CASTLING THE KING:
INSTITUTIONAL SEQUENCING AND REGIME CHANGE

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by
Matthew Charles Wilson

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The dissertation of Matthew Charles Wilson was reviewed and approved* by the following:

Gretchen Casper
Associate Professor of Political Science
Dissertation Adviser
Chair of Committee

Joseph Wright
Associate Professor of Political Science

James Piazza
Associate Professor and Chair of the Graduate Program

Melissa A. Hardy
Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Demography

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School.
Abstract

The question that this dissertation seeks to answer is the following: What conditions determine the timing of political institutions in authoritarian regimes? An increasing focus in the comparative research on modern autocracies is on the institutions by which different forms of authoritarianism govern. In terms of formal political institutions—the rules and expectations by which politics is conducted and society operates—non-democracies have displayed a remarkable diversity and survivability. The thesis attempts to explain the relative benefits of authoritarian institutions—particularly the legislature—in situations with high uncertainty. Recent work has highlighted major differences between modern autocratic institutions, such as parties and legislatures, which seemingly “go together.” In contrast, this study addresses antecedent conditions that predict the turn to neither, to one, or to both. I argue that historical patterns of state building show a common trend in which contestation precluded participation, and that this trend helps to explain the timing and success of institutions in authoritarian regimes.

Noting that a majority of non-democracies have legalized legislatures but are not based on a political party, and that leaders who adapt institutions are more likely to allow a legislature than to encourage parties, I draw on a real-world example in which a dictator confronted issues of power-sharing to better understand the attractiveness of an authoritarian legislature. A prime example of power-sharing problems is nineteenth
century Mexico, during which a federal government was being forged out of protracted post-independence conflict between multiple parties with different ideologies. The administration of Porfirio Díaz—roughly, 1876-1911—maintained relative stability in the absence of modern political parties and with a regularly meeting Congress. I demonstrate that regional bosses emerged after Independence and Reform as a consequence of local violence patterns, and that their capacity to contain regional politics earned them a say in the formation of law. The problems facing Porfirio Díaz therefore differed from those facing post-Revolutionary leaders, which explain the timing of legislative and party institutions in Mexico.

Using a cross-national dataset on levels of executive recruitment and political competition for 1800-2013, I examine whether there are ‘modal’ patterns of institutional development. I find that transitions that firstly involved regularizing contestation characterize the bulk of countries in my sample. In turn, this state positively predicts regime type, ethnic diversity in party leadership, and the survival of authoritarian regimes. The results suggest that the emergence of modern authoritarian institutions is conditioned by conflict and unrest, and that particular institutional arrangements provide distinct solutions to different problems related to governance. Though applied to a modern sample, the historical case and the tested logic encourage scholars to further consider whether there exist distinct paths of institutional development. The research supports comparative research by considering the long-term temporal dimension of institutional change, utilizing the richness of experiences in Latin America to explain political transitions, and adding nuance to the study of authoritarian parties and legislatures.
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Preface

This dissertation has undergone substantial transformations over the course of drafting it. The original prospectus that I submitted to my committee aimed to examine the effect of political sequences on the likelihood of democratization. I had a substantial interest in ways of visualizing and modeling sequences based on discrete values, and had just completed a course on survival models. Both of these motivated me to consider whether prior patterns of authoritarian regime type determined whether and when democracy occurred.

Though I remained interested in the role of sequencing and institutions in determining democracy and political outcomes more generally, my focus changed when I was given the opportunity to conduct research at the Center for the Study and Teaching of Economics (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE). Mexico is a great case by which to study the interactions of actors in a stable authoritarian regime—for roughly 70 years, the same political party dominated national politics, despite changes in the involvement of the military and organized labor. Indeed, a great deal of research has been done on the success of the authoritarian party. In preparing for a brief research stay there, I began to examine differences in the relationship between the state and labor in Mexico, contrasting interactions between actors there with the rise of Juan Perón in Argentina.

In familiarizing myself with the history of Mexico, however, I became fascinated by a particular observation that, while it has been researched, has largely never been used to explain subsequent political developments. Prior to the establishment of the dominant political party that came to be known as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), a major revolution impunged the country of its dictator that was characterized by
large-scale mass mobilization. This dictator, however, is credited with much of the modernization and industrialization in Mexico. What is more, Porfirio Díaz—a former military officer—assumed power during very precarious politics and maintained office for an unprecedented thirty years.

The dissertation quickly became qualitatively oriented, as I learned more about aspects of his administration. I discovered that while there was an active legislature during the Porfiriato, party politics was largely nonexistent. Having been informed by scholars that political science research should pay greater attention to the role of time and history in determining political outcomes, I spent a lot of time thinking about the relationship of this segment of history to that which followed the Mexican Revolution. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that during my brief time at CIDE, my theoretical pursuit was not very favorably looked upon. It was difficult to develop a theory of institutional changes that sufficiently satisfied both historians and political scientists. However, the struggle to internally defend the logic and to look elsewhere for theoretical support was a major turning point in my development as a graduate student, for which I am grateful.

The result is a dissertation that uses the case of Mexico to demonstrate that political institutions may occur in a general pattern in which elite coordination is first achieved and then suffrage is extended to nonelites. I believe that this was an important feature in the formation of the Mexican state, and it corresponds to patterns of historical institutional change in Latin America and the rest of the world more broadly. By abstracting from individual states and thinking about long-term effects, I find qualitative and quantitative support for the notion posited by Dahl (1971) that there are pathways to polyarchy. Although Huntington (1965) took this implication to mean that stable government initially required the suppression of mass mobilization, I argue that what we can learn from them is how to structure political institutions to resolve distinct problems related to elite and mass involvement.

The dissertation may not be definitive or ground-breaking, but it represents an earnest endeavor to better understand politics in Mexico and Latin America for the
purposes of contributing to contemporary political science research. Getting here has been an emotionally and mentally exhausting pursuit, but I have thoroughly enjoyed the process of constructing a dissertation. More than anything, developing an explanation for broad trends in Latin American institutional development has really given me the experience of developing a theory and trying to take it to its conclusions. What began as an attempt to quantitatively model the impact of regime patterns on democratization, however, turned into a mixed-methods account of the temporal relationship between authoritarian institutions.
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To my wonderful husband, Ben, who helped me attain the life I always wanted (whether I knew it or not).
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The Question

What conditions determine the development of political institutions in authoritarian regimes? This thesis makes two related arguments: the first is that a general trend describes historical statebuilding, in which dominant actors regularized competition and then extended the franchise. Second, understanding why this trend–what North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a) call the transition from a limited-access order to an open-access order–is likely helps to explain the timing and success of authoritarian institutions. By timing, I mean when and under what circumstances we should expect a political institution that prioritizes elites over regular citizens; success refers to the ability of such institutions to effectively coordinate the interests of elites and masses, and to direct their action. In particular, I highlight potential distinctions between authoritarian legislatures and authoritarian parties. My focus on authoritarian regimes comes from the fact that non-democracies are generally regarded as any form of government that is not democratic. Explaining the origin of political institutions therefore concerns interactions that frequently precede democracy, if it occurs at all. Nevertheless, understanding how institutional forms are related to societal interactions yields useful implications for the successful design and implementation of democratic government (Casper and Taylor 1996). The implications of the argument therefore apply to autocracies as well as democracies.

The development of a two-pronged argument on why the timing of each of these
political institutions matters is motivated by the research on political development in Mexico, which effectively begins with the ebbing of the Mexican Revolution and the creation of the first national political party. My selection of Mexico as a case study stems from the fact that a period of stability was attained prior to the Revolution, and prior to the formation of a national political party. As a result, I argue that much of the work that looks to Mexico to explain the development of political institutions explains only part of a longer term trend in its institutional development. Correspondingly, a historical appraisal of actors and their interactions in Latin America in the 19th and 20th centuries supports the notion of a predominant long-term pattern—elites initially fought amongst themselves, and in the process of reconciling their differences generated public discontent that often resulted in the initiation of party politics. I outline the logic, much of which comes from existing literature in comparative politics on political institutions, for why contestation among elites so often preceded participation by the masses.

To illustrate the process, I provide a qualitative analysis of political institutions in Mexico in the 19th and 20th centuries, and explore the extent to which it is generalizable more broadly. The contributions of this research include helping to explain why legislatures often preceded political parties in non-democracies and what makes nonpartisan legislatures successful, as well as adding theoretical distinction to varieties of authoritarian regimes and party systems. Why are some traditional parties, such as the Communist Party of Cuba and the Colorado and Blancos in Uruguay so durable, while other electoral systems with political parties—such as those in Brazil and Bolivia—appear fragmented and volatile? In addition to drawing on the rich and varied political experiences of countries in Latin America, this research looks farther back in history for answers to support contemporary knowledge.

1.2 The Motivation

Although there is considerable research on the roles of political parties, legislatures, and courts in democracies, scholars have more recently sought to explain their presence
in non-democracies (Boix and Svolik 2013, Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Geddes 2003). At the national level, political parties represent the vertical aggregation of group interests, the representatives of which compete to determine policy. The legislature provides a forum in which the cadre who represent them negotiate with one another in an effort to shape laws that provides benefits for their constituents, while courts help to enforce adherence to, and equal protections under, the law. In countries that practice unfree and unfair politics, however, political parties, a national congress, and judicial review do not necessarily equate with greater levels of democracy. In many cases, the adoption of seemingly democratic attributes like elections can actually reinforce non-democratic rule and thwart movements toward democracy (Schedler 2002).

The presence of formal institutions in non-democratic countries has prompted scholars to reconsider their relationships to important political outcomes such as stability and human rights. As rules and norms that guide actors’ behavior, the effects of political institutions may depend more on the content with which they are embued than the codified structures that they represent. A variety of scientific approaches, such as formal modelling, case-studies, and quantitative analysis, have been used to explore the purpose of ‘institutionalizing’ competition and participation in places where freedom is not the end goal. As a result, there are a number of alternative explanations for authoritarian institutions that portray them as conceptually different from their democratic counterparts or as attenuated versions of democratic practices.

The study of authoritarian institutions has identified distinct roles by which electoral politics may support non-democratic rule. For example, a political party can serve as an intermediary through which leaders can identify and reward their supporters. Congressional seats can also constitute sources of patronage, for which the legislature is a useful device for coordinating elite interests and mollifying opposition. Additionally, courts can support dictators by giving the appearance of constitutional review and arbitrating lower-level administrative issues. The variety of institutionalized practices in non-democracies—which includes hereditary succession and military oversight—even supports the differentiation of non-democratic rule into ‘types’ of dictatorship that
are significantly distinguishable with regard to conflict behavior, regime survival, and economic productivity (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011, Weeks 2008, Wright and Escribá-Folch 2012).

The body of research that focuses on political institutions in non-democracies has generated much discussion over the benefits from, and ultimate consequences of, different styles of dictatorship. However, much of the current work on autocratic institutions lacks a broader focus that incorporates history into their account for why some institutions work and why others do not, as well as when they are likely to occur (Grzymala-Busse 2011). A narrow focus on modern institutions can lead to ‘functionalist’ interpretations and underspecified theories about the dynamics that explain them (Pepinsky 2014). That is to say, despite progress toward understanding the present functions of non-democratic political practices, beliefs about how they came to be may be undermined by insufficient research on the origins of such institutions within the context of non-democracy.

An illustrative example of the potential bias that can result from ‘ahistorical institutionalism’ is the process of statebuilding in Mexico. The dominance of the Partido Revolutionario Institucional—the party which controlled politics from roughly 1946 to 2000—and its origin in the political parties that followed the Mexican Revolution, is a well-studied case of electoral authoritarianism in the twentieth century. It was, however, not the first instance of stable authoritarian rule in Mexico, nor was it the first regime to promote non-democracy through elections. These distinctions belong to Porfirio Díaz, a military general who had participated in battles to create an independent, liberal state. Between Mexico’s independence in 1821 and the coup that brought Díaz to office in 1876, the country experienced repeated factionalism over how Mexico should be governed, interruptions of civil war and foreign imposition, and a number of different constitutional projects. As a result, as of 1876 only one president had ever finished his term in office. The observation that Díaz’s executive influence lasted nearly 35 years—a period of rule referred to as the Porfiriato—raises questions about what political practices helped to solidify his rule and whether they tell us anything about the future success of the PRI.

At the time of Díaz’s emergence as executive leader of Mexico, power resided in local
bosses and large landowners, which made creating and maintaining a central government dependent, in part, on cultivating relationships with regional elites. Popular society was not well organized, and institutionalized party competition was largely nonexistent. However, a chamber of deputies had existed, at least in principle, since 1855. The legislature, therefore, may have provided an important mechanism for coordinating the interests of strongmen and promoting local representation in the initial steps toward building a central government. In this way, a congress would have facilitated statebuilding in ways that were neither democratic, nor dependent on organized political parties. As well as being characterized by relative stability and the personal enrichment of government officials, the Porfiriato was notable for the extent of industrialization and modernization that occurred, phenomena that help to explain the mass uprising that unseated him in 1910. A decade after the revolution had subsided, the first national political party emerged which became a vehicle for popular political participation and helped to maintain major social groups such as labor unions and agraristas.

There are several ways to view the story of development in Mexico. The first is to conclude that the Mexican Revolution purged society of all actors, institutions, and even memories of past forms of politics, in which case modern Mexico began with the ascendance of the Sonoran leaders that eventually created the first national political party. Indeed, “[t]he Revolution of 1910-17 all but destroyed the existing Mexican state” (Benjamin 1985, pg. 198). If the parties that emerged did so as a result of conflict, however, and if the conflict was a product of the affairs of the central government, then a story of institution-building that begins with the revolution is incomplete. The authoritarianism dominated by party politics after 1929 was borne out of the institutions and interactions that supported a dictatorship that only a revolution could remove. This has some origins in the legislative activity that occurred during the Porfiriato.

The prevailing view of authoritarian institutions often treats bodies such as parties and legislatures as synonymous, though they may not have begun at the same time. Despite their present complementarities, the appeal of formalizing different practices may stem from distinct interactions or different threats facing the regime. The notion
that states face different governance issues vis-à-vis their populace and that the order in which they are addressed matters has been suggested by a number of theorists whose writings were geared toward explaining democracy (Dahl 1971, Moore 1966, North 1981). Nevertheless, such generalized explanations fell short because of their failure to explain democratization. At the same time, the argument that states are faced with a set of strategic dilemmas that present different issues—such as contestation and participation, or the problems of power-sharing and control—can be used to explain why legislatures and parties historically occurred in a specific order.

The motivation for examining whether there are long-term institutional patterns stems not just from the expectation that the Porfiriato may have had a major impact on subsequent politics in Mexico, but from a number of similar observations in Latin America. In many cases, ‘exclusionary’ polities promoted stability and eventually gave way to more accommodating institutional forms. Examples include Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay. The three cases were selected to be ‘typical’ examples that represent the general institutional trend that motivates this thesis (Seawright and Gerring 2008). They are also quite different from one another, providing points of contrast that highlight potential limitations of a general theory and ways in which it can be expounded upon. In the following section, I briefly describe historical political developments in each; in the conclusion, I return to their differences and similarities to help assess the overall utility of my argument.

**Argentina**

Originally, present-day Argentina consisted of a group of allied regional governments which called themselves the Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata (“United Provinces of the River Plate”). A revolution began against the Spanish in 1810, and the region was officially declared independent by Congress in 1819. However, divisions over how the country should be organized resulted in protracted civil conflict between different factions, which led to the dissolution of the national legislature (Chen 2007). For nearly a decade, the various provinces retained their autonomy and were ruled by local caudillos rather
than a central government, but they remained loosely affiliated through pacts and treaties. Between 1827 and 1852, the provinces coalesced into a confederation. Under Justo José de Urquiza the national federal government was formed, and competing factions—Centralists and Federalists—found common ground. Although Argentina was a republic as of 1853, Buenos Aires remained the exception; after a series of battles in 1859 and 1861 it was reincorporated, and Bartolome Mitre served as the first president of the unified country (Chen 2007).  

With the reentry of Buenos Aires, Argentina entered a new era of growth. The settlement of the Pampas expanded, and prosperous economic conditions led to an influx of immigrants from Europe (Lovering 2007). Presidential succession occurred under the elections of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in 1868 and Nicolás Avellaneda in 1874, until the 1880 presidency of Julio Argentino Roca. An army general, Roca used the threat of army intervention to gain control over unwieldy provincial governors. Roca’s control over the Ministry of the Interior, who supervised the elections, and the provincial governors, also gave him control over the selection of member to the Congress (Goldwert 1972). His ability to dominate national politics altogether, however, was supported by an oligarchy that had arisen from landed wealth (Chen 2007). The ability to control large tracts of land supported the accumulation of resources in the hands of a few families whose revenue came from exporting beef and grain. As classical liberals, they supported centralized authority only to the extent that it kept political stability and helped to develop the Buenos Airan economy. According to Goldwert (1972), the landed elites viewed Roca’s presidency as “a kind of tutelary democracy by which an enlightened elite, dedicated to progress along positivistic lines, would control the nation until the development of conditions necessary for full-fledged democracy” (pg. 7). The provincial gentry represented an “official party,” the National Autonomist Party (PAN), which dominated electoral outcomes for nearly 40 years (Chen 2007, Di Tella 2004).

The period of influence by the oligarchy in Argentina, spanning 1880 to 1910, is referred to as the unicato (Goldwert 1972). The sanction of ‘strongman politics’ by powerful families contributed to the strengthening of the federation and brought to an
end many of the old confrontations (Romero 2012). The strength of this class, however, prevented organized political opposition from effectively challenging it until a financial crisis that began in 1890. A political movement that began in protest of conservative rule, the Radical Civil Union (Unión Cívica Radical, UCR), gained traction among the middle and lower classes. After electoral reforms in 1912 that included universal male suffrage, the UCR participated in elections as a party. According to Smith (1969), the economic growth of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the ascendance of “large and disparate middle classes,” whose members allied with the Radical party to win the presidency away from the landed aristocracy (pg. 34). In 1916 Hipolito Yrigoyen, the leader and co-founder of the Radical Civic Union, won the general election and took office (Chen 2007, Di Tella 2004, Solimano 2003, Wynia 1990).

Towards the end of World War I, industrialization and rapid growth stimulated a wave of internal migration from the rural countryside to urban areas, which was further intensified by the Great Depression (Cerrutti and Bertoncello 2003, Chen 2007, Lovering 2007, Solimano 2003, Wynia 1990). The global depression also negatively affected the export economies that had been open to the world market (Schvarzer 1992). On behalf of the agro-exporter elite and their allies in the armed forces, Lieutenant General Jose Felix Uriburu took office through a coup d'etat in 1930, thereby removing Yrigoyen from office and marking the end of the Radicals (Chen 2007, Wynia 1990). The restoration civilian rule in 1932 ushered in another period of conservative rule referred to as the Concordancia. During “the Infamous Decade,” conservative groups used fraudulent indirect elections to prevent extremists from coming to power (Alston and Gallo 2010, Chen 2007, Di Tella 2004, Wynia 1990). The period also saw a continuation of internal migration and a turn towards import substitution industrialization, which gave rise to a new urban industrial working class (Chen 2007, Collier and Collier 1991, Wynia 1990). The military, which was concerned with the consequences of electoral fraud on the radicalization of Argentine politics, was also in opposition to President Ramón Castillo’s hand-picked successor, who was suspected of being pro-Allied (Collier and Collier 1991). A second seizure of power by the military and a series of coup d’états between 1943 and 1946 supported the rise of
Colonel Juan Perón to the presidency (Madsen and Snow 1987, Wynia 1990).

According to Collier and Collier (1991), “[a]s skillful as Perón was at maneuvering for power within the military and within the state elite, an additional driving force behind his rise to the presidency was his ability to attract worker support” (pg. 332). While in a position to oversee labor, Perón was able to court the urban working class, who had faced discrimination from an older generation of workers and harsh treatment by the state (Buchanan 1985, Chen 2007, Collier and Collier 1991, Lovering 2007, Wynia 1990). “By the middle of 1945, Perón had converted the General Labor Confederation, the nation’s largest labor organization, into one of the strongest political forces in the country” (Wynia 1990, pg. 253). Despite antagonism from the military, which had attempted to arrest Perón, thousands of workers protested his jailing and supported his release. In the 1946 elections, Perón stood as the candidate of the newly formed Labor Party and won easily against a “hastily contrived coalition of Radicals and Conservatives” (Wynia 1990; see also Craig 1976, Di Tella 2004, Lovering 2007, Madsen and Snow 1987, Smith 1969). “The critical point,” says Smith (1969), “is that socially mobilized groups sought political participation, but were not given access to power. The inevitable result was frustration. Perón’s entrance onto the scene came, then, at a propitious time; his success in behalf of urban lower-class groups won him their support and even devotion” (pg. 48).

The difficulty posed by post-independence disagreement over centralization in Argentina is similar to the experience of a number of other countries in Latin America, including Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. It is also characterized by the dominance of an oligarchy, as also occurred in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala. “[F]or Latin Americans,...land was not only a means of production for domestic and foreign markets but also a foundation for social control by a privileged class” (Wynia 1990, pg. 8). The rise of a radical party associated with the growth of the middle class, and later, a populist movement that attracted laborers and peasants, is also present in the political histories of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru.
Bolivia

Fourteen years after Peru and the Argentine Republic battled over control of Bolivia, Simón Bolívar helped to liberate the country from Spanish rule in 1824 and oversaw the creation of a new constitution. The document established a tricameral congress; it also institutionalized a strong president, out of Bolívar’s concern that rival elites would destabilize the nation (ConstitutionNet 2014). General Antonio José de Sucre Alcala served as the country’s first president, but he was forced from office after Peru invaded the country attempting to reunite the territories. Thereafter, the country was dominated by a series of local leaders who commanded private armies, also called caudillos (Stokes 1952, Wynia 1990). Bolívar’s misgivings about elites were confirmed by conflict between caudillos, through which the country devolved into a semi-feudal structure (Stokes 1952). “[T]he national government became prizes to be captured by one or another caudillo” (ConstitutionNet 2014). Caudillismo, or personalist, quasimilitary politics, characterized Bolivian political life for over 40 years. As a result, between 1839 and 1880 six different constitutional projects were attempted (ConstitutionNet 2014).

Following Bolivia’s defeat by Chile in a territorial war, a new constitution was adopted in 1880 which reinforced the bicameral structure of the legislature introduced by earlier constitutions. Though now landlocked, the country recovered in part due to a boom in the mining of silver and tin. This period also saw the formation of the Conservative and Liberal parties, both of which represented the upper classes. The Conservative Party controlled Bolivia from 1880 to 1899, and the Liberal Party held power from 1899 to 1920. The dissolution of the Conservative Party and splintering of the Liberal Party resulted in the creation of the Republican Party, but it was a “carbon copy of the Liberals” that “drew its strength from the same classes” (Klein 2011, pg. 163).

According to Klein (2011), during the period of Republican rule that lasted from 1920 to 1934 national politics evolved from a two-party arrangement to a multiparty system. The Great Depression also exacerbated tensions among the mestizo and indigenous majority, which increased rebellions and the organization of labor (Klein 2011). The profusion of alternative demands led to the emergence of minor parties and the split of
the Republic Party into two branches that pitted the urban middle class, represented by Bautista Saavedra, against large estate owners, led by hacendado Daniel Salamana (Di Tella 2004, Hudson and Hanratty 1989, Klein 2011). Saavedra served as president in 1920 and was replaced in 1925 by his chosen successor, Hernando Siles Reyes. Amid the growing frustrations of Indian peasants, workers, and students, the military briefly imposed a junta after Siles Reyes attempted to circumvent rules against reelection.

Salamanca was chosen as a coalition candidate in 1931, but he was unable to ameliorate many of the economic and social issues at the fore (Hudson and Hanratty 1989). The tin market, for one, had been nearly destroyed by the depression and was slow to recover (Di Tella 2004). Another coup d’État was therefore carried out against his successor in 1936 in an attempt to implement a radical solution. Between 1930 and 1943, eight different men occupied the presidency (Stokes 1952). According to Hudson and Hanratty (1989), the socialist appeals of the military leaders raised the expectations of members of the middle class, but the failure to implement effective reforms led to greater radicalization. It continued into the 1940s with the emergence of new political parties, such as the Leftist Revolutionary Party.

Though the traditional Liberal and Republican parties attempted to join forces against increasing reformism, such efforts were stymied by a number of newer parties that gained control of Congress. One of the strongest, the National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR), had the support of intellectuals, as well as white- and blue-collar workers. Composed of “dissidents from the middle and upper classes,” the MNR aimed at the nationalization of natural resources (Di Tella 2004), and criticized the president’s (then General Enrique Peñaranda Castillo) cooperation with the United States (Hudson and Hanratty 1989). The MNR had participated in an alliance to overthrow president Peñaranda, but its participation in a government coalition was not successful. The party unsuccessfully attempted a coup in 1949; its legal attempts to hold power, in the presidential election of 1951, were also thwarted by military intervention.

The further deterioration of the Bolivia economy, and the social unrest stoked by it, set the stage for the 1952 Revolution. Armed members of the MNR marched on La
Paz and incited civilian participation, resulting in an urban insurrection that involved organized labor, students, intellectuals, and members of the middle class. After several days of fighting which resulted in 600 deaths and the army’s surrender, MNR co-founder Víctor Paz Estenssoro assumed the office of president. The new government reduced the size of the military and purged it of conservative elements, requiring officers to pledge allegiance to the MNR. The government also monopolized the sale of minerals and nationalized the largest tin mines. It oversaw the seizure and redistribution of rural property, transferring land to Indian peasants. In addition, universal suffrage was established, such that by the 1956 elections the population of eligible voters in 1956 had increased from roughly 200,000 to one million. The revolutionary government attempted to construct a large support base for itself that constituted indigenous peasants, workers, and the middle class (Hudson and Hanratty 1989, Mayorga 1997, Morales and Sachs 1989).

According to Hudson and Hanratty (1989), the spirit of revolutionary nationalism supported the party throughout the 1950s and 1960s. However, economic and political problems caused the decline of the party and resulted in factionalization (Council on Hemispheric Affairs 2009). “Owing to the fact that the MNR was a coalition of political forces with different agendas and aspirations...the subsequent splits in the party determined the course of Bolivian politics” (Hudson and Hanratty 1989). Though populist forces demonstrated their strength by creating a united front in the 1940s and 1950s in support of economic and political reform, present day political parties in Bolivia are generally regarded as disparate from major social bases and vehicles for patronage that better represent the caudillaje politics of the 19th century (Di Tella 2004).

The political experience in Bolivia was characterized by an early dichotomy involving Conservative and Liberal Parties. Such situations occurred in Chile, Colombia (and Panama), Ecuador, and Honduras. Paraguay and Uruguay saw similar divisions in the differentiation of ‘Colorados’ (Di Tella 2004). In Colombia and Honduras, the loyalties to the two parties ran particularly deep and continue to persist (Dix 1992, Wynia 1990). While the division between Conservatives and Liberals often included the issue
of federalism, their ideologies encompassed many more issues. In Mexico, Centralists and Federalists developed more complex ideologies, thereby becoming Conservatives and Liberals \cite{Bazant1991}. However, the early political parties that were represented by the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party bear little resemblance to political parties in the modern sense. “Election contests between Conservatives and Liberals were exclusive affairs, seldom involving more than five percent of the adult male population” \cite[pg. 75]{Wynia1990}. An important undercurrent in Bolivian politics involves the suppression of its indigenous population, which has also impacted politics in Ecuador, Peru, and Guatemala. Moreover, the case of Bolivia demonstrates the tenuous relationship between the military and leftist parties, as seen elsewhere in Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru \cite{Lucero2008, Mayorga1997, Morales and Sachs1989}.

**Uruguay**

After rebelling against Spanish colonialism and subsequently defending itself from Argentina and Brazil, Uruguay obtained independence in 1828. The first legislative assembly met and approved a constitution in 1830, with Fructuoso Rivera as the first president. Initial disagreements between proponents of federalism and champions of centralism, however, led to confrontations that solidified into distinct political ideologies. The two groups, which called themselves the blancos (whites) and the colorados (coloreds), took their names from the color of the hatbands worn by each faction. The National Party, which represented the Blancos, was associated with conservatism, the protection of order, and church authority. The Colorado Party, in contrast, stood for individual freedoms and liberal values. President Rivera was the founder of the Colorados, and his successor Manuel Oribe was responsible for the Blancos \cite{Di Tella2004}. The solidification of these identities into political parties gives Uruguay Latin America’s oldest two party system \cite{Encyclopedia of the Nations2015}. In reality, however, differences between the two parties represented little more than a feud between personalist followings. Uruguayan political life centered on local leaders, and both Rivera and Oribe were considered caudillos \cite{Hudson and Meditz1990, Martin1930}.
Ongoing strife between the Blanco and Colorado Parties came to a head in the form of the ‘Great War’ between 1843 and 1852, which resulted in a victory by the Colorados (Martin 1930). Following the restoration of Colorado control over the country, a major population increase occurred—in large part due to European immigration—, and the capital underwent major developments. Livestock farming grew substantially, resulting in an increasing number of large-landowners (hacendados). Colorados and Blancos attempted to put aside their differences, which was expressed through the prevailing political ideology of fusión. Rivalries nevertheless beleaguered presidencies over this period, as illustrated by a civil war in 1864 that also drew in Argentina and Brazil.

The year 1865 marked the beginning of a 94-year streak of presidents from the Colorado Party. A notable leader in the party was José Batlle y Ordóñez, who served as interim president in 1899 and who was credited with effectively ending the intermittent conflicts between the Colorado and National Parties (Hudson and Meditz 1990, Martin 1930). Batlle served two terms as president of Uruguay (1903-1907 and 1911-1915). The Batlle family had a major hand in Uruguayan politics—José’s father, Lorenzo Batlle y Grau, came from a wealthy merchant family with loyalties to the Spanish crown and had served as president from 1868 to 1872. Future presidents would also include José’s nephew, Luis Batlle Berres, and great-nephew Jorge Batlle. During his administration, Batlle undertook major reforms aimed at expanding public education and passing labor laws, developing government-owned public utilities, promoting the separation of church and state, and extending the franchise to women (Di Tella 2004, Encyclopedia of the Nations 2015, Hudson and Meditz 1990, Martin 1930). According to Hudson and Meditz (1990), the reforms initiated by Batlle took into account the growing influence of workers and members of the middle class, and instigated renewed opposition among large landowners and clergy.

Batlle, who was wary of caudillistic politics in Uruguay, proposed an executive council to replace the role of the president. In the 1917 constitution that followed his administration, a compromise was made wherein the president would maintain responsibility over the organs of national security, and a council (the colegiado) would
oversee other issues related to national governance (Di Tella 2004, Gascoigne 2001, Martin 1930). Following his second term in office, Batlle remained a dominant political figure. The Colorado party saw ideological divisions that led to splinter parties, although ‘Colorados’ maintained a hold over the presidency. Additional social reforms were passed in the 1920s, including the gradual organization of worker unions.

The Great Depression had a negative impact on Uruguay’s economy, and President Gabriel Terra faced difficulties from the colegiado in enacting policies to avert further deterioration. Terra’s response was to launch a coup d’etat and to dissolve the congress and the colegiado, governing by decree (Hudson and Meditz 1990). The 1934 constitution transferred their powers to the president. Terra suppressed organized opposition through a series of electoral laws. His government also weakened economic nationalism and rolled back many of the social reforms that had been previously implemented (Hudson and Meditz 1990). Following Terra, subsequent presidents submitted a new constitution and reinstated civil liberties that the dictator had abrogated. Luis Batlle Berres, during his presidency, encouraged socioeconomic reforms but rejected both the populist political movement embodied by Peronism in Argentina as well as the corporative structure of the PRI in Mexico (Di Tella 2004). A 1951 plebiscite reinstated the colegiado as the National Council of Government, which was composed of six members from the majority party and three from the minority party (Hudson and Meditz 1990).

Economic decline in the 1950s, in combination with increasing labor unrest and the reunification of elements of the National Party, resulted in a loss by the Colorado Party to them in 1959. Economic crisis and social unrest continued, however, resulting in eight National Party governments between 1959 and 1967. The 1960s also saw the emergence of a Marxist group of urban guerrillas called the Tupamaros which employed violent tactics against the government (Di Tella 2004). Uruguay had become more polarized by 1970, and the traditional bipartisan nature of politics gave way to a multiparty system “bitter divided by political, social, economic, and ideological differences” (Hudson and Meditz 1990). The 1967 constitution returned the country to a presidential system and enhanced the power of the executive, but a military government took charge shortly thereafter and
put political participation on hold (Di Tella 2004).

Parallels to political developments in Uruguay include major conflict between conservative and liberal factions, which also erupted in Mexico, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Venezuela. The longstanding electoral dominance and adaptability of the Colorado Party is also evident in Paraguay (Dix 1992). The military’s suppression of party politics in Uruguay resembles similar bouts in Argentina and Chile, as does those parties’ commitment to democratic competition (Dix 1992, Wynia 1990). Finally, the attempt by formerly violent political dissidents to legitimize themselves by participating as a political party, like the Tupamaros, was also made by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua, the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador, and more recently, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru (The Economist 2012, Neuman 2012, Starn 1995).

An Underlying Trend

The cases of Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay highlight many typical attributes of statebuilding in Latin America. The first is conflict stemming from divergent preferences regarding the strength of the central government, influenced in part by the countries’ colonial experiences. Local autonomy was also stressed by the distribution of power, which often resided in the hands of caudillos and political bosses. Where political ideologies were a little more complex, the differences coalesced into ‘political parties’ that represented conservative and liberal interests, although they were hardly parties of the masses. In many places, landed wealth resulted in an upper class that controlled politics for much of the 19th century. Early forms of statebuilding among much of Latin America was therefore characterized by institutionalized power-sharing among elites (Kurtz 2013). There were fits and starts to the process, however, as exemplified by recurrent conflicts among elite groups and arrangements that did not always accommodate dissident leaders (Chen 2007, Martin 1930, Nielson and Shugart 1999).9

Towards the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, however, economic
changes associated with industrialization and modernization—coupled with subsequent economic downturn—increased pressures from rural and urban labor and created new conflicts involving mass mobilization. In a few cases, the party in power adapted to address social issues. In others, populist sentiment found expression in political movements that sometimes came in the form of revolution. In countries with a strong military presence, its interest in economic development and distrust of leftist and revolutionary parties prompted coups and attempts to direct government for the sake of security. Across the board, however, the 20th century was characterized by changes in party politics and transformations in elite-mass relations in Latin America.

The political parties coming out of the 20th century were not all the same among Latin American countries. Some organized (or reorganized) to represent a broad social base and appeal to multiple organized groups, permitting them to enjoy electoral hegemony for a time. Others factionalized and became personalist vehicles within a multiparty system, further reinforcing the practice of caudillismo (Di Tella 2004). A few, like the parties utilized by Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and François Duvalier in Haiti, were constructed to be tools of dictatorship and served nearly exclusively as forums for recruiting and rotating political officials (Wiarda 1968). Further still, some parties resulted from the reinvention of guerilla groups that had fought previous governments but sought to play by the rules of the game in exchange for legitimation (Di Tella 2004, Wiarda and Eds. Wood 2003, Wynia 1990).

Despite the many differences that can be identified across cases in Latin America, there is an underlying theme that is present, to some degree, in each case. Post-independence politics foremostly involved conflicts among elite groups—a landed oligarchy, or local caudillos—over the shape of government and the structure of competition (Wiarda and Eds. Wynia 1990). Once a modicum of stability could be maintained, economic development occurred which supported urbanization and changes in the labor force. Elite governments often found themselves confronted by organized mass interests, a juncture in which they were forced to decide whether to accommodate them through increased participation. Where the military was not strong enough to suppress it, and
existing parties failed to integrate it, the result was attempted revolution (Wiarda and Eds., Wynia 1990). Political parties do not always represent strong, mass-oriented organizations, but in many cases in Latin America, they played a role in the incorporation of the masses through political participation (Di Tella 2004). On the whole, therefore, political developments in the long-term involved transitions from a closed polity, in which the game was decided among elite, to one based on increased political participation. Notably, however, the transitions were not hallmarks of democracy (Higley and Gunther 1992, Karl 1990, O’Donnell and Whitehead 1986).

Even in cases that might be considered outliers, a ‘closed’ polity preceded one based on mass participation. As a colony of Britain, an Executive Council governed Belize in 1840 until it was replaced by a Legislative Assembly in 1854 (National Assembly of Belize 2015). It was not until the devaluation of the dollar in 1949 that the first national political party in Belize found its start in the People’s Committee, which formed an alliance with the working class and became the People’s United Party in 1950 (Leslie 2009). Guyana, which was also declared a British colony in 1831, was governed by a Legislative Council with was largely dominated by representatives of planters and merchants. The country’s first mass based political party, the People’s Progressive Party, was founded in 1950.

The long-term pattern that is observable in Latin America–of increasing participation that followed changes in contestation–motivates the research that makes up this thesis. The question that I seek to explore is whether political institutions serve distinct roles in non-democratic settings, and if they constitute broad, generalizable patterns that characterize statebuilding. I argue that autocratic institutions like parties and legislatures should be treated differently, because historical examples show non-democratic settings in which they helped to resolve distinct problems related to state building. Specifically, I argue that authoritarian legislatures may resolve problems associated with elite coordination, while political parties help to integrate popular groups with defacto power. This argument is consistent with Wright and Escribá-Folch (2012), who find that legislatures (elected or not) do not significantly predict democratization. As Miller (2015) noted, legislative elections occurred in at least twelve non-democracies in Latin
America prior to 1850. This was observed in over thirty non-democratic countries worldwide; moreover, by 1880 nearly two-thirds of autocracies were supported by an elected legislature (Miller 2015).

The purpose of this research is to identify the reasons why institutions may emerge in non-democracies and to hone the application of them in pre-modern contexts. I do so by considering the strategic dilemmas that affect the emergence of political institutions prior to their “free and fair” use. The history of statebuilding in Latin America, with its personalist, military, and dominant-party governments, provides a useful starting place for examining whether there is a pattern in which authoritarian institutions occur. Principally, I discuss the dominant elements that characterize transitions from closed to more open polities in Latin America using the history of political development in Mexico.

1.3 The Argument

Societies are often characterized by inequality, resulting in rule by the powerful (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009b, Olson 1993). Where one person does not possess total power, however, a potential leader must figure out how to govern in such a way that her contenders will not continuously vie to unseat her and assume her office. This problem firstly requires the leader to consider a way to institutionalize power-sharing among the individuals with the greatest capacity to depose her. In other words, the foremost problem in the construction of a regime concerns competition, for which initial efforts at institutionalization are focused on institutionalizing competition.

The institutionalization of competition is best supported by horizontal accountability. Preventing contenders from fighting over resources requires that each is informed of the amount of resources available, as well as the size of their share relative to others. In addition to providing future opportunities for personal enrichment, formalizing elite interactions helps to lower the costs of mobilizing against the leader, should he overstep, enhance brokering among the agents, and support the generation of enforcement
costs that reinforce coalition membership (Boix and Svolik 2013, Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014, Svolik 2009, 2012, Wright 2008a). In turn, regularizing competition by creating an alliance of privileged individuals provides incentives for remaining part of the dictator’s “inner circle” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). As such, institutions that promote lateral interactions are conducive to stabilizing relations and giving the regime structure (Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Svolik 2009).

In highly unequal or pre-industrial societies, therefore, the most likely initial form of institutionalization should be focused on stabilizing the interactions of elites, which constitutes “closed societies” and oligarchies (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009b). This is facilitated by the creation of a cabinet, as well as the encouragement of individual participation within a national legislature (Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). The success of such an arrangement at binding elites and preventing power-plays creates conditions that are propitious for economic development, including specialization and modernization (Moore 1966, North 1981). Among other artifacts of growth, however, are the diffusion of wealth and the recognition of class, which has the capacity to generate tensions from below (Huntington 1965). Where repression is insufficient to deter mass organization, the recourse is to institutionalize their participation by turning to a form of politics that emphasizes vertical accountability (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Boix 2003, Weingast 1997). To this end, the creation of a national political party and the recognition of parties serves to integrate popular demands and perpetuate the regime.

In the long-term, therefore, a consideration of the strategic interactions that accompany statebuilding implies that there may be an order in which political institutions emerge (Boix and Svolik 2013, Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Svolik 2012). To the extent that the construction of a successful regime depends on first addressing the “problem of authoritarian power-sharing” followed by the “problem of authoritarian control,” as put by Svolik (2012), it is logical to expect institutions that promote horizontal accountability to precede those based on the vertical organization of power. As it regards the sort of institutions currently discussed by the literature on authoritative regimes, such as parties and legislatures, one may historically precede and influence the
other. However, the pattern of institutional change that connotes the construction and maintenance of a regime need not result in competition and participation that are both free and fair, for which it is not a very good explanation for democracy. On the contrary, the successful implementation of institutions to avert problems related to different threats may help to explain the consolidation of authoritarianism as well as it would predict democratization. Understanding the purpose of authoritarian institutions may therefore benefit from a more nuanced consideration of the strategic dilemmas that make them relevant. The theoretical utility of going back to the origin of such institutions is conceptually different from, but complementary to, research that traces the adaptation and longevity of political institutions in modern regimes.

The argument that historical statebuilding in Latin America can be generalized as a sequence, which first involved the institutionalization of elite contestation and was followed by mass participation, offers to help overcome extant limits in the literature on Latin American political development. It avoids ‘denial’ by acknowledging the breakdown of authoritarianism that occurred in the 1980s, and the tendency toward greater levels of inclusion in newer democracies. It is also attempts to provide an explanation of the development of both autocracy and democracy in ways that are not ‘voluntaristic’. Another critique by Remmer (1991) against the prevailing literature on Latin America is that case studies are unhelpful for explaining democratization because they result in complex propositions and are subject to impressionist readings. As a result, many explanations that are developed out of ‘barefoot empiricism’ are difficult to falsify. Though my primary analysis is based on one case (Mexico), I attempt to find a rudimentary institutional cause over the long term, thereby avoiding complication and untestable hypotheses about the manner in which states have formed. I am also wary of ‘intellectual recycling’; though the theoretical framework borrows from classic authors such as Dahl (1971), it is intertwined with contemporary theories of autocratic states and complemented by other structural arguments. In this way, I strive to contribute to the comparative understanding of Latin American statebuilding by heeding warnings from Remmer (1991).
1.4 The Plan of the Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to expound in greater detail on the case of Mexico, to bear out the argument that political institutions first emerge to moderate elite interactions and that they are followed by institutions designed to cultivate popular support. I elucidate one of the primary mechanisms that explains the unforeseen success of the Porfiriato, which is the participation of local powers within the incipient national congress. The purpose of outlining this long-term explanation of institutional change in the context of a particular country is to highlight specific actors and issues that may affect institutional choice—to differentiate between the problems of authoritarian power-sharing and authoritarian control. Demonstrating the value of treating political institutions as conceptually distinct, and considering them as part of a longer span of state development, provides a framework for evaluating institutional patterns cross-nationally and for refining existing arguments about authoritarian institutions.

In the second chapter, I discuss in greater detail some of the current explanations for political institutions in authoritarian regimes. Reviewing the literature serves to highlight the many points on which scholars overlap. It contrasts the dynamism of research on non-democracies with the regimes that it purports to explain. In discussing the extant research, I also note existing criticisms and recommendations for future work. The thesis is situated at the nexus of present explanations and critiques of them, aiming to add clarifications that would support ongoing research.

In the third chapter, I present a theory of institutional development in autocracy. Interweaving existing explanations regarding the purpose of authoritarian institutions with ‘classic’ intuitions about the conditions for democracy, I provide an argument for why elite-oriented institutions should historically precede institutions that integrate popular demands. I lay out my explanation using some of the existing jargon and language with which authoritarian regimes are presently described. The propositions outlined in the third chapter identify conditions that should explain the development of authoritarianism, as well as the consolidation of the state.

In chapter four, I use process-tracing to demonstrate that politics before Porfirio
Díaz was volatile and uncertain, and that the success of the Porfiriato can be explained, in part, by his willingness to work with local elites. I also illustrate the degree of economic development and modernization that occurred under Díaz, which I attribute to the stability his regime engendered. Chapter five discusses the revolution that forced the aging dictator into exile and brought new actors to the national scene. In particular, I describe the rise of the Sonorans–Adolfo de la Huerta, Álvaro Obregón, and Plutarco Calles–and the establishment of the first national political party. I argue that from its inception, the party was designed to accommodate the masses in a way that no prior institutions had been.

A critical link connecting the narratives of Porfirio Díaz’s rise and fall is the interaction of elites within the national legislature. In chapter six, I use information on congressional members between 1884 and 1930 to examine the composition of the Congress during the Porfiriato. In accordance with my argument that the legislature was dominated by elites, I demonstrate that it was comprised of local bosses, military officers, and large estate owners. I also evidence the rise of members associated with labor groups, agrarian leagues, and political parties, through the end of the Porfiriato to the establishment of the first national political party.

After process-tracing interactions and institutions that characterized Mexico prior to the post-World War II era, I turn to the question of whether similar patterns of institutional change exist elsewhere. Using data on levels of executive recruitment and political competition from the Polity IV project for the period 1800-2010, I find support for the intuition that institutionalizing power-sharing may precede institutionalized control. Chapter seven describes trends in the proportion of countries in the world with open forms of executive recruitment and political control, demonstrating that changes in the two were not concomitant prior to 1950. Using a relatively novel approach to identify groups of similar institutional sequences, I demonstrate that political transitions can be characterized by a set of modal changes. The next chapter, Chapter 8, quantitatively tests whether regularized competition explains subsequent forms of government, the breadth of political parties, and the survival of regimes. The quantitative relationships that I address
in this chapter follow from conclusions that I drew from my descriptions of institutions and regime change in Mexico.

1.5 The Importance

The value of the inquiry begun by this dissertation, and encouraged in future research, is that focusing on the origins of authoritarian institutions may help to hone and refine scholarly understanding of how parties and legislatures work in non-democratic settings in ways that are distinct from democratic institutions. Explaining the motivation behind the initial construction of a formal procedure in dictatorships addresses the initial roles that they played, the actors they addressed, and the trajectories that they can take once formalized. In particular, thinking about non-democratic institutions in the long-term may support causal explanations in which institutions themselves did not come and go, but the meaning behind them did, thereby affecting the prospects for regime change and democratization. In the case of Mexico, for example, this may contribute to explanations for the Mexican Revolution—why did elites support the uprising against Díaz?—and the persistence of the Revolution as an image frequently called on by political parties such as the PRI.

An alternative explanation for the phenomenon examined herein that the development of party politics was a cohort effect, and that it only became common practice in the 20th century. Additionally, it could be that class consciousness or mass mobilization does not explain the institutionalization of popular parties, but that a society need only experience voting by parties for it to persist as a political practice. As I point out in the latter chapters, institutional persistence is observable. At the same time, however, there are regional difficulties with instituting competitive politics that are notable in the 21st century (Haggard and Kaufman 2012, Levitsky and Way 2010). Attempts to hold free and fair elections in places such as Sub-Saharan Africa show political outcomes that are different from post-Communist countries, and in the Middle East parties have largely failed to take root. In addition to the observation of failed attempts
at party politics, there is also considerable variation in the size of the constituencies of different political parties (Di Tella 2004). These issues substantiate the importance of considering whether there is a path to stable government that involves identifying distinct threats to statebuilding and institutionalizing different interests. Like Higley and Gunther (1992), I am interested in relating institutional structures to regime stability and the prospects for long-term survival. As I discuss much later, believing that such a trend exists does not lead necessarily to the Huntingtonian conclusion that the masses must be suppressed for successful governments to form—rather, it provides suggestions for constructing institutions that address separately the issues of elite and mass politics. In the concluding chapter, I point out some of the implications of reinventing historical institutionalism to support modern peacekeeping efforts.
Chapter 2

Nuances in the Study of Authoritarian Institutions

Despite a growing body of work that seeks to explain the purpose and effects of institutions in authoritarian regimes, a number of conceptual issues remain. In particular, this literature has been criticized as relying on underspecified logics, being too functionalist, and ahistorically interpreting their purposes (Grzymala-Busse 2011, Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014, Pierson 2004, Pepinsky 2014). As it regards the study of authoritarianism, therefore, there is a risk of confusing modern uses of political institutions with the reasons for their emergence, and failing to distinguish between types of institutions and the actors that they engage. Outstanding issues in the literature on authoritarian institutions represent a primary starting place for further progress, to which this thesis contributes by examining the interactions and institutions that constituted statebuilding in 19th and 20th century Mexico. This chapter briefly overviews some of the major agendas in the study of authoritarian institutions and discusses some conceptual issues. Like Pepinsky (2014), I argue that subsequent research must address the conditions under which institutions emerge, how their roles might change over time, and their complex relationships to different actors and outcomes. To this end, I aim to extend and build upon some of these shortcomings by relating dictators’ use of institutions to
share power with the source of threat and the structure of their interaction.

2.1 Varieties of Authoritarianism

A principle objective in comparative political science is to conceptualize, distinguish, and evaluate political processes across countries. To this end, a large bulk of work in the field has examined the institutions by which governments operate. For the most part, ‘institutionalist’ works in political science concern formal political institutions. These refer to established rules that guide citizens’ behavior, as well as the organizations that enforce such rules.\textsuperscript{11} Examples of the former include the right to vote and constitutional procedures, while examples of the latter might include political parties, courts, and the armed forces.\textsuperscript{12} As societal “rules,” political institutions are made manifest in consensual bodies and procedures for arbitrating between them. The tradition of studying institutions—known as institutionalism—asks how institutions emerge and become established, what are the purposes and consequences of different institutions, and how they change over time. They embody the distribution, exercise, and maintenance of political power. If formal rules emerge in societies to resolve conflicts and enforce commitments, what are the problems for which institutions serve as a solution? How do groups agree upon and follow the rules, and when do certain actors deviate from them?

Among scholars who compare democracies to non-democracies, a major focus has been on how they differ with regard to institutional development. Only fifty years ago political scientists began to differentiate between forms of authoritarianism on the basis of political institutions. Before then, democracies were associated with power-sharing and consensual, egalitarian politics, while autocracies were characterized as crude, unstructured, and repressive. \textsuperscript{\textcolor{blue}{Arendt (1958)}} was one of the first to systematically explore the success of totalitarian regimes, highlighting the role of ideology in the mass organization of atomized individuals. \textsuperscript{\textcolor{blue}{Friedrich and Brzezinski (1956)}} also reformulated the term by assigning to it distinctive characteristics, one of which was a single mass party.
The conceptual definition of authoritarianism was further refined by Huntington (1968), who argued that levels of political participation and institutionalization distinguished ‘civic’ societies from ‘praetorian’ societies. Linz (1975) also pointed to the limited pluralism and political participation in authoritarian regimes to demonstrate their difference from totalitarian regimes. Thus, authoritarian regimes came to be seen no longer as merely unstructured and oppressive states, an antithetical image to democracy, but rather as distinctive systems of rules and practices that favored certain minorities. A number of seemingly democratic institutions became apparent, such as parties, legislatures, courts, and elections, which were distinguishable from restricted institutions such as military juntas and hereditary succession, and the systematic use of repression.

