the conditions which make it possible to *seek* commerce with the old inhabitants" (AA 8:358; PP 329). In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant reiterates: "This right, since it has to do with the possible union of all nations with a view to certain universal laws for their possible commerce, can be called *cosmopolitan right (ius*

²⁶⁷ Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 14.

cosmopoliticum)" (AA 6:352; MM 489). Kant argues that these relationships between countries that are entered into on the basis of trade, if done peacefully, is also a way in which nations in the world can enter into peaceable and lawful relationships with one another. Thus, the main reason for why Kant condemns the barbarous acts common of European settlers and travelers is because the way in which they treat the original inhabitants harms the possibility of their trade. "[T]he commercial states do not even profit from this violence [...] that the Sugar Islands, that place of the cruelest and most calculated slavery, yield no true profit [...]" (AA 8:359; MM 330). Insofar as Kant claims that the cosmopolitan right is an addition to the unwritten code of states and nations in order to ensure to the rights of human beings and perpetual peace, this suggests that in spite of the fact Kant recognizes the humanity of people of color, the degree to which their humanity is protected is only to ensure the ideal of perpetual peace. If Kant also does not recognize that these "nations" of color are eligible for the voluntary league of nations, then these colonized "tribes" also cannot take full advantage of the guidelines of the cosmopolitan world order. To this end, Kant has not undergone a radical or fundamental change in his work and especially not for the sake of ensuring that he includes people of color equally in his cosmopolitan society.

Kleingeld also argues that Kant changed his views on chattel slavery. In "Perpetual Peace" (AA 8:359; PP 330) and in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant mentions the enslavement of Africans and states that their enslavement is cruel (AA 6:330; MM 472). In the latter passage, Kant argues that the kind of slavery that Africans are subjected to in the Sugar Islands does not allow one to have dignity and for this reason no citizen who is a part of the state should be treated in that way. Additionally, Kleingeld points out that as a part of the cosmopolitan right and the necessity of signing contracts, that insofar as Kant respects the

contracts of people of color that this also suggests that Kant thinks that Africans should be enslaved.

However, Robert Bernasconi in the essay "Kant's Third Thoughts on Race," gives three reasons as to why these proclamations do not show a radical reformulation of Kant's thoughts with regard to chattel slavery. First, Kant did not publish nor make public these comments that are supposed to offer a defense against the slave trade.²⁶⁸ Second, Kant's comments refer to the slave trade and not to the institution of slavery (slavery is what is described in the context of 1788 and possibly in the *Critique of Judgment*).²⁶⁹ Furthermore, Bernasconi argues that when Kant does address the slave trade in Africans, he mentions the cosmopolitan law as opposed to the Categorical Imperative. If Kant used the latter it would strengthen the notion that Kant argues against slavery on moral grounds. To this end, I would add that Kant's proclamations against slavery in his published writings relate to the specific situation in which Europeans go to a land of people of color and bring them back to European lands. Kant is not against the slave/master relationship as such, nor does he question the fact that during the time that he was writing that the African slave trade had already been well under way for at least two centuries. For similar reasons I gave with regard to colonialism, Kant does not argue against chattel slavery for moral reasons; rather, his arguments support the fact that Europeans jeopardize their trade relationships if they enslave.

Robert Bernasconi also argues that the tension between Kant's universalism and his remarks on the enslavement of Africans is a direct reflection of a second ongoing tension present between Kant's work on morality and politics. Understanding the degree to which both tensions

²⁶⁸ See Robert Bernasconi, "Kant's Third Thoughts on Race" in *Reading Kant's Geography* edited by Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2011), 302-303.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 303.

work in tandem may not solve the worries surrounding Kant's universalism, but it does shed light on how Kant could have seen these contradictory approaches as uncontested corollaries:

To this extent, in eventually condemning the slave trade, Kant was acting in conformity with the general tenor of his moral philosophy, even if we can now also begin to understand what was pulling Kant in the other direction: he came to see that he had to condemn the slave trade and the cruelty with which slaves were treated, but at the same time he also had an account of how slavery contributed to bringing about a "moral whole."²⁷⁰

Bernasconi's claim is that while Kant had to condemn the slave trade he also had to account for the fact that violence is a means to progress the human species, a notion that is fully supported by the philosophy of history. The result of this tension is that while slavery may be morally problematic to some degree, it is also historically and teleologically necessary.

