APPLYING THE COMPETING VALUES FRAMEWORK TO STUDY
ORGANIZATIONAL SUBCULTURES AND SYSTEM-WIDE PLANNING
EFFORTS IN A MILITARY UNIVERSITY

A Thesis in
Public Administration

by
Christopher R. Paparone

Copyright 2003 Christopher R. Paparone

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

August 2003
The thesis of Christopher R. Paparone has been reviewed and approved* by the following:

Rupert F. Chisholm  
Professor of Management  
Chair of Committee and Thesis Advisor

David Morand  
Associate Professor of Management

Robert F. Munzenrider  
Associate Professor of Public Administration

James T. Ziegenfuss, Jr.  
Professor of Management and Health Care Systems

Steven A. Peterson  
Professor of Politics and Public Affairs  
Director, School of Public Affairs

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School.
Abstract

This case study explores how organizational subunits may have cultural values that compete with top-management implementation of system-wide planning. The study employs the competing values framework (CVF) (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981) to assess organizational subcultures in a Department of Defense military university for senior executives (i.e. pseudonym “MUSE”). Specifically, the CVF-based Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) (Cameron & Quinn, 1999) is used to diagnose distinctive subcultures in four MUSE subunits. This is the first time the OCAI has been used in this manner as indicated by available research published to-date and by personal correspondence with one of the OCAI authors (K. Cameron, personal communication, July 2, 2001). Additional quantitative and qualitative data are collected over an eighteen-month period to substantiate the OCAI findings. This case also develops and employs a unique planning typology to investigate how the members of the identified four organizational subcultures agree or disagree with a top-management system-wide planning effort. The MUSE top-management planning effort is based in the “Balanced Scorecard” (BSC) method, popularized by Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001a). The results of this case study demonstrate a patterned relationship between subunit subcultures and the way that these subunits would prefer to conduct planning. Based in diagnosing subcultural preferences for system-wide planning types, the study also reveals substantial disagreement patterns with top-management use of BSC. Overall, the study indicates that diagnosing organizational subcultures and planning agreement patterns can inform organizational efforts to integrate activities and decisions through system-wide planning.
# Table of Contents

List of Figures ................................................................. vii  
List of Tables ........................................................................ viii  
Acknowledgements ............................................................ ix  

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1  
Synopsis of Model and Method ............................................. 8  
Significance of Study .......................................................... 12  
The Organizational Setting: .................................................. 13  
Military University for Senior Executives .......................... 13  
The Plan of the Dissertation ................................................. 19  
Conclusion ........................................................................... 20  

## CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .......................... 21  
Introduction ......................................................................... 21  
Research Issues in Organizational Culture .......................... 22  
  Culture: Organizational Variable or a Metaphor? ............... 22  
  Culture: Only a Metaphor Among Equals? ....................... 24  
  Culture: Revealed Only by Basic Underlying Assumptions? 26  
  Culture: Integrated, Differentiated, and/or Fragmented? .... 30  
Addressing These Theoretical and Methodological Issues in This Study ................................................. 32  
  Smircich’s Dichotomy ......................................................... 32  
  Morgan’s Concerns ............................................................ 34  
  Schein’s Cautions ............................................................. 39  
  Martin’s Issues .................................................................... 43  
Development of a Planning Typology for This Study ......... 44  
  “Participative” Planning ..................................................... 48  
  “Emergent” Planning ....................................................... 50  
  “Analytic” Planning ......................................................... 51  
  “Programmatic” Planning .................................................. 52  
Subculture Diagnosis ............................................................ 54  
Diagnosing Planning Process Agreement Patterns ........... 60  
Interpretation for Management Practice and Future Research ......................................................... 62  
Conclusion ........................................................................... 63  

## CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY ............................................... 65  
Introduction ......................................................................... 65  
The Embedded Case Study Method ...................................... 66  
Sub-Question 1. Diagnosing Subcultures ............................. 68  
Sub-Question 2. Diagnosing Planning Agreement/Disagreement Patterns ............................................. 73  
Plan Content Agreement/Disagreement Quantitative Measures ......................................................... 73  
Planning Process Agreement/Disagreement Quantitative Measures ............................................... 75  
Triangulation of Quantified Data with Qualitative Data .......... 78  
Fortuitous Consultations and Surveys with Management and Workforce ........................................... 79  
The Research Model ............................................................ 80
List of Figures

1.1 A summary of the competing value sets and effectiveness models .......................................................... 8

1.2 The competing values of leadership, effectiveness, and management theory expressed as ends and means of organizational culture ......................................................... 10

2.1 A summary of the competing value sets and effectiveness models .......................................................... 56

2.2 The organizational culture profile ............................................................................................................ 58

3.1 An example plot of the results of the OCAI ....................................................................................... 72

3.2 An example plot of the results of the structured interview survey ......................................................... 77

3.3 A second example plot of the results of the structured interview survey ................................................ 77

3.4 Research model on subcultural agreement with system-wide planning efforts ........................................ 81

3.5 Study Timeline ................................................................................................................................... 85

4.1 Overall culture of MUSE based on “now (solid line) and “preferred” (dotted line) respondent ratings on the OCAI ..................................................................................... 89

4.2 OCAI plots that depict the patterns of culture “now” and “preferred” associated with HQMUSE (hierarchy-clan); MILCDI (clan-clan); PRIE (mix-mix); and, ConCenWar (market-clan) .................................................................................... 91

4.3 A comparison between OCAI generated organization culture archetypes and planning archetypes associated with subunits ................................................................................. 113

4.4 Subcultural agreement patterns with HQMUSE system-wide planning process ........................................ 114

5.1 Overlay of subcultural archetypes and subcultural preferences ............................................................... 122

5.2 Overlay of planning archetypes and planning preferences .................................................................... 124
### List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Frequencies of responses to the items on the structured interview that stated, “Select the best description to characterize your department/subunit culture as it is now.”</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Average score on a seven-point scale of commitment to MUSE’s Plan stated goal number three concerning support to DoD agency strategic communications effort</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Disagreement differentials reflecting how much each subculture wants the HQMUSE planning process to change in terms of the four planning ideal types</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Diagnosing agreement/disagreement patterns associated with Process and content: adapting the Thompson and Tuden Typology</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Diagnosing agreement/disagreement patterns associated with planning process and content</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

First, I thank God for giving me life and for blessing me in knowing his Son, Jesus. My daily conversations with Him have inspired me and my success is attributable to His goodness. He set conditions in my family, work, and school so that things would emerge as they happily did. I express my heartfelt thanks and love to my family for putting up with my late nights, weekends, and early morning efforts to complete my coursework and this thesis. My bride, Carrie, my daughter, Kimberly, and sons Scotty and Carl tolerated and supported me during the tougher times. My father, God bless him, has served as a lifelong mentor to me, always providing encouragement and support throughout this and many other endeavors. I also owe so much to the United States Army and my country for having the faith and confidence in me by sending me off to graduate school, all expenses paid. I am indebted to Dr. Rupert F. Chisholm for his mentorship he gave me as his student. He exposed me to organization theory in a way that inspired me to self-learn. He also taught me invaluable techniques in teaching that have helped me tremendously in my new role as a teacher. Finally, he patiently led me (from start to finish) as my thesis committee chairman through the demanding path of my dissertation. God has truly blessed me for all of this and more. Amen.
Consideration of whether organizational subcultures agree with a system-wide planning effort can be crucial to appreciating the effectiveness of that management effort to integrate activities, priorities, and direction toward the future. Organizational culture is defined as “the taken for granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and definitions present in an organization” (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 14). As such, Cameron and Quinn (1999) call culture a major distinguishing feature that describes the social aspects of decision-making in organizations; hence, they propose culture is the “most competitive advantage, the most powerful factor [that organizations] highlight as a key ingredient in their success…” (p. 4). Open systems theory maintains that at the societal level of analysis cultural and subcultures can also be described as groups of people who share images (Boulding, 1970, p. 133) of what things are or should be. Organizations as open systems can be considered potential subcultures of a greater societal culture. Likewise, subunit, professional, or intellectual associations in organizations may form the basis for subcultures within the organizational or system-wide culture. In universities, for example,

---

1 Katz and Kahn (1978, p. 43) define “values” as “ideological justifications for roles and norms [that] express the aspirations that allegedly inform the required activities.”

2 This definition is consistent with prevailing definitions of culture found in organizational culture literature that include typically the importance of studying “values” and “assumptions” (Cameron & Ettington, 1988, p. 362). The disagreement in the organizational culture literature stems from methodological philosophy (i.e., functionalist versus semiotic) and what the dimensions of culture are (e.g., common themes, dysfunctional attributes, typologies, etc.). This research project adopts both a functionalist (e.g., use of quantitative measurement) and semiotic (culture as a metaphor rather than strictly as an organizational variable), and a typological view (i.e., Jungian-style archetypal images of culture) for studying organizational culture because the overarching purpose of the study is to develop a practical way to assess multiple cultures and how they relate to system-wide planning. Other methods and dimensions are not (at least not yet) as applicable and timely as a management tool.
“each discipline or department within the general subculture tends to develop rituals and value systems of its own” (Boulding, 1970, pp. 136-137).

Subcultures associated with subunits in organizations, by definition, will hold different patterns of underlying values that make them distinguishable from other subunit cultures (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). The intent of this study is to first diagnose whether significantly different subcultures exist in an organization and then explore whether or not these unique subcultural value patterns will be evident when members of the organizational subculture are asked to evaluate aspects of a system-wide planning effort. The results of this empirical study will serve to bridge theory associated with organizational culture and theory associated with planning and decision-making.

System-wide planning is a “formalized procedure to produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of decisions” that are interpreted by organizational members as being important to future success (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 12). This study proposes that the degree of “integration” or general agreement achieved by a system-wide planning effort is predicated on the nature of the organizational subcultures present—that agreement may be associated with unique value patterns of those subcultures. The issue for organization theory, which this study seeks to help resolve, is that these patterns of agreement are often invisible because up to now there has not been a valid and reliable way to operationalize the existence of organizational subcultures (Hofstede, 1998).
This study seeks to help remedy this issue by using a valid and reliable measure, the Organization Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI), developed by Cameron and Quinn (1999) as a theoretical derivative of the competing values framework (CVF) (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981). By using the OCAI, the first step in discriminating the existence of subcultures in an organization, one can investigate how members of these subcultures agree with system-wide planning and whether these agreement patterns are reflective of their measured cultural value patterns. Hence, the purpose of the present study is to explore how organizational subunits may have cultural values that compete with top-management induced, system-wide planning efforts.

The secondary purpose of this study is a practical one. This method of exploration should also make the nature of subcultural agreement and system-wide planning efforts more visible to both employees and management in a systematic and understandable way; hence, this exploration will serve organizations by describing a distinctive way of conducting research. To approach this style of exploratory case study research, one begins with a grounded understanding "what is" while establishing the consent of those in the system to "what should be." Hence, the methodological model offered in this case study (described in more detail the Chapter 3, Methodology) attempts to operationalize agreement associated with both existing conditions (“what is”) and preferred (“what should be”) of culture and planning within a single organization.

Unfortunately, methods to diagnose the nature of these subunits as subcultures and whether subcultures agree or disagree with system-wide planning
efforts are largely absent in the literature. The intent of this study is to increase understanding about these phenomena and how they interrelate. More specifically, this research project explores the nature of subcultural agreement with management efforts to conduct system-wide planning. The overall research question for this study is: How does lack of agreement between subculture and top management values affect system-wide planning?

Attempting to answer to this research question will also serve the advancement of organization theory in two ways (that constitute research sub-questions for this study). First, this is the first study to employ the competing values framework (CVF) based Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). Second, diagnosing organizational subcultures will increase understanding of the diverse nature of culture in organizations. Third, understanding the patterned nature of organizational culture is a key initial step toward developing planning strategies for organizational growth and development (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). Schein makes this same point:

Not only does culture limit the strategic options that are conceivable to an organization, but strategies cannot be implemented if they run against powerful cultural assumptions. [On the other hand, the]...situation of an organization may dictate a strategy that requires some culture change, so we need to understand the conditions under which change is possible, and we need insight into how to manage the process of culture change. (Schein, 1997, p. 19)

An organization should not begin to develop and implement its desires through system-wide planning unless it assesses the nature of its organizational archetype (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). That assessment should address both
the nature of the cultural values now and of those most preferred cultural values for the future (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). This study seeks to explore how organizational subcultures exist “now” and how these subcultures would “prefer” them to be to be in future. This is an important planning consideration in itself because if the assessment reveals a heterogeneous organizational culture, this knowledge alone may introduce a paradoxical intervention (i.e. a clinical strategy to promote individual and group change by pointing out sources of dissonance or incommensurability) (Siporin & Gummer, 1988). Hence, the research sub-question 1 is: What is the diagnosis of organizational subcultures “now” (i.e. do they exist) and how do these compare with diagnosed “preferences” for subcultures for the future?

Second, the answer to the general research question may reveal deep-rooted value differences (i.e. the cultural biases toward the integrating decision criteria proposed or dictated by management) that reflect a challenge for organizations as they attempt to unify decisions into the future with system-wide planning. According to Schein, subcultural diversity:

…creates the basic problem of integration and coordination that is often the most difficult part of general management in that one is attempting to bring into alignment organizational members who have genuinely different points of view based on the education and experience in the organization (Schein, 1997, p. 258).

In this regard, planning in organizations is a cultural artifact (i.e. a visible organizational phenomenon) that can reflect espoused values and deeper assumptions associated with organizational culture. Planning is a means toward goals; hence, reflects cultural “assumptions about truth, time, space, and human
relationships…” (Schein, 1997, p. 95). Relative agreement with the system-wide planning process and plan content will be affected by distinctive subcultural value patterns used to evaluate them. According to Schein, a planning effort can also affect culture:

Internal debates start among members for whom the priorities among the different functions are different, forcing the organization to confront what collectively it has assumed to be at the top of this hierarchy. If no such overarching priority is found, the group may splinter and even dissolve. On the other hand, if the debate leads to an affirmation of what the group’s ultimate mission and identity are, a strong cultural element has been formed, one that will carry forward through the beliefs and assumptions of senior management. (Schein, 1997, p. 55)

Subcultures with one set of values may produce significantly different patterns of agreement with top-management induced system-wide planning. These differences will reveal potential sources of subcultural conflict indicating substantive issues with a system-wide planning effort (i.e. whether the planning is, in Schein’s terms, producing splintering or dissolution or is forming a desired cultural element toward integration). Schein maintains that effective system-wide planning should reflect a strong element of the group’s culture by producing consensus on mission, strategies, and goals. He concludes: “If consensus fails to develop and strong subcultures form around different assumptions, the organization will find itself in serious conflict that can potentially undermine its ability to cope with its external environment” (Schein, 1997, p. 65).

System-wide planning presents ultimately a set of general criteria for valuing strategic choice and then seeks to apply them through members of the organization to specific situations (Simon, 1997, p. 109). Members of various
organizational subcultures may evaluate both the planning process and the resulting content of the plans differently. The way the organizational members determine a common set of criteria for integrated decision-making (i.e. its system-wide planning process) may be subject to disagreement among cultural “factions” (i.e. subcultures) (Lewis, 1995). Even if the planning process may be judged favorably among a diversity of subcultures, the resulting plan content (e.g., decision criteria such as formally espoused values, vision, mission, goals, and objectives) may not be (for a similar “culture audit” on espoused values, see Martin, Su, & Beckman, 1997). This study assumes that plan content can be evaluated by members independent of the planning process (Michael, 1997). Finally, as with the CVF cultural assessment, it is important to assess both “now” and “preferred” planning within and among subcultures. Hence, research sub-question #2 is: What patterns of agreement or disagreement exist among subcultures both on system-wide planning content and process and what are their corresponding preferences for future planning efforts?

The remainder of this introductory chapter summarizes this research project and

- Provides a synopsis of the combined quantitative and qualitative data collection methods used to diagnose organizational subcultures and study the relationship between culture and system-wide planning;
- Establishes the significance of the study;
- Explains briefly, the organizational setting for this case study (a Department of Defense military university for senior executives or “MUSE”3)—a diversified Defense organization

---

3 “MUSE” is used in this study as a pseudonym for the real institution in order to help protect the identity of the respondents.
that has adopted a popular system-wide planning process (the Balanced Scorecard or “BSC” developed by Kaplan and Norton, 1996);

- Delineates how the remainder of the dissertation is organized by chapter.

**Synopsis of Model and Method**

The CVF is quite valuable to students of organization theory because it helps account for multiple time orientations and paradoxes in organizations that other models are too simple to accomplish (Ofori-Dankwa & Julian, 2001). CVF “retains the possibility of making discriminations among competing interpretations” because it is a “metaparadigm theory” (Kildruf & Mehra, 1997, p. 455; Lewis & Grimes, 1999, p. 674). Figure 1.1 presents the CVF.

**Figure 1.1.** A summary of the competing value sets and effectiveness models (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981, p. 136).

CVF is a multidimensional framework that integrates several competing schools of thought on management theory (i.e. human relations, open systems,
rational goal, and internal process models) and accounts for paradoxical factors of organizational effectiveness. The four competing management models create archetypes of means and ends when plotted on two axes. The north-south axis portrays the flexibility versus control paradox; the second depicts the people (internal focus on members and technologies) versus organization (external focus on the organization within an environment) paradox. The importance of this framework to organizations and management is summarized hereby Quinn and McGrath (1982, p. 469):

This framework suggests a view of organizations that is more complex than most of the more popular diagnostic tools in organization development. It not only encapsulates more criteria than other schemes, but the criteria are embedded in contradictory or competing values. Each of the quadrants or models is important and to ignore criteria in any one of the models is to have an incomplete view. This suggests that an operating manager must consider all of these criteria in making choices and from time to time make explicit or implicit tradeoffs among them.

Quinn and McGrath (1982, 1985) introduced the use of the CVF applied to organizational culture. With the CVF, the study of organizational culture was taken to a much higher degree of theoretical complexity and applicability than previously thought possible. Figure 1.2 presents the CVF with proposed leader types and dominant management theories which correspond to four culture types: the clan, adhocracy, hierarchy, and market (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). The theory is that all four cultural types exist simultaneously in all organizations; hence, archetypes may be used to describe the pattern of organizational culture,

---

5 The CVF "offshoots" for empirical study have since included not just culture, but leadership, transformational change, information management, business communications, decision-making, ethics, etc.
appropriate leadership styles, meanings of organizational effectiveness, and dominant management theories in-use.

Figure 1.2. The competing values of leadership, effectiveness, and management theory expressed as ends and means of organizational culture (from Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 41).

This model of culture was used to develop a standardized diagnostic tool, the OCAI (Cameron & Quinn, 1999), used in the present study. The developers administered the OCAI to thousands of managers in many kinds of organizations (e.g., commercial, nonprofit, and governmental) to establish its validity and reliability. Distinctive archetypal patterns were found to be associated with these categories of organization and others.

The OCAI assesses six dimensions of organizational culture: dominant characteristics, organizational leadership, management of employees, organizational glue, strategic emphasis, and criteria for success. Each dimension is measured by respondents assigning points from a total of 100 points to four
questions that each correlate to the four quadrants of the CVF (i.e. it is an ipsative scale\(^6\)). When the survey responses are averaged across dimensions and within quadrants, the results may be graphed on the CVF to provide a holistic view of the organizational cultural archetype.

In addition, this study develops and employs a planning typology that represents four academic perspectives: *participative planning* (e.g., Lindblom, 1959/1997); *emergent planning* (e.g., Mintzberg, 1994; Michael, 1997); *analytic planning* (e.g., Bryson, 1995; Roberts, 2000); and *programmatic planning* (e.g., the Department of Defense *Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System-PPBS*). This typology serves to create for this study a portion of a structured interview with members of the organizational subcultures to frame patterns of agreement or disagreement with a “headquarters” system-wide planning effort.

Other questions are developed in the structured interview to ask informants directly for their ratings and views about how committed they are to system-wide planning, and how planning works in their own subculture. In addition, they are asked how well they see efforts to integrate planning from upper management (“higher headquarters” in military jargon) are working. Last, but not least, the study takes advantages of opportunities to ask, observe, read, and feel the nature of management in the action of planning. The researcher looks for fortuitous insights and reports “surprises” and “irony” in organizational

\(^6\) Ipsative scales are found in any test or assessment in which there are forced choices in responses or every response is scored. Their advantage is that you can detect biases or preferences among choices and get a feel for the weights that respondents give to their forced choices. In this study the relative weights that respondents gave on the scales were used by treating each choice as a single measure and then comparing like measures across groups using discriminant analysis techniques. For example, MILCDIE (the teaching department) had a clan score different from all the other subcultures/subunits (p. < .05); therefore, I selected it as a differentiated subculture for the study.
circumstances that give clues to cultural roots (Hatch, 1997; Martin, 2002). In this regard, the researcher uses CVF as a sensemaking device to categorize these qualitative findings of organizational symbolism (Pfeffer, 1981; Strati, 1998).

**Significance of Study**

The results of this case study will make a contribution to studies employing the CVF concept of organizational culture and to the more general body of research on organizational culture, especially to differentiated (multiple subcultures) perspectives (e.g., Enz, 1988; Barley, Meyer & Gash, 1988; Bloor & Dawson, 1994; Elsas & Veiga, 1994; Martin, 2002). Applying planning analysis to the CVF model of culture will contribute to empirical evidence of unique planning typologies associated with types of organizations (Miles & Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1994, pp. 397-416). This is the first time the OCAI has been used in this manner as indicated by available research published to-date and by personal correspondence with one of the OCAI authors (K. Cameron, personal communication, July 2, 2001). The study expects a key finding that addresses how theoretical concepts of culture and system-wide planning might be linked.

In addition, results of this study are expected to influence positively the organization under study, because the nature of the culture-planning agreement will be described in practitioner-oriented categories that can be then translated into organizational action (Nadler, 1977; Burke, Coruzzi, & Church, 1996; Hinrichs, 1996). In that regard, the results of this study will be presented to top-management of MUSE and general members of the organization at some future date.
Finally, this study will inform students of management because it tells a story of the dangers of those in authority who attempt to apply a popular management technique without first diagnosing the taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and definitional issues associated with organizational culture and subcultures. Witness the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, which spurred the performance–based, “new public management” movement and the five-Ds of government reform – debureaucratization; deregulation, decentralization; devolution, and downsizing.

Roberts (2000, p. 299) describes this kind of synoptic planning as “integrated comprehensiveness …a conscious effort launched by top management to integrate decisions that compose the overall strategy to ensure that plans are consciously developed, mutually reinforcing, and integrated into a whole.” Because there are official and legal mandates for this specific blend of analytic and programmatic planning – that is, GPRA-directed “strategic planning” – this sort of research is important to inform both practitioners and theorists in the field of public management.

**The Organizational Setting:**
**Military University for Senior Executives**

The following description of the organizational setting, coupled with a critical analysis of the system-wide planning method (i.e. BSC) adopted by top-management in this case, are important to set the stage for this study. The military university for senior executives (or “MUSE” -- the study’s pseudonym for one of several Department of Defense [DoD] schools) was designed and
resourced for post-graduate education and research. Graduates of MUSE have historically moved into institutional levels of national government, some having United States policy influence of international importance. Its over 600 resident and distance education students are selected competitively each year from eligible American and international military senior field grade officers and from a small pool of eligible U.S. federal civilian employees. MUSE’s mission has evolved to the following statement (edited only slightly to help protect the identity of the school):

To prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders for the responsibilities of strategic leadership; educate current and future leaders on the development and employment of military power in a joint, multinational and interagency environment; conduct research and publish on national security and military strategy; and engage in activities in support of our DoD strategic communication efforts.

What makes MUSE and ideal site to conduct this research is the diversity of the workforce, its variety of organizational subunits, and that it has a more than two-year history with a formal system-wide “strategic planning” effort. Employee categories include active duty and reserve component military officers and enlisted personnel, federal civil service personnel, and contracted civilian faculty. Occupational positions, for example, include the President of MUSE (filled by a U.S. military flag officer), headquarters staff experts (in personnel, logistics, operations, security, and intelligence), professors, lawyers, information management technicians, housing, buildings, and grounds support, instructors

---

7 Distinguished MUSE “interwar” graduates include John J. Pershing (Class of 1905), Dwight D. Eisenhower (1927), and Omar N. Bradley (1934). As of May 2001, 18 international fellow graduates have assumed duties as military service chiefs in their governments--among them are Germany, Canada, Japan, Australia, Senegal, Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea.
(civilian and military from all services, requiring either a masters or doctoral-equivalent degree), librarians, archivists, medical professionals, national security and policy researchers, and trainers.

MUSE consists structurally of a combined military-civilian headquarters element for command, control, and traditional academic support functions, college teaching departments, a research institute, and a conference center for research and war-gaming. A description of the four major subunits under study is:

- The Headquarters (pseudonym, “HQMUSE”) is made up of the President, his staff, and deans. It is structured to develop university policy and provide supervision over the support and administration of MUSE.
- The Military Campaign Department of Instruction (Pseudonym “MILCDI”) has the purpose of instructing resident students in the science and art of conducting military campaigns. MILCDI consists of approximately two-dozen faculty members, led by a department chairman, and a small support staff. Each instructor is expected to lead a 17-student seminar-style dialogue based in a standardized curriculum developed by those members appointed as faculty lesson authors and an overall course director.
- The Policy Research Institute of Excellence (pseudonym, “PRIE”) is one of several research study agents for the DoD. Its mission is to identify international security issues likely to affect the United States, its friends, and potential adversaries; analyze national security issues and, through the timely publication of studies and conduct of conferences, inform the DoD as well as national leadership of policy options; provide the DoD with a source of ideas, criticism, innovative approaches, and independent analyses; expose external audiences to the DoD’s contributions to the nation; and, provide studies and analyses to support and supplement the MUSE curriculum.
- The Conference Center for Research and Wargaming (pseudonym “ConCenWar”) mission expands and refines the study of strategic use of military power and its application in joint and combined operations, and helps senior executives solve strategic
problems with information-age technology. Its mission is to serve as an educational center and high technology laboratory, focused on the decision-making process at the interagency, strategic, and operational levels -- in support of the DoD, combatant commanders, and senior armed service leadership;

When the researcher arrived on-site, MUSE was in the process of adopting a system-wide planning process based on the popular metaphor of the “balanced scorecard” (BSC) developed by Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001a, 2001b). This adoption coincided with the arrival of MUSE’s newly appointed President, who quickly directed the use of this method because he was convinced of its utility after having been briefed by one of the authors in a previous assignment.