In the last fifteen years, there has been a massive expansion in the literature highlighting authoritarian institutions. Some offered regime classifications based on the supporting organizations and heads of regime. In a path-breaking book on the process of comparative analysis, Geddes (2003) argued that the preferences of different authoritarian regimes set apart single-party, military, and personalist regimes, affecting their likelihood of breakdown. Single-party regimes referred to those in which the government is the exclusive control of one party, while in military regimes the government is controlled by the armed forces. In contrast, in personalist regimes the leader is supported by a narrow coalition and uses patronage and personal favor to govern without other formal institutions. The focus by Geddes (2003) built upon Bratton and van de Walle (1997), who had previously underscored the personalistic nature of neo-patrimonial African regimes.

In turn, Hadenius and Teorell (2007) built on the work by Geddes (2003). Rejecting the notion of personalism as a regime type, but rather a continuous leadership trait, they differentiated between military, monarchical, party-based (including party-less) and other regimes. Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) also offered an alternative classification of authoritarian regimes that separated monarchies, in which rule is based on an ‘imperial’ title and hereditary succession, military regimes, in which the leader is or was ever
a member of the armed forces, and civilian regimes.\textsuperscript{13} Elsewhere, others treated the proximity of regimes to democracy as scalable dimensions. Marshall and Jaggers (2002) quantified levels of authoritarianism by assigning values to represent levels of executive constraint, and the regulation and competitiveness of executive recruitment and political participation.\textsuperscript{14}

The refined literature that identified types of authoritarianism based on political institutions raised questions of whether the presence of parties and political participation was an indication of widespread democratization among authoritarian regimes (Armony and Schamis 2005, Brownlee 2002, Diamond 1996, Doorenspleet 2000, Huntington 1991, University 1993, McFaul 2002, McGlinchey 2010). There were also questions of whether democratization occurred in waves and in a particular order (Brownlee 2007, Carothers 2007, Doorenspleet 2000, Fukuyama 2011, Huntington 1991, Mansfield and Snyder 2007, Strand et al. 2012). With time, however, it became increasingly clear that institutions in autocracies did not necessarily constitute a phase that ultimately ended in democracy.

There was a surprising discontinuity among a number of countries labeled as “third wave” democratizers, which seemed to create democratic openings but never fully democratized (Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007, Smith 2005). Rather, they demonstrated the capacity for autocratic regimes to use democratic institutions for non-democratic purposes, and adapt “consensual” politics to maintain relevancy in the modern world. As a result, new terminologies were used to characterize institutionalized autocracy, such as “hybrid regime,” “illiberal democracy,” and “competitive authoritarianism” (Armony and Schamis 2005, Collier and Levitsky 1997, Diamond 1996, 2002, Howard and Roessler 2006, Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010, O’Donnell and Whitehead 1986, Schedler 2002, Zakaria 1997). All the same, the recognition of authoritarian institutions engendered more sophisticated questions about the relationship between different institutions and transitions away from, as well as changes in, authoritarianism.

The research that has amassed on the topic of authoritarian institutions has shed light on particular institutions and mechanisms of authoritarian control, and sharpened images of authoritarian regimes and actors. More recently, a considerable amount of work has
developed linking authoritarian regime types to important political outcomes. Examples include civil war (Fjelde 2010, Maves and Braithwaite 2013), interstate conflict (Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002, Weeks 2008), terrorism (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012, Wilson and Piazza 2013), investment, (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011, Jensen 2008, Wright 2008a), and expropriation (Albertus and Menaldo 2012, Guriev, Kolotilin, and Sonin 2009, Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014). At present, however, questions remain as to whether autocratic and democratic regimes represent different phases in the construction of institutions, and what purposes the institutions in them serve.

### 2.2 Explanations for Authoritarian Institutions

Generally speaking, explanations for the institutions that are observed in authoritarian regimes can be discussed according to the type of relationship that they address. First, scholars have argued that institutions in dictatorship are the product of interactions between the ruler and his or her supporters. A leader might set up rules circumscribing the ruling coalition or selectorate—the group of people whose support is vital for the leader to stay in power—to reinforce the regime and standardize the distribution of benefits to coalition members. For one, exclusive access to the formation of law, votes, and programs confers with it private gains such as rents and political influence. As such, political institutions can represent an equilibrium for providing policy concessions and distributing rents, either by satiating the representatives of constituent groups or appealing to the groups they represent (Frantz and Ezrow 2011, Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Truex (2014), for example, found that deputies to the Chinese legislature—many of whom are CEOs of various companies—benefited financially through their association with the congress.

Institutions in which the elites can participate make coalition membership more exclusive, and help align the interests of regime insiders with those of the regime (the interests of the dictator). Elites have incentives to renew their support of the leader to continue receiving benefits, an effect to which Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) refer as
the ‘loyalty norm.’ The smaller the supporting coalition is relative to the size of potential participants, the stronger their loyalty to the regime should be (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Parties, like courts, have also proven easy to manipulate by rotating the roles of members, heightening members’ uncertainty and acquiescence (Wiarda 1968).

Geddes (2003) argued that single party regimes create incentives for dominant and rival factions to cooperate, in order to continue to receive the benefits from party membership. This logic has been borne out in qualitative analyses. As Magaloni (2008) demonstrated, members of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico were co-opted, in part, by the incentives to reap rewards from the only major political party. Based on data on regional legislatures in Russia, Reuter and Robertson (2013) and Reuter and Turovsky (2012) found that ruling parties provide institutional norms that regulate career advancement, and that by encapsulating the interests of opposition elites, legislatures encourage them to not mobilize their power-bases. Malesky and Schuler (2010) suggested that co-optation explains the participation of delegates in the Vietnamese National Assembly, while Saeid (2010) argued that the Iranian parliament promoted the subordination and co-optation of loyal opposition and effectively excluded outsiders.

Because the leader absolutely needs the support of a core number of people, creating institutions may serve as a way to signal the leader’s commitment to continue to redistribute to them. It can also signal the protection of elite property rights by formalizing their influence in the regime. Establishing rules and organizations that constrain the dictator can help to alleviate a commitment problem on the part of the dictator, ensuring that the temporary power of his supporters is made more permanent. According to Boix and Svolik (2013) and Svolik (2012), institutions such as parties and legislatures support authoritarian longevity by alleviating problems of commitment and monitoring between the ruler and his supporters. Moreover, by regularizing the continued interactions of elites, institutions enable contract enforcement and monitoring between them (Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014, North 1990). Party cohesion can also help to hedge-in elites and prevent splits that could threaten the regime (Brownlee 2007).
Creating regular means of deciding succession to top posts (and the rules regarding them) helps leaders avoid violent removal from office and lowers the costs of dealing with challengers, resolving “problem[s] of succession” (Collier and Collier 1991, Cox 2008, Grayson 2007). Scholars have argued, however, that institutions such as political parties are as capable of strengthening norms of collective action among elites as they are of exaggerating the collective action problem (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012, Haber 2006, Magaloni 2010).

The second group of explanations for authoritarian institutions is less focused on the minimum winning coalition, or the group of supporters that comprise the heart of a regime. Rather, they suggest that political institutions develop in authoritarian regimes to help the dictator deal with societal actors more generally. When rulers need to solicit cooperation from regime outsiders, institutions enable them to incorporate the potential opposition. They moderate the effect of societal unrest by giving the dictator the capacity to include or exclude partisan groups. For example, when organized elements of the population present a formidable challenge to the government, a temporary solution may be to give their representatives seats in the legislature. Dictators would therefore prefer to rule without institutions, but they might create spaces for controlled bargaining when they face threat from general segments of society, or need the cooperation of citizens (Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007). This encourages them to work with the regime rather than challenge it, by providing a space for limited policy making and giving them the opportunity to privately air grievances against the regime (Case 2011, Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).

Furthermore, institutions can be used to engage citizens. Through the act of voting in elections, citizens are able to signal their preferences and loyalties, providing valuable information to the regime. For example, although the PRI was practically guaranteed to win elections in Mexico in the 1990s, expressive voting was not uncommon (Magaloni 2008b). Magaloni (2008b) argued that elections enabled the PRI to identify areas with high levels of loyalty or opposition, to which the party could target spending. Thus, promoting election activity and weak opposition parties can help the person(s) in power...
to recognize problem issues and locations, and apply personalized solutions to maintain
the regime. The success of institutional involvement led Collier (1978) to argue that
pre-independence experiences with mass political participation and party dominance
supported one-party formation and lowered military coup risk in post-independence
African regimes.

Institutions can also serve as a vehicle for the transmission and exchange of ideas
between the government and citizens. Courts, for example, help the regime to delegate
the responsibilities of low-level legal issues (Carrubba 2009). Moreover, court decisions
help to give the appearance of examination, thereby bolstering the stance of the regime
(Carrubba 2009). To the extent that institutions help to make an authoritarian ruler seem
more legitimate, it increases citizen perceptions of their performance and discourages elite
defection and challenges. Finally, courts are useful for institutionalizing the representation
of various sectors through the protection of property rights. Such protections encourage
productivity and attract investment, thereby generating more national wealth (Haber
2006, Jensen 2008, Wright 2008a). In these ways, political institutions support citizens’
views of the regime and are therefore useful for demonstrating its resilience to mass
opposition. Landslide victories by the incumbent against competitors help deter
challengers by showing such efforts to be futile (Magaloni 2008b). This can translate
into repeated victories for the incumbent regime, as people prefer not to waste their vote
on an unlikely contender (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, Chhibber and Kollman 2004,
Haber 2006).

A third group of explanations for institutions in authoritarian regimes is less focused
on the concerns of an individual dictator, and more focused on the relationship between
the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of a regime. Whether it is coercive or economic power that divides
them, these explanations cast institutions in terms of the distributional issues between
elites and mass society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Boix 2003). Inherent in every
society are conflicts over the issues of taxation and redistribution, and they are often
decided by the balance of power between constituent groups. The privileged collectively
impose a set of terms on the unprivileged, and they remain largely unchanged until there
is a shift in the distribution of power between groups. When non-elites are capable of collectively organizing against the regime, institutions may emerge to translate their temporary power into long-term influence.

As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003) argued, institutions in a society can be understood through the negotiation of two groups over redistributive conflicts. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) conceived of the two simplified groups of actors as elites and non-elites; for Boix (2003), they were the rich and the poor. In general, the wealthy prefer low levels of taxation and redistribution, and the less-privileged prefer high levels that would distribute wealth more evenly. Bargaining over the tax rate is affected by the distribution influence–power or wealth–between the two groups. In Boix (2003)'s explanation, when the level of potential transfers from redistribution is high, the wealthy are strongly disinclined to entertain redistribution. As inequality lessens, redistribution becomes less threatening to the wealthy and democratization–or the willingness to negotiate with the non-wealthy–becomes more likely. For Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), democratization is set in motion when non-elites gain temporary (defacto) power and are able to credibly threaten elites. Magaloni (2010) also argues that a unified opposition can compel authoritarian leaders to hold clean elections.

Thus, when repression is not enough to prevent a rebellion, elites create institutional provisions for including non-elites in government as a credible commitment to continued redistribution. Political institutions may act as insurance against future expropriation; by becoming more inclusive, elites can forestall the complete destruction of the regime. The rationalization that institutions stem from the empowerment of lower classes and the development of a middle class is supported by analyses on the transformation and demise of historical regimes Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004), Moore (1966), North (1990), North and Weingast (1989), Moore (1966), for example, argued that democratization could be explained by the landed aristocracy turning to a commercial form of agriculture. Though the bulk of studies that comprise the third set of explanation focus on the development of democracy, the causal mechanisms that they assert nevertheless explain the creation of institutions in authoritarian regimes that were
formally thought exclusive to democracy.

The abovementioned explanations for autocratic institutions are by no means mutually exclusive, nor are they exhaustive. Empirical approaches to understanding institutions support a number of these explanations, in part because each is difficult to specify apart from the others. Whether they indicate citizen dissatisfaction, channel concessions, subvert opponents, transmit ideas, augment legitimacy, resolve issues of succession, or signal against expropriation, institutions are positively linked to autocratic performance. Using an ordered probit analysis of all authoritarian leaders during 1946-1996, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) demonstrate that rulers who successfully institutionalize against threats from regime insiders and opponents last significantly longer. In a similar fashion, Gandhi (2008) performs an event history analysis of the use of institutions by non-democratic leaders from 1946 to 2002 and demonstrates institutions may be partly responsible for authoritarian longevity. Others, such as Frantz and Ezrow (2011) and Geddes (2003), link autocratic institutions such as parties and legislatures to leader survival. Through a duration model of authoritarian regime spells between 1946 and 1996, Geddes (2003) demonstrates that party-based dictatorships are significantly more likely to endure compared to military and personalist regimes. Boix and Svolik (2013) and Svolik (2012) also show that authoritarian legislatures and parties have independent positive effects on the duration of leaders. In general, then, there is a consensus that autocratic institutions such as parties and legislatures translate into longer executive tenures, higher rates of economic growth, and greater stability (Boix and Svolik 2013, Frantz and Ezrow 2011, Fjelde 2010, Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Geddes 2003, Hanson 2010, Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002, Svolik 2012, Weeks 2008, Wilson and Piazza 2013).

2.3 Outstanding Issues

The literature on comparative authoritarian institutions has progressed tremendously over the last five decades, the growth of which mirrors somewhat the increasing variation
in authoritarian regimes that it set out to study. Comparative scholars have identified unique groups of actors, mechanisms, and institutions that elicit different political trajectories and which explain a variety of political outcomes. At present, much of the literature aims to put the prior work together—to link the preferences of different actors to the institutions in place to explain the timing, location, and shape of political transformations. However, the ability to progress research in this area is stunted by some conceptual issues.

As Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth (2014) briefly note, the specific logics by which some political institutions affect outcomes are sorely underspecified. Explanations provided for the roles that institutions serve are but general mechanisms that seem to apply equally well to different types of institutions, be they parties, legislatures, or elections. A number of scholars have evaluated the hypothesized roles of parties and legislatures by focusing on a specific case (Case 2011, Malesky and Schuler 2010, Reuter and Robertson 2013, Reuter and Turovsky 2012, Saeid 2010). Nevertheless, such studies tend to depict legislatures that work alongside parties and elections, and do more to explain how legislatures currently work than the reasons for their emergence. As an artifact, a number of studies treat autocratic institutions as synonymous concepts, and there is some apparent confusion over the relative benefits offered by different institutions.

By providing explanations that apply to “interchangeable” institutions, existing arguments confound the possibility that they may play specific roles in non-democratic contexts. An example of this can be found in the present discourse on the role of political parties and legislatures in non-democracies. Legislatures are not part of any of the major classifications of authoritarian regime type (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, Geddes 2003, Hadenius and Teorell 2007, Weeks 2012). As a result of datasets that obscure or omit legislatures in typifying authoritarian regimes, the bulk of quantitative work that uses them to test institutional arguments also obscure or omit the role of legislatures. Examples include Escribá-Folch and Wright (2010), Fjelde (2010), Gandhi (2008), Greene (2007), Gurses and Mason (2010), Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002), Weeks (2008), and Wilson and Piazza (2013). The effect is to either ignore
the role of legislatures, or to assume that they work in tandem with political parties and to attribute the same explanations to both. Elsewhere, other studies explicitly treat parties and legislatures similarly in demonstrating the tenure-lengthening impacts of authoritarian institutions (Ezrow and Frantz 2011; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). While non-partisan governments are extremely rare among democracies, however, they are less so among autocracies. The open empirical question of whether legislatures exert independent effects from political parties on authoritarian regimes exemplifies the underspecified logics to which Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth (2014) allude.

Part of the reason that authoritarian institutions are treated as somewhat synonymous is that many of the explanations for them generalize about the nature of opposition to the regime. The institution in question is often said to bolster the regime against opposition in general, without specifying from where the threat may originate. However, the type of interactions that each promotes (inter-elite versus elite and citizens) and the structure of accountability that it reinforces (vertical or horizontal) should make some forms of institutionalized interaction more suitable for handling threats originating from within as opposed to from below. Such explanations are also confounded by the interpretation that opponents are united against the regime and that organized interests prevail over individual motivations as far as integrating opponents is concerned.

More recently, scholars have begun to consider specific causal mechanisms that may apply to certain political institutions in authoritarian regimes (Hanson 2010; Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014; Magaloni 2008a; Wright 2008a; Wright and Escribá-Folch 2012). Hanson (2010), for example, addresses the question of what effect authoritarian institutions have on inequality. He finds that parties are associated with lower levels of inequality but legislatures are not significantly associated with differences in levels of inequality. He does not offer an explanation for the divergent findings, however. In contrast, Wright and Escribá-Folch (2012) offer an explanation for the different impacts that parties and legislatures may have on regime survival. While legislatures and parties may both bolster a leader’s credibility, the authors argue that they differ with regard to monitoring, their effects on the distribution of power, and post-transition adaptability.
They find that legislatures are associated with a lower probability of transition to a subsequent dictatorship, while both legislatures and parties are associated with a higher likelihood of transition to democracy (Wright and Escribá-Folch 2012).

Nevertheless, there is a need for more scholars to look for varieties in the structures by which non-democratic governments rule, and to identify their independent effects as well as their complementarities to other institutions. A primary reason for doing so is that authoritarian institutions might play different roles regarding issues of power-sharing and control. As noted earlier, many of the institutionalist explanations for political outcomes in authoritarian regimes are cast in terms of domestic interactions (the leader and elites, the leader and masses, elites and masses). However, few explicitly consider the joint determination of outcomes from the engagement of the leader, elites, and masses with political institutions. As an example, it could be argued that authoritarian legislatures mitigate domestic unrest by providing a weak signal of executive constraint to regime outsiders, and also prevent intra-elite splits by co-opting regime insiders. Ongoing discussions about how authoritarian institutions affect regime survival must therefore develop an explanation regarding the role of institutions in supporting the “multi-layered chess game” being played by the dictator (O’Donnell and Whitehead 1986).

In addition, many of the recent studies linking authoritarian institutions to political outcomes have been criticized for being too functionalist. As noted by Pepinsky (2014), most theories for why authoritarian institutions exist suggest that leaders create them to solve specific problems, treating institutions as exogenous to political outcomes. However, much of the research on authoritarian parties and legislatures infers their purpose based on their relationship to political outcomes (if parties prevent defection, then they are created to prevent defection). Because they are socially constructed, institutions both cause and are caused by the outcomes that they are intended to explain. It thus remains in question whether political parties and legislatures are actually created, or whether they emerge as a result of constrained decision making involving prior rules and multiple actors. According to Pepinsky (2014) and Shepsle (2006), the ‘Riker objection’ would hold that institutions are the product of strategic interactions, and are thus not actually created.18
“[F]or a theory of institutions as constraints to survive the Riker objection, the individuals whose behavior institutions constrain must fear the manipulation of institutional rules, and therefore not manipulate them” (Pepinsky 2014, pg. 634).

The endogeneity problem posed by functionalist interpretations is illustrated by differentiating between the impact of authoritarian institutions on regime supporters and their impacts on regime outsiders. Among scholars who look at the specific roles of authoritarian parties and legislatures, there is disagreement as to whether or not they actually limit the powers of the executive. On the one hand are scholars who argue that the emergence of political parties and legislatures may constrain the executive (Boix and Svolik 2013, Svolik 2012, Weeks 2008, Wright 2008a). Power-sharing institutions emerge in contested dictatorships where the ruling coalition possesses a credible threat of violence (Svolik 2012). By accepting constraints on their power, executives alleviate monitoring problems and signal their commitment to transparency and elites’ continued involvement in politics (Boix and Svolik 2013, Svolik 2009, Wright 2008a). As a result, parties and legislatures temper the willingness of elites (or citizens) to overthrow the leader by adding credibility to the promises of a dictator. Internationally, parties and legislatures may also signal a higher capacity for elites and citizens to collectively organize to punish the leader, thereby encouraging higher levels of investment and lower rates of reciprocity from international disputes.

On the other hand are scholars who suggest that parties and legislatures do not actually constrain dictators (Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Magaloni 2008a, Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014). They may not wield any practical power, but are “rubber stamps” for orders issued by the executive, or “window dressings” that disguise the true source of decision-making in authoritarian regimes (Jensen 2012, Michalik 2013, Gandhi 2008). Rather, because parties and legislatures provide channels for distributing rents and policy concessions, they enable the leader to exert stronger control and discipline over his or her supporters. As tools of co-optation, parties and legislatures help to cement cooperation by buying off potential opponents (Brownlee 2007, Gandhi 2008, Magaloni 2008b). In coordinating the actions of investors, they
also better enable corporate insiders to police the contracts made between them, which supports financial development. Based on observations of their current operations, there are dual perspectives that explain parties and legislatures in authoritarian regimes using co-optation and collaboration on the one side, and constraints and power-sharing on the other.

A third, more distant criticism of the recent crop of literature that examines institutions in authoritarian regimes is that they do not seriously consider the ways in which time moderates causal mechanisms (Grzymala-Busse 2011; Pierson 2004). The present view of institutions lacks the broader perspective advocated by historical institutionalism, which acknowledges the constraining effect of previous institutions.19 This is underscored by Pepinsky (2014)’s observation that many studies fail to separate the causal effect of institutions on outcomes from the factors that jointly determine them. As such, ongoing work on authoritarian institutions must cultivate a focus that is more sensitive to how institutions form and change. This requires looking in greater detail at the historical origins of the practices and dilemmas that prefigured political institutions, and the changing role of such institutions as actors were added and removed (Pepinsky 2014; Smith 2005).

A complementary agenda, therefore, concerns the origins of institutions, as well as the order in which they emerge. The ability of past institutions to impact the determination of future institutions has been stressed by Collier (1978) and by Cheibub (2006). Cheibub (2006), for example, argued that the observed instability of presidential democracies stemmed not from inherent weaknesses of presidentialism, but rather is due to the tendency of presidential democracies to follow military dictatorships. It is also well-known that one military coup can beget a reinforcing string of future coups which may differ in motivation from the original (Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2014). Casper (1995) has also argued that political institutions leave lasting legacies on future regimes because of their impact on social institutions. In carefully analyzing the conditions that generate political institutions, therefore, one must keep in mind a country’s previous experiments with institutions.
Despite the abundance of comparative research on authoritarian regimes and increasing variety in the political institutions that support them, critics argue that the present literature can benefit from a more nuanced focus on the roles of specific institutions and the interactions that produce them. Deepening the agenda can be accomplished, in part, by taking a broader approach to explaining institutions, which distinguishes their origins from the functions that they may come to adopt. It may also require further consideration as to how authoritarian institutions become entrenched, whether such institutions are path-dependent, and how they take on new roles in the process of authoritarian consolidation. Important objectives in the ongoing study of authoritarian institutions, therefore, should be to construct more specific arguments about how institutions come to exist in non-democratic settings, to focus more explicitly on the strategic interactions that produce them, and to interpret them as products of historical developments.

2.4 Institutional Trends

To demonstrate the value of thinking separately about the role of authoritarian institutions and their relation to different temporal mechanisms, I examine trends in autocratic regime spells using data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). The authors define an autocratic regime as one in which the executive achieved power through undemocratic means, the government limited competition through changing the formal or informal rules, or the military prevented a significant portion of the citizenry from participating in elections. A regime spell refers to an uninterrupted period of non-democratic rule involving the same support structure, which reflects a similar set of defacto rules. Between 1946 and 2010, the authors coded 280 autocratic regimes representing 116 countries. The information that the authors coded corresponds to questions that were used to construct the regime types developed by Geddes (2003). Specific variables pertain to characteristics of the support party and the legislature (if any), military involvement in government, and the leader.
Figure 2.1 compares the prevalence of support parties and legislatures across the regime spells identified by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Regime spells with a support party are those in which the leadership was based on, or supported by, a political party, while those with a legislature refer to regime spells that had a legislature that met at any interval, however they were selected. The dashed blue line shows the proportion of regime spells in which control over executive selection and governance was exerted by a political party, while the solid red line denotes the proportion of regimes that had a national legislature, regardless of the process by its members were chosen. In cases where there was a legislature but not a support party, I refer to the legislature as non-partisan. As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the distribution of parties and legislatures in autocracies over time has not changed in a concomitant fashion. The growing number of regimes with a support party since the 1950s appears logarithmic, whereas the proportion of regimes with a legislature decreased between 1960 and 1980. Prior to 1965 autocratic regimes were more likely to have a legislature than to be based on a support party, a trend which recurred after 1985. Party-based regimes and regimes spells with a legislature thus show different rates of change over the last fifty years.

Figure 2.1: Regime spells with a support party and legislature, 1946-2010

Figures 2.2 and 2.3 further differentiate between support parties and legislatures on
the basis of their connectness to citizens and competiveness, respectively. I distinguished a *strong* support party as one in which the party had local organizations that linked party members to citizens and which represented more than one ethnic group, region, or religious group. I also separated between legislatures that were appointed or decided by indirect selection or uncontested elections (*closed*), those involving only front groups and party members or independents (*limited*), and those in which opposition seats were decided by elections (*open*). Figure 2.2 shows that the increase in regimes with support parties was roughly the same for both broadly representative (strong) and non-representative (weak) support parties, and that the gradual increase in support parties across the time period was due to subtle changes in the number of regime spells with either type.

In contrast, the type of legislature that existed in autocratic regime spells across the period differs considerably, as shown in Figure 2.3. Prior to 1960 more competitive legislatures were most common, but their prevalence decreased in tandem with an increase in legislatures associated with more restricted, multi-candidate elections. The decrease in autocratic legislatures between 1965 and 1985 is due largely to the recession of these types of legislatures, and not to appointed legislatures. After 1990, however, there is a sharp difference with regard to the type of legislature that existed in authoritarian regimes. The proportion of legislatures whose members were selected by contested elections rapidly increased, while more restricted legislatures decreased. Thus, not only has the proportion of support parties and legislatures in authoritarian regimes changed differently over time, the attributes associated with them are quite different over the period. Support parties have become gradually more common among authoritarian regime spells in the last fifty years, but they have not necessarily become more citizen-oriented. The composition of legislatures in authoritarian regimes, however, dramatically differs between the pre- and post-Cold War periods.

In addition to the different proportions of regime spells that had a support party or a legislature, the rate of transitions involving these institutions is also markedly different over the period 1946-2010. Table 2.1 shows the transition probabilities associated with
Figure 2.2: Percentage of regimes with a support party, 1946-2010

Figure 2.3: Percentage of regimes with a legislature, 1946-2010
neither institution, a support party or legislature only, or both institutions. Regimes that
had neither institution in a given year were more likely to transition to a non-partisan
legislature in the next, and least likely to adopt both a support party and a legislature.
While regime spells based only a support party were very likely to transition to both
institutions, those with only a legislature were about equally as likely to do so, relative
to closing the legislature. Overall, the transitions observed among regime spells in the
sample suggest that regime spells with a non-partisan legislature were more likely, and
that the turn to a support party made it a fixture in subsequent years. Differentiating
transition rates by decade (Table 9.1 in the Appendix) confirms that regimes spells with
neither institution were considerably more likely to transition to a non-partisan legislature
prior to 1960 and after 2000.

\[ \begin{array}{cccc}
\text{neither}_{t-1} & \text{support party only}_t & \text{legislature only}_t & \text{both}_t \\
85.66 & 5.74 & 6.50 & 2.10 \\
2.13 & 78.30 & 0.43 & 19.15 \\
5.88 & 0.23 & 89.82 & 4.07 \\
1.42 & 0.75 & 0.50 & 97.33 \\
\end{array} \]

Table 2.1: Transition rates between support parties and legislatures, 1946-2010

2.5 Moving Forward

Given the interest in authoritarian institutions – as indicated by the growth of
research on autocratic regimes – and the different explanations that have been generated
regarding their purposes in non-democracies, there is a subsequent need to develop
theories that account for the variety of political institutions that are observed and to
combine expectations about their impacts on the political behavior of different actors. As
this chapter has discussed, suggested ways for this to be accomplished include developing
more specific logics regarding the functions of authoritarian parties, legislatures, and
courts, and using the more specific logics to explain the complementarity of authoritarian
institutions and their contributions to the dynamism of authoritarian rule. At the
same time, conceiving of non-democratic rule as dynamic and closely interrelated to the strategic interactions of actors involved also requires a theoretical focus that is not static, but which separates the origins of institutions from their consequences and explains them as part of a process of state development.

This thesis contributes to the rapidly expanding literature on authoritarian institutions by building upon, synthesizing, and refining existing arguments about their purposes. By looking in-depth at the historical development of the legislature and political parties in Mexico, I aim to focus on the specific mechanisms that the legislature and first major political may have originally served. I provide a theory that differentiates between the initial roles of authoritarian parties and the legislature, which is supported by evidence regarding the construction and dissolution of the regime of Porfirio Díaz. Moreover, my focus on the conditions surrounding the formation of the national government in post-independence Mexico attempts to avoid a functionalist interpretation for why they exist. Instead, I describe the narrative of the Porfirian legislature and the political party that followed as one in which institutions emerged from broader political factors and prior institutions. After over fifty years of political turmoil, I argue that the national legislature played a critical role in regularizing competition among elites. After a thirty-year period of stability supported by inter-elite coordination, economic developments led to a confrontation with newly mobilized masses through a large-scale revolution. The creation of a popular political party helped to conciliate the newly relevant interests, indicating a change in the rules for political survival. Considering the interactions that occurred at the genesis of these institutions supports a causal explanation regarding the sort of dilemmas that make parties and legislatures more likely in authoritarian settings.

I also try to adjudicate on different perspectives in the literature on authoritarian parties and legislatures. I argue that the initial construction of legislatures and parties may serve different initial functions. In many cases liberal projects were cited as a template for the initial adoption of institutions such as the legislature, but the interactions that occurred in them suggested that other dilemmas were being resolved.
The argument that I offer therefore considers separately how parties and legislatures emerge, their independent effects on regime change, and the societal levels at which they operate. Though far from being comprehensive or resolving outstanding issues in the study of authoritarian institutions, the following research attempts to reframe the discussion of parties and legislatures according to the historical institutionalist framework. The primary goal is to apply historical lessons on political development in Mexico to support modern analyses of authoritarian institutions, an endeavor that requires fusing old arguments with new, and qualitative evidence with quantitative. Doing so may help to integrate the different explanations for autocratic practices and their relationship to democratization and authoritarian consolidation, and to dispel the “democratic character” formally attributed to parties, legislatures, and courts. More importantly, however, this research aims to move forward by providing an overarching description of institutional trends in autocracies and to taking up the long-standing effort to discern the temporal relationship between contestation and participation.
Chapter 3

A Theory of Institutional Development

3.1 Introduction

One of the primary aims of the dissertation is to resituate the discussion of authoritarian institutions—how they emerge and the purposes they serve—within the historical institutionalist framework. As Smith (2005) noted, “[m]issing from the study of authoritarianism is a causal account linking origins to institutions and institutions to outcomes, that is, a theory of how the origins of regimes shape their long-term prospects for survival” (pg. 57). Pepinsky (2014) recently called attention to the ongoing need for theory that separates the joint determination of institutions and outcomes from the effect of institutions on outcomes. The previous chapter reviewed the bulk of literature on authoritarian institutions, underscoring three outstanding issues on which future research could further improve. The thesis supports this goal by evaluating some of the current theories on institutional development in the context of Mexico’s political history.

In this chapter, I offer a general theory regarding institution building that is comprised of existing arguments. The purpose of the general theoretical framework is to provide a guide by which to analyze the political narrative of Mexico’s development, and to connect it to the broader literature on how institutions emerge and change. In particular, I focus on the emergence of legislatures and political parties in authoritarian regimes—these are formal institutions that can include a wide range of political elites, as opposed to courts and the armed forces. The implications of the theory provide
suggestions for understanding the order of authoritarian state-building and for framing contemporary cross-national analyses.

In short, this chapter argues that autocratic state-building favors the creation of institutions that coordinate the actions and preferences of the most powerful in society, which in turn enables new social actors to assert their political relevance. In three sections, I discuss the following logic: first, enforcement problems between powerful actors hinder cooperation and complicate state-building. To prevent conflictual interactions among ‘would-be’ leaders, institutions can emerge to facilitate cooperation and promote stability. Socio-economic changes that accompany political stability often create new social actors, however, which encourages further institutional change. Thus, authoritarian attempts to resolve the problems of power-sharing and control presupposes a general order of institutional change. I argue that it often results firstly in a political institution that support personal, horizontal networks among the influential, and later leads to more complex, vertically-oriented institutions that represent the larger populace. This pattern explains why national legislatures may precede (and operate independently of) national political parties in non-democracies. This argument builds upon scholarship that anticipates unique patterns of institutional change with regard to elites and masses (Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009a, b).

In discussing each of the propositions that constitute a general theory of institutional development under authoritarianism, I draw on, combine, and revise existing arguments on the construction and maintenance of authoritarian regimes. I argue that a credible threat of violence induces institutional solutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix and Svolik 2013; Svolik 2012). It does not necessarily lead to democratization, however, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003). Dictators use political institutions as a means of discouraging rebellion and encouraging cooperation (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). The question nevertheless remains whether the type of institution that is used depends on source of the threat. Like Geddes (2003) and Wright (2008a), I am interested in the impact of authoritarian institutions on individual incentives. At the same time, I follow Casper (1995) and Casper and Taylor (1996) in
emphasizing the role of strategic interactions and negotiation in producing them.

The theory highlights the role of authoritarian legislatures and institutionalized coalitions as independent from authoritarian parties, and as equally important to the construction and maintenance of a regime (Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014, Magaloni 2008a, Wright 2008a, Wright and Escribá-Folch 2012). In so doing, it also attempts to contribute to theory that also constitutes a debate over the role of authoritarian legislatures (Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014, Wright 2008a). This is accomplished, in part, by unifying explanations based on “winning coalitions,” “access-orders,” and “political integration” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003, North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009a,b). Furthermore, my argument aims to serve as a useful theoretical bridge between historical explanations of institutional change and modern analyses on the performance of authoritarian institutions (Bruhn 1997, Eisenstadt 2004, Magaloni 2008b, Moore 1966, North 1990).

3.2 Enforcement Problems Favor ‘Roving Banditry’

Uncertain individuals compete over resources with force

The starting point for a general theory on the development of political institutions involves specifying basic assumptions about the characteristics of the actors involved. The first “building block” on which my explanation is based assumes that individuals have well-defined preferences over a set of known outcomes or consequences. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue, acknowledging the economic nature of individuals does not necessarily mean that their decisions are always rational. Similarly, individuals need not know the full set of possible options or consequences to have well-defined preferences about what they do know. Rather, it is sufficient to assume that individuals are capable of ordering preferences about the set of options presented to them. That is, people often evaluate and rank options according to their perceived costs and benefits, or their perceived consequences. Individuals are therefore capable of advocating for the fulfillment of their most-preferred option.
Second, ideological preferences and benefits from altruism may exist, but like Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) I assert that individuals are foremostly concerned with the personal economic and social consequences of their actions. The actors in question are therefore regarded as self-interested individuals who are motivated by clearly defined personal preferences. When an individual’s preferences conflict with others’, personal interest is assumed to prevail. This highlights the “inherently conflictual” nature of distributional politics (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, pg. 20). In reality, policies often affect and are affected by competition over limited resources. As Kurtz (2013) notes, however, elite self-interest does not necessarily preclude them from supporting the provision of public goods and the modernization of the state.

The third assumption on which my approach is based is that unsupervised actors often operate under imperfect information. Competition for scarce goods encourages actors to conceal their true preferences, such that in many situations actors are not fully aware of the motivations of potential collaborators. Uncertainty creates a “sharp tradeoff between cooperativeness and unexploitability” (Bendor 1993, pg. 733). As a result, actors are wary of cooperating with each other. The possibility for cooperation and durable coalitions exists, particularly in situations that involve repeated interactions (Axelrod 1984, Casper and Taylor 1996, North 1990, Wright and Goldberg 1985). In general, however, a lack of information obscures one’s ability to evaluate the true costs of different actions that involve others, making noncooperation a more attractive option. Interactions can also be complicated by preference divergence, actors’ responsiveness to cues, and the effectiveness of strategies (Casper and Taylor 1996).

The fourth major assumption about interactions between individuals is that power determines the “winners” and the “losers” in a competition over limited resources. Power refers to the ability to affect an outcome, which can take different forms. Wealth, for example, gives one the ability to pay a higher economic cost to obtain a preferred outcome. Coercive power involves the ability to apply force to achieve an ends, while legitimacy and persuasiveness provide sources of ideological power. In practical terms, force is often a primary determinant of political power. Indeed, the historical institutionalist approach

Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) demonstrate the relevance of coercion using the following analogy: “If there is fruit that can be consumed by one of two individuals, which one will get to eat it? The answer is clear: because there is no law, whoever is more powerful, whoever has more brute force, will get to eat the fruit” (pg. 21). The expectation, therefore, is that the individual with the greatest capacity to satisfy his or her preferences usually gets his or her way. Individuals are capable of pooling together their resources, such that the discussion of political conflicts can concern groups as much as it can individuals. All the same, I assume that the most powerful group sets distributional terms when there is competition between groups rather than individual actors.

In general, I anticipate that the actor most capable of affecting an outcome—the means by which are contextually determined—is most likely to satisfy his or her preferences. In a competitive situation, therefore, the result favors the most powerful actors. In the alternative scenario in which powerful individuals do not get their way, we would expect there to be conflict. Where individuals are able to overcome collective-action problems and act cohesively, the resolution may favor groups of individuals, but influence remains the currency. If force determines outcomes, whoever constitutes the greatest force has the strongest say in determining it; in other cases, the richest or most convincing individual is most likely to obtain his or her preferred outcome.

The above-mentioned assumptions about individuals provide a basis for constructing a general story regarding their interactions. Like other scholars, I take as given that politics involves self-interested individuals acting to maximize their preferences (to get the most possible for themselves). In a competitive situation over limited resources, however, individuals must often evaluate choices and make actions without complete information, which limits their willingness to cooperate with each other (Jones 1999). Moreover, the resolution of a conflict over resources is often determined by the powerful—whoever has the greatest potential to affect the outcome.
**Without enforcement, securing rents is a one-person game**

To the extent that a political situation involves uncertainty, and is characterized by competition between the most powerful for limited resources, voluntary cooperation is unlikely (Axelrod 1984, Olson 1993). Actors aiming to maximize their benefits at a minimal cost must evaluate the benefits of cooperating with another, relative to the costs of doing so. Under imperfect information, this is often difficult to do. Each actor might benefit from collaborating with the other to achieve an outcome, but the potential costs of being exploited by the other—and the potential gains from exploiting—prevents a rational actor from cooperating. The basic problem that results is that the pursuit of self-interest by each individual can negatively impact the other and create sub-optimal outcomes (Weingast 1997).

The ubiquitous problem that self-interest creates for cooperation is encapsulated by the well-known *Prisoner’s dilemma*, a situation that describes a simplified set of choices offered to two individuals. The scenario refers to two criminals, each of whom are independently offered the following deal by a prosecutor: *If you disclose the crime and your partner does not, you will receive a lesser punishment, and your partner will receive a greater punishment*. The associated payoffs are represented in Table 3.1 below. As the table shows, the best outcome for both criminals is for neither to confess to anything, but this is highly unlikely, if not impossible. This is because if one person discloses the crime and the other does not, whoever disclosed would benefit the most. Despite the action of the other player, disclosure offers a greater payoff than silence. Out of self-interest, each criminal should therefore be motivated to seek the highest possible benefit, ultimately leading both to disclose their crimes. This simple formulation demonstrates that rational individuals can be led to pursue a sub-optimal outcome. It also explains why cooperation is unlikely between two self-interested individuals. It is easier to explain the absence of cooperation rather than its presence, a predicament explored by Axelrod (1984) in greater detail.
The *Prisoner’s dilemma* illustrates the problem of collective action, which can be adapted to explain dilemmas in politics. Among individuals who possess the means to control political outcomes, it suggests that they would prefer to secure rents on their own, whether or not they could secure more gains in the long-term through cooperation. Consider a variation on the Prisoner’s dilemma game, in which two individuals weigh the option to fight over control of a territory against jointly sharing control (Table 3.2). For the sake of simplicity, I assume that if one person chooses to fight (challenge) and the other does not, the challenger wins; if both choose to fight, either wins with some probability (\(\alpha\) and 1-\(\alpha\)). I also assume that if both actors agree to share office, they receive equal shares.

### Table 3.2: Power-sharing variant of *Prisoner’s Dilemma*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player 1</th>
<th>challenge</th>
<th>share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>challenge</td>
<td>(2\alpha, 2(1-\alpha))</td>
<td>(2, 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share</td>
<td>(0, 2)</td>
<td>(1, 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The payoffs for each actor are as follows: if both actors choose to share office, each receives exactly half of the benefits (1). If one chooses to share office when the other challenges, however, he or she receives nothing, and the other person receives the full benefits from office (2). In a one-shot game, either actor can be expected to prefer the full benefits from office as opposed to sharing them. The rational choice, therefore, is for each person to challenge. If both actors challenge each other, player 1 wins with probability \(\alpha\) and player 2 with probability 1-\(\alpha\). Were perfect information available, actors would challenge only if a win were certain. Based on imperfect information, however, each player would prefer to challenge for any value of \(\alpha\) greater than zero. That is, *both players would prefer to challenge for any outcome other than a certain loss.*
The only way in which either individual could be persuaded to cooperate with the other is if there were costs for losing or gains from not losing. For example, if the loss of a challenge meant losing one’s life, it would change their valuation of the probable gains from fighting. The risk of challenging now includes the possibility of death, which would be mitigated by sharing office. Provided that conflict also carries with it potential losses in future revenue—resources are often destroyed, inhibiting productivity and investment—the difference could also be represented by the future gains from collaboration. Individuals’ future expectations can exceed present gains, thereby demonstrating the importance of one’s time horizon in choosing between conflict and cooperation (Olson 1993, Weingast 1997, Wright 2008a). Though extremely simplified, the above example suggests that without additional inducements, a rational actor operating with imperfect information would choose to compete for rents rather than share them. Without some kind of structural incentive or commitment mechanism to support cooperation, the use of power to obtain a preferred outcome is therefore dominated by single-players. At the same time, however, it also suggests that external inducements can make cooperation possible.

**Unenforced interactions are unstable and uncoordinated**

As I showed in the previous section, uncertainty over the costs of collaboration should encourage political actors to pursue outcomes on their own. Yet, individuals with conflicting interests are still capable of cooperation, even in situations involving imperfect information. Axelrod (1984) argued that cooperation can emerge from repeated interactions, through which actors are able to update their strategies. Other scholars have emphasized the capacity of “trust,” “social capital,” and “encapsulated interest” to promote cooperative arrangements (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2007, Levi and Stoker 2000, Putnam 1993, Uslaner 2002). Such features are nevertheless difficult to introduce. The application of violence against potential collaborators often closes the door to future interactions between them. Where coercive power is the primary means of obtaining outcomes, the failure to cooperate the first time can forestall future cooperation (Casper and Wilson forthcoming 2013). Myriad examples—such as the execution or exile of former
leaders and co-conspirators, and the ill-fated “coup trap”—show this to be true (Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2014).

Where the formal means of enforcing or rewarding cooperation are nonexistent—which is a characteristic problem in state-building—those with the power to enact political change are often unrestrained. Unless power is sufficiently diffuse, the important interactions occur between a few powerful actors (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). As was already demonstrated, such interactions are likely to be uncoordinated, as each individual has an incentive to pursue his or her own goals. As a result of a powerful few competing for authority over rents, their interactions are also expected to be unstable. Absent a framework that encourages negotiation between them, ‘roving bandits’ take turn seizing and relinquishing control over the state and its resources (Olson 1993). The situation can be likened to playing with a piñata, in which people take turns striking at a paper-mâché container filled with treats. Until cooperation can be induced between them, the players will continue to vie for their turn to strike the piñata, further damaging an already delicate structure.

Thus, because actors have conflicting preferences and do not have full-information about potential collaborators, powerful actors facing distributional conflicts should find it more attractive to use their power to seize control of the pie rather than offer to share it. Without the ability to monitor and enforce the interactions between major actors, securing rents is essentially a one-person game. As a result, the interactions between capable individuals vying for the same resources are expected to be unstable and uncoordinated. In short, enforcement problems favor ‘roving banditry,’ in the sense that powerful actors take turns stealing office from one another and, in the process, destroy economic capital.
3.3 Stability Requires the Powerful to Coordinate

**Political institutions support credible commitments**

The foremost threat to a leader is posed by elites, whose designation often comes by virtue of their ability to unseat the leader (Boix and Svolik 2013, Gandhi 2008, Geddes 1999a, Higley and Gunther 1992, Svolik 2012). That is to say, the potential leader faces persistent competition when she is relatively equal in strength to her competitors. “The predominant political conflict in dictatorships appears to be not between the ruling elite and the masses but rather one among regime insiders” (Svolik 2012 pg. 5). Svolik (2012) referred to this as the problem of *authoritarian power-sharing*.

There are three possible outcomes of competition between the leader and elites: the first possible outcome is that the leader is deposed by another powerful individual, with the consequences that it entails (e.g., imprisonment, death, etc.). As I argued above, the absence of an enforcement mechanism or credible commitment between a few equally powerful individuals makes this a likely outcome. However, Svolik (2009), demonstrates that stable regimes can emerge from the strategic behaviors of the “dictator” and her supporting coalition. When the person with the greatest potential to govern is capable of acquiring enough power that the possibility of a coup or revolt by other powerful individuals is no longer threatening, the dictator is in a position to establish absolute rule. Svolik (2009) refers to this scenario as an *established dictatorship*:

> Among the possible power trajectories implied by this theory is one in which an authoritarian leader assumes office as the ‘first among equals,’ but over time, as a result of opportunism and luck, he succeeds in bolstering his power to the extent that he can no longer be credibly threatened by the ruling coalition. (Svolik 2009 pg. 482)

The possibility that upon seizing office a dictator can acquire enough power to stonewall threats and render power-sharing unnecessary is supported by the observation of personalist regimes, in which access to office and the benefits from it are within the jurisdiction of an individual leader (Gandhi 2008, Geddes 1999a, 2003, Wright 2008a). The second possible outcome, then, is that the leader gains enough power to render future
challenges unlikely. When the leader cannot gain an advantage over her competitors, however, the next plausible option is to offer concessions to secure her place in office (Boix and Svolik 2013, Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Svolik 2009). In such a scenario, the leader cannot remain in her position without the support of powerful individuals who might otherwise take her place. It is therefore in the leader’s interest to offer to redistribute to a minimal number of her “peers,” to whom I refer as elites, in exchange for her authority (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). They constitute the leader’s “winning coalition” (also, “ruling coalition” or “supporting coalition”), representing a subset of individuals whose support endows the leader with political power over the rest of society (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). This refers to a contested dictatorship, in which the autocrat “rules in the shadow of the threat of a coup” (Svolik 2009, pg. 482). This can also be seen as the product of negotiation between a leader and elite challengers, in which the “regime defender” relinquishes a portion of his power in order to maintain control (Casper and Taylor 1996). 23

The inherent tension between a leader and those who could credibly overthrow her is moderated by promises to continue distributing future rents. The promises of an autocrat are not trustworthy, however, insofar as she can almost always later abrogate the informal terms to which she agreed. Without an enforcement mechanism to police her actions, there is nothing preventing her from making guarantees that she will not follow through with once she becomes more powerful than her opponents. A “commitment problem” therefore necessitates a more formal gesture to assure elites that the promise of continued access to rents is credible. A credible commitment to future redistribution is critical for ensuring the continued possibility of long-term interactions between the leader and her supporters (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Boix and Svolik 2013, Svolik 2012). This is supported by the emergence of an institution that either constrains the leader or reduces information costs between coalition members. This involves setting rules that determine the time and place in which negotiation and information sharing will occur, and formally establishing who is included. “Accordingly, to co-opt the ruling elite, dictators frequently set up inner sanctums where real decisions are made and potential rivals are kept under
close scrutiny” (Gandhi 2008, pg. 74). Institutionalizing interactions between the dictator and members of the coalition signals a commitment to sharing power, thereby enhancing stability (Boix and Svolik 2013, Svolik 2012).

The importance of the institution, be it a law, process, or organization, lies in adding credibility to the offer of continued access and cementing relationships between powerful individuals. The formalized promise of future interactions, wherein each member can secure personal rents relative to other powerful actors, creates incentives to be a part of a supporting coalition rather than rebelling against it. Historically, contracts emerged between rulers and asset-holders as a means of forestalling revolution and institutionalizing their cooperation (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004, Moore 1966, North 1981, North and Weingast 1989). Thus, leaders can be motivated, by the threat of being deposed, to systematize and recognize the rights of their coalition members to continued access to rents (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Boix and Svolik 2013, North 1990, Olson 1993, Svolik 2012). In this way, the development of political institutions can be understood as the result of a behavioral equilibrium that occurs between elites based on the balance of power between them.

**Institutions coordinate actors’ preferences and actions**

The institutionalization of competition between elites, and the management of their interests and activities, can take different forms in different types of authoritarian regimes (Gandhi 2008). This can help to protect the leader by creating an arrangement in which the dominant actors can expect to be rewarded only if they remain in the coalition, thereby continuing to support the leader. Gandhi (2008) described several arrangements that differ in composition, size, and shape, but perform similar functions:

[T]he heads of dynastic monarchies rely on consultative councils and extensive kin networks to staff important government positions. To prevent intercennine fighting and to rationalize decision-making, military officers form juntas and other power-sharing arrangements within the armed forces. Finally, civilian dictators who often govern with a regime party create a smaller political bureau within the party. These smaller bodies and inner sanctums are the first institutional trench by which dictators protect themselves. (pgs. 74-75)
Geddes (2003) uses this logic to explain the durability of single-party regimes, in which “everyone’s cooperation is needed in order to achieve a desired end, and no one can achieve it alone” (Geddes 2003 pg. 59). Among powerful elites, the accumulation of personal benefits can be achieved alone, but it is often less costly to support the leader. Though political competition and disagreements may continue to occur among coalition members, the benefits of cooperation should encourage them to resolve their differences within the established channels rather than upsetting the arrangement (Brownlee 2007, Gandhi 2008, Geddes 2003).

By promising to reward cooperation with future rents, a political institution encourages the same elites who might otherwise fight to control the state’s resources to support a coalition headed by another and to regularly interact with it. The continued benefits that this arrangement promises to offer to members of the winning coalition helps to align their preferences. Moreover, the cost of exclusion from the coalition should rebellion fail, inspires a collective norm of collaboration and non-violence that also coordinates their actions. Where the agreement can be reached, therefore, opposing interests can be made to work together as part of a patronage network that supports the tenure of a particular leader.

The expectation of future rents, relative to the costs of independently exercising authority, can induce those who would otherwise fight against each other for the leading role to assume subordinate roles, as long as resources continue to flow. In this way, political institutions provide power-sharing arrangements. They provide behavioral incentives that induce powerful actors to restrain themselves and to negotiate over resources in less violent ways. In the context represented by Table 3.2, formalizing the time and place for negotiation reduces uncertainty and increases the value of sharing power. By inducing actors to cooperate, therefore, institutions coordinate actors’ preferences and their actions.
Institutions facilitate power-sharing, stability

The creation of a formal framework that determines to whom and how future resources are to be distributed supports the cooperation of elites (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Boix 2003). The forum provided by a formal institution, such as legislatures and parties, also enables potential opponents to articulate their policy preferences and work out additional agreements (Gandhi 2008). Formal institutions therefore add credibility not only because they give substance to intentions to distribute, they also enhance actors’ ability to affect what and how benefits are accrued and distributed in the future. Institutions support a particular leader remaining in office by lessening the secrecy that surrounds his office and making more apparent the benefits from associating with his regime (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). In particular, they alleviate monitoring and commitment problems associated with cooperation (Boix and Svolik 2013, Escribá-Folch 2003, Wright and Escribá-Folch 2012).

For moderating the interactions of a set of equally matched individuals, the legislature may represent a more suitable institution than a political party. The structure of the legislature, in which members engage each other in the process of enacting, amending, and repealing laws, presents a relatively even plane for negotiation (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). By reinforcing commitments and allowing them to monitor each other, the forum supports the generation of norms of collaboration. The coalitional nature of the legislature, which is reflected elsewhere in councils, juntas, and bureaus, emphasizes the importance of horizontal accountability for preventing defection and supporting stability (Gandhi 2008, Svolik 2012). I do not refer to horizontal accountability in the sense in which it has been used by O’Donnell (1998) and Hazama (2011)–in which state agencies hold each other accountable to the constitution (constitutional review), thereby subordinating the state to the law and supporting republican and liberal values (Herron and Boyko 2013). Rather, I am referring to an arrangement in which self-interested elites are able to hold each other accountable to an agreement. As a forum in which individuals who might renege on their commitments are able to hold each other accountable, horizontal accountability reinforces elite pacts.
characterized by collusion and oligarchy, and is therefore equally capable of undergirding authoritarianism.

Consequently, the legislature can facilitate power-sharing and national stability. It is a starting place for the initiation of the “rules of the game,” at least among contentious elites (Casper and Taylor 1996). The recognition that contractual agreements among the powerful are often a requisite for stable governance is fairly widely recognized (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008; Moore 1966; North 1990; Svolik 2012). As long as the benefits being offered to each actor and the belief in continued provisions are high enough, upsetting the status quo is sub-optimal. Institutions such as partisan legislatures thereby broaden the basis of support for a leader and lengthen his or her tenure (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008). Out of repeated attempts to seize control of the state and its rents, an observable outcome is the creation of an institutionalized coalition that sufficiently deters threats and sustains the leader. Such cooperation is unlikely to arise voluntarily, but it can be initiated and overseen by the person in charge. The creation of stability and consequent increases in production can therefore be supported by a legislature that helps to coordinate politics among factionalized elites.

As a body of individuals tasked with determining policy, the legislature need not involve political parties. In the legislative models analyzed by Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989), for example, the legislature consists of n members representing different districts. To the extent that congressional membership is determined by the members of each district, individuals are dependent upon the support of their district to hold office. However, members with sufficient control over their districts are able to maintain office without electoral support. The concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals can therefore result in a legislature composed of n members representing themselves, by virtue of their influence. Distributional policies, which allocate benefits to specific areas, can further reinforce the importance of control over districts comprising territories (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). To this end, the determination of policy as represented by a national legislature can be dominated
by individuals rather than party representatives. Such situations also account for the persistence of subnational authoritarian units and their influence at the federal level (Gelman 2010, Gervasoni 2010, Gibson 2005, 2012).

Scholars have debated whether the power-sharing arrangements represented by legislatures support stability by constraining the leader, or by lowering transaction costs between elites (Boix and Svolik 2013, Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014, Wright 2008a). The logic presented here suggests that the latter mechanism is primarily responsible, and that the constraining effect of institutions is a secondary outcome. Why? If the legislature binds the hands of a leader, it does so firstly by enhancing the ability of coalition members to collectively organize to punish the leader. It stands to reason that the constraining effect of congress is only as strong as its members’ ability to reach a consensus. The primary appeal of participating, therefore, is not in knowing that expropriation by the leader cannot occur. Rather, participating in the legislature augments one’s ability to learn about how resources are being distributed; it informs them about their standing among their peers (who is getting what), and enables more precise estimates about the risk of expropriation by anyone in the coalition. Thus, the legislature promotes stability by facilitating contract enforcement between coalition members, more so than by actually constraining the leader (Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014). By fostering negotiation among elites, however, legislatures enhance information gathering and transparency, making it easier for elites to coordinate against the leader if expropriation should occur.

Whereas capable actors are driven by self-interest to seize rents on their own, and frequent coups and conflicts are inherently unstable, stability first requires coordinating politics among the powerful. To this end, political institutions support credible commitments on the part of the leader to provide contenders with continued access. Such an arrangement helps to coordinate actors’ preferences and actions. By institutionalizing an agreement to provide continued access to rents and resources in exchange for loyalty, political institutions support power-sharing and stability.
3.4 New Interests Motivate Institutional Complexity

**Stability is necessary for development, growth**

As Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003) note, “[o]ne of the logical implications of the theoretical literature on the interaction of political and economic institutions is that political instability should have a strongly negative impact on growth” (pg. 2). As it pertains to early phases of state-building, this appears to be true. The notion of “roving banditry” threatens to discourage production, decreasing the amount of rents that could be confiscated and leaving virtually nothing for its producers (Olson 1993). Olson (1993) argued that no society could work satisfactorily without the provision of a peaceful order and a minimal level of public goods. The “rational” autocrat should be led by his own self-interest to establish himself as leader and provide a minimum level of stability. “The gigantic increase in output that normally arises from the provision of a peaceful order and other public goods gives the stationary bandit a far larger take than he could obtain without providing government” (Olson 1993, pg. 568).

At a basic level, elites should also be able to recognize the economic benefits of peace. Dominant actors compete with each other, after all, to control the accumulation and distribution of resources. The upheaval and turmoil created by competition deters productivity, however. A limited peace resulting from the creation of a power-sharing arrangement between elites should therefore encourage citizens to be more productive, as their output is less likely to be destroyed. As a result, future challengers from within the coalition would have to compare the amount of rents that they would control under the old equilibrium (instability) to the share of rents they would receive under the new equilibrium (stability).

The ability of dominant actors to work out a political arrangement that deters them from engaging in persistent coup d’etats and re-seizing state assets should therefore be favorable for development. The development of states in Western Europe has been attributed to contractual peace (North 1990, Olson 1993). Out of the anarchy created by the fall of the Roman empire, local production systems emerged in the form of
feudal structures. According to the dominant arrangement at the time, noblemen offered military service to the king in return for land, and peasants worked the land in return for protection (North 1990). The creation of a coalition of individuals with the capacity to defend a territory secured for the leader (the king) a dominion. It provided lords with a level of private and public goods sufficient to keep them in their position, and protected farmers and workers against expropriation. The stability provided by this arrangement has been used to explain subsequent population growth and economic development that eventually led to the disappearance of the feudal system (North 1990).

Stability can therefore be considered a precondition for the development of a functional society (Olson 1993). Given the trade-off between work and leisure, individuals must believe that at least a fraction of their output will remain available to them, and that it is greater than the expected utility of not working (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). To the extent that infighting among potential leaders diminishes the returns from working, instability is assumed to discourage production. As a result, previous research has shown that there is a strong positive relationship between economic prosperity and civil peace (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Fjelde and de Soysa 2009). Where powerful actors are capable of working out a durable power-sharing arrangement, the subsequent stability should be auspicious for levels of development and growth.

**Development frequently creates new societal actors**

If the political arrangement between powerful elites invests them in a level of stability that is propitious for economic development and growth, it subsequently produces new questions about the relationship between elites and the producers in society. That is to say, once the question of who is in charge has been answered and patterns of authority have crystallized, the question arises of how economic activity is to be governed. In some cases, the monopolization of trade supported the development of absolutist monarchy; in others, the crown was not strong enough to control economic activity (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004, North 1990). The development of a merchant class subsequently encourages renewed negotiations over how resources are to be distributed (Acemoglu and
After the basic requirements for a functioning society have been fulfilled, growth and development produce changes in human capital. Agricultural societies industrialize; gains from trade favor specialization and the accrual of specialized skills, and divisions of labor occur in the production of goods (Moore 1966, North 1990). Such changes can be thought of as affecting the political landscape in several important ways. The specialization of knowledge and skills increases the value of individual workers, and at the same time encourages a shared identity among its possessors. The complexification of economic activity and increased value of workers also causes capital accumulation to occur in the hands of businessmen, thereby constituting a source of power that brings new actors to the table.

The development of a bourgeoisie, or middle class, drawn primarily from the ranks of merchants and business represents a new societal interest that exerts force on the flow of resources that were previously negotiated between the leader and elites (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Moore 1966). In addition to placing demands on the distribution of resources, it has implications for the political authority that controls it. New groups may come to the fore, in the form of unions and guilds, that assert their place in the framework for decision-making. Expanding economic hierarchies and associated representation, in turn, require the leader and his coalition to recognize the newly emergent societal actors.

**Political integration accommodates increasing complexity**

North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009b) argue that three types of “social orders” have existed in human history, each of which accommodates different structural forms of violence. The foraging order refers to small groups that make up hunter-gatherer societies. The limited-access order denotes a society built upon a “hierarchy of personal relationships among powerful individuals. Personal relationships among the elite form the basis for political organization and constitute the grounds for individual interaction” (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009b, pg. 56). Also referred to as a “natural state,” the limited-access order is characterized by a dominant coalition, such that people outside
of it have only limited access to “organizations, privileges, and valuable resources and activities” (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009b, pg. 56). “Because of their positions, privileges, and rents, the individual elites in the dominant coalition depend on the regime to keep entry limited. All elites therefore have incentives to support and help maintain the coalition” (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009b, pg. 60).

The open-access order, in contrast, describes a more developed society in which individuals are assigned less personal statuses—such as ‘citizen’ (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009b). All those who meet “a set of minimal and impersonal criteria” are free to participate in the open-access order. Accordingly, face-to-face interaction becomes less salient as a political activity in open-access orders. “Impersonality is a central feature of open-access orders, which grows out of the structure of organizations and the ability of society to support impersonal organizational forms” (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009b, pgs. 61-62).

Broadly, North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009b) assert that the type of “social order” that is observed denotes the structure of violence in a society. The limited-access order indicates a state in which violence is concentrated among a few powerful individuals. It is the capacity for violence, argue North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009b), that determines membership in the dominant coalition and exclusion from privilege. The turn to a more open-access order is therefore predicated by the dispersal of power outside of the exclusive circle of regime insiders:

First, a natural state must develop institutional arrangements that enable elites to create the possibility of impersonal intraelite relationships. Second, the transition proper begins when members of the dominant coalition find it a matter of self-interest to expand impersonal relationships and to institutionalize open access for all (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009b, pg. 64).

North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009b) do not represent the first scholarship to relate violence potential to the openness of a society. Historical analyses have recognized the role of lower classes in initiating a transition (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004, North 1990). “As the Magna Carta amply attests, a king who stepped over the boundary of accepted custom faced the possibility of revolt. Many of the king’s vassals were almost
as powerful as he..., and certainly in concert they were more powerful” (North 1990, pg. 139). In examining the conditions for democratic, fascist, and communist regimes, Moore (1966) considered the ways in which industrialization and the pre-existing agrarian society interacted to produce different political outcomes. He drew particular attention to the means by which societies are transformed as precedents of democratic institutions. Absent a revolution involving a united peasantry and bourgeoisie, Moore (1966) concluded that democracy was unlikely. In this way, he emphasized the accumulation of power among the lower classes (in the form of support for a revolution), and a middle class capable of carrying it to fruition. Boix (2003) also related the rise of a middle class to democratization.

Historical observations supported more abstract generalizations about democratic transition. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003) argued that political confrontation, or the threat of it, is a catalyst for transitions to democracy. As the holders of de jure power in society, elites sometimes confront non-elites when they possess sufficient de facto power, however transitory. At the point where non-elites represent a credible threat of violence against elites, elites must choose between repression or accommodation. Where the costs of repression are too high or the costs of transition are low enough, elites will choose to open the political arena to include non-elites to a greater extent (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). In this way, the responses of the masses can play an important role in the timing of political openings (Casper and Taylor 1996).

Thus, the “natural state” is one in which a privileged few possess enough violence to form a dominant coalition, to which the bulk of rents and resources accrue (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Boix 2003; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009a,b). The political space can be forced open, however, by normally excluded individuals who have acquired enough temporary power to demand change (Casper and Taylor 1996). When the threat of revolution is credible and cannot be contained, the dominant coalition must widen, and a new contract must be worked out. The process of institutionalizing guarantees to the lower classes marks a transition to a
more open-access order, a move which is often interpreted as democratization. According to Weingast (1997), moments such as the Glorious Revolution in seventeenth-century England evidenced citizens’ ability to resolve coordination dilemmas, forcing the state to accept limits on its behavior:

The consensus after the Glorious Revolution was thus a direct consequence of the new set of “pacted” institutions. It did not result from a new, uniformly held ideal about the best form of English government. The agreement instead occurred over the appropriate trigger strategies coordinating citizen reactions. For many of the most central political issues of the era, the Revolution Settlement furnished a new set of limits on sovereign behavior. The newly agreed-upon limits implied that citizens would react in concert against any future violation of them, thus making their political and economic rights more secure (Weingast 1997, pg. 255).

If a political transition is in order, how does it affect the shape of political organization? To the extent that citizens at lower levels are brought into the framework for decision-making, politics is transformed from a horizontal network that emphasizes interpersonal networks among elite, to a more vertical network based on representation. After all, face-to-face negotiation cannot accommodate whole populations. Societal changes based on the exercise of violence are therefore accompanied by increasing political complexity, in which a vertical framework of accountability is created to accommodate lower-level actors. The problem of authoritarian power-sharing is first worked out among a powerful few, who then address the problem of authoritarian control (Svolik 2012).

The complexification of political organization applies equally well to economic activity. Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003) describe a system of property rights that, though it is only a “theoretically second-best solution to the commitment problem,” is reproducible even under political uncertainty, and reflects the empirical reality in many countries (pg. 20). According to the authors, vertical political integration (VPI) refers to the emergence of rent-seeking coalitions composed of asset holders in a government that is too weak to prevent it, and a third-party enforcer that receives rents to monitor the contract between them. In the business sense, vertical integration refers to the consolidation of firms that operate at different stages of production. It involves a company overseeing more than one point on the path of production, which reduces the costs of
The development of new economic actors and social identities represents the emergence of rent-seeking coalitions, insofar as they demand political recognition. Where the leader and his coalition of elites are unable to prevent their demands through repression, they must turn to co-optation—the political space must be opened up to include more opposition (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Moore 1966). The specter of non-credible guarantees necessitates that formateurs craft an institution that can serve as a third-party enforcer to the contract between them. Political parties, elections, and bureaucratic expansion help to satisfy this requirement. Though Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003) used the concept of vertical political integration to refer to a system of property rights, the term applies well as a depiction of the verticalization of politics and the accommodation of new political actors. Political parties, which refer to groups of like-minded individuals who cooperate to win elections, fulfill this function by aggregating the interests of citizens. The structure of a party—in which voters typically select and promote an individual to represent their interests—provides an institution that links mass-based groups to the national (or regional) government (Aldrich 1995, Mintz 1996). They are hierarchical, in the sense that constituents send delegates to act on their behalf.

Political parties add another layer to the structure of decision-making process, helping to stabilize volatility associated with majority-rule decision making (Aldrich 1994, 1995; Cox 1993; Cox and Mccubbins 1994; Mintz 1996). According to Cox and Mccubbins (1994), to the extent that a representative values being selected to represent the party, he or she should be inclined to vote in accordance with party preferences.25 By binding party representatives to a “specific structure of agenda power,” political parties limit the range of feasible options from which an individual legislator might choose (Cox and Mccubbins 1994, pg.226). The power of mass-based groups to influence national-level decision making is therefore often institutionalized in the form of political parties (Aldrich 1994, Cox and Mccubbins 1994).

It is important to note that political parties do not necessarily equate with popular control. Personalist parties can form from an individual garnering enough personal control.
support to control office, as was the case in Bolivia (Di Tella 2004, Hudson and Hanratty 1989). Moreover, the ability of outgoing authoritarian regimes to control social institutions has the potential to yield weak democracies (Casper 1995). However, the turn to party politics is often associated with increasing power at the level of the masses, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003). As an institution capable of connecting popular groups to the national government, therefore, the general structure of political parties reinforces a system based on vertical accountability. Party representatives (agents) receive benefits from office for articulating and securing objectives of the broader group (principals) (Aldrich 1994, 1995, Cox 1993, Cox and McCubbins 1994, Mintz 1996).

At the national level, political parties provide an institutional structure integrating the interests of mass-based groups. They are not, however, the only form of institution that can do so. Labor unions, organized religious groups, and civic associations channel collective interests and are therefore capable of functioning as “pseudo-parties” (Casper 1995, Collier and Collier 1991, Varshney 2002). Usually, though, competition among political parties determines the representation of group interests within the national legislature. By encouraging new forms of economic activity and redistributing capital, development frequently creates new societal actors. Increasing socio-economic complexity finds itself, at a point, reflected in more complex, vertically-oriented, political forms. Newly organized interests therefore motivate institutional complexity, which is reflected in the emergence of national political parties.

3.5 Summary

The theory of institutional development being offered here combines insights from the bulk of scholarship on the role of institutions before the emergence of democracy. My argument is essentially the following: the initial problem of enforcing cooperation between powerful actors hinders state-building, as individuals are driven to compete for rents rather than share them. Creating stability therefore firstly requires establishing
cooperation among powerful actors, which can be accomplished by an institution that promotes horizontal accountability. According to Higley and Gunther (1992), the ability to establish a consensus among elites was critical for the stability and survival of democratic regimes. “[D]emocratic stability requires that elites perceive politics as ‘bargaining’ rather than ‘war’ and that they see political outcomes as positive—not zero sum” (Higley and Gunther 1992, pg. 3). Nevertheless, for all regimes it is reasonable to expect that the ability to do so translates into continued longevity for the leader that achieves it; it galvanizes a coalition among those who would overthrow him, and focuses their attention on exclusion and continued reward. Such an arrangement is characterized by interpersonal networks and patrimonialism among coalition members.

Insofar as a horizontal network among powerful actors promotes the stability necessary for a functioning society, the resultant political institution represented by a coalition of elites supports economic growth and development. Unless it is restricted by the state, such growth often comes to benefit new groups of actors and distributes wealth elsewhere. Consequent economic wealth also encourages members in the lower ranks of society—workers and peasants—to demand more of the pie being enjoyed by the elites. A credible ultimatum induces elites to open the political space and to provide access. In the literal sense, however, the political arena cannot accommodate the flood of constituents. Representative structures become necessary; citizens align themselves according to preferences, which are embodied in elected officials. The influx of organized interests therefore motivates institutional complexity.

In general, then, the story often told by historical institutionalists contains elements of gradualism and sequencing (Carothers 2007, Mansfield and Snyder 2007). It suggests that state-building firstly involves coordinating the interests of powerful actors. The leader’s foremost need to make an arrangement with those who represent the greatest threat (to her, as well as to each other) is a widely-recognized stipulation of political survival. This implication led Dahl (1971) to argue that the most stable pathway to democracy was one in which liberalization preceded inclusiveness. Subsequent scholars have made similar arguments regarding institutional patterns best suited for producing democracy (Higley
In their analysis of democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Higley and Gunther (1992) presented a nearly identical argument. The authors held as a critical determinant of long-term stability whether elites first achieved a settlement over the rules of the game. To Higley and Gunther (1992), elite settlements provided the basis for stable, limited democracy. Only when new groups were included could democracy be said to be consolidated; otherwise, they remained unconsolidated democracies or “pseudo-democracies.” As the authors noted, “[t]he collapse or impending collapse of an authoritarian regimes is most commonly accompanied by frequent and often large-scale mass mobilizations” (Higley and Gunther 1992, pg. 23). Thus, the second step in the consolidation of democracy involved the accommodation of mass mobilization. In the face of elite and mass pressures for change, Higley and Gunther (1992) hypothesized that regimes characterized by elite settlement and mass democratization underwent the stabilization and institutionalization necessary for consolidated democracy. However, the scholarship on authoritarianism has demonstrated that not all openings of this type are democratic (Diamond 2002, Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, Schedler 2002). If it is not “democratization,” the creation of representative bodies and a hierarchical electoral system in autocracies may also evidence the transition from a limited-access order to an open-access order (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Boix 2003, North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009a,b).

Structural theories of democracy suggested that there were prerequisites such as economic and social modernization (Huntington 1968, Lipset 1959). Eventually, however, these theories gave way to explanations that highlighted the importance of negotiation and strategic interaction in determining whether democracy occurs and is consolidated (Casper 1995, Casper and Taylor 1996, Haggard 1998, O’Donnell and Whitehead 1986). The primary dilemma of preventing ouster by powerful individuals, and the subsequent question of whether to include the masses, explains important choices that occur in autocracies. These interactions may be considered responsible for whether sufficient levels of development occur. As such, structural explanations are merely proxies for
the underlying institutional deliberations that may or may not produce democracies. Such change involves a turn from horizontal, interpersonal politics that occurs between powerful individuals, to a more complex, vertically-oriented, impersonal form of politics in which electoral competition occurs among the representatives of social groups. A theory of institutional development may therefore be useful for explaining varieties of authoritarianism and transformations between them (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, Geddes 2003, Gleditsch and Ward 1997, Hadenius and Teorell 2007, Wright 2008a).

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has offered a general theory, largely built on the foundations of a number of studies, that can help to explain the construction and maintenance of authoritarian regimes. Many of the prior arguments that explain why dictators creating binding institutions, and what accounts for political transitions and institutional change, fit together quite well. The resulting image is one that explains institutional development under authoritarianism as a product of how violence and power is distributed in society, institutional solutions to continued governance, and socio-economic changes. What previously stood as an explanation for democratization now generally explains institutional changes that accompany political openings (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003, Moore 1966, North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009b).

This thesis is not the first to suggest that increasing institutional complexity may follow a particular order as a result of strategic dilemmas. The two closest theoretical frameworks to mine are Kurtz (2013) and Svolik (2012). Kurtz (2013) took a society-centric view of political development, linking long-run outcomes to underlying social and political dynamics at two critical moments—the initial consolidation of national political institutions after independence and the first large-scale electoral incorporation of nonelite civil society in the tumultuous decades in and around the Great Depression. He argued that the most important factors affecting the first critical moment are whether labor is free or servile—whether the peasant has the practical legal right to leave the
farm—and whether elites cooperate in the delegation of political authority to the center. Where labor is servile, elites should be unwilling to centralize authority because it would leave them more vulnerable to the national government’s willingness to uphold the labor-repressive system. The second critical moment involves the electoral incorporation of the middle and working classes, which is conditional around the Great Depression. Kurtz (2013) argued that the timing of the rise of the middle class—whether before or after the depression—affected their willingness to align with the oligarchy or with emergent working-class parties and unions.

Like Kurtz (2013), I take a society-centric view of political development and am concerned with the underlying dynamics that induce long-run outcomes characterized by institutional changes. I also argue that the first critical moment affecting political development involves obtaining elite coordination. However, I focus exclusively on the ability of elites to form an exclusionary oligarchy. I maintain that this critical juncture occurs prior to mass incorporation, regardless of the structure of labor. The type of labor—free or servile—may certainly affect the calculus of an elite to cooperate in the formation of a national government, but it is likely one of many determinants. Additionally, characterizing ‘free’ labor as a system in which peasants have the practical legal right to leave the farm overstates the complexities of land tenure and economic inequalities that characterized peasant life in the 18th century in Latin America. Though many were free to leave the farm, they were often tied to the property by debt peonage and did not have the capital to be mobile, an inequality that was enforced by local power structures. Rather than highlighting the disincentives for cooperation, my explanation focuses on the benefits of participation afforded by different institutional arrangements. My explanation is also in line with Kurtz in emphasizing the electoral incorporation of the masses as the second critical juncture affecting political development. I nevertheless aim to explain the process of state building in Latin America in a way that is not dependent on the economic shock represented by the Great Depression.

While middle class policy preferences and their willingness to align with the working class certainly represented a major determinant of the form of electoral incorporation (and
is indeed a central aspect of the argument by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), I assume
that at the decision node the members of the middle class may or may not support
popular interests, and that they may also differ with regard to cohesiveness. The focus
on middle class preferences as a function of the Great Depression does not explain the
revolution that occurred in Mexico, which involved a considerable portion of middle class
members, nor does it acknowledge the ability of peasants and rural citizens to support the
cause of nascent working class groups. I therefore strongly complement Kurtz’s argument
by focusing on the accommodation of specific constituent groups in the process of state
building, but with less conditionality. Instead of highlighting the role of labor systems and
middle class alignment to explain successes or failures in achieving elite coordination and,
later, mass integration, I rely on a simplified version of his argument to emphasize the role
of political institutional structure for accomplishing it. Elaborating on the institutional
configuration of elite coordination and mass integration is something that Kurtz (2013)
does not do; as a result, my focus on the functional differences in political institutions
supports and complements his argument. This study also aims to contribute to Kurtz’s
objective of showing this process at work in Latin America. Though his empirical focus
was on state building in Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, I provide evidence from
Mexico that supports and helps to develop his thesis.

Like Kurtz (2013), Svolik (2012) was concerned with underlying social and political
dynamics. In particular, the author aimed to contribute to a “unified theoretical
framework” on authoritarian institutions by explaining authoritarian politics through two
forms of conflict that dictators face. The first involves handling challenges from within the
dictator’s inner circle or from his or her peers, a problem to which Svolik referred as the
“problem of authoritarian power-sharing.” The second problem affecting dictatorship
is threats from the masses, which the author called the “problem of authoritarian
control.” Svolik (2012) made a substantial contribution by demonstrating how the two
problems–power-sharing and control–explain a great deal of the politics in authoritarian
regimes, including the creation of institutions and policies, the survival of leaders
and regimes, as well as varieties of authoritarianism. He emphasized the ever-present
threat of violence in non-democracies, and he started by considering the situations in which an authoritarian leader takes office as “first among equals.” Svolik noted that “[w]here authoritarian power-sharing succeeds, it most often takes the form of high-level, deliberative and decision-making bodies–committees, politburos, or ruling councils–and are usually embedded within authoritarian parties and legislatures.” He also identified institutional features through which political parties support authoritarian control.

My argument borrows from Svolik (2012) a concern with the dual problems of authoritarian power-sharing and control. I differ from the author, however, in placing greater nuance on the institutional structures that facilitate each, as well as the reasons why that should be the case. Moreover, the author’s theoretical framework is primarily concerned with the problems of authoritarian control and power-sharing as they relate to contemporary dictatorships. I aim to focus in greater detail on the timing in which such problems tend to arise in the long term, as a means of explaining patterns in the trajectories of state building. Doing so emphasizes the inherent order of institutional solutions to authoritarian power-sharing and control and considers whether they can be described in path-dependent terms. I therefore contribute to the work by Svolik by considering the potential order of political institutions that arise in dictatorship to address the problems of power-sharing and control, and placing these problems in historical perspective. My explanation also helps to differentiate among patterns in historical dictatorships, particularly within Latin America. As Svolik (2012) observed, “[t]he classic literature on totalitarianism and bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin America focuses primarily on repression, as does more recent research. Meanwhile, in the literature on elections, legislatures, and parties in dictatorships, the key mechanism is almost exclusively co-optation” (pg. 9). The purpose of investigating the role of the legislature and political parties in Mexico is to complement the focus on repression in this region with an argument that emphasizes co-optation and that speaks in the vernacular of contemporary research on authoritarian practices.

To summarize, my theoretical argument is closely in line with that of Kurtz (2013) and Svolik (2012), but it differs in very nuanced ways. While I emphasize the order in
which nation building accommodates constituent groups, I deviate from Kurtz in focusing on the specific social problems and institutional solutions that characterize this process. Furthermore, I utilize the conceptual problems of authoritarian power-sharing and control explicated by Svolik. However, I cast them in a long-term perspective that enables me to focus on the generation and adaptation of specific institutions, and to consider the possibility that there exist modal paths of political development.

The discussion of institutional development in authoritarian regimes contributes to their debate by considering the dilemmas that dictators face in attempting to assert and maintain their authority. While no country may be observed progressing deterministically toward a particular end, the general theory of institutional development offered here suggests that parties and legislatures emerge in the authoritarian setting to satisfy particular arrangements. It also suggests that different political institutions, at least in authoritarian regimes, might represent different levels of social complexity. In the next chapters, I use process tracing to demonstrate this theory at work in the development of politics in 19th century Mexico.
In the previous chapter I argued that an institution that facilitates personal interactions in an exclusive political setting, such as a legislature, committee, or politburo, is a necessary first step in the consolidation of an authoritarian regime. It satisfies the coordination of interests of individuals with high levels of economic and coercive power, who would otherwise utilize their resources to acquire more benefits at the expense of the state. The durable arrangement between elites that is supported by the institutionalization of horizontal linkages augments the conditions for development, thereby increasing the amount of resources that can be redistributed. Consequently, the accumulation of wealth outside of this inner circle can also promote the political ascendance of mass-based groups, prompting a turn to a more complex, vertically-oriented political institution to integrate interests from lower strata of society. This pattern of state-building is implicit in the classic literature on political science, and elsewhere in economic and conflict research (Dahl 1971, Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003, Moore 1966, North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Few scholars have identified it in specific cases, however, nor have they attributed it to the success of states.26

The relative absence of qualitative research that outlines long-term patterns of political development, and in particular the paths of institutionalization in non-democracies, does not mean that such patterns cannot be identified. The story of how Mexico was created, for example, strongly supports the expectation that the structure of legislatures and parties imbues them with different functions for the creation and maintenance of authoritarian regimes. In this chapter and the next, I use process-tracing
to describe the context in which power-sharing institutions emerged in Mexico in the 19th and 20th centuries, separating it into two distinct segments. The first saw the establishment of independent Mexico and an unprecedented episode of stability and development led by Porfirio Díaz. The second saw the initiation of modern party politics and the inauguration of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), one of Mexico’s first and longest lasting political parties. Separating these two segments was a violent revolution in which the masses politically asserted themselves and fundamentally changed the nature of—and institutional requirements for—politics in Mexico.

A number of scholars have studied the electoral hegemony of the PRI in Mexico between 1946 and 2000, which exemplified the staying power of party-based authoritarianism (Bruhn 1997, Eisenstadt 2004, Grayson 2007, Magaloni 2008b). Nevertheless, the forebear of the PRI was preceded by the administration of Porfirio Díaz, which was the first effective and longest-lasting dictatorship since Mexican independence (Katz 1991). I therefore selected the case of Mexico to identify pre-revolutionary connections that might explain the successful model of authoritarianism that emerged in the form of the PRI. Under Díaz, Mexico emerged from a state of violence and uncertainty and took the semblance of a modern state (Rowe 1912). This period—roughly, 1876-1911—has been referred to as the formative era of modern Mexico (Bryan 1976, Cosío Villegas 1960). According to Stevens (1965), this period also fits neatly into the model of absolute authoritarianism.

The Porfiriato, or the nearly 35 year period of influence by Díaz, also stands in stark contrast to the hegemony of the PRI. During the Porfiriato modern political parties did not formally exist, yet participation in the legislature was a common and frequent occurrence (Bryan 1976, Garner 2001, Harris 1911, Schmitt 1966). This period demonstrates the independent capacity of the legislature to support authoritarian consolidation prior to the institutionalization of party-based rule. Expanding the scope of institutionalist research in Mexico to include pre-Revolution years thus provides a more complete picture regarding political development in Mexico. Historians who have studied the Porfiriato have advocated for a more rigorous explication of the formal institutions
by which Díaz remained in office and kept peace, and for understanding the Mexican transition from a historical perspective, both of which represent goals of this thesis (Barrón 2006, Bryan 1976, Garner 2001).

There are benefits to rethinking this particular era and adapting the insights for modern theory-building as well. For example, in Przeworski (1991)’s formal model of strategizing by a moderate opposition and reformers within an authoritarian regime, he concludes that authoritarianism with concessions is the most rational choice. Otaola (2011) criticizes the model, claiming that the Mexican experience—referring to the twentieth century—refutes its expectations. I argue that Otaola (2011) was too modern-looking in his critique of Przeworski (1991)’s model, which may better describe the Porfiriato. A narrow focus on modern institution-building is a short-sighted endeavor if the goal is to understand the long-term impacts of political institutions. In the next section, I list a set of propositions that describe politics in Mexico prior to the Mexican Revolution. I then provide evidence supporting each proposition and evaluate the strength of support.

4.1 Process Tracing the Porfiriato

To fully evaluate a theory on interactions that undergird the institutionalization of authoritarian regimes, one should start with a setting in which the question of autonomous governance had not yet been decided, and where power was concentrated among individuals competing for personal control. I aim to establish that an interest in stability led to reliance upon an institution to facilitate exchanges between important individuals, whose importance was defined by economic resources and coercive capacity. I also aim to demonstrate that the formalization of elite interactions contributed to political and economic development. This is accomplished by process-tracing the period in Mexico between independence and the Mexican Revolution in 1911. I argue that the Porfiriato and its impacts on Mexican politics can be reduced to the following set of propositions, which are shown as a sequence in Figure 4.1.
1: Before the emergence of Porfirio Díaz, Mexican politics was violent and uncertain.
2: A prevailing concern during Porfirio Díaz’s administration was establishing order.
3: Participation in the legislature was part of the framework that supported stability.
4: The relative stability of the Porfiriato enabled a number of significant developments.

Prior to 1867, Mexican politics was truly indeterminate. Porfirio Díaz’s vision for Mexican development therefore built upon the goals of his predecessor Benito Juárez, which aimed at creating political stability. The president used a variety of strategies aimed at conciliating and undermining various elites, which were aided in part by the national congress. As a result of the relative stability that was procured during his administration, significant developments occurred across Mexico in a number of areas. On the basis of historical evidence, I argue that the legislature was part of the institutional backdrop that moderated elite interactions and led to the development of the political and social identities that eventually replaced Díaz. Exploring the institutional setting that undergirded the Porfiriato highlights the importance of institutions—such as the legislature—for coordinating conflicting interests and conducting politics at the national level.

Figure 4.1: Analytic description of the Porfiriato

To demonstrate my argument concerning the importance of the legislature as a Porfirián institution, I use a causal case-study methodology known as process tracing (PT) (Beach and Pedersen 2013). PT is “defined by its ambition to study the causal
mechanisms by which X contributes to produce Y (Beach and Pedersen 2013, pg. 3). The difference between PT and other case-study methodologies, such as congruence testing, is that the latter deals with if-then statements whereas the former unpacks a causal statement into a series of parts that explain the process leading from X to Y (Beach and Pedersen 2013). It is characterized by a focus on “temporality and conjunctural causality” (Rohlfing 2013, pg. 13). In addition to careful description, process tracing requires “finding diagnostic evidence that provides the basis for descriptive and causal inference” (Collier 2011, pg. 824). To this end, I address each proposition by providing a set of causal process observations that support it, which enables me to evaluate the strength of the claim. Evidence for the arguments presented below comes primarily from secondary sources (books and articles published by historians and regional specialists).

According to Beach and Pedersen (2013), PT “enables the researcher to study more or less directly the causal mechanism linking a causal condition (or set of conditions) and an outcome, allowing us to open up the ‘black box’ of causality and focus on how X contributes to producing an outcome through the operation of a causal mechanism” (pg. 3). Tracing the events that occurred between two observations is merely descriptive, however, and does not enable one to fully establish a causal claim (Beach and Pedersen 2013). Nevertheless, through process tracing I aim to develop a “mechanistic explanation for a particular outcome” (Goertz and Mahoney 2013, pg. 15). I argue that process tracing is particularly useful for investigating Mexico as a case for historical institutional development. For one, a lack of concrete primary evidence (as a result of the case being historical) necessitates carefully considering depictions of the Porfiriato and identifying elements that may contribute to a causal explanation. Evaluating the strength of elements that support a set of conditions regarding a causal mechanism demonstrates the plausibility of the argument, while at the same time highlighting weaknesses in the accumulated evidence that bears it out. Additionally, unpacking the casual mechanism into a set of ‘steps’ focuses on the time-dependent nature of the strategic interactions that produced it. This is necessary, for example, for explaining why the PRI occurred when it did. Evaluating the sequence of events that describes the stability of the Porfiriato
provides insights into why and how it ended.

Understanding unique within-case features better enables one to create abstract expectations that can be applied to a broader sample of cases (Mahoney 2001). Among other “decisive contributions to diverse research objectives,” process tracing enables one to discover and assess new hypotheses, thereby giving insight into causal mechanisms (Collier 2011, pg. 824). Moreover, “[u]sing temporal sequences as a cornerstone for drawing causal inferences within a causal process tracing approach fits the asymmetrically deterministic logic of set theory” (Blatter and Haverland 2013, pg. 10). Intertwining the historical narrative with rationalist explanations for modern autocratic institutions aims to “incorporate elements of deduction and induction in ways that overcome traditional distinctions between historical institutionalism’s characteristic focus on specific contextual conditions and rational choice’s characteristic search for generalizable features of political behavior rooted in the incentive structures that individuals face” (Thelen 1999, pg. 370).

**Early Mexican politics was volatile and uncertain**

Prior to 1519, the territory that was to become Mexico was inhabited by a collection of Indian civilizations. The Spanish Conquest in 1519 brought with it a corporatist style of governance, Roman Catholicism, and the crystallization of society into distinct classes (Grayson 2007, Guardino and Walker 1992, Roel 1968). Colonial policies involved taking possession of the land and granting it to the Church, soldiers, and local authorities favored by the Crown (Cabrera 1914, Guardino and Walker 1992, Van Young 1993). It created a dominant, largely non-native class, who exercised control over state power and economic resources (Guardino and Walker 1992, Van Young 1993). With increasing war debts and a deepening economic crisis, the Spanish Crown increasingly extracted colonial revenues to meet its obligations in Europe. A financial crisis emerged that was aggravated by an economic downturn caused by disruptions in overseas trade and bad harvests (de la Teja 2013). This set the stage for Mexico’s revolt against Spain. In 1810, parish priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla issued a call to rebellion, which was answered by rebel Vicente
Guerrero and defected general Agustin de Iturbide.

With the push for independence, Mexican politics would incur over half a century of conflict (Benjamin and Ocasio-Melendez 1984, Roel 1968). A white, native elite that had developed under colonialism launched a coup d’etat against the ruling class. They were supported in their endeavor by peasants who were similarly restricted in relation to their colonial rulers (Camp 2007, Coatsworth 1978, Guardino and Walker 1992, Van Young 1993). The struggle for independence did not seriously threaten royal authority in Mexico until 1820, however, but broke down into a series of local revolts and guerrilla actions (de la Teja 2013). “Independence transformed Mexico from Spain’s largest and most prosperous colony to a sovereign nation suffering economic decline and political strife” (Stevens 1991, pg. 1).

After over a decade of intense fighting, Mexicans achieved independence from Spain in 1821 (de la Teja 2013, Guardino and Walker 1992, Wynia 1990). A provisional board oversaw the drafting and signing of a declaration of independence, the creation of the First Constitution of Independent Mexico, and the appointment of a small regent to govern the Mexican Empire (Roel 1968). The War of Independence did not completely destroy the colonial ruling class, however, and its members continued to support colonial features to maintain their dominance (Guardino and Walker 1992). Thus, although it declared itself a republic, newly independent Mexico came to resemble a monarchy. Augustine Iturbide, who had assisted in securing Mexico’s independence, was made president of the regency. In 1822, he declared himself emperor of the country, with the intention of using the pre-existing institutions to guide Mexico’s transition (Bazant 1991, Camp 2007, Roel 1968). Initially, Iturbide had the support of old guerilla fighters. He supported himself by establishing a governing junta of thirty-eight members composed of clergy, judges, a few nobility, and army officers. When he encountered opposition from the newly formed Congress, Iturbide closed it. Eventually, Augustine I lost the support of the army. He was forced to abdicate his position by Guerrero and a young officer named Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Congress was restored, and leadership of the country was passed on to a provisional triumvirate. Under their supervision, the federal republic was formed (de la
Inspired by the French Revolution and the U.S. Constitution, the first Constitution adopted federalism and sought to create a republican, representative government (Roel 1968). A decade of military coups, political turmoil, and economic stagnation, however, suggested to the country’s ruling elites that the country was not ready for a federal system (Bazant 1991, Camp 2007). The first constitutionally elected president of the republic, Guadelupe Victoria, struggled to complete his term. As a result, “repeated efforts were made to recreate the arbitrary centralism of the colonial state” (Coatsworth 1978, pg. 95). Centralists advocated a strong, centralized government to ease the transition from monarchy to an eventual republic. In contrast, Federalists wanted a greater dispersal of power to prevent future dictatorship. Ideological differences constituted a source of conflict between them over how the state should be governed (Harris 1911). When Centralist republicans regained control in 1835, they replaced the federalist constitution with a centralist one (Harris 1911). Constitutional disputes—armed uprisings, secessions, and international conflicts—continued (Camp 2007). The Centralist Republic came to an end in 1846 after a group of Federalists dismissed the president and reinstated the 1824 federalist constitution. The armed conflict that changed power from Centralist to Federalist hands also coincided with a territorial war between Mexico and the United States, which cost Mexico a substantial portion of its land (Bazant 1991, Camp 2007, Katz 1991, Wynia 1990).

The early 1850s saw the beginning of the Reform period in Mexican history, a period that “laid the bases for the consolidation of the Mexican state and the eventual installation of the Porfian export-oriented model of development in Mexico” (Guardino and Walker 1992, pg. 35). Although political parties did not formally exist at the time, both Centralists and Federalists became associated with Freemasonry. Different Masonic lodges provided each a political base that helped transform their ideologies into more complex political movements, through which they became known as Conservatives and Liberals (Bazant 1991). Liberals sought to weaken the power of the Catholic Church, strip the army of its privileges, and reduce the local power of land-holding elites (Camp
By attacking the church and large and communal land-holding, Liberals hoped to develop a middle class comprised of small landowners and to modernize Mexico (Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez 1984, Coatsworth 1978, Katz 1991). Their opponents advocated for the traditional roles of the church and the military. “[Conservatives] argued for a strong executive because it would follow naturally after centuries of authoritarian colonial rule...[that] without forceful leadership, Mexico would succumb to disorder and remain underdeveloped economically” (Camp 2007, pg. 34). The development of Conservatism and Liberalism reinforced the inherent tensions between elites as to how the country ought to be governed (Camp 2007, Hamnett 1996).

Throughout the Centralist and Second Federalist Republic, General Santa Anna repeatedly served as head of state, though he left the affairs of presidency to his civilian vice-presidents. His rule was increasingly arbitrary and authoritarian, however, such that he came to resemble “a monarch in all but name” (Bazant 1991, pg. 29). A group led by Benito Juárez and Ignacio Comonfort overthrew Santa Anna in 1855 and sent him into exile, restoring Liberals to power (Bazant 1991, Katz 1991, Roel 1968, Thomson 1991). The Liberals quickly readopted the 1824 federalist constitution in 1857, which Santa Anna had suspended. Like the 1824 Constitution, the Constitution promulgated in 1857 embodied nineteenth-century liberal ideology that reflected ideas in the French and American Constitutions (Cabrera 1914). It presented Mexico as a sovereign, federal republic with twenty-four states and a Federal District. It reestablished a division of powers, stipulating the selection of Federal Deputies and Senators to Congress every two years by an indirect system involving electoral colleges in each state (Bazant 1991, Harris 1911, Roel 1968). A permanent committee of 29 members was also established to approve appointments and advise when Congress was not in session (Harris 1911).

The ouster of Santa Anna and the re-ascendance of Liberals also marked a period of distancing from the Catholic Church (Roel 1968). They added amendments and reform laws that were aimed at the separation of Church and State (Coatsworth 1978, Katz 1991, Roel 1968, Schmitt 1960). The Ley Lerdo (Lerdo Law) proposed by Secretary of the Treasury Miguel Lerdo y Tejada, for example, prohibited the church from owning or
administering property (Assies 2008). A law put forward by Juárez also restricted the Church’s judicial sphere of influence to cases only involving ecclesiastical matters (Bazant 1991). The reform laws stripped the Church of many of the special privileges that it had held between 1821 and 1855 (Camp 2007, Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Coatsworth 1978, Schmitt 1960).

Angered by Liberal reforms, reactionary conservative and army units rebelled in 1857 against President Comonfort, who partially supported the constitution’s annulment (Bazant 1991). The self-coup of his predecessor brought Benito Juárez to the presidency, but the Conservatives refused to recognize him. In his place, the Conservatives supported Félix María Zuloaga for president (Grayson 2007, Wynia 1990). The resulting struggle between Liberals and Conservatives transformed into a three-year civil war. Notwithstanding, the end of the war saw a Liberal victory and the reestablishment of Juárez as president of Mexico (Camp 2007, Bazant 1991, Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez 1984, Roel 1968).

As a consequence of Juárez’s refusal (and inability) to repay European creditors, Britain, France, and Spain convened in favor of militarily intervening in Mexico. Britain and Spain abandoned the treaty shortly thereafter, however, sensing that the French had ulterior motives (Bazant 1991). Embittered Conservatives and proponents of monarchy seized the opportunity to support French invasion, hoping to restore a conservative Mexican empire under European royalty. “[The Liberals’] unwillingness to compromise and their introduction of even more radical reforms—particularly those associated with suppressing the Catholic Church, and incorporated into the 1857 constitution—impelled the conservatives and their church allies to take the unusual step of seeking help from abroad” (Camp 2007, pg. 36). The Liberal Republic was thus briefly interrupted by the imposition of a French “emperor,” Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, by Napoleon III in 1864 (Grayson 2007). The Liberals fought resolutely against the French intervention.

It was through his participation in the insurgence that army general Porfirio Díaz began to gain renown (Katz 1991). Born in 1830, Díaz lost his father at the age of three and worked to support his mother (Garza 2001). As a teenager he attended a seminary
in Oaxaca. His studies were interrupted by the U.S. invasion in 1846, in which he drilled with a local battalion. He later abandoned the seminary to pursue legal studies, but never received a degree (Garza 2001). At the age of 25, Díaz was appointed as a jefe político (political boss) of the Ixtlan District because of his support for the overthrow of Santa Anna. Díaz joined the National Guard in 1856. He participated on the side of the Liberals during the Wars of Reform, earning the rank of brigadier general. He also served briefly as a federal deputy from his home state (Garza 2001, Garner 2001). During the French Intervention Díaz joined the forces of Benito Juárez, and he successfully led an attack on the French army in 1862. Díaz was promoted to Commander of the Army of the East, in which he commanded more than 25 battles. Later, he accepted the post of Commander of the second division of Tehuacan, Puebla (Garza 2001). As he rose through the ranks, Díaz demonstrated a commitment to the Liberal cause.

With the ouster of Maximilian I in 1867, the presidency of Benito Juárez was once again restored. Civilian government resumed, ushering in a period of Liberal assertion known as the Restored Republic (Falcone 1977, Katz 1991). “Between 1855 and 1867, Liberalism grew from a minority movement to become the national political consensus” (Thomson 1991, pg. 265). The execution of Maximilian therefore signaled not only the end of imperialism and colonial ambitions by the French, but also the triumph of Mexican Liberalism over Conservatism (Garner 2001). Consequently, the Liberals worked to diminish the influence of the Church over political matters, turned attention toward foreign investment and industry, and supported the emergence of two new social classes comprised of capitalists and large landholders (hacendados) (Roel 1968). Nevertheless, the success of Liberalism “owed more to the ideological clarity and military prowess of a younger generation of Liberal leaders, and to the weakness of their opponents, than to any deeper social or economic forces” (Thomson 1991 pg. 265).

By 1867, Mexico did not yet fully resemble a nation (Barrón 2006). Despite the Liberal triumph over Conservatives, there did not exist a national political culture or true middle class capable of bringing the ideals of Liberalism to fruition (Guardino 1996, Hamnett 1996). There were also internal schisms among the Mexican Liberals,
who were already “hardly a cohesive group” (Falcone 1977, pg. 632). Major political figures—such as Benito Juárez, Sebastian Lerdo y Tejada, Jose Maria Iglesias, and Manuel de Zamacona—were Liberals of an older generation who espoused an image of Liberalism that differed from that of younger leadership (Katz 1991, Cosío Villegas 1960). Other scholars have suggested that Liberals of this period were little more than a “shifting coalition” of caciques, radicals, and ideologues, and that Conservatives were equally shapeless (Brading 1985, Stevens 1991, Thomson 1991). As a result, “[t]he resumption of civil government in 1867 marked the opening phase in an often bitter internal power struggle” in Liberal leadership (Falcone 1977, pg. 630).

Moreover, Liberalism was inherently contradictory and varied, in that it aimed to create a strong, central, national government using a political ideology that favored federalism and individual rights (Ballard Perry 1978, Garner 2001, Hamnett 1996). The strength of Liberalism resided in the provinces, but the constitution regarded them as a federation integrated by a central government (Hamnett 1996, Thomson 1991). The goal for constructing a national government founded on Liberal principles therefore involved “the subordination of regionalism to nationalism without destroying federalism with centralism” (Ballard Perry 1978, pg. 5). In attempting this, however, Juárez faced considerable challenges from regional leaders. The real problem involved “asserting the national government’s position, not so much in relation to the states as institutions but to the state governors and local chieftans as overbearing political personalities” (Hamnett 1996, pg. 677). An example of the sort of local power struggles that his administration faced in consolidating a central government is that of Porfirio Díaz’s brother Felix. Rising from Military Commander of Oaxaca to Governor, Felix built a political machine based on local administrators (jefes políticos) which undermined Juárez’s control of the state (Falcone 1977).

The 1857 Constitution had weakened the power of the executive in favor of a strong Congress. As a result, Juárez looked elsewhere to build up presidential authority (Ballard Perry 1978). Though he was committed to the Liberal project, replacing elements of the ancien régime—and diminishing the practice of caudillismo—required
Juárez to adapt to the currently prevailing political culture (Garner 2011). “Therefore, while Juárez’s political persona was clearly rooted in advocacy, adherence to constitutional principles, and the rule of law, he was also prepared to bend these principles in practice” (Garner 2011, pg. 293). Juárez frequently used fraud to bias election results in his favor, and corruption was pervasive (Ballard Perry 1978). Juárez also imposed the acceptance of his preferred candidates for political offices. In the 1867 Convocatoria, Juárez attempted to reform the 1857 Constitution by adding a second chamber to the Congress and giving the president veto power over legislation (Garner 2011, Hamnett 1996).37 His attempts at centralization provoked a strong reaction from the radical Liberals (puros) and the newly emergent social classes, however, forcing him to abandon his proposals and make compromises (Ballard Perry 1978, Falcone 1977, Garner 2011).38

At the same time, political support for General Díaz had been growing. Juárez’s attempts at self-perpetuation compelled many to see to Porfirio Díaz as an alternative who was more committed to Liberals goals (Falcone 1977, Garner 2011, Hamnett 1996). Díaz had the support of local authorities who had been replaced by Juárez’s maneuvering. Juárez had also lost the backing of many officers by dismissing a large portion of the federal army in 1867. Díaz thus enjoyed the support of a loose confederation of people that included political outsiders who aspired to public office, Conservatives and radical Liberals who saw Díaz as the only viable anti-Juárez option, and officers who were concerned about the fate of the military (Falcone 1977). Ostensibly, the goals of Porfiristas concerned the preservation of the principles of the 1857 Constitution—namely, the principle of no re-election (Rowe 1912). However, though the differences between Díaz and Juárez were couched in constitutional arguments, power was a central concern (Ballard Perry 1978, Falcone 1977, Garner 2011). In 1867, Díaz ran against Juárez and lost. When he ran in the 1871 elections against Juárez and lost again, Díaz issued a proclamation denouncing abuse of the presidency and claiming that the elections were rigged (Falcone 1977, Katz 1991). At best, the Plan of La Noria instigated a series of local uprisings that were easily quelled.39

Benito Juárez died in office of natural causes in 1872, in the midst of large peasant
unrest and conflict on the Northern frontier (Katz 1991). At the time, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada was serving as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Like Díaz, Lerdo had also run for president in 1871 and lost to Juárez (Katz 1991). As Juárez’s appointed successor, Lerdo called new elections and won. Porfirio Díaz challenged the outcome of the election. He issued another proclamation based on similar accusations of fraud and corruption. The Plan of Tuxtepec called for a revolt against Lerdo, Díaz’s election to the office of President, and municipal democracy. This time, his dissension spread beyond local centers, enabling him to declare himself provisional president in place of Lerdo (Bazant 1991, Coerver 1977, Katz 1991, Rowe 1912). In the new elections held in 1877 Díaz was confirmed president, and Lerdo went into exile (Coerver 1977). José María Iglesias, another contender for the presidency after the death of Juárez, was also exiled by the revolution of Díaz in 1876 (Coerver 1977).

Between 1810 and 1876—when Porfirio Díaz declared himself president of Mexico, nearly a third of the time had been spent under imposed rule or at war (de la Teja 2013, Grayson 2007, Guardino and Walker 1992, Wynia 1990). In addition, nine constitutional projects had been attempted during this time, which vacillated between Centralism and Federalism, and between Monarchy and Republicanism (Camp 2007, Roel 1968). Subsequent governments saw internal power struggles, revolts, and civilians’ refusal to accept a number of heads of state (Coerver 1977, Falcone 1977, Grayson 2007, Katz 1991, Rowe 1912). A national legislature had been in consideration since the Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States in 1824, but it had been difficult to put into practice (Muñoz 2002). The first through the third legislatures which met between 1857 and 1867 were hampered by conflict, including the War of Reform and foreign imposition (Hamnett 1996). As a result, no congress could meet between 1858 and 1860, and between 1863 and 1867 (Hamnett 1996). The beginning of the fourth legislature was marked by the ouster of Maximiliano I. The experiences of various executives between 1821 and 1876 also demonstrated that a president was not guaranteed to finish his term in office (Grayson 2007, Hamnett 1996).

As noted by (Camp 2007), “[v]iolence was a frequent means for settling political
disagreements, which enhanced the presence and importance of the army as an arbiter of political conflicts, and consumed much of the government budget that might otherwise have been spent more productively” (pg. 34). However, instability was not just measurable at the national level. The volatile nature of national politics accompanied local-level insecurity, especially for peasants, which included invasion, hunger, and revolts (Van Young 1993). In the state of Yucatán between 1848 and 1873, for example, the state had 26 governors, including seven in 1873. Other states had a history of local uprisings, such as the continuous threat of revolt posed by Yaqui Indians in Sonora (Coerver 1977). Thus, the political situation facing Díaz at the time that he took office was violent and uncertain; industry and commerce were stagnant, and aspirations of creating a national government founded on Liberal principles were far from being realized.

**Díaz’s foremost concern was political stability**

Díaz’s rise to power fulfilled the role of state-building through the use of force (Thomson 1991). There remained a need to adequately define the state vis-à-vis its constituents, however, as Liberalism had not provided a solid foundation for lasting constitutional government (Hamnett 1996). “The constitution not providing the proper means of rendering the federal government effective, it was incumbent on the chief executive to find a way” (Harris 1911, pg. 206). While Díaz may have been principally concerned with the consolidation of power and personal control, this could only be accomplished by promoting stability as a central goal of his administration (Falcone 1977). “Before any...political or developmental goals could be achieved, it was vital to establish, first and foremost, a period of internal political peace. This was the principal and central task of the first Díaz administration, and it remained a consistent priority throughout the history of the entire regime” (Garner 2001, pg. 69).

The need to establish national security found limited expression within society and his supporters, which helped to legitimate Díaz’s actions. He was justified, in part, by the numerous agarian and Indian revolts that frustrated elite interests (Coatsworth 1974). As aptly described by Goldfrank (1975), the programme of his first administration would
necessarily be aimed at achieving stability at whatever cost:

When Díaz took power in 1876...he saw both his own and his country’s interest to lie in political stability. The fractious politics of the previous half-century were generally recognized as a primary cause of both international weakness and economic stagnation. To achieve stability required conciliating factional opponents, curtailing the independence of local and regional chiefs, controlling the military, and abrogating most political rights without abandoning the liberal constitution of 1867 (pg. 426).

The importance placed on order as a requisite for creating a durable national framework did not originate in Díaz’s administration. For many scholars, the Liberals of the Reform era were concerned as much with creating a state they could control as they were with championing popular freedoms (Ballard Perry 1978, Sinkin 1979, Thomson 1991). “Preoccupation with ensuring order outweighed any concern for protecting individual rights” (Thomson 1991, pg. 266). Stevens (1991) argues that a concern with the breakdown of the nation and society weighed sufficiently heavily that moderate Liberals grew ideologically closer to the Conservatives after 1848. Thus, while Juárez and Lerdo had begun to construct a framework for Liberal government, carrying out the broader goals of the Liberals required Díaz to focus on security (Thomson 1991). In part, this obligated gaining the support of conservative and aristocratic elements to restore and strengthen the upper-middle-class coalition (Harris 1911, Katz 1991, Stevens 1991).

In addition to moderating Conservative-Liberal antagonisms, the need to ensure order arose from Díaz’s goals for economic development. The composition of the Mexican economy was highly stratified when Díaz first assumed office. The rural areas were dominated by hacendados, who controlled many of the peasants, the landless, and indentured workers. The top strata of urban society included capitalists, merchants, and clerics, and below them were workers, artisans, and the unemployed. In the countryside ranchers represented the middle class, which in the cities this was occupied by intellectuals and professionals (Foran 2005). Díaz’s plan for economic development involved encouraging the major producers to expand their opportunities, rather than aiming efforts at smaller producers. To pull Mexico out of economic stagnation, Díaz would therefore exacerbate rather than mitigate existing inequalities. “Díaz saw the
primary need for the development of industrial efficiency, an integral part of which involved the utilization of the country’s national resources through investment of foreign capital (Rowe 1912, pg. 284). Some of the projects overseen by Díaz included lowering or eliminating import duties, moving from the silver to the gold standard, and reforming the banking system (Garza 2001). Such development required creating “new parameters for Mexican political institutions and practices,” including placing limits on the expression of dissatisfaction by those who would be negatively affected in the short term (Bryan 1976, pg. 653).

Like Díaz, a younger generation of Mexican Liberals continued to stress the importance of liberty, but promoted a transformed version of ‘old’ Mexican Liberalism that was guided by a scientific approach to achieving economic progress (Katz 1991, Dirck Raat 1968, Schmitt 1966, Cosío Villegas 1960). This was exemplified by Positivism, an ideological movement developing in Europe and elsewhere in Latin America, which held as a basic tenet the role of peace and order as a means to liberty and progress (Camp 2007, Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez 1984, Garner 2001, Garza 2001, Katz 1991, Dirck Raat 1968, Schmitt 1966, Cosío Villegas 1960). Positivism advocated applying the scientific method to address economic, social, and political problems (Garner 2001). The “scientific” character of Positivism came from its emphasis on observation and on the principle of causation. Originating from the ideas of Auguste Comte, it entailed prescribing solutions on the basis of experience and objective evaluations, and gauging their success according to the material progress they achieved (Dirck Raat 1968). A more modern manifestation of this philosophy can be found in the approach of Atatürk to governing Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, who “believed that ‘unrational beliefs’—which virtually meant processes of thought not amenable to scientific proof—were in almost every case hostile to his ideal of progress” (Ward 1942, pg. 51).

The elites who supported Porfirio Díaz were not entirely subscribed to Positivism. As Bryan (1976) notes, “[t]he traditional view of the Diaz era as one pervaded almost
exclusively by Positivismo has also been seriously challenged. In fact, the opinions and beliefs held by Porfrian elites were varied and complex, and Mexico’s intellectual milieu was quite pluralistic” (pg. 659). Nevertheless, Positivism was influential because it was supported by powerful elites (Garner 2001). An emphasis on the objective application of social prescriptions by a central authority was also an identifiable feature of Díaz’s approach to governance, as Díaz collected statistics on social development during his administration (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Cosío Villegas 1960). Moreover, the rise of Positivism in Mexico as a political philosophy signified the attractiveness of political stability among elites and the recognition of its necessity. Even moderate liberals were willing provided armed support for the introduction of Positivism (Camp 2007). “The acceptance of Positivist ideas by the moderate liberals ultimately led to the dominance of order over liberty and progress. Indeed, it can be argued that after decades of civil conflict, Positivism became a vehicle for reintroducing conservative ideas among Mexico’s liberal leadership” (Camp 2007, pg. 37). In addition to Positivists Díaz also had the backing of the federal army, which largely consisted of veterans of the liberal-conservative conflicts and the French intervention (Bryan 1976, Camp 2007, Schmitt 1966).

Given that his attacks on President Juárez had concerned the principle of no re-election, toward the end of his first term Díaz decided to not run for a second term (Coerver 1977, Katz 1991, Rowe 1912). In the 1880 elections, President Díaz supported a hand-picked successor, Manuel González Flores, to replace him. González won and assumed the presidency in 1880, leaving Díaz to look to the 1884 election (Coerver 1977, Katz 1991). Some have argued that González was corrupt and weak, and that he was Díaz’s choice because he would have been a rival had he decided to assert himself or run for a second term (Katz 1991). Díaz purportedly made political promises based on his ability to influence González, and some governors such as Luis Torres preferred to consult with Díaz over González during the latter’s presidency (Coerver 1977). Although González was no puppet of Díaz’s, he promoted policies that were favorable to the former president. Within the parameters that Díaz had created, González gave priority to policies
on economic growth that continued the long-term goals that Porfirio Díaz had for Mexico.
In particular, González initiated the construction of a railroad from Mexico City to El Paso, Texas.

In the 1884 elections, Díaz ran for president again and won. The almost decade of relative calm that had transpired gave his supporters faith in Díaz’s notion of “development through order” and helped to legitimize his continuation in office (Katz 1991, Roel 1968). He was supported by the emergence of the científicos (scientists) in the 1890s, an influential clique of technocrats that embodied Positivist principles (Knight 1991, Dirk Raat 1977). “Científico principles harmonized well with the dictatorial plans of Porfirio Díaz. Not only did they sanctify, with the almighty decree of science, his violations of the constitution, but they coincided with his own plan for industrial development in imitation of the United States” (Schmitt 1966, pg. 207). The científicos attempted to form a political party through the creation of the Liberal Union in 1892, but it was ephemeral (Schmitt 1966). Nevertheless, científicos professed faith in a benevolent dictatorship through Díaz (Schmitt 1966). The influence of the científicos gradually increased, such that by the turn of the century they constituted a near-oligarchy among the urban elite (Schmitt 1966).

“Díaz, for whom peace, economic growth, and political stability were primary goals, had little patience with those who would continue the struggles of the 1850s and 1860s” (Schmitt 1966, pg. 200). Díaz’s administration therefore exhibited less discontinuity from earlier administrations, but it was more military-oriented (Katz 1991). As a military general, President Díaz relied upon the federal army to support his goals of creating and maintaining political order (Bryan 1976, Schmitt 1966). “The enforcement of this policy carried with it, as a logical consequence, the discouragement of all popular political activity” (Roew 1912, pg. 283). In general, the elites who supported the Díaz regime accepted the curtailing of popular political activity to promote liberal goals. The prevailing philosophy that freedoms could be placed second to the need to manage dissidence and impose order, and the belief that doing so was a necessary requisite for economic development, resembled the doctrines of authoritarian regimes in modern

Díaz therefore kept a tight grip on the formation of opposition groups and their representation in the popular arena. For one, he outlawed opposition newspapers and expanded state bureaucracy (Katz 1991). He also capitalized on the formlessness of party politics that had preceded him by placing restrictions on the formation of political parties (Harris 1911, Meyer 1977). “When, in spite of everything, [an] alternative appeared, first in the form of the Partido Liberal Mexicano and later in that of the Maderista movement, the central and local governments made it impossible for them to show their strength at the ballot box and they had to resort to rebellion” (Meyer 1977, pg. 4). The system of controlled elections utilized by Díaz in Mexico originated from Spanish political practices (Herr 1974). To this end, his style of governing closely resembled his predecessor, Juárez (Falcone 1977). “Díaz’s adherence to personalism, patronage, and camarilla politics always formed a more important part of his political armoury than was the case of Juárez, but he certainly understood the fundamental importance of adhering to constitutional practice, especially in the conduct of elections” (Garner 2011, pg. 293).

Where necessary, Díaz also applied localized repression in the face of resistance to achieve his goals (Bryan 1976, Espinosa 2010, Katz 1991). During his first term, for example, a rebellion occurred along the U.S. border that was led by supporters of Lerdo de Tejada. In response, Díaz sent an order to the local governor to “kill them on the spot” (Garza 2001). Díaz subsequently strengthened the rurales, a rural militia, into a powerful force to be used to put down revolts (Anderson 1974, Garza 2001, Goldfrank 1975, Harris 1911). The violent suppression of the anarchist elements encouraged moderateness among the more entrepreneurial leaders of social groups. As an
example, “[r]epression, precisely orchestrated, unceasingly persecuted labor radicalism, but preserved unimpaired a cooperative, moderate labor bureaucracy dependent upon the state. To that bureaucracy Díaz delegated primary responsibility for disciplining the labor movement” (Walker 1981, pg.268). Others have asserted that Díaz frequently abused the constitutional provision which allowed incarceration without trial for 30 days, which in practice “might be repeated on the same victim month after month” (Goldfrank 1975, pg. 429).

Díaz’s tight control of the political sphere aimed at insulating economic development from democratic forces (Camp 2007, Wintrobe 1998). Given the violence from which Mexican politics had suffered prior to Díaz’s ascension to office, however, his efforts to attain political stability were viewed positively by outsiders:

He was not seeking the aggrandizement of any particular state of the Republic or the triumph of any special party, but rather the creation of a great nation—united, self-respecting and progressive—that should take its place in the family of nations and not be ashamed. He recognized the natural richness of the country and the advantages of its splendid geographical situation; but he realized that without unity and a powerful federal government, it could never fulfill its destiny (Harris 1911, pg. 204).

At the same time, Díaz’s occasional violations of the constitution, his control over elections, and his intolerance of opposition—particularly from outside of the inner circle of elites with whom he consulted—imbued his administration with a distinctly authoritarian character (Bryan 1976). Díaz’s expansion of political authority aimed at maintaining order and progress, for which he increasingly used the power of the state (Camp 2007, Bryan 1976). In Díaz’s own words, “[p]eace was necessary, even an enforced peace, that the nation might have time to think and work. Education and industry have carried on the task begun by the army” (Creelman 1908).

The National Congress supported local politics

Díaz’s administration marked “a rapid process of political centralization” aimed at reconciling the fragmentation that had characterized Mexican politics since independence (Meyer 1977, pg. 5). Like Juárez, he faced the task of using illiberal tactics to enforce
Liberal goals, and centralizing power to offset the centralist tendencies of others (Foran 2005, Garner 2001, Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez 1984, Bryan 1976). The relationship between the executive and legislative branches remained inadequately defined, however, as well as the relationship between the national government and the states (Hamnett 1996). An important element of control therefore involved dealing with a variety of powers at the local level. The success of the Porfiriato can be attributed in part to how Porfirio Díaz utilized political office to facilitate power-sharing (Bryan 1976, Coerver 1977, Meyer 1977).45 “This element of personal rivalry, over and beyond the constitutional question of the correct balance of institutions, is fundamental to an understanding of the issues at play” (Hamnett 1996, pg. 677).

The accumulation of private property, and the use of force to protect one’s holdings, gave local elites considerable autonomy. “Every Mexican state was practically a sovereign unit, owing little allegiance or obedience to the central power. They controlled the resources of their own districts and maintained their individual police and military forces” (Harris 1911, pg. 202). While the strength of regionalism underscored the attractiveness of Liberalism in 19th century Mexico, it complicated the implementation of Liberalism at the national level (Hamnett 1996, Harris 1911). Power resided in individuals who were capable of resisting attempts to strengthen the national government (Coatsworth 1978, Hamnett 1996, Harris 1911, Meyer 1977, Rowe 1912). “The personalization of power tended to devalue the institutionalization of political structures, thereby enhancing the importance of political personalities” (Camp 2007, pg. 30).

The sources of power that dominated local-level politics were varied and included regional political leaders, governors, military officers, and wealthy families. Often, the sources of these authorities overlapped, with landowners necessarily coming to represent political bosses, and officers seizing claims to the governorship (Coerver 1977, Wasserman 1985). First, many municipalities were governed by de facto representatives whose political authority derived from coercive power and extensive patronage networks, called caudillos or caciques (Coatsworth 1978, Garner 2001, Hamnett 1996).46 As elsewhere in Latin America, a partiarchical system developed in which strongmen exercised political
power through patron-client networks, a practice referred to as caudillismo (Buve 1975, Hamnett 1996, Schroeder 2008, Weldon 1997). “[T]he ‘classic’ caudillo who dominated the early post-Independence period in Spanish America was a combination of warrior, patriot, and patron, who rose to political power and prominence from a local or regional base” (Garner 2001, pg. 168).

In addition to the de facto political authority wielded by caudillos, jefes políticos (political bosses, or jefes, for short) served as de jure local representatives (Fowler-Salamini 1993). Jefes provided direct links between the central governments of states and citizens, as well as indirect links between the local and federal governments (Falcone 1977). They were usually appointed by state governors for two-year terms, and had wide-ranging powers which included the publication and enforcement of laws; responsibility over public security; the power to impose taxes and fines; and limited judicial powers. “This power, along with the initial supervision of the district’s national guard meant that the jefes could fine, draft, and imprison anyone who violated the state’s laws” (Falcone 1977, pg. 643). Jefes and local administrators were important because of their ability to deliver favorable election results at the state and national level (Hamnett 1996). “[T]he minister of gobernación gave instructions to the local jefe político (civil governor of a province), who was his appointee, and the jefe político worked with the caciques to produce the desired majority” (Herr 1974, pg. 2). Of course, “[t]he right to name state administrators made the governor the key political figure in the state” (Falcone 1977, pg. 643). An aide to Juárez once warned him that Díaz’s brother Felix—once the military governor of Oaxaca—was a formidable opponent because of his connections to jefes, “who, as you know, control the elections, and most of the people vote as they command.”

Garner (2001) observed that an important feature in the case of Mexico was not simply the maintenance of political power through the use of personalist and clientalist networks; it also depended on military force (pg. 32). At the national level, the military was unpopular and therefore somewhat arbitrary. “Mutual trust between politicians and military professionals was sadly lacking in Porfirian Mexico, and a true professional
consciousness and sense of responsibility among the officer corps and the ranks did not
develop” (Bryan 1976, pg. 655). Nevertheless, “[m]ilitary experience in Mexico had
traditionally provided a power base in state and local affairs” (Falcone 1977, pg. 633).
State militias were dominant forces in the politics of some states, such as in Puebla
Sierra after 1867 (Thomson 1991). They also played dominant roles in mediating agrarian
disputes between large landowners and indigenous communities (Thomson 1991). As a
result of its importance at the local level, scholars have argued that the National Guard
is a neglected element in the story of post-Reform politics (Thomson 1991).

The alliance of leading Liberal families with the National Guard was important for
supporting the ascendance of both Juárez and Díaz. Moreover, “the National Guard could,
in certain contexts, coexist with, even complement, the reassertion of local autonomy and
the pursuit of local objectives, within a broadly Liberal discourse” (Thomson 1991, pg.
279). The fragmentation of political authority also meant that regional military chiefs
could combine civil and military functions to create personal “fiefdoms,” or “National
Guard cacicazgos” that challenged the authority of the central government (Garner 2001,
Thomson 1991).49 Like his predecessors, therefore, Díaz confronted Liberals who had
made careers out of military service and were motivated by personal ambition (Falcone

Finally, local politics were dominated by economic elites who controlled the selection
of–and were created by– positions of local authority. “The local governments of the
different states in Mexico and nearly all the important public offices, were almost always
in the hands of, or controlled by, wealthy families owning large tracts of land” (Cabrera
1914, pg. 250). Their ownership of land gave large estate owners considerable control
over the primary source of revenue in Mexico, which was largely agricultural. According
to Buve (1975), “Mexican society at that time was still an agrarian society where the
power of the elites was largely based on land” (pg. 113). Social organization resembled
the characteristics of a “postcolonial manorial society,” whereby elites nearly completely
controlled natural resource wealth, giving them considerable control over the peasant
labor force. This describes the hacienda system–“a relatively closed rural social system
dominated by an individual power-holder, or a group that tries to obtain, if possible, a monopolistic control over the available natural and human resources in order to minimize the cost involved with the maintenance and improvement of its overall social status” (Buve 1975, pg. 115). As a consequence, hacendados (hacienda owners) had considerable political influence.

Mexico was predominantly rural and technologically backwards in comparison to its neighbors, and some of the biggest problems it faced were agrarian and included land disputes, latifundismo, Indian rebellions, and agrarian revolts (Harris 1911, Cosío Villegas 1960). Landed elites frequently came into conflict with indigenous communities over the issue of land rights and community property, which further reinforced the value of political control (Katz 1974, Thomson 1991, Cosío Villegas 1960, Wasserman 1985). The geographic concentration of power was therefore emphasized by the use of force to protect private holdings. Controlling local government was necessary for elites to protect their economic holdings from “roving bandits”—the army deserters, fugitives, and vagrants—who took advantage of the lack of central control and menaced the countryside (Bazant 1991).

“A half century of chaos after independence had taught Mexican (and Latin American) elites the necessity of acquiring political power, at least to an extent that allowed them to control their immediate environment” (Wasserman 1985, pg. 646). Thus, a major problem that Díaz faced regarding strengthening the federal government involved securing the acquiescence of regional powers. In his effort to create “an integrated polity with functioning central institutions,” the President would have had to manage the influences of the caudillos and jefes, state governors, enterprising officers, and landed elites (Hamnett 1996, pg. 661). Juárez had faced resistance from the powerful provincial leaders in trying to construct a federated government. “The constant struggle between ‘centralism’ and ‘federalism’ which characterized the period was really one between presidential power and the strength of regional caudillos” (Bryan 1976, pg. 658).

Díaz’s approach to presiding over a nation with regionally dispersed power was similar to that of Juárez, which involved nurturing and expanding his own personal connections (Bryan 1976). This included courting the support of local chieftans, who
substantially contributed to his rise to the presidency (Hamnett 1996). “Political power in the Díaz system was exercised through a wide network of formal and informal personal relationships carefully cultivated across a broad social spectrum (from peasants to cabinet ministers), and based upon negotiated rather than enforced exchanges of deference and loyalty to the patriarchal figure of Porfirio Díaz” (Garner 2001 pg. 169). In this way, Díaz adapted to the politics of caudillismo, which involved establishing relationships and making various groups dependent upon him (Garner 2001). The breadth of the relationships that Díaz cultivated spanned across Liberal and Conservative elements. “From the start, Díaz moved his government toward a more accurate reflection of the class structure, by bringing members of the ousted liberal factions into his cabinet and by conciliating some conservatives” (Goldfrank 1975 pg. 423).

His approach to caudillos and jefes políticos was to play them off of one another and to foster dependencies that would allow him to exert more control on the region (Bryan 1976, Camín and Meyer 1993, Falcone 1977). For example, he supported the accumulation of power by one family to counterbalance others (Bryan 1976, Katz 1991). When possible, the president would replace local bosses with representatives of his own choosing (Friedrich 1965, Hamnett 1996, Meyer 1977). President Díaz counteracted local strongmen by appointing military commanders to oversee the activity of civilian officials and subordinating them to de jure authorities (Harris 1911). Among the military zones that Díaz created, he rotated the commanders frequently (Goldfrank 1975). By 1905 Díaz had all but done away with jefes políticos (Bryan 1976, Harris 1911). “[T]he gradual elimination of the old local ‘strong men,’ a product of the long period of civil war after independence, was an important step in this process of concentration of power” (Meyer 1977 pg. 5). However, “the dismissal of local strongmen rarely meant their complete elimination in political terms” (Katz 1991 pg. 84). Díaz encouraged them to continue to enrich themselves by acting as intermediaries for foreign investors (Goldfrank 1975, Katz 1991). “In this way Díaz gave the members of the local oligarchy, both the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs,’ a powerful stake in the stability of the region” (Katz 1991 pg. 84).

On occasion, Díaz practiced conciliation toward conservative and popular elements.
Though the Reform laws remained the legal basis of his regime, the Church was given greater freedom conditional on their restraint (Schmitt 1960). As a result of the ease on restrictions placed on the Church, the first Catholic Congress was held in Puebla in 1903 (Powell 1968). Many of Liberals objected to his appeasement of the Church; Francisco Bulnes, an influential intellectual during the Díaz era, saw his willingness to tolerate the Church a contradiction to the Liberalism that Díaz seemed to espouse (Schmitt 1966). He did not engage in mass politics; upon coming to power in 1876, Díaz quickly dismantled existing labor organizations and replaced them with more subservient ones (Walker 1981). However, he expressed a willingness to work with groups through their leaders, creating conditions that encouraged them to impress acquiescence upon their followers. In 1877 he provided government aid to the Asociación Artística Industrial (Industrial Arts Association), with the bulk of the aid accruing to its leaders (Walker 1981). He also granted select labor leaders, such as Pedro Ordóñez of the Gran Círculo, the position of alternate deputy in Congress. The true force of labor, however, remained weak (Bortz 1997).

As president, Díaz controlled the appointment of most national political offices, which he used to reward supporters and co-opt potential opponents (Camp 2007, Meyer 1977). “It was an open secret that state governors, although nominally elected, were in reality appointed by President Díaz. Even members of the state legislatures owed their election to the good will of the federal executive” (Rowe 1912, pg. 286). In the early years of his regime, Díaz selected governors from among regional leaders who derived political power from support at the local level (Garner 2001). However, not all state governors were equally acquiescent to Díaz. “Generally, while Díaz may have reduced many governors to total subservience, it seems that his administrative success relied in great part on the energies of some governors” (Bryan 1976, pg. 656). Díaz did not alienate outright the governors who lobbied against him, but rather he played off of their aspirations and allowed them to tend to their own affairs. President Díaz courted the support of militia members by buying them off—allowing corruption, padding payrolls, and offering civilian positions (Bryan 1976). By providing officers with privileged local positions, he co-opted
military leaders and simultaneously undermined the role of the army such that there was no longer a threat of military intervention \cite{Garner2001, Goldfrank1975, Katz1991}.

It is important to note that President Díaz was not boundless in his ability to oversee regional politics, as exemplified by the state of Sonora. A geographically isolated state, Sonora was difficult to govern from Mexico City due to poor communication and transportation \cite{Coerver1977}. After the longstanding governor in Sonora attempted to install his nephew as his replacement, a revolt occurred which prompted General Ignacio Mariscal to declare a state of seige and assume office. Mariscal supported the reelection of Lerdo de Tejada over Díaz, but Díaz’s ascendance forced him to reconsider his allegiances. As governor, Mariscal faced opposition from the state legislature. The self-interested disputes that occurred at the state level were often misrepresented to the central authorities \cite{Coerver1977}. The lieutenant governor supported the opposition and requested that the federal government authorize the use of force to replace Mariscal, to which Díaz acceded. Facing the prospect of federal intervention, Mariscal fled and Luis E. Torres was elected governor in his place.

In the 1880 election to select Díaz’s successor, Torres publicly supported Díaz’s secretary and advisor over Díaz’s preferred candidate. Torres’ endorsement thereby placed him at odds with Díaz, as well as the commander of the First Military Zone \cite{Coerver1977}. Coerver \cite{Coerver1977} argues that the tensions between governor and president, as exemplified by Sonora, “go far to dispel the often-presented image of a Porfirian power structure in which the central government exercises absolute control over both federal and local authorities in the provinces” (pg. 584). Scholars have characterized state politics at the time as beset by personalist factions that shifted allegiances and promoted rivalries in the fight for power. As such, Díaz could not be certain that the authorities whom he supported would be loyal; rather, the relationship between the center and the periphery involved a mix of dutiful and conniving individuals.

With regard to the few families who controlled a vast proportion of local wealth, the President did not disrupt this system; instead, the Porfirista regime reinforced the power of wealthy elites in order to promote his economic policies \cite{Cabrera1914}. In
particular, President Díaz aggrandized the status of wealthy landowners. This included the hacendados, who sought to expand their holdings to support money crops—agriculture sold to make a profit—at the expense of old native villages (Katz 1974, McNeely 1966). Such crops included exportable commodities such as coffee, tobacco, and sugar, which often took the place of staples such as corn and wheat (Katz 1974, Meade 2009). There was a prevailing belief that agricultural development required putting the nation’s fertile land into the hands of capable individuals (Beezley 1970, Powell 1968). It was reinforced by a system of land denunciation which Díaz promoted, in part to encourage foreign immigration (Beezley 1970, Powell 1968). A land law passed by González in 1883 allowed individuals to claim lands for which there was no clear title (Merrill and Miró 1996, Powell 1968, Stevens 1982). Under Díaz’s watch, the law was expanded on through activities by self-interested congressmen. In 1893, a group of notable científicos put forth legislation that made it easier to denounce and acquire unclaimed land, which was passed by the Lower House in 1894.

To a large extent, the land reforms benefited hacendados and land companies (Merrill and Miró 1996, Powell 1968). For example, the companies that were tasked to survey and demarcate the land—most of which were based in the U.S.—received nearly one-third of the land surveyed, amounting to over ten percent of the national territory (Assies 2008). Much of the ‘deserted’ land “passed into the hands of speculators, hacendados, friends of the dictator, or the government itself” (Powell 1968, pg. 29). According to Buve (1975), by the end of the Porfiriato nearly half of all the state’s territory belonged to large haciendas. As of 1911, individuals representing 0.2 percent of the rural population controlled roughly 87 percent of the land (Assies 2008).

The denunciation of land had a major impact on the communal land holdings of Indian villages (ejidos), often forcing peasants onto haciendas (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Beezley 1970, Merrill and Miró 1996, Stevens 1982). Of the major land expropriation that occurred between 1811 and 1911, 40-45 percent involved communal lands (Katz 1991). Not surprisingly, the policy encountered a considerable amount of unrest, especially in indigenous areas. However, Díaz was noted for his
indifferent, if not callous, attitude toward Indians (Bryan 1976, Powell 1968). According to Brachet-Márquez (2014), the indigenous communal villages of Ocotlán and Ahuatlán were “practically destroyed by repression under the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship” (pg. 18). In another example, when the Hacienda of Atlihuayán claimed land belonging to the town of Yautepec, its townspeople sent a delegation of 60 from Morelos to Mexico City to appeal to Díaz for help. Their appeal was rebuffed—the leaders of the delegation were arrested, assigned new identities, and were deported to Quitana Roo to do forced labor. Meanwhile, the hacendado, who had apparently offered payments against the delegation, became governor of Morelos (McNeely 1966).

Elsewhere, Yaqui Indians in Sonora and military colonists in Chihuahua represented some of the greatest resistance to Díaz’s plans for modernization. To these different forms of opposition, Díaz offered different responses. In Sonora, Díaz repressed and deported many of the Yaquis (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Hu-Dehart 1974, Katz 1974). In Chihuahua, Díaz placed a man more favorable to the regionally dominant Terraza-Creel family as a compromise (Katz 1991, pg. 93). In some instances, Díaz was more compromising with indigenous communities and was actually more moderate than some present-day accounts suggest (Schmitt 1960, Stevens 1982, Wasserman 2008). Nevertheless, Díaz expressed a greater willingness to work with large estate owners. Notably, many of the Yaquis who were deported were sent to Yucatán to work on henequen plantations, the bulk of which was owned by the Secretary of Development, Colonization, and Industry, Olegario Molina (Hu-Dehart 1974).

An example of the interrelatedness of power, wealth, and political office during the Porfirio Díaz can be found in Enrique C. Creel, in which many economic and political strands come together (Wasserman 1985). Raised in “genteel poverty,” Creel sold cigarettes and cigars on the streets as a teenager. He managed a small store for his father until his father died, after which Creel borrowed money and entered business on his own. “By the time he was twenty-five, he had ‘one of the best mercantile houses in Chihuahua’” (Wasserman 1985, pg. 647). As Enrique Creel expanded in business he also became active in politics, serving on the city council for Chihuahua City in the 1870s. At the age of 26, Creel
married the daughter of Luiz Terrazas, a political boss in his home-state. Practically, the marriage was one of political and economic convenience, making him “son-in-law and second-in-command of the nation’s most powerful regional political boss” (Wasserman 1985, pg. 645). Luis Terrazas was an active challenger against Porfirio Díaz and had fought against him in the rebellions led by Díaz in 1872 (the Plan of La Noria) and 1876 (the Plan of Tuxtepec) (Wasserman 1985).

Political networks supported Creel’s enterprises as a banker and international financier. He particularly benefited from having Luis Terrazas as a father-in-law. As governor, Terrazas granted himself and Creel a state charter in 1882 and defended it from provisions of a 1884 national commercial code that would have annulled it. Terrazas also delayed implementing the law in Chihuahua. In 1888 Terrazas and Creel acquired a federal charter from Díaz, and Creel obtained exemptions from state taxes on all Terrazas-Creel banks (Wasserman 1985). During this time, Enrique Creel served four terms in the state legislature of Chihuahua. He also served four terms in the national legislature as federal deputy from Durango (1900-1902) and Chihuahua (1902-1906). By 1907 Creel was the governor of Chihuahua, as well as ambassador to the United States. He was also a member of Mexico’s greatest landowning and cattle exporting family, a leading banker, one of the most influential representatives of foreign capital, and a major industrialist (Wasserman 1985).

Similarly, Olegario Molina made a fortune by using the governorship to form a monopoly over the trade of henequen in Yucatán (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Hu-Dehart 1974, Meyer 1977). According to Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher (2009), the election of Olegario Molina as governor of Yucatán represented “[p]erhaps the most blatant example of the relationship between economic and political power” (pg. 109). Born in a poor family, Molina earned a law degree from a state school in 1866. He joined the Liberal cause against Emperor Maximilian and served as private secretary to Manuel Cepeda Pedraza. He was later named director of the first public secondary school in Yucatán (Rodríguez and Fallaw 2010, Wells 1982). During his time as director, he also earned a degree in topographical engineering (Wells 1982). Described as an opportunistic
individual, Molina was a Liberal who formed alliances with members of the Church and with conservatives to support his political ascendance (Rodríguez and Fallaw 2010, Joseph 1982). Molina also used marriage to incorporate powerful elite into his family, thereby extending his reach in Yucatán (Joseph 1982).

Olegario Molina served as a federal deputy between 1869 and 1871, and also between 1873 and 1875. However, his position in Congress did not confer him with any economic advantages. “Despite extensive public service, by 1880, Molina had neither profited from his political career nor succeeded financially” (Wells 1982, pg. 234). Molina invested as a silent partner in haciendas producing henequen, agave fibers that are used to make rope and twine. He also became involved in the completion of a railway between Mérida and Progreso, and was promoted to superintendent of the company (Wells 1982). Molina’s involvement in the railway company also enabled him to participate in an import-export company, in which he assumed a one-third partnership. By 1887, Molina took control of the business.

With his own export house, Molina decided to reenter politics, this time running for governor of Yucatán. As Díaz’s chosen candidate, he faced little opposition. Governor
Molina was able to use his political position to acquire massive amounts of land. As Wells (1982) describes, in state-run auctions he acquired haciendas for nearly a third of the value of comparable haciendas. Until 1902 his company continued to grow, when Molina signed an agreement to become the sole producer of henequen for International Harvester Company (Carstensen and Roazen-Parrillo 1983, Meyer 1975, Pinto 1956, Wells 1982). A newly formed conglomerate comprised of the five largest harvesting machine companies in the United States, International Harvester represented the largest purchaser of fiber in the world (Wells 1982). “The contract effectively destroyed the previously competitive balance among local fiber traders, forced planters to sell at the price fixed by the exporter and manufacturer, and allowed both parent company and local agents to reap considerable profits” (Wells 1982, pg. 239).

Olegario Molina became a dominant political authority in Yucatán, as well as a powerful economic force. After 15 years of business, he consecutively held the post of governor of Yucatán from 1890 to 1911. “By the end of the Porfiriato, Molina not only was the single largest landowner in the state, but his haciendas cultivated more henequen than those of any other planter” (Wells 1982, pg. 241). The examples of Creel and Molina demonstrate the close connection between business and politics in nineteenth-century Mexico (Barbezat 1998, Wasserman 1985). In particular, their experiences highlight the value of horizontal linkages during the Porfiriato—by ingratiating themselves with members of President Díaz’s regime, enterprising individuals were able to utilize political positions such as the governorship and congressional seats to further aggrandize their personal wealth and reinforce their local power. “As the central government grew stronger, regional and local flexibility in economic and political matters lessened. It became necessary for entrepreneur-bosses to enter the national political arena” (Wasserman 1985, pgs. 661-662).

Against this backdrop, politics involving the national legislature was still being worked out. Congress was initially not pliant, as Juárez had discovered. However, Díaz gained considerable strength in initiating and shaping legislation, and gradually diminished the ability of Congress and the Supreme Court to check executive power.
Díaz’s subordination of the legislative and judicial branches supported the creation of a strong centralized federal government by allowing him to draft a regime that was composed of friends, as well as closely guarded enemies (Camp 2007, Richmond 1980, Weldon 1997). “Elections of governors, local legislatures, congress, supreme court, etc., never took place, General Díaz himself making all the appointments” (Cabrera 1914, pg. 254).

Scholars have argued that Congress “fell into relative disuse” during the Porfiriato, and that congressmen merely attended to meet the quorum (Weldon 1997, pg. 229). However, such a description undervalues the role of the national legislature as a tool for co-optation during a particularly formative period. The resources that congressional office provided— in the form of additional land, tax exemptions, and business contacts—as well as direct access to the President and other regional leaders gave the position functional value. Whether or not the strength of the Congress was artificial, it represented a central meeting place for people who were potentially powerful in their own jurisdictions. Participating in the legislature was attractive because it enabled elites to acquire information about the relationship of the central government to their respective holdings, and to lobby for greater control of local affairs. In addition, the legislature was a source of policy-making that furthered the interests of its constituents and reinforced the authority of local elites. An artifact of such collaboration is the land law passed by the Lower House in 1894, which originated from within the legislature. Wealthy Mexicans were invited to participate in politics and direct the affairs of the state, in part to replace caudillos and older Liberals (Schmitt 1966).

According to Cabrera (1914), the Porfirista regime consisted in putting power in the hands of large landholders. The Porfiriato saw the “expansion of the hacienda system endorsed by federal and state governments which put an army and rural gendarmerie at the disposal of landlords and colonists” (Buve 1975, pgs. 116-117). The economic policies that he espoused—like his apparent political strategy—involved brokering outcomes by furthering the self-interests of wealthy elites at the national level. Local governments of different states, and nearly all public offices of importance, were controlled by

Rather than describing the Porfirian strategy as one of moderating competitions at the center and maintaining dominance over the periphery, therefore, a more apt description may be that it was concerned with centrally organizing and coordinating state and local interests (Thomson 1991). This was accomplished through the utilization of governorships and legislative seats to appease, represent, and ultimately, co-opt. The utility of the legislature as an institution that was used for co-optation is described by Goldfrank (1975):

In the years of consolidation, Díaz had been able to provide the mestizo middle strata with political and administrative jobs and with opportunities in the emerging economic sectors. Conservative landowners were left alone to enjoy and extend their large properties; the largely honorific posts in the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and the diplomatic corps went to the latter... Liberal bourgeois were the pivotal economic group, taking advantage of their modernity and foreign connections to bring in investments and to enrich themselves in the process. But they were excluded from positions of command (pg. 425).

To this end, political offices at the national level supported Díaz’s efforts to manage a transition from politics focused on coercion and landed wealth to one involving an industrial and enterprising elite. As a result, the political elites favored by Díaz became indistinguishable from economic elites. “The equivalence of political and economic hegemony emerged in a context in which almost all the rest of society was excluded from meaningful political participation” (Meyer 1977, pg. 7). To outside observers, the centralized interactions of elites was conducive to the establishment of peace. “During the early years of the Diaz administration, the people of the states did not suffer by reason of this subordination. In fact, the plan worked to their benefit, for through this policy internal order was assured and both person and property were protected” (Rowe 1912, pg. 286).
It has been said that Díaz’s intentions were aimed at the creation of a “great nation–united, self-respecting and progressive–that should take its place in the family of nations” (Harris 1911, pg. 204). Doing so, however, required a framework of relationships that proved stable enough to condition expectations–even if it required negotiating terms with local powerful elites and permitting a certain level of corruption (Meyer 1977). “Díaz tried to be predictable to the point that, for the first time in independent Mexico, public expenditure was programmed and became the tool of the regime’s policies” (Meyer 1977, pg. 6). While it may be true that Porfirio Díaz exercised repression as part of the maintenance of his regime, it was mainly directed at the lower levels of society (Camp 2007, Camín and Meyer 1993, Meyer 1977). “With the upper classes, co-optation and negotiation were the most common responses, not force” (Meyer 1977, pg. 8). The unprecedented stability that occurred during Díaz’s administration thus stemmed in part from his use of patriarchy and patronage–an inherent feature in the culture of caudillismo–to navigate the contradictions of Mexican Liberalism (Bryan 1976, Foran 2005, Garner 2001, Garza 2001, Goldfrank 1975). “The Porfirian formula of a military dictatorship, recruited from the liberal army, backed by foreign investment and Positivist intellectuals, was the direct outcome of both the popular strength and intellectual weakness of Mexican Liberalism” (Bryan 1976, pg. 658). Up to and through the apex of his regime, institutions and offices played a role in sustaining it.

Due in part to his involvement at the local level, Díaz’s administration prevented rural uprisings from making a real impact, at least during his first fifteen years in office (Cabrera 1914). Díaz also succeeded in creating a malleable Congress, largely through his manipulation of local conditions and nursing personal dependencies by local powers. Nevertheless, the Congress was an important arena through which Díaz brokered politics and acheived subservience. “The net effect of these tendencies were the emergence of a very powerful presidency whose great capacity to control political events was to a certain extent the result of an expropriation of the powers of the legislative, judiciary, and local government” (Meyer 1977, pg. 5). By the turn of the century Mexican political life had become dominated by a core of Díaz supporters; “[a] new aristocracy had arisen”
The emergence of a “national ruling class,” comprised largely of Positivists and Díaz loyalists, helped to sustain his duration in office through 1910 (Katz 1991, Schmitt 1966).

Porfirian stability enabled important developments

During the administration of Benito Juárez, an important step had been taken in the transformation of property rights through the Reform laws that were passed. According to Coatsworth (1978), however, little more had been accomplished during the Restored Republic beyond putting Church wealth in private hands. There was little legislation that would have encouraged the formation of limited liability corporations, no banking regulations, no laws to protect long-term investment, and no modern patent laws (Coatsworth 1978). Juárez was responsible for expanding roads in Mexico, starting irrigation projects, and finishing the railroad between Veracruz and Mexico City begun by Maximiliano I (Gordon 1978). Nevertheless, the developments that occurred under the watch of Porfirio Díaz are all the more impressive when they are weighed against the economic and social situation that preceded the Porfiriato.

Under Díaz a gradual rationalization of the railroad occurred, and joint-venture enterprises expanded (Espinosa 2010, Garner 2001, Gordon 1978). According to estimates taken at the end of the Díaz administration, railways had expanded from about 100 km in 1875 to over 22,000 km in 1908 (Alec-Tweedie 1906, Harris 1911). As a consequence, President Díaz is credited—especially through the development of transportation—with having achieved national integration (Barrón 2006). The development of the railroad was crucial for economic success in Mexico, and innovation in transportation caused important changes in crop production, land tenure, labor patterns, and rural development (Coatsworth 1974, 1978, Dobado and Marrero 2005, Garza 2001).

Land reform forced the development of rural society and increased agricultural output (Espinosa 2010). It was supported by a boom in agricultural products that benefited large landowners such as Molina (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Hu-Dehart 1974). During this period, the production of sugar increased by a factor of five, and
the production of henequen rose eleven times (Foran 2005). The spread of the railroad enabled Mexico to transport raw materials across country, allowing it to rely more on domestic production than imports (Garza 2001). There was also a major growth in mining and the extraction of raw materials, such that Mexico ranked third in the world in oil production by 1911 (Foran 2005). The increase in raw materials, coupled with increased agricultural production, supported a shift toward the production of manufactured goods. As an example, Figure 4.3 shows the estimated output of cotton textiles in meters based on data from Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003), which increased rapidly during Díaz’s second term. Textile production was driven by increasing prices in the real value of cotton (Figure 4.4). Although mining and oil were more profitable sectors, the manufacturing of cotton textiles became the most important factory industry in Mexico (Bortz 1997).

![Figure 4.3: Cotton textile output, 1878-1913](Data from Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003)

Trade also experienced significant increases. In 1874, imports amounted to roughly 19 million dollars; they grew to almost 76 million by 1902. Exports increased nearly eightfold over the same period (from 27 million dollars to 207 million dollars) (Alec-Tweedie 1906, Camín and Meyer 1993, Foran 2005). Correspondingly, public revenues increased from about 19 million dollars in 1877 to just over 87 million dollars in 1904 (Alec-Tweedie 1906).
In addition, the establishment of banks, financial institutions, and domestic capital markets were important factors that contributed to economic development during the Porfiriato (Garner 2001, Marichal 1995). Foreign investment expanded and the country incurred excess income (Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez 1984, Camín and Meyer 1993, Coatsworth 1978, Espinosa 2010, Gordon 1978, Harris 1911).

One of the cornerstones of Porfirian development was placing a greater portion of the economy in foreign hands. This included encouraging foreign immigration, granting concessions to foreign companies, and allowing foreign investors to acquire large portions of national enterprises (Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez 1984, Bryan 1976, Foran 2005, Garner 2001, Goldfrank 1973, Powell 1968). The participation of foreign capital had the effect of developing export industries that held together large estates, and it supported the development of industries on a larger scale. At the same time, however, it prevented small-scale producers and tradesmen from prospering, creating newfound discontent among those who might have taken a new role in the economy (Coatsworth 1978). Díaz’s reliance on foreign investment had profound effects on the path taken by the Mexican economy, but it also demonstrated the capacity of a “dependency model” of economic
development to create prosperity and support modernization (Bryan 1976, Coatsworth 1978, Ray 1973).

The development that stability fostered under the watch of Porfirio Díaz was not solely economic. Major population growth occurred across Mexico, especially during the first 18 years during the Porfiriato, although the effects differed across states. By several estimates, the population nearly doubled (10 to 20 million) between 1876 and 1905 (Alec-Tweedie 1906, Camín and Meyer 1993, Katz 1991). Though progress may have been ineffective overall, public health increased and deaths decreased under Porfirio. What is more, between 1874 and 1907 the number of public schools roughly doubled (Cosío Villegas 1960).

Along with economic and social developments, political developments also occurred during the Porfiriato. Before Díaz took office, “there was little evidence of a coherent sense of national identity, of social and economic integration, or of profound social, material or political development” (Garner 2001, pg. 68). In addition, there were no large political parties, but rather, “clubs” that formed to endorse a particular candidate and dispersed after elections had occurred (Garner 2001, Harris 1911). There was also no organized union structure in the state (Beezley 1970). The relative stability of Díaz’s rule, however, led to a number of important political changes (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Goldfrank 1975).

For one, political identities became more sophisticated and durable. After 1900, for example, the Liberal camp became united in its opposition to científicos (Dirk Raat 1977, Garner 2001). “Only when the adherents of the group that eventually became the [Mexican Liberal Party] began to attack the Díaz regime on anticlericalism and other issues did Liberalism once again have meaning” (Bryan 1976, pg. 659). The Anti-re-electionist movement of 1903 also developed a party organization in 1908 (Dirk Raat 1977, Garner 2001). The awakening political consciousness rationalized political parties, as expressed in the sentiments of Francisco Bulnes at the Second Congress: “[a]fter General Díaz, the country does not want men. The country wants political parties, institutions, efficient laws, [and] the free expression of ideas, interests,
passions. The country wants the successor of General Díaz to be the law” (Garner 2001, pg. 209). Díaz had attempted to suppress such consciousness through the prevention of political parties.

Second, industrialization and urbanization encouraged the development of specialization and urban labor, which constituted new interest groups. After 1900, urban and agrarian labor unrest grew; liberal critics and their worker allies also became more vocal (Dirk Raat 1977). Economic depression towards the end of the Porfiriato instigated the emergence of strong working class opposition (Katz 1991). The turn of the 20th century saw the founding of craft associations by firemen, mechanics, and boilermakers. It was supported by a newly coalescing middle class that emerged out of the Porfirian stability (Alec-Tweedie 1906, Barrón 2006). For a period, however, the repression of organized activity prevented workers and middle-class individuals from posing a real threat to the regime (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Anderson 1974, Bortz 1997, Camín and Meyer 1993, Foran 2005, Garner 2001, Goldfrank 1975, Parlee 1984, Rowe 1912).

Until the end of the Porfiriato, “there can be no doubt that the central course of Mexican life progressed with tranquility and confidence” (Cosío Villegas 1960, pg. 677). Growth under the Porfiriato included increased foreign investment and industrialization, as well as population growth and increased public services (Bryan 1976, Gordon 1978, Harris 1911, Rowe 1912, Cosío Villegas 1960). Scholars also note that from the entrance of Díaz to public office to his ouster, political identities and worker groups developed and began to make demands on the political arena (Beezley 1970, Dirk Raat 1977, Harris 1911, Katz 1991). There is thus considerable evidence to support the claim that stable government enabled a number of economic, social, and political advancements. Such changes may have supported the personalization of his power and his lengthy tenure in office (Rowe 1912). By the end of Díaz’s rule, however, the regime “had adopted more innovations than could be assimilated by a society such as Mexico’s at the turn of the century” (Camín and Meyer 1993, pg. 1). Before the end of the decade, a massive revolution would be launched against Díaz, spurred in part by the changes he
had overseen.

4.2 Postscript: Was Díaz really a dictator?

Much of the early historiography on the Porfiriato vilifies the administration of Porfirio Díaz (Garner 2001). However, there are reasons to suspect that Díaz was not as monstrous a leader as some may claim. Walker (1981), for example, provides several examples of labor strikes that received support and conciliation from Díaz. Parlee (1984) also argues that Díaz sometimes took the side of labor organizations. Although many ejidos were broken up and villages dispossessed due to land denunciation, he also sometimes intervened on behalf of Indian villagers who had legal titles to their lands (an example given by Stevens 1982 occurred in Tamazunchale). “Despite this underlying concern for the legal rights of Indian villages, Díaz would not condone social revolution in the countryside or attempts by Indians to assert their rights by force of arms” (Stevens 1982, pg. 162).

Many sources acknowledge that he was, in fact, dedicated to the Liberal cause (Bryan 1976, Garner 2001). Like his predecessor Juárez, accomplishing the task of creating a centralized government often occasioned illiberal practices (Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez 1984). Until order was established and the economy revitalized, Díaz could not afford to pay considerable attention to the plight of the masses. The “objectiveness” of Positivism encouraged one to accept short-term suffering for long-term prosperity. As Bryan (1976) notes, “[p]olitical stability, which made the processes of dispossession and the concentration of landownership possible, was itself reinforced by the extension and consolidation of the hacienda and the economic stimulus provided by Mexico’s increased links with the world economy” (pg. 665). Díaz therefore supported enterprises that accumulated and developed the land, such as encouraging the expansion of mining, the growth of haciendas, and foreign immigration as a means of turning Mexican agriculture into a capitalist enterprise (Camp 2007, Bryan 1976, Coatsworth 1974, Powell 1968, Roel 1968). A consequence of this, however, was that
“the underprivileged peons and peasants suffered a precarious situation” (Roel 1968, pg. 263).

Bryan (1976) acknowledges that various forms of political opinion were tolerated during his administration, within the boundaries of acceptable behavior. “It has been customary to dub those who opposed the regime in the decades before 1910 as ‘precursors’ of the Revolution. (If no revolution had occurred, what would we call them?)” (Bryan 1976, pg. 670). Thus, at least some of the injustices ascribed to the Porfiriato were attributes of the Liberal policies on which it was built, and which were begun before Díaz came to office. The increase in development at the expense of the masses was also an artifact of Díaz providing conciliations to elites, who arguably posed a foremost threat to the regime. “President Díaz had a clear understanding of villagers’ ideas of their rights and understood the violence which would be provoked by expropriations in the countryside...Yet, Díaz was unable to prevent local pressures from gradually eroding away village lands; there were other groups, including foreign and Mexican capitalists and powerful politicians, who could also threaten the fragile ‘stability’ of Porfirián Mexico” (Stevens 1982, pg. 166).

On the whole, the circumvention of democratic practices—limited competition, fraudulent elections, and personalist politics—characterizes Porfirio Díaz as a dictator in the conventional form. The view of Díaz as despotic, however, is attenuated by the recognition that the politics that preceded him was precarious and that national integration was an important goal in his administration. The dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz involved the use of political office—in addition to the promise of personal gain—to manage powerful individuals at the regional level and to mollify competing interests that proved an obstacle to stability. The elite negotiations occurring during this time played a critical role in setting the conditions for Mexican development. According to Knight (1991), “the Porfían regime is built less on oppression than consensus” (pg. 80). Thus, while the developments incurred during the Porfiriato widened some inequalities even as it produced prosperity, the dictatorship represented by the presidency of Porfirio Díaz was also marked by conciliation and engagement through political institutions.
4.3 Summary

Table 4.1 summarizes inferences made from an analysis of the historical narrative. Following Collier’s (2011) framework for discussing process tracing, I list each proposition, some of the observations that support it, and specific examples. The first proposition was that there was a considerable amount of violence which preceded the Porfiriato. This is supported by the string of conflicts that prior to Díaz taking office, including the coup that he launched in 1876. The deeper problem that these conflicts represented, however, was a lack of executive legitimacy—Conservatives and Liberals took turns denouncing attempts at the formation of a central government headed by an executive, as demonstrated by the number of constitutional projects undertaken. The straightforwardness of observations that confirm the first proposition can be taken as passing the “doubly decisive” test for affirming causal inference, as they confirm the proposition and eliminate rival hypotheses about the conditions under which Díaz assumed office. One would be hard pressed to deny the amount of uncertainty that surrounded the position of executive in eighteenth century Mexico.

Given the difficulties of establishing a central government, the second proposition was that a primary concern facing Díaz’s administration was achieving political stability. This is supported by the prevailing ideology among Mexican intellectuals which stressed the value of imposing order as a requisite for development, and the willingness of moderate Liberals to place individual liberties second to order. Examples of the latter include the tendencies of Juárez and Díaz—both of whom were considered Liberals—to engage in illiberal and personalistic practices. General Díaz relied upon the military to govern, using localized repression, as well as collecting social statistics and making conciliatory gestures. These observations support the relevance of the proposition that stability was a primary concern of Díaz’s, but they do not fully confirm it. Thus, the second proposition—arguably the weakest—only passes the “hoop” test for affirming causal inference.

Díaz’s attention to local power structures, the distribution of local representative offices, and legislation that reinforced local authority serve to confirm the third proposition, which is that the representation of local authorities at the national level was
a relevant attribute of Díaz’s administration. By exploiting the control by local officials and their aspirations, Díaz managed to maintain a relatively taut system and to keep local power-holders loyal to him. Juárez had aspired to a similar political arrangement. It involved the brokering of personalized politics, the legalized expansion of land-holdings, and the encouragement of monopolies [Bryan 1976, Falcone 1977, Rowe 1912]. Individuals who held local power served as intermediaries to the national government by being governors or congressmen, where they were able to influence and draft legislation that reinforced and augmented their power. As a result, proposition three passes the “smoking gun” test. Like the metaphor of a smoking gun, which refers to incontrovertible proof of a crime, the interactions of elites through political offices and Díaz’s tolerance of Congress implicate the role of the legislature in supporting his administration but are not sufficient explanations for his unprecedented tenure.

Finally, the amount of growth that occurred in economic, social, and political spheres of Mexican life confirm the claim that the stability represented by the Porfiriato enabled a number of important developments. This is not to say that such growth would not have occurred in a counterfactual scenario, but a considerable amount of growth occurred over the period 1876-1910 which was negatively affected by the resumption of conflict marked by the Revolution (see, for example, Figures 4.3 and 4.4). The evidence thereby implicates the role of stability during the Porfiriato in supporting the social, economic, and political activities that took place, for which the proposition can also be said to pass the “smoking gun” test for affirming causal inference.

In general, then, the observations offered to support the claim that Díaz worked with local representatives and utilized the national Congress as a means of achieving a level of stability necessary for growth confirm the hypothesis. That is to say, beyond strongly supporting the argument, they establish its validity. In addition to drawing upon his control of the military, the President also utilized the national legislature and the governorship as institutions to moderate the behavior of elites. There are, nevertheless, two important points of clarification that must be made in this regard. First, Díaz’s involvement with the national legislature does not completely explain his ability to restrain
potentially destabilizing forces. Rather, there were also economic inducements to support peace—such as advising foreign investors and expanding businesses—which moderated elites’ behavior (Goldfrank 1975, Katz 1991). Though not sufficient to explain the success of the Porfiriato, the manipulation of governorships and congressional seats does help to explain political and economic changes associated with the consolidation of the central government.

Second, attributing stability and growth to interactions between Porfirio Díaz and local elites within the governorship and the national legislature does not mean that Díaz is directly responsible for such developments. Indeed, some of the presidents that preceded him could be seen as “false starts” in the implementation of national politics. Juárez had attempted to broker relationships among local powerholders, for example. Moreover, the national legislature had been in consideration since 1824, and was first implemented in 1857 (LXI Legislatura 2011). However, the process can be said to have been successful during the Díaz administration, insofar as his presidency represented one of the longest (and most developed) periods of peace in Mexico since the recognition of its independence in 1821.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Implication</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Before the emergence of Porfirio Díaz, Mexican politics was volatile and uncertain</td>
<td>- protracted series of conflicts - lack of executive legitimacy - nine constitutional projects</td>
<td>Wars of Independence War of Reform denunciations by Conservatives, Díaz Siete Leyes, Bases Orgánicas</td>
<td>unenforced interactions among powerful individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: A foremost concern in Díaz’s administration was political stability</td>
<td>- military rule - supporting ideology - authoritarian character</td>
<td>executive a general, use of federal army Positivism, los científicos repression, suppression of freedoms</td>
<td>recognition of need for power-sharing for development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: National representation of local politics was key to maintaining stability</td>
<td>- caudillismo - interactions with governors, Congress - policies favoring local elites</td>
<td>hacendados, caudillos Terrazas, Creel, Molinas land denunciation laws</td>
<td>institutionalization of elite interests in governorships, Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: The relative stability provided by the Porfiriato enabled a number of developments</td>
<td>- economic developments - social developments - political developments</td>
<td>foreign investment, railroads population growth, public services PLM, workers’ groups</td>
<td>power-sharing arrangement supported stability necessary for growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Summary of findings
Despite the support that the evidence presented gives toward the conclusion that inter-elite activities in non-partisan institutions were important for the survival of the Porfiriato and the corresponding development that occurred, there are several alternative explanations for the success of the Porfiriato. For one, it could be argued that the ability of Porfirio Díaz to carry out Liberal goals without challenges was due to the defeat of the Conservatives, which was represented by the execution of Maximiliano (Coerver 1977). There is some validity to the claim that conflict between Conservative and Liberal forces was coming to an end. Conservative ideology was dealt a major blow by the defeat of the executive whom they had endorsed. At the same time, declining support for Conservatism does not account for the coordination of politics among local authorities, and individuals remained who had provided armed support to the Conservative side in previous conflicts. There was also little unity among the Liberals at the time of Díaz’s ascension to office, as signified by the Revolution of Tuxtepec. Moreover, this account does not explain Díaz’s centralist tendencies and willingness to forge compromises that satisfied Conservatives and Liberals alike. Thus, while support for Conservatives declined substantially after Maximiliano I, it is unclear that future conflicts involving armed elements would not have occurred. This is evidenced by the rise of similarly disposed elites against Díaz later on in the Mexican Revolution.

Similarly, one could argue that there were no major contenders facing Díaz or that elites did not face conflicts of interest. However, the central government showed itself to be an important arbiter of conflicts among local politicians, such as that occurring between the Governor of Sonora, Carlos Ortiz, and José Carbó, the Commander of the First Military Zone (Coerver 1977). The self-interests of certain politicians also created tensions within the regime. Creel, for example, was an elite who was “squarely in the middle of the major political struggle of the Porfiriato” (Wasserman 1985, pg. 645). His father-in-law, Luis Terrazas, actively fought Díaz as an authority over Chihuahua and had participated in armed campaigns against Díaz in the plans of La Noria and Tuxtepec (Wasserman 1985). “As Luis Terrazas’s second-in-command and agent in Mexico City, Creel was deeply involved in the struggle between Diaz and Terrazas for control of Chihuahua that
lasted from the late 1880s until 1902” (Wasserman 1985, pg. 656). Terrazas—who also participated in the national legislature—was not only an outspoken opponent of Díaz, but he was effective at procuring benefits at the expense of national legislation. Luis Torres also placed himself in confrontation with the federal government over his position as governor in Sonora (Hu-Dehart 1974).

Though not entirely indisputable, the propositions evaluated herein are substantially supported by observations and historical accounts. The Porfiriato, it could be argued, was a critical juncture in the development of Mexico’s political history. During Díaz’s administration, an unprecedented quietude enabled significant developments in the economy and society, which had implications for the politics on which Díaz’s government was based. The same developments can be said to have contributed to his downfall and eventual ouster. They are also inextricably linked to manner by which elites interacted in the legislature and as governors, and to the administration of local political offices.

4.4 Conclusion

The events that transpired between Mexican independence and the end of the Porfiriato serve to illustrate an important phase of nation-building, which is the development of a limited-access order. Coercive and economically powerful people were involved in an ideological contest over how the country ought to be administered, specifically with regard to individual rights and personal autonomy. The contest occasionally took the form of conflict (Three Year’s War) or foreign occupation (Maximiliano I). In the absence of a strong central government, politics was equally beset by competition among local powers to acquire and protect personal holdings. Garner (2001) succinctly describes the major elements that constituted the Porfiriato:

The political longevity of the Díaz regime was founded upon the construction of a modus vivendi between the three most important components of nineteenth-century Mexican and Latin American politics. First, the traditions of patriarchal authority and the complex network of patronage represented by caudillismo (the exercise of personal, authoritarian, noninstitutional power so
common in the Hispanic world); second, the diverse and often contradictory traditions within nineteenth-century Mexican Liberalism (constitutionalism, the supremacy of civil power and the secular state, the effective expression of popular sovereignty and representation, and the conflict between centralism and federalism over the distribution of political power between central and regional government); and third, the emergent conservative ideology of Positivism, with its emphasis on “scientific” politics (organic political harmony, social order, and industrial progress) (pg. 168)

The ascendance of the dominant Liberals subsequently raised the challenge of crafting a central government strong enough to control politics, but under a banner of autonomy and through the decentralization of colonial and caudillo practices. Liberal leaders therefore resorted to illiberal practices to maintain office and strengthen central authority, such as rigging elections, permitting corruption among officials, and brokering politics with powerful individuals. The story told by politics leading up to and through the Porfiriato is the creation of a limited-access order among elites based on military and economic power. An assessment made at the end of Porfirio Díaz’s presidency likened the situation to the German Empire formed in 1871 out of 27 territories—“Bismarck deliberately constructed the constitution so as to place the control of affairs largely in the hands of the aristocratic and conservative portion of the body politic, for he distrusted the masses” (Harris 1911, pg. 206). A contemporary example can be found in the administration of the Philippines by the U.S., which was largely elite-based (Aquino 1996).

As I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter, General Porfirio Díaz seized office at the tail-end of a protracted period of elite conflicts and political uncertainty. Liberal leaders continued to face the challenge of dismantling the remnants of colonial institutions and subordinating local authorities to the national government. This was a task that Benito Juárez began, and which his successor Díaz acquired. Part of Díaz’s success came from his ability to work with, co-opt, and replace local elites such as caudillos, jefes, state governors, and wealthy families. One of his priorities involved integrating powerful locals into national channels as a means of coordinating state and regional politics from above. To an extent, Díaz strategies for continued rule supported an unprecedented level of stability that was accompanied by major economic and social changes. The
developments encouraged by the access-order established under Juárez and Díaz were attributes of an increasingly prosperous nation. Ultimately, however, such developments subverted and undid the personal dictatorship that Díaz had formed to support them.
Chapter 5

The Rise of Party Politics in Mexico

Mexico is an appealing case for comparing authoritarian institutions because of the opportunity that it provides to differentiate between the roles played by legislatures and parties in the development of the state. Prior to the Mexican Revolution that began in 1910, a durable dictatorship occurred which was supported in part by the use of the legislature. A notable observation about politics during the Reformed Republic and into the Porfiriato was the absence of national political parties (Bryan 1976, Garner 2001, Harris 1911, Schmitt 1966). In tandem with the replacement of Porfirio Díaz, however, political parties emerged and gradually became a dominant feature of Mexican politics. Over 70 years passed between the creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) to the end of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)’s electoral hegemony, making it one of the longest lasting among party-based autocracies (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). It is therefore not surprising that scholars have emphasized the importance of party-based rule in Mexico (Bruhn 1997, Eisenstadt 2004, Grayson 2007, Magaloni 2008b). Nevertheless, the question remains as to why parties emerged when they did, the manner in which they did, and for what purpose. Though Magaloni (2008b) explains hegemonic-party survival through the PRI in Mexico, for example, she readily notes that her “theory is not about why hegemonic-party autocracies emerge in the first place” (pg. 3). This study therefore aims to contribute to such research by analyzing party formation in conjunction with the previous analysis of the Porfiriato.

I have previously argued that institutions first emerge to satisfy an arrangement between powerful elites, largely based on horizontal linkages (Haber, Razo, and Maurer
By process-tracing the period of rule by Porfirio Díaz, I demonstrated that it was supported by a political arrangement involving local elites who posed a credible threat to the creation of a centralized national government. Díaz’s ability to secure a power-sharing arrangement—a task begun by his predecessor Juárez and supported through the use of governorships and the national legislature—helps to explain the dramatic growth that occurred during the Porfiriato. Such development, however, often supports the ascendance of mass-based groups as new political and economic actors and requires a more complex, vertically-oriented political institution to integrate them. The integration of the masses in politics was not an accomplishment that can be attributed to Porfirio Díaz, but rather to the new elites who led the charge to overthrow him.

In this chapter, I use process-tracing to analyze political events beginning with the Revolution—roughly, 1911-1946. The primary goal is to identify unique conditions that surrounded the formation of new government after Porfirio Díaz. I argue that a major difference between the Porfiriato and the government that emerged out of the revolution was the involvement of mass-based groups. I focus on the development of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) as a ‘modern’ political party spearheaded by the Revolutionary Family. Though initially focused on resolving the issue of succession, the party became a cross-class coalition of organized actors that cooperated at the national level. It was markedly different from emergent parties that predated it, which were small, specialized, and regional (Grayson 2007, Magaloni 2008b). Camín and Meyer (1993) describe the distinction fairly well:

For Mexicans, the electoral process had been an ephemeral experience, almost theoretical; no political group had achieved power through the vote. As of 1920, and despite the constitutional guarantees, the situation hadn’t changed much...In reality, the majority of [postrevolutionary] parties were created and revolved around certain revolutionary personalities: thus, they served more as a vehicle to promote the personal interests of their leaders than as representatives of more general and permanent interests. Almost all were “parties of notables,” not mass political parties that circumstances would seem to indicate. The fragility of the life of the postrevolutionary parties was a consequence of this narrow and individualistic clientelism, which tied the fate of the organizations to the very risky and changing fate of their leaders...Beginning in 1929, with the foundation of the official party, the
National Revolutionary Party (PNR), the situation changed dramatically (pg. 108).

Focusing on the creation and roles of the PNR allows one to compare and contrast the major actors in the two governments (Díaz and post-Díaz), and the governance problems that each faced. I argue that the parties that emerged after the Revolution resulted from newly ignited political identities and mass-based organizations. Faced with the same succession problem that Díaz faced, post-Revolution leaders found a solution in a political party that combined dominant organized interests. Comparing this scenario to the early years of the Porfiriato points to differences in the level of aggregation of political power (elites versus masses) and underscores a transition from a limited-access to a more open-access order. Generalizations from these insights may help to explain differences in the timing and functions of legislatures and parties under authoritarianism—namely, how these institutions facilitate such transitions.

**Analytical framework**

In contrast to the set of propositions that describe the Porfiriato, I argue that the emergence of party-based politics in Mexico can be summarized by the following sequence shown in Figure 5.1:

1: Revolutionary actors competed for political authority after Díaz’s ouster
2: The Revolution invigorated organized, mass-based political activity
3: A political party solved the problem of incorporating diverse actors
4: Once created, the political party adapted and persisted

The Revolution against Porfirio Díaz created a new set of elites who argued over the new set of terms for government. In so doing, they drew on newly awakened political identities and forms of organized politics to support them. The looming problem of regularizing politics—particularly succession—encouraged the creation of a political party to encompass divergent interest groups. Though initially successful, the party eventually
Critical revolutionary actors fought among themselves

Political activity became more organized, mass-oriented

A political party provided the solution to the problem of succession

The party transformed into a vehicle for continued success

Figure 5.1: Analytic description of party emergence in Mexico

took on different roles and supported a stable long-term political arrangement.

As with the previous chapter, the objective herein is to use process-tracing to describe the events that predicated the formation of modern political parties after the Revolution in Mexico. Using the same analytic method and exploiting within-case features helps to generate expectations for a broader sample of cases (Mahoney 2001). For each aforementioned proposition in the causal sequence shown in Figure 5.1, I look for diagnostic evidence to support description and inference. The analysis helps to generate new hypotheses about an initial purpose of authoritarian parties that may differ from authoritarian legislatures.

5.1 Process Tracing the Creation of the PNR

**Critical actors continued to negotiate after the Revolution**

Despite the conclusion that the administration of Porfirio Díaz supported stability and growth, the apparent “lull” that the Porfiriato represented in the otherwise violent narrative of Mexican political history was not without opposition. In the last decade that Porfirio Díaz oversaw, urban and agrarian labor unrest grew, workers became more vocal, and party organizations became more persistent. At the same time that opposition to Díaz was growing, the regime itself was weakening. Towards the end of Díaz’s time in office, the distribution of offices based on political fitness gave way to selection based on personal loyalties (Rowe 1912). The Positivist values that had supported him had
atrophied (Schmitt 1966). Moreover, attempts to professionalize and restrain the army had deteriorated it and created significant resistance, for which the military could no longer preserve Díaz in the presence of opposition (Bryan 1976, Rowe 1912). Nearly 80 years old at the time, the president had seemingly outlived his usefulness in office. Díaz was acutely aware of the potential threats posed by personal leaders such as Venustiano Carranza and Francisco Madero, and their supporters (Richmond 1980). At the same time, Díaz “failed to realize that the nation with which he had to deal in 1911 was different in many respects from that which he found in a state bordering on anarchy in 1876” (Rowe 1912, pg. 285).

In 1908, Pearson’s magazine ran the now infamous “Creelman Interview,” in which James Creelman met and questioned President Díaz. “In some ways, [the Creelman Interview] became the spark that ignited the Mexican Revolution” (Library of Congress 2013). While generally deferential and flattering to the president, the article put in writing promises that Díaz would be expected to fulfill. Díaz indicated that, unlike when he first took office, Mexico was finally ready for democracy. “It is a natural sentiment of democratic peoples that their officials should be often changed. I agree with that sentiment” (Creelman 1908). The president acknowledged that he had used force, but for “justified” means. Furthermore, Díaz was well aware of the personalist charges against him: “It is quite true that when a man has occupied a powerful office for a very long time he is likely to begin to look upon it as his personal property, and it is well that a free people should guard themselves against the tendencies of individual ambition” (Creelman 1908). Porfirio Díaz announced in the interview that he would not be running for another term, and that he would turn the country over to democracy (Grayson 2007, Wynia 1990). His willingness to do so, however, would be conditional on whether or not he was “needed” to run again.

As it turns out, it was not hard to convince the dictator to remain in office (Grayson 2007, Wynia 1990). Having made the announcement that he would not be running again, however, Díaz faced a strong uprising of assorted revolutionaries who were determined to hold him to his words. Francisco Madero announced his candidacy against Díaz in the
1910 election, for which Díaz imprisoned him and declared himself the winner. From jail, Madero issued a proclamation against Díaz—the Plan de San Luis Potosí—calling for the annulment of the election results and denouncing the Díaz regime. The letter spawned a series of revolts constituting an “anti-reelectionist movement” against Díaz. Collectively, the wave of insurrections constituted a revolution that ultimately destabilized his regime. The individuals who led rebellions against Díaz included peasants and elites alike. Figure 5.2 shows a map of the major battles in Mexico initiated by different leaders during the Revolution. Notable leaders in the Revolution against Díaz included Emiliano Zapata, Francisco Madero, Venustiano Carranza, Pascual Orozco, Álvaro Obregón, Jose Luis Moya, and Francisco Villa. Through concurrent struggles—sometimes independent, other times jointly organized—the various insurgent leaders laid siege to towns and cities in attempts to reclaim Mexico. The result was a state of near-anarchy that existed between 1910 and into the early 1920s.
Figure 5.2: Map of major battles during the Mexican Revolution, 1911-1917

*Name denotes the leader to whom battle was attributed*
Scholars have offered a number of explanations for the upheaval represented by the period 1910-1917:

Among the most important [causes of the Revolution] to have been singled out are foreign economic penetration, class struggle, land ownership, economic depression, local autonomy, the clash between modernity and tradition, the breakdown of the Porfirián system, the weakness of the transition process, the lack of opportunity for upward political and social mobility, and the aging of the leadership (Camp 2007, pg. 42).

Different accounts of the Mexican Revolution describe it as the product of political, economic, and social problem that arose out of the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (Bryan 1976). A common sentiment among all of them is that the changes that occurred during Díaz’s administration was a kind of inverse Malthusian crisis: “[I]t had adopted more innovations than could be assimilated by a society such as Mexico’s at the turn of the century” (Camín and Meyer 1993, pg. 1).

One set of explanations for the movement that began against Díaz in 1910 is political, focusing on abuses of power, the difficulty of maintaining clientelistic relationships, and resistance to institutionalization (Bryan 1976, Fowler-Salamini 1993). Notable abuses of state and local offices had occurred under the watch of Díaz, and a certain amount of corruption was permitted in exchange for loyalty (Rowe 1912). The legitimacy of local offices was also undermined by Díaz’s use of them to counterbalance dominant actors and reinforce their dependence upon him. His personal currency made Díaz the figurehead of political advancement (Camp 2007, Fowler-Salamini 1993, Meyer 1977). “But if this practice gave Díaz much room for political maneuvering, it also prevented the institutionalization of the system and the peaceful transmission of power” (Meyer 1977, pg. 5). One result of Díaz’s political maneuvering was a resentful local elite and “a mutually destructive rivalry between provincial and national ruling elites for control of the government in Mexico City” (Hart 1997, pg. 13). Prominent anti-Díaz campaigner José María Maytorena, Jr., for example, came from a family of hacendados who Díaz effectively shut out of national politics (Hu-Dehart 1974). Later on in the Revolution, Yaquis allied with Maytorena in support of overthrowing Díaz (Hu-Dehart 1974).

There was also a realized need to force Díaz out of office because of his reluctance
to allow a political transition (Goldfrank 1975). According Rowe (1912), “[e]ven those who were dissatisfied with the Díaz regime were willing to accept his reelection in 1910,” provided that they were given freedom of choice regarding the selection of vice president. Ramón Corral was vice president at the time, and he was Díaz’s choice for vice president in the next term. The Minister of the Treasury Jose I. Limantour and a group of científicos formed the Reelectionista Party to promote their continuation in office. Outside of this circle, however, General Bernardo Reyes appeared to be the popular choice for vice president. Reyes had the support of the Partido Demócratico and a group of over 600 workers from various trades and occupations known as the Gran Partido Nacional Obrero (Anderson 1974). The popular support for Reyes nevertheless failed; he denied running for vice president, and Díaz sent Reyes to Europe on military assignment (Anderson 1974).

“While the restrictions on the development of political institutions and parties helped to keep opposition to a minimum, it deprived the regime of both institutional forms of succession and of a means of channeling the demand for wider political participation in a society that had undergone a profound transformation by 1910” (Garner 2001, pg. 170). The forced reelection of Ramon Corral to the vice presidency occurred at a time when Díaz’s popularity was declining, and was interpreted as a determination to perpetuate the Díaz regime (Rowe 1912). Part of the explanation for the Revolution can therefore be found in the personalization of Díaz’s regime, and his resistance to institutions that might have facilitated the transition to his successor (Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez 1984, Goldfrank 1975). Moreover, Díaz was of advanced age by 1910 (80 years old), for which it was increasingly difficult to hold together clientelist alliances (Fowler-Salamini 1993, Meyer 1977, Rowe 1912). Many of the regime insiders who supported him were also of advanced age. Additionally, the military had weakened substantially throughout the Porfiriato—a consequence of which Díaz himself was guilty—and therefore offered little protection against the political opposition ignited by issues of reelection (Beatty 1998, Goldfrank 1975, Rowe 1912).

A second set of explanations points to the economic growth that “served as the
tinder that ignited into the Revolution” (Bennett and Sharpe 1980, pg. 169). The developments that had occurred under Díaz helped some groups, but they alienated many others. For example, the influx of foreign capital initially helped the upper class, but it hurt the newly strengthened middle class (Camin and Meyer 1993, Meyer 1977, Cosío Villegas 1960). According to Camp (2007), the primary beneficiaries of economic policies that Díaz promoted “were the wealthy at home and abroad” (pg. 38). In reality, however, Díaz’s economic program placed an overwhelming amount of power in the hands of foreign investors and created a strong dependency on foreign capital (Bryan 1976, Hart 1997, Foran 2005, Goldfrank 1975, Knight 1994). By 1910 nearly 90 percent of Mexican business was foreign-owned:

Mexican capital still accounted for much agricultural and craft production, but textiles were 80 percent French and banking 94 percent foreign. Great Britain had a large stake in the budding oil industry. Towering over the Europeans was the United States, with over $1 billion in investments by 1910, representing 80 percent of foreign investments and more than the entire Mexican bourgeoisie. American companies and individuals controlled about 80 percent of mining, owned over 100 million acres of land, and provided 57 percent of imports, while taking 75.6 percent of exports in 1910. Railroads had a north-south orientation, reflecting American needs (Foran 2005, pg. 36).

Díaz’s preferential treatment of foreigners led to growing nationalism that pointed to foreign domination as a cause of Mexico’s economic troubles (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Bryan 1976, Goldfrank 1975, Hu-Dehart 1974, Parlee 1984). This was exemplified by the banner of the newspaper of Mexico City, El Hijo del Ahuizote, which read “Mexico for the Mexicans” (Foran 2005). The country had also become more vulnerable to economic fluctuations as a result of greater international trade, which negatively impacted elite families. An eventual decline in the price of some agricultural goods, such as henequen, created tensions among landed elites whose fortunes were tied to those markets (Fowler-Salamini 1993). Many of the economic effects heightened disparities between the center, northern, and southern regions of the country (Katz 1991). The expansion of the railway, for example, increased the mobility of laborers and diminished the work supply on which some hacendados had become dependent (Goldfrank 1975, Katz 1974). As such, increasing dissatisfaction could even be found among regional
elites who had initially prospered during the Díaz administration.

Concurrent with the expressions of economically driven grievances by elites were independent movements by indignant citizens who had also been impoverished by economic development (Camp 2007, Buve 1975, Camín and Meyer 1993, Fowler-Salamini 1993, Garner 2001, Meyer 1977, Richmond 1980, Rowe 1912, Wasserman 1985). “[C]ountless rural insurrections against commercial and foreign property owners were carried out by local peasants, agricultural workers, and miners across the country” (Hart 1997, pg. 13). In the process of modernizing, peasants had been negatively affected, and the rights of rural towns and indigenous villages had been infringed upon. The rural peasantry, which had formerly subsisted by farming small tracts of land, saw much of it taken away by land reform laws (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Bryan 1976, Foran 2005, Katz 1991, Powell 1968, Stevens 1965, 1982). As a result, inhabitants were forced into peonage under wealthy landowners and were driven into the elite-initiated conflicts due to their subordinate relationship to them (Camín and Meyer 1993, Foran 2005, Katz 1974). Recession and unemployment in Mexico after 1907 did further damage among the lower classes, and the urban poor were affected by the rising costs of living in the city (Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez 1984, Foran 2005, Richmond 1980, Rowe 1912).

Lastly, some scholars refute claims that the causes of transition rested solely in political restlessness, economic reform, or globalization. Rather, the Mexican Revolution can be seen as a social transformation (Barrón 2006, Foran 2005, Stevens 1975). From the Mexican perspective, the Díaz regime deepened divisions between the high and low classes (Cabrera 1914). It also saw the development of social groups that, while still rather inchoate, occupied similar social positions. During the Porfiriato, “[t]he landless peasantry had no political representation and very little capacity to make successful demands on the government...The industrial worker had no right of association to defend his interests...even the middle class was without the proper channels of representation” (Meyer 1977, pg. 7).

Industrialization and urbanization had created new forms of labor and specialized worker groups that sought to improve their conditions through unions (Parlee 1984).
Some work organizations were influenced by the organized nature of U.S. workers who came to work in Mexico, as occurred in the railroad industry (Parlee 1984). The unions fomented an increasing number of strikes in demand of higher wages and better working conditions (Parlee 1984). In many cases, however, the old regime responded to worker organization with intolerance and repression (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009, Anderson 1974, Bortz 1997, Camín and Meyer 1993, Foran 2005, Garner 2001, Goldfrank 1975, Parlee 1984, Rowe 1912). A strike at the Cananea mine in 1906 led to over 100 deaths, while a bloody massacre occurred during a strike at the Rio Blanco textile mill in 1906 (Anderson 1974, Foran 2005, Parlee 1984, Walker 1981).

In addition, the proliferation of professionals and businessmen formed an incipient middle class which found itself prevented from upward mobility (Cabrera 1914, Camín and Meyer 1993, Foran 2005, Meyer 1977). Díaz acknowledged the dearth of bourgeois influence at the beginning of his administration in the Creelman (1908) interview:

> In the old days we had no middle class in Mexico because the minds of the people and their energies were wholly absorbed in politics and war. Spanish tyranny and misgovernment had disorganized society. The productive activities of the nation were abandoned in successive struggles. There was general confusion. Neither life nor property was safe. A middle class could not appear under such conditions.

By the beginning of the 20th century, however, the middle class constituted a noticeable presence. The ill fit of the growing middle classes with the feudal framework that was replicated in the Reform era, and which persisted under Díaz, created a new audience who echoed the demands of the peasant masses (Iturriaga 1951). Wolf (1969), however, attributes revolutionary support from the middle class to the growing ranks of highly educated citizens who found few opportunities among the vestiges of an older regime.

The development of social bases during the Porfiriato led to an increasing tempo in attempts to create political parties and to extend the scope of influence of the sort of political “clubs” that were previously common (Goldfrank 1975). One of the first well-known parties was the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM), a group of científicos that emerged in 1900 (Foran 2005, Meyer 1977). The PLM was prevented from gaining any real traction, however, and there were government attacks on Liberal clubs between 1902
Nevertheless, there was increasing politicization on the basis of group identities and coalescence among the various groups, as demonstrated by parties’ efforts to recruit support from the working class (Anderson 1974, Foran 2005, Parlee 1984).

Thus, “the restricted political base of the [national government] became obsolete as economic growth created new economically and technologically important, yet politically excluded, social groups” (Hart 1997, pg. 11). The newly emergent social pressures, it has been suggested, fed the development of a class consciousness that attracted both bourgeoisie and populist elements (Burgess 1999, Fowler-Salami 1993, Guardino and Walker 1992, Meyer 1977). It was supported by a transformation in the social composition of higher education and the ideological perspectives it inspired (Fowler-Salami 1993, Rowe 1912). The Indianist Society of Mexico, for example, was founded in 1910 by Francisco Belmar to study indigenous races in an effort to redeem them (Powell 1968). The social character of the Revolution against Díaz was also exemplified by the stated goals of the Constitutionalist party that later emerged, which aimed to: solve the social problem by fostering education to level class barriers; improve lower class conditions to encourage a middle class; and reform the Constitution to meet the country’s needs (Cabrera 1914).

The complexity of the Mexican Revolution makes it difficult to analyze as an event; it has been characterized as both victorious and unfinished (Bryan 1976, Foran 2005, Goldfrank 1975). The diverse motivations that supported Díaz’s replacement have therefore led a number of scholars to advocate focusing on the regional dynamics that led to the collapse of the regime (Beezley 1970, Bryan 1976, Coerver 1977, Fowler-Salami 1993, Richmond 1980). As noted by Bryan (1976), “[e]ven if one accepts the viewpoint that many of the grievances against the Porfiriato were national in scope, perhaps they can still best be comprehended when one studies them in their regional and often dissimilar contexts—particularly since the exaggerated centralizing tendencies of the Díaz era yielded to a period of intense regionalism, sectionalism, and factionalism” (pgs. 667-668). Scholars are also somewhat divided over the significance of the Revolution, which has been
described as a disorganized, ideologically incoherent movement (Purcell 1973). As noted by Benjamin (1985), more recent historiography regarding the Mexican Revolution calls into question the extent to which it was united, victorious, and long-lasting. “Diverse factions of landless peasants, workers, small landholders, and disgruntled politicians joined to topple Díaz in 1911 and then separated to contest the settlement” (Bennett and Sharpe 1980, pg. 169). Further still are scholars who question the extent to which various groups actively engaged in the Revolution, as well as their motivations. Anderson (1974), for example, argues that workers contributed very few to the fighting, and explains Díaz fall as the product of their inaction rather than their action.

For a variety of reasons that may have differed by locale, popular dissatisfactions were channeled by equally belligerent leaders into waves of insurgency which eventually toppled the Díaz regime. At the same time, the wave of revolts that constituted the Revolution centered on dominant themes concerning constitutionalism, economic development, nationalism, and social justice, and were united in their direction against Díaz (Purcell 1973). The revolts that spread across Mexico attracted opposition from newly mobilized middle sectors, labor, and peasants (Wynia 1990). In contrast with most revolutions that had taken place at the time in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America, the uprising against Díaz was exclusively civilian (Rowe 1912). The multiclass nature of the Revolution that began in Mexico in 1910 paralleled transitional conflicts that occurred in China, Russia, and Iran (Hart 1997). “The nationalistic autonomy-minded Mexican provincial elites and their pequeña burguesa allies, like their counterparts in China, Iran, and Russia, led workers and peasants in the demand for increasingly effective representation of their interests by the national government in its dealings with foreigners” (Hart 1997, pg. 11). Thus, although it was largely elite driven, the push to remove Díaz from office was supported by a large swath of classes and involved a number of previously inactive or disenfranchised groups that acted in tandem (Benjamin 1985, Bennett and Sharpe 1980).

The Revolution “moved by fits and starts, and in numerous directions at once; it carried with it the bastions of power and the straw-covered huts of the peasantry alike”
Due to the relatively shapeless nature of the various uprisings that aimed to unseat Díaz, the Revolution persisted beyond his removal and transformed into conflicts that exposed additional issues regarding statebuilding in Mexico. Hart (1997) distinguishes the period encompassing the Revolution as proceeding in three stages involving elite crisis and mass mobilization (1910-1914); class confrontation, American intervention, and workers’ defeat (1914-1916); and elite synthesis and socio-political reorganization (1916-1924). Foran (2005), in contrast, lists the phases of the Revolution as the uprising against Porfirio Díaz (1910-1911), the Constituionalist movement against Huerta (1913-1914), and infighting among victors of the Revolution (1915-1916).

Within eight months of issuing the Plan de San Luis Potosí, Francisco Madero and his forces defeated the Mexican federal army. The Treaty of Ciudad Juárez that Madero signed with Díaz in 1911 stated that he would officially abdicate his rule. Díaz fled to France, where he would remain until his death, and Madero was elected president in his place. Nevertheless, enduring rivalries presented further challenges to the presidency (Hart 1997, Richmond 1980, Needler 1961, Rowe 1912, Wynia 1990). Madero was constrained to cooperating with elements of the old Porfirian regime, which stoked the ire of fellow Revolutionaries (Cabrera 1914, Camín and Meyer 1993, Foran 2005).

As a result of Madero’s inability to address lower class demands, individuals who had once joined Madero to capture Ciudad Juárez and defeat Díaz—such as Pascual Orozco, Francisco Villa, and Emiliano Zapata—broke forces and contested Madero’s presidency (Hart 1997, McNeely 1966). Through the Plan de Ayala in 1911, Zapata denounced Madero and recognized Orozco as head of the revolution. Zapata’s calls for land reform also resonated with peasants and rural workers, who continued to launch insurrections against commercial and foreign property owners in the countryside (Hart 1997, Hu-Dehart 1974, Stevens 1965, 1982). Meanwhile, revolutionary leader Emilio Vazquez Gomes issued a call for revolt from Texas, and sporadic mutinies were led by army officers such as Pedro Leon and Félix Díaz.

Madero’s presidency was short-lived, lasting nearly fifteen months (Hart 1997). In 1913, General Victoriano Huerta led a coup d’état to remove him from office, which
was supported by U.S. Ambassador Henry Wilson (Cabrera 1914, Foran 2005, Grieb 1968, Hart 1997). According to observers and historians, however, General Huerta was as arbitrary as Díaz (Cabrera 1914, Camín and Meyer 1993, Richmond 1980). Huerta reintroduced jefes políticos and returned to the practice of distributing offices to “carefully selected ‘friends of the regime’” (Richmond 1980). He also dissolved Congress and indefinitely postponed elections (Camín and Meyer 1993). Venustiano Carranza, a governor from Coahuila, was one of the few governors who refused to support the presidency of Huerta (Richmond 1980). He organized his own rebel army, called the Constitutionalists, and issued a pronouncement against Huerta called the Plan of Guadalupe (Cabrera 1914, Grieb 1968). With the support of the oligarchy in Sonora, Carranza led a civil war against Huerta (Hart 1997). His dissension was aided by armed raids carried out by the followers of Villa and Zapata (Hart 1997, Richmond 1980). “At that point tens of thousands of fighters were arrayed in two coalescing and hostile groups while independent groups still stalked the countryside” (Hart 1997, pg. 14).

Huerta was defeated by Constitutionalist forces 1914. Following his departure from office civil conflict recurred, this time between the provincial elite and middle class members aligned with Carranza and the populist supporters of Villa and Zapata (Buchenau 2011, Foran 2005, Grayson 2007, Hart 1997, Wynia 1990). Amidst the intra-revolutionary fighting that occurred between compatriots, Carranza and his forces were victorious (Richmond 1980, pg. 61). With crucial support from the United States the commander of the Constitutionalist forces, Álvaro Obregón Salido, and Carranza came to defeat the Villistas and Zapatistas (Buchenau 2011, Grayson 2007, Hart 1997, Wynia 1990). According to Foran (2005), the success of Carranza and Obregón came from their ability to forge a broader alliance of support than either Villa or Zapata, who led geographically isolated rebellions.

For many scholars, the end of civil war between the petty bourgeoisie and rural insurrectionists around 1916 marked the end of the Mexican Revolution. Carranza convened a special congress to create a new constitution, which represented the culmination of a struggle that had been begun before 1910 against Díaz (Roman 1977).
Notwithstanding, the conflict had continued long after the deposition of Porfirio Díaz. Nearly a million people died as a result of conflicts spawned by the Revolution against Díaz, and the economic cost of the Revolution was an estimated 37 percent of GDP not produced (Camín and Meyer 1993). The conclusion of the Revolution in Mexico, therefore, marked the onset of a period of incorporation in which collaborators against the Porfiriato negotiated their position in the new regime (Collier and Collier 1991).

“The moment of triumph, then, was also the hour of upheaval and settling of accounts” (Camín and Meyer 1993, pg. 47). The actors who had formally conspired together against Díaz were left to pursue individual ambitions. According to Buve (1975), the Revolution caused a regression into the “classic” type of caudillaje that renewed the importance of military patron-client relationships and legitimized the personal ambitions of revolutionary leaders. The politics at the end of the Díaz era did not devolve into complete anarchy, however. Rather, intense conflicts followed from his removal as a result of negotiations involving new constituents and strata of membership, which were represented by various leaders. After joint rebellions that sent Díaz into exile, middle and lower class insurrectionists fought against the elite politics that Madero and Huerta seemed to embrace. Additional class warfare occurred when the organized workers, peasants, and agrarians who had worked together to defeat Huerta turned against each other in support of different leaders. Critical actors continued to work out the terms of government in post-Revolution Mexico. Thus, the 1917 Constitution was a powerful symbol of the end of the old regime, but the shape of the new regime remained indeterminate.

_Organized political activity was reinvigorated_

The 1917 Constitution incorporated much of the 1857 Constitution, building upon and amending it (Gordon 1978, Grayson 2007, Roel 1968). At least superficially, it mirrored that of the United States (Grayson 2007). It afforded the legal separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and established checks and balances. The power given to the judiciary and checks placed on the legislature by
the 1917 Constitution reflected the pressure being placed on the center by peripheral elements, much as Turkey’s 1961 constitution emphasized the protection of personal rights through constitutional guarantees (Kili 1992, Özbudun 2006, Patton 1995). Mexico’s chief executive was head of the armed forces, could mobilize state militias, and had a dominant role in foreign-policy making (Grayson 2007). It also provided the collective bargaining rights and the right to strike (Bortz 1997). According to Grayson (2007, pg. 390), however, the real organization of power in Mexico bore little resemblance to the formalities of its 1917 constitution. As Weldon (1997) notes, some of the literature on *presidencialismo* in Mexico credits the 1917 Constitution for creating a strong president in order to create greater efficiency and stability. Roman (1977)’s analysis of the drafting of the 1917 Constitution suggests that Constitutionalists were less radical democrats, but rather elitists “fearful of mass participation as well as fearful of the possibility of a new dictatorship” (Roman 1977, pg. 81). If this was true, it was rightfully so—the threat of further revolution, insurrections, and rebellions remained (Beezley 1970, Stevens 1965, Wynia 1990).

Like Madero, Carranza had difficulties restoring authority among the revolutionaries. Reconstruction after the Revolution thus showed itself to be a process of trial and error (Meyer 1977). “Armed resistance persisted in Morelos, Chihuahua, Chiapas, and elsewhere in remote pockets throughout Mexico” (Benjamin 1985, pg. 198). Carranza’s approach, therefore, was similar to that of Porfirio Díaz (Camín and Meyer 1993). “Already experienced in the dynamics of Porfirián rule, Carranza understood political organization and the sources of power” (Richmond 1980, pg. 57). “Instead of working toward the institutionalization of state power, Carranza...relied on patronage and repression in an attempt to maximize his personal capacity to maneuver among conflicting intra-and interclass forces.” (Benjamin 1985, pg. 198). Obregón announced his candidacy for president in 1917, to which Carranza responded by harassing his former compatriot and arresting his supporters. Obregón called for an uprising against Carranza, which Villa joined (Buchenau 2011).

Though he had convoked the constitutional convention that produced the new
arrangement, Venustiano Carranza proved to be a poor fit as head of the new government. “It was Carranza’s increasing rejection of mass politics, his policy of ignoring the social provisions of the 1917 constitution, and his tendency to follow Madero’s path of an accommodationist alliance with the old dominant classes, rather than a populist alliance with the popular sectors, that began to divide the ranks of the former revolutionaries” (Collier and Collier [1991] pg. 205). Carranza’s attempts to impose a conservative successor therefore resulted in a coup and his assassination. With the removal of Carranza, a group of middle-class leaders from the state of Sonora (los sonorenses) rose to a place of importance (Bennett and Sharpe [1980], Buchenau [2011]). The arrival of Sonoran leadership was also concurrent with a dramatic decrease in civil conflict. Though comparatively minor, outbreaks continued into the 1920s, most notably the Cristero War of 1926 to 1929.

Having destroying the liberal oligarchy represented by the Porfiriato, the Revolution left in its wake “a coalition of forces, precarious and contradictory because of its multi-class structure, but under the relatively firm leadership of a political-military bureaucracy” (Leal [1975] pg. 50). The new leadership thus faced the challenge of accommodating actors from parts of society that had theretofore been disengaged. “[I]t was the failure of Madero to engage in mass politics—to adopt a reformist program with which he could have mobilized mass support and thus could have made a more decisive break with the Porfiristas—that led to his failure to consolidate power and his vulnerability to Huerta’s counterrevolutionary coup” (Collier and Collier [1991] pg. 204). Carranza had also suffered the consequence of ignoring the demands of the masses, who were now a force to be reckoned with (Collier and Collier [1991]). “The insurrectionist tendencies of the working class...demonstrated the social revolutionary potential of the popular sectors” (Collier and Collier [1991] pg. 204).

The relevance of organized groups after the Revolution can be attributed to the growth of new industries, a decrease in levels of repression that was formerly applied to organized activity, and the collective expression of dissatisfaction against the Díaz regime (Barrón [2006], Buve [1975], Dirk Raat [1977], Rowe [1912]). By virtue of their participation...
in the Revolution, domestic actors had demonstrated their value as important elements in the creation of the new regime (Bennett and Sharpe 1980). Though not strong enough to influence political outcomes on their own, the development of new social identities and the reinforcement of old ones encouraged a turn toward la política de masas (mass politics) (Bennett and Sharpe 1980). The somewhat nebulous labor groups, peasant and agrarian leagues, and political parties represented viable bases of support for postrevolutionary leaders (Benjamin 1985). Organized labor, for example, was given greater impetus as a result of industrialization and the cultivation of an urban workforce. The first trade unions came into existence in 1892, but they were actively suppressed by Díaz (Roel 1968). There was also significant growth in the number of working-class clubs that formed in textile villages around 1910 over the issue of reelection, which Díaz had obstructed and harassed (Anderson 1974). By the end of the Porfiriato, however, there existed “the first working-class battalions in Mexico” (Camin and Meyer 1993, pg. 6). The increasing effectiveness of workers’ ability to challenge authority encouraged labor’s incorporation into the new regime (Bortz 1997).

When their forces were pushed out of Mexico City by Zapata and Villa, Carranza and Obregón established an alliance with an anarchist syndicate that resembled “the embryo of a trade union” (Delarbe and Yanez 1976). Known as the Casa del Obrero Mundial (House of the World Worker), leaders of the Casa promised to “suspend trade union and syndicalist organizing and enter into a different phase of activity in view of the urgent need to propel and intensify the revolution” (Salazar 1972, pg. 79). “The collaboration of the Casa with Carranza marked the alliance of the labor movement with the bourgeois wing of the ‘revolution’ in exchange for a few concessions” (Delarbe and Yanez 1976, pg. 134). As a result, the victorious revolutionary leadership granted labor the right to organize and strike (Handelman 1976). The Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (Mexican Regional Labor Confederation, CROM) was also formed in 1918 (Middlebrook 1995, Spenser 1995). Carranza, who was concerned about staying in at least partial control of organized labor, was able to accomplish this by sponsoring the CROM (Delarbe and Yanez 1976). Under his leadership, “the CROM enjoyed state
protection and a number of federal legislators was sympathetic to the labor movement” which gave it “a disproportionate power in national politics which did not correlate to its strength as a labor confederation” (Spenser 1995).

“[P]easants were also incorporated in the political system through an extensive agrarian reform that jeopardized the power of traditional rural oligarchies” (Cardoso 2004, pg. 13). Although the economic policies that Díaz supported materially hurt peasants and agricultural workers, their participation in conflicts gave them “tactical freedom” and experience in organization and warfare which made them valuable to elites (Buve 1975, Camín and Meyer 1993). The shift in favor of agraristas after the Revolution saw the destruction of haciendas and the restitution of indigenous lands, the representation of peasants in political office, and the emergence of agrarian groups (Camp 2007, Beezley 1970, Beezley and Eds., Buve 1975, Camín and Meyer 1993, Meyer 1977). Governor Emilio Portes Gil in Tamaulipas built his party based on local agrarian leagues; he, along with Adalberto Tejeda and Ursulo Galván, supported the foundation of national peasant associations (Beezley and Eds., Camín and Meyer 1993). Mexican statesmen thus incorporated campesinos in the 1920s by promoting centralized peasant organizations such as the National Peasant League (LNC) and the Mexican Peasant Cofederation (CCM) (Camín and Meyer 1993).

Between 1920 and 1934, national government was dominated by leaders from the state of Sonora—namely, Adolfo de la Huerta, Álvaro Obregón, and Plutarco Calles—in a period to which scholars have referred to as the “Sonoran dynasty” (Buchenau 2011, Collier and Collier 1991). The Sonorans “shaped the Revolution almost as much as a group of from Oaxaca, most notably Benito Juárez and Porfirio Díaz, shaped the era of Liberal modernization in the second half of the nineteenth century” (Buchenau 2011, pg. 407). The Sonoran leaders were responsible for the coup d’état that unseated Carranza; they also promoted plans for national reconstruction and economic development (Buchenau 2011, Collier and Collier 1991). Upon the death of Carranza in 1920, Adolfo de la Huerta became provisional president and oversaw the scheduling of elections. With the support of labor and peasants, Álvaro Obregón won the elections and assumed office (Buchenau
Obregón set about curbing infighting among revolutionary elites and bringing his collaborators into line (Benjamin 1985).

Though Obregón, de la Huerta, and Calles were initially united in opposition to Conservative elements, personal ambitions and rivalries gradually differentiated the three. In turn, each became involved with political groups representing different collective interests. Obregón became associated with agrarians through the National Agrarian Party (PNA); de la Huerta had the support of businessmen and the National Cooperativist Party (PNC), and Calles found support among urban workers through the Mexican Labor Party (PLM) (Benjamin 1985, Collier and Collier 1991). In the 1920 elections, however, Obregón courted a group of young leaders of the CROM, thereby obtaining support from labor for his election to the presidency (Delarbe and Yanez 1976).

Though he served as Treasury Secretary under President Obregón, de la Huerta intended to retake the presidency in 1924 (Buchenau 2011). When Obregón indicated a preference for Calles as his successor, army generals mobilized the greater part of the army in 1923 on behalf of de la Huerta. His revolt was also supported by the National Cooperativist Party. “The ensuing so-called de la Huerta Rebellion pitted a majority of army officers against the Obregón regime” (Buchenau 2011, pg. 408). Nevertheless, Obregón was equally supported by other organized groups. With the support of a few detachments of troops that had remained loyal, organized peasants, and “labor battalions” made up of Mexico City union members, Obregón was able to defeat de la Huerta’s forces. Through their support of Obregón, “labor and the ejidatarios gave substance to their claim for an equal voice with the military in the councils of the Revolution” (Needler 1961, pg. 310). Calles was elected into office after Obregón in 1924 (Delarbe and Yanez 1976).

Although new interests had come to the fore as a result of the uprising against Díaz, there was a necessary process of institutionalization to rationalize how constituent interests would be represented and of what value they were to the new government. Political activity at the mass level nevertheless created an awareness of organization among peasants, workers, and other domestic actors. As various groups strengthened their identities through collective action, they gradually began to impress upon the
formation of post-Revolution regimes. “Paralleling the development of the party...was the consolidation of worker and campesino organizations” (Benjamin 1985, pg. 211). Political activity by the newly mobilized groups demonstrated the capacity for organized interests to support the new leadership. The aggregation and reconfiguration of interests among masses that had participated in the Revolution also coincided with similar transformations among the elite who were involved. The Sonoran leadership, for example, was concerned with maintaining a consensus among the revolutionary elites, in addition to personal gain (Benjamin 1985). Worker and campesino organizations remained apart from elite decision-making during the Sonoran dynasty, but their importance as constituent groups was evident (Benjamin 1985). The involvement of a greater number of political actors whose demands were channeled upward “[gave] the political life of the country a much more complex structure than in the past” (Meyer 1977, pg. 18). Thus, “by 1926, all state governments practice[d] some form of mass politics through labor and alliances” (Beezley and Eds., pg. 446).

**A political party resolved coalitional problems**

In general, the sentiments at the time of the Revolution were that the days of the strongman were over; peace could only come from proper government forged on the equilibrium between classes (Cabrera 1914, Wells 1914). Though the 1917 constitution and its predecessors named political parties as necessary organizations that adjudicated the contest for power, few until then had been able to inspire participation among citizens and channel their political interests. According to Camín and Meyer (1993), this only began to be accomplished after the Revolution, although the fate of mass organizations remained closely tied to clientelist networks and specific leaders. During the “Sonoran dynasty” that included de la Huerta, Obregón, and Calles, efforts were gradually made to reconcile revolutionary actors and incorporate social movements. It saw the creation of a political party truly aimed at articulating the concerns of lower strata of society, but which would not be fully accomplished until its reorganization in 1934.

The culture of caudillismo that was a pervasive element of Mexican politics
necessitated that a powerful individual play a guiding role in creating a political confederation, a role that Obregón managed to fulfill. “[H]e set out to create a government of conciliation with all the excluded parties, over which he would govern, by negotiation or force, the ever-changing nature of the alliances of a fragile equilibrium always on the brink of catastrophe, with the pragmatic and unchallengeable hand of the caudillo” (Camín and Meyer 1993, pg. 69). He formed a coalition of actors that included officers, local caudillos, organized labor and campesino groups, and civil servants (Benjamin 1985). According to Benjamin (1985), Obregón’s power derived from his ability to manage his coalition to unify and maintain a “Revolutionary Family,” a talent that Calles lacked.

Following Obregón’s term in office, Plutarco Calles was elected to replace him. Calles inherited the coalition fostered by Obregón. Within this coalition, there were inherent tensions between agrarian groups and urban workers (Benjamin 1985, Collier and Collier 1991). It also threatened to fracture from the centrifugal tendencies of revolutionary generals (Benjamin 1985). “The tensions within the political coalition, between Obregónistas and Callistas, between agraristas and laboristas, and between the central government and the revolutionary generals, threatened to undo the modest measure of political solidification of the previous decade” (Benjamin 1985, pg. 210). The principle obstacle in the way of consolidation, therefore, was the lack of unity among the revolutionary elite (Benjamin 1985, Garrido 1982). According to Loyola Díaz (1980), the crisis of confrontation between various factions within the elite represented a critical historical juncture that laid bare the need to turn away from caudillistic practices toward greater institutionalization.

The threat of a breakdown in internal order reached a climax when the time came for Calles to endorse a successor. Obregón’s allies in Congress approved legislation to allow him to campaign for reelection, an act that was repudiated by military leaders (Camín and Meyer 1993). In spite of the “revolutionary principle of no reelection” that Obregón had once championed and staunch opposition, he was reelected to the presidency in 1928 (Buchenau 2011). His victory, however, was short-lived; only two weeks after the election, Obregón was assassinated at a gathering to celebrate his reelection.
There remained a number of challenges preventing the consolidation of a post-Revolution regime (Benjamin 1985). “[The Sonorans] were now without an heir apparent. De la Huerta could not be considered after his 1924 revolt; Obregón was dead; and Calles was eliminated by the principle of no reelection” (Collier and Collier 1991, pg. 226). Moreover, there was still a looming threat of breakdown among the competing interests and loyalties that Obregón had tried to balance. With Álvaro Obregón’s assassination in 1928, “it became evident that there was a need for a majority party that would both embody the Revolution and yet, through self-canceling internal structures, would prevent a ‘struggle for power’ among the caudillos” (Stevens 1965, pg. 853).

Calles “conceived the necessity and benefit of political institutionalization when his personal situation, and the country’s, reached a critical state of instability as a consequence of Obregón’s assassination” (Benjamin 1985, pg. 206). As a result, he sought to reorganize many of the dominant interests that had supported him and his predecessors. To prevent further power struggles and the forceful removal of the executive, Calles’ answer “took the form of a ‘revolutionary party’ composed of military strongmen, regional strongmen, chiefs of small parties, and some agrarian and labor bosses” (Grayson 2007, pg. 394). It drew together a large number of small parties that had emerged out of the Revolution, and elements of the different factions that had backed Obregón, Calles, and de la Huerta (Camín and Meyer 1993). One of the objectives for creating the PNR, which Calles stated publicly, was to depersonalize disagreements among the “Revoluionary Family” by institutionalizing power (Benjamin 1985). It was an attempt “to preserve what little unity remained within the political elite, to solve the difficult problem of presidential succession, and to maintain and advance his own power and influence in national politics” (Benjamin 1985, pgs. 199-200). Created by top-down, presidential fiat, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party, PNR) cut a broad swath across populist interests and incorporated their voices in the decision-making process (Benjamin 1985, Camín and Meyer 1993, Grayson 2007, Lajous 1981, Magaloni 2008a, Meyer 1977, Stevens 1965). By encapsulating potentially conflicting interests, the
national party helped to preserve the coalition, facilitated his smooth transition from office, and averted the possibility of Calles alienating anyone through the selection of his successor (Meyer 1977).

With the creation of the National Revolutionary Party, Calles “announced the end of the caudillos and the beginning of an era of institutions” (Camín and Meyer 1993, pg. 74). Having been “constitutionally framed” in 1917 and consolidated through Obregón after 1920, the postrevolutionary Mexican state was institutionalized by Calles in 1929 (Benjamin 1985, Camín and Meyer 1993). The PNR supported Calles’ personal aims by giving him greater control over future political outcomes (Benjamin 1985, Collier and Collier 1991). Calles “was able to use the party to maintain political power without occupying the presidency” (Collier and Collier 1991, pg. 226). Through the PNR he was able to field his preferred candidates for office, to promote his programmatic ideas, to discipline the political bureaucracy, and to undermine the power of others (Benjamin 1985). He also abolished regional parties that were associated with the PNR and brought their members into the national membership, “thereby converting the PNR into a real political party and a powerful, centralized political machine” (Benjamin 1985, pgs. 206-207). Thus, Calles’ departure from office did not signal the end of his influence in national government.

Known as the Jefe Maximo (Top Chief) of the Revolution, Calles offered council from the sidelines for the next six years in a period referred to as “the Maximato” (1928-1935) (Camín and Meyer 1993, Collier and Collier 1991). Subsequent presidents during the Maximato were overpowered by the PNR, which was in turn informally controlled by former President Calles (Weldon 1997). Presidents Portes Gil (1928-30), Ortiz Rubio (1930-32), and Rodriguez (1932-1934) were therefore considered to be puppets of Calles (Weldon 1997). “There was...a tacit agreement between the two: the president was in charge of supervising the correct operation of the public administration, while the Jefe Maximo reserved for himself the main political decisions” (Camín and Meyer 1993, pg. 98). Calles’ success through the creation of the PNR resolved many of the problems that the Sonoran leaders faced and gave the executive greater control over the regime.
In so doing, however, it promoted a different form of authoritarianism in Mexico made apparent by the Maximato (Magaloni 2008b, Medin 1982, Weldon 1997). The period just after its creation was “[t]he best example of a presidency that was weak with respect to the party leadership in Congress” (Weldon 1997, pg. 232).

Once created, the party had continued success

The establishment of the National Revolutionary Party was a major step toward the achievement of a consolidated postrevolutionary state. The mobilization of social groups had given political life in Mexico “a much more complex structure than in the past” (Meyer 1977, pg. 18). In contrast to President Díaz, who actively deterred citizens from participating in politics, postrevolutionary governments gradually came to accept as political actors “all classes and groups identified with the Revolution” (Camín and Meyer 1993, pg. 110). Foran (2005) argues that the “social revolution” that the Revolution represented had been defeated by Obregón and Carranza in 1915 and 1916, who constructed boundaries for a more tractable social transformation in the 1920s. The coalition that Obregón had formed was heterogeneous and divisive, however, for which the creation of a political party helped to restrain it (Camín and Meyer 1993).

Beyond giving Calles greater political control after his term in office, the party may also have helped to familiarize its members with the “rituals of representative democracy” (Camín and Meyer 1993). As an artifact, the presidents who passed through office during the Maximato drew support from very different backgrounds. Portes Gil was connected to a number of different agrarian organizations and had once headed the largest agrarian organization in Mexico; Ortiz Rubio was strongly influenced by the railway sector, and Rodriguez had reached the rank of division general and served as the secretary of war and navy (Ai Camp 1991, Beasley and Eds., Camín and Meyer 1993, Haberman 1921). The party may therefore have gained traction by demonstrating to important leaders the capacity for constituent groups to alternate power.

Scholars have suggested that Calles fully intended to make the PNR a party of the masses; however, it did not directly incorporate workers, peasants, and the middle
class (Benjamin 1985, Camín and Meyer 1993). Lazaro Cárdenas, who enjoyed a base of electoral support that included peasants and organized workers, as well as politicians and officers who were isolated by politics during the Maximato, used it as an opportunity to maximize his own personal power (Benjamin 1985, Camín and Meyer 1993, Hamilton 1982, Kus and Ozel 2010). Paralleling the development of the party during the Maximato was the consolidation of worker and campesino organizations that remained outside party control but contributed, along with the climate of popular discontent, to the designation of Cárdenas, a populist Callista, as president (Benjamin 1985, pg. 211). Cárdenas was elected to office in 1934 under a new constitutional reform which extended the presidential term to six years. Meanwhile, former President Calles’ influence through the Maximato began to wane, for which the continued success of the PNR became conditional on integrating mass organizations. As such, the party turned attention from maintaining a consensus among elites to truly becoming a “party of the masses” (Magaloni 2008b). According to Middlebrook (1995), the nature of elite relations in postrevolutionary Mexico meant that “if it play[ed] any significant role at all in limiting mass mobilization, control over mobilization activities depend[ed] more on the actions of the party’s constituent sociopolitical organizations than on those of the central party bureaucracy” (pgs. 11-12).

The Cárdenas presidency has been considered an important phase in the construction of the contemporary Mexican state (Benjamin 1985). Cárdenas refashioned the PNR into a “corporatist-like” party in 1938 based on a confederation of labor, peasants, the military, and “popular” sectors (teachers, public employees, and small farmers) (Basurto 1999, Benjamin 1985, Camín and Meyer 1993, Cardoso 2004, Collier and Collier 1991, Delarbe and Yanez 1976, Handelman 1976, Kus and Ozel 2010, Patromi 2001, Wynia 1990). The new party, called the Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana, PRM), also more directly incorporated dominant mass organizations to consolidate the strength of the new regime and ensure its continued success. “The PRM was not born as a complement to, nor in opposition to the mass organizations which already existed...but as an organization which grouped all of them together” (Delarbe...
Camín and Meyer (1993) explain the organization of the PRM in greater detail:

At the end of March 1938...the PNR became the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), created as a coalition of sectors: the peasant sector (represented first by the leagues of agricultural communities and the CCM and, after the CCM’s dissolution, by the CNC); the labor sector, formed by the CTM, the CROM, the CGT and the two great industrial unions affiliated to the central organization, the mining and electricians’ unions; the popular sector immediately identified itself with the bureaucracy; and the military sector, which in fact included all the members of the armed forces. This indirect means of affiliation permitted the brand-new PRM immediately to count four million members, a significant figure in a country with slightly fewer than nineteen million inhabitants (pg. 149).

By the time that Manuel Ávila Camacho took office in 1940, the significance of the Revolution had ceased to be a real force, and the role of the military in party politics was severely undercut (Camín and Meyer 1993). There had been an “atrophy of the military influence in Mexican politics” (Needler 1961 pg. 311). As a result, Cárdenas trimmed the army’s share of the federal budget from 25 to 19 percent and reoriented officers, troops, and civilians through legislation passed in 1939 (Basurto 1999). In 1942, Camacho abolished the military sector of the party as a separate entity. President Camacho also negotiated a pact with major labor groups during World War II to prevent them from striking (Alegre 2007, Collier and Collier 1991, Gauss 2010, Niblo 1999). Conditions favored the development of Mexican manufacturing, and the signing of the National Labor Pact solidified the regime against worker strikes (Collier and Collier 1991). Following the end of the war, however, “labor unity collapsed as various union groups abandoned the policy of multiclass collaboration and sought to argue their independence from the state and return to a period of Cárdenas-type reforms” (Collier and Collier 1991, pg. 413). Facing the problem of controlling the labor sector, Camacho reorganized the PRM into the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) (Collier and Collier 1991).

The reorganization of the PRM aimed at changing procedures surrounding the internal selection of candidates, and giving more authority to the top posts in the party (Benjamin 1985). With the advent of the PRI, interest groups were further consolidated.
around three ‘sectors’–the agrarian sector (peasants and agricultural workers); the middle class (the “popular sector”); and organized labor unions (Handelman 1976, Needler 1961). Nominations to elective posts, which were normally equivalent to election, were allotted to the sector strongest in the constituency to be represented. Party policy became “subject to a process of bargaining and compromise among sector leaders (Needler 1961, pg. 309). “The problem of succession at any level of government–municipal, state, or national–or within the organizations that form the Party was finally institutionalized” (Meyer 1977, pg. 15). These conditions set the stage for Miguel Aleman Valdes–who had a “very authoritative manner” (Collier and Collier 1991, pg. 575)–to take office in 1946, and for the six years of protectionist policies that he encouraged (Grayson 2007). The combined efforts of Aleman and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, who assumed office after him, ushered in a period of high growth and currency stability (Gonzalez 2008, Grayson 2007, Magaloni 2008b).

By the time that the PRI had been created in 1946, the shape and nature of party control had changed considerably from its 1929 implementation by Calles. The party consolidated the interests of mass groups under a number of major representative organizations and strengthened the power of the party over them. It also streamlined the distribution of benefits, thereby facilitating coordination between the government and major forms of potential opposition. With these organizations firmly embedded in the structure of the party, subsequent party leaders were able to expand its control (Needleman and Needleman 1969). To a point, therefore, the PRI became difficult to distinguish from the government (Camín and Meyer 1993). Economic performance, in combination with authoritarian practices, helped to maintain PRI dominance until 2000. The period of continued occupation of the presidency by a member of the same party–which had its origins in the PNR–represents the longest-lasting party-based rule in modern politics (Geddes 2003, Magaloni 2008b).
5.2 Postscript: More on the PRI

The major claim that I have advanced here is that Calles envisioned a political party to resolve elite divisiveness that stemmed from a broad coalition of individuals with ties to different social groups. Under Cárdenas, the party became more mass-oriented by more directly incorporating labor, campesinos, and popular sectors, and it underwent further changes under Camacho. However, it is not necessarily true that the party enjoyed long-term success because of the initial functions that it served. Thus, while I aimed to explain the emergence of the political party, its continued survival is a different story altogether. Explanations for the monopolization of political power by the PRI can be found in the different containment strategies by which the party managed opposition to the state. To an extent, early party leaders were not averse to the use of force. “Under Ávila Camacho, the ‘crime of social dissolution,’ was defined and became, because of its ambiguous terms, the favorite legal instrument of the state in the persecution of political dissidents and union leaders for thirty years” (Delarbe and Yanez 1976, pg. 144). In general, however, repression was used as a last resort and where applied, was selective (Castañeda 2000, Magaloni 2008).

The more predominant strategy by which the PRI sustained its hegemony involved co-optation, or “winning-over” potential opposition by offering enticements. One form of co-optation involved the distribution of rents, or payments (Delarbe and Yanez 1976, Gonzalez 2008, Kus and Ozel 2010, Magaloni 2008b). To maintain loyalties, party leaders “resorted to the systematic manipulation of the budget and other policy instruments” (Magaloni 2008b, pg. 16). The Echeverría administration, as did President López Portillo who succeeded him, “attempted to restore the loss of the government’s credibility by dramatically increasing expenditures, food and housing subsidies, land distribution, and state control over a wide range of economic activities” (Magaloni 2008b, pg. 105). According to Gonzalez (2008), “the hegemonic PRI regime in Mexico tried to buy off and incorporate mass dissent through the economic populism of the 1970s to avoid having to give up the sole exercise of de jure and de facto power it enjoyed by virtue of its hegemonic rule” (pg. 215).
The Echeverría and Portillo administrations also expanded the scope of the government and created positions uniquely tailored toward encouraging participation. In addition to rents distributed to the masses, access to government jobs through participation in the party encouraged elites to remain loyal to it. The PRI coalition was maintained by offering its members special privileges, including the promise of party advancement (Magaloni 2008b). “The cement of the hegemonic coalition was ambition and rent seeking, rather than a common ideology” (Magaloni 2008b, pg. 18). In the political arena, the PRI exchanged office and party posts for working-class votes (Burgess 1999). Under Echeverría, neopopulism and bureaucratic expansion helped to support the PRI’s public image (Grayson 2007, Gonzalez 2008).

A third form of co-optation involved creating a façade of competition. Under Lopez’s watch, a number of electoral reforms were passed to “institutionalize dissent against President Echeverría” (Eisenstadt 2004, pg. 39). The regime legalized leftist parties and encouraged their participation, lowering the threshold of support needed to conserve their national registries (Eisenstadt 2004). As a way of forcing participation, however, it also implemented a law that any party not participating in a federal election would lose its registry (Eisenstadt 2004, Klesner 1988). The Federal Law of Political Organizations and Electoral Processes (Ley Federal de Organizaciones Políticas y Procedimientos Electorales, LFOPPE) added 100 proportional-representation seats to the Chamber of Deputies, thereby providing a permanent form of minority representation (Shirk 2005). The LFOPPE increased the access of smaller opposition parties to the Chamber of Deputies and made it easier for them to compete in elections. However, by encouraging the formation of many small parties in opposition to the PRI, the government could appear to electoral competition while simultaneously undermining opposition unity (Edmonds-Poli and Shirk 2009, Gonzalez 2008, Klesner 1997).

In the later years, the PRI government became prone to electoral fraud. In the 1988 presidential elections, for example, “the party declared that the new computer system had mysteriously collapsed the night of the elections” (Magaloni 2008b). As a result, the head of the leading opposition party lost to PRI candidate Carlos Salinas when his
defeat seemed inevitable (Bruhn 1997, Eisenstadt 2004, Magaloni 2008b). As was the case in the later years of the Porfiriato, the PRI was accused of overseeing the placement of candidates and running “rubber stamp” institutions (Gordon 1978, Katz 1991). According to Magaloni (2008b), however, electoral fraud does not by itself explain the survival of the PRI. The conclusion to the story of the party’s hegemony came at the end of the 1990s, when a peso devaluation that occurred in 1994 led voters to serious doubts about the party’s abilities. “[The peso crisis] had made voters realize that the economic booms and busts around elections had become a systematic, yet undesired and undesirable, attribute of the party’s rule” (Magaloni 2008b, pg. 225). By the time of the 2000 elections, the desire for political change superceded divisiveness over economic policy, and opposition united against the PRI in favor of a candidate from the Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, PAN).

Thus, although a number of studies have sought to explain the longevity of the PRI—examples include Bruhn (1997), Eisenstadt (2004), and Magaloni (2008b)—relatively few go into detail as to the reasons for the creation of the party and its subsequent impact on party changes. I argued that the initial conditions for the party’s creation concerned disciplining the diverse coalition members that Obregón had attracted. They were, in turn, connected to a variety of new social groups that had been spawned by Porfiriian development and the Revolution against Díaz. Highlighting the party after Calles serves to underscore that it successfully resolved coalitional problems. From there, however, the institution took on new roles and motives. In part, the continued success of the party came by additional transformations that hammered out a behavioral equilibrium between the elites and masses (Magaloni 2008b).

5.3 Summary

Table 5.1 summarizes the inferences made by process tracing the twenty year period immediately following the Mexican Revolution. The table lists each proposition, the observations that support it, and specific examples. As a means of assessing the strength
of support for each proposition, I reference process tracing tests discussed by (Collier 2011). The first proposition was that major actors in the Revolution continued to negotiate their positions, and the type of government that would follow. Observations that support the claim include pacts and cooperation among the revolutionary elite, such as the Constitutional Congress and the resulting Constitution of 1917, and initial collaboration between Sonoran leaders. The proposition is also supported by incidences of irregular leader turnover, which happened to Madero, Huerta, and Carranza. de la Huerta’s later break away from Calles and Obregón, and in particular Obregón assassination, evidenced the ongoing contestation between critical actors. They serve to confirm the proposition and eliminate rival hypotheses. Regarding the claim that the bargaining process did not end with the Revolution, therefore, the proposition passes the “doubly decisive” test for affirming causal inference.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Implication</th>
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</table>
| 1: *After the Revolution,* critical actors continued to negotiate among themselves | - new political pacts, cooperation  
- irregular executive turnover  
- elite disagreements | Constitutional Congress, ‘Sonoran dynasty’  
replacement of Madero, Huerta, Carranza  
assassination of Obregón  
revolt by de la Huerta | institutional regression, return to conflict among powerful actors |
| 2: The Revolution invigorated organized political activity | - organized labor  
- regional and interest-based parties | Casa del Obrero Mundial, CROM  
PNA, PLM  
rise of middle class | development had created new actors represented by popular groups |
| 3: A party was partially created as a solution to the problem of succession | - succession problem  
- political factionalism  
- scope of the PNR’s inclusiveness | lack of obvious successor to Calles  
PNA, PLM, PNC  
smaller parties, local bosses, revolutionaries | a national political party helped to integrate the new groups |
| 4: Once created, the party adapted and continued to persist | - party reorganization  
- changes in elements  
- changes under Cardenas | PRN → PRM → PRI  
diminished military, abolished regional parties  
incorporation of labor, peasants | institutional persistence |

Table 5.1: Summary of findings
The second proposition was that participation in the Revolution encouraged the further development of organized political activity. Supporting examples include organizations that developed to represent labor interests, such as the Casa del Obrero Mundial and the CROM, as well as specialized parties such as the National Agrarian Party. According to Middlebrook (1995), “official” labor organizations emerged out of the “mobilization of mass actors during the Mexican Revolution” (pg. 33). Not only did the exile of Porfirio Díaz open the release valve for preexisting interests to organize, developments during the Porfiriato created new political identities, such as a middle class, that found expression through mobilization in the Revolution. The proposition, therefore, also passes the “doubly decisive” test for affirming causal inference.

The observations that support the proposition that the PNR helped to resolve coalitional problems can be taken as passing the “smoking-gun” test, insofar as the proposition is confirmed and rival hypotheses are only substantially weakened. Although a broader political party was needed to accommodate newly mobilized groups, their incorporation did not happen right away. Rather, the party began as “an essentially elitist organization” that did not become a “party of the masses” until the mid-1930s (Magaloni 2008b, pg. 4). The creation of the PNR by Calles augmented his influence behind-the-scenes, supporting the alternation of individuals who, though weak relative to the party, had connections to important social groups (Portes Gil was associated with agrarians, Ortiz Rubio with railway companies, and Rodriguez with the military). As a result, I claimed that the PNR underwent further developments that incorporated mass groups and helped the party to sustain itself. Observations to support the claim include the multiple reorganizations of the party, first into the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano and then into the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. The influence of original elements of the party also changed, leading to the disappearance of the military and regional parties. Cárdenas also more directly engaged labor and peasant groups, something that Calles did not do (Benjamin 1985, Cordova 1980). In combination with abundant research on the different strategies by which later versions of the party governed, this fourth proposition passes the “doubly decisive” test for affirming causal inference (Bruhn 1997).
5.4 Conclusion

While the Porfiriato represented one of the first stable governments in free Mexico, the removal of Porfirio Díaz from office reinitiated a contest among revolutionary actors over leadership. The state was once again thrust into a state of near-anarchy, but the conditions in which leaders competed had changed. In the same way that property rights remained largely intact during the instability—such that many sectors returned to former levels of growth afterward—political assets that had been acquired during the Porfiriato were not completely destroyed (Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003). Society was more complex, however, as mass activity had been spurred by the urbanization and industrialization that Díaz oversaw. The political potential of lower levels of society was reinforced through their participation in the Revolution against Díaz. Though not sufficiently strong to dominant politics, organized activity by mass actors—such as labor, peasants, and businessmen—commanded the attention of postrevolutionary leaders. Confronted with a broad coalition of leaders with ties to different groups, Plutarco Calles saw a national party as a means of introducing discipline. By establishing the PNR, he united formerly separate populist elements and depersonalized political involvement (Meyer 1977). The success of the party as a tool for discipline enabled Calles to influence presidencies well after his own. Under Cárdenas and Camacho, the party was redesigned to better incorporate major social groups and encourage their dependency upon the state.

Comparing the two periods—1876-1910 and 1910-1946—lends insights into the manners by which power was institutionalized in Mexico. At the time that Porfirio Díaz took office, he faced power that was geographically and locally concentrated, for which personal networks and horizontal accountability made sense. Contracting power by including regionally powerful individuals in decision-making and reinforcing their authority provided the means for short-term stability. It enabled the central government to establish itself as a legal authority and laid foundations economic development, thereby
making it one of the first stable regimes in post-independence Mexico. At the same time, his government hampered social mobility and generated increasing frustrations among the citizenry. As a result, the aging dictator was removed from office through a violent revolution that involved the better part of society. Leaders after the Revolution also struggled over issues of authority, but they found support in mass groups that offered distinct political bases. Managing their diverse interests was accomplished through the creation of a national political party. Though not the first political party to appear, the PNR grouped together a number of different leaders and their constituent groups. It also amassed many smaller political parties that emerged out of the Revolution. In so doing, the party established greater vertical accountability and introduced discipline among political contenders. Under the hands of subsequent presidents the party changed shape, took on different actors, and adapted strategies to sustain its electoral hegemony.

La Reforma and la Revolución, therefore, illustrate phases in the transition from a limited-access to an open-access order (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009a). The Restored Republic that gave way to dictatorship by Díaz was based on a conservative-liberal ideology that elites used to justify personal agendas. A limited-access order emerged that involved forging alliances with locally and regionally independent actors in order to create a working federation (Beezley 1970, Coerver 1977, Fowler-Salamini 1993, Hamnett 1996, Harris 1911, Richmond 1980, Thomson 1991). The result of its establishment—represented by the clientelist politics of the Porfiriato—was over thirty years of relative stability which supported significant economic and social development. Socio-economic changes added complexity to political life, however, for which Díaz’s regime came to be replaced (Bryan 1976, Garner 2001, Goldfrank 1975). “[I]mpersonal and inexorable forces’...conditioned the construction and functioning of the postrevolutionary Mexican state” (Benjamin 1985, pg. 202). The regime that followed—organized by Obregón, institutionalized by Calles, and consolidated by Cárdenas—included a larger portion of society in the political process. The emergence of party politics that was exemplified by the creation of the PNR, therefore, represented the transition to a more open-access order.
Chapter 6

Analyzing Porfirian Power-sharing

6.1 Introduction

In previous chapters, I used process tracing to explain the historical development of Mexican politics. The method involves making causal process observations and evaluating the strength of evidence that supports each claim. In so doing, I provided evidence supporting the claims that post-independence politics in Mexico was violent and unstable and that, through working with and manipulating local power structures, Díaz purposefully established order that was conducive to development. The revolution that removed Díaz from office reinitiated a contest over leadership, but it was supported by mass activity generated by urbanization and industrialization. As a consequence, party politics took hold through the creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), which included a larger portion of society in the political process. The story of institution-building in Mexico during this period therefore exemplifies the notion that elite-coordination is a precondition for more complex political institutions (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009).

Historical accounts of the Porfiriato suggest that Díaz’s management of local strongmen was a critical factor in achieving stability where it otherwise would have not been expected. As scholars have noted, Díaz was acutely aware of the importance of rewarding loyalties (Camp 2007, Bryan 1976, Falcone 1977). Moreover, recent military campaigns had produced a number of armed individuals. Power was not confined to former officers, however. In their quest to protect their holdings, local elites “fought
bitterly to maintain local and state political power” (Wasserman 1985). Though unintentional, Juárez had actually expanded the power of hacendados, or large estate owners, during his administration by giving them more local authority (Katz 1991). Consequently, local governments and important public offices fell under the influence of wealthy, landed families such as the Torres, Terrazas-Creels, and Galans (Coerver 1977, Katz 1991, Richmond 1980, Wasserman 1985).

Given the established importance of armed individuals and landed elites, and Díaz’s interaction with them as a means of fostering stable politics, their interests were presumably institutionalized during the Díaz regime. Collectively organizing critical actors would have provided a credible guarantee against the elite’s future exclusion (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, Svolik 2012). It would also have lowered transaction costs between elites and the president, making it easier to decide on legislation and provide policy concessions (Gandhi 2008, Wright and Escribá-Folch 2012). Relatively little is known about the connection between power structures and formal institutions during the Porfiriato, however (Bryan 1976). In support of process tracing and as a logical consequence of the conclusions reached in the previous chapter, this chapter investigates the institutionalized representation of critical actors during the Porfiriato by looking at attributes of the Congress and governors during this period.

The hypotheses advanced here do not attribute the creation of the legislature to Porfirio Díaz. The legislature as an institution existed before Díaz assumed the presidency. The first Congress was created in 1857 with the promulgation of the 1857 Constitution. Congress had ceased to exist between the two Juárez administrations, however, under the empire of Maximiliano I (LXI Legislatura 2011). Thus, Congress as an institution was still young (19 years since its inception), and only four legislatures had met since the reconvening of the legislature in 1867. Moreover, prior to the Porfiriato congresses exhibited variable term lengths, suggesting that the legislature had yet to become established as a regularized institution. As an institution, therefore, the Congress was still crystallizing by the time of Porfirio Díaz’s emergence.

Using secondary data from Ai Camp (1991) on congressmen and governors during
and after the Porfiriato, I test the argument that political offices were more likely to be composed of coercive and economically powerful actors in the early years of the Díaz regime. I demonstrate that the presence of military officers and local bosses was initially high in earlier congresses, and that it decreased throughout the Porfiriato. The empirical trends also point to financial activity and academic endeavors as elements that replaced landed and military elites. The results also show that office-holders were more likely to be associated with agrarian and labor groups by the time that the PNR was established, thereby supporting the notion that the party arose in part to accommodate increasing social complexity. By analyzing the composition of the legislature and governorships throughout and following the Porfiriato, the results help to shed light on the role of formal institutions in reinforcing—and eventually, undermining—the power structures that were in place when Díaz assumed office. It also lends insights into more general theory about the role of authoritarian institutions as it regards the type of interactions that they facilitate. In the following sections, I present the hypotheses and discuss data collection and variable operationalization. I then show the results of several analyses, which provide implications that extend beyond the case of Mexico.

6.2 Hypotheses

For Porfirio Díaz to hold onto office under the ever-present possibility of counterrevolution, it would have required the general to accommodate those who had the power to overthrow him. Co-opting those with a credible threat and providing them a space within the regime would have incentivized their continued participation with Díaz and extended his tenure. In general, power refers to the ability to influence the behavior of others and the outcome of events. The power that threatened Díaz’s rule derived largely from the ability to direct others by rewarding or coercing them to achieve a desired outcome (French and Raven 1959). As a result, the political offices associated with national government should have been given to those who possessed material wealth or the potential for violence:
H1: Powerful individuals were more likely to hold office during the Porfiriato

The influence of power on public offices during the Díaz administration should also have been greatest earlier on in the Porfiriato. Institutional theories imply that with repeated iterations of play—with enough practice—the “rules of the game” become sufficient to sustain politics, such that power is no longer a necessary criterion (Axelrod 1984, North 1981, North and Weingast 1989, Olson 1965). Svolik (2009) argued that, in addition to contested dictatorships involving the use of formal institutions to share power, repeated interactions involving the leader and elites can also lead to the development of an established dictatorship in which elites are no longer able to credibly threaten the leader. Historiographers have argued that Díaz actively sought to replace his rivals (Bryan 1976, Camín and Meyer 1993, Katz 1991, Meyer 1977, Schmitt 1966). As such, a second hypothesis is that the relevance of power among members of the Congress diminished over time:

H2: Powerful individuals were more likely to hold office earlier in the Porfiriato

The deterioration of coercive and landed wealth in political office represents a decline in “hard power,” which has been used to refer to the use of coercion or economic strength to affect an outcome (Nye Jr. 2004). Its converse is “soft power,” or influence derived from the ability to attract or persuade. I expect that the waning presence of military officers or hacendados in office should be accompanied by an increase in politicians whose reputations derived from alternative sources. The stabilized interactions of individuals with material or coercive power would have supported learning about shared identities, expertise, and the legitimacy of power among citizens (French and Raven 1959). It would also have supported the development of commercial enterprises. As a result, office holders later in the Porfiriato should have been more likely to be associated with business or ideology:
H3: *Individuals associated with commercial and intellectual activity were more likely to hold office later in the Porfiriato*

Most notably, political parties were largely absent during the Porfiriato. Scholars assert that “modern” parties had not yet come onto the scene (Bryan 1976, Garner 2001, Harris 1911, Schmitt 1966). This is due in part to Porfirio Díaz’s active suppression of organized political activity, as well as the inchoate political identities of a weak civil society. Nevertheless, the mobilization of citizens in support of non-material forms of political power—power not derived from coercion or from land—may have found expression in new forms of political organization. Towards the end of the Porfiriato and into the Revolution, therefore, the number of officials who were associated with political parties should have increased:

H4: *Office holders were more likely to be party members after the Porfiriato*

As stated by Plutarco Calles, the creation of the PNR intended to incorporate a number of mass groups. Such groups—labor, peasants, and small businessmen—had origins in Porfirian development, and they were strengthened by the Revolution against Díaz. As a result, I expect that the increase in party representation in political office should coincide with an increase in the representation of populist groups. Party membership should be positively associated with affiliations to labor or agrarian groups:

H5: *Party members were more likely to be associated with labor unions or agrarian groups*

The first three hypotheses relate power to office-holding in an authoritarian regime, suggesting that the transition denoted by the Porfiriato involved the replacement of hard forms of power with soft forms of power in political office. In the case of pre-Revolution Mexico, I aim to identify whether landed or coercive power equated with public office
during the Porfiriato, and the extent to which such influence persisted over time. The fourth and fifth hypotheses aim to identify whether the rise of political parties is distinctly observable after the Porfiriato in conjunction with the creation of the PNR, and whether party membership was associated with populist groups. To test the hypotheses, I use biographical data collected on congressmen over 1884-1934. In the following section I describe in detail the data, collection procedures, and research design.

6.3 Research Design

Examining the relationship between power and representation during the Porfiriato depends on information about political figures in prominent public positions. Fortunately, much of this information is readily available. In an effort to augment the biographical reference materials on Mexican cabinet figures, [Ai Camp (1991)] published political biographies of leading public figures. The available information extends back to 1884, which marks the beginning of Díaz’s second administration.88 The work, which took nearly two decades to complete, is arguably the most complete single source of information on prominent political figures during the Díaz administration.

Although the political biographies do not fully cover the entire duration of Porfirio Díaz’s time in office (1876-1910), there are several reasons to suspect the information provided by [Ai Camp (1991)] to be sufficient for examining the proposed relationships. For one, it can be said that the first Díaz administration dealt with establishing the rules of conduct: during the first Diaz administration “new parameters for Mexican political institutions and practices were created” [Bryan (1976), pg. 653]. Moreover, the first and second Díaz administrations were interrupted by the term of Manuel Gonzalez Flores, for which there might have been discontinuity between administrative styles and strategies practiced by Díaz. More importantly, however, the hypotheses assert linear relationships that should still be observable in data that begin in 1884.

According to the author, individuals for whom biographies were written were chosen “on the basis of positional and reputational criteria, and on the completeness and
accuracy of the biographical information available” (Ai Camp 1991 pg. xvii). The biographical information that Ai Camp (1991) recorded for each individual is divided into twelve categories: date of birth; place of birth; level of education; elective positions; party positions; appointive government positions; group activities; nongovernmental positions; relevant family information; military experience; miscellaneous information; and sources. Group activities include “intellectual, student, labor, and other organizations” while nongovernmental positions concern “professional jobs, self-employment, ownership of land and firms, and generally, any post in the private sector” (Ai Camp 1991 pg. xiv). Out of an original sample of nearly 2,000 individuals, sufficient information was available for about 1,000. Ai Camp (1991) selected roughly 700 for inclusion.

The information provided by Ai Camp (1991) on office holders is purely qualitative, in that the political biographies describe, rather than classify, individuals. To create a consistent and replicable method of deriving quantitative data from the biographies, I converted the biographies to electronic text and used text analysis to classify each individual according to a set of criteria. I created a dictionary that includes specific terms to be met, and excludes others, for each individual to be counted as having a particular attribute. To be considered a Constitutionalist, for example—referring to a major armed faction that participated in the Revolution—the description of the individual’s military experience must include the term “Constitutionalist” but not the phrases “fought against the Constitutionalist” or “fought the Constitutionalist.” Using this framework, I extracted quantifiable data on the composition of governors and Congress during and after the Porfiriato. The criteria by which each attribute was coded are listed in the dictionary provided in the Appendix.

Hypotheses 1-3 concern the relationship between power and political office during the Porfiriato, while the hypotheses 4-5 concern the representation and composition of party affiliations afterward. The list of office holders precludes me from using the office as a dependent variable, as I cannot compare the attributes of individuals who did not hold office. An alternative, however, is to use the attributes of interest as the dependent variables. Each attribute of interest is binary across all individuals.
(the individual was either a hacendado or not), for which logit analysis is the most appropriate functional form. I therefore test each of the hypotheses using a series of logit models that regress particular attributes on the terms of office for each individual to determine the probability of someone with that attribute holding office at that time.

I operationalized the concept of coercive power by exploiting two attributes. First, I indicated whether the individual had prior military experience. This was determined by identifying whether a rank was listed under prior military experience. The importance of the military is emphasized by Garner (2001): “[o]ne of the particular features of the Mexican case was that the maintenance of political authority relied not only on the mastery of informal, personalist or clientalist networks of power, but also on the ability to mobilize the support of the army” (pg. 32). I also coded whether the individual was described by Ai Camp (1991) in any field as being a “political boss” or “caudillo.”

As an indication of economic power deriving from landed wealth, I created a dummy variable indicating whether the individual was listed as a hacienda owner. Katz (1991), in particular, emphasizes the importance of haciendados. As Friedrich (1965) observed, local power arose as a “direct, political consequence of a polemical struggle over the principal means of production, land” (pg. 192). Hacendados were determined based on whether the individual was described as owner of or as having owned a hacienda, or if Ai Camp (1991) referred to him as an hacendado.91

I operationalized the notion of non-traditional forms of power in two ways. To capture financial activity, I coded whether an individual was listed as a stockholder, a shareholder of a company, a banker or bank owner, or an investor. Quantifying involvement in currency is meant to measure the turn away from agriculture to commercial activities. I also identified the association of each individual with academia, coding whether he ever served as dean, director, professor, or rector of a university. In so doing, I aimed to capture the involvement of policy-makers who had direct ties to universities. Finally, I created a dummy variable indicating whether the individual had a party affiliation. To meet this criterion the individual must be noted under party positions as having known affiliations with a political party. This includes the PLM,
PNR, PRM, PRI, PARM, Anti-reelectionist, or other.

The independent variables concern when each individual was in office. Ai Camp (1991) notes the terms that individuals served, for which my unit of analysis is person-year. Figure 6.1 shows how the number of individuals listed in each year is distributed over the temporal domain. Although some of the individuals in the sample had been in politics as early as 1850 or as late as 1950, the bulk of the data exists over the period 1885-1925. The average number of office holders for whom I have information in a given year is roughly 78, for a total sample of 525 unique individuals and 5075 person-year observations. To indicate congressional membership during the Porfiriato, I created a dummy variable which equals one for the years 1876-1911 and zero for the year 1912 and thereafter. The second indicator is the start year of an individual’s time in office.

![Figure 6.1: Person-year observations for congressmen and governors, 1848-1973](Ai Camp 1991)

As control variables, I included the position that each individual held in a given year (senator, federal deputy, or governor) and the age of the individual. In addition, I coded the highest level of education, listed as none/unknown, primary, secondary, preparatory,
certificate, or degree. I also controlled, where applicable, for whether the individual was a hacienda owner, a military officer, a local power (political boss or caudillo), or a member of a political party. I included whether the individual was involved in finance or academia. Finally, I controlled for whether the individual came from a wealthy family, was a business owner, owned land, and if he was a known (reported) supporter of Díaz. Summary statistics and correlations are available in the Appendix, as well as model estimates that do not include control variables.

6.4 Results

Figure 6.2 shows the proportion of office holders designated by Ai Camp (1991) as hacienda owners over the period 1850-1950, and their associated confidence intervals. Gray shading denotes the span of years recognized as the Porfiriato (1876-1911), with light gray signifying the term of González (1880-1884). Between 1848 and 1884 the confidence intervals on hacienda owners are considerably large, due to the number of observations. However, during the Porfiriato a consistent proportion of office-holders—about twenty percent of the sample—were hacendados. The proportion of the sample that consisted of hacienda owners is markedly different after the Porfiriato; by the time of the creation of the PNR, virtually no congressman or governor owned a hacienda.
In stark contrast to the fairly steady representation of hacienda owners between 1876 and 1911, Figure 6.3 shows that the influence of military officers in political offices was initially quite high. During Porfirio Díaz’s first term in office, nearly one in two office holders was a member of the armed forces. The trend shows a steady linear decrease, however, beginning with Porfirio Díaz’s second term. Additionally, the importance of controlling for the ranks held by Constitutionalist and other revolutionary fighters is illustrated by the dramatic spike in individuals with military rank after Díaz’s exile. This number reached a peak in 1917, which may have occurred as a result of Carranza rewarding the Constitutionalist compatriots who brought him to office. The proportion of political offices held by local strongmen or political bosses (Figure 6.4) shows a trend that is similar to that of military officers during the Porfiriato. Though congressmembers and governors were about as likely to be local bosses as hacienda owners at the beginning of Porfirio Díaz’s time in office, the number steadily decreased thereafter.
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show that while military officers and local authorities were decreasing in number among governorships and congressional seats, there was an increase in office holders who were associated with financial and academic activities. The number of office holders associated with financial activities increased steadily.
throughout the Porfiriato and reached its climax around 1902, thereafter decreasing almost as steadily. Similarly, the number of office holders associated with academic positions increased throughout the Porfiriato and declined somewhat more slowly—though not steadily—through the Revolution. These trends help to support the notion that developments during the administration of Porfirio Díaz encouraged the rise of actors with financial and ideological motives to undermine his continuation in office.

Figure 6.5: Proportion of financially active individuals in sample, 1850-1950
Lastly, Figure 6.7 shows that party affiliations among office holders were not nonexistent during the Porfiriato, but that they expanded considerably afterward. At the time of the creation of the PNR, nearly one in two office holders belonged to a political party. The Revolution in Mexico may therefore have removed the lid from political activity, which eventually found expression in the creation of the PNR. Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show that the number of office holders associated with agrarian and labor groups also increased considerably after the Revolution. The political representation of agrarian and labor groups after the Porfiriato—and their connection to party affiliation—further reinforce the argument that new social actors became involved in politics, in part through the formation of political parties.
Figure 6.7: Proportion of party affiliations in sample, 1850-1950

Figure 6.8: Proportion of agrarian affiliations in sample, 1850-1950
The trends in the attributes of congressmen and governors during and after the Porfiriato illustrate the possibility that changes in the formal representation of various constituencies were significantly different over this period. To test this empirically, I estimate a series of logit models predicting whether congressmen and governors during and after the Porfiriato were hacendados, military officers, or local authorities, respectively. I restricted the sample to the years that constituted the Porfiriato (1876-1911) and afterwards. The results are shown in Table 6.1. The coefficients that are reported show the log-odds that an official exemplified each trait, the values of which can be converted to odds ratios by exponentiating the coefficient. A positive value indicates an expected increase in the log-odds, while a negative value indicates a decrease in the expected log-odds (lower odds).

According to the first model, a deputy, senator, or governor was significantly more likely to be a hacendado during the Porfiriato rather than after. The effect is quite large—the odds were roughly six to one. As would be expected, hacendados were strongly and positively associated with land ownership. Compared to congressmen, hacendados were more common among governors. They were positively associated with
<table>
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<th>hacendado (β)</th>
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<th>caudillos/jefe (β)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(σ)</td>
<td>(σ)</td>
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<td>-0.262 (0.207)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.320 (0.133)</td>
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<td>1.606 (0.191)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.059 (0.151)</td>
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<td>1.573 (0.137)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>revolution</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.859 (0.216)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caudillo/jefe</td>
<td>-0.845 (0.241)</td>
<td>0.201 (0.144)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family wealth</td>
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<td>-0.311 (0.147)</td>
<td>0.664 (0.170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
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<td>-0.113 (0.144)</td>
<td>0.715 (0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financial</td>
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<td>0.257 (0.305)</td>
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<tr>
<td>academic</td>
<td>-1.128 (0.197)</td>
<td>-1.182 (0.124)</td>
<td>-0.972 (0.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pro-diaz</td>
<td>0.711 (0.190)</td>
<td>0.641 (0.189)</td>
<td>1.106 (0.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party</td>
<td>-1.692 (0.336)</td>
<td>-0.722 (0.111)</td>
<td>0.558 (0.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-5.275 (0.395)</td>
<td>0.403 (0.204)</td>
<td>-4.640 (0.353)</td>
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</table>

N 4565 4685 4685
Log-likelihood -1011 -1974 -1039
Pseudo R² 0.219 0.358 0.180

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 6.1: Logit analysis predicting hacendados, military, and local authority in political office

family wealth, business ownership, financial activity, and having a reputation of being pro-Díaz. Hacendados in political positions were also strongly and negatively associated with academic activity, party affiliation, or being a local strongman (caudillo). All of these relationships are significant below a one-percent probability of error. Hacendados were significantly more likely to have had military experience, although the relationship is only slightly less significant than other relationships.

Specified in the same way as the first model, the coefficient associated with the porfiriato dummy is not significant in the second model, suggesting that military officers were no more likely during the Porfiriato than after (Table 9.6 in the Appendix). The estimate is made significant, however, by the inclusion of dummy variables indicating
whether the office holder supported the Constitutionalists or other revolutionaries that unseated Díaz. The reason for the correction is because the Constitutionalist Army and other revolutionary armies also assigned their soldiers ranks. When I control for participation in these armies, therefore, the sign is significant and in the expected direction. Office holders were more likely to be associated with military rank during the Porfiriato rather than after. I argue that this can be taken as an indication that congressmen and governors were more likely to be drawn from the federal army during the Díaz administration.

The profiles of political officials with military experience share some similarities with hacendados. They were more likely to be governors, more likely to be associated with pro-Díaz sentiment, and less likely to be associated with academic or party affiliation. Unlike in the first model, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between hacienda ownership and military experience. Moreover, military experience was significantly and negatively related to land ownership, in general. Officers were also significantly less likely to have come from a wealthy family—which is significant below a five-percent probability of error—and exhibit no significant relationship with business or financial activity. They were also significantly more likely to have no (or unknown) education, which supports the common observation that servicemen tended to come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Geddes 2003, Nordlinger 1977). Although caudillaje is often defined as local authority derived from coercive authority, military experience was not significantly associated with being a caudillo or political boss. The above findings are consistent regardless of whether or not I control for participation in Constitutionalist or revolutionary activities.

In the model predicting caudillos and political bosses (jefes), the coefficient on the porfiriato dummy is also positive and significant; the odds of a congressman or governor also being a local authority were roughly 2.5 to 1. Local strongmen were significantly more likely to be governors than congressmen as well. Interestingly, caudillos and political bosses were significantly more likely to be landed, but less likely to be hacendados. This finding reinforces, in part, the expectation that land ownership before Díaz was based on
coercive ability. Caudillos and political bosses were more likely to come from a wealthy family or own a business, and they were also more likely to be pro-Díaz. While they were significantly less likely to hold academic positions, they were more likely to be associated with a political party. This finding speaks to the observation that, prior to the Revolution, such parties tended be constructed around individuals on the basis of clientelism and personal networks. Though rare, the result suggests that party participation may have been a local phenomenon during the Díaz administration.

By all accounts, there appears to be support for the hypothesis that power, in the form of landed wealth or coercive ability, was more likely to be represented in political office during the Porfiriato. To see the effect during the Porfiriato, I specified the same models as those shown in Table 6.1 but replaced the Porfiriato dummy with years in office. The sample is therefore restricted to the years corresponding to Díaz’s second term in office in 1884 until his ouster in 1911. The results are shown in Table 6.2. Almost all of the previously identified relationships between the control variables and the dependent variables are consistent. Some exceptions are that in the first model hacendados are no longer significantly associated with governorships over congressional seats, nor with military experience. In addition, the relationship between caudillos/jefes and family wealth (model three) is no longer significant.

When I replace the dummy variable for the Porfiriato with a year count, the relationship between time and hacendados is not significant. Thus, while hacendados were more likely during the Díaz administration than afterward, their representation in political office did not significantly decline during his presidency. Nevertheless, military experience and local authority are negatively associated with year, and significant below a one-percent probability of error. Moreover, in the second model, the direction and significance of the coefficient on year does not change if I omit constitutional and revolutionary participation. Thus, the representation of military experience in political office decreased during the Porfiriato regardless of whether the individual later participated in the revolt against Díaz. The results demonstrate that military and local strongman influence decreased significantly throughout the period 1884-1911.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>hacendado $\beta$ (σ)</th>
<th>military $\beta$ (σ)</th>
<th>caudillos/jefe $\beta$ (σ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>year</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.052 (0.009) ***</td>
<td>-0.082 (0.014) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>0.019 (0.008) ***</td>
<td>0.034 (0.006) ***</td>
<td>0.053 (0.011) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary</td>
<td>0.315 (0.205)</td>
<td>-1.306 (0.179) ***</td>
<td>0.121 (0.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary</td>
<td>(omitted)</td>
<td>-2.238 (0.310) ***</td>
<td>2.491 (0.341) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>preparatory</td>
<td>0.585 (0.265) **</td>
<td>-3.070 (0.210) ***</td>
<td>-0.256 (0.374)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certificate</td>
<td>(omitted)</td>
<td>-4.338 (1.081) ***</td>
<td>6.058 (1.114) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degree</td>
<td>0.527 (0.214) **</td>
<td>-3.111 (0.157) ***</td>
<td>-0.086 (0.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governor</td>
<td>0.132 (0.151)</td>
<td>0.315 (0.136) **</td>
<td>0.610 (0.179) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hacendado</td>
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<td>-1.000 (0.301) ***</td>
<td>1.678 (0.235) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landed</td>
<td>0.727 (0.218) ***</td>
<td>-0.981 (0.233) ***</td>
<td>1.678 (0.235) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military rank</td>
<td>0.227 (0.186)</td>
<td>1.826 (0.659) ***</td>
<td>-0.431 (0.210) **</td>
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<tr>
<td>constitutionalist revolution (omitted)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caudillo/jefe</td>
<td>-1.080 (0.297) ***</td>
<td>-0.359 (0.201) *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family wealth</td>
<td>0.657 (0.178) ***</td>
<td>-0.472 (0.195) **</td>
<td>-0.220 (0.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
<td>1.096 (0.190) ***</td>
<td>-0.059 (0.224)</td>
<td>0.891 (0.214) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financial</td>
<td>1.205 (0.231) ***</td>
<td>-0.030 (0.235)</td>
<td>0.558 (0.348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>academic</td>
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<td>-1.446 (0.190) ***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-3.589 (0.521)</td>
<td>2.375 (0.433) ***</td>
<td>-1.787 (0.614) ***</td>
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N 2313 2408 2408
Log-likelihood -769 -944 -561
Pseudo R$^2$ 0.143 0.402 0.268

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6.2: Logit analysis predicting hacendados, military, and local authority in political office
Table 6.3 shows a similarly specified model to Table 6.2, but predicts whether office-holders in later years were more likely to be involved in finance or academia. This serves to help answer the question of what kind of person replaced coercive officials during the waning influence of military officers and local bosses. The estimate associated with year in both models confirms that representation of financial sectors and universities significantly increased during the Porfiriato. Individuals associated with academic positions were significantly less likely to be governors, while there is no significant relationship for those associated with financial activity. Interestingly, those in academic positions were significantly less likely to be hacendados or landed, while those involved in finance were more likely to own a hacienda. This may reflect Díaz’s encouragement of the members of the old oligarchy that remained to seek out investments as an alternative to political office (Katz 1991). In contrast, office holders associated with academic positions were significantly more likely to own a business, while no relationship exists with those who were involved in financial activity.

Academics were significantly less likely to hold rank, but there is no significant relationship between financial activity and military experience. The same relationships exist for each with caudillo or jefe status. Financial activity and academic positions are not significantly related to each other, nor do they appear to be significantly associated with party activity. It is worthwhile to note that, in stark contrast to hacendados, military officers, or local strongmen—all of which were significantly associated with older individuals—office holders engaged in financial activity or academia were significantly younger. This finding supports the notion that a younger generation of individuals emerged from the development of the Porfiriato.

Finally, Table 6.4 shows the results of a logit model predicting whether office-holders were more likely to be associated with political parties after the Porfiriato. Whereas the odds of an office holder being a caudillo or political boss during the Porfiriato was roughly 2.5 to 1, these were roughly the same odds of an office holder being a party member after the Porfiriato. This finding is significant below a one-percent probability of error. Party membership is significantly and negatively associated with age, indicating
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<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>$(\sigma)$</td>
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<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
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<td>(0.005)</td>
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<td>preparatory</td>
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<td>*</td>
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<td>1.149</td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
<td>***</td>
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<td>governor</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
<td>-1.014</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
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<tr>
<td>hacendado</td>
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<td>(0.254)</td>
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<td>-0.435</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
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<td>(0.241)</td>
<td>-2.237</td>
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<td>caudillo/jefe</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>(0.368)</td>
<td>-0.830</td>
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<td>family wealth</td>
<td>1.143</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.105</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.730)</td>
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<td>Log-likelihood</td>
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<td>Pseudo R$^2$</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.214</td>
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</table>

* *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6.3: Logit analysis predicting financial, academic activity in political office
that party members tended to be younger individuals. They were significantly more likely to be congressmen than governors. Party members after the Porfiriato were also strongly and negatively associated with hacienda ownership, military rank, or financial activity. However, they continued to be associated with local power (caudillo/jefe), as well as family wealth.

The results in Table 6.4 provide considerable support for the hypothesis that party members were more likely to exist in political office after Díaz’s administration. The finding is intuitive, insofar as historiographers assert that he actively suppressed the formation of political parties. Another important finding, however, is that party members in political offices were more likely to be associated with agrarian and labor groups. A party member was nearly as likely to have connections to a populist group as he was to

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<td>(0.088) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>(0.003) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary</td>
<td>1.088</td>
<td>(0.134) ***</td>
</tr>
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<td>secondary</td>
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<td>(0.209)</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.156)</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.243)</td>
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<td>degree</td>
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<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
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<td>governor</td>
<td>-0.278</td>
<td>(0.097)  ***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.334)  ***</td>
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<td>landed (omitted)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military rank</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>(0.098)  **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caudillo/jefe</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>(0.163)  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family wealth</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>(0.137)  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
<td>-0.167</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financial</td>
<td>-0.526</td>
<td>(0.210)  **</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.149</td>
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<td>(0.255)</td>
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<td>agrarian</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>(0.177)  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labor</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>(0.122)  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>-1.049</td>
<td>(0.209)  ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 4436
Log-likelihood = -2153
Pseudo R$^2$ = 0.135

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6.4: Logit analysis predicting party membership in political office
be in office after the Porfiriato. These relationships are significant below a one-percent probability of error. The results therefore support the notion that Porfirian development inspired mass activity and created newfound demands to be addressed through the administrations of Obregón, Calles, and Cardénas. As shown by Table 6.4, after the Porfiriato political office became tightly intertwined with both party membership and populist interests.

6.5 Discussion

As a whole, the results provide considerable support for the argument that politics during the Restored Republic (1867-1876) and the Porfiriato involved the coordination of interests among powerful elites and their diminished influence in office. Hacendados, military officers, and local bosses were all more likely to be represented in the Congress during the years of Porfirio Díaz’s regime, as opposed to afterward. But while the representation of the military and local powers decreased with the passing years of the Porfiriato, the same cannot be said of power derived from landed wealth. The peak of hacendado representation in office—either governorships or congress—occurred just at the turn of the century, and began to decline thereafter.

The influence of hacienda owners, therefore, did not linearly decline during the Porfiriato, as suggested by Figure 6.2. One reason that this may have been the case is that hacienda owners, as property holders, were more intractable and thus harder to remove from office. Alternatively, Díaz may have seen the accumulation of land as a necessary part of his plan for economic development, which augmented the benefits acquired to hacendados in his administration. Nowhere was the rate of increase higher among hacienda owners than just after the González administration, which corresponded with land denunciation laws passed in 1884. Unfortunately, statistics on the ownership of land and the number of haciendas are not readily available. Revisionist literature also calls some estimates into question, one of which is how haciendas should be defined (Knight 1992, Van Young 1983). It is reasonable to think that the number of haciendas—or the
economic predominance of haciendas—did not decline throughout the Porfiriato, however. Knight (1991) claims that haciendas remained the “keystone of rural production in 1910” (pg. 103).

Controlling for the different attributes—hacienda ownership, military membership, and caudillo or local boss status—shows interesting interrelations regarding how I operationalized material and coercive power. According to the results, the relationship between hacienda ownership and military membership is not strong; in addition, hacendados were significantly unlikely to be considered caudillos or political bosses. Likewise, congressmen and governors who held military rank were not strongly related with local authority. While hacendados and local bosses were significantly more likely to be landed, members of the military were significantly less likely to be land-owners. These findings support historiographical accounts that hacendados, the military, and local authorities constituted very different sources of political power that played a role in shaping the Díaz regime.

The results also demonstrate that, in conjunction with changes in the representation of hacendados, military officers, and caudillos during the Porfiriato, representatives became increasingly associated with commercial and academic activities. The changing attributes of politicians during this period therefore evidence the industrialization and modernization with which the Díaz regime has been credited. In turn, there was a wave of party representation that followed the Porfiriato and which was strongly associated with the connections to agrarian and labor groups. The stated intentions of Plutarco Calles to integrate mass-based groups in a political party, along with subsequent restructuring of the PNR by Cárdenas and Camacho, are borne out through the connection of early party members in official positions to groups that represented the interests of agrarians and labor.

Analyzing the composition of political offices among those individuals whom Ai Camp (1991) provided biographies supports the hypotheses that derive from the historical narrative of Mexico and the general theory of institution-building. In short, I argued that politics during the Porfiriato served to coordinate the actions and preferences of powerful
elite, eventually subordinating them to the institution. Subsequent stability enabled developments that engendered a new wave of politicians not identified by “traditional” forms of power, which was succeeded still by a wave of mass-based politicians. Though not perfectly identified, the results shown here evince that such trends did occur, at least among governors and congressmen for whom biographical information was easily obtainable. These relationships are robust to the rare-event logit specification, and nearly all of them are robust to individual-clustered standard errors, thus remaining valid in the face of related but unobserved factors.

Despite the support lent to my hypotheses, the downward trend in gubernatorial and congressional representation of local elites and military officers could have occurred for a number of reasons. For one, economic changes associated with the Porfiriato might have increased opportunity costs, motivating hacendados and officers to pursue alternative careers. This is unlikely to be borne out in the analysis, however, as Ai Camp (1991) noted if a person in office had ever owned a hacienda or fought in the military. Similarly, there may have been structural changes in local power and military service, such that local bosses or enlisted men were less common. Given the decrease in conflicts that were associated with the Porfiriato, this is likely; however, the decreasing relevance of these types of actors complements, rather than obviates, the story being told here. That is to say, as political institutions, caudillaje and the military became subordinate to alternative forms of political participation. It is also possible—and indeed, it has been suggested by some historiographers—that the institutions themselves did not wane, but that Díaz actively displaced them [Bryan 1976, Friedrich 1965, Hamnett 1996, Katz 1991, Meyer 1977]. Nevertheless, if it is true, his ability to do so should have come from the initial contracts that were initially worked out. Thus, whether the decline of those individuals in Congress was due to decreasing numbers, diminished value, or intentional targeting, my argument remains that it occurred as a result of an initial ‘contract’ between powerful individuals that was worked out in the legislature.

The analyses, in combination with visualizations of various attributes of governors and congressmen, suggest that substantial socioeconomic changes occurred between the
establishment of *el congreso* and the first national political party. In particular, the empirical results undergirding the historical narrative of Mexican political development provide evidence of the particular pattern of development outlined by a theory on the timing of autocratic institutions. It confirms the expectation that in non-democratic settings, a congress may play a crucial role in mitigating the violence potential of powerful elites prior to the inclusion of citizens through a political party. As suggested by Svolik (2012) and implied by “classic” works on the development of democracy such as Dahl (1971) and Moore (1966), the effect of legislatures and political parties as authoritarian institutions may differ with regard to how they moderate interactions between the leader and elites, and between the subsequent regime and the masses.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter set out to investigate whether there were discernible patterns in the composition of political offices during and after the administration of Porfirio Díaz. Process-tracing the events leading up to and through the Porfiriato suggested that Díaz’s administration was preceded by considerable violence that necessitated, first, coordinating the interests of powerful elites; particularly, individuals with coercive power. By analyzing the descriptions of office holders through political biographies provided by Ai Camp (1991), I found evidence supporting this description. Bryan (1976) asked whether the army constituted a politically relevant interest group during the Díaz regime. The results demonstrate that it did, insofar as military officers were represented in congressional seats and governorships. Members of the federal army and local strongmen were more likely to be governors or congressmen during, as opposed to after, the Porfiriato. Their presence in political office significantly declined throughout Díaz’s second term in office, a period in which historiographers asserted that Díaz consolidated his personal power.

Figure 6.10 provides a simplified representation of the argument that I set out to examine in this chapter. It shows three “waves” constituting associations with the military and local authorities, academics and finance, and political parties in governorships and
congressional offices. Though a generalization of the trends that I hypothesized, it fairly clearly illustrates the changing representation of coercive power during Díaz’s administration. It was replaced by a new set of actors who had benefited from the development that he promoted, as illustrated by the rise of academics and financial investors in political office. Corresponding social developments nevertheless created pressure for a change in institutions. This change is reflected in the significant increase in party affiliations that occurred afterward, as well as the expounding revolution brought about by his unwillingness to tolerate it.

![Figure 6.10: Proportion of military and caudillo, academic and financial, and party affiliations in the sample, 1884-1930](image)

To the extent that people with power based on landed wealth and coercion were declining in political office during the Porfiriato, I hypothesized that they were replaced by individuals not associated with coercive abilities or land, but with capital and education. The results showed a significant increase in these individuals during Díaz’s administration. There is thus some illustrative evidence that the development that occurred during the Porfiriato created new actors. The general theory, in accordance with process-tracing, also suggested that the emergence of new actors prompted institutional complexification, which was met in part by the creation of a political
party. The results confirm that, following the ouster of Díaz from office, the number of office holders associated with political parties significantly increased, in tandem with populist affiliations such as labor unions and agrarian groups. As a whole, therefore, the hypotheses find considerable support regarding the composition of offices during the Porfiriato, speaking to the potential roles that each institution might have played in early Mexican politics. The data on political biographies strongly confirm the notion that the legislature and political parties occurred at distinctly different times, for distinctly different reasons.
Chapter 7

Analyzing Institutional Sequences

I have argued that state building can be characterized as a sequence in which competition among elites is first formalized, followed by an increase in participation by non-elites. In general, the development of an oligarchy that leads to increasing institutional complexity is a trend that is observable across countries. This modal path helps to explain the timing and success of political institutions in dictatorships. It also helps to explain why the creation and the timing of authoritarian institutions may be fundamentally different from patterns of institutional change within democracies.

By process tracing the consolidation of the national government in Mexico, I provided supporting evidence that the national legislature helped to coordinate the activities of elites, engendering the stability that characterized the Porfiriato. In nineteenth-century Mexico, the federal government was forged out of protracted post-independence conflicts between multiple actors with different ideologies. As I demonstrated elsewhere, the administration of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911) was formative because of its ability to attain stability, largely through the use of a regularly meeting Congress composed of regional bosses and military officers (Bryan 1976, Cosío Villegas 1960). After an unprecedented thirty-year period of stability, however, elites who had been co-opted drew on the support of a newly-strengthened middle class and the labor sector that had developed (Camín and Meyer 1993, Meyer 1977, Cosío Villegas 1960). The Mexican Revolution that began in 1911 asserted the political relevance of the masses and led to the construction of a national party that included agrarian and labor representatives (Collier and Collier 1991, Grayson 2007, Schmitt 1966).
One implication from the case of Mexico is that the differences between parties and legislatures as authoritarian institutions may stem from the roles that they play in facilitating elite coordination and mass integration. The pattern of political development that is observed in Mexico reinforces extant theoretical arguments that the modal process of statebuilding is one in which competition is first institutionalized among elites followed by the possible institutionalization of actors who threaten from below. But to what extent is the pattern of institutional development in early Mexico characteristic of other states? This chapter examines whether there is a modal sequence of institutional change that is associated with statebuilding. Specifically, I test the claim that a competitive arrangement first emerges in successful autocracies from the interaction of elites, after which mass politics may follow.

Using a sample of data on political institutions between 1800 and 2013, I examine the frequencies of different levels of contestation and participation over time. I compare patterns involving changes to and from greater levels of executive recruitment and political competition. Doing so demonstrates that countries were more likely to transition to institutional settings that were open on both fronts after a period of relatively open executive recruitment and closed political competition. I also find that countries with no prior experience with an open form of political competition were more likely to turn to it if they had previously had an open form of executive recruitment. I then turn attention to whether common long-term patterns exist in the data. Using an empirical approach that is relatively novel within political science, I group together similar patterns of institutional change based on contestation and participation. In addition to identifying whether there are predominant paths of institutional development, the results help to elucidate on the mechanisms that affect institutional patterns. In the following section, I briefly summarize the theoretical argument and describe attempts to operationalize
dimensions of contestation and participation.

7.1 The Argument

Paths to polyarchy

The expectation that statebuilding has an implicit order underlies much of the literature on dictatorship and democratization. Noting that few leaders are capable of ruling with absolute power, scholars argue that it is in a leader’s interest to offer to redistribute rents to a minimal number of her “peers” in exchange for her authority (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009a, Svolik 2009). The “problem of authoritarian power-sharing” involves regularizing the terms of competition among threatening domestic contenders, either by transferring private benefits to them or ceding some decision-making capability (Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Svolik 2012). This describes a “limited-access order,” in which violence is concentrated among a few powerful individuals (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009a). Analogous language that connotes politics that is exclusive to one group includes references to “the elites and the citizens” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), “the rich and the poor” (Boix 2003), and “the winning coalition” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005).

Thus, while the ability to control politics cannot be restricted to one person, the most likely observation should be a limited number of individuals with the capability to influence politics. Institutionalizing their interactions facilitates contract enforcement by enhancing information gathering and transparency, making it easier for elites to coordinate against the leader should he overstep his boundaries in the future (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011, Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014). To the extent that it is a credible arrangement involving the actors who pose the greatest threat, this form of interaction should reinforce dictatorship by circumscribing politics vis-à-vis the rest of the populace. An institution that fosters exchanges between powerful individuals—by regularizing competition among them and enhancing the perceived chances for each to secure private benefits—should therefore constitute a stable form of politics among non-democracies.
The transition from a limited-access order to an open-access order, however, may be predicated on the dispersal of power outside of the exclusive circle of regime insiders. When faced with an irrepresible threat to the status quo, members within the ruling circle must either compromise or risk being overthrown (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In the same way that a political institution can help to forestall an elite uprising against the leader, elites may turn to institutions such as political parties as a credible signal of their intent to include formerly excluded individuals in future interactions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) demonstrated that democracy emerges as an equilibrium in this setting, and North (1981) and Moore (1966) argue through historical examples that democracy is a product of revolutions resulting from modernization. However, “democracy” in the sense used by these authors refers to increased political participation through electoral politics, on which party-based authoritarian regimes have shown capable of capitalizing (Levitsky and Way 2002 2010 Magaloni 2008b Schedler 2002). Dictatorship or democracy can therefore follow from mass inclusion in the sequence of institutionalization. Simply put, the “sequence” in question can be represented by the following hypothesis:

H1: Institutions associated with mass participation are more likely in states that had prior experience with restricted politics involving elite competition.

The general intuition that statebuilding occurred through elite coordination followed by mass coordination was explicitly expressed by Dahl (1971), who argued that “polyarchy” could be understood along two theoretical dimensions, contestation and participation. Movement along these dimensions toward democracy, Dahl argued, could occur in three ways. The first pathway involved a closed regime increasing opportunities for contestation, followed by greater inclusiveness. In the second pathway inclusiveness preceded liberalization, while the third pathway denoted a simultaneous increase on both dimensions. According to Dahl (1971), the first pathway to democracy—in which competitive politics preceded expanded political participation—was the most common and most stable sequence of political development:
The other two paths are more dangerous, and for the same reason: to arrive at a viable system of mutual security is a difficult matter at best; the greater the number of people and the variety and disparity of interests involved, the more difficult the task and the greater the time required. Tolerance and mutual security are more likely to develop among a small elite sharing similar perspectives than among a large and heterogeneous collection of leaders representing social strata with widely varying goals, interests, and outlooks. This is why the first path is more likely than the other two to produce stable transformations away from hegemony toward polyarchy (Dahl 1971, pgs. 36-37).

The parsimonious proposition offered by Dahl (1971) contributed to an increased interest in institutional sequences. His forebears included Lipset (1959), Huntington (1965), and Rustow (1970). In the last decade, scholars debated whether stronger, more robust states resulted from democratization that followed necessary prerequisites such as a minimum level of economic development. Wright (2008b) considered the impact of political competition on democratic survival, aiming to test the logical implication following from Dahl’s argument that political competition initially needs be restricted in the development of democracy. Using a measure of political competition that captures “the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena,” Wright (2008b) found that among newer democracies those with a higher initial level of competition were more durable. The finding is taken as evidence contradicting Dahl’s argument. Wright (2008b) also showed that new democracies with lower levels of initial political competition are more likely incur civil conflict, and that economic development does not significantly explain democratic survival among new democracies.

Following the efforts of Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado (2008) Miller (2015) also explored Dahl’s argument, examining the relationship between autocratic elections and democratic survival. Using principal components analysis on a variety of indicators of democracy from 1815, he produced a composite measure of both contestation and participation. Figure 7.1 is a replication of Figure 4 in Miller (2015), which shows levels of participation and contestation for 1815-1940 and 1972-2004, respectively. As illustrated by the figure and noted by the author, higher levels of contestation over participation occurred in electoral regimes prior to 1940, after which participation appears
to overshadow contestation. Miller (2015) also finds that the history of contestation in a country predicts democratization as well as democratic survival, but that participation shows a different relationship. As might be anticipated by the literature on electoral authoritarianism, participation is positively related to democratic survival but not to democratization.

The notion of sequencing in the process of statebuilding is a theoretically interesting concept that deserves further investigation. Firstly, however, the type of sequence that characterizes statebuilding must be conceptually refined. It is important to note that the pathways suggested by Dahl (1971) do not require, as an initial condition, a minimum level of economic development or ‘modernization’. It also does not assume that rule of law must occur first, a central issue of contention among those who have debated over “democratic sequentialism” (Fukuyama 2011, Mansfield and Snyder 2007, Carothers 2007). In this way, whether competition naturally precedes participation also differs in scope from preconditions listed by Huntington (1968). Rather, the institutional ‘sequence’ embodied by contestation and participation may reflect the foremost need to establish power-sharing and the subsequent need to exert control, as identified by Svolik (2012). If competition refers to the regularization of contention and participation the means by which members of society are engaged more broadly, it makes sense to conceive of such a sequence not as a determinant of democratic survival, but also as one of autocratic survival. The types of interactions that are thought to induce changes in levels of competition and participation also support the idea that one occurs before the other (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Boix 2003, Svolik 2012).

Clarifying what is meant by ‘competition’ and ‘participation’, and distinguishing between them, is also necessary to create conceptually valid measures by which to empirically evaluate institutional change. To this end, scholars have endeavored to identify the latent dimensions of competition and participation from among existing measures of political institutions (Coppedge 2002, Coppedge and Reinicke 1990, Coppedge et al. 2011). Both Wright (2008a) and Miller (2015) made useful strides toward evaluating the two dimensions, but the concepts that they used remain somewhat
Participation and contestation, 1815–1940

Participation and contestation, 1972–2004

Figure 7.1: Replication of Figure 4 from Miller (2015)
biased by their focus on democracy. For example, while Wright (2008b) was concerned with political competition, the measure that he used–PARCOMP, from the Polity IV project–refers only to the extent of government restriction on political competition. A second component which was not incorporated concerns the degree to which political participation is institutionalized (PARREG). The importance of accounting for the regulation of participation is exemplified by the fact that, outside of one-party states and Western democracies, participation can be unregulated and may not be characterized by national political organizations. “In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion among shifting coalitions of partisan groups” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014, pg. 26). Similarly, Miller (2015) does not conceive of contestation as an individual-level phenomenon, but as one that occurs between organizations. The author measured contestation based on the existence of political parties and the freedom of electoral competition, and participation by suffrage and electoral turnout. Moreover, neither of the authors have considered whether such elements occur in a sequence, as Dahl (1971) implied.

I therefore attempt to build on the empirical efforts of Wright (2008b) and Miller (2015) to verify whether political institutions occur in a sequence. In doing so, however, I step away from the expectation that it occurs as a condition of democracy or that it supports democracies in particular. In support of my theoretical expectations that different sets of institutional choices arise from interactions involving the leader, elites, and the masses, I distinguish between competition and participation with finer distinction and examine whether there are generalizable patterns with which each has changed over time. In line with the discrete nature of such changes which is implied by the term ‘sequence’, I resume the undertaking of Wright (2008b) and compare categories of contestation and participation based on the competitiveness and the regulation of political participation.
7.2 Research Design

Is there a sequence of institutional change?

To determine whether there are any generalizable sequences of institutional change, I rely on a set of country-level indicators from the Polity IV project that help to distinguish levels of contestation and participation. The Polity IV project is a conceptual scheme created to identify authority characteristics for quantitative analysis. Although the aggregate Polity score has been criticized as a continuous measure of the level of democracy (examples include Gleditsch and Ward [1997], Munck and Verkuilen [2002], and Vreeland [2008]), the six “component variables” that are used to construct it are also available. ‘Contestation’, which I use interchangeably with ‘competition’ and ‘competitiveness’, stands for the “extent of permissible opposition, public contestation, or political competition” that is available to “at least some members of the political system who wish to contest the conduct of the government” (Dahl [1971] pg. 4). I indicate this using three component variables that represent the “structural characteristics by which chief executives are recruited” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers [2014] pg. 20).  

The first, XRREG, concerns the extent to which there are “institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power,” and can be either unregulated, designational/transitional, or regulated. Where the transfer of executive power is unregulated, such changes occur through forceful seizures of power. In designational/transitional polities the executive is chosen by a political elite or as part of a transitional arrangement after an unregulated seizure of power, while regulated successions are determined either by hereditary right or through competitive elections. The second component variable, XRCOMP, refers to the competitiveness of executive recruitment, or “the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers [2014] pg. 21). Executives may be determined by selection, as part of a dual executive or transitional framework, or through competitive elections. Finally, XROPEN measures the openness of executive recruitment and is designated as either closed, dual executive involving
selection, dual executive with election, or open.

By taking these three components together, I obtain an image of contestation that indicates the openness and regularity with which individuals can compete for the position of chief executive. It is important to use all three components of executive recruitment—unregulated selection, for example, implies a different form of competition than regulated selection. Their combined forms are embodied in the “concept variable” provided by Polity IV, which denotes distinct patterns of executive recruitment. The eight forms of recruitment that it identifies are ascription, dual executive involving ascription and designation, designation, self-selection, executive-guided transition, dual executive involving ascription and election, transitional or restricted elections, and competitive elections. To avoid making any assumptions about the power of the chief minister relative to the monarch, I combined dual executive systems that involve ascription and either designation or election with those that are based on ascription. I also combined the categories for guided transition and transitional or restricted elections into a “transitional” category, as the extent to which executive influence dominates recruitment in both of these are not clearly distinguishable.

I presume that the characteristics regarding the recruitment of executive selection condition political elites’ view of political competition more generally. The plausibility of this assumption is illustrated by tabulating the concept variable for executive recruitment with the measure provided by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) to indicate the status of the legislature, shown in Table 7.1. Legislatures are much more likely to exist and to be nonappointed in systems in which the executive is designated by a political elite, and in those that are transitional or competitive. The relationship is less strong when comparing the presence of parties in the legislature (Table 7.2), further demonstrating the utility of using executive recruitment to denote political competitiveness as individuals might perceive it.

Participation, according to Dahl (1971), refers to the proportion of the population that is engaged in the system of public contestation. Critical to the understanding of the effectiveness of public engagement, however, is an additional aspect of political
Table 7.1: Forms of executive recruitment and status of the legislature, 1946-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>closed</th>
<th>appointed</th>
<th>elected</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ascription</td>
<td>284 (42.77)</td>
<td>15 (2.26)</td>
<td>365 (54.97)</td>
<td>664 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designation</td>
<td>182 (8.56)</td>
<td>127 (5.97)</td>
<td>1817 (85.47)</td>
<td>2126 (100)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Self-selection</td>
<td>436 (74.15)</td>
<td>67 (11.39)</td>
<td>85 (14.46)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional</td>
<td>73 (6.39)</td>
<td>33 (2.89)</td>
<td>1037 (90.73)</td>
<td>1143 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>12 (0.41)</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>2945 (99.59)</td>
<td>2957 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>987 (13.19)</td>
<td>242 (3.24)</td>
<td>6249 (83.57)</td>
<td>7478 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Row percentages in parentheses.

Table 7.2: Forms of executive recruitment and parties in the legislature, 1946-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>regime party only</th>
<th>multiple parties</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ascription</td>
<td>510 (76.81)</td>
<td>65 (9.79)</td>
<td>89 (13.40)</td>
<td>664 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designation</td>
<td>235 (11.05)</td>
<td>1133 (53.29)</td>
<td>758 (35.65)</td>
<td>2126 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-selection</td>
<td>492 (83.67)</td>
<td>34 (5.78)</td>
<td>62 (10.54)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional</td>
<td>117 (10.24)</td>
<td>145 (12.67)</td>
<td>881 (77.08)</td>
<td>1143 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>15 (0.51)</td>
<td>28 (0.95)</td>
<td>2914 (98.55)</td>
<td>2957 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1524 (18.31)</td>
<td>1453 (18.79)</td>
<td>4831 (62.90)</td>
<td>7478 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Row percentages in parentheses.

participation, which is the manner in which citizens participate. It could be argued, for example, that in societies with fluid competition and shifting coalitions, the freedom to participate is not conducive to democracy (or mass politics) because the masses lack sufficient cohesiveness to form permanent groups to pressure the government. For this reason, I view the existence of political parties as a better indicator of participation than competition in a polity; political parties demonstrate organized political participation.

The Polity IV project also uses two component variables to indicate “the extent to which the political system enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014, pg. 25). PARREG refers to the degree to which political participation is regulated or institutionalized, and can be unregulated, multiple identity, sectarian, restricted, or regulated. Multiple identity and sectarian politics are distinguishable from restricted or regulated politics—and from each other—by the extent to which the interests of national groups are common and compatible. The second indicator of participation, PARCOMP, is that used by Wright (2008b). Though Polity
refers to this variable as the *competitiveness* of participation, the attributes that determine it characterize the the degree of government restriction on organized activity. Because it measures the participation of organized opposition, this component is better suited as an indicator of participation than it is for competition.

As noted in the codebook, “while PARREG measures the degree of organization and institutionalization of participation, PARCOMP measures the degree to which this political participation is free from government control” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014, pg. 67). The combined concept variable that includes them both therefore serves as a measure of the extent to which citizens engage the political system. The resulting forms that it characterizes are repressed competition, restricted competition, authoritarian-guided liberalization, uninstitutionalized competition, gradual transition from unregulated political participation, factional/restricted and factional competition, coercive liberalization, liberalization with limited and/or decreasing coercion, and institutionalized participation. I combined authoritarian-guided liberalization with coercive and limited-coercive liberalization to designate the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation without emphasizing the impetus for liberalization. I also combined uninstitutionalized competition, transitions from unregulated participation, and factional/restricted and factional competition to represent inchoate forms of political participation.

Factional competition does not mean that there are not durable political identities, however. As defined by Polity IV, in factional polities “[t]here are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level...but particularist/parochial agendas tend to be exclusive and uncompromising with limited social integration or accommodation across identity boundaries. As such, competition among them is often intense, antagonistic, hostile, and frequently coercive” (pg. 75). This combined group therefore represents weakness in political participation stemming from interpersonal and interorganizational problems, as opposed to participation that is repressed, restricted, guided, or institutionalized.

The effectiveness of using the measure of political competition provided by Polity to
Table 7.3: Forms of political competition and status of the legislature, 1946-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>closed</th>
<th>appointed</th>
<th>elected</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>na/Factional</td>
<td>89 (6.07)</td>
<td>33 (2.25)</td>
<td>1345 (91.68)</td>
<td>1467 (100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repressed</td>
<td>758 (33.41)</td>
<td>101 (4.45)</td>
<td>1410 (62.14)</td>
<td>2269 (100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>72 (8.79)</td>
<td>85 (10.38)</td>
<td>662 (80.83)</td>
<td>819 (100)</td>
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<td>Guided Lib.</td>
<td>70 (5.47)</td>
<td>23 (1.80)</td>
<td>1186 (92.73)</td>
<td>1279 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>1 (0.06)</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>1654 (99.94)</td>
<td>1655 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>990 (13.22)</td>
<td>242 (3.23)</td>
<td>6257 (83.55)</td>
<td>7489 (100)</td>
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</table>

Row percentages in parentheses.

Table 7.4: Forms of political competition and parties in the legislature, 1946-2008

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<th>nonpartisan</th>
<th>regime party only</th>
<th>multiple parties</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>na/Factional</td>
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<td>86 (5.86)</td>
<td>1261 (85.90)</td>
<td>1468 (100)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressed</td>
<td>974 (42.93)</td>
<td>1105 (48.70)</td>
<td>190 (8.37)</td>
<td>2269 (100)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>184 (22.47)</td>
<td>185 (22.59)</td>
<td>450 (54.95)</td>
<td>819 (100)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided Lib.</td>
<td>93 (7.27)</td>
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<td>1157 (90.46)</td>
<td>1279 (100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>1 (0.06)</td>
<td>0 (0.00)</td>
<td>1654 (99.94)</td>
<td>1655 (100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1373 (18.33)</td>
<td>1405 (18.76)</td>
<td>4712 (62.91)</td>
<td>7490 (100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Row percentages in parentheses.

represent political participation is demonstrated in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. They show the extent to which the levels correlate with the status of the legislature and parties in the legislature, respectively. Whereas there is a clear majority of observations with openly elected legislatures at any level of political participation, the differences between the levels are more pronounced regarding the status of parties in the legislature. The observations in which political participation was repressed are nearly evenly split with regard to having a nonpartisan legislature or a legislature dominated by the regime party, and almost half of polities with restricted political participation had either type of legislature. Political participation, as represented by the Polity component variable for political competition, therefore appears to measure the representation of political parties within the legislature better than the status of the legislature itself.

The two concept variables offered by the Polity IV project—exrec and polcomp—combine five of the six original component variables and provide fairly sound measures of the theoretical definitions envisioned by Dahl (1971). The sixth component
variable, \textit{XCONST}, concerns the extent to which there are institutionalized constraints on the power of the chief executive. I omitted this concept from the characterization of regime types, however, as I do not think executive constraints fundamental to the nature of political competition. Indeed, executive constraints are not considered in the Polity IV aggregation of variables that were meant to indicate levels of executive recruitment. Nevertheless, the relationship between institutional patterns and executive constraints can be examined using the conceptual variables identified above. In addition to the attributes that characterize executive recruitment and political competition, the Polity variables also indicate periods with institutional uncertainty. These periods are referred to as periods of interruption (e.g., foreign occupation), interregnum periods that represent the collapse of central political authority (e.g., civil war), and transition periods (e.g., constitutional convention). For reasons discussed above, I interpret executive recruitment and political competition from here on as \textit{political competition} and \textit{political participation}, respectively.

To gauge the validity of using the concept variables to interpret institutional patterns, I first examine them in the context of Mexico and Latin America more broadly. Figure 7.2 shows the levels of contestation and participation that were coded for the period 1822-2013. The figure shows breaks that correspond to major periods of upheaval in Mexico’s history–a period of transition following the end of the First Federal Republic (1834), interruptions due to the Mexican-American War (1846) and the imposition of Maximiliano I (1863), a transition accompanying the coup by Porfirio Díaz (1876), and the interregnum that began with the Mexican Revolution (1911). Prior to 1867, the data suggest that contestation was accomplished through self-selection. After the ouster of Maximiliano I, the executive was chosen by designation. Following the Revolution, the system appears to have returned to a system based on designation, as the PRI dominated electoral politics until its eventual loss in 2000. The period just prior to Mexico becoming a competitive system is also coded as transitional, likely denoting the 1994 electoral reform which gave independence to an electoral monitor and represented “[t]he most fundamental institutional reform in the construction of democracy in Mexico” (Magaloni 2008b, pg. 210).
The data on political participation in Mexico suggest that prior to the administration of Porfirio Díaz, the political activity was either nonexistent or factionalized. During the Porfiriato, organized political participation was repressed. At the end of the Mexican Revolution, politics was once again beset by factionalism. With the emergence of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario in 1929, however, the political system became one of restricted participation, which fits descriptions of the PRI’s electoral dominance (Bruhn 1997, Eisenstadt 2004, Magaloni 2008). Political participation became more factional in 1977, as an electoral reform enabled the legalization of additional political parties “with the expectation that additional participation would be channeled into futile efforts to win election races” (Klesner 1997). The change in coding to guided liberalization is likely an artifact of electoral reforms in 1996 that created more representative institutions, while the mark of factionalism associated with 1999 may reflect contention over the first national primary election.

Similarly, a plot of institutional changes in other Latin American countries (Figure 7.3) matches narratives of the major events that affected their political landscapes. In
the case of Nicaragua (a), one sees restricted political participation under the Somoza regime, the interregnum following the ouster of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979, and the transitional government represented by the election of FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega in 1984. In Colombia (b), the period representing the National Front—an electoral compromise between two previously violent political groups—is shown as a transitional form of contestation between 1958 and 1974. Participation is also coded as guided liberalization from this time until 1994, when a statutory law was passed that “intended to enhance citizen participation in elections” (Moreno 2005, pg. 492).98 The coding of contestation and participation in Brazil (c) evidences the 1964 military coup, as well as the gradual opening that occurred under General Ernesto Geisel and led to the 1985 presidential election.99

7.3 Analysis

Based on political events that occurred in Mexico and other countries in Latin America, the concept variables provided by Polity IV show considerable concept validity.
The apparent sensitivity of the data to institutional change, as well as the limited number of states denoted by each variable, make it a plausible place to start for analyzing sequences of institutional change involving contestation and participation. Using levels of competition and participation provided by the Polity IV component variables, I demonstrate the possibility of a modal path of political development in three ways. First, I visualize patterns of contestation and participation, and compare their frequencies over the period 1800-2013. Second, I calculate transitions between them and empirically test whether prior competition significantly predicts greater participation. Third, I generate similar groups of institutional patterns and examine possible causes for the differences between them.

**Frequencies**

Figure 7.4 shows a sequence index plot of levels of contestation and participation for a sample of 167 countries. Similar plots based on the original concept variables are available in the Appendix. Index plots represent a useful means by which to visualize sequences and to compare them side-by-side. A cursory examination of the figure suggests that ascription was the most likely form of contestation in the 19th century, and that as more countries entered the sample designation and institutionalized competition became more likely. As of the 1990s, the bulk of countries whose executive was determined by designation seems to have given way to transitional and competitive forms of contestation. The majority of countries in which executive office was determined by ascription also had repressed political participation, and institutionalized participation appears to have begun to take off in the 20th century. The latter half of the 20th century was characterized by repressive or institutionalized participation, which also became predominantly transitional or institutionalized by the 1990s.

Another way of viewing the same information is to plot the number of countries with each form of contestation and participation, as shown in Figure 7.6. I show the number of countries with each type, rather than the percentage, so as to not mislead the viewer regarding the size of the sample in each year. However, proportional figures are
Figure 7.4: Levels of contestation and participation, 1800-2013
Figure 7.5: Levels of contestation and participation, 1800-2013
provided in Appendix (Figure 9.3). The frequencies over time confirm the information ascertained through visual inspection of the sequences. Between 1800 and 1900, the most predominant type of competition among the countries in the sample involved executive office determined through ascription, and the overwhelming majority of states had factionalized or virtually no political participation until about 1950. By around 1910, ascriptive contestation was surpassed by executive selection based on designation and competitiveness, which represented the lion’s share of the sample until the 1990s. The 1990s saw a sharp increase in the number of transitional and competitive regimes, which accompanied a decline in contestation based on designation and self-selection. A gradual increase occurred throughout the 19th and 20th centuries in the number of countries with institutional participation, which surpassed factional/nonparticipatory regimes after 1950. There was a dramatic spike in the number of countries with repressed political participation in the latter half of the 20th century, while “guided liberalization” became the dominant form of political participation after 1990.

Tables 7.5 and 7.6 reports the transition probabilities for each state based on the sample. Among different forms of contestation, ascription is the most stable, which fits with the observation that monarchies tend to be long-lasting. Executive selection based on ascription or designation is more likely than other states to be followed by an interruption, interregnum, or transitional period, while changes from self-selection are most likely to be to transitional contestation. Institutionalized participation is the most stable form of participation and is more likely to emerge from interrupted/interregna periods or from guided liberalization. In turn, restricted political participation is probabilistically more likely to give way to guided liberalization, should it change. The transition probabilities imply that competitive forms of contestation is borne out of interruptions, interregna, and transitional periods or transitional recruitment, which are fed by changes from contestation based on ascription, designation, or self-selection. Moreover, institutionalized political participation is most likely to come from interrupted, interregna, or transition periods, which are likely derived from factionalized and repressive regimes.
What can we say about the openness of contestation and political participation in the world over the last two centuries? Figure 7.6 shows trends in the number of countries in which contestation depended on at least a subset of the population, as well as those in which there was at least restricted participation. They are not mutually exclusive; a country can adopt both at the same time, in which case both lines would increase. Given the number of countries that entered the sample over the time period, I show both the number of countries in the sample as well as the number of countries that transitioned to either or both states. Percentages based on the same information are shown in the Appendix. Several notable trends can be gleaned from the figure. The first is that there has almost always been more countries with open forms of contestation than with open forms of political participation. In addition, the rate of increase in both rose after 1950. The number of transitions to more open contestation and political participation was largely coterminous until about the time of the ‘third wave’ of democracy (Huntington 1991), and became markedly more divergent throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Institutional changes after World War II differed considerably from earlier patterns of institutional development. Furthermore, the 1990s and 2000s were
characterized by a number of transitions to more open political participation that occurred either after open contestation was attained, or without it.

An important question, therefore, is whether the existence of relatively open forms of political participation \textit{without} open forms of contestation is a common phenomenon in the world. Figure 7.6 shows a mutually exclusive classification of countries based on the relative openness of contestation and participation. “Open” forms of contestation refer to recruitment based on designation, or is transitional or competitive; “open” forms of participation include restricted (limited-party), guided, or institutionalized participation. The plot confirms much of the aforementioned information but presents a much starker image regarding contestation and participation over time—while the 19\textsuperscript{th} century was dominated by regimes that lacked either forms of openness, relatively open forms of contestation also existed in greater numbers. The 19\textsuperscript{th} century saw an increase in the number of countries with either open contestation and closed participation, or both open contestation \textit{and} participation. However, the distinction placed on political participation occurred for the part in the 1990s and 2000s.\textsuperscript{102}
Transition types

Figure 7.7 suggests that political participation was a secondary trait of institutional change, which is further supported by a tabulation of the types of transitions that occurred between each of the states, shown in Figure 7.8. For each of the states shown in figure 7.7, I tabulated the count of each Polity type (closed, open contestation, open participation, or open) after each ‘round’ of transitions that were observed in the sample. The x-axis refers to the ‘round’ (n) of changes observed, while the y-axis shows the count of each type. Thus, before any transitions between them occurred, roughly 80 countries had open contestation and closed participation. After considering all countries that went through at least one transition (n=2), however, that number dropped by more than half. Of those countries that transitioned, many of them became closed in the next period. As a greater number of institutional changes are observed in the sample, the number of countries with open contestation seems to quickly stabilize.

Of those countries that changed institutions over the period 1800-2013, the bulk of changes that occurred to political systems with both open contestation and open participation came from states that previously had open forms of contestation and closed
forms of political participation. Changes from fully closed systems tended somewhat toward systems with open forms of participation and closed forms of contestation, but such systems were also more likely to return to closed. Thus, while changes involving systems with open contestation or open political participation sometimes led to systems that were closed altogether, changes to open contestation and participation tended to follow from systems that had had previous experience with open contestation without much political participation.

To test whether there is a significant relationship between the states, I employ a multinomial logit model, shown in Table 7.7. The estimates reflect the probabilities of transitions between them, as well as the statistical strength associated with them. Unlike Tables 7.5 and 7.6, which show transition probabilities associated with each type of transition, one of the discrete categories must be omitted from the independent variables and from the levels of the dependent variable to determine statistically significant differentiation among the other transition types. I refer to these levels as the ‘reference category’ to facilitate comparison. Compared to observations in which a country had an open form of participation and a closed form of contestation, those with open
### Table 7.7: Multinomial logit regression predicting next state in sequence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>outcome value of dependent variable</th>
<th>explanatory variable</th>
<th>coefficient</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interr./Trans.</td>
<td>Interr./Trans.,t−1</td>
<td>3.251</td>
<td>(0.410) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closed,t−1</td>
<td>-3.291</td>
<td>(0.394) ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open contestation only,t−1</td>
<td>1.082</td>
<td>(0.410) ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open participation only,t−1</td>
<td>1.373</td>
<td>(0.487) ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.647</td>
<td>(0.372) *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>closed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interr./Trans.,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closed,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open contestation only,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open participation only,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>open contestation only</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interr./Trans.,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closed,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open contestation only,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open participation only,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>open participation only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Interr./Trans.,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closed,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open contestation only,t−1</td>
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<tr>
<td>open participation only,t−1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>open</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interr./Trans.,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closed,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open contestation only,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open participation only,t−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                    | 14218 |
| Log-likelihood       | -3780.896 |

*standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10*

contestation only were statistically *most* likely to remain in the same category, as opposed to transitioning to a system with neither open contestation nor participation. They were also significantly more likely than than countries with open forms of participation only to experience institutional perturbation (interruption, interregnum, or transition) or to become open on both counts in the next year. Thus, compared to those countries with restricted contestation and open political participation, those with the opposite were significantly more likely to liberalize. The estimates associated with these relationships are significant below a one-percent probability of error.
Table 7.8: Logit regression predicting open political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>explanatory variable</th>
<th>coefficient</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>past closed, ( t-2 )</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>(0.193) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past open contestation, ( t-2 )</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>(0.193) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past open participation, ( t-2 )</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>(0.209) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past open both, ( t-2 )</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>(0.209) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>closed, ( t-1 )</td>
<td>-0.481</td>
<td>(0.161) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open contestation, ( t-1 )</td>
<td>6.072</td>
<td>(0.234) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open participation, ( t-1 )</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>(0.278) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open both, ( t-1 )</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>(0.278) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-4.088</td>
<td>(0.144) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-\( N = 14049 \)

*standard errors in parentheses;

***\( p < 0.01 \) **\( p < 0.05 \) *\( p < 0.10 \)

Model 1 in Table 7.7 demonstrates that regimes with open forms of contestation only are significantly more likely to transition to an institutionally open setting than those with open political participation only. They are also significantly more likely to transition to a fully open form of contestation and participation over the interim category or to open participation only, compared to countries with both closed contestation and participation. Does the mode of contestation matter for the development of participation more generally? To answer this, I ran a series of logit models predicting whether a country had an open form of political participation (restricted, guided liberalization, or institutionalized) in a given year. In Table 7.8 I compared whether the country had an open form of contestation (designation, transitional, or competitive) the year prior, as well as whether the country had ever had an open form of contestation.

According to the results, if a country had an open form of participation the year prior, it was significantly more likely to have one the following year. The coefficient is quite large compared to the other estimates, which reflects the tendency for states to persist (shown in Table 7.6). Controlling for previous states, if a country had an open form of contestation, it was significantly less likely to turn to open participation in the following year, while countries that had both open contestation and open participation were more likely to have an open form of political participation in the following year.
Whether the country had ever experienced any form of institutional openness appears to matter, however. Intuitively, if a country had ever had open participation before, it was likely to do so later. The estimate associated with whether the country had ever had an open form of contestation is particularly interesting, however. It indicates that in countries that had neither open contestation or open political participation, and which had never experienced open political participation, a history of open contestation is a significant and positive predictor of future participation.

Figure 7.9 shows the effects on select estimates when I control for a number of different factors, including the year and the date of independence, logged values of per capita GDP and population, and region. It also shows the robustness of the estimates against country-clustered and year-clustered standard errors, which I specified to detect the potential effect of unobserved factors that may influence institutional change. As the figure demonstrates, the relationship between a country’s past experience with contestation and open participation is sensitive to controlling for the year, ceasing to be significant below a ten-percent probability of error. The estimate is, however, robust to the inclusion of geographic controls and to the date of each country’s independence. Additionally, when I control for levels of economic development and population—which nevertheless restricts the sample to the years 1946-2004—past contestation is a significant positive predictor of future participation where past participation ceases to be. There is thus reason to think that prior experience with contestation is a relevant determinant of participation, especially among modern countries.

**Common patterns**

Examining levels of contestation and participation over the period 1800-2013 suggests that much of the world could be characterized as having more open forms of competition and limited participation prior to 1950. Institutional changes associated with more open forms of political participation were also significantly more likely to occur after a period of open competition and limited participation. Despite the support that these findings lend to Dahl’s ideas regarding a general pattern of institutional development, the institutional
sequences that make up the sample are variable and thus somewhat ‘noisy’. Many of
the steps by which political systems developed were not progressive, but rather part
of a process involving trial-and-error. In addition, the countries in my sample did not
begin at the same time and with the same prior experiences. The indeterminateness of
institutional development stems, in part, from differences in the timing of independence
and institutional applications enforced by colonialism, secessions and the collapse of old
regimes, and an increasing international presence in the affairs of many countries. The
reality is that while there may be modal institutional sequences in the intuitive, theoretical
sense, such sequences are difficult to identify.

The question therefore remains whether there are generalizable patterns in the means
by which countries developed. Variability in the timing of institutional levels requires one
to look for overarching commonalities in the patterns, for which Sequence Analysis is a
valuable tool. Sequence Analysis is an approach to comparing patterns and discerning their
similarity. The approach originates from the computer sciences, where it was developed
to identify similarities in strings of text. It was later adopted in the biological and medical
sciences to compare genetic sequences and match DNA likeness. Sequence Analysis is relatively new in political science; exceptions that have served to introduce it include Blanchard (2011) and Casper and Wilson (forthcoming). It is very much alive in other disciplines of social science, however, most notably in sociology and demography. One of the most common applications of Sequence Analysis in the social sciences has been its use to study life trajectories and career patterns (Abbott 1995, Blanchard 2005, Brzinsky-Fay and Kohler 2010, Lemercier 2005). As noted by Casper and Wilson (forthcoming), it is also conceptually promising for explaining political phenomena, as it is capable of helping to answer questions related to changes in electoral decision making and patterns of political activity, political discourse, and patterns of conflict among groups or individuals.

The primary attribute of Sequence Analysis is the use of an algorithm to identify the number of similar states shared by two sequences of discrete information. The result of applying a distance algorithm to compare a sample of sequences is an n x n matrix that indicates the degree of similarity between each pair of sequences. Common metrics include Longest Common Prefix, which counts the number of consecutive states that comprise the beginning of two sequences, and Longest Common Subsequences, which counts the number of states that occur in the same order–consecutively or nonconsecutively–in two sequences. Optimal Matching, which calculates the minimal number of edits needed to make two sequences perfectly match, is the most common method of calculating sequence similarity (Elzinga 2008). User-defined weights for each type of edit–insertions, deletions, and substitutions–determine the difficulty of forcible matching within the sample.

Using Sequence Analysis, I compared patterns based on the mutually exclusive categories for open contestation and participation shown in Figure 7.7. A sequence index plot based on these levels is provided in Figure 7.10. The same information, sorted by start value and region of the world, is presented in Figures 9.6 and 9.7 in the Appendix. This plot confirms previous findings, showing the predominance of ‘closed’ polities before the 20th century and the proliferation of ‘open’ polities after 1990.

As I am primarily interested in the order in which institutional levels changed, I omitted duplicate country-years in which the same level existed as the year prior. The
result is a sample of sequences determined by the number of institutional changes. Using Optimal Matching, I set the cost of inserting and deleting states arbitrarily high so as to require the algorithm to rely only on the substitution costs to calculate sequence dissimilarity. Substitution costs were derived from the observed transition rates, such that it would be more costly to mimic a transition that was statistically less likely to occur. In addition, to avoid the possibility of sequences being matched on the basis of their length I simulated a fake state to represent the missingness associated with each country and set the costs of matching them sufficiently high to prevent the algorithm from doing so. As a result of my specifications, the pairwise similarity between the sequences in my sample was calculated by substituting elements to make them match and weighting them by the probability of such a transition occurring, ignoring missing values.

Based on the pairwise distances calculated through Optimal Matching, I used hierarchical clustering to derive groups of similar sequences. Hierarchical clustering involves merging items into groups based on the distances between the items that each contains. I used the agglomerative method proposed by [Ward, 1963], which groups items such that it minimizes the amount of variance between the items in each cluster.

Figure 7.10: Levels of contestation and participation, by institutional changes
An artifact of merging groups based on their averages, however, is that very unique observations are often isolated. Figure 7.11 shows the proportion of observations that are sorted into each cluster as I increase the number of clusters from two to ten. At seven clusters, this method of agglomeration begins to isolate five or fewer sequences into separate categories. As a first pass, therefore, I differentiate the sequences in my sample into six groups.

Figure 7.12 shows how institutional patterns are grouped by cluster when they are differentiated into six groups. A list of the countries in each cluster is provided in Table 9.8 in the Appendix. The first cluster contains 14 countries which can be generally characterized as begun as open but which later restricted participation, if only for a short while. This cluster includes countries such as Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe, as well as the United States. The second cluster contains 21 countries, such as Canada, Israel, Latvia, Norway, and Tanzania, and pertains to those that were nearly exclusively open in terms of political contestation and participation.

Cluster 3 is by far the most dissimilar group of sequences. It is also the largest,
containing 53 countries that include Algeria, Belgium, Cambodia, France, Honduras, Greece, Pakistan, Sudan, and Uzbekistan. A common attribute among them, however, is that all of them either had open contestation and closed participation or experienced a much greater number of institutional changes, or both. The 18 sequences in cluster 4 include Brazil, China, Hungary, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand. They are predominantly characterized by transitions from closed polities to open political contestation, and many of the sequences in this group later instituted a greater level of political participation. Cluster 5 is also a considerably large group, with 42 countries such as Austria, Colombia, Estonia, Finland, Côte d’Ivoire, Mongolia, and Turkey. Almost all of these countries transitioned from open contestation to a polity based on open contestation and participation. Finally, the bulk of the 18 countries in cluster 6–including Afghanistan, Denmark, Ethiopia, Portugal, and Sweden–are those in which closed polities transitioned a form of politics with open political participation but closed contestation.

The variability in sequences that fit into the third group demonstrate a limitation in the ability of Sequence Analysis to classify patterns. The method does not perfectly
classify like sequences, but it supports the visualization of patterns based on general distinctions. At the same time, the classification was based in part on user-specified values and is therefore capable of being improved. Grouping together similar patterns of contestation and participation shows some interesting attributes. First, there are distinct patterns that characterize, in general, a large number of countries. Second, the most common general pattern of institutional change involves a transition from open contestation to a polity with open contestation and participation. Third, although the clusters comprise a variety of countries from different regions, the regions can be represented to some extent by a particular sequence group. For example, Norway, Sweden, and Finland are each in a different group. At the same time, however, 42 percent of the countries in Eastern Europe pertain to cluster 5; 45 percent of Latin American countries, and 44 percent of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, belong to cluster 3. There is nevertheless considerable persistence in political institutions, which underscores the importance of understanding the impacts of transitions when they occur (Kurtz 2013).

Given the observation of specific transitions that characterize institutional change in a large number of countries, an important question concerns the factors to which differences in institutional patterns can be attributed. I estimate a multinomial logit to determine whether cluster membership is correlated with domestic features. The empirical relationships being specified are not necessarily causal, but they highlight underlying features that are associated with long-term patterns of institutional change. The exploratory analysis therefore supports the identification of a model that more accurately explains political developments.

To ascertain whether economic or demographic effects matter, I use logged values of the augmented data on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and population estimates that are reported by Gleditsch (2002). Using these data, I also calculated annual GDP growth. I included proxies for geographical differences using dummy variables denoting the region, and accounted for temporal differences by including the year of independence. To denote forms of domestic threats, I use information regarding
levels of domestic armed conflict reported by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which refer to conflicts between a state government and domestic opposition groups that do not incur outside intervention (Gleditsch and Strand 2002). I also included binary indicators of coup attempts and successful coups, based on data provided by Powell and Thyne (2011). Finally, I estimated the impacts of forms of non-democracy and their successfulness using data recently collected by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). The data by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) correspond to questions that were used to construct the regime types developed by Geddes (2003). Along with autocratic regime type, I included a count of the number of years that each authoritarian ‘spell’ lasted, as an indicator of regime success. Summary statistics are shown in Table 9.9 in the Appendix.

Table 7.9 shows the results of a multinomial logit regressing cluster membership on domestic attributes. The model covers the period 1951-2004. It includes 142 of the 167 countries in the sample, comprising 245 of the 264 autocratic regime spells coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Missingness in the data reduces the number of observations drops from 7668 to 6204, however, as a result of listwise deletion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>explanatory variable</th>
<th>cluster 1</th>
<th>cluster 2</th>
<th>cluster 4</th>
<th>cluster 5</th>
<th>cluster 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>independence</td>
<td>0.014 (0.001) ***</td>
<td>0.009 (0.001) ***</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.000) ***</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.000) ***</td>
</tr>
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<td>reference category</td>
<td>reference category</td>
<td>reference category</td>
<td>reference category</td>
<td>reference category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.America</td>
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<td>-20.629 (953.854)</td>
<td>-0.326 (0.200) *</td>
<td>-0.773 (0.174) ***</td>
<td>-20.201 (1143.829)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.East/N.Africa</td>
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<td>-2.938 (0.429) ***</td>
<td>-1.998 (0.240) ***</td>
<td>-1.438 (0.196) ***</td>
<td>-1.304 (0.239) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.938 (0.259) ***</td>
<td>-2.520 (0.243) ***</td>
<td>-1.647 (0.174) ***</td>
<td>-1.935 (0.236) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.Europe/N.America</td>
<td>-6.301 (0.449) ***</td>
<td>-5.835 (0.414) ***</td>
<td>-1.265 (0.264) ***</td>
<td>-0.958 (0.231) ***</td>
<td>0.042 (0.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Asia/E.Asia/S.E.Asia</td>
<td>-2.026 (0.237) ***</td>
<td>-1.641 (0.300) ***</td>
<td>-1.409 (0.218) ***</td>
<td>-0.818 (0.181) ***</td>
<td>-2.117 (0.272) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(GDP per capita)</td>
<td>0.435 (0.058) ***</td>
<td>0.839 (0.064) ***</td>
<td>0.214 (0.046) ***</td>
<td>0.213 (0.039) ***</td>
<td>0.112 (0.051) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(GDP growth)</td>
<td>0.172 (0.754)</td>
<td>1.968 (1.022) **</td>
<td>0.979 (0.605)</td>
<td>0.894 (0.491) *</td>
<td>-0.186 (0.523)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(population)</td>
<td>0.258 (0.051) ***</td>
<td>-0.534 (0.057) ***</td>
<td>0.791 (0.045) ***</td>
<td>0.185 (0.037) ***</td>
<td>-0.371 (0.055) ***</td>
</tr>
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<td>reference category</td>
<td>reference category</td>
<td>reference category</td>
<td>reference category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minor conflict</td>
<td>0.472 (0.250) *</td>
<td>1.247 (0.343) ***</td>
<td>-0.981 (0.274) ***</td>
<td>0.345 (0.175) **</td>
<td>-0.471 (0.372)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intermed. conflict</td>
<td>-0.238 (0.396)</td>
<td>1.828 (0.425) ***</td>
<td>-0.311 (0.214)</td>
<td>0.538 (0.181) ***</td>
<td>1.665 (0.238) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.279 (0.215)</td>
<td>0.377 (0.172) **</td>
<td>1.642 (0.257) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.320 (0.219)</td>
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<td>0.054 (0.372)</td>
<td>-0.756 (0.312) **</td>
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<td>reference category</td>
<td>reference category</td>
<td>reference category</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.096 (0.469)</td>
<td>2.707 (0.525) ***</td>
<td>-0.450 (0.386)</td>
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<td>party-based regime</td>
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<td>17.402 (3379.903)</td>
<td>0.223 (0.475)</td>
<td>2.398 (0.524) ***</td>
<td>1.014 (0.356) ***</td>
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<td>-21.949 (27356.440)</td>
<td>3.169 (0.376) ***</td>
</tr>
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<td>military regime</td>
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<td>1.379 (3631.439)</td>
<td>0.447 (0.472)</td>
<td>1.279 (0.537) **</td>
<td>-0.323 (0.450)</td>
</tr>
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<td>personalist regime</td>
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<td>-0.489 (3533.063)</td>
<td>1.048 (0.470) **</td>
<td>2.335 (0.525) ***</td>
<td>0.248 (0.367)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime spell</td>
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<td>0.096 (0.005) ***</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.002) **</td>
<td>0.002 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>-40.682 (3379.903)</td>
<td>-8.824 (0.959) ***</td>
<td>-14.861 (1.171) ***</td>
<td>5.896 (0.997) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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N 6204
log likelihood -6855.121

*standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10

Table 7.9: Multinomial logit regression estimating cluster membership
(cluster 3 is reference category)
According to the results, countries that more recently gained independence are more likely to make up clusters 1, 2, or 4 than they are to be in cluster 3. Newer countries are significantly less likely to be in cluster 6 than in cluster 3, the estimates for which are significant below a one percent probability of error. There are also significant regional differences with regard to the countries in each of the clusters. Compared to cluster 3, the countries in the other clusters are significantly associated with higher levels of GDP per capita, and clusters 2 and 5 are also positively associated with GDP growth. The estimates associated with these relationships are all significant below a ten percent probability of error or lower. Clusters 1, 4, and 5 comprise countries with significantly larger populations than those in cluster 3, while those in clusters 2 and 6 are significantly smaller. Moreover, the countries in clusters 2, 5, and 6 are associated with greater levels of civil conflict than those in cluster 3, the magnitude of which is greatest in cluster 6. Cluster 6 is also positively associated with attempted coups, compared to cluster 3. Compared to the countries in cluster 3, those in cluster 4 are significantly more likely to be personalist or monarchical regimes than ‘other’ authoritarian regime types. The countries in cluster 6 are more likely to be party-based or monarchical regimes. Cluster 1 appears to be much more likely to contain other regime types, and cluster 5 is more likely to contain any regime type but monarchies. Additionally, the countries in clusters 1, 2, and 4 are associated with regimes that had significantly greater longevity than those in cluster 3, the estimates for which are significant at a 95 percent level of confidence or higher.

It is interesting to note that the pattern of political development in countries that make up cluster 6 is aberrant to my theory. In these countries, institutionalized political participation appears to preclude institutionalized competition or competition was never regularized. Many of the countries in this group were formerly monarchical regimes, but not all. However, this general pattern—which is the most contrary to my expectations—is arguably the rarest. When cluster 6 is made the referent category according to the model specified in Table 7.9, the other countries in the sample appear to have performed significantly better in a number of respects. All but cluster 3 are associated with
significantly higher levels of per capita GDP, while clusters 2, 4, and 5 are related to higher GDP growth. All of the clusters are significantly less likely than those in cluster 6 to experience intermediate or major civil conflict, and all but cluster 2 are significantly associated with a decreased likelihood of an attempted coup. Additionally, the countries in clusters 1 and 2 are significantly associated with longer regime spells, on average. There are therefore notable differences in the domestic attributes of countries that underwent different long-term changes, but the general trend of institutional development that I hypothesized is also positively associated with various indicators of successful state building.

Similar patterns of institutional change can be identified among the bulk of countries that exist in the modern world. To a large extent, such ‘patterns’ are defined by one or a few notable transitions. The most common institutional change that can be observed is one in which relatively open forms of political contestation gave way to polities with open forms of contestation and participation. The evidence presented herein thus provides considerable support for the hypothesis that mass participation tended to follow from prior experience with restricted politics involving elite competition. It is notable, however, that a small number of predominant institutional changes differentiates such a large sample of politically diverse countries. Not only can countries be characterized by modal patterns of political development, such groups are significantly associated with domestic attributes that include economic and demographic factors, forms of domestic conflict, authoritarian regime type, geographic region, and date of independence. These findings contribute to historical institutionalist research which purports that certain factors, such as economies of scale, exert forces that create path-dependent political development (Moore 1966).

7.4 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to evaluate whether there is a common path by which institutions have developed, as suggested by Dahl (1971) and his contemporaries.
Building on the efforts of previous research, I attempted to clarify contestation and participation as empirical concepts and operationalized them using a set of indicators from the Polity IV project that span 1800-2014. Using Mexico and several countries in Latin America as examples by which to determine concept validity, I demonstrated that the measures accurately portray institutional changes as they relate to elites and masses. The data, which indicate forms of contestation and participation, supported the generation of sequences and a comparison of types of government over time. From this, a clear picture emerged that showed that competitive contestation was an artifact of the 20th century which only became distinguishable in number from designated executives around 1990. Additionally, factionalized or nonexistent political participation characterized much of the world prior to 1950.

Examining trends in institutional openings also suggested that through the last two centuries changes in contestation have outpaced those in participation, although that gap has narrowed considerably in the last few decades. A statistical comparison of transition rates nevertheless demonstrated that countries with relatively open forms of contestation and political participation were more likely to follow from a state of more open recruitment and less open participation. Moreover, countries without previous experience with open forms of political participation were found to be significantly more likely to adopt party-oriented politics if contestation had been competitive in the past. The findings therefore lend considerable support to the hypothesis that institutions associated with mass participation are more likely after a period of restricted politics involving elite competition.

Nearly 45 years after Dahl (1971) speculated that there was a modal path to polyarchy, there is some evidence to suggest that such a path exists and that it characterizes the bulk of institutional changes in the world. The argument that I have offered to explain the consolidation of the Mexican state fits this description, wherein elites interacted during the Porfiriato in the absence of national political parties and adopted a national party only after a massive uprising that involved the masses. Institutional development is not perfectly reducible to a two-state sequence, as shown by the diversity
of observed patterns and variability in the timing in which specific institutions were adopted. Nevertheless, distinct institutional trajectories characterize the political paths that countries have taken, the most common of which involves first setting the terms of competition.
Chapter 8

Institutional Sequencing and Political Outcomes

In the previous chapter, I compared patterns involving changes to and from greater levels of executive recruitment and political competition. I demonstrated that countries were more likely to transition to institutional settings that were open on both fronts after a period of relatively open executive recruitment and closed political competition. I also found that countries with no prior experience with an open form of political competition were more likely to turn to it if they had previously had an open form of executive recruitment. These findings fit with the narrative of how institutions emerged in Mexico, in which I argued that stability came from the regulation of competition among elites in the legislature, and that subsequent mass mobilization necessitated a national political party. Clustering together groups of similar institutional patterns shows distinct commonalities among countries with regard to the broad changes that each underwent, the most common of which was open executive recruitment followed by polities that were open on both fronts. Moreover, the groups are empirically associated with factors related to the economy, population, region, and conflict, suggesting that underlying domestic factors shape and are shaped by the long-term pattern of political institutions. Arguing that executive recruitment and political competition are valid indicators of contestation and participation, respectively, I concluded that there is empirical support for the original notion put forth by Dahl (1971) that there may be a modal path to ‘polyarchy’.

In this chapter, I examine whether contestation explains the timing and success of political regimes. To the extent that regularizing competition is an important precursor to
subsequent institutional changes, this condition should be propitious for the development of more ‘complex’ political regimes and for regime survival. I therefore test whether countries with established forms of contestation but little to no political participation are more likely to develop a political party, whether the political parties that they engender are more likely to cut across ethnic groups, and whether they are more likely to endure. Somewhat intuitively, I find that regularized contestation positively predicts party-based regimes, that the political parties that occur in them tend to be multiethnic, and that regularized contestation enhances regime survival. I also find that institutionalized competition is positively associated with personalist regimes, for reasons that I discuss later. However, demonstrating the importance of institutionalizing competition separately from participation emphasizes why institutional design matters in places where the terms of politics are uncertain. In the following section, I outline the hypotheses and research strategy. I present three sets of analyses that address different aspects of the relationship between institutional sequencing and political outcomes, concluding with a general discussion of their implications.

8.1 Herding Roving Bandits

If open forms of institutionalized political participation are more likely to follow from a period of limited participation and open contestation, the conditions that favor them should impact the form of authoritarianism that is practiced. In the case of Mexico, elite cooperation under the Porfiriato supported development that led to the violent articulation of mass demands. The *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* was borne out of that struggle, as were other ‘revolutionary’ parties ([Magaloni 2008b](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/maga2008b.2008b.10.7312/10.7312/maga2008b.2008b.10.7312) [Moore 1966](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/211703)). To describe their origins broadly, however, the impetuses of party politics should be traceable back to a power-sharing coalition that moderates the conflicts that would be detrimental to the formation of any institution. The axiom that dictators rarely rule alone implies that, in many cases, there are multiple actors involved in the process of turning ‘roving bandits’ into ‘stationary bandits’ ([Olson 1993](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/108104)). Once the problem of ‘authoritarian power-sharing’ has been addressed, greater institutional complexity can
follow that resolves issues related to the problem of ‘authoritarian control’ (Svolik 2012).

Previously, scholars have interpreted the elite-mass struggle as a determinant of democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Boix 2003, Moore 1966). Nevertheless, the literature on authoritarian regimes has made it clear that electoral politics can occur in non-democracies as well (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, Geddes 2003, Howard and Roessler 2006, Levitsky and Way 2010, Magaloni 2008). Thus, rather than anticipating that institutions that facilitate regularized competition necessarily lead to democracy (or autocracy), I expect that more institutionally complex regimes follow from regularized competition. The ability to institutionalize a modicum of elite consensus—to encourage elites to use political endeavors to achieve an outcome—should therefore explain the development of regimes that are based on political parties. This expectation represents the first hypothesis that I intend to test:

H1: Democratic or party-based regimes are more likely after a period of open contestation and limited participation.

A noteworthy observation about the party that emerged out of the Revolution in Mexico is that it was intended to, and was eventually reorganized to, rest upon columns of popular interests. One of the conclusions that I drew from process tracing the period prior to the Revolution was that mass activity was stimulated in part by economic changes that occurred during the Porfiriato. An extension of the hypothesis stated above, therefore, is that not only is the institutional complexity represented by political parties supported by a period of institutionalized competition, but that the parties that follow are more likely to cut across ethnic or class divisions. To the extent that institutionalized competition enables development that engenders populist demands, the subsequent institutionalization of those interests should encompass more than a narrow swath of constituents. Anecdotal evidence to support this expectation includes the rise of the Peronism in Argentina, a movement that attracted the support of the lower-middle class and working class, which accompanied industrialization under a military regime.
The second hypothesis, therefore, is that the parties that follow from a period of open contestation and little to no participation are more likely to be multiethnic:

H2: *Authoritarian parties are more likely to be multiethnic after a period of open contestation and limited participation.*

More importantly, however, the argument that regularizing competition is a necessary early step in the process of statebuilding implies that it is a critical determinant of the survival of regimes, regardless of its institutional form. I anticipate that achieving a relatively open form of political contestation—which I argue is a valid indicator of elite cooperation—supports the survival of the regime. The means by which a dictatorship addresses the problem of ‘authoritarian control’ is certainly likely to be an important determinant of the longevity of a regime, but it should be firstly affected by the ability to achieve elite cooperation. The third hypothesis, therefore, is that regularized contestation also predicts the survival of autocratic regimes.

H3: *Autocratic regimes are more likely to survive after a period of open contestation and limited participation.*

I analyze each of the hypotheses, in turn, by estimating a set of quantitative models that reflect average observations across a modern sample of countries. The analyses are estimated on a sample that includes between 100 and 167 countries between 1946 and 2010. They also reflect institutions and outcomes that correspond to roughly 260 autocratic regime spells. The following section discusses the research strategy by which I evaluated whether there are observable differences with regard to institutional choice.

### 8.2 Research Design

To test the hypotheses, I use data by [Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014)] on authoritarian regime spells. A *spell* refers to an uninterrupted period of non-democratic rule based on the same support base. Between 1946 and 2010, the authors collected
information on 264 authoritarian regime spells. Of those, 75 were classified as party-based regimes, 17 were monarchies, 74 were military dictatorships, and 98 were personalist regimes. They account for 4222 country-year observations. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) also indicate observations in which the country was democratic, foreign-occupied, not independent, provisional, or governed by a warlord. In none of these periods do the cases have unique identifiers. With the exception of predicting democracy as a regime type, I do not include the non-autocratic observations in my analyses.

To test whether democratic or party-based regimes are more likely after a period of open contestation and limited participation, I estimated a multinomial logistic regression based on the regime types classified by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Although Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) do not give democracies a unique case id, they do count democracies as a regime type. Because I argue that the same institutional pattern could explain democracies as well as autocracies, I include democracies in my estimation of the first model. In addition to the type of regime, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) also include the component variables that were used to determine regime type. One of the variables indicates whether the leadership of the governing party is dominated by a particular ethnic or religious group, or if it is multiethnic. To examine whether authoritarian parties are more likely to be multiethnic after a period of open contestation and limited participation, therefore, I also estimate a multinomial logistic regression on the type of political party in office. Additionally, the information on spells allows me to estimate whether contestation or participation has an effect on the duration of regimes. To test whether political regimes are more likely to survive after a period of open contestation and limited participation, I estimate a duration model predicting the time to regime failure.

The concept of ‘contestation’, or ‘competition’, that I use refers to the ability of individuals to compete for political office. As I have noted elsewhere, contestation is often confounded with organized political activity, and used to refer to the access of political parties to place their candidates in office. However, it need not be the case that parties and other organizations participate in the process of selecting candidates, but
that the selection process is institutionalized. I therefore treat the term ‘contestation’ as synonymous with ‘selection’ and ‘competition’, and I consider countries with rules deferring the selection of the executive to a third party as having ‘institutionalized,’ ‘regularized’, or ‘relatively open’ forms of contestations. The point of making this distinction is to indicate that in these polities, there are agreed upon rules regarding the selection of individuals to political office that rely on someone other than the executive to decide succession.

To distinguish among levels of contestation, I use a concept variable provided by the Polity IV project which aggregates ordinal-level information on the openness, competitiveness, and regulation of executive recruitment. In the previous chapter I explored the composite “forms” of executive recruitment in greater detail. To distinguish regularized versus nonregularized competition, however, I find it sufficient to aggregate the types of executive recruitment into a dichotomous variable. I code all forms of ascriptive executive recruitment as closed, as well as cases in which the executive position is self-selected. Where the executive is designated, selected to head a guided transition, or elected, I denote the country as having an open form of executive recruitment. Though Polity IV refers to this concept as ‘executive recruitment’, I argue that it is a valid indicator of contestation in the way that I have defined it. This dichotomy is strongly correlated with legislatures and not as strongly correlated with political parties in the legislature, thereby reinforcing my argument that regularized competition is an appropriate proxy for elite coordination in authoritarian regimes.

‘Participation’ refers to the extent to which individuals are involved in the process of selecting among candidates for political office. I argue that the role of political parties is more relevant to the concept of participation, as organized political groups help to aggregate the interests of a greater number of individuals and impose or represent their collective decisions in the electoral process. I use a concept variable also provided by Polity IV which indicates levels of the competitiveness and regulation of political participation. Despite the use of the term ‘competitiveness’ in its reference to political participation, the variable indicates the extent to which alternative preferences for policies and leadership
can be pursued in the political arena. I take this aspect to indicate the extent to which the political arena accommodates the participation of people with alternative preferences. Like contestation, I dichotomize the concept variable for participation to represent ‘closed’ versus ‘open’ forms of political participation. I consider participation that is non-existent, factional, or repressed as closed, and that which is limited (suppressed), transitional, or competitive as open.

Combining the dichotomous indicators of open forms of contestation and participation yields four types of government based on levels of contestation and participation: those that are institutionalized closed, those with open contestation and little to no political participation (contestation only), those with open participation but unregularized competition (participation only), and institutionally open regimes. Polity IV also denotes periods of interregna, interruption, and transitions between polities. Rather than omit these exceptional observations from the sample, however, I treat them as conceptually similar to closed regimes and drop them as a determination of the robustness of model specifications. I tested the impacts of levels of contestation and participation in two ways. First, I indicated whether each state ever occurred in a country. For each, I created a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of one in the first year in which each level is observed, and retains that value throughout the rest of the period of observation. I also included lagged dichotomous variables for each level, allowing me to compare previous experience with a state to current institutional settings.

As a means of testing the robustness of the relationships that I estimated, I employed a set of control variables that I discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter. I account for the year of each country’s independence and its geographic region, logged per capita GDP and GDP growth, population, and levels of domestic armed conflict and coup activity. I also compare the empirical relationships to a model with clustered standard errors. Where applicable, I control for lagged values of the dependent variable. In the next section, I evaluate the impact of contestation and participation on regime type, multiethnic political parties, and the survival of authoritarian regimes.
8.3 Analysis

Regime type

Table 8.1 shows how levels of contestation and participation vary across the regime types identified by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Nearly half of the country-year observations for autocracies in my sample belong to party-based regimes. Over 92 percent of these observations satisfied my thresholds for open competition or polities with both an open form of competition and an open form of participation. What is more, over half of the observations for party-based autocracies had relatively open contestation but not open participation (58 percent). In contrast, the bulk of observations pertaining to monarchies were closed in both dimensions. A considerable portion of military regimes allowed open contestation, but not as much as party-based regimes. Less than 20 percent of military regimes allowed both open contestation and open participation. Interestingly, there are a greater number of country-year observations for personalist regimes that would qualify as having an open form of contestation and participation than there are for military regimes, and fewer observations in which the regime was fully closed. As would be expected, the vast majority of countries that Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) coded as democratic satisfied the thresholds for open contestation and participation, and together with open contestation make up over 97 percent of democratic country-year observations.

To examine whether levels of contestation and participation predict the type of regime, I estimated a multinomial logit regression, shown in Table 8.2. For the sake of space, I omitted from the reported results the category pertaining to foreign occupation and provisional or warlord regimes. Compared to military regimes, democracy and all other forms of autocracy are significantly less likely where the country had previous experience with regularized competition. The estimates associated with this ‘historical’ variable are all significant below a one percent probability of error and strongest for monarchies, followed by party-based regimes. Past experience with regularized participation makes monarchies more likely, and party-based regimes less likely, than military dictatorship. Past experience with open contestation and participation does
<table>
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<th>participation only</th>
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</table>

Table 8.1: Levels of contestation and participation, by regime type

not strongly differentiate regimes, though party-based regimes are somewhat less likely to follow from it compared to military regimes. A model based solely on these variables contains the same signs and significance, with three exceptions: past openness in contestation and participation ceases to differentiate party-based dictatorships from military dictatorships, while the two estimates associated with democracy that are insignificant become significant below a one percent probability of error.

As specified in Table 8.2, the estimates associated with past experience assume that the country is not presently in that state. The estimates for levels of contestation and participation in the last time period look considerably different. Where a country had an open form of contestation at time \( t \), it is significantly more likely to be party-based, democratic, or personalist in the next period, as opposed to a military dictatorship, above a 99 percent level of confidence. This is true regardless of whether the country had an open form of political participation. Monarchies are significantly less likely to occur in the next time period following open contestation only, which is significant above 95 percent. Based on the size of the coefficients, party-based regimes and democracies are almost equally likely to result from institutionalized competition without participation, and nearly three times more likely than personalist regimes. Democracies are roughly twice as likely to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>coefficient</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>party-based</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interr./Trans., closed</td>
<td>past contestation only, $t_{-2}$</td>
<td>-2.637</td>
<td>0.287 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past participation only, $t_{-2}$</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.118 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>0.295 ***</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>monarchy</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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<td><strong>military regime</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.126 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.171 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>0.299 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>personalist</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interr./Trans., closed</td>
<td>past contestation only, $t_{-2}$</td>
<td>-2.373</td>
<td>0.286 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past participation only, $t_{-2}$</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past open, $t_{-2}$</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contestation only, $t_{-1}$</td>
<td>2.604</td>
<td>0.169 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>participation only, $t_{-1}$</td>
<td>-0.650</td>
<td>0.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>open, $t_{-1}$</td>
<td>4.265</td>
<td>0.196 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.312 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>democracy</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interr./Trans., closed</td>
<td>past contestation only, $t_{-2}$</td>
<td>-2.373</td>
<td>0.286 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past participation only, $t_{-2}$</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past open, $t_{-2}$</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contestation only, $t_{-1}$</td>
<td>2.604</td>
<td>0.169 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>participation only, $t_{-1}$</td>
<td>-0.650</td>
<td>0.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>open, $t_{-1}$</td>
<td>4.265</td>
<td>0.196 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.771</td>
<td>0.312 **</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7333</td>
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<tr>
<td>spells</td>
<td>261</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
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<td>-7802.607</td>
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*standard errors in parentheses;***$p<0.01$ **$p<0.05$ *$p<0.10*

Table 8.2: Multinomial logit regression predicting regime type
result from institutionalized contestation and participation as party-based regimes, and party-based regimes are twice as likely as personalist regimes, when their likelihoods are considered relative to military regimes. The same signs and significance hold in a model based solely on the state in the last time period; in that specification, monarchies also appear more likely to result from open participation and noninstitutionalized competition than military regimes.

Based on the comparisons provided by Tables 8.1 and 8.2, monarchies can be characterized as regimes with either no institutionalized contestation or participation, or with institutionalized participation only. The finding is not surprising, however, since I consider ascription a ‘closed’ form of contestation and since ascription tends to characterize monarchies. Military dictatorships appear to derive from a history in which contestation was institutionalized but participation was not. This might be explained by the observation that government intervention by the military often occurred in the struggle to maintain elite hegemony. Open contestation and closed participation in the last time period positively predicts party-based authoritarianism and democracies, providing support for the first hypothesis. However, this state also positively predicts personalist regimes, to a lesser extent. This result is anticipated by Svolik (2009), who argues that a potential equilibrium of power-sharing dynamics involves the leader acquiring enough power relative to elites to render his coalition with them unnecessary. These results are incredibly robust, retaining their signs, significance, and often magnitude to the inclusion of lagged regime type, date of independence, region, economic and demographic factors and conflict. Additionally, although I included democracies in my specification, I obtain similar empirical relationships when democracies are excluded from the sample.

**Type of political parties**

Table 8.3 shows the how observations from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) on support parties are distributed by levels of contestation and participation. About 65 percent of the observations in which a country had an open form of contestation also
had a multiethnic party, whether or not there was open political participation. In terms of the sheer numbers, the most country-year observations for multiethnic parties pertain to countries with open contestation only. Interestingly, the majority of observations regarding countries with open participation but without institutionalized contestation had no support party. A support party also did not exist in the bulk of country-year observations for countries that had closed polities.

Table 8.4 therefore shows the results of a multinomial logit regression predicting the type of political party, comparing the likelihood of having no party or a multiethnic party to the likelihood of having a political party whose leadership is dominated by a particular ethnic or religious group. Whereas the results in the previous model suggest that past experience with open contestation makes party-based authoritarianism less likely than military regimes, here past experience with open contestation alone is positively associated with having a political party, but not of a particular type. The estimate on no support party is negative and significant below a one percent probability of error, and the estimate associated with multiethnic party is not significant. Past experience with relatively open political participation and noninstitutionalized contestation is positively predicts nonpartisan regimes, and a history of relatively open contestation and participation does not differentiate regimes on the basis of political parties.

Countries that were relatively open in terms of political competition in the last year are significantly more likely to have a multiethnic party in the next year, regardless
<table>
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<th>outcome value of dependent variable</th>
<th>explanatory variable</th>
<th>coefficient</th>
<th>s.e.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>no support party</td>
<td>past Interr./Trans./closed, $t-2$</td>
<td>-0.604</td>
<td>(0.132) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past contestation only, $t-2$</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>(0.130) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past participation only, $t-2$</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past open, $t-2$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interr./Trans./closed, $t-1$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contestation only, $t-1$</td>
<td>-1.857</td>
<td>(0.138) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>participation only, $t-1$</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>open, $t-1$</td>
<td>-1.841</td>
<td>(0.173) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.896</td>
<td>(0.128) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic party</td>
<td>past Interr./Trans./closed, $t-2$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiethnic party</td>
<td>past contestation only, $t-2$</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party</td>
<td>past participation only, $t-2$</td>
<td>-0.536</td>
<td>(0.118) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past open, $t-2$</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interr./Trans./closed, $t-1$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contestation only, $t-1$</td>
<td>0.826</td>
<td>(0.138) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>participation only, $t-1$</td>
<td>-0.376</td>
<td>(0.324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>open, $t-1$</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>(0.159) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>(0.145) *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                |                          |             |          |
|                |                         | N           | 4004     |
|                |                         | spells      | 256      |
|                |                         | Log-likelihood | -3340.385 |

*standard errors in parentheses;***$p<0.01$ **$p<0.05$ *$p<0.10$

Table 8.4: Multinomial logit regression predicting type of political party
of the past level of political participation. The order of magnitude on the estimates for having no political party are roughly the same, but countries that had both open contestation and participation are somewhat more likely to have a multiethnic party as opposed to those that only had regularized contestation. In general, therefore, the results suggest that open forms of political contestation predict multiethnic parties in authoritarian regimes better than open forms of political participation. The results are strongly robust; they retain their signs and significance to the inclusion of regime type, the date of independence, region, GDP and population, and domestic conflict. I also obtain similar results when I control for whether the country has ever had a political party in the past, as well as the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Adding a lagged variable for the type of political party severely diminishes the strength of the estimates, however, reducing the confidence associated with open contestation in the last term to only 82 percent. The significance of the estimates is also weakened when I cluster the standard errors by country, but not below a ten percent probability of error. However, the results are the same when I cluster standard errors by year.

The results therefore strongly suggest that, among authoritarian regimes that adopt a political party, multiethnic political parties can be attributed to experience with institutionalized competition. The findings support my hypothesis, allowing me to reject the null expectation that open contestation does not affect the development of political parties. At the same time, however, this relationship is highly conditional on whether the arrangement provided by institutionalized competition spurs economic developments or polarizes identities such that a coalitional party is more advantageous. It is also to be expected that more nuanced factors influence the development of broadly representative authoritarian parties.

**Regime duration**

Figure 8.1 shows the hazard rate associated with the sample of authoritarian regime spells coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), representing 263 of the 264 spells. Based on the 209 failures that occurred in the sample, the probability of failure occurring
at any year is initially at its highest and then nearly linearly decreases until 62 years. After 62 years, the probability of failure rapidly increases. The dramatic shape of the hazard estimate is due to a few outliers; only eight regimes survived beyond 62 years, four of which were monarchies (Jordan, Nepal, Oman, and Saudi Arabia) and four of which were party-based regimes (Mexico, Mongolia, South Africa, and the USSR). The longest lasting, Nepal and Oman, lasted 105 and 269 years, respectively. To moderate the impact of monarchies lasting over a century, I coded Nepal and Oman as beginning in 1918. As a whole, however, the median survival time for authoritarian regime spells is 11 years and the mean is 18 years (Figure 9.8 in the Appendix).

Plotting the hazard estimate by regime type, as shown in Figure 9.9 in the Appendix, supports the observation that military dictatorships tend to be short-lived and that monarchies and party-based regimes are relatively long-lasting. Plotting hazards by levels of contestation and participation (Figure 9.10 in the Appendix) shows that the probability of failure is relatively flat among regime spells with open forms of contestation and participation at least until one standard deviation above the mean survival time. Between 15 and 30 years, the probability of failure is lowest for regime spells with open contestation
and closed participation, and between 12 and 30 years, the failure rate is lowest among those with open contestation and either level of openness in participation. For the different regime types and levels of contestation and participation, the hazards appear to be fairly proportional to one another. A covariate-specific test of the proportional-hazards assumption confirms that the assumption is not strongly violated, although it should be noted that the null hypothesis (which indicates deviation from the proportional-hazards assumption) is only rejected for open polities at a confidence level of 90 percent. A ‘log-log’ plot by covariates in (Figure 9.11 in the Appendix) shows lines that are relatively parallel, and comparing Kaplan-Meier observed survival curves with Cox predicted curves (Figure 9.12 in the Appendix) shows them to be fairly close together, graphically illustrating that the proportional-hazards assumption is not grossly violated. The scaled Schoefeld residuals associated with levels of contestation and participation (Figures 9.13 through 9.15 in the Appendix) are also fairly flat, further confirming the reliability of using a model based on proportional hazards.\textsuperscript{114}

Duration analysis involves estimating the probability of an event over time, of which the hazard rate is a central component. While Cox regression models the effect of covariates on the hazard, it makes no assumptions about the shape of the hazard. However, the shape of the hazard rate may vary, such that the risk of failure increases or decreases with time. Accurately characterizing the underlying shape of time-dependency yields parameter estimates that are generally more precise than estimates from semi-parametric and nonparametric models where the shape of the hazard is unspecified. This encourages a parametric approach that explicitly models duration dependence, or the way that transition rates vary over time. A comparison of model fit with covariates suggests that the Weibull or exponential functional forms are equally appropriate for estimating the time to regime failure. Table 8.5 therefore shows the results of a survival model based on Weibull-distributed hazards. The first model estimates the impact of levels of contestation and participation on the survival of all regime spells, while the second and third show their impact on party-based and personalist regimes, respectively.
According to the results, the hazard of failure was significantly higher for regime spells in countries that had prior experience with relatively open contestation. The risk of failure was considerably higher—by a factor of 6—for those that had previously institutionalized competition but disallowed participation. Compared to authoritarian regimes that currently had neither institutionalized contestation or participation, those with either or both were significantly more likely to survive. The estimates associated with current levels are all significant above a 90 percent level of confidence. However, the tenure-lengthening impact of contestation was nearly twice that of participation. Institutionalized contestation therefore supports regime survival; in cases in which it is not present but there was past experience with it, the regime was at greater risk of failure.

The results shown in the first model of Table 8.5 hold to the inclusion of controls for independence, region, GDP and population, civil war and coup attempts, and regime type. When I account for the region of the world in which each regime existed, the estimates become sharper—in addition to past experience with open contestation, a history of open participation significantly raises the risk of failure, and presently open participation without institutionalized competition significantly lowers the hazard. I obtain similar results when I control for institutional patterns, as indicated by the cluster groups.

Table 8.5: Duration model predicting time to regime spell failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>explanatory variable</th>
<th>all regime spells</th>
<th>party-based spells</th>
<th>personalist spells</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reference category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interr./Trans., closed</td>
<td>past contestation only</td>
<td>6.070 (1.639) ***</td>
<td>4.945 (3.040) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past participation only</td>
<td>1.074 (0.180)</td>
<td>1.083 (0.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>past open</td>
<td>1.562 (0.249) ***</td>
<td>1.579 (0.512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reference category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contestation only</td>
<td>0.223 (0.038) ***</td>
<td>0.062 (0.021) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>participation only</td>
<td>0.464 (0.189) *</td>
<td>0.696 (0.765)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>open</td>
<td>0.258 (0.055) ***</td>
<td>0.174 (0.032) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(p)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.001 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.269 (0.104) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>4147</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spells</td>
<td></td>
<td>263</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-356.860</td>
<td>-61.917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*standard errors in parentheses;***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10
The finding that prior experience with contestation where it currently does not exist places an authoritarian regime spell at greater risk of failure, and that presently open forms of contestation protect it from failure, is true for both failures that resulted in democracy as well as countries that remained authoritarian. These estimated risks are reflected in Figure 8.2, which shows the survivor functions for regime spells by current levels of contestation and participation. However, the interpretation varies according to the type of regime that is at risk, as shown in the second and third models of Table 8.5. Past experience with open contestation alone significantly increases the hazards of failure in party-based regimes, but it is not statistically significant for predicting failures in personalist regimes. Neither does it significantly predict failures among monarchies and military dictatorships. In contrast, previous experience with open forms of contestation and participation do not raise the hazards of failure among party-based and personalist regimes, but it does for monarchies and military regimes. The tenure-lengthening impacts of contestation are much greater for party-based regimes than personalist regimes, and not a significant predict of failure among monarchies and military regimes.

Specifying the type of failure—transitions to democracies or transitions to subsequent autocracies—suggests that past experience with open contestation and little to no participation, where it currently is not practiced, places party-based regimes at a greater risk of democratization than a transition to another authoritarian regime. However, party-based regimes with currently institutionalized competition have significantly lower hazards of either type of failure. Overall, the findings confirm that relative to polities with neither institutionalized contestation or participation, past experience with either places a regime at greater risk of failure and current openness lowers the risk of failure. In particular, I find strong support for the hypothesis that political regimes are more likely to survive as a result of having open contestation and limited participation. The effect of levels of contestation and participation on regime failure differs by the type of authoritarian regime, and is particularly acute for party-based regimes.


8.4 Discussion

The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the second part of the broader claim being made in this thesis. I argued that the general trend of countries that first set the terms of competition and later expanded participation points to an aspect of statebuilding that helps to explain the timing and success of authoritarian regimes. In particular, I drew on insights from a qualitative analysis of the long-term process of political development in Mexico to explain the predominance of authoritarian legislatures that occur independently of a ruling party. That is, that instituting open contestation under restricted participation is historically associated with the complexification of political regimes as well as their survival.

In the first part, I empirically analyzed whether countries characterized by a period of regularized competition and restricted political participation were more likely to turn into party-based authoritarian regimes or democracies. I found considerably robust support for the hypothesis that this was the case. Among the regimes coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) between 1946 and 2010, democracies and party-based authoritarianism
were more likely to follow from established contestation. This corresponds with findings in the previous chapter, in which I demonstrated that increased participation was more likely after contestation had been established. In a way, this finding is incredibly intuitive—it would be quite difficult for a ruling party to assume power in the absence of regularized competition, and by definition democracy cannot exist without it. However, the intuition that more complex forms of institutionalized politics is supported by establishing competition among elites is at least demonstrable. The empirical relationship underscores conclusions that I made about political institutions in Mexico, which were that the period of nonpartisan legislative activity that characterized the Porfiriato may have contributed to the inertia that resulted in the highly successful Partido Revolucionario Institucional. I also found that open contestation and limited participation positive predicts personalist regimes. Although I did not hypothesize this relationship, the finding attests to the claim by Svolik (2009) that power-sharing dynamics can sometimes result in the consolidation of personal power by the executive.

While the finding that contestation helps to predict partisan politics is somewhat intuitive, what is perhaps less intuitive is that it also positively predicts multiethnic political leadership among party-based regimes. This may be explained as the result of cross-class or cross-ethnic identities that coalesce during the period of elite hegemony, which supports economic growth and the entrenchment of political practices. The relationship is highly robust, and it provides a supporting illustration of a possible mechanism behind the establishment of a political party in Mexico that represented workers, military officers, and agrarians alike. Nevertheless, explaining multiethnic ruling parties cannot be reduced to whether elite coordination was established previously. This test is arguably the least persuasive, but it contributes to my argument that elite coordination provides stability that engenders further political development. The study of party formation and party dominance in autocracies is a related, yet separate agenda for future research.

Thirdly, I tested whether contestation helps to explain the survival of authoritarian regimes. I found considerable support for the expectation that it does. Open contestation,
regardless of the level of openness in political participation, is positively associated with regime longevity. In particular, this relationship helps to explain the survival of party-based authoritarian regimes. Though the narrative of the Porfiriato highlights the value of legislature in coordinating elite activity, it appears to have limited traction for explaining its survival. In reality, however, the thirty-year period represented by the administration of Porfirio Díaz was unprecedented when compared to the presidents before him. Thus, establishing institutional rules regarding political competition may be a critical aspect for the development of, as well as the survival of, party-based politics. The argument has been suggested by a number of scholars, but has been difficult to demonstrate. Measured as dichotomous indicators of institutionalized forms of contestation and participation, there is limited evidence to support it.

8.5 Conclusion

In support of the argument that there is a general historical trend in which states first developed competitive institutions and then faced the issue of mass electoral incorporation, I tested whether the first condition helps to explain the timing and success of authoritarian institutions. I did so using a series of three tests which constitute some logical extensions from process tracing institutional development in Mexico. I find that the condition of having a regularized, or ‘open’ form of contestation significantly explains regime type, the breadth of party inclusion (in terms of a multiethnic party leadership) and the duration of authoritarian regime spells. Though the evidence that each analysis represents is not definitive, together they provide considerable support to illustrate the value of elite coordination through a competitive arrangement. Some important extensions not explored here, but which nevertheless represent useful avenues for future research, concerns the extent to which more sophisticated patterns of interactions and institutions can explain political outcomes. Moreover, while I have attempted to use a simple and straightforward method to identify whether a broad pattern matters in a cross-national sample, the process that I qualitatively identified in Mexico must also be
complemented by additional research on the process of political development elsewhere.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

9.1 Synopsis of the Argument

The argument that I have advanced in this thesis is that political institutions can be thought of as occurring in a particular order in the long-term, as part of the process of statebuilding. Forums like legislatures and political parties may resolve specific strategic dilemmas that arise in non-democratic settings. In particular, I argued that an initial problem facing a leader in the absence of institutions is to address the problem of authoritarian power-sharing, as identified by (Svolik 2012). At its core, addressing power-sharing involves setting the terms of competition. This may be best served through the development of an institution that promotes horizontal accountability among actors who would otherwise use force to secure gains. The interactions between a would-be leader and elites are therefore likely to be supported by personal exchanges within institutions such as coalitions, legislatures, and juntas, which lower the costs of collective action and information-sharing.

If initial forms of non-democratic government are supported by a ‘closed’ polity in which elites practice competition, political stability should be expected, insofar as the political arrangement mollifies threats stemming from oppositional elites. However, economic developments made possible by détente, in the form of urbanization, industrialization, and modernization, are capable of generating new threats as a result of wealth accumulation outside of the regime. Alternatively, the aggrandizement of regime insiders, coupled with changes in the form of labor, may sharpen economic and political
disparities and contribute to grievances. Where challenges arise from the broader society that are uncontainable, the constituents of the ‘regime’ are forced to either institutionalize the interests of organized masses or risk rebellion (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Boix 2003, North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009a). However, the institutional structure required to accommodate larger portions of society can be expected to emphasize participation over contestation.

To use the language of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a), I argue that the development of a ‘limited-access order,’ in which “[e]lite organizations generate and distribute rents to the coalition,” is supported by a political institution that reinforces between-member linkages, such as a legislature (pg. 20). In many ways, even the construction of democracy is dependent upon the construction of political institutions by an initially restricted group (Bermeo 1992). Subsequently, however, transitions from ‘limited-access orders’ to ‘open-access orders’ can be characterized as one in which horizontally organized institutions either give way to, or are complemented by, vertical political institutions that extend to more actors. There are, therefore, two major pieces of this argument. The first is that, as suggested by Dahl (1971), the institutionalization of political competition may precede that of political participation. This need not explain the development of democracies, however. Moreover, it may not be appropriate to discuss ‘contestation’ and ‘participation’ in terms of degrees, as has been done by Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado (2008), Miller (2015), and Wright (2008b). Instead, it may be theoretically important to distinguish them as attributes that are either present or absent in political institutions.

The second is that distinct forms of political organization help to institutionalize each of these attributes, such that the origins of political parties and legislatures in non-democracies should be considered separately. The importance of considering whether there are causal mechanisms that explain differences in the timing of institutions in autocratic regimes is underscored by the institutional trends shown in chapter 2, which demonstrate that autocratic legislatures have not increased concomitantly in number with authoritarian parties in the last fifty years. There are also present issues in the
study of authoritarian political institutions which may benefit from further exploration of the motivations behind the creation of different political organizations, as well as their adaptability. Chapter 3 articulated a logic behind the development of ‘horizontal’ versus ‘vertical’ political institutions based on strategic interactions involving the leader, elites, and masses, building on existing theoretical efforts. The purpose was to identify and to explain similarities in long-term institutional patterns in real-world cases.

The reason for this thesis was to reconcile issues related to functionalist, ahistorical, and underspecified logics behind the creation of authoritarian institutions. In attempting to do so, I aimed to truly better understand the process of institution building in Mexico and to explore the intuitions of [Dahl (1971)], some of which softly reverberates in other aspects of the literature on comparative politics. In so doing, I drew upon the strengths of three major contemporary works—[Svolik (2012), North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009a), and Kurtz (2013)]—that together provide good reason for not dismissing outright the prospect that authoritarian governance occurs in stages. Noting the uncertainty and indeterminacy surrounding transitional politics, [O’Donnell and Whitehead (1986)] liken the situation to a “multi-layered chess game”:

...with people challenging the rules on every move, pushing and shoving to get to the board, shouting out advice and threats from the sidelines, trying to cheat when they can—but nevertheless becoming progressively mesmerized by the drama they are participating in or watching, and gradually becoming more committed to playing more decorously and loyally to the rules they themselves have elaborated (pg. 66)

At the risk of perpetuating a fallacy by false analogy, the authors’ metaphor provides a useful guide by which to understand the pattern of state building. The process may firstly involve resolving threats at the most immediate level, and then addressing longer term governance issues. In the analysis of authoritarian institutions, therefore, it is important to remember that “castling the king” is a multilevel concern.115
9.2 Summary of Findings

A primary motivation for exploring the abovementioned argument is the observation that in many Latin American countries, elite conflicts and political institutions that favored elites preceded conflicts involving the masses or the integration of popular interests. Although the cases in Latin America are not equally similar, I argued that many of the attributes that characterize politics in the region were present in the case of Mexico. Using process-tracing, I attempted to expound on the pattern by which institutions emerged in Mexico by evaluating a set of statements that make up a causal explanation. In chapters 4 and 5, I provide support to demonstrate that political instability characterized the national government in Mexico after independence, for which one of Porfirio Díaz’s primary concerns involved fulfilling a liberal project using conservative elements. Representing the interests of local elites at the national level through their participation in congress reinforced his regime; in turn, it supported economic developments credited with bringing Mexico into the modern era.

Nevertheless, economic changes associated with the Díaz regime constituted one of the root causes of the revolution that unseated him