This is not to say that Kant does not see people of color as human beings, but it is still an open question as to whether he sees them as people capable of contributing equally to the cosmopolitan society. Kant still recognizes sectors of people within the society who are not civic leaders. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant claims that voting is the only requirement of a citizen; however women, domestic servants, and apprentices, "lack civic personality" and must be represented by another with proper social and vocational standing, a *man* who is considered to be an individual who can protect these underlings (AA 6:314-315; MM 458). He goes on to say that this dependence upon these individual (*men*) that these "underlings" must show, this "inequality," does not mean that these underlings lack freedom and equality *as human beings* but that in order to conform with the civil constitution they be represented in the public sphere. Two points are important to underscore: The first is that Kant recognizes that there are people who are unequal to others in the public sphere despite the fact that he sees them as human beings. Kant does not take a critical position about why women and those who

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 311.

are considered to have inferior vocations should not be allowed to participate in the public sphere. Thus, the idea that Kant is somehow different after 1792 must be reevaluated. Second, insofar as Kant states that these underlings must work themselves up to a better status does not distinguish this view from what Kant says in the essays on history where human effort is necessary to fulfilling the cosmopolitan ideal.

Conclusion

Kant is often claimed to have had a moral change of heart with regard to his theory on race but the supporting evidence given has been the legal provisions presented in "Perpetual Peace." In Kant's own discussion about cosmopolitanism, he does not give moral provisions or any hope that morality will be that which will bring about change in the world. For Kant, since perpetual peace is unachievable, the only thing that can be achieved are the accompanying political principles which allow for an approximation toward perpetual peace (AA 6:350; MM 487). Additionally, the idea of the republican constitution is difficult for human beings to execute perfectly given the fact that human beings are not angels and so in contrast, the work of nature is to ensure that human beings become good citizens even if they cannot become better human beings (AA 8:366; PP 335). Nature's goal is not for the moral improvement of human beings, but rather to make the human species such that they can bring about a peaceful and lawful government. This is not to say that the legal provisions do not have any importance (that is, unless one sees how limited these provisions are as I do) but that they are not a substitute or indication that Kant changed his position on the racial hierarchy for moral reasons. It is not enough that Kant makes the claims that slavery is cruel; while it is true that Kant does not celebrate slavery, this does not mean that he did not think that enslavement

is the best place for Africans. My point is that the *fleeting comments* that Kant gives in "Perpetual Peace" (and in the draft of it) which appear to speak out against chattel slavery and colonialism do not provide enough details or reasons for why one should concede that Kant "changed his mind" given that Kant dedicates *entire essays* arguing for a racial hierarchy that valorizes inequality and separatism of the species. Rather, Kant does not appear to have changed his mind at all.

Conclusion

In this project, I argue that after 1792 the racial hierarchy continued to have influence on Kant's cosmopolitan philosophy through the concepts of inequality and separatism which I argue take on a special role in race in 1775. I do concede that Kant did offer a reasonable view regarding the trade in enslaved Africans in "Perpetual Peace" but, regardless, these provisions did not mean or demonstrate that he had a "change of heart" with regard to racial equality. Rather, starting with the concept of race, both inequality and separatism worked to stratify the species and corroborate why different races had to pursue different goals in order to fulfill nature's plan for them. As a result, certain inferior races were also justified in taking a lower status in the species than others. The crux of this argument lies in the way in which Kant justifies the enslavement of the Africans, whereby their inferior status is crucial to the idea that inequality is a necessary and inevitable aspect of human progress, an aspect that for some parts of the species must remain permanent.

The idea is that inequality and the various forms of racialized separatism, that is, the separation of the races based on natural inequities are crucial to how Kant conceives of the natural history, philosophy of history, teleology, and cosmopolitanism. They come along with Kant's concept of *Anlagen* that in the context of race it is responsible for the development of racial characteristics which become permanent, and in the philosophy of history and teleology it becomes the foundation for how Kant argues that the species develops mentally, morally, and politically. Focusing on the development of *Anlagen* and the role that it plays in the attainment of these character traits within the larger context of inequality and separatism, I demonstrated that the basic elements of the racial hierarchy continues through Kant's cosmopolitan philosophy.

In the process, Kant ushers in a more subtle form of racism which is both an extension and deeper form of the racial hierarchy insofar as the species is stratified in accordance with such internal capacities as *Anlagen*. Thus, the claim that equality is an intrinsic part of his cosmopolitanism must be reevaluated. Rather, what is shown is that insofar as he uses inequality and separatism to bring about unity in the species this hierarchy of the species only retains inequality within the very unity Kant seeks to create. Thus, regardless of whether or not race is explicitly mentioned in a text, where Kant describes these hierarchies I claim that the residue of race is still present.