The thrust of the BSC management approach to system-wide planning is to develop measurements of system performance (i.e. metrics) “to communicate and align…organizations to new strategies” (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, p. viii). According to this strategic planning scheme, a continuous cycle of planning and target setting, communicating and linking, feedback and learning, and clarifying and translating vision and strategy will benefit organizational effectiveness.

The following is a critique of BSC to present insights into the nature of this popular management prescription. Kaplan and Norton present a machine image (Mintzberg, 1989; Morgan, 1997) of organization with the assumption that organizations can be guided given the proper instrumentation. In their opening paragraphs of their best selling book, Kaplan and Norton use piloting of an airplane as their metaphor (1996, pp. 1-2). According to the authors, using the correct and "balanced" performance measures is like having airspeed indicator
and altimeter among other instruments in an airplane. In short, BSC proposes a kind of mechanistic dashboard view of organization management.

Kaplan and Norton also assume that organizational vision comes from the top (senior executive management team "work together to translate its...strategy into specific strategic objectives") (1996, p. 10). Other, perhaps through more scholarly studies, have suggested that vision can and should come from anywhere in the organization, especially in turbulent environments (e.g., Trist, 1978/1997; Argyris & Schon, 1978; Senge, 1990). Kaplan and Norton also assume that management can get "buy in" by strategically communicating these scorecard metrics throughout the organization (1996, p. 12). Other, such as Weick (2000) would caution that "buy-in" is a marketing technique, not a way to build real commitment that requires respectful interaction.

BSC assumes that the whole process is technically rational because substantive outcomes (i.e. goals achievement, mission performance measures, allocations of resources, etc.) are the important focus for organizational effectiveness. On the other hand, BSC tends to ignore organizational effectiveness expressed in terms of symbolic outcomes (i.e. sentiments, beliefs, attitudes, satisfaction, values, and commitment) (Pfeffer, 1981). Non-rational or informal social issues do not account for much in this espoused theory. This assumption of BSC violates 50 years of human relations management and organization research. In addition, Etzioni (1964) warns us that organizations can become servants to their own goals rather than masters of them. Values associated with organizational culture can serve to transcend ephemeral goals
because the goals by themselves are not necessarily internalized, taken-for-granted values. In other words the values that the goals represent may not be compatible with the deep-rooted values of the organizational culture. In hierarchies, management attempts to force goals that represent values contrary to those of the culture will likely meet resistance.

In that regard, Kaplan and Norton (2001a, p. 25) claim organizational culture needs to be assessed and "aligned" to develop "team effort" to support the BSC strategy. They further assume that culture can be changed by feedback from scorecard metrics (pp. 320-321), by "sharing knowledge around shared goals" (p. 324). Unmentioned is the assumption that affected members in the organization will share these top management goals.

Finally, Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001a) stress that the desired organizational design for the BSC approach is characterized by "information sharing" in a future "networked organization. ...individuals ...linked together by their competencies instead of departmental or functional organization" (p. 325). The nature of BSC, which is a top-down driven and mechanistic method, is antithetical to the more organic nature of self-adapting networks. Even if the authors could reconcile this discrepancy, they fail to address what happens when this organizational design assumption is violated when implementing BSC. In this case study, for example, MUSE is structured much more like a traditional bureaucratic hierarchy than as a networked organization. Yet the proponents of BSC offer no additional prescription for transforming from a hierarchical to a more network-like organization.
These criticisms of BSC are germane to this study because they inform potential interpretation for management practice and future research that will be covered in Chapter 5, Conclusions. Today, public organizations are taking cues from businesses that have incorporated BSC as a popular management method with reported success (e.g., Kaplan, 2001; Inamdar, Kaplan, Bower & Reynolds, 2002; Schay, 2002; Shih-Jen, 2002); so, such critical analysis is important to illustrate the nature and potential pitfalls of the BSC system-wide planning process employed by MUSE in this case.

In summary, this case study takes place and time in the context of a U.S. Defense Department university in which top-management has adopted a popular system-wide planning method (namely, BSC). The assumptions of BSC include: its machine image or organizations; effectiveness in that top management can steer the strategic direction of the organization within its environment; and, that organizations can achieve congruent values by invoking top-down performance measures. In addition, the incongruity of the mechanistic model with more organic forms of organizing is clear. The implied values of BSC, in a CVF interpretation, seem to emphasize the lower two quadrants (a mixture of hierarchy and market values). This initial analysis clued the researcher that subcultures diagnosed with competing value emphasis in the two upper quadrants would likely not agree fully with this approach to system-wide planning.

**The Plan of the Dissertation**

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1, Introduction, provides an overview of the study’s purpose, background, methodology and
description of the case study site. Chapter 2, Review of the Literature, presents a comprehensive review of past research centered on the research question and sub-questions. This chapter develops the theory of organizational culture with particular emphasis on providing background on the CVF theory of organizational culture. It also develops conceptual ties between culture and a typology of system-wide planning efforts. This planning typology is one of the unique theoretical contributions of this study. Finally, from this review of the literature, a discussion is presented on how organizational culture and system-wide planning may be related, or be one-in-the-same. Chapter 3, Method, explains in detail, the data collection effort and how the data will be analyzed and reported. Chapter 4, Results, reports the findings of the study based on the research questions of the study. Chapter 5, Conclusions, provides interpretation and advice to organizational management and workforce and informs future research.

Conclusion

This chapter has explained the purpose of this research, developed the three research questions under study, introduced the theoretical frameworks (i.e. CVF and a study-unique planning typology) and methodology for conducting the study, covered why the study is important, and described in some detail the case study site and the planning process underway at that site. The next chapter (Review of the Literature) will delve deeper into the theoretical and methodological bases of the study.
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

The literature on organizational culture published over the last twenty years is immensely voluminous and varied. It has remained a “hot” research topic throughout these two decades and seems to continue to draw considerable attention (Martin, 2002). Likewise, published research on system-wide planning concepts (alias strategic or organizational planning, and/or strategic or organizational decision-making) is also vast and diverse (Pettigrew, Thomas, & Whittington, 2002). The first section (following this short introduction) of this review, Research Issues in Organizational Culture, will discuss and synthesize four premier works that address comprehensively the nature of and associated contemporary issues with organizational culture studies: those by Smircich (1983); Morgan (1997); Schein (1999); and Martin (2002). The section will culminate with a discussion of how the present study consider the uses of these four major views of studying organizational culture in this study.

The second section, Development of a Planning Typology, will cover the state of research on the nature of system-wide planning types in organizations. This section synthesizes research on planning and develops a typology (unique to this study) of system-wide planning useful to seek the nature of subcultural patterns of agreement with system-wide planning efforts. These first two sections will together set the theoretical basis for selecting organizational culture and system-wide planning for this study and how these concepts might be related.
Following these sections about the nature of studying culture and system-wide planning in organizations, the third section, Propositions for Study, will move to review literatures that suggest how these constructs might be studied. Specifically, the third section presents the detailed rationale for why this study intends to diagnose organizational subcultures using the competing values framework (CVF), and how organizational subcultures might reveal different patterns of agreement with system-wide planning efforts using a researcher developed typology of planning. Finally, the section will include a discussion of how linking culture and planning is expected to inform students of organization theory and management in a way that is not available in the literature.

**Research Issues in Organizational Culture**

**Culture: Organizational Variable or a Metaphor? (Smircich, 1983)**

Smircich (1983) encompasses a large body of organizational research that takes the cultural perspective. Her research question is, “How may we critically evaluate the significance of the concept of culture for the study of organization” (p. 339)? To answer this question, she describes two main schools on approaching culture as being linked to organizations: one school uses culture as an *organizational variable* (i.e. organizations have cultures) and the other school defines culture as a *metaphor* (i.e. organizations are cultures and their nature is revealed only by studying cognition, symbolism, and unconscious processes). These schools have produced distinctive research approaches to the study of organizational culture based on different sets of assumptions.
Using culture as an independent (the sociological perspective) or dependent (the anthropological perspective) construct gives the student of culture the impression that culture, no matter how complex a theoretical construct, can be either be managed by social means (i.e. a social systems theory application) or that it can be the result of other variables (i.e. revealed only by comparing and contrasting organizational cultures like anthropologists would). Smircich points out that empirical studies have had “less-than-hoped-for results” because of the complex and often misunderstood nature of corporate culture. The construct of organizational culture appears to be made up of other multiple variables yet to be determined or it may be too large a construct to ever reach such a determination. Seeking management prescriptions to change organizational culture is probably beyond reach (e.g., studying cause-and-effect relationships between organizational independent variables and the “dependent variable” of culture is likely to fail). Culture is formed in too complex a way, with mutually causal and overlapping variables, to be studied scientifically.

On the other hand, viewing culture as the deeply rooted metaphor of organization would make such management “science” a fruitless undertaking to begin with. Therefore, one can only hope to understand that the nature of culture as group images that can provide deeper meaning to management as to the way things are and could be in their organization. Management of culture becomes a matter of seeking unification of symbolic meaning or at least understanding the diversity of metaphoric meaning, because the “metaphoric process [of] seeing one thing in terms of another, is a fundamental aspect of human thought” (p. 340).
Smircich links the concept of organizational “paradigm” to this metaphoric concept of culture (p. 350). To understand the paradigm, a researcher would need to “penetrate beneath the surface level of appearance and experience to uncover the objective foundations of social arrangements” (p. 352). This symbolic way of looking at organizational life has produced a lucrative vein of phenomenological research interpreting organizational culture as the *social construction of reality* (e.g., Berger & Luckman, 1967; Pfeffer, 1981; and, Bolman & Deal, 1997).

Smircich concludes that both schools are valuable to the study of organizational culture, and together reflect a late twentieth century (and now early twenty-first century) trend in organization theory away from the more pervasive “open systems model” (1983, p. 354). The answer to her research question on how the culture framework is useful is contingent upon who is conducting the research and for what purpose. She culminates her argument by asking whether the researcher is looking for “prediction, generalizability, causality, and control” or is engaged in a quest for understanding “fundamental issues of meaning and the processes by which organizational life is possible” (p. 354)?

**Culture: Only a Metaphor Among Equals? (Morgan, 1997)**

Similar to Smircich’s ideas on symbolism, Morgan relates organizations as cultures because that metaphor (in combination with others) is useful to

---

8 Kuhn (1996) suggests "paradigm," in the sociological context, "stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community" (p. 175). As Smircich suggests, this definition of paradigm is remarkably close to her definition of culture. Also, note how Pfeffer’s definition of “organizational paradigm” comes close to the Smircich view of organizational culture: "beliefs about cause-effect relations and standards of practice and behavior, as well as specific examples of these, that constitute how an organization goes about doing things" (1982, pp. 227-228).
increase management competency — the “ability to read and understand what is happening in one’s organization” (1997, p. 355). Specifically “corporate cultures” are viewed in the same manner an anthropologist or sociologist would study “mini-societies that have their own distinctive patterns of culture and subculture” (p. 129). In this metaphoric image of organizations, cultural transitions reflect true change; hence, all change is cultural change to some degree. Morgan emphasizes the benefits that organizational culture research has provided. It has enabled us to explore patterns of culture and subculture within organizations and offers these advantages to increase management appreciation:

- The study can reveal "blindness" and ethnocentrism;
- The resulting information is useful for management who must temporarily adopt the standpoint of a stranger (i.e. become agnostic) to achieve a new perspective;
- The understanding can increase credibility of action in situations that would otherwise be managed through guesswork and hunch.
- The differences will help identify sources of fragmentation, especially in congruence with a stated strategy that may be interpreted, as would political characteristics of coalitions and countercultures.
- The research captures the significance of symbolism (revealing the organization’s social construction of reality).
- The study will provide a new perspective on impacts and roles of management and leadership, focusing on social responsibility not just technical aspects.

Morgan also cautions potential research pitfalls of studying organizational culture. First, there may be ethical issues associated with management attempts to manipulate ideology to gain control. Second, because “culture is self-organizing
and is always evolving,” snapshots of it in time may be misleading (p. 151).

Third, the most important aspects of culture can never be entirely revealed and
deep structures and assumptions may be hidden from research.

Fourth, Morgan postulates there is likely a deeply political dimension to culture,
so the significance may never be useful except only to identify factions. Finally,
Morgan emphasizes the need to determine the “dominant metaphor” and three or
four supporting metaphors in organizational images of the eight he postulates, so
the “culture” metaphor may not be appropriate to study organizations in all cases.

**Culture: Revealed Only by Basic Underlying Assumptions? (Schein, 1999)**

Schein (1999) defines organizational culture as “the learned, shared, tacit
assumptions on which people base their daily behavior” (p. 24). Schein makes it
clear that “organizational culture depends for its existence on a definable
organization,” (1983, p. 13), yet he neither addresses very clearly where the
boundaries are as a whole nor where they exist with sub-organizations.

According to Schein (1999), corporate culture can be described on three levels:
artifacts (visible organizational structures); espoused values (strategies, goals,
philosophies), and basic underlying assumptions (unconscious, taken-for-granted
beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings—the ultimate source of values and
action) (p. 16). In Schein’s model, culture can only be detected through clinical
means and then *described* in the same way national cultures can be described (p.
xiii). Schein asks the basic research question, “Why does corporate culture
matter?” in several of his books on the topic. His answer is worth repeating here:

> Organizational culture …matters because cultural elements
determine strategy, goals, and modes of operating. The values and
thought patterns of leaders and senior managers are partially determined by their own cultural backgrounds and their shared experience. If we want to make organizations more efficient and effective, then we must understand the role that culture plays in organizational life. (p. 15)

Schein rejects notions of inferring deep-rooted cultural assumptions solely from quantitative means, specifically the Organization Culture and Assessment Instrument (OCAI) used in the present study. He considers this measure of culture “correct but dangerously narrow” because it will by itself “ignore other elements of culture that are more deeply embedded and may not be noticed” (p. 28). In essence he rejects the validity and reliability of such instruments because they measure something else (such as organizational climate) rather than all underlying assumptions. Schein also attacks questionnaires, such as the OCAI, because there is no way of knowing whether the respondent actually reads the question (p. 61) and it is difficult to separate espoused values from those actually in use.

Schein stresses the importance of using qualitative study based on examining organizational external survival issues (e.g., revealed by statements of mission, strategy, goals) and internal integration issues (e.g., the nature of authority relationships) to find clues about deeper underlying assumptions (e.g., the nature of reality and truth) (p. 30). “How an organization decides to implement its strategy and goals” is one important indication of cultural content (p. 35). Example sub-questions that should be asked to reveal the answer to this question include:

- How did your own organization develop its approach to meeting goals?
• How and why did it develop the kind of structure that it has?

• Do the formal structure and the design of how work gets done largely reflect the beliefs of the founders and leaders of the organization?

• To what extents are the means used in the functional and geographic divisions the same (or different)?

• Is there evidence that your organization has strong subcultures within it? What are they based on? (pp. 37-38)

Schein stresses that culture involves an ongoing group learning process. To address the learning of culture, Schein adapts Lewinian notions of “unfreezing” and “refreezing” cultural beliefs, values, and underlying assumptions in stages of transformative change. Step one (unfreezing) involves “creating motivation to change” through “disconfirmation, survival anxiety or guilt, or psychological safety to overcome learning anxiety.” Step two involves “learning new concepts and new meanings for old concepts” through “imitation of and identification with role models and scanning for solutions and trial and error learning.” Step three ends the process by “internalizing new concepts and meanings” through “incorporation into self-concept and identity and into ongoing relationships” (p. 117).

Like Schein, Argyris and Schon (1978) and Argyris (1985) have also examined learning as an organizational process. In this theory of organizational learning, organization culture may provide members with defensive routines that sustain single-loop learning and prevent double- and triple-loop learning. Single-loop learning exemplifies the status quo, in which “success” or perceptions of effectiveness reinforce no change in beliefs, values, and assumptions. In other
words, as perceptions of feedback that effectiveness exists go up, the chances for
changes in beliefs, values, and assumptions go down. Double-loop learning
conceptually bypasses the “success” feedback loop and strives to continuously
assess alternatives; thereby, increasing receptiveness to changes in beliefs, values,
and assumptions regardless if feedback is perceived as positive. Double-loop
learning works, particularly in uncertain environments, providing that “defensive
routines” do not interfere with learning. Defensive routines are emotional
responses to alternatives because those alternatives threaten existing beliefs,
values, and assumptions and serve to block rational consideration of those
alternatives. Triple-loop learning is the same as double-loop, only that it extends
consideration of alternative beliefs, values, and underlying assumptions to outside
the traditional cultural boundary (for example, to include consideration of a
member of a foreign nation and their cultural interpretation of alternatives).

If the underlying beliefs, assumptions, and values of the organization have
produced organizational effectiveness or success in the eye of organizational
members and other stakeholders, there is no reason to question them. However,
even when confronted with evidence of poor performance or environmental shifts
that would necessitate change to those underlying beliefs, assumptions, and
values, the organization engaged in single-loop learning will exhibit defensive
routines to ignore or rationalize away these conditions. This learning theory
suggests that individuals in a healthy (i.e. learning) organization would be
receptive to these indicators despite success. Organizational members would
exercise double-loop learning (the Lewinian “unfreezing” process Schein, 1997,
refers to) and be open to consider alternatives to their now exposed beliefs, assumptions and values. Triple-loop learning would occur when the learning organization is not only cognizant of the need to change in its environmental domain and within its societal boundaries, but will extend its search for alternatives to a wider view of the environment and into consideration of other cultures’ viewpoints. In unobstructed double and triple-loop learning, organizational beliefs, assumptions, and values are no longer taken for granted. Argyris and Schon say this about the process, using the organizational culture metaphor:

…organizational may refer to the processes by which individuals become socialized to the culture of the organization. Or organizational learning, in a deeper sense, may refer to the processes by which organizational category-schemes, models, images, or cognitive modes are transformed in response to error, anomaly, or inconsistency. Finally, organizational learning might be taken to signify the process by which members of an organization become cognizant of the social reality they have jointly constructed, subject that sense of reality to critical reflection, and seek deliberately to transform it. (1978, p. 328)

Schein (1999) stresses that any serious researcher of organizational culture seeks to describe these learning patterns as an acculturation process in the organization under study.

**Culture: Integrated, Differentiated, and/or Fragmented? (Martin, 2002)**

Martin (2002) discusses in detail the advantages and disadvantages of three research perspectives and the methodological issues that must be addressed in the study of organizational culture. Martin advises the organizational culture researcher to be clear which assumptions are made while constructing a methodology: Does the researcher design a quantitative and objective versus
qualitative and subjective study, or both? Is the researcher after generalizable findings (e.g., requiring sampling techniques across multiple organizations) versus situational-unique findings (e.g., requiring rich analysis of single case study)? Does the researcher take an etic (outsider) or emic (insider) position? Is the researcher adopting a managerial (outcomes-oriented) versus a workforce (democratic) perspective? Martin states that culture researchers must think carefully through these epistemological issues as well as where they stand on both theory and research-interest questions that help develop their study plan. Martin distills the research literature on organizational culture to three perspectives: integration, differentiation, and fragmentation. In that light, her definition of culture is from a researcher’s point of view. Culture research is an:

…in-depth, subjective interpretation of a wide range of cultural manifestations (a generalist rather than a specialist view), both ‘ideational’ and ‘material.’ [Organizational culture] must be viewed from all these perspectives simultaneously:

- **Integration** – some interpretations are shared by all members;
- **Differentiation** – different interpretations exist among groups, creating subcultures that overlap and nest in terms of harmony, independence, or conflict.
- **Fragmentation** – Individuals and groups may interpret with ambiguity, with irony and paradox, and irreconcilable tensions. (p. 120)

Martin writes furthermore, “the boundaries of culture and the boundaries of an organization are not identical” (p. 319). Unlike Schein who views organizational boundaries as important to the formation of organizational cultures, Martin (2002) maintains that to suggest organizational subordinate units
(subunits) are subcultures is too simplistic and that the researcher would have to view the subunit from all three of these perspectives to understand the “nesting, overlapping, and interpenetrating” nature of culture (p. 318). She concludes future research should examine “espoused and inferred content themes” of organizations as evidence of values and basic assumptions that may be shared, different, or fragmented.

**Addressing These Theoretical and Methodological Issues in This Study**

From these four contemporary works on the study of organizational culture, issues emerge that governed research decisions made about how this study will approach the study of organizational culture. The purpose of this section is to help increase the validity of the present study by evaluating the research concepts and design (delineated in detail in the next chapter) against these issues.

**Smircich’s Dichotomy**

Considering the Smircich (1983) conclusions, the culture-as-a-variable versus culture-as-a-metaphor dichotomy is not mutually exclusive under the CVF model of culture. Cameron and Ettington (1988), in their careful review of the literature on organizational culture, explain how the variable-metaphor duality proposed by Smircich (1983) is addressed uniquely with the CVF model of culture. CVF portrays organizational cultures as complex, nonlinear patterns created by measuring six organizational *variables* (dominant characteristics, leadership, management, social “glue,” strategic emphases, criteria for success).
and by making comparisons across four organizational metaphors: the clan, the
adhocracy, the market, and the hierarchical.

Using a precursor to the OCAI used in the present study, Cameron and
Ettington (1988) investigated congruent relationships between organizational
culture strengths that were relevant to certain components of educational
effectiveness using a sample of 334 American colleges and universities. The
“clan” culture was linked to higher student educational satisfaction, personal
development, faculty and administrator employment satisfaction, and
organizational health. The “adhocracy” culture type was linked to higher levels
of student academic development, student career development, professional
development and quality of the faculty, and system openness to community
interaction. The “market” culture type was linked to the ability to acquire
resources. The “hierarchy” culture was not linked to any of the highest ratings on
these areas. This study marked the unique combination of studying culture as
both as a “variable” (in terms of measures of organization effectiveness) and as
descriptive metaphor (in terms of archetypes).

The reason the CVF model of culture is capable of meeting both of the
Smircich requisites at the same time is that it provides the basis for what Mitroff
(1983) has called “archetypal (social) systems analysis” (ASA). In Mitroff’s
“first order” ordering of characters and human systems levels, the ability to
employ archetypes for analysis provides “the most symbolic, universal … image
of character type known to man” (1983, p. 390). ASA gets closer to the true
nature of organizational character than would the “traditions of cybernetics or
open systems theory” at all organizational levels (p. 389). Unlike these other analytic approaches, the ASA properties of CVF include:

- The number of archetypes is not fixed, constant or static because contradictory properties can exist simultaneously (p. 392);
- Each archetype is contained within all the other archetypes; therefore, “neither the psychological nor sociological [type] is more real or fundamental than the other” (p. 395).

Measures across the six CVF variables enable the researcher to plot amoeba-like cultural patterns among the four metaphoric types. It also permits ASA at individual, group, organizational, and interorganizational levels (Cameron & Quinn, 1999).

**Morgan’s Concerns**

On the up side, the advantages of organizational culture study mentioned by Morgan (1997) (e.g., reveal "blindness" and ethnocentrism) are also advantages in the present study. By demonstrating various patterns associated with different emphasis across CVF culture types has great potential to allow management to leverage these advantages. The third proposition of this study involves interpretation of findings for management, employees and future research.

Morgan’s concern about the ethics of managerial manipulation of culture is also a major concern in this study. The researcher articulates clearly that the present research is not designed as a contrived cultural intervention in behalf of management, but rather uses an exploratory case study to investigate the nature of the organization culture and subcultures. The present study intends to share results with all members of the organization through electronic messaging and
electronic bulletin boards. In addition, the present study is not just engaging top-
management personnel, but also collects data from other organizational members
at all levels. In any event, the current body of research is quite uncertain as to
whether culture can be managed, or whether culture manages the organization.
The literature suggests that culture more likely drives managerial choices rather
than the other way around (summed up in this quote): “Culture is like surfing for
a wave. You cannot make a wave. All you can do is wait and watch for the right
wave, then ride it for all it’s worth” (Martin, 2002, p. 257). Hence, leadership and
management may be able to shape culture, but this is a recursive relationship and
culture may also shape leadership. These concepts must be considered along with
other influential forces (the environment, disasters, serendipity, etc.).

In the present review of the literature, the researcher found no evidence to
support a proposed cause-and-effect relationship between measuring substantive
outcomes (i.e. goals achievement, mission performance measures, allocations of
resources, etc.), promulgating that knowledge to employees, and thereby changing
culture. Rather, the research strongly suggests the another paradigm – that
managers can only hope to shape culture by employing symbolic means (i.e. by
employing leadership that focuses less on measures of performance and more on
developing the shared sentiments, beliefs, attitudes, satisfaction, values, and
commitment of followers) (Klapp, 1966; Pondy, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981; Smircich &
Morgan, 1982; Hunt, 1984; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985; Smith &
Peterson, 1988; Thayer, 1988; Gioia, & Chittipeddi, 1991; Marshak, 1993; Trice
& Beyer, 1993; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; Fairhurst, Jordan, & Neuwirth, 1997;
Morgan’s (1997) second concern challenges the organizational researcher who takes single snapshots in time to describe or measure the nature of the culture under study. This study seeks to remedy this potential shortfall by taking multiple measures and by collecting data over approximately eighteen months of conducting surveys, observing, and through structured interview discussion with a cross-section of members of the organization. Research suggests that no single quantitative measure or qualitative method suffices to discern the nature of the overall culture and subcultures; hence, this study seeks to collect multiple forms of cultural data over time.

Third, Morgan points out that much of culture will remain hidden no matter what methods are employed. The developers of the CVF model of culture, operationalized by the OCAI, do not claim to cover comprehensively all cultural phenomena in organizations (Cameron & Quinn, 1999), but to address values associated with organizational effectiveness. CVF relies heavily on the pivotal investigation of organizational effectiveness by J. P. Campbell (1977) who identified thirty factors strongly associated with organizational performance. J. P. Campbell also concluded the factors were too conflicting to use traditional factorial analysis techniques in order to come up with a practical framework for a wide diversity of organizations.

Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) challenged the J. P. Campbell conclusion by introducing a multidimensional framework that integrated several competing
schools of thought on management theory (i.e. human relations, open systems, rational goal, and internal process models) and accounted for paradoxical factors of organizational effectiveness. The four competing management models create archetypes of means and ends when plotted on two axes. The north-south axis portrays the competing values of flexibility versus control; the second depicts the competing values of people and technology (internal focus on members and how work is accomplished) versus organization survival (external focus on the organization within an environment).

This study makes it clear that the CVF provides only one theoretical perspective on the nature of culture (i.e. as multiple perspectives of organizational effectiveness); therefore, it is limited by both theory and generalizability from a single case. On the other hand, this study does not rely solely on CVF, but combines quantitative and qualitative methods to find other evidence of cultural manifestations that do not necessarily correspond to the CVF model (e.g., by discovering what the patterned differences are in planning within and among subunits that may provide support that these subunits constitute actual organizational subcultures). For this study, the researcher’s interpretation of what is happening in the organization is not just based in CVF, but includes drawing from other theoretical perspectives (e.g., the four views discussed above from Smircich, 1983, Morgan, 1997, Schein, 1999, and Martin, 2002 among others).

For example, other key organizational culture theorists include Trice and Beyer (1993) who carefully examine the research available on the “consequences
of culture” from a management perspective and these controversial aspects of organizations:

- Single (unified or shared) culture versus multiple subcultures.
- Consensus versus dissensus associated with culture.
- Distinctive versus universal elements of culture.
- Rigid versus malleable cultures. (p. 13)

It is clear that the researcher included these and other controversies in the research questions and design of this study.

Fourth, Morgan (1997) postulates that the importance of culture research may not be useful except to expose political factions. Perhaps, but this study not only seeks to investigate whether subcultural-related “political factions” exist, but whether they demonstrate unique patterns of agreement with a system-wide planning effort. These findings may give a new meaning to the political nature of organizational political ideologies (a related metaphor to organizational culture).

By examining another phenomenon (in this case “system-wide planning”) coupled with the subculture phenomenon, there is potential to advance knowledge beyond just exposing the existence of political factions. For example, one quantitative study (Koene, Boone, & Soeters, 1997) investigated within- and between-group (i.e. subcultural) agreement along organizational leadership and climate variables. They found that subcultures (identified by statistically variant levels of agreement) were determined largely by organizational structure, demography, and climate. Koene, et al. found that larger organizations tended to have more heterogeneity of culture (i.e. more subcultures) than smaller ones. Another finding from the study was paradoxical: the more subunits, the more homogeneity of agreement on system-wide decisions (e.g. policy). The
speculation provided by these researchers was that smaller sub-groupings in larger organizations may provide a structural way for organizational-level espoused values to be presented and accepted; hence, building more homogeneity (or integration) of organizational culture. The present study will consider these potential patterns as well, oriented specifically on agreement patterns of system-wide planning efforts.

Finally, Morgan (1997) maintains that the “culture” metaphor may not be appropriate to study organizations in all cases because other metaphors may more suitably dominate the case situation. The researcher in this study will consult with organizational informants to determine an “in-use” dominant metaphor(s) of organizational image and whether there is a different preferred (i.e. “espoused”) metaphor(s) based in Morgan’s typology of images. The results of these informant consultations about organizational metaphor will be examined as potential cultural and/or counter-cultural perspectives.

**Schein’s Cautions**

Schein’s contempt for using survey instruments to measure culture, particularly the OCAI, stems from his proposition that the researcher cannot possibly understand the deeper assumptions because surveys touch only the surface of the organization. However, Schein fails to look deeper into the twenty years of research and theoretical underpinnings of CVF (e.g., he cites only the Cameron and Quinn, 1999, book in his reference list). Ofori-Dankwa and Julian (2000), for example, consider CVF to be one of the most complex theoretical frameworks available to organization researchers, yet Schein seems to have fallen
into his own metaphoric trap – he failed to examine these deeper interpretations available on the theoretical nature of CVF. Nevertheless, his criticisms are important; hence, the present study does not rely solely on the use of the OCAI and permits qualitative confirmatory information about subcultures associated with other lines of organizational culture research.

It is also important in this study to consider Schein’s views on the acculturation process because there is substantial evidence to support this theory of learning. Elsas and Veiga (1994) explain the acculturation process also using the Lewinian force-field approach. In this case, Elsas and Veiga present the process of blending two organizational groups as the social corollary to functional differentiation-integration suggested by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). Lewinian acculturation is a "…dynamic interaction between opposing forces of cultural differentiation, or the desire of groups to maintain their separate cultural identity, and organizational integration, or the need for cultural groups to work together" (p. 3). In other words, subcultures maintain differences while the organization as a whole strives to change toward integration, causing acculturative tension.

From these causes of acculturative tension, organizational and professional subcultures take on characteristics of political entities or advocacy coalitions in organizations. Van Maanen and Barley (1985) postulate that these organizational power arrangements are a function of both formal (i.e. subunits) and informal groupings (i.e. subcultures); thus, the respective formal subunits and informal subcultures will affect the way things get done in organizations as would political constituencies.
Schein (1999) incorporates these Lewinian views on how management can promote organizational culture change. He claims that culture can be managed as a learning process and he cites a multiple organization development case studies that support this claim. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, academe is undecided on whether management of change applies to organizational culture. For example, Peters and Waterman (1982) study a series of cases and make conclusions about the nature of cultures of high performance businesses. These authors maintain that culture can be “shaped” by management (p. 103). In addition, leadership research indicates the normative role of the “cultural leader” is to transform meaning and revise underlying assumptions (e.g., Burns, 1978; Trice and Beyer, 1993; Bass, 1998; Bjerke, 1999). However, while narrative case study analysis is prevalent in these studies, there is a really a dearth of sophisticated empirical studies that have demonstrated that management intervention can substantively alter underlying assumptions associated with culture (Pfeffer, 1992).

Even if effects are detected (usually through correlational analysis), researchers may actually be exercising form of retrospective rationality (Pfeffer, 1982, p. 117; Weick, 1995) that explains change with “reverse causality.” In other words, this view would suggest the culture could have changed management that now sees the opportunity to “ride the wave.” As they think back, management and researchers may falsely attribute cultural change to interventionist actions, when in reality, the causation was more circular (Weick, 1995, 2000). For example, it might be that management is driven by
organizational culture as much or more so than the culture is affected by management strategy (Knights & Willmott, 1987). Weick (2000) is also critical of the Lewin model (used by Schein in his explanations) because “[w]e sometimes forget that Lewin presumed that there was a high resistance to change and that strong emotions are often needed to breach the resistance” (p. 235). Weick argues persuasively that a more contemporary management approach should instead seek to “freeze continuous change” (Weick, 2000, pp. 235-236) by promoting learning organization processes vis-à-vis the seminal works of Argyris and Schon (1978) and Senge’s (1990). Freezing continuous change is Weick’s corollary to sustaining double- and triple-loop organizational learning, rather than the process being episodic.

Despite the controversy, the present study does not assume management can intervene to change culture, but does assume that organizational members can at least explore organizational culture and subcultures regardless if cause and effect relationships exist (Smircich, 1983; Martin, 2000). As mentioned, exploration is an important process of this case study; therefore, the study includes assimilating information associated with how subcultural value differences may translate into complex agreement issues that may influence the effectiveness of system-wide planning efforts. Schein’s Lewinian pattern of how cultures are learned and change is an important theoretical consideration for this case study. For example, the researcher must note any evidence of defensive routines or lack of them, especially in the planning process, that are tied to cultural beliefs, assumptions, and values. Such insights are important as an
adjunct to the main purpose of the study. Any evidence of the learning process in this case will be reported.

**Martin’s Issues**

Perhaps the most sophisticated methodologist on the contemporary study of organizational culture, Martin (2002) insists the organizational culture researcher be clear which assumptions are made while constructing their methodology. This study answers each her concerns as follows:

- Does the researcher design a quantitative and objective versus qualitative and subjective study or both? In this study, both methods are combined to provide a richer and more internally valid product.

- Is the researcher after generalizable findings (e.g., requiring sampling techniques across multiple organizations) versus situational-unique findings (e.g., requiring rich analysis of single case study)? In this study, the choice was to conduct a situational-unique, case study with the advantage being a richer appreciation of the nature of organizational culture.

- Does the researcher take an etic (outsider) or emic (insider) position? The researcher has a unique ethnographic advantage in his roles as both a burgeoning university scholar and senior military officer, with both roles serving as bases for legitimization of data collection. The researcher in this study takes emic (outsider) and etic (insider) positions because both perspectives are important to the qualitative study organizational culture (Martin, 2002, p. 36).

- Is the researcher adopting a managerial (outcomes-oriented) versus a workforce (democratic) perspective? This question is similar to that posed by Morgan (1997). This study articulates clearly that the present research is not designed as a contrived cultural intervention in behalf of management, but rather an exploratory study into the nature of the organization culture and subcultures. The researcher in this study takes a holistic view of the organization and is neither predisposed to examine it from the top-down nor from the bottom-up.

- Will the research go beyond assuming that subunits are equivalent to subcultures? Based on the methods, no such assumptions are made. The data will likely reveal subunits with uneven patterns of values that overlap, are distinctive, or represent fragmentation. However, to
anchor the analysis on the subunit is a logical way to examine these possibilities. The plan for this study’s methodology allows this and its theoretical basis capitalizes on the strengths of CVF.

- Will the research reveal “espoused and inferred content themes” of organizations as evidence of values and basic assumptions that may be shared, different, or fragmented? Formal statements (vision and goals) from organizational planning documents in the present study reveal espoused content. Informants from organizational subcultures are surveyed and interviewed about how they view both the process of creating these documents and how committed they are to the stated vision and goals. This is the basis of the overall research question in this study, rephrased in Martin’s terms as: is subcultural commitment to the system-wide plan content and planning process revealed as shared, different, or fragmented? These patterns will be methodically addressed in the present study.

**Development of a Planning Typology for This Study**

In order to assess system-wide planning agreement or disagreement patterns associated with organizational subculture, this study develops a typology of planning process ideal types. This study proposes that asking respondents to weigh the relative presence of these ideal types in both subunit and system-wide planning may reveal unique patterns in various subunits. A variety of planning process types is available in the literature and this study synthesizes those into four categories. But first, it is important to address how organizational culture and system-wide planning are theoretically related.

Trist summed up the theoretical relationship between culture and system-wide planning when he stated, “when common values are shared by large numbers of people they become able to undertake congruent courses of action” (1981, p. 40). This statement implies that when those values are not shared (or inculcated), system-wide courses of action can be difficult to implement because of the value disagreement among individuals and groups. For example, this
would include the proposition that members of subcultures who have high “clan”
values would perceive lack of participation with top-management in the process
as grounds for disagreeing with the process all together.

This proposition has received empirical support. In their seminal research,
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) found that subsystems in organizations develop goal
orientation toward its relevant sub-environment. “Sales personnel were more concerned
with the market [external competition] sub-environment, whereas production personnel
were concerned primarily with the technical-economic [internal processing] sub-
environment” (p. 21). Lawrence and Lorsch found that studying differences in various
functional units with presumably different cultural attributes, to be crucial in determining
differentiation in organizations. The nature of the environment and the tasks performed
by subgroups in the organization shaped these prevalent subcultural attributes. Lawrence
and Lorsch suggest that how well organizations integrate differentiated units depends on
the “locus of influence” (how much members at different levels of the hierarchy have
influence on the way things are).

Ouchi (1982) suggests that a strong adhocracy culture (he calls “theory
Z”) would prefer “wisdom, experience, and subtlety” in a planning process over
“quantitative analysis, computer models, and numbers, numbers, numbers” that
are more characteristic of market and hierarchical cultures. Planning decisions in
adhocracies are favored if there is less attention to “analysis of facts” and “serious
attention to questions of whether or not this decision is ‘suitable,’ whether it
‘fits’” the organization. This suggests that organizational subunits with a stronger
preference for adhocracy values would disagree with a top-management imposed
planning process that reflects hierarchical values.
Likewise, Mintzberg proposes this about planning in adhocracies:

Strategy formation is a most complex and nontraditional process in adhocracy, taking on especially shades of the grass roots model....There is thus a great need to have participants understand it, which highlights the importance of the catalyst role....And because the strategies of adhocracies tend to be emergent, the role of finding strategies likewise becomes crucial. (1994, p. 409)

Subunits with strong preferences for adhocracy values (such as creativity and open-endedness) would tend to disagree with a top-management attempt to implement a planning process that represents hierarchical values (such as control and accountability).

In light of these conceptual points, this study examines possible differentiation of clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy values that has occurred in the formation of subunit subcultures. It examines this differentiation in terms of how members of various subcultures view top-management imposed system-wide planning. Members of different subcultures may perceive that top-management is attempting to impose its set of values on their social system. In this study, the “headquarters subunit” values are examined in relation to subunit values.

Strong cultures, reflecting homogeneity of values and assumptions within an organization, would seemingly make “goal alignment, motivation, and control” easier for the organization (Kotter & Heskett, 1992, p. 18). However, as Lawrence and Lorsch found, weak organizational cultures (reflecting heterogeneous patterns of beliefs and values between groups in the organization) can also produce “excellent performance” (p. 21). Similarly, Cameron and Freeman (1991) investigated the relationship between cultural congruence,
strength, type and organizational effectiveness in 334 colleges and universities. They found that the CVF culture type (dominant values in one quadrant of either clan, adhocracy, market, or hierarchy) to be more efficacious in predicting performance than congruence or strength. Incongruent culture with other organizational systems or components (in this case leadership and strategic emphasis) was not a significant factor in determining organizational effectiveness. One proposed reason by the authors is that disagreement associated with culture type produces paradoxical conflict that spurs collective action toward a solution—a necessary prerequisite for organizational change, especially in turbulent environments (Van de Ven & Poole, 1988).

From an open systems theory perspective, Trist (1978/1997) counsels organizations that face uncertainty to consider systematically, the conflicting views among groups. This philosophy:

…requires the collaboration of interest groups…identification of shared values (common appreciative systems in Sir Geoffrey Vickers’ [1965] sense); continuous learning…; and continuous evaluation and modification. It is an open-ended unfolding process. Ackoff has called it “adaptive planning.” (Trist, 1978/1997, pp. 523-524)

In the present study, that systematic process includes a way of relating CVF cultural value patterns (i.e. culture type) to a topology of planning process alternatives. This “adaptive planning” concept would be indicated by how organizations change the relative weights incorporated in opposing planning types. Developing a planning topology that permits a study of planning patterns that reflect culture is the subject of the following paragraphs.
Judgment, strategic orientation, and organizational types are key to
distinguish “ideal type” alternatives to the planning processes in organizations.
For this study, a typology is developed that synthesizes the works of Vickers
(1965) on judgment, Miles and Snow (1978) on strategic orientation, Mintzberg
change process types. These works are synthesized across all four types (other
works, e.g. Stone, 1997, are also introduced within the descriptions of one of the
four types that are not applicable across all the types).

Vickers (1965) developed four types of appreciative system judgments to
include political, learning, reality, or instrumental. Similarly, Miles and Snow
(1978) presented how administrative action is planned by virtue of these four
strategic orientations: reactor, prospector, analyzer, or defender. Mintzberg’s
(1994) discusses of planning types associated with these five organizational types
(two are combined in this typology): professional, adhocracy and
entrepreneurial, diversified, or machine. Garud and Van de Ven (2002) proposed
four strategic change process types: dialectic, evolution, teleology, or life cycle.
The resulting typology of four planning ideals used for this study is a synthesis of
these works (among other works cited within each type described below) and are
described in the following paragraphs.

“Participative” Planning

Planning requires political judgment because “the many who have been
affected by the choices of the few have become increasingly able and ready to
insist that their manifold interests be taken into account” (Vickers, 1965, p. 123).
“Making decisions in the polis” involves “persuasive appeals mounted by people with stakes in the outcome” (Stone, 1997, pp. 242-243). This kind of planning gives “close attention to detail and focus[es] primarily on issues related to…functional specialties; hence, when the external environment warrants change, the challenge is to obtain consensus toward a system-wide change effort while considering of the prime value given to these functional specialties (Miles & Snow, 1978, p. 127). Planning includes building a consensus in the plurality—so the plans process is participatory, open to dialogue, and sensitive to affected members of the organization. The planning sequence is Compromise Process Consensus ➔ Compromise Content Consensus ➔ Act (i.e. indicating the need to compromise with affected members before acting). This type of planning is associated with professional organizations found in hospitals, universities, and other skilled and craft services (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 398). The fundamental importance of relationship building must be acknowledged in this type of planning. Hence, the process used depends on guidelines for engaging various participants through the design of forums, steering committees, and so forth; that is, structuring the planning process to enhance the human relations aspect of planning for change. In its pure form, this planning ideal type may be problematic because the organization tends to react to forces for change from the environment (Miles & Snow, 1978). Thompson and Tuden (1959/1987) called this type of decision-making "judgment," commonly found in collegial structures (p. 198). Garud and Van de Ven characterize this type of strategic change process as “dialectic change,” where political struggles cause change “in a pluralistic
world of colliding events, forces, or contradictory values that compete…” (2002, p. 209).

“Emergent” Planning

Also referred to as “planning to learn” (Michael, 1997), this type of planning is required when it becomes necessary to learn “new valuations” and increase “skill in valuing” (Vickers, 1965 p. 74). Values guide decisions and not specific directions from a hierarchical authority structure. Because learning is never complete, the plan is never complete (Weick, 1995). Planning is loosely coupled and dispersed, connected typically only by a shared meaning of the potential growth and development of the organization. Planning is not centralized but is a form of dispersed trial-and-error throughout the organization that relies understanding of emergent factors and is oriented on “problem finding and contingent upon feedback from experimental action” (Miles & Snow, 1978, p. 61). “Retrospective sensemaking” or selecting, after the fact, from among these experiments contributes to “enacting the environment” (Weick, 1995). The planning sequence is “ActÆEvaluateÆPlan” (p. 62). Stated in the analogy of a rifle range would be “ready-fire-aim-fire-aim” (Mintzberg, 1994, pp. 291-292), signifying planning as the last step rather than the traditional second step (see “analytical planning” below) or first step (see “programmatic planning” below). This planning type is common in adhocracy-type organizations that face highly dynamic environments characteristic of “high technology” firms and have nonelaborated and flexible structures attributable to small businesses (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 398). “Broad targets and a set of milestones…[leave] considerable
flexibility to adapt to the dead ends and creative discoveries along what must remain a largely uncharted route” (p. 409). In its pure form, this planning ideal type is problematic because the organization tends to lose efficiencies associated with prospecting in the environment (Miles & Snow, 1978). Continuous experimentation and feedback are part of an organizational learning capacity to make good decisions (Argyris & Schon, 1978). Thompson and Tuden (1959/1987) called this decision type "inspirational," found commonly in “anomic” or anarchic structures (p. 198). Garud and Van de Ven name this the “evolution” type where the “knowledge-based view” of strategy is dominant. Shared knowledge about emerging environmental change is the “most significant resource” of the organization in order to adapt and survive (2002, p. 139). Weber expressed this logic about deciding one’s future is based in “rational orientation to an absolute value” of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other forms of behavior (i.e. wertrationalitat), entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of external success (1921/1999, pp. 3-4).

**“Analytic” Planning**

This type of planning requires reality judgment when projections about the future are made “from observations and…communications by mental processes often complex and prolonged, resulting in inferences, forecasts, estimates, and conclusions, which may be stored and further processed to an extent still unknown” (Vickers, 1965, p. 75). Hence, planning is based on evaluation of the environment with the intent to remain constantly ready for contingencies. Based on these contingencies, new programs are developed for testing. The planning
sequence is “Evaluate→Plan→Act” (i.e. indicating evaluation of the environment for opportunities and threats) (Miles & Snow, 1978, p. 75). Mintzberg attributes this type of planning to “diversified” organizations that attempt to exercise financial and performance control over diverse subunits (1994, p. 411). Traditional uses of a top-down “strategic planning” or “synoptic planning” (such as that suggested by the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act) fall into this category (e.g., Bryson, 1995; Roberts, 2000). In its pure form, this planning ideal type is problematic because the organization is constrained by the limits of their own analyses of a given environmental domain (Miles & Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1994). Thompson and Tuden (1959/1987) called this decision type "compromise," found commonly in “representative” structures (p. 198). Garud and Van de Ven describe this type as the “teleology-based” change process, where change is guided by goals and desired end-states (2002, p. 208). In Weberian terms, the logic of this process is zweckrationalität, that is, it makes use of organizational insider and outsider expectations as “conditions” or “means” for the successful attainment of the top management’s own rationally chosen ends (1921/1999, pp. 3-4).

**“Programmatic” Planning**

This type of planning requires instrumental judgment when “some disparity between the current or expected course of action…and the course which current policy sets as desirable or acceptable standard” (Vickers, 1965, p. 86). Formal planning is necessary to make marginal adjustments to existing programs with the purpose of gaining efficiencies through formal budgeting processes,
relatively fixed planning documents, and the use of policy directives. The planning sequence is “Plan→Act→Evaluate” (Miles & Snow, 1978, p. 43). Mintzberg refers to this type as “strategic planning in machine organizations” (1994, p. 398). In its pure form, this planning ideal type is problematic because the organization is constrained by the defensive nature in protecting their existing structures and processes within a given environmental domain (Miles & Snow, 1978). Thompson and Tuden (1959/1987) called this decision process the "computation" type, found commonly in bureaucratic structures (p. 198). In the Garud and Van de Ven typology of strategy, this is considered the “life cycle” type where institutionalization of “rules and programs…require developmental activities to progress in a prescribed sequence” (2002, p. 209). Weber referred to this way of thinking as traditionally oriented, through the habituation of long practice (1921/1999, pp. 3-4).

Because these planning four planning types (participative, emergent, analytic, and programmatic) reflect similar values found in the organizational culture types (respectively, clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy). That is, the patterns of planning processes within organizational subunits should roughly correspond to their subcultural patterns. The theoretical rationale is that planning processes are cultural artifacts (Schein, 1997); hence, by measuring planning process patterns one can find matching patterns of measured organizational culture. In short, the present study should reveal the recursive\(^9\) nature of culture and planning. That recursiveness can be better understood by operationalizing the

---

\(^9\) Bateson (1979) distinguishes “lineal” systems from the mathematical concept of linear relationships. “Lineal describes a relation among a series of causes or arguments such that the sequence does not come back to the starting point….The opposite of lineal is recursive” (p. 251) (emphasis in original).
measure of both culture (using the OCAI) and planning patterns (using a unique instrument developed for this study), one can better understand why organizational members might disagree with top-management imposed interventions (such as system-wide planning). This is because subcultural agreement patterns associated with planning ideal types (presented above) should theoretically be a close reflection of competing values found with CVF subcultural archetypes (presented in detail in the next section). The following subsections (subculture diagnosis, planning process diagnosis, subculture agreement with system-wide planning, and interpretation for management and future research) will explore the theoretical steps to investigate this research proposition. In the form of this study’s overall research question, that proposition is restated as: *How does lack of agreement between subculture and top management values affect system-wide planning?*

**Subculture Diagnosis**

The first step in this research study is to determine whether organizational subcultures exist and particularly whether different subcultures can be distinguished among a variety of subunits. Subcultural diagnosis addresses the first research sub-question: What is the diagnosis of organizational subcultures “now” (i.e. do they exist) and how do these compare with diagnosed “preferences” for subcultures for the future? The available literature on CVF will be next covered in this section to inform this diagnosis.

Organizational culture is defined in this study as “the taken for granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and
definitions present in an organization” (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 14). Inside an organization, “subunits such as functional departments, product groups, hierarchical levels, or even teams may reflect their own unique cultures” (p. 15). The “taken for granted values” associated with organizations and their subunits can be distinctively revealed by unique patterns of beliefs about organizational effectiveness. These beliefs are associated with how organizational members give value to the structure (i.e. relative value of stability versus flexibility), focus (i.e. well-being of the members versus the whole organization itself operating in an environment), and organizational means and ends (i.e. processes, such as planning and goal setting versus final outcomes, such as resource acquisition) of the organization (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981, p. 131).

These dimensions associated with structure, focus, and ends and means form continua that when plotted in a foursquare archetypal form. The resulting pattern framed by this typology of ideal types allows a glimpse at the paradoxical nature of competing perceptions of organizational effectiveness. Quinn and Rohrbaugh named this typology the competing values framework (CVF) (Figure 2.1). CVF proposes that all of these “competing values” exist to some degree in all organizations; however, determining the pattern of relative weights of these values demonstrates the uniqueness of how a particular subunit organization and its members interpret organizational effectiveness – based on the relative balance associated with these competing values.
These unique patterns are developed by the dynamics of interpersonal relationships among the members and groups and through environmental influences – these patterns are not static. Emphasis placed in any quadrant will shift, revealing an “interpersonal marketplace” of value tradeoffs among coalitions or interest groups (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981, p. 138) as the organization interacts with a changing environment. Hence, CVF, by its nature of conceptualizing “competing” values, is grounded in the Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) transactional model of organizations, where:

The organization is a coalition of groups and interests, each attempting to obtain something from the collectivity by interacting with others, and each with its own preferences and objectives. The result of these interactions and exchanges is the collectivity we call organization…. organization participants make contributions to the collectivity and receive inducements to ensure their continued participation. Organizations, then, are quasi-markets, in which influence and control are negotiated and allocated according to which organizational participants are most critical to the organization’s continued survival and success (cited in Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981, p. 138).

Figure 2.1. A summary of the competing value sets and effectiveness models (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981, p. 136).
Building on how CVF describes conceptually the ways organizations can produce unique value patterns, Quinn and McGrath (1985) developed a corresponding model of organizational culture. This model of organizational culture is based on the four logics of effectiveness ideal types associated with CVF theory of organizational congruence. The CVF definition of congruence is defined as “a theoretical state where personal information-processing styles, leadership orientations, organizational forms or cultures, and external demands are matched in such a way that contradiction and paradox are less prevalent than they are in states of incongruence” (Quinn & McGrath, 1985, p. 330). The four culture types are:

- A consensual or “clan” culture (associated with the upper left CVF quadrant), collective information processing (discussion, participation, and consensus) is assumed to be means to the end of cohesion (climate, morale, and teamwork).

- A developmental or “adhocracy” culture (associated with the upper right CVF quadrant), intuitive information processing (insight, invention, and innovation) is assumed to be a means to the end of revitalization (external support, resource acquisition, and growth).

- A rational or “market” cultures (associated with the lower right CVF quadrant), individual information processing (goal clarification, logical judgment, and direction setting) is assumed to be a means to an end of improved performance (efficiency, productivity, and profit or impact).

- A rational or “hierarchical” culture (associated with the lower left CVF quadrant), formal information processing, documentation, computation, and evaluation) is assumed to be a means to the end of continuity (stability, control, and coordination). (p. 325)

Cameron and Quinn (1999) have operationalized these cultural ideal types in terms of archetypal value patterns measured within this framework (Figure
2.2). Uniqueness of culture, according to the CVF model, is determined by the relative weights of these values that reflect the way the group imagines “how things are” and “how things should be.” The relative differences among groups associated with these patterns (i.e. cultures) reveal insights as to the cultural heterogeneity (i.e. a weak culture associated with existence of multiple value patterns associated with subcultures) or homogeneity (i.e., a strong culture associated with a single pattern of values) of the organizational culture.

The CVF theory of culture postulates that cultures change as a result of *transcendence* (a parallel concept to the open systems view of autopoiesis and double- or triple-loop learning” suggested by Argyris and Schon (1978).

**The Clan Culture.**
A very friendly place to work where people share a lot of themselves. It is like an extended family. The leaders, or the heads of the organization, are considered to be mentors and perhaps even parent figures. The organization is held together by loyalty or tradition. Commitment is high. The organization emphasizes the long-term benefit of human resources development and attaches great importance to cohesion and morale. Success is defined in terms of sensitivity to customers and concern for people. The organization places a premium on teamwork, participation, and consensus.

**The Adhocracy Culture.**
A dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative place to work. People stretch their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. The organization's long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means gaining unique and new products or services. Being a product or service leader is important. The organization encourages individual initiative and freedom.

**The Hierarchy Culture.**
A very formalized and structured place to work. Procedures govern what people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and organizers who are efficiency-minded. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is most critical. Formal rules and policies hold the organization together. The long-term concern is on stability and performance with efficient, smooth operations. Success is defined in terms of dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low cost. The management of employees is concerned with secure employment and predictability.

**The Market Culture.**
A results-oriented organization whose major concern is with getting the job done. People are competitive and goal-oriented. The leaders are hard drivers, producers, and competitors. They are tough and demanding. The glue that holds the organization together is an emphasis on winning. Reputation and success are common concerns. The long-term focus is on competitive actions and achievement of measurable goals and targets. Success is defined in terms of market share and penetration. Competitive pricing and market leadership are important. The organization style is hard-driving competitiveness.

**Figure 2.2.** The organizational culture profile (from Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 58).

The CVF theory of culture postulates that cultures change as a result of *transcendence* (a parallel concept to the open systems view of autopoiesis and double- or triple-loop learning” suggested by Argyris and Schon (1978).
Transcendence occurs when members and groups in the organization must confront a paradox and the pattern of values they held are no longer adequate to deal with that paradox (Quinn & McGrath, 1985, p. 331). Paradox is the “simultaneous presence of contradictory, even mutually exclusive” values that are perceived most often in turbulent times (Cameron & Quinn, 1988, p. 3).

Transitioning paradox constitutes transcendence to a new value pattern (i.e. no matter how slight, a different culture emerges) (Ford & Backoff, 1988).

Transitioning through paradox is a fundamental process for organizational change, because:

…attempts to resolve or accommodate the paradox bring about change and foster development (movement to higher levels) or dedevelopment (movement to lower levels). Resolution attempts that emphasize one pole over the other…ignore dualities and the equilibriums they maintain…. Disruptions of equilibrium result from the dynamic interplay of different levels and force organizations to seek different equilibriums….Confronted with the apparent pressure of the opposite pole exerting itself—the disruption—organizations attempt to cope through deviation dampening or counteracting processes…. However, embracing the paradox allows for the possibility…of a new form and development [that] will continue through transcendence to a higher level. (Ford & Backoff, 1988, pp. 108-109)

Recognizing paradox exposes absurdity of a buried premise or of some preconception previously reckoned as central to the theory of action or thinking process of a person, group, or organization. Paradox brings about “crisis in thought” because of surprise, humor, ponder, and muse by exposing falsehoods from what were thought of as paradigms, principles, laws, or facts. "Learning paradoxes revolve around processes of sensemaking, innovation, and transformation that reveal interwoven tensions between old and new" (Lewis,
2000, p. 765). This process was suggested at the individual level almost a half century ago by Festinger (1957), which he termed “cognitive dissonance theory,” and is here applied at the group and organizational level.

Transcendence to higher development and growth plants again the “seeds of contradiction” for the future (i.e. eventual return to formalization and routinization of values that can again serve as inadequate means to cope with an even newer paradox). This is why organizations cannot equate congruence with excellence (a conclusion about effectiveness often drawn from linear thinking about organizations), but effectiveness is actually an evaluation of evolutionary and nonlinear pattern shifts in congruence and incongruence as new paradox emerges (Quinn & McGrath, 1985, p. 333). Making matters even more complex, when cultural value patterns are different in organizational subunits, shifts occur differently in time among them. Hence, any system-wide attempt (e.g., through planning) to align values or unify direction can be problematic.

**Diagnosing Planning Process Agreement or Disagreement Patterns**

Again, stated another way, this study proposes that subunits in organizations may develop unique subcultures that represent CVF value patterns different than management (in this case a military-style headquarters) wants as an integrative whole. The CVF concepts about paradox portray organizational change as transitional shifts in cultural value patterns. Determining how these agreement patterns look in relation to each across subunits will address the second research sub-question: What patterns of agreement or disagreement exist among subcultures both on system-wide planning content and process and what are their
corresponding preferences for future planning efforts? Contrary to the intent of system-wide planning -- to have an integrating effect on decision making into the future-- both the content of plans and the process of planning and may be grounds for significant disagreement among subcultures.

Subcultures represent different value patterns; hence, member judgments about system-wide planning efforts will be biased toward those value patterns. A system-wide planning effort to form goals is likely to be challenged passively or actively by disagreeing coalitions; therefore, to be effective the planning process often becomes one of bargaining (Cyert & March, 1999, p. 33). Indeed, empirical studies have confirmed the conflictual nature of system-wide planning and the negotiation process needed to maintain these efforts among diverse organizational subunits with different “logics of action” (Bacharach & Mundell, 1993; Bacharach, Bamberger, & Mundell, 1995).

When this conflict arises, it produces a planning paradox for management in the face of environmental uncertainty. Affected members of an organization may become aware that “those involved in goal setting” have restricted “goal choices” developed from their limited interpretation of their own “rational data and models;” hence, that interpretation could become subjected to “ridicule and challenges of fraud” by those affected members (Michael, 1997, p. 172). On the other hand, if goal choices are not restricted to values determined by management only (based only in their data and models), “then the door opens for preferences, values, ideologies, and feelings that underlie them to become an explicit part of the goal-setting process” (p. 172). Both the planning process and the resulting
plan content must reflect shared meaning among the affected organizational members and this can only achieved through their participation.

Using the typology of planning ideal types developed above, it is possible to develop research methods that will reveal both how subunits plan and how they, as distinct subcultures, view integrative planning efforts of top-management. By comparing the results of this method of investigating planning archetypes with the results of the method to assess the existence of CVF subcultural archetypes, this study breaks new ground.

**Interpretation for Management Practice and Future Research**

Interpreting the archetypal nature of subcultural agreement or disagreement for management is important so that managers can decide to take action or at least appreciate the nature of internal conflict. Thompson and Tuden (1959/1987) describe a typology of uncertainty about agreement with organizational decision-making and types of action that may also be appropriate to system-wide planning. The typology is “built around beliefs about causation and preferences for possible outcomes:”

- When there is agreement on both causation and preferences, the [ideal] decision-making process is one of computation.
- When there is agreement about causation, but disagreement about preferred outcomes, the [ideal] process is compromise.
- When there is disagreement about causation, but agreement about preferences, [ideal] decisions are based on judgment.
- But when there is disagreement about both causes and outcomes, [ideal] decision-making is by “inspiration.” (cited by Michael, 1997, p. 172)
In the present study, the Thompson and Tudlen typology of agreement is extended by operationalizing “preferences for possible outcomes” as the pattern of subcultural agreement on plan content and “beliefs about causation” as the pattern of subcultural agreement on the planning process. In this study, four patterns of subcultural agreement may serve as actionable feedback to organizations and management: agreement requiring computation of performance measures of the accepted plan content and planning process; agreement requiring compromise about process, based on accepted content; agreement requiring judgment on content, based on accepted process; and, agreement requiring inspiration because of disagreement with both content and process.

In theory, management has to consider that members of organizational subcultures might evaluate system-wide planning efforts quite differently and this study seeks to find an effective way to discern these differences. Distinctive subunit subcultural values may be strong enough to be ideological in nature; hence, subunits may take on characteristics of political entities or advocacy coalitions in organizations (Elsas & Veiga, 1994), either disagreeing with the planning effort imposed by others (such as a dominant coalition or in this case a “headquarters”) or wanting to get involved in the politics of creating and implementing a planning effort based in their different subcultural values.

**Conclusion**

The findings in this study are expected to contribute to the growing body of knowledge about how to study culture in organizations and how to appreciate
that differentiated subcultures in organizations might reflect differing viewpoints on management integration efforts (in this case system-wide planning). By systematically employing CVF in the study of organizational subcultures along with the typology of planning processes developed for this study, practitioners and future researchers can gain new insights into how knowledge of different values, underlying assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and definitions can inform management efforts to integrate through system-wide planning.
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

In a case study done by an alert social scientist who has thorough local acquaintance, the theory he uses to explain the focal difference also generates predictions or expectations on dozens of other aspects of the culture, and he does not retain the theory unless most of these are also confirmed. In some sense, he has tested the theory with degrees of freedom coming from the multiple implications on any one theory. The process is a kind of pattern-matching in which there are many aspects if the pattern demanded by theory that are available for matching with his observations on the local level.

--D. T. Campbell (1975, pp. 181-182)

Introduction

The opening quote reveals quite accurately the nature of studying organizations. Armed with theory (in this case a competing values framework for studying organizational culture and a unique planning typology), the researcher enters this case study site in a kind of “pattern-matching” mode, looking for ways to sample the nature of the organizational culture, planning efforts, and garner insightful “surprises.” This does not imply that a solid methodological approach is not valued, but that the organizational researcher must walk the balance beam between looseness and tightness in the execution of the study. While this chapter is written to demonstrate that a “tight” methodology was prepared, the researcher was also prepared to be flexible during execution to ensure valuable observations and related serendipitous qualitative and “opportune” quantitative data could be gathered that was unplanned. In a way, this way of researching exemplifies the author’s typology of planning explained in Chapter 2, Review of the Literature. Traditional scientific-style research is a plan that espouses a strong mixture of analytic and programmatic “controlled”
approaches. A more postmodern research plan would emphasize the more “flexible” participative and emergent approaches. All four approaches are valuable and are all used to varying degrees in the design of this study.

This remainder of chapter will develop the case study method employed here. This involves discussion on how the research will diagnose subcultures, find patterns of subcultural agreement with system-wide planning efforts, triangulate qualitative and quantitative data, and how fortuitous consultations with organizational members and planned surveys will inform the findings. Next, the Chapter will present the guiding propositions under study. Finally, the Chapter will discuss the strengths and limitations of this case study methodology and present the planned timeline.

The Embedded Case Study Method

The overall research question for this study is repeated here,

- How does lack of agreement between subculture and top management values affect system-wide planning?

The two sub-questions (that address diagnosing subcultures and diagnosing planning agreement patterns) are restated here:

- What is the diagnosis of organizational subcultures “now” (i.e. do they exist) and how do these compare with diagnosed “preferences” for subcultures for the future?
- What patterns of agreement or disagreement exist among subcultures both on system-wide planning content and process and what are their corresponding preferences for future planning efforts?
To best address the research questions and achieve the purpose of this study, the researcher selected a Type II (i.e. multiple embedded, single case design) case study method, using a mixed methodology of both quantitative and qualitative assessments (Yin, 1994; Cresswell, 1994). One of the principal applications of case studies is to answer “how?” questions and “explain the causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental strategies” (emphasis in original, Yin, 1994, p. 15). The research questions in this study explore the nature of links between subcultures and system-wide planning in a real-life organization. Yin (1994) stresses the need for a research action plan that articulates specific research questions, units of analysis, the logical and theoretical links among the data, and criteria for interpreting the findings. A Type II, or an “embedded case study,” involves more than one unit of analysis in a single case.

Cresswell (1994) emphasizes that combined qualitative-quantitative designs are advantageous when necessary to better understand the concept being explored. This study seeks to leverage this advantage by incorporating quantitative survey measures of culture and planning agreement with multiple qualitative data obtained through observation, consultation, reading archived materials, and from promoting conversation with questions asked during a semi-structured interview process.

D. T. Campbell (1975, p. 187) stresses the confirmatory value of case study research is increased “when the theory has been chosen without knowledge of these confirmations.” In this case, the use of the OCAI to diagnose subcultures
is not documented in the literature; hence, if findings do not reveal distinctive subcultures with the use of the OCAI, this in itself is an important finding and adds something important to the body of knowledge on organizational culture.

Sub-Question 1. Diagnosing Subcultures

To address sub-question 1, first quantitative survey measures are employed. Up to now, measuring organizational culture has been problematic for researchers. Hofstede reports that methodology on measuring culture could not yet permit measurement of potential subcultures (1998, p.5). However, with the development of the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) (Appendix A, Part I), this is no longer the case (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). Again, this is the first study to employ the CVF-based OCAI to measure the existence of organizational subcultures.

The OCAI is a 100 point ipsative scale that asks respondents for both “now” and “preferred” ratings of culture (Appendix A, Part I). The validity of the OCAI has been established (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). First of all, it has been established through the external validity (i.e. does the framework make sense in real life situations?) of CVF, in which the OCAI is based. A diversity of published research studies and books using CVF has been noteworthy. These include executive leadership (Hart & Quinn, 1993), group decision making (Reagan & Rohrbaugh, 1990), ethics (Stevens, 1996), transformation (Brown & Dodd, 2000; Quinn & McGrath, 1985; Hooijberg & Petrock, 1993), self-managed teams (Yang & Shao, 1996), policy reform in the federal government (Ban, 1995), budgeting (Dunk & Lysons, 1997), business communications (Quinn,
management information systems (Cooper & Quinn, 1993), human resource
development (McGraw, 1993), management training and development (Quinn,
1988; Sendelbach, 1993; Quinn, Faerman, Thompson, & McGrath, 1996; Quinn,
2000), quality of working life (Quinn & Spreitzer, 1991), organizational learning
(Berrio, 1999), and culture (Winchip, 1996; Howard, 1998; Cameron & Quinn,
1999, Dastmalchian, Lee, & Ng, 2000). The comprehensiveness of CVF research
has achieved a remarkable status in organization management theory and practice.
The external validity of the OCAI is enhanced greatly by this status.

Cameron and Quinn (1999, pp. 68-69) have developed the psychometric
properties of the scale so that it is possible to discern gross differences among
diverse types of organizations (i.e. agriculture, forestry and fishing, N=72;
finance, insurance, real estate, N=172; manufacturing, N=388; mining, N=21;
construction, N=9; public administration, N=43; service, N=127; retail and
wholesale, N=44; and transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary
utilities, N=127). The OCAI appears to have external validity when measures are
associated with varying missions and tasks associated with these groupings.

The internal validity of the OCAI (i.e. does it measure what it is supposed
to measure?) has also been supported. The six content dimensions of the OCAI
(dominant characteristics of the organization, leadership style and approach,
management of employees, organizational glue, strategic emphases, and criteria
for success) were developed to reflect “how things are” in organizations
(Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 137). While the developers admit these are not
comprehensive, they provide an “adequate picture of the type of culture that exists” (p. 137). Because the instrument was developed as an ipsative scale (with relative weights assigned by the respondents across all six content dimensions), it has external validity because it approaches the complexity and paradox found in organizations. Resulting profiles (or archetypes) plotted from the results of the OCAI enable the researcher to detect congruency or in congruency associated with these values. Based on which quadrant in the resulting plot receives the most emphasis, research can discern what type of culture the organization possesses.

Cameron and Quinn (1999) also report three ways that internal validity was supported (e.g., through multi-trait and through multi-dimensional scaling analysis). First, twenty-three out of twenty-four comparisons showed correlations among the scales derived from the same quadrant were significantly higher than with comparisons the others. For example, all “A” responses in each of the six dimensions correlated higher than when compared to “B,” “C,” and “D” responses. Secondly, sixteen of twenty-four scales in the same culture type showed significant correlations. Third, these two independent methods were examined with Kendall’s co-efficient of concordance (the result was .764, p<.001) (p. 142). Multidimensional scaling produced similar significant results as well.

The OCAI has also been tested for reliability (i.e. the “extent to which the instrument measures culture types consistently”) (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 139). For example, Quinn and Spreitzer (1991) developed Cronbach alpha
coefficients of better than .70 for each culture type as rated by almost 800 participants from 86 different public utility firms. Yeung, Brockbank, and Ulrich (1991) studied over 10,000 executives in over 1,000 businesses and achieved a Cronbach alpha close to .80 for all OCAI culture ratings. Kalliath, Bluedorn, and Gillespie (1999) used structural models of CVF to test an earlier-developed scale of the OCAI (Quinn & Spreitzer, 1991). The results yielded “excellent validity and reliability estimates” (p. 143). Cameron and Quinn (1999) cite additional studies that have had similar results.

OCAI operationalizes the competing values framework (CVF) model of organizational culture. For the purposes of this study, the operational definition of subculture is: a distinctive pattern reflecting a CVF cultural archetype that identifiable groups of people in an organization have rated on the OCAI. Using the multivariate technique of discriminate analysis (Kachigan, 1991), these CVF patterns can be diagnosed as differing significantly from the overall organizational cultural patterns in which they are embedded. Discriminate analysis also permits identification of subcultural CVF patterns that differ significantly from each other. Organizations can have both an overall CVF cultural pattern and a multiplicity of CVF subcultural patterns (Trice & Beyer, 1993, p. 174).

Personal data relating to respondent subunit assignment are collected as part of the OCAI questionnaire (Appendix A, Part III, Other Information). Other categories, such as category of employment, length of service, previous employment experience, education level, race/ethnicity, and age are also obtained
from the respondent. These potential contributors to subculture formation are derived from a synthesis of the literature on organizational subculture (Van Maanen and Barley, 1985, pp. 39-47; Cox, 1993; Trice and Beyer, 1993, pp. 176-179; Bloor and Dawson, 1994, p. 283; Schein, 1997, p. 256). These data are used as the basis for discriminant analysis\(^\text{10}\) of CVF subcultural patterns in order to evaluate their potential contribution to subunit culture formation—i.e. ensuring these factors are considered while assigning an OCAI- measured CVF culture type to a subunit. Only three subunits that had the largest statistically significant differences on the OCAI results from the other subunits and as compared to the overall culture. These were selected for further study. The subunit subcultural patterns resulting from data collected on the OCAI may be plotted on the CVF model as follows (Figure 3.1):

![Figure 3.1. An example plot of the results of the OCAI. This illustrates the “cultural patterns” associated with this organization based on “now” (solid line) and “preferred” (dotted line) ratings on the OCAI. This plot indicates this organization’s cultural type is “The Clan” based on a high score in that area for both “now” and “preferred” ratings.](image)

\(^{10}\) Discriminant analysis is a multivariate technique that permits prediction of between-group membership. In other words, the technique finds the variables that discriminate the groups that you already know. Similar to regression analysis, this analysis determines relationships for given values based on predictor variables. The techniques incorporates both regression analysis and analysis of variance.
These plots can indicate differences in patterns within-groups (indicating how things are now versus how they should be) and also when compared between-groups (indicating the existence of subcultures).

**Sub-Question 2. Diagnosing Planning Agreement/Disagreement Patterns**

To address sub-question 2, the study extends Mintzberg’s (1994) definition of formal planning. System-wide planning is operationally defined as *evidence of a formal effort to integrate decision-making across subunits in an organization*. That evidence includes written documents explaining the system-wide planning process, written products that list strategies, goals and objectives, agendas for planning meetings and conferences, and informal consultations with those subcultural members involved in creating a future for the organization.

Virtually all studies of planning as decision-making have used *content* (operationally defined as evidence as to what the plans or decisions are about), *process* (operationally defined as evidence of how planning and decisions flow through the organization), and *importance* (e.g., categorized as operational or strategic) as variables for analysis (Miller, Hickson, & Wilson, 1999, p. 55).

Categorization of importance for the purposes of this study is twofold. First the study develops questions about how the subunits conduct operational-level plan internally. It also asks respondents about the headquarters efforts to conduct system-wide, “strategic-level” planning. Assessing the content and process variables in planning is discussed in more detail as follows.

**Plan Content Agreement/Disagreement Quantitative Measures**
The extent of subcultural agreement on plan content is obtained by questionnaire that surveys agreement on vision, mission, goals and objectives published by the organization. Agreement with content is measured with an addendum to the OCAI (Appendix A, Part II, Strategic Management Survey). Participants are asked to rate on a Likert scale (O'Sullivan & Rassel, G. R., 1999) of 1 to 5 (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree) their level of agreement with the formally espoused statements of organizational mission, vision, values, goals and objectives. Subcultural agreement patterns associated with content are interpreted through discriminant analysis (Kachigan, 1991). These findings are corroborated later with structured interview questions that ask selected informants to gauge their level of commitment to the stated vision and goals. Levels of commitment are derived from Senge (1990, p. 220):

1. Commitment
2. Enrollment
3. Genuine compliance
4. Formal compliance
5. Grudging compliance
6. Noncompliance
7. Apathy

Senge also maintains that efforts to integrate members of the organization must achieve levels 1 and 2 (“above-the-line) in order to be effective.¹¹ Results

---

¹¹ According to Senge, ideal vision and goals statements align one's personal vision and goals of the organization's. This is inherently the problem with top-down developed and promulgated vision and goal statements. While an organization may get role congruence (i.e. from the role of the "good soldier," who will support it with professional rigor), this is still a form of compliance versus commitment. This is still "below-the-line." This is how Burns (1978) defined the difference between transactional and transformational leadership. A transformational leader-follower relationship finds a way to gets to a shared vision that puts "fire in the belly" and it is transformational because it fundamentally alters symbolic meaning (i.e. culture). Recall the movie
from this interview data will be analyzed to determine if unique subcultural patterns are detected (i.e. are there differences in the way members of subcultures rate their commitment levels?). In addition informants are asked to choose a definition (among five offered) to a key institutional-unique concept contained in the plan content (i.e. “military strategic leadership”). This will reveal presumed “tacit knowledge” about this term and whether all in the organization actually share the same meaning of it. Variances in their responses to this definitional issue will be analyzed for subcultural differences.

**Planning Process Agreement/Disagreement Quantitative Measures**

Evidence of agreement on the planning process is obtained through structured questions that are part of the overall semi-structured interview (Appendix B, Part III, Planning Process Questions). Interview data are collected from 42 interviewees selected purposefully (Babbie, 1973) from four of the distinctive organizational subcultures (clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy) identified by the results of the OCAI. The four subcultures are selected from the population of subcultures based on strength of CVF patterns associated with

---

Spartacus, when each his men stood up together and said, "I am Spartacus" when their lives could have been spared by simply turning him over. At that point, they were not followers and he the leader (i.e. roles), they were all committed to the same vision (i.e. freedom from slavery or die). With the risk of sounding a bit hokey, this is a good illustration of why "management" is not the only component to organizational effectiveness (and may not even be the principal one). Leadership and followership, on the other hand, are the mutually rewarding relationships that express powerful and shared symbolic meaning.

12 A purposeful sample size of at least 10 interviewees from each of the subunits (population sizes range from 27-82) was determined sufficient and supportable in this organizational setting to establish a “typical subunit case” (Patton, 1990). Purposeful selection ensures a variety of positions can be sampled that represent the general demographics of military experience and education level (critical factors based on analysis of initial OCAI results, whereas, age, ethnicity, and duty position had little impact statistically) of the population of that particular subunit; ensures at least one year experience in the organization (to establish historic reference to the planning effort); and, ensures that the interviewees have adequate knowledge of the system-wide planning effort (have participated to some extent in the two year old planning process).
“now” ratings of clan, adhocracy, market, or hierarchy. Purposive sampling has these characteristics:

- The researcher selects the sample based on his knowledge of the population (in this case organization volunteers who have direct knowledge of the system-wide planning effort).

- The category of membership is visible (in this case belonging to an identified clan, adhocracy, market, or hierarchy subculture). (Babbie, 1973, p. 106).

Determining planning process agreement quantitatively requires respondents from various subcultures to rate on “now” and “preferred” system-wide planning (i.e. how things are planned now versus how they would want them to be planned in the future). Measured agreement with system-wide planning process (both “now” and “preferred”) can also be quantitatively assessed in a semi-structured interview of the same purposeful sample, using the planning ideal types developed for this study (participative, learning, analytic, and programmatic).

The results associated with responses to this portion of the semi-structured interview are interpreted against the identified subcultures again using the multivariate discriminant analysis technique (Kachigan, 1991) and by comparing graph plots derived from OCAI results (Figure 3.1) to planning archetype plots for individual subunits (Figure 3.2) and their ratings about system-wide planning (Figure 3.3). Interpretation of the results of this analysis will be based on whether measured patterns of agreement on current planning process and alternative preference correspond uniquely to the nature of the diagnosed subculture types.
Figure 3.2. An example plot of the results of the structured interview survey. This illustrates the “planning patterns” associated with this organization based on “now” (solid line) and “preferred” (dotted line) ratings on the OCAI. This plot indicates this organization’s planning is predominantly of the “participative” type.

Figure 3.3. A second example plot of the results of the structured interview survey. This illustrates the “planning patterns” associated with the top management or this imaginary “headquarters of the organization based on “now” (solid line) and “preferred” (dotted line) ratings on the OCAI. This plot indicates this organization’s planning type is predominantly of the “programmatic planning” process.
Triangulation of Quantified Data with Qualitative Data

Qualitative assessments of subculture type, plan content, and planning process agreement are also obtained through the semi-structured interviews to triangulate with the tentative quantitative findings (Appendix B, Part I). Subculture type is confirmed by asking the participants to read organizational culture profiles descriptions of clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy culture ideal types provided by Cameron and Quinn (1999, p. 58). The participants are then asked to rate which description represents their subunit best and why? The interviewer solicits stories that illustrate the nature of this culture type (Martin, Su, & Beckman, 1997). The researcher triangulates these data with the quantitative findings from the OCAI results. This procedure attempts to add to the validity and clarity to the OCAI findings.

Evidence of whether members of subcultures would prefer alternatives to the formal plan content (i.e. to formal statements of mission, vision, values, goals and objectives) is also collected also during semi-structured interviews (Appendix B, Part II, Questions on Planning Content). Questions pertaining to the planning are asked to establish and distinguish subculture group planning types in comparison with the system-wide types. Participants are also asked to comment on why they favor a particular type of planning (Appendix B, Part III, Questions on Planning Process). Finally, the interviewer solicits, through conversation, stories and anecdotes that illustrate the nature of this planning type.
Qualitative data collection will generally adhere to the Sathe (1983) model of diagnosing culture (ask, observe, read, and feel). Specifically, qualitative data collection will take the following forms:

- **Researcher Consultations (Ask).** Notes taken by the researcher during consultation and interview sessions with the participants in meetings and offsite conferences. These consultations are either scheduled or opportunistic (e.g., a fortuitous meeting in the hallway). These will serve to provide rich descriptions of the organizational setting, the nature of the system-wide planning effort, and the behaviors of the participants. They will also serve to describe subtle differences in planning preferences among the subcultures.

- **Researcher Observations (Observe).** Notes taken by the researcher through observation during meetings and off-site planning conferences. These will serve to provide rich descriptions of the organizational setting, the nature of the system-wide planning effort, and the behaviors of the participants.

- **Researcher Examination of Archived Materials (Read).** Notes taken by the researcher from- and copies made of- pertinent written archives (books, papers, reports, memorandums, policies, procedures, and planning documents) that relate to the nature of the organizational culture and subunit/system-wide planning efforts. These will serve to provide rich descriptions of the history of the organization, the nature of documented planning efforts, and the opinions of the participants.

- **Researcher Interpretation of Responses to Open-Ended Questions (Feel).** These are asked during a semi-structured interview process (Annex B) and during consultations. The researcher will interpret these responses in terms of further evidence that describes culture type, planning type, and pattern of agreement.

**Fortuitous Consultations and Surveys with Management and Workforce**

Because of the researcher’s unique “insider” status (as a member of the organization under study), he anticipates fortuitous opportunities to observe and interact with members of the organization, especially with management. These
make opportunities for other quantitative and qualitative data collection possible.

For example, while gaining approvals necessary for this study, the researcher was approached by two key managers to help design a management survey questionnaire to frame issues for an upcoming off-site strategic planning conference. The data from this survey, and from other such fortuitous data collection are also incorporated to support planned quantitative and qualitative data collection interpreted in Chapter 4, Results and Chapter 5, Conclusions.

**The Research Model**

In light of this methodological approach, the researcher developed the following research model for studying organizational culture and system-wide planning in a “military university for senior executives” (hence, the pseudonym “MUSE”) (Figure 3.4).
Research Question: How does lack of agreement between subculture and top management values affect system-wide planning?

Sub-question 1. What is the diagnosis of organizational subcultures “now” (i.e. do they exist) and how do these compare with diagnosed “preferences” for subcultures for the future?

1. Diagnose Overall Culture & Subculture Types:
   Clan, Adhocracy, Market, or Hierarchy
   (“Now” and “Preferred”)

   Data Collection: OCAI and semi-structured interviews

2. Interpret System Wide Planning Effort Subcultural Agreement (“Now” and “Preferred”)

   Data Collection: OCAI Survey Part II, data from semi-structured interviews, researcher observations, consultations with management, and interpretation of archived materials.

   Agreement on Plan Content and Planning Process
   Agreement on Planning Process but not Plan Content
   Agreement on Plan Content but not Planning Process
   Disagreement on both Plan Content and Planning Process

Sub-question 2. What patterns of agreement or disagreement exist among subcultures both on system-wide planning content and process and what are their corresponding preferences for future planning efforts?

Figure 3.4. Research model on subcultural agreement with system wide planning efforts. Step 1 is to diagnose subcultures associated with organizational subunits using the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). Step 2 is to interpret how these subcultures demonstrate agreement or disagreement patterns.

Strengths and Limitations of this Case Study Methodology

The use of the CVF model of culture is a major strength of this study. CVF is considered to be a complexity “level three” theory of organization (Ofori-Dankwa & Julian, 2000). There is a tradeoff between theory complexity and empirical measurements associated with testing theory. Ofori-Dankwa and Julian (2000) link theoretical frameworks to levels of theory complexity and compare them based on the criteria of exclusivity (“whether a particular theory emphasizes the use of only one core concept or several core concepts to describe or predict the organizational phenomena being studied”) and endurance (“extent to which
the core concept of a particular theory is presented as relatively stable and unchanging or as unstable and changing") (p. 419). “Contingency theory” (handling one time orientation at a time) is the lowest rated theory on the complexity scale, having high exclusivity and low endurance. Next, “cycle theory” (which permits changing time orientations) has high endurance but low exclusivity. While chaos theory occupies the highest level of complexity (low exclusivity and very high endurance), CVF is the next highest (low exclusivity and relatively short endurance). Unfortunately chaos theory by its nature is nonlinear, and involves shifting patterns of time orientation configurations that are difficult to model. CVF, however, is nonlinear, handles multiple time orientations at once, and is simpler to apply than chaos theory (pp. 419-420). The most appealing feature of the CVF model of culture is that it can portray unique value patterns of organizational subunits that are understandable to organizational members (see Figure 3.1 above).

Because this is the first known attempt in examining patterns of system-wide planning agreement at the subcultural level, the methods and results are expected to break new ground for future field research. Nevertheless, the generalizability of this exploratory study should be considered extremely limited for the four reasons that follow. First, the sampling techniques employed are not random. For example, a purposive sampling technique was employed to conduct the semi-structured interviews based on the researcher’s assessment of participants that represented the four OCAI-identified subcultures. While statistical analysis using nonparametric means is an acceptable practice in
nonrandom sample social science studies, the study admits this weakness and cautions readers to not generalize the results to other populations.

Second, although the OCAI is a well-developed, valid, and reliable instrument (e.g., Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Kalliath, Bluedorn & Gillespie 1999), the developers emphasize that the CVF model of culture, operationalized by the OCAI, does not claim to cover comprehensively all cultural phenomena in organizations. Instead it offers an intuitively appealing and relatively easy way to “organize organizational culture types” (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 17). The purpose of the instrument is to provide a way for members of organizations to “discuss and interpret key elements of organizational culture that can foster change and improvement” (p. 17). CVF uses semiotics – both metaphor (i.e. “clan,” “adhocracy,” “market,” and “hierarchy”) and irony (a nonlinear image that creates “a disjunction between the conventional image of reality and the reality it represents”) (Oswick, Keenoy, & Grant, 2002, p. 299). The use of these semiotic devices “can only be seen as creating ‘partial truths’ about organizations” (p. 297).

There are other scholarly means to assess culture in organizations to include qualitative approaches (e.g., Dennison, 1990; Cox 1993; Sathe, 1983; Martin & Frost, 1999; Ringer & Robinson, 1996; Zeffane, 1996; Schein, 1999; Martin, 2002) and quantitative approaches (e.g., Kendall, Buffington, & Kendall, 1987; Cook, & Rousseau, 1988; Hofstede, Neuijen, & Sanders, 1990; Harrison & Stokes, 1992; Jermier, Slocum, Fry, & Gaines, 1991; Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Hofstede, 1998; Bridges, 2000). Nevertheless, the advantages of using the OCAI
are that it enables the researcher to address multiple groups in the organization at the same time (Cameron & Quinn, 1999) – something not possible with qualitative-oriented ethnographic research. The established strength in validity and reliability associated with the OCAI is an attribute which none of the previous quantitative measures of organizational culture has demonstrated.

Third, the local development of the semi-structured interview used in this study (Appendix B) is developed in the context of the organization studied. The validity or reliability of these questions for use with other organizations is not established. Only after replications of the process of developing similar interview questions in other case settings can the general method employed here offer substantial grounds to enhance any proposed theory of an organizational culture and system-wide planning relationship.

Fourth, the quantitative method used during the semi-structured interview to confirm culture type inferred from the results of the OCAI could be seen to have potential threats to validity. The issue is that the researcher essentially asked the same or at least very similar question that was asked in the OCAI (but not in the ipsative scale form) (see Appendix B, pp. 147-148). Nevertheless, this risk to validity was offset for three reasons. First, the researcher could not tell whether the interviewed respondent had responded on the first survey, so the second was a double check. Second, the responses were asked for eighteen months after the first and this served to check for subculture stability. Third, the qualitative data collected confirmed the first two findings using quantitative methods.
Finally, Type 2 (“single case-embedded”) design pitfalls include typically failing to analyze the larger organizational system and/or focusing only on some subgroups or individual level of analyses (Yin, 1994). The stated problem, purpose and methodological scope of this study clearly transcend subgroup and individual member analyses and covers the possibility of many subgroups within an organizational system.

**Study Timeline**

The schematic (Figure 3.5) shows the flow of data collection over the 21-month period the study took place:

![Study Timeline Diagram]

*Figure 3.5. Study Timeline. The final report will be completed by April 2003.*
Conclusion

This chapter has explained how this study will be conducted in light of the methodological issues described in Chapter 2, Review of the Literature. A research model was developed to inform how the methodology will unfold. The methodology follows from the three guiding research propositions developed in Chapter 2. Finally, this chapter covered strengths and weakness of the methodological design and the timeline associated with the execution of the study. The next chapter (Results) will present the findings from the study resulting from the methodology explained in this chapter.
CHAPTER 4 RESULTS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to report and discuss the results of the case study to answer the primary research question: How does lack of agreement between subculture and top management values affect system-wide planning? The first section following this introduction will present “Diagnosis of MUSE Subcultures,” delineating the results of the CVF diagnosis of subcultures using the OCAI and addressing whether these subcultures were confirmed by the results of the structured interview and qualitative data collection. The four subunits under investigation include these pseudonyms: HQMUSE (headquarters, military university for senior executives); MILCDI (MUSE’s Military Campaign Department of Instruction); PRIE (MUSE’s Policy Research Institute of Excellence); and, ConCenWar (MUSE’s Convention Center for Research and Wargaming). The intent of this section is to address the first research sub-question: What is the diagnosis of organizational subcultures “now” (i.e. do they exist) and how do these compare with diagnosed “preferences” for subcultures for the future?

The next two sections will together address the second research sub-question: What patterns of agreement exist among subcultures both on system-wide planning content and process and what are their corresponding preferences for future planning efforts? The second section, “Subculture Plan Content Agreement/Disagreement Patterns” will provide data analysis from the initial survey and from data collected during a subsequent structured interview process.
revealing how the subcultures viewed MUSE system-wide plan content. The third section, “Subculture Planning Process Agreement/Disagreement Patterns,” will report the use of the planning typology and how respondents from MILCDI, PRIE, and ConCenWar rated the system-wide planning process.

**Diagnosis of Muse Subcultures**

**OCAI Results**

The OCAI (Part I of the initial survey, Appendix A) was sent to all members of MUSE, comprising sixteen subunits, ranging from activities that maintain grounds and buildings, a museum and military history archive, four teaching departments, a medium sized library, to a health and fitness research center. Approximately 41% of the roughly 650 full time workforce participated in the MUSE culture-strategy survey, with 34% of the questionnaires returned with usable data (n=222). The demographics of the respondent population that provided usable data closely matched the overall population (e.g., gender, race, and age); however, officers and faculty members had slightly higher response rates than others. The MUSE faculty is staffed with 63% military officers (N=90) and 37% Civilian (N=53). Educationally, less than 10% of the military have a doctoral degree while 58% of the civilian researchers and educators have doctorates. Some of the civilian staff and faculty are retired from the military, and, so have mixed professional ties to both the military and to academe. On faculty, 93% are male, 7% female, and only a very few in each category are ethnic minorities (about 1%). In the greater population that includes staff and installation support (N=507), 49% are white females, 3.5% are black females,
42% are white males, and 2.8% are black males. Race, ethnicity, age, and time in position were found not to be discriminators in the OCAI ratings.

While the analysis based on the OCAI suggests the possible nature of the overall MUSE culture to be relatively balanced in the clan, market, and hierarchy types, and lower in the adhocracy type (See Figure 4.1), this conclusion is misleading when examining the data that is based in subunits. After performing discriminant analysis (Kachigan, 1991) across organizational subunits this overall CVF cultural archetype was found likely to be a poor reflection of a diversity of organizational subculture types. The analysis revealed three distinctive subcultures that had significant statistical variation in at least one CVF culture type (p < .05) from the other subunits and three that differed significantly in at least one CVF subculture type (p < .05) from the “overall” MUSE culture.

Figure 4.1. Overall culture of MUSE based on “now” (solid line) and “preferred” (dotted line) respondent ratings on the OCAI. This plot indicates this organization’s cultural archetype is relatively balanced, with the exception of a lower rating in the adhocracy type. Note the preferred ratings indicate clearly that “clan” is the desired culture type. The aggregate scores for each culture type “now/preferred” were: clan (27/34); adhocracy (17/28), market (27/21), and hierarchy (29/21).
Here is a summary of OCAI findings across unique subcultures found:

- **HQMUSE** (university headquarters) OCAI data (n = 19 returned surveys with good data of 38 mailed or 50% return rate) reveals a dominant **hierarchy** type. The aggregate scores for each “now” and “preferred” culture types were: clan (26/36); adhocracy (14/17); market (27/27); and hierarchy (32/27). This was the only subculture of the sixteen examined that rated adhocracy as the lowest type in both now and preferred categories. In addition, this was the only subunit that rated hierarchy as both present and somewhat desirable (statistically significant, p < .05). All of the other subunits rated hierarchy as least preferred.

- **MILCDI** (university teaching department) OCAI data (n = 8 of 28 or a 29% return rate) suggests a strong **clan**-dominant archetype. The aggregate scores for each “now” and “preferred” culture types were: clan (52/51); adhocracy (19/21); market (13/14); and hierarchy (16/14). By far, of the sixteen subunits measured, this was the highest clan rating (statistically significant, p < .05) with the next highest of 33/35 from another teaching department.

- **PRIE** (university research department) OCAI data (n=11 of 23 or a 48% return rate) shows a mixed culture with relatively equal scores among clan, market, and adhocracy types, with a slightly higher (yet statistically insignificant) “now” rating for market. The aggregate scores for each “now” and “preferred” culture types were: clan (24/28); adhocracy (25/30); market (29/26); and hierarchy (22/16). Of all the subunits, this one had the highest now and preferred ratings (statistically significant, p < .05) for adhocracy.

- **ConCenWar** (university conference and wargaming center) OCAI data (n=33 of 82 or a 40% return rate) demonstrates a relatively strong (statistically significant, p < .05) **market** culture. The aggregate scores for each “now” and “preferred” culture types were: clan (20/32); adhocracy (18/26); market (34/22); and hierarchy (28/20). This was the only subunit in sixteen that had the market subculture as the strongest culture type.

---

13 This was the lowest response rate among the four groups. One would speculate that an “academic” department would have a high response rate because the members would value research. However, the members of MILCDI are primarily officer practitioners, among whom several expressed outright disdain for “research” because their value was on practicing military campaign methods through practicum and simulations.
All of the subunits, except PRIE, had a preference to be a clan-dominant culture. PRIE, on the other hand, had a statistically significant (p < .05) preference for adhocracy as its dominant culture archetype—the only subunit among the sixteen studied in MUSE. PRIE also had the highest and statistically significant (p < .05) score for adhocracy “now” of the sixteen subunits analyzed. In short, these four subunits had the widest differences in OCIE scores; hence they were selected as the most interesting for further study. Figure 4.2 provides the CVF patterns associated with these four subunits.

**Figure 4.2.** OCAI plots that depict the patterns of culture “now” (solid lines) and “preferred” (dotted lines) associated with HQMUSE (hierarchy; clan), MILCDI (clan; clan), PRIE (mix; mix), and ConCenWar (market; clan).
Triangulation of OCAI Findings with Semi-Structured Interview Quantitative Data

As indicated in Chapter 3, structured interviews were used to obtain data on participants’ perceptions of subcultures via a separate method. In general, these interviews, conducted with members of the subcultures approximately one year to eighteen months after the OCAI was administered, confirmed OCAI findings. When asked during the structured interview to choose from one of four CVF culture descriptions as to which one best characterized their subunit, the majority of members chose the ones that reflected the dominant culture types found with the OCAI (Table 4.1). In addition, all subunit respondents were asked to rate the dominant subculture type of HQMUSE using the same descriptions. Although 42 were asked the HQMUSE question from all subunits, only 36 felt capable of responding based on first hand knowledge. Their perceptions are:

- HQMUSE is viewed predominantly as a hierarchical subculture (23 of 36 selected hierarchy, 6 selected clan, and 7 selected market with none selecting adhocracy);
- MILCDI as a predominantly clan subculture (7 of 11 selected clan, 2 chose market, 1 chose adhocracy and 1 chose hierarchy);
- PRIE as a mix prevalence among clan, adhocracy, and market (4 of 10 selected adhocracy, 3 each selected clan and market, and none selected hierarchy); and,
- ConCenWar clearly suggests a dominant market subculture (8 of 11 selected market, 2 selected adhocracy, 1 chose clan, and none chose hierarchy).

Results of a Pearson chi square test supports rejecting the null hypothesis that the same number of responses would be given by respondent groups for each culture type \((p < .01)\). Table 4.1 provides the results of this data collection effort. In
short, the second data collection provided strong support for the original diagnoses with the OCAI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HQMUSE n=36</th>
<th>MILCDI n=11</th>
<th>PRIE n=10</th>
<th>ConCenWar n=11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLAN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHOCRACY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIERARCHY</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.1.** Frequencies of responses to the items on the structured interview that stated, “Select the best description to characterize your department/subunit culture as it is now,” and, “Select the best description to characterize the MUSE Headquarters culture as it is now.”

**Triangulation of OCAI Findings with Semi-Structured Interview Qualitative Data**

Non-structured interview data were also collected during the administration of second part of the study (i.e. administration of a semi-structured interview, Appendix B). Member descriptions collected during these interviews coupled with researcher observations helped determine the nature of the subculture—“the way we do things around here” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982, p. 4) or as Weick (1995, p. 189) makes it in retrospective sense, “what we have done around here.” Each of the identified subcultures has a unique story associated with what members do and how they think about their work. The respondents describe their own subunit and were also asked for their respective views about HQMUSE. These descriptions strengthen the validity of the OCAI findings about their subunits and HQMUSE. Interview data were post-checked with each respondent for accuracy and validity at the end of the interview period.
**HQMUSE (university headquarters).** HQMUSE is located in its own wing and floor of the main MUSE building. MUSE members refer to HQMUSE (in a less-than-affectionate tone and sometimes with “rolled eyes”) as the “H-Wing.” The researcher impressions included that the foci of the “H-Wing” members were to keep the President informed, protect him by making sure subordinates were held accountable, and ensure that his policies were written down and enforced. The researcher saw little evidence of “boundary spanning” (Katz & Kahn, 1978) activities or initiatives that would indicate concerted efforts to influence MUSE’s environment by HQMUSE (rather that activity was produced by other subunits, such as ConCenWar). HQMUSE is the only subunit at MUSE that requires its officers to wear military uniforms; whereas, officers in other subunits may choose to wear coat and tie (civilian clothing). This is indicative of the hierarchical value for rank. Here is what members of the “H-Wing” say about themselves, in this composite result of conversations held with the researcher:

On the HQ culture as it is now, I think number one [clan] is preached, but number four [hierarchy] is the reality. The higher your rank and position, the more you think things are participatory. In that regard, as a group, people in HQMUSE are sincere about what they want (that is more participation and feeling of family) but they actually do what they are comfortable with. There is scant time available to achieve the participation we might desire. To be open and cooperative takes time. Unfortunately time is spent in front of leadership briefing stuff. Desire for openness might be authentic, but too much stuff is going on. The time line closes in before “mature” staffing and dialoguing can be done. Unfortunately, information never gets sorted and really useful recommendations to leadership aren’t made….too much “kicking the can” because of time. Even though there is an espoused preference for being participative, there is a big caveat: that even
if time permits lots of discussion and debate, in execution there is total emphasis on compliance.

Our headquarters culture has a reluctance to embrace conflict – that disagreement will hurt feelings. The illusion of collegiality reigns over good, healthy confrontation and debate to get a good decision. I went to a four hour meeting that the President attended that was turned out to be doing analytical staff work that should have been done prior to the meeting. Our President should not have to do staff work; that is why he has a staff.

I see HQMUSE as #3 [market] because competitiveness is key. I view the entire organization as a collection of political coalitions based primarily in departments and subunits. Sees lots of “turf-battles” going on between these elements mainly over resources. Ego, budget, and saving face are key motivators to interactions among the players. This is an important perspective that may not be described well in the four choices you gave me to describe the culture. HQMUSE leads the organization as an overall “political” culture.

These member descriptions clearly emphasize the presence of hierarchical values such as formalized structure, positional authority, staff coordination, keeping the boss informed, and the overall role of the headquarters as the source of a smooth running organization.

**MILCDI (university teaching department).** MILCDI is a teaching department consisting of either active duty senior field grade officers or retired field grade officers on faculty and several women who comprise the department administrative support staff. They frequently get together socially in the form of “hails and farewells” (newcomers’ welcome and veterans’ going-away parties), Christmas parties, and even in the hallways around a huge, communal coffee machine (with two pots of regular and one pot of decaf always available). The department chair sets a collegial leadership climate where the faculty members
have equal voices as long as they have demonstrated to each other the professional competency to teach military campaigning. That competency is the most observable value in the department, and stems from most faculty members having more than twenty years of experience in the “profession of arms” (many having seen combat in Vietnam, the Gulf War, or in smaller regional contingencies). The colloquialisms, “warfighter” and “operational art,” dominate their collective ethos and are the focus of their attention and professional discussions. One of the faculty members of this department named their culture when he said, “we are a culture of colonels,” because they were all of that grade-equivalent or had retired with that grade-equivalent. Only one faculty member is a woman, so the culture is clearly male-dominant.

All members departing the department are celebrated with a military medal award at an annual “hail and farewell” party (as are members in the other departments, except PRIE). What makes MILCDI different is their additional clan-like symbolic gift described here:

MILCDI has a "normal" system for departure gifts by which members contribute throughout their assignment and upon departure are given a book or comparably priced item of their choice (e.g., during the period 1988-1992 these were engraved plates with the MUSE crest). Since 1988 each departing member has also received a very special gift, at no cost to the department, rooted in military history and legend. It is a piece of rock with extraordinary properties relevant to military wartime campaigning. Although having existed from the beginning of time, these rocks were first documented in the records of Roman Consul Appius Claudius Caudex during the first Punic War. In their initial struggles (264 BC) with Hiero, the king of Syracuse, Campanian mercenaries, known as the Mamertini and allies of the Romans found the rocks in the valleys at the base of Mount Etna. Since then they have been the treasured possessions of that family of soldiers and have been passed down through each generation to the
present day and are shared with soldiers sharing the same martial values. When suspended by twine from a plank of a Lombardi Poplar at eye level the rocks can predict the weather—an indispensable component to planning military operations. The award to the MILCDI member and directions for operating the device are inscribed on the plank from which the rock is suspended and each soldier of the department either signs or makes his mark on the plank. An example of the award inscription and operating directions are as follows:

**JAKE T. FLAKE**  
**COLONEL**  
U.S. Air Force  
1962-1992  
MUSE-MILCDI  
1988-1992  
FOR OUTSTANDING SERVICE  
AND UNCOMMON PATIENCE  
AND GOOD CHEER  
IN THE VORTEX OF PLANNING  
IS AWARDED THIS GENUINE  
ITALIAN WEATHER ROCK

Direzioni:
1. Hang d rock outside in a sunny place.
2. Ifa d rock isa move, isa wind.
3. Ifa d rock isa wet, isa rain.
4. Ifa d rock isa white, isa snow.
5. Ifa u no see d rock, isa fog.
Arrivaderci from alla u amici signa here!

The following is a compilation describing the world of MILCDI though the eyes of its members. This represents a composite of researcher conversations with multiple MILCDI respondents:

We are definitely collegial and group oriented. This is not surprising because we are all military (active or retired) and share same military values. We are also a flat organization: one chairman, and lots of faculty. “Servant leadership” describes the chairman’s role well. On that note, our leader succession story is interesting. We, the faculty of this department, have picked our own department heads as far back as I can remember. When “H-Wing” was going to place an officer coming from an overseas command assignment in the slot, we pointed out the vacancy in
HQMUSE that he would be more suited to and then recommended one of our own to get our department chair job. We just went through the same sort of process again, picking one of our own rather than some outsider. We even discussed among ourselves who would be the best to take the job (some of us declined). But consensus was clear and we nominated our department chair’s replacement – the outgoing chair was our “talking head” to nominate the replacement we chose. Our guy got the job!

I worked hard to get into this department because of the sense of shared values and family I had experienced before. I am a bit idealistic, but that is also why I am here. MILCDI is intensely family-like. We are a class of warriors. We hold shared values. We work and play together. There is nobody here I would not trust on my right flank in combat. I am excited about coming to work every morning. I look forward to standing around the coffee pot and listening to the conversations about the best way to approach this or that. This is intellectual excitement. The sharing of ideas, instructors visiting instructors in their offices sharing tips…the level of respect for one another is unparalleled.

In general I like the way things work here. We are “flat” in the sense that we are all the same rank, but then again, we also value structure and doctrine because that is what we teach. I also see a lot of creativity in what we do. We are treated like adults here with little supervision. Work hours are flexible and pretty much up to the individual. But that doesn’t mean we take advantage of this, because we all work hard.

HQMUSE is rigidly bureaucratic. It follows the letter of the law. This is indicative of a culture where coordination, uniformity, and the ability to control is valued. But it is stifling to innovation. I think they are broke in HQMUSE. They are so intent on finding better ways to do things, nothing gets done. We have marathon meetings to discuss what to take off the plate and end up being ineffective and inefficient. Although the HQMUSE gives the impression of hierarchy, it tends to even violate their own rules and order when it sees fit and muscle their way to their own ends.

These MILCDIE member descriptions highlight clan values associated with a sense of family, camaraderie, a “brotherhood of war” myth, a shared repulsion toward the hierarchy outside the family, and demonstrates the overall collegiality expected of a teaching department.
**PRIE (university research department).** PRIE was described as one of the members as a group of autonomous researchers who rarely work together on projects, but produce individual publications such as monographs or articles that appear in peer-reviewed journals. All of the researchers are male and all but one has a doctoral degree in diverse fields of study, ranging from political science and history, to law. The small support staff consists of all women. There appear to be no gathering spots in the hallways and there is no communal coffee pot. The members reportedly do not get together socially out of the office area except in an annual event formally sponsored by them for MUSE in its entirety (they have been “tasked” to sponsor this event by HQMUSE). Observations indicate that each researcher was an “island of research” and worked in relative isolation from both the other members and from other subunits. It is almost as if there were no subculture, but rather a loosely affiliated group with very diverse views of the world -- what Martin (2002) refers to as a fragmented culture.

The following is a composite rich description of how members of PRIE view the world that the researcher produced through interview data with several members:

We are writers. You cannot have too much control over us or we’ll lose our independent thinking. Although our topics are “approved,” we have the latitude to nominate them. Really, our only control is self-imposed in our protocol for vetting and getting peer review for our draft research products. Researchers live in their own worlds. It’s the way it should be; otherwise, it would be like herding cats. Each member is comfortable in his own niche as an individual. I see two groups in our institute -- the “window people” (those researchers who sit in the outer ring of the building) that have no interest in anybody else. That’s okay. If you want to come in, knock first. Then there are those without windows (those involved with other things besides research). So I do not see the
family atmosphere that you might see in a traditional military organization or academic teaching department.

As a subunit, we have become more bureaucratic over the years, so #4 [hierarchy] is increasing. In my view, there is too much attempt at paternalistic type control -- bureaucratic interference and even censorship. Now our publications must not only be “approved” by our Public Affairs folks in the “H-Wing,” but also our institution head. I think this violates academic freedom big time.

In some ways, we are like a market culture because everyone is encouraged and rewarded for establishing outside partnerships, creating new markets, and having networks with academics and DoD. In that way we are kind of adaptive. For example, our process for selecting publication topics is very flexible. We are also finding new ways to promulgate our research all the time, to include innovative ways to use our web page. Each researcher understands their role, their relative autonomy, flexible work hours, and how to address research issues.

I would prefer HQMUSE to be more hierarchical. I do not want HQMUSE, for example, participating in our day to day planning and activities, so I do not want them to be participative. By them being more bureaucratic, that shields us and allows us to be more autonomous. I see them in support of us in that they provide administrative services and resources. They buffer us from the outside world. They can do so because they will speak the bureaucratic language that the Pentagon speaks and that’s how we get our resources.

The PRIE interviewees expressed mixed values present in what appears to be a fragmented subculture (Martin, 2002). Expressed values ranged from pro- and con- bureaucratic ones to those associated with semi-autonomy and new products -- valued by adhocracies and market cultures. Clearly, clan culture values were not emphasized, perhaps because of the nature of the independent work performed (“writers” who are not interested in the others).

ConCenWar (university conference and wargaming center).

ConCenWar occupies a very modern, relatively new building, separated from the
core building housing HQMUSE, PRIE, and four MUSE teaching departments. The building is designed to be flexible with removable walls and hundreds of miles of under-floor wiring that permits almost limitless variations to conduct conferences and “high-tech” war simulations. Some have re-named the street separating the buildings as “the walled-avenue” signifying the cultural chasm that exists as seen by members from both sides. The atmosphere in ConCenWar is highly charged with multiple projects being planned or executed daily. People walk around with quick steps and into meeting rooms to hash out the next tasks. Ephemeral project teams are created to produce conferences, simulations, or to prepare summary-style policy papers that will be mailed to “customers” outside MUSE, to include high level federal administrators and political appointees. People love to work here. They also feel that outsiders (the rest of MUSE) often misunderstand their mission and role in the greater organization.

Here is a composite description of life in ConCenWar provided by its members:

We do a lot of creative things here. A lot of our folks put things together in a short time – very creative. Although I think it best describes us, I do not like the word “competitiveness” in the third culture choice [market] because we do not see ourselves competing against other organizations. However, we do compete against high standards or “standards of excellence,” in that we set very high standards for the services we provide. Then again, our business is beyond education. Our “operations” are planned to support DoD, define national security issues, and joint military or multinational issues. In that regard, I guess we really are in competition with other organizations that do the same, such as Rand Corporation, “MPRI,” “SCIC,” Brookings…etc. We want to be the first organization of choice when strategic leaders want to exercise or investigate problems/issues. We provide them training and education or just a place to hold a conference. We also prepare our “CSL glossies” or colorful information papers and
pamphlets that we mail to over 150 “stakeholders” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, the State Department, etc. – to those who we think are influential players in these arenas.

We are a flat organization. Although we have division chiefs, we really work as temporary teams depending on the project we are working on. We have over seventeen military officers working here but rank doesn’t matter -- any one can be put in charge of a project based on their respective competency be they civilians or military in whatever rank. We mix and match folks on any project team as we need. We are the only part of MUSE that is really multi-customer oriented. We support the teaching departments internally, but also the service department staff in Washington, D.C., regional combatant commanders, the State Department, CIA, etc. In that regard we engage in a certain amount of marketing. I think we are entrepreneurial in that regard.

The culture here is that no one can accomplish a mission without the assistance of others; therefore, we are forced into cooperation and a culture fostered on working together toward goals. We are interdependent. Confrontation is part of the way things are and we feel totally free to be contrary up until the decision is made. In that regard, I do not feel fear or the need for confidentiality in this interview.

We tend to work to the military ethic, unlike the rest of MUSE. We’ll work “24/7” if we have to get the job done. Many of us come to work at 7 a.m. or earlier and stay past 6:30 p.m. similar to the Pentagon staff or officers at Fort Hood or Fort Campbell. The guys over there [referring to the building that houses HQMUSE, PRIE, and MUSE teaching departments] are on “collegial time” and their schedule is in line with students’. Guys here think that those guys are gone 15 minutes after the students are dismissed!

What I like about this place is how we are adaptable. The guy working for me on the organizational chart—well, I might be working for him on a project team. How we make up these project teams depends on competence, not rank. In fact, we even reconfigure the building for each project (conferences, etc), so we even have a physical adapting ability. This place is all about being adaptive unlike what I see over there in the HQMUSE building.

HQMUSE is executive agent for an educational institution. [The Clan] is the appropriate culture for an educational institution
like MUSE. However, as a member of this center, I like number 3 [market] and would like to blend both. This is what we are all about because we are a service agency. We live and fail based on how we treat our customers.

The remarks from ConCenWar participants indicate a strong market subculture that is “results-oriented organization whose major concern is with getting the job done” (Cameron & Quinn, 1999, p. 58). There are clearly dominant market orientations on customers, stakeholders, and products.

These qualitative interview data confirmed the strengths (or diversity in the case of PRIE) in culture types found with the OCIE and with the confirmatory interview quantitative data. HQMUSE works with predominantly with hierarchical values associated with rules, structure, and accountability. MILCDI displays very strong clan values associated with belonging to a family-like group. PRIE appears to have no set value pattern except a preference for autonomy (more characteristic of adhocracies or at least a fragmented culture). Finally, ConCenWar, with their strong customer orientation and respondents’ expressed value of competing against high standards, are clearly a strong market type subculture.

**Subculture Agreement/Disagreement Patterns on Plan Content**

**OCAI-Extended Survey Quantitative Data on Plan Content**

In addition to the OCAI standard questions (Cameron & Quinn, 1999), this study extended the instrument with a Likert scale that asked the respondents to rate content statements (vision, goals, and supporting objectives) from MUSE’s strategic plan document (Appendix A). The purpose of this procedure was to detect disagreement with the espoused mission, vision, goals and objectives
among the various subgroups to help answer the “planning content” part of the second research sub-question: What patterns of agreement exist among subcultures both on system-wide planning content and process and what are their corresponding preferences for future planning efforts? There were no significant subunit discriminations when agreement levels were tested with the presentation of formal strategy statements.

This part of the questionnaire survey asked respondents to indicate their agreement on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being strongly agree; 2, agree; 3, neither agree nor disagree; 4, disagree, and 5, strongly disagree) with the MUSE espoused mission, vision, values, goals, and objectives. On average, respondents high scores ranged from 1.74 (agreement with mission statement), 1.89 (agreement with vision statement and commitment to educational goals) to a low of 2.79 (the espoused value of, “our people are important, so we use our time wisely”). The researcher used an average of 3.0, or lower, as the cut off to indicate agreement issues associated with ambivalence (neither agree nor disagree) or disagreement. Using that cut off, none of the average ratings qualified for further analysis.

Overall, the respondents supported the MUSE espoused strategy statement; albeit, some more than others. When the researcher shared this summary data with top-management, HQMUSE key members also interpreted these results as signifying general agreement with plan content.

**Semi-Structured Interview Quantitative Data on Plan Content**

The second set of questions concerning agreement or commitment with plan content (limited to formal statements of MUSE vision and four goals) were
asked of the subculture members during structured interviews (Appendix B). The purpose of this redundant questioning was to triangulate the findings of general agreement with MUSE espoused strategy statements from the previous OCIE-extended questionnaire. Only this time, instead of a 5-point scale, the interviewer asked about the respondent’s personal level of commitment to each of the statements. Recall from Chapter 4, levels of commitment were derived from Senge (1990, p. 220):

1. Commitment  
2. Enrollment  
3. Genuine compliance  
4. Formal compliance  
5. Grudging compliance  
6. Noncompliance  
7. Apathy

The respondent could select from seven possible choices, in descending order of scaled to level of commitment:

____ I want this vision or goal with a passion. I will make it happen. We will change the regulations, directives, or even law to create whatever structures and processes are needed.

____ I want this vision or goal and will do whatever can be done within the “spirit of the law” (or regulations and directives).

----------Senge (1990) “commitment-enrollment” versus “compliance-aphathy” line----------

____ I see benefits from this vision or goal because it does everything expected and more. I’ll follow the “letter of the law” in support of it. As a “good soldier/employee,” I will support it with professional rigor.

____ On the whole, I can see benefits of this vision of goal. I’ll do what is expected and no more. As a “good soldier/employee,” I’ll support it in balance with my other priorities.

____ I do not see the benefits of the vision or goal. But I also do not want to lose my job. I’ll do enough of what is expected because I have to, but I’ll also speak out that I am not really on board.

____ I do not see the benefits of the vision or goal and will not do what is expected. “I won’t do it and you cannot make me.”

____ I am neither for nor against this vision or goal. I am not interested in it. I will not devote energy to it. “Is it five o’clock yet?”
Discriminant analysis of the results indicated a significant difference (p < .01) in only the subcultural responses to one statement – a MUSE goal concerning support to an external U.S. Defense agency’s “strategic communications efforts.” The average scaled responses (1 being the highest commitment and 7 being the lowest level of commitment) by subculture are shown in Table 4.2. Any average below “2.00” is considered bureaucratic compliance and not internalized commitment. Only ConCenWar demonstrated that level of commitment to this MUSE goal (what Senge, 1990 called commitment and enrollment levels). HQMUSE respondents demonstrated the lowest level (considered by Senge to be somewhere between genuine and formal compliance levels). (Using discriminant analysis, the means were found to be statistically different between the ConCenWar subculture and the other subcultures (p < .01) (Table 4.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal 3: Support XXX agency’s strategic communications efforts.</th>
<th>HQMUSE</th>
<th>MILCDI</th>
<th>PRIE</th>
<th>ConCenWar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.64*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2. Average score on a seven point scale of commitment to MUSE’s plan stated goal number three concerning support to DoD agency strategic communications effort. (n=42, *p < .01)

The explanation for this difference in subculture agreement with the plan content (in this case goal number three) can be found in the value that ConCenWar places in its customers (i.e. they view that support to this agency as a prime purpose of their existence). They realize that their effectiveness to a large degree depends on whether that external agency sees MUSE as supporting their strategic communications plan. This result is clearly consistent with the
CVF “market” type value found to be dominant with the ConCenWar OCIE results. Some additional excerpts from conversations with members of ConCenWar add more support to this interpretation about MUSE Goal 3:

I am very passionate about this. For us this is our bread and butter. We do a load of strategic communications for this [DoD agency]. We must get the message out and we do this. We inform and influence the Department, Congress and the public--kind of like lobbying. This is our core competency. While we also contribute to the other goals of the overall college, few others contribute to this one. We pretty much own it. We formulate what is essentially a marketing plan for our part in supporting the agency’s strategic communications group. Our memos that delineate these marketing plans go straight to highest levels.

Another respondent from PRIE stated the opposing view:

This goal bothers me a lot. “Strategic communications” is the Department’s way of having all in the organization advocate this agency’s interests and positions. This is not consistent with the core mission of this school, which is supposed to be academic, and which should be able to show the emperor that he has no clothes. The [DoD agency] wants us to speak with a single voice, manifested in our “strategic communications.” This is antithetical to a professional and academic environment that values diversity of thought - sometimes in “loyal opposition” to those who have power. This goal is incongruent with academic freedom. When we fall under the training command, this will present even more of a challenge for us, because it is in their charter to support [agency] decisions without questioning them. We should always be in a position to question—that is the nature of healthy academic institutions.

This appeared to be the only real content issue associated with subcultural agreement based in the initial OCAI extended survey (Appendix A) and the semi-structured interview (Appendix B) quantitative results.

**Semi-Structured Interview Qualitative Data on Plan Content**

While this study finds only one case of significant disagreement with a particular formally espoused organization goal based on quantitative results, this
was not the situation indicated by qualitative results. Qualitative interview data collected during the conversations between the respondents and the researcher revealed that deeper probing of content consensus produced a different pattern of results. The following are sample excerpts of these data from respondents, indicating disagreement with content (specifically the performance measures or “metrics” required by the Balance Scorecard method):

Sometimes this is a counterproductive process. While the President seems to spend a lot of time trying to build consensus, we spend too much time gathering data [i.e. balanced scorecard performance measures] that are worthless. I do not think we are measuring the right information. A lot of info, but I am not sure what we are gaining from it. We’ve changed the metrics it seems like every quarter. Stuff that we used to report that I thought was useful is now no longer reported. This data is not influencing anything of importance; it is a waste of time. The slides we brief [with our balanced scorecard performance metrics] every quarter are meaningless to us.

People aren’t asking hard questions. We aren’t taking time to assess where we need to go. The scorecard method does not identify weak areas. It’s a good tool but we jumped to it without first being honest with ourselves. The scorecard method will have some impact because the numbers will indicate some of the things we need to change. However, I think the numbers will become the focus and not the meaning of the numbers (as will happen in all bureaucracies). But, we’ll still get some change.

It is an evaluation system borrowed from other organizations. Not appropriate to education process. Strikes me that the “old man” is looking to get a handle on the “beast.” But this education stuff is not measurable. The key question of our effectiveness is whether we are turning out better strategic leaders than the other institutions?

While I respect the idea of measuring how well we are doing, the metrics we use are not really accepted by those reporting them. This is a slippery slope. I applaud the President’s efforts to measure, but these measures were not developed from the grass roots – up. The commitment is not there. In fact, anybody below
director level is not even aware of this effort, so it has no meaning deep into the organization.

I go to all the meetings and off-site conferences, but we are just going through the motions, and not really getting to strategic changes. The problem with this method is we need to re-look at our metrics and give more thought to what they mean. Some of them do not apply to all organizations here. Even when we think they have common meaning and try to apply them to budgeting decisions, interpretation still becomes a key issue.

We keep changing what our numbers mean to the point they are meaningless. We have seen no management consequences from this method; that is, we see numbers, but no decisions based on them to re-arrange resources or obtain new ones. Nice info, but marginally effective at best. Not worth the time we put into creating them. Overall, I would say keeping score is not worth the time we spend on it.

Metrics do not get to what we do. What we need to establish is what will make us successful. This is the strategic question. Sure, some things can be measured, but the measures we do now do nothing for us. When Ford [Motor Company] looks at whether their cars bring them success, they can look at things such as warranty costs, returns based in Lemon Laws, but we have no measures like that. Maybe we should follow our graduates and ask them how much the curriculum helped them in their jobs.

In my opinion anything the President [of MUSE] wants will generate change. But, I am not sure that numbers [balanced scorecard performance metrics] is the right approach. You can do a lot more to gain support by example than by looking at data. We are better served by looking at the internal qualities associated with teaching and contributions to education rather than numbers. This numbers system reminds me of body count in Vietnam. Lots of bodies, but it did not reflect mission accomplishment.

Metrics cannot change the organization. It’s like baseball player batting averages. You can keep track, but by keeping track does not make the guy batting .150 bat .250. You would need to hire a better batter. The same applies in organizations. If you want better, hire better people.

These comments reveal some strong content disagreement associated with implementation of goals and objectives that were not revealed by the more
superficial questioning about agreement or disagreement with the more general espoused goals and objectives (what Deal and Kennedy, 1982, p. 6, refer to as “superordinate goals”). In this case, the qualitative data did not support the quantitative data collected on respondent agreement or disagreement with plan content. When the researcher probed deeper, respondents generally thought the use of performance measures (one of the prescriptions of the balanced scorecard method) was not an effective part of the plan. There was significant disagreement among the respondents when asked to comment on whether the “metrics” actually measured what the goals and objectives espoused.

**Subculture Agreement/Disagreement Patterns on Planning Process**

A second aspect of studying MUSE planning involved questioning participants from each subculture as to their perceptions of the system-wide planning process, again, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. First, the quantitative results will be presented.

**Semi-Structured Interview Quantitative Data on Planning Process**

The study planned to have ten participants in each subculture rate agreement with the HQMUSE planning process to make possible the use of multivariate analytic techniques (Patton, 1990). Unfortunately, when executed, there were insufficient (less than ten) participants in each subculture with a first hand knowledge of HQMUSE system-wide planning to allow discriminant analysis to be conducted as planned. Consequently, an alternative approach was developed. First, this subsection presents graphic representations of within-subculture patterns of how each subunit is perceived by its members to conduct
planning. Next, subcultural agreement patterns associated with HQMUSE
system-wide planning are reported graphically. The researcher then interprets the
differences in the patterned graphics for both sets of data using the naked eye.
Third, qualitative data collected during the study re presented.

Figure 4.3 shows the side-by-side comparisons of the subculture patterns
measured by the OCAI (shown on the left side) and patterns measured on the
ipsative scale used in the structured interview to rate planning processes within
subunits (shown on the right). Examining the “gestalt” of the patterns reveals
general similarities between the cultural archetypes and the planning archetypes
presented for each subunit.
Figure 4.3. A comparison between OCAI generated organization culture archetypes and planning archetypes associated with subunits.
HQMUSE, a predominantly hierarchical culture, has an apparent affinity for programmatic planning. This makes sense because hierarchies value control more than flexibility and tend to focus on their own programs rather than the external environment. MILCDI, on the other hand values collegiality as a culture that is associated with participative planning in these diagrams. Yet MILCDI also values a balance between programmatic and emergent planning, characteristic of what they teach students in campaign planning – an artful mix of control and freedom to make decisions based on uncertain situations in combat. PRIE demonstrates an almost identical mixed or perhaps fragmented pattern of culture and planning process. There seems to be an equivalent mixture of analytical, emergent, and participative planning types and a desire to minimize programmatic type planning. These are consistent findings with the culture archetype found with the OCIE results. ConCenWar (dominated by the market culture type) shows a propensity to use analytical planning and at the same time exercise a preference for emergent planning (signified by their preference for a more adhocracy type culture). Finally, HQMUSE personnel desire a less programmatic and a more emergent and participative planning process. This is highly consistent with their preferences for a more of a clan or adhocracy type culture.

While these patterns demonstrate general culture-planning process pattern matches within groups, they also reveal how these subcultures disagree with HQMUSE’s propensity to emphasize programmatic planning while preferring a more emergent planning process. These pattern differences appear to be
consistent with perceived “now” and “preferred” patterns associated with subcultural views of HQMUSE’s system-wide planning process as well (Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4. Subcultural agreement patterns with HQMUSE the system wide planning process.

These patterns demonstrate that MILCDI, PRIE, and ConCenWar respondents see the HQMUSE Balanced Scorecard (BSC) system-wide planning process as too programmatic. Note how also MILCDI (with a strong “clan” culture type) sees the HQMUSE planning process as needing to be much more participative. This is apparent with the relatively large differential between the MILCDI “now” rating and the “preferred” rating. When the researcher asked
respondents during structured interviews whether they thought the BSC method would lead to the necessary changes for MUSE, no respondents answered, “yes,” while nineteen said, “no,” and fifteen respondents said “maybe.” In short, there was universal respondent skepticism about this method among respondents from the three subcultures (MILCDI, PRIE, and ConCenWar).

The average percent differentials associated with the “now” versus “preferred” ratings indicate the degrees to which members how much the subcultures disagreed with the HQMUSE system-wide planning process (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3. Disagreement differentials reflecting how much each subculture wants the HQMUSE planning process to change in terms of the four planning ideal types. When comparing “now” ratings to “preferred” ratings, the differentials become clearer (respondents from the three subcultures studied prefer a more participative and emergent planning process).
These quantitative findings indicate that members of these three subcultures studied want to increase the participative and emergent qualities of the headquarters planning processes. All three see little change necessary in the analytic nature of the current planning process. Members of all subcultures want to reduce the programmatic nature of the current planning process substantially.

**Semi-Structured Qualitative Data on the Planning Process**

The qualitative interview data confirm quantitative results indicating disagreement with top-management implementation of system-wide planning. The following are representative comments from respondents from all subcultures, speaking about whether the current planning process will affect necessary changes for MUSE.

Our last offsite [strategy conference] revealed leadership in HQMUSE is dictating rather than building commitment. At the offsite, leadership broke us down into groups. We spent two days contemplating goals and objectives. When we presented these to leadership, the products were edited so that our work was not what we had developed. This was arbitrary and creates frustration with those who developed them. This pisses me off more than anything and next time I am asked to attend, I will probably stand up and say, “Sorry, I cannot participate in this.”

“Scorecard” will not get us where we need to go. It’s a fad. Like TQM and Zero Defects. We must have a true vision and real commitment and learning to get a balanced approach to strategy. Again, management has skewed itself away from the organization. They go off on a tangent and then run back when they see nobody following. When they ask “why?” the organization tells them, yet they go off again on their own way. Again they look behind and see no one is following. Cycle repeats…

The planning process has great merit but is clearly the personal baby of the President. The system is well intended but a business practice model is not always appropriate for a process-
oriented institution like MUSE...the planning system seems to confuse efficiency with effectiveness.

While these qualitative data appear to confirm disagreement patterns found from the quantitative data, the researcher could detect no qualitative differences among respondents’ dialogue from the three subcultures. Respondents from all three subculture disagree with HQMUSE planning in roughly the same way.

This almost universal lack of respondent agreement with the HQMUSE system-wide planning process was also revealed in an “opportunе” survey administered to participants in an off-site strategy conference. As stated in Chapter 3, the researcher planned to take advantage of opportunities to interact with members of MUSE. While pursuing the main efforts of the study, the researcher was asked by HQMUSE members to develop a survey to provide top-management feedback from conference participants.

Fifty-two surveys were mailed to all participants of an offsite strategic planning conference. These participants were from top-management level staff and middle management positions across the MUSE organization. Twenty-eight were returned with usable data: a 54% response rate. These management respondents produced data consistent with that of the three subcultures summarized in Table 4.3. Participating managers desired an increase in participatory aspects of HQMUSE planning, an increase in emergent planning, a smaller increase in analytic planning, and a decrease in programmatic type planning. Above all, these respondents, like those from each subculture, prefer to move away from the programmatic type of planning and into more participative and emergent modes of planning. The results of this fortuitous data collection
opportunity support study’s other findings in that there seems to be noteworthy disagreement with the top-management imposed planning process.

**Conclusion**

This chapter reported the results of the case study and discussed the meaning of those results toward the exploration of how organizational subunits may have cultural values that compete with top-management implementation of system wide planning. Quantitative analyses were coupled with qualitative analyses to support to this exploration. In summary, the findings showed that organizational subunits that were diagnosed as distinctive subcultures (determined with the use of the OCAI and subsequently confirmed with both quantitative and qualitative data) have distinctive opinions about plan content and preferences for alternative planning process patterns (determined by quantitative and qualitative respondent survey and interview data).

The MILCDIE (teaching department) subculture is diagnosed with strong clan values and has a propensity to employ a more participative and emergent planning processes. The PRIE (university research department) respondents indicated a mixed or perhaps fragmented subculture, which matches the way it has mixed preferences for planning processes. The market culture reported by members of ConCenWar (center for conferences and wargaming) has a roughly matching planning process patterns that value analytical and emergent planning more than the other types.
Although there was general respondent agreement on plan content (with the exception on the one goal noted) based on quantitative data, qualitative interview data revealed sharp disagreement here. Interviewed respondents opined that performance measures were inappropriate to measure the stated goals and objectives with which they generally agreed. As far as process, members of subcultures display patterns of disagreement with the top-management system-wide planning process. Members of three subunit subcultures generally prefer the process to be more oriented on participative and emergent processes.

These findings have substantially addressed the research questions of this study, first concerned with first diagnosing subcultures and then determining how subcultures agree or disagree with a top-management system-wide planning effort. The next chapter, Chapter 5, Conclusions, addresses interpretation of these results in more detail and suggests how these interpretations will inform organizational practices and future research.
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The purpose of the present study was accomplished to a substantial degree — it explored how organizational subunits may have cultural values that compete with top-management implementation of system-wide planning. The methodology addressed the overall research question: how does lack of agreement between subculture and top management values affect system-wide planning? The two sub-questions for this study (restated here) were also answered:

- What is the diagnosis of organizational subcultures “now” (i.e. do they exist) and how do these compare with diagnosed “preferences” for subcultures for the future?
- What patterns of agreement or disagreement exist among subcultures both on system-wide planning content and process and what are their corresponding preferences for future planning efforts?

The following paragraphs address these conclusions in more detail, offer lessons learned for MUSE top-management, address the usefulness of the planning typology developed in this study.

The OCAI is Effective in Diagnosing Organizational Subcultures

In this case study, four distinctive organizational subcultures are identified by the use of the Organization Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). Existence of these subcultures is supported through semi-structured interview data collected one-year to eighteen months later. The subcultures reflect unique value patterns associated with CVF: those of the clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy. The distinctive subcultures include: a
university headquarters (with a relatively strong hierarchy archetype); a university teaching department (with a strong clan archetype); a university research department (with a mixed or fragmented culture type, but with a stronger preference for adhocracy); and, a university center for conferences and wargaming (that had a relatively strong market-dominant culture archetype). A general conclusion of this study is that the OCAI can be an effective tool to diagnose organizational subcultures. This is the first time the OCAI has been used in this manner as indicated by available research published to-date and by personal correspondence with one of the OCAI authors (K. Cameron, personal communication, July 2, 2001).

Second, the OCAI results not only provide insight into status quo (“now”) value patterns, but also are useful to determine subcultural preferences for changes to those value patterns. This information provides insight to MUSE members and top-management as to the potential for “unlocking” otherwise unstated organizational desires for changing their culture archetype. At the subcultural level these can reflect both a unique pattern of value preferences and overlapping preferences with other subcultures. This knowledge could reveal bases for achieving consensus, or at least understanding toward a future system-wide desired cultural state. In the present study, for example, the overlay of all four subcultures value patterns (both “now” and “preferred”) presents a picture of how respondents would value a cultural change effort (Figure 5.1):
Figure 5.1. Overlay of subculture archetypes (solid lines) and subculture preferences (dotted lines). The arrows indicate a common preference to move to more emphasis on both clan and adhocracy values.

The overlay of four MUSE subcultural archetypes (solid lines) coupled with preferences for future culture archetypes (dotted lines) reveal a common desire to move the organization toward greater degrees of clan and adhocracy values in relation to the status quo. Members and top-management of MUSE could use this information to guide system-wide dialogue and action toward establishing a more unified strategy for culture change.

Subculture Patterns Are Consistent with Planning Patterns

Members of four subcultures (identified by the results of the OCAI and later confirmed by interview data) were also asked to evaluate efforts by top-
management to implement a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) system-wide planning process, a prescriptive process popularized by Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001a). Surveys on plan content agreement and planning process were used to analyze these subcultural valuations. Resultant OCAI patterns associated with subcultural archetypes (clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy) are consistent with corresponding patterns associated preferences for planning process (participative, emergent, analytical, and programmatic respectively).¹⁴

By creating an overlay of the status quo of the planning process patterns perceived by members of subcultures and their preferences for a future pattern, members could use this information to guide system-wide dialogue and action toward establishing more unified planning (Figure 5.2). Similar to the overlay of preferred subculture archetypes, this overlay of three subcultural archetypes (solid lines) coupled with preferences for future culture archetypes (dotted lines) reveals a common desire to move the organization toward greater degrees of participative and emergent planning in relation to the status quo. Members and top-management of MUSE could also use this information to guide system-wide dialogue and action toward establishing a system-wide planning effort.

¹⁴ Albeit, there were insufficient numbers of respondents who understood the HQMUSE planning process to enable statistical discriminant analysis. This discovery about MUSE is a finding in itself because it helps confirm the nature of top-management teams that represents a hierarchical-dominant subculture type. Using hierarchical, top-down approaches to planning, it is very difficult to maintain congruent value patterns down into subunits (e.g., Bacharach, Bamberger, Mundell, 1995; Bacharach & Mundell 1993; Beer & Nohria, 2000). Hence, top-down change or integration efforts become problematic.
Figure 5.2. Overlay of planning archetypes (solid lines) and planning preferences (dotted lines). The arrows indicate a common preference to move to more emphasis on both participative and emergent types.

OCAI patterns associated with subcultures of three subunits investigated offer an explanation of how members of the identified subcultures agreed or disagreed with higher headquarters attempts to implement system-wide planning. The subcultures’ across-the-board preferences for a greater headquarters participatory and emergent type planning were consistent with their OCAI across-the-board preferences for the headquarters to be more like the clan and adhocracy culture types. While members of these organizational subcultures may have different OCAI value patterns, this does not mean they cannot agree or disagree in common ways with a system-wide planning process implemented by top-management. Findings of diversity and likenesses in subcultural patterns in
MUSE indicate a need for a greater participatory and emergent planning process to be implemented by the organization.

**Lessons for MUSE**

In this case study, top-management introduced a planning process without understanding the organizational cultural value and planning preference patterns first. Hence, another important conclusion of this case study is that without such an assessment, the organization’s top-management may be “culturally blind” while attempting to conduct system-wide planning according to their preferences. Top-management at MUSE should have addressed concerns of members by first trying to assess and appreciate subcultural competing values before implementing what turned out to be an unpopular planning process. When the researcher provided feedback on the scope of this unpopularity to top-management, they responded with attempts to better educate the workforce about the process, attempted more “strategic communication” about the process to its members, and concluded that more “selling” of the process was necessary to obtain employee “buy-in.” From the view of the researcher, these top-down attempts to change the values of members of organizational subcultures had little or no impact over the eighteen months of observation.

Members of HQMUSE (to include top-management) also assumed that hierarchical authority (something valued by them more as a subculture than other subunits) would be sufficient to successfully implant a BSC method on the organization, not realizing that these strong hierarchical values were not prevalent in at least three subcultures. In opposition, members of these three subcultures
expected to participate not only in the planning process, but also in the initial
determination of what kind of planning process should work best. MUSE top-
management should have first gained consensus with, or at least understanding
and acceptance from members of the organization, on what type of planning
process would be acceptable before setting out to conduct system-wide planning
using BSC.

It is not too late to reconsider alternative planning processes that would
revisit how MUSE approaches planning (perhaps at the next scheduled off-site
strategic planning conference planned with a better representative stratified
sample of the workforce and subcultures to participate). One suggestion would be
to renew dialogue and build commitment to a planning process or perhaps
multiple processes that satisfy both the diverse and commonly held values of the
organizational subcultures present in MUSE. The general content (mission,
vision, and goals) of the current plan seems to be acceptable by members of the
four subcultures studies, but respondents indicate the “Balance Scorecard”
performance measures that implements them are not acceptable. Now equipped
with an appreciation for the competing values present in the organization
associated with patterns of culture, the members can better understand the
challenges ahead for achieving consensus.

**Usefulness of the Planning Typology**

The planning typology proposed by this study can assist organizations in
describing existing agreement/disagreement patterns associated with both plan
content and planning process and to consider alternatives. For example, when
top-management becomes aware of alternatives and which alternatives affected members prefer a management strategy can be formulated to match patterns of planning to the unique situation the organization faces. Applying the planning typology in concert with an assessment of subcultures in the organization could help top-management in any organization determine what strategies to take to achieve greater consensus, understanding, and commitment. As stated in Chapter 2, Thompson and Tuden (1959/1987) describe a typology of uncertainty about agreement with organizational decision-making and types of management strategies that may be appropriate. Another way to present the Thompson and Tuden typology, using the planning types developed in this study, is suggested in Table 5.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Agreement</th>
<th>Content Agreement</th>
<th>Content Disagreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process Agreement</td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>Analytic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Disagreement</td>
<td>Participative</td>
<td>Emergent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1. Adapting the Thompson and Tuden typology to aid organizational diagnosis of agreement/disagreement patterns associated with process and content.

Planning strategies (placing emphasis on one or more of the planning types) can be developed to address diagnosed agreement or disagreement patterns.

For example, the results in the present study demonstrate a combination of agreement patterns on plan content at some levels ("superordinate goals") and disagreement patterns at other levels (whether performance measures actually measure goal attainment). The results also show substantive disagreement with the planning process. A suggested remedy would for the organization search for ways to increase emphasis on participative and emergent planning (Figure 5.2).
Table 5.2. Diagnosis and Planning Strategies. The circle indicates the diagnosis of the agreement patterns and suggests emphasis for associated planning strategies (based on both quantitative and qualitative data analyses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Agreement</th>
<th>Content Agreement</th>
<th>Content Disagreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>Analytic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Disagreement</td>
<td>Participative</td>
<td>Emergent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This typology coupled with the methods used in this study would likely be useful to any organization before it tries to institute a particular system-wide planning method.

Study Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

Because this is a single case, generalizability of these results is not possible; nevertheless, this study’s methodology is flexible enough to be adapted to other organizational contexts. A significant problem encountered in the methodology is the ability to conduct parametric statistical analysis (in this case discriminant analysis) of small populations of knowledgeable respondents. Faced with small populations of respondents who are knowledgeable in the planning processes, the researcher is compelled to use simple “eyeballing” technique to discern relative pattern differences in the data. For that reason the methodology is much more clinical than was expected at the outset.

A methodological improvement, suggested by D. T. Campbell (1975), would be to use two researchers or more, preferably with different cultural backgrounds, to investigate qualitatively (or “ethnographically”) the existence of subcultures. Although keeping the two or more researchers independent might be
problematic, whether or not they come to similar conclusions about the organizational subcultures would increase the validity of the case study.

While this study employed the OCAI (for the first time in known published research) to diagnose subcultures, replications in future study is required to validate this process further. It would be interesting to academe, for example, to see if university headquarters and teaching departments have similar subcultural patterns across universities.

More work is required to develop the predictive qualities of the OCAI in terms of the planning typology developed in this study. The objective of future study should be to substantiate planning process patterns as cultural artifacts. This planning typology offers a way to further substantiate the recursive relationship between organizational culture and planning.

This case study failed to locate enough knowledgeable respondent volunteers during the structured interview phase to allow statistical multivariate techniques to be employed. Future researchers should be cognizant that fewer-than-expected volunteer members of organizational subunits may have knowledge of system-wide planning processes and adjust their methodological strategies accordingly. The ideal would be to employ random sampling techniques, providing there is a large enough population of knowledgeable volunteers to sample.

A longitudinal study of potential shifts in CVF organizational culture patterns over long periods of time (say five years or more) and in relation to planning efforts might reveal some useful theoretical propositions about culture
and planning. It would be interesting, for example, to identify critical environmental and external stakeholder influences on culture and subcultures over time. Bacharach and Mundell (1993) and Bacharach, Bamberger, and Mundell (1995) discovered varying “logics of decision justification” as external forces compelled organizational change in an airline and public schools. These studies found that hierarchical levels developed different logics at different times based on the same influencing events, but all eventually changed logics through a political process to eventually be more congruent with each other.\textsuperscript{15} The same could be true about logics of action associated with subcultures and that subcultures would seek an organizational consensus solution to eventually resolve this dissonance.\textsuperscript{16}

Finding a mixed or fragmented (Martin, 2002) subculture archetype with a significant preference for adhocracy presents an interesting paradox for organizational theory based in the CVF. Mixed or fragmented subcultures such as case of PRIE--the university research department -- would seem to rely little on structure and rules (to which members would find it difficult to agree) and organize more around ephemeral projects. Is this fragmentation revealed better by the results of a OCAI showing strong ratings for adhocracy, or by a mixed, fragmented culture archetype? Or would both examples constitute an

---
\textsuperscript{15} These studies supported the proposition that when criteria for organizational decision-making are dissonant, the organization will seek reduction of dissonance over time (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 1996). For example, organizations will negotiate collectively toward dissonance reduction with the external environment (i.e. macropolitics) and individually and in coalitions among executives, managers, and workers internal to the organization (micropolitics). Future study could examine evidence of coalitions in terms of like-patterns associated with OCAI-diagnosed subcultures.

\textsuperscript{16} This brings us back to Morgan (1997) who treats culture as a metaphor; hence, suggests other metaphors, such as organizations as political systems, can be employed at the same time.
“adhocracy?” These are questions for future CVF-based research and should serve as potentially important feedback to further develop the theory behind the competing values framework.

Finally, the presence of a culture archetype may suggest a like-presence of a planning archetype, and vice versa. Pursuing such recursive relationships (in this case between culture and planning) is probably acceptable when the assumption is that organizations are cultures rather treating culture as a parsimonious variable (e.g. Whetten, 1989). As some management and organization chaos and complexity theorists suggest, deep patterns (or “fractals”) repeat themselves from the macro level to micro levels (e.g. Kiel, 1994; Marion, 1999; Wheatley, 1999). CVF gives researchers one tool to help recognize these repeating fractal-like patterns of culture and planning types from the individual member level up to- and across- the whole organization. In this case study, patterns of culture seems to reflect patterns of planning.

**Conclusion**

The preceding chapters and this chapter have:

- Explained the purpose of this case study;
- Developed the three research questions under study;
- Established the theoretical framework (i.e. CVF) and introduced a planning typology for conducting the study;
- Covered why the study is important;
- Described in some detail the case study site and the planning process underway at that site;
- Described the planned methodology employed;
• Reported results and interpreted them; and,

• Finally drew general conclusions from the study and several insights how this study might inform future practice and research.

Students of organizational culture and strategic management should find this study useful because it attempts to link the two topics together in both theoretical and practical ways.
Appendix A. Extended OCAI Mailed Survey

Part I. Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI)

In this part of the survey, “your organization” means your department or subordinate unit within MUSE.

In Part I, rate each of the statements by dividing 100 points between A, B, C, and D depending on how similar the description is to your organization (100 is very similar and 0 is not at all similar to this firm). The total points for each question must equal 100. Rate for both how you feel the firm is now (NOW) and how you think it should be (PREFERRED).

For example, in question 1, assume that you gave 75 points to A, 10 points to B, 15 points to C, and 0 points to D in the "NOW" column. This would indicate that the organization is predominantly a personal place and not at all a controlled and structured place. Assume that you gave 25 points to each one in the "PREFERRED" column. This would indicate you would prefer for these cultural attributes to be exactly equal. You may use only four numbers that total to 100 in each column. Thank you!

EXAMPLE QUESTION 1: Here is how you might rate the culture of your organization "NOW" and how you might "PREFER" the culture of your organization to be sometime in the future.

1. DOMINANT CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A 75</td>
<td>A 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 10</td>
<td>B 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 15</td>
<td>C 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 0</td>
<td>D 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that your responses must add to 100 in each column.
PART I. (Continued)

1. DOMINANT CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The organization is a very <strong>personal place</strong>. It is like an extended family. People seem to share a lot of themselves.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The organization is a very <strong>dynamic and entrepreneurial</strong> place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The organization is very <strong>results oriented</strong>. A major concern is with getting the job done. People are very competitive and achievement oriented.</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The organization is a very <strong>controlled and structured</strong> place. Formal procedures generally govern what people do</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify <strong>mentoring</strong>, <strong>facilitating</strong>, or <strong>nurturing</strong>.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify <strong>entrepreneurship</strong>, <strong>innovating</strong>, or <strong>risk taking</strong>.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify a <strong>no-nonsense</strong>, <strong>aggressive</strong>, <strong>results-oriented focus</strong>.</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify <strong>coordinating</strong>, <strong>organizing</strong>, or <strong>smooth-running efficiency</strong>.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART I. (Continued)

3. MANAGEMENT OF EMPLOYEES

A. The management style in the organization is characterized by **teamwork, consensus, and participation.**

B. The management style in the organization is characterized by **individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness.**

C. The management style in the organization is characterized by **hard-driving competitiveness, high demands, and achievement.**

D. The management style in the organization is characterized by **security of employment, conformity, predictability, and stability in relationships.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. ORGANIZATIONAL GLUE

A. The glue that holds the organization together is **loyalty and mutual trust.** Commitment to this organization runs high.

B. The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to **innovation and development.** There is an emphasis on being on the cutting edge.

C. The glue that holds the organization together is the emphasis on **achievement and goal accomplishment.** Aggressiveness and winning are common themes.

D. The glue that holds the organization together is formal **rules and policies.** Maintaining a smooth-running organization is important.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART I. (Continued)

5. STRATEGIC EMPHASES

A. The organization emphasizes **human development**. High trust, openness, and participation persist.  

B. The organization emphasizes **acquiring new resources** and **creating new challenges**. Trying new things and prospecting for opportunities are valued.

C. The organization emphasizes **competitive actions** and **achievement**. Hitting stretch targets and winning in the marketplace are dominant.

D. The organization emphasizes **permanence** and **stability**. Efficiency, control and smooth operations are important.

Total 100 100

6. CRITERIA OF SUCCESS

A. The organization defines success on the basis of the **development of human resources**, **teamwork**, **employee commitment**, and **concern for people**.

B. The organization defines success on the basis of **having the most unique or the newest products**. It is a **product leader** and **innovator**.

C. The organization defines success on the basis of **winning in the marketplace** and **outpacing the competition**. **Competitive market leadership** is key.

D. The organization defines success on the basis of efficiency. **Dependable delivery**, **smooth scheduling**, and **low cost production** are critical.

Total 100 100

(please continue with Part II)
Part II. Strategic Management Survey

If you make a mistake, please erase completely and circle your new answer. In order to provide comparative reports, please circle your rating of these MUSE strategic planning statements.

We are interested in your opinion about the current MUSE’s strategic statements listed below.

Rate as to whether you agree with the statements as written (and not whether you think they are being implemented, or whether they are being implemented effectively -- this will be addressed in a later part of the study).

Please circle the number as to whether you:

(1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) disagree, or (5) strongly disagree

with the MUSE strategic planning statements (i.e. the mission, vision, values, goals, and objectives)

For example, for the first question, you may rate the mission statement of the MUSE as a "[4]" to indicate you disagree with the mission statement of the MUSE as follows:

1. The USAWC Mission. To prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders for strategic leadership responsibilities; educate current and future leaders on the role of landpower in a joint, multinational and interagency environment; conduct research and publish on national security issues; and engage in outreach programs that benefit the Department of Defense and the Nation.

Part II (continued). Please circle the number as to whether you:
(1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) disagree, or (5) strongly disagree

1. The MUSE mission. To prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders for strategic leadership responsibilities; educate current and future leaders on the role of military power in a joint, multinational and interagency environment; conduct research and publish on national security issues; and engage in outreach programs that benefit the Department of Defense and the Nation.


2. The MUSE vision. The Nation’s most prestigious institution for the education of strategic leaders and the study of military power.


3. The MUSE values:
   • Regardless of rank or position, we will treat each other with dignity and respect.


   • We are dedicated to quality education


   • We enjoy learning


   • We encourage critical thinking and collaboration


   • We stand by everyone in the time of need

      {1} [2] [3] [4] [5]
Part II (continued). Please circle the number as to whether you:
(1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) disagree, or (5) strongly disagree

- Our people are important, so we use our time wisely
  

- We do our “best” each day and are proud of it
  

- We stand by those who innovate for the good of the institution
  

4. The MUSE Strategic Goals and Objectives for each Goal:

- Goal 1. Educating the nation’s current and future leaders in strategic leadership and the role of military power in a joint, multinational and interagency environment.
  

  Objective 1.1: Recruit and retain a professional faculty commensurate with the credentials, experience and expertise required to accomplish the mission of the MUSE.
  

  Objective 1.2: Identify and be responsive to outside assessments which bear on the MUSE educational mission.
  

  Objective 1.3: Provide a high quality, relevant instructional program consistent with the MUSE mission.
  

  Objective 1.4: Provide a high quality faculty development program.
Part II (continued). Please circle the number as to whether you:
(1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) disagree, or 
(5) strongly disagree

- Goal 2. Researching and publishing studies focused on national security 
  issues of value to the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Nation.


  - Objective 2.1: Produce articles, books, and monographs in journals, 
    media, publishing houses, and commissioned studies/research on national security 
    issues.


  - Objective 2.2: Produce articles, monographs and books on national 
    security issues that reach a wide audience.


- Goal 3. Engage the Nation and its leaders to increase the understanding of 
  strategic leadership and the role of landpower in support of the National Security 
  Strategy and contribute to the engagement strategy in the International 
  Community.


  - Objective 3.1: Conduct outreach events which reach appropriate audiences.


  - Objective 3.2: Measure AWC dollars spent on outreach events.


  - Objective 3.3: Conduct outreach events which capture or hold audiences the 
    USAWC has touched.

Part II (continued). Please circle the number as to whether you:
(1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) disagree, or
(5) strongly disagree

- Goal 4. Care for our people by becoming the model installation of "well-being."


  - Objective 4.1: Provide an acceptable infrastructure and safe environment to live, work, study, and visit to enhance a sense of community.


  - Objective 4.2: Monitor and enhance the overall physical health of the civilian and military workforce, and students.


  - Objective 4.3: Provide a positive command climate for military and civilians assigned to MUSE.


  - Objective 4.4: Provide services in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD) standards.


  - Objective 4.5: Achieve standard level of service for base operations (BASOPS) and validated funding level for mission funds.


(please continue with Part III)
Part III. Other Information

In order to provide comparative feedback, please provide the following information about yourself. These questions are used for research purposes—in order to aggregate data by groups only—and are not tied to your individual feedback. Please use an "\(\times\)" to mark your response. Mark only one response per question.

1. Your current organization:
   
   ____ HQMUSE
   
   ____ MILCDIE
   
   ____ PRIE
   
   ____ ConCenWar
   
   ____ etc.
   
   ____ etc.
   
   _____ Other MUSE organization (please write in) ___________________
PART III. OTHER INFORMATION (continued)
Mark your answer with an "X." Mark only one response per question.

2. Your gender

___Female

___Male

3. Your age

___30 & under  ___46-50

___31-35       ___51-55

___36-40       ___56-60

___41-45       ___over 61

4. Your present civilian or military category

___Title 10

___WG

___GS

___Enlisted

___Officer

___(other, please indicate)___________________________________________
5. Your length of military service experience
   ___ I have no military experience
   ___ less than 1 year
   ___ 1-4 years
   ___ 5-11 years
   ___ 11-20 years
   ___ more than 20 years

6. I would best categorize my current position at MUSE as
   ___ laborer
   ___ office worker
   ___ technician
   ___ instructor
   ___ researcher
   ___ staff
   ___ leader/manager

7. I have worked in my current position at MUSE for
   ___ less than 1 year
   ___ 1-4 years
   ___ 5-11 years
   ___ 11-20 years
   ___ more than 20 years
PART III. OTHER INFORMATION (continued)
Mark your answer with an "X." Mark only one response per question.

8. I have worked for MUSE in previous position(s) for
   ___ less than 1 year
   ___ 1-4 years
   ___ 5-11 years
   ___ 11-20 years
   ___ more than 20 years

9. I have achieved the following education level
   ___ did not graduate high school
   ___ high school or graduate equivalency degree
   ___ associates degree
   ___ bachelors degree
   ___ masters degree
   ___ doctoral degree or equivalent (i.e. includes all types, e.g., philosophy, medical and jurisprudence)

10. Race/Ethnicity:
    ___ African American
    ___ Native American
    ___ Asian American
    ___ Chicano/Mexican American
    ___ Caucasian
    ___ Other Latino
    ___ Other
Now that you have completed the formal parts of the questionnaire, please provide any additional information here that you feel is important. Please attach additional paper as needed if this is not enough room.

__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

This concludes the questionnaire. Please seal your copy in the brown envelope provided (to help assure your anonymity) and return it through the office that provided it to you or through internal distribution. Thank you for participating!

Again, your answers and this document will be handled confidentially. Only compiled information from you and many other respondents will be used to provide feedback to the organization. Your responses will remain anonymous.
Appendix B. Three-Part Semi-Structured Interview

INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH STUDY
The Pennsylvania State University

Title of Project: Applying the Competing Values Framework to Study Organizational Subcultures and System-Wide Planning Efforts in a Department of Defense Military University for Senior Executives.
Principal Investigator: Christopher R. Paparone

This is to certify that I, ____________________________, have been given the following information with respect to my participation as a volunteer in a program of investigation under the supervision of Dr. Rupert Chisholm, Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg.

1. Purpose of the study:
The proposed study will involve measuring military university for senior executives (MUSE) subcultures and subcultural agreement with planning postures and environmental perceptions using a semi-structured survey questionnaire. Results are aggregated and provided as organizational development feedback to the MUSE leadership and employees.

2. Procedures to be followed:
This portion of the study involves interviewing volunteer employees about the organization and its culture and planning postures. No individual data or information will be revealed to MUSE or anyone except the researcher. Participation in the study will not affect your employment status with MUSE.

3. Discomforts and risks:
You may elect not to participate at any time whereas I'll stop the interview and not include your responses in my data collection (no hard feelings!). You may decline to answer specific questions at any time.

   a. Benefits to you: The results (that will include your input) will serve as feedback to the leadership and is expected to help guide decisions, especially about planning for the future. This is one way for you to participate and have a voice in the process of creating a new direction for the organization.

   b. Potential benefits to society: The research will assist the MUSE in planning and to gain valuable insights as to the opinions of military and civilian employees. It will also add to the growing research literature on the impact of diversity and subcultures in organizations.

4. Time duration of the procedures and study:
The researcher expects this interview to take about 60 minutes. The overall study will span approximately 1 year.

5. Retention of Interview Records.
The researcher will store interview notes at home in a locked filing cabinet. Notes will be destroyed upon approval of his final dissertation report.

6. Statement of confidentiality and consent:
All records associated with my participation in the study will be subject to Pennsylvania State University confidentiality standards and in the event of any publication resulting from the research no personally identifiable information will be disclosed.

   This is to certify that I consent to and give permission for my participation as a volunteer in this program of investigation. I understand that I will receive a signed copy of this consent form. I have read this form, and understand the content of this consent form.

   This consent form was reviewed and approved by Penn State’s Institutional Review Board on May 14, 2002, with an expiration date of May 14, 2003.

Volunteer Date Colonel Chris Paparone Date
Part I. Subunit & System-Wide Culture (Present and Preferred-Future)

1. How would you rank order these descriptions to best characterize your department/subunit culture as it is now? (from 1 being the dominant one, to 4 being the weakest characterization)

_______ The department/subunit culture emphasizes shared values and goals, participativeness, individuality, and a sense of family.

_______ The department/subunit culture emphasizes entrepreneurship, creativity, adaptability, and dynamism.

_______ The department/subunit culture emphasizes competitiveness, goal accomplishment and production, environmental interaction, and customer orientation.

_______ The department/subunit culture emphasizes order, rules, and regulations, clear lines of authority, uniformity and efficiency.

Why? (Can you provide examples of why you picked this as number 1?):

2. How would you rank order these descriptions to best characterize how you would prefer your department/subunit culture to be in the future? (from 1 being the most desirable, to 4 being the least desirable)

_______ The department/subunit culture should emphasize shared values and goals, participativeness, individuality, and a sense of family.

_______ The department/subunit culture should emphasize entrepreneurship, creativity, adaptability, and dynamism.

_______ The department/subunit culture should emphasize competitiveness, goal accomplishment and production, environmental interaction, and customer orientation.

_______ The department/subunit culture should emphasize order, rules, and regulations, clear lines of authority, uniformity and efficiency.

Why? (Can you provide examples of why you picked this as number 1?):
3. **How would you rank order these descriptions to best characterize the HQMUSE culture as it is now?** (from 1 being the dominant one, to 4 being the weakest characterization)

   _____ The HQMUSE overall culture emphasizes shared values and goals, participativeness, individuality, and a sense of family.

   _____ The HQMUSE overall culture emphasizes entrepreneurship, creativity, adaptability, and dynamism.

   _____ The HQMUSE overall culture emphasizes competitiveness, goal accomplishment and production, environmental interaction, and customer orientation.

   _____ The HQMUSE overall culture emphasizes order, rules, and regulations, clear lines of authority, uniformity and efficiency.

**Why? (Can you provide examples of why you picked this as number 1?):**

4. **How would you rank order these descriptions to best characterize how you would prefer the HQMUSE culture to be in the future?** (from 1 being the most desirable, to 4 being the least desirable)

   _____ The HQMUSE overall culture should emphasize shared values and goals, participativeness, individuality, and a sense of family.

   _____ The HQMUSE overall culture should emphasize entrepreneurship, creativity, adaptability, and dynamism.

   _____ The HQMUSE overall culture should emphasize competitiveness, goal accomplishment and production, environmental interaction, and customer orientation.

   _____ The HQMUSE overall culture should emphasize order, rules, and regulations, clear lines of authority, uniformity and efficiency.

**Why? (Can you provide examples of why you picked this as number 1?):**
Part II. Questions on Planning Content

1. Read the MUSE vision statement and check the description below that best defines to what degree your personal vision is compatible with the MUSE vision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Nation's most prestigious institution for the education of strategic leaders and the study of military power.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

____ I want this vision with a passion. I will make it happen. We will change the regulations, directives, or even law to create whatever structures and processes that are needed.

____ I want this vision and will do whatever can be done within the “spirit of the law” (or regulations and directives).

____ I see benefits from this vision because it does everything expected and more. I’ll follow the “letter of the law” in support of it. As a “good soldier/employee,” I will support it with professional rigor.

____ On the whole, I can see benefits of this vision. I’ll do what is expected and no more. As a “good soldier/employee,” I’ll support it in balance with my other priorities.

____ I do not see the benefits of the vision. But I also do not want to lose my job. I’ll do enough of what is expected because I have to, but I’ll also speak out that I am not really on board.

____ I do not see the benefits of the vision and will not do what is expected. “I won’t do it and you cannot make me.”

____ I am neither for nor against this vision. I am not interested in it. I will not devote energy to it. “Is it five o’clock yet?”

Can you explain why you feel this way?

Next I will show you several goals from the USAWC plan. Please rate them and then comment.
Goal 1. Educating the nation’s current and future leaders in strategic leadership and the role of military power in a joint, multinational and interagency environment.

___ I want this goal with a passion. I will make it happen. We will change the regulations, directives, or even law to create whatever structures and processes that are needed.

___ I want this goal and will do whatever can be done within the “spirit of the law” (or regulations and directives).

___ I see benefits from this goal because it does everything expected and more. I’ll follow the “letter of the law” in support of it. As a “good soldier/employee,” I will support it with professional rigor.

___ On the whole, I can see benefits of this goal. I’ll do what is expected and no more. As a “good soldier/employee,” I’ll support it in balance with my other priorities.

___ I do not see the benefits of the goal. But I also do not want to lose my job. I’ll do enough of what is expected because I have to, but I’ll also speak out that I am not really on board.

___ I do not see the benefits of the goal and will not do what is expected. “I won’t do it and you cannot make me.”

___ I am neither for nor against this goal. I am not interested in it. I will not devote energy to it. “Is it five o’clock yet?”

Can you explain why you feel this way?
Goal 2. Researching and publishing studies focused on national security issues of value to the DoD and the Nation.

____ I want this goal with a passion. I will make it happen. We will change the regulations, directives, or even law to create whatever structures and processes that are needed.

____ I want this goal and will do whatever can be done within the “spirit of the law” (or regulations and directives).

____ I see benefits from this goal because it does everything expected and more. I’ll follow the “letter of the law” in support of it. As a “good soldier/employee,” I will support it with professional rigor.

____ On the whole, I can see benefits of this goal. I’ll do what is expected and no more. As a “good soldier/employee,” I’ll support it in balance with my other priorities.

____ I do not see the benefits of the goal. But I also do not want to lose my job. I’ll do enough of what is expected because I have to, but I’ll also speak out that I am not really on board.

____ I do not see the benefits of the goal and will not do what is expected. “I won’t do it and you cannot make me.”

____ I am neither for nor against this goal. I am not interested in it. I will not devote energy to it. “Is it five o’clock yet?”

Can you explain why you feel this way?
Goal 3. Engaging the Nation and its leaders to increase understanding of strategic leadership and the role of military power in support of the National Security Strategy and contributing to the engagement strategy in the International Community.

____ I want this goal with a passion. I will make it happen. We will change the regulations, directives, or even to law create whatever structures and processes that are needed.

____ I want this goal and will do whatever can be done within the “spirit of the law” (or regulations and directives).

____ I see benefits from this goal because it does everything expected and more. I’ll follow the “letter of the law” in support of it. As a “good soldier/employee,” I will support it with professional rigor.

____ On the whole, I can see benefits of this goal. I’ll do what is expected and no more. As a “good soldier/employee,” I’ll support it in balance with my other priorities.

____ I do not see the benefits of the goal. But I also do not want to lose my job. I’ll do enough of what is expected because I have to, but I’ll also speak out that I am not really on board.

____ I do not see the benefits of the goal and will not do what is expected. “I won’t do it and you cannot make me.”

____ I am neither for nor against this goal. I am not interested in it. I will not devote energy to it. “Is it five o’clock yet?”

Can you explain why you feel this way?
Goal 4. Caring for our people by becoming the model installation for “well-being.”

___ I want this goal with a passion. I will make it happen. We will change the regulations, directives, or even law to create whatever structures and processes that are needed.

___ I want this goal and will do whatever can be done within the “spirit of the law” (or regulations and directives).

___ I see benefits from this goal because it does everything expected and more. I’ll follow the “letter of the law” in support of it. As a “good soldier/employee,” I will support it with professional rigor.

___ On the whole, I can see benefits of this goal. I’ll do what is expected and no more. As a “good soldier/employee,” I’ll support it in balance with my other priorities.

___ I do not see the benefits of the goal. But I also do not want to lose my job. I’ll do enough of what is expected because I have to, but I’ll also speak out that I am not really on board.

___ I do not see the benefits of the goal and will not do what is expected. “I won’t do it and you cannot make me.”

___ I am neither for nor against this goal. I am not interested in it. I will not devote energy to it. “Is it five o’clock yet?”

Can you explain why you feel this way?
2. Finally, in this section, I wanted to ask you about your views on the concept of “strategic leadership” because this appears to be a key definition associated with the planning effort. (Tests for homogeneity of potential cultural “definition.”)

What statement best describes the USAWC established or institutional view of “strategic leadership?”

____ Strategic leadership is a highly participatory, mutual relationship among leaders and their collaborators who together intend to make real changes that reflect their mutual purposes.

____ Strategic leadership sets organizational conditions for ongoing accommodations, adaptation, and alterations that produce fundamental change without \textit{a priori} intention to do so.

____ Strategic leadership transcends the organization by orchestrating internal events, in concert with personal and organizational influence on the external environment, to achieve an organizational vision.

____ Strategic leadership interprets context within the environment and then shapes the decisions made by the organizational internal operating systems.

____ Strategic leadership institutionalizes structures at the macro-level and establishes and maintains coordinative mechanisms at the micro-level of the organization.

What statement best describes your preferred view of “strategic leadership?”

____ Strategic leadership is a highly participatory, mutual relationship among leaders and their collaborators who together intend to make real changes that reflect their mutual purposes.

____ Strategic leadership sets organizational conditions for ongoing accommodations, adaptation, and alterations that produce fundamental change without \textit{a priori} intention to do so.

____ Strategic leadership transcends the organization by orchestrating internal events, in concert with personal and organizational influence on the external environment, to achieve an organizational vision.

____ Strategic leadership interprets context within the environment and then shapes the decisions made by the organizational internal operating systems.

____ Strategic leadership institutionalizes structures at the macro-level and establishes and maintains coordinative mechanisms at the micro-level of the organization.

Any comments on your selections?
Part III. Questions on the Planning Process

1. Do you think the “scorecard” or “keeping score” planning process HQMUSE is using now will result in necessary changes at MUSE?

__________YES  _____________NO  ____________MAYBE

Why? (Can you provide examples of why this is so?):
Rate each of the statements by dividing 100 points between A, B, C, and D depending on how similar the description is to how HQMUSE plans. (100 is very similar and 0 is not at all similar to this firm). The total points for each question must equal 100. Rate for both how you feel the HQMUSE planning is now (NOW) and how you think it should be (PREFERRED).

2. General Orientation of Planning Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The planning process is oriented on workforce participation.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The planning process is oriented on organizational adaptation.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The planning process oriented on competition with other organizations.</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The planning process oriented on budgeting.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. General Requirement of Planning Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The planning process requires obtaining workforce consensus.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The planning process requires learning.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The planning process requires analysis of the environment.</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The planning process requires programming.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. General Purpose of Planning Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The purpose of the planning process is to gain workforce commitment.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The purpose of the planning process is to learn as emergent factors become clearer.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The purpose of the planning process is to ready the organization for contingencies.</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The purpose of the planning process is to gain efficiencies with programs.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Why do you see it this way? Can you provide examples?
Rate each of the statements by dividing 100 points between A, B, C, and D depending on how similar the description is to how your department/subunit planning. (100 is very similar and 0 is not at all similar to your subunit total points for each question must equal 100. Rate for both how you your department/subunit overall planning is now (NOW) and how you think it should be (PREFERRED).

5. General Orientation of Planning Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOW</td>
<td>PREFERRED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. The planning process is oriented on workforce participation.  
A _____ A _____

B. The planning process is oriented on organizational adaptation.  
B _____ B _____

C. The planning process oriented on competition with other organizations.  
C _____ C _____

D. The planning process oriented on budgeting.  
D _____ D _____

Total 100 100

6. General Requirement of Planning Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOW</td>
<td>PREFERRED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. The planning process requires obtaining workforce consensus.  
A _____ A _____

B. The planning process requires learning.  
B _____ B _____

C. The planning process requires analysis of the environment.  
C _____ C _____

D. The planning process requires programming.  
D _____ D _____

Total 100 100

7. General Purpose of Planning Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOW</th>
<th>PREFERRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOW</td>
<td>PREFERRED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. The purpose of the planning process is to gain workforce commitment.  
A _____ A _____

B. The purpose of the planning process is to learn as emergent factors become clearer.  
B _____ B _____

C. The purpose of the planning process is to ready the organization for contingencies.  
C _____ C _____

D. The purpose of the planning process is to gain efficiencies with programs.  
D _____ D _____

Total 100 100

Why do you see it this way? Can you provide examples?
8. Do you feel like your opinion really counts on how MUSE is managed strategically?

_________ YES  ___________ NO

Why? (Can you provide examples of why this is so?):

9. If you could change one thing in the planning process, what would it be? How would you go about doing it? What would you predict would be the biggest barriers to overcome?

Last question:
10. Do you have confidence in the confidentiality of your responses to this questionnaire? Any comments?
Part IV. Confidential Information About the Respondent

1. Department/MUSE sub-unit_____________________________.

2. Respondents gender: Male____ or Female____

3. Respondent age
   ___30 & under ___46-50
   ___31-35 ___51-55
   ___36-40 ___56-60
   ___41-45 ___over 61

4. Respondent is
   ___Title 10
   ___GS
   ___Enlisted
   ___Officer
   ___(other, please indicate)___________________________________________

5. Respondents length of military service experience
   ___Has no military experience
   ___less than 1 year
   ___1-4 years
   ___5-11 years
   ___11-20 years
   ___more than 20 years

6. Respondent would best categorize current position at MUSE as
   ___laborer
   ___office worker
   ___technician
   ___instructor
   ___researcher
   ___staff
   ___leader/manager

7. Respondent has worked in current position at MUSE for
   ___less than 1 year
   ___1-4 years
   ___5-11 years
   ___11-20 years
   ___more than 20 years

8. Respondent has worked for MUSE in previous position(s) for
___ less than 1 year
___ 1-4 years
___ 5-11 years
___ 11-20 years
___ more than 20 years

9. Respondent has achieved the following education level
___ did not graduate high school
___ high school or graduate equivalency degree
___ associates degree
___ bachelors degree
___ masters degree
___ doctoral degree or equivalent (i.e. includes all types, e.g., philosophy, medical and jurisprudence)

10. Respondent’s Race/Ethnicity:

___ African American
___ Native American
___ Asian American
___ Chicano/Mexican American
___ Caucasian
___ Other Latino
___ Other
Appendix C. Data Tables

DATA TABLE 1. MUSE TOTAL INITIAL PLAN CONTENT RATINGS BASED ON MAILED SURVEY AND MUSE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IDENTIFIED IN TOTAL WITH THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (OCAI) (CAMERON & QUINN, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUSE</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mission statement agreement/disagreement</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vision statement agreement/disagreement</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dignity and respect</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quality education</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enjoy learning</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>critical thinking &amp; collab</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stand by in time of need</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people important so use time wisely</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best each day &amp; proud of it</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stand by those who innovate for the institution</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>educating straf leadership &amp; role of landpower</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recruit and retain professional faculty</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>id &amp; be responsive to outside assessments</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high qual &amp; relevant instructional program</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high quality faculty development program</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>research &amp; publication on natl sec issues</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>produce articles, books, monographs (scholars)</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>produce articles, monographs &amp; books (wide audience)</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engage nation &amp; leaders on strategic leadership &amp; landpower</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach to appropriate audiences</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure dollars spent on the outreach events</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct outreach events which capture or hold those touched</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>care for people model installation of well-being</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acceptable infrastructure and safe environment-work, study, visit</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitor&amp; enhance overall physical health of civ &amp; mil workforce &amp; students</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pos command climate for soldiers and civilians</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide services IAW DA &amp; DoD standards</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve SLOS for BASOPS and DCSOPS mission validated funding level</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLANNOW</td>
<td>26.47</td>
<td>15.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHOCRACY NOW</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>9.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET NOW</td>
<td>27.74</td>
<td>14.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIERARCHY NOW</td>
<td>28.12</td>
<td>14.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAN PREFERRED</td>
<td>33.89</td>
<td>11.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHOCRACY PREFERRED</td>
<td>23.94</td>
<td>7.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET PREFERRED</td>
<td>21.21</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIERARCHY PREFERRED</td>
<td>21.32</td>
<td>10.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DATA TABLE 2. MUSE FOUR SUBUNIT INITIAL PLAN CONTENT RATINGS BASED ON MAILED SURVEY AND FOUR MUSE ORGANIZATIONAL SUBCULTURES IDENTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF SUBUNITS ASSESSED WITH THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (OCAI) (Cameron & Quinn, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subculture</th>
<th>HQMUSE</th>
<th>MILCDI</th>
<th>SSI</th>
<th>ConCenWar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission statement agreement/disagreement</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision statement agreement/disagreement</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity and respect</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality education</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoy learning</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical thinking &amp; collaboration</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand by in time of need</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People important so use time wisely</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best each day &amp; proud of it</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand by those who innovate for the institution</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educating strat leadership &amp; role of landpower</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit and retain professional faculty</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>立 &amp; be responsive to outside assessments</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High quality instructional program</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High quality faculty development program</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; publication on non sec issues</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce articles, books, monographs (scholars)</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce articles, monographs &amp; books (wide audience)</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage nation &amp; leaders on strategic leadership &amp; landpower</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach to appropriate audiences</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure dollars spent on the outreach events</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct outreach events which capture or hold those touched</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for people model installation of well being</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptable infrastructure and safe environment-work, study, visit</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor &amp; enhance overall physical health of civ &amp; mil workforce &amp; students</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POS command climate for soldiers and civilians</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide services IAW DA &amp; DoD standards</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve SLOS for BASOPS &amp; DCSOPS mission validated funding level</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Significant, p<.05
DATA TABLE 3. MUSE TWO SUBUNIT INITIAL PLAN CONTENT RATINGS BASED ON MAILED SURVEY AND TWO MUSE ORGANIZATIONAL SUBCULTURES IDENTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION (THOSE RESPONDENTS WITH PhDS AND MILITARY OFFICERS WITHOUT PhDs) ASSESSED WITH THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT (OCAI) (CAMERON & QUINN, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PhDs. n = 19 respondents</th>
<th>PhDs. Mean</th>
<th>PhDs. Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Officer. n = 57 respondents</th>
<th>Officer Mean</th>
<th>Officer Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mission statement agreement/disagreement</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vision statement agreement/disagreement</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dignity and respect</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quality education</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enjoy learning</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>critical thinking &amp; collab</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stand by in time of need</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people important so use time wisely</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best each day &amp; proud of it</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stand by those who innovate for the institution</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>educating strat leadership &amp; role of landpower</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recruit and retain professional faculty</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ld &amp; be responsive to outside assessments</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high qual &amp; relevant instructional program</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high quality faculty development program</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>research &amp; publication on natl sec issues</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>produce articles, books, monographs (scholars)</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idg nation &amp; leaders on strategic leadership &amp; landpower</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach to appropriate audiences</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure dollars spent on the outreach events</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct outreach events which capture or hold those touched</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>care for people model installation of well-being</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acceptable infrastructure and safe environment-work, study, visit</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitor &amp; enhance overall physical health of civ &amp; mil workforce &amp; students</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide services IAW DA &amp; DoD standards</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve SLOS for BASOPS and DCSOPS mission validated funding level</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLANNOW</td>
<td>24.47</td>
<td>11.48</td>
<td>32.68*</td>
<td>16.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHOCRACY NOW</td>
<td>20.79</td>
<td>11.06</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>9.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET NOW</td>
<td>27.11</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>23.81</td>
<td>11.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIERARCHY NOW</td>
<td>27.11</td>
<td>16.31</td>
<td>25.75</td>
<td>14.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAN PREFERRED</td>
<td>29.41</td>
<td>9.72</td>
<td>36.85</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHOCRACY PREFERRED</td>
<td>28.16*</td>
<td>10.28</td>
<td>25.63</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET PREFERRED</td>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>19.94</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIERARCHY PREFERRED</td>
<td>19.47</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>17.62*</td>
<td>9.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant, p<.05
DATA TABLE 4. CROSSTABULATION RESULTS OF STRUCTURED INTERVIEW, PART I. SUBUNIT & SYSTEM-WIDE CULTURE (PRESENT AND PREFERRED FUTURE).

HOW RESPONDENTS SEE THEIR INTERNAL SUBUNIT CULTURE NOW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLAN</th>
<th>ADHOCRACY</th>
<th>MARKET</th>
<th>HIERARCHY</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HOW RESPONDENTS WOULD PREFER INTERNAL SUBUNIT CULTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLAN</th>
<th>ADHOCRACY</th>
<th>MARKET</th>
<th>HIERARCHY</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HOW RESPONDENTS SEE HQMUSE CULTURE NOW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLAN</th>
<th>MARKET</th>
<th>HIERARCHY</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMUSE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HOW RESPONDENTS WOULD PREFER HQMUSE CULTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CLAN</th>
<th>ADHOCRACY</th>
<th>MARKET</th>
<th>HIERARCHY</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMUSE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DATA TABLE 5. CROSSTABULATION RESULTS OF STRUCTURED INTERVIEW, Part II. QUESTIONS ON PLANNING CONTENT

**VISION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Genuine compliance</th>
<th>Formal compliance</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMUSE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GOAL 1 (EDUCATION)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Genuine compliance</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMUSE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GOAL 2 (RESEARCH)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Genuine compliance</th>
<th>Formal compliance</th>
<th>Apathy</th>
<th>n=l</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMUSE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GOAL 3 (STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Genuine compliance</th>
<th>Formal compliance</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMUSE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GOAL 4 (WELL BEING)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Genuine compliance</th>
<th>Formal compliance</th>
<th>Grudging Compliance</th>
<th>n=l</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMUSE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DATA TABLE 5. CROSSTABULATION RESULTS OF STRUCTURED INTERVIEW, PART II. QUESTIONS ON PLANNING CONTENT

INSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Human relations/participative</th>
<th>Open systems/adaptive</th>
<th>Institutional or MUSE’s oriented definition</th>
<th>Internal process or bureaucratic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMUSE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERSONAL DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Human relations/participative</th>
<th>Open systems/adaptive</th>
<th>Institutional or MUSE’s oriented definition</th>
<th>Internal process or bureaucratic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILCDI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ConCenWar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMUSE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DATA TABLE 5. RESULTS OF STRUCTURED INTERVIEW, PART III. QUESTION ON INTERNAL SUBUNIT PLANNING PROCESS (IPSATIVE SCALE).

Subculture Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subculture</th>
<th>Participative Now</th>
<th>Emergent Now</th>
<th>Analytical Now</th>
<th>Programmatic Now</th>
<th>Participative Preferred</th>
<th>Emergent Preferred</th>
<th>Analytical Preferred</th>
<th>Programmatic Preferred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
DATA TABLE 6. RESULTS OF STRUCTURED SURVEY INSTRUMENT PART III. QUESTION ON HQMUSE SYSTEM-WIDE PLANNING PROCESS (IPSATIVE SCALE).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subculture Statistics</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>n=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MILCDI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Now</td>
<td>12.1429</td>
<td>7.1824</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Now</td>
<td>21.4286</td>
<td>4.9468</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Now</td>
<td>23.5714</td>
<td>6.6269</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Now</td>
<td>42.8571</td>
<td>7.1177</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Preferred</td>
<td>26.4286</td>
<td>8.0178</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Preferred</td>
<td>23.3333</td>
<td>6.0858</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Preferred</td>
<td>19.2857</td>
<td>5.1691</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Preferred</td>
<td>30.9524</td>
<td>11.0494</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRIE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Now</td>
<td>20.9524</td>
<td>9.9003</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Now</td>
<td>21.6667</td>
<td>10.3638</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Now</td>
<td>19.0476</td>
<td>16.1262</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Now</td>
<td>38.3333</td>
<td>15.5754</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Preferred</td>
<td>20.2381</td>
<td>7.5553</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Preferred</td>
<td>28.8095</td>
<td>15.7149</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Preferred</td>
<td>26.9048</td>
<td>17.0628</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Preferred</td>
<td>19.2857</td>
<td>9.9934</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ConCenWar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Now</td>
<td>17.6667</td>
<td>13.7706</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Now</td>
<td>21.1667</td>
<td>14.3426</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Now</td>
<td>14.1667</td>
<td>8.0985</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Now</td>
<td>29.0000</td>
<td>20.1415</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Preferred</td>
<td>25.0000</td>
<td>17.9505</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Preferred</td>
<td>23.1667</td>
<td>14.5392</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Preferred</td>
<td>16.1667</td>
<td>11.7864</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Preferred</td>
<td>14.6667</td>
<td>13.0005</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HQMUSE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Now</td>
<td>23.5000</td>
<td>14.2172</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Now</td>
<td>23.9333</td>
<td>8.5068</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Now</td>
<td>21.1000</td>
<td>6.4980</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Now</td>
<td>31.4333</td>
<td>16.5977</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Preferred</td>
<td>27.6667</td>
<td>13.1750</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Preferred</td>
<td>30.0333</td>
<td>9.2636</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Preferred</td>
<td>19.7000</td>
<td>8.6445</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Preferred</td>
<td>22.5333</td>
<td>10.7200</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Now</td>
<td>18.9216</td>
<td>12.3083</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Now</td>
<td>21.5490</td>
<td>10.1619</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Now</td>
<td>19.1471</td>
<td>9.8740</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Now</td>
<td>34.4902</td>
<td>16.4024</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Preferred</td>
<td>25.0980</td>
<td>12.8114</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Preferred</td>
<td>26.3824</td>
<td>11.9618</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Preferred</td>
<td>20.0588</td>
<td>11.4349</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Preferred</td>
<td>21.2843</td>
<td>12.3373</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D. Copyright permission to use OCAI (Cameron personal correspondence, 2001)

Paparone, Christopher R COL USAWC/DCLM

To: Cameron, Kim
Subject: RE: Internal use of the instruments

From: Cameron, Kim [mailto:cameronk@bus.umich.edu]
Sent: Friday, March 23, 2001 3:37 PM
To: Paparone, Christopher R
Cc: Quinn, Robert; 'Sherry.Slade@b-d-s.com'
Subject: RE: Internal use of the instruments

Dear Chris:

Thank you very much for your inquiry about the use of the culture assessment instrument in MUSE. I don't know of any other applications of the competing values framework in that setting.

Anyway, I would be pleased to have you use the OCAI in your project. It would be terrific if you would share your results with me. I'm eager to learn what you find. Your potential data set should be terrific.

Thanks again for your message, Chris. Best wishes in your research.

Kim
Appendix E. Pennsylvania State University Institutional Review Board Approval Document

The Behavioral and Social Sciences Committee of the Institutional Review Board has reviewed and approved your proposal for use of human subjects in your research. This approval has been granted for a one-year period.

Approval for use of human subjects in this research is given for a period covering one year from today. If your study extends beyond this approval period, you must contact this office to request an annual review of this research.

Attached are confidential labels you can use to seal the envelopes that contain the original, signed informed consent forms obtained from the subjects of your study. These envelopes are then to be mailed to the address listed above.

Contact this office if you need more labels.

Subjects must receive a copy of any informed consent documentation that was submitted to the Compliance Office for review.

By accepting this decision you agree to notify the Compliance Office of (1) any additions or procedural changes that modify the subjects' risks in any way and (2) any unanticipated subject events that are encountered during the conduct of this research. Prior approval must be obtained for any planned changes to the approved protocol. Unanticipated subject events must be reported in a timely fashion.

On behalf of the committee and the University, I thank you for your efforts to conduct your research in compliance with the federal regulations that have been established for the protection of human subjects.

CAY/lik
Attachments
cc: R. Chinholm
    S. Peterson
    H. Sachs
Appendix F. Written Permission to Conduct the Case Study from “HQMUSE” (real names have been removed)

Department of _________
Military University for Senior Executives
Somewhere, USA

Assessment Office 28 June 2001

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

SUBJECT: Letter of Agreement and Approval for Survey Research

Colonel Paparone's research proposal, entitled "The Impact of Subcultural Strategic Congruence at MUSE" is approved for implementation. He has agreed to follow human subject research requirements of his University and the Department of Defense.

The President of MUSE gave his explicit approval to Colonel Paparone for the project on 15 June 2001.

Original Signature On File with Researcher
I. M Incharge, PhD
Director, Institutional Assessment
Associate Professor, Educational Research
References


Mintzberg, H. and Quinn, J. B. (1992). Chapter 1, Five Ps for strategy (pp. 12-19); Chapter 5, Strategic change: Logical incrementalism (pp. 96-104), Crafting strategy (pp. 105-114). In The strategy process: Concepts and contexts, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.


Vita

Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army, is faculty instructor at the U.S. Army War College Department of Command, Leadership and Management. He received a bachelor degree in psychology from the University of South Florida, Tampa, and master degrees from the Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne, the US Naval War College, Rhode Island, and the US Army War College, Pennsylvania. During his 25 years of active duty he has served in various command and staff positions, in peace and war, to include the continental United States, Panama, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. His jobs have included deputy G3, 21st Theater Support Command, Kaiserslautern, Germany; battalion commander, 47th Forward Support Battalion, 1st Armored Division, in Germany and Bosnia, battalion executive officer in the 82nd Airborne Division, logistics planner in Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps during Operation Desert Storm, and support operations officer in U.S. Army, South during Operation Just Cause. He is married to the lovely Carrie Li of Tokyo Japan, and together, they have raised three children, Kimberly, Scotty, and Carl.