My contribution to the literature on this topic which was discussed in the context of chapter one of this project is to contend that Kant's racial hierarchy continues to have an influence on his work, especially in the last decade where Kant espouses his cosmopolitan work. This argument, *contra* Kleingeld and others who argue that Kant had a change of heart near the end of his life, has the aim of situating race within the context of Kant's work and using the argument too as a criticism of the view that Kant's cosmopolitanism is the same as an idea of equality.

One limitation of this work has already been mentioned in the earliest chapters, but it is worth reiterating. I am not able to claim that the concept of race necessarily had direct influence on these later areas of Kant's work. This project can only map out the parallels, relationships, and contradictions between the racial hierarchy and other areas of Kant's work. To determine whether or not race influenced these areas requires both a thorough discussion about race before 1775 and some evidence that Kant used race to help him map out these other projects. While the former could possibly be done, and something be discovered, the latter could be virtually impossible to know. Regardless, this does not mean that it is a mute point to explore the relationship between

the concept of race and these other areas. If one accepts that Kant's (or anyone else's) thinking occurs in very compartmental ways, then it is plausible to consider that Kant's thinking about race did in some way affect his thinking about other things. To be sure, Kant did not give only one articulation of his racial theory; he devoted three essays to race, amongst several other articulations in other texts about race.

Other limitations of this project include exploring additional areas of Kant's work which would enhance both the moral and anthropological influences which the racial hierarchy certainly touches on. These areas which, respectively, include the moral philosophy and the lectures on anthropology, could possibly shed more light on the moral and anthropological, and especially with regard to the anthropology, the unpublished thoughts that Kant held about race. The reason why these areas did not get their own chapters in this project is mainly because I wanted to focus on the themes of the philosophy of history and follow *Anlagen* which are less prominent in these other areas. However, in a more in depth version of this project or as a way to expand the project, it would be interesting to investigate these important areas of Kant's work. I am specifically thinking about Kant's discussions of the South Sea Islanders in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, and Kant's descriptions of Africans in his anthropology lectures.

One area where this work can be expanded which also captures the political aspect of the racial hierarchy has to do with modern concepts of cosmopolitanism and race. Such scholars as Georg Cavallar²⁷¹ and Martha Nussbaum²⁷² have already posited Kant the most influential figure for modern cosmopolitanism, but these scholars have not engaged the question of race and racism. This concern takes one back to the question I raised in the "Introduction" when I was saying that my students often think that discussions about race are outdated because one is said

²⁷¹ Georg Cavallar, "Cosmopolitanisms in Kant's Philosophy," 95-118.

²⁷² Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 1-25.

to live in a world where racism no longer exists, "we are all human *now*, not like before" they say. The idea is that the current ways in which one thinks of the world, that is, as a global market, as a unified place, in turn has an inevitable effect on how one thinks of race and racism. Not only does this mean that racism can be felt globally, for example as in Pan-Africanism, but this also potentially means that racism can, and in a universal context, become hidden and re-scripted. These concerns attach themselves to old problems such as what should be the appropriate response to the politics and other practices which are considered to be barbaric in the West, but other concerns have to do with the presence of race in discussions about immigration and refugees. The world suffers from a lack of unity when immigrant workers are paid well below the standards for any Western country's minimum wage, and when celebrities can make comments about the Latina workers whose job is to scrub toilets, and claim that this statement is not racist.

My contribution to the secondary literature focuses on the degree to which Kant's understanding of equality relies on inequality tainted by the racial hierarchy. That is, the notion of human progress and what it takes for the species to progress is, at base, related to Kant's racial hierarchy. Thus, the conversation must continue with regard to the impact of the racial hierarchy on Kant's cosmopolitanism. In addition, the claim that Kant's cosmopolitanism grants equality for all must be reevaluated. My project also contributes to the interest in such terms as *Keime* and *Anlagen* and their role in the concept of race; I have demonstrated that *Anlagen* in particular is also responsible for the permanency of racial characteristics in both a naturalistic and teleological way. My project shows that Kant did not in fact abandon all iterations of stratifying the species based on natural capacities. This contribution should encourage more conversations

about what Kant's cosmopolitanism, equality, and human progress really mean with regard to people of color and their inferior status.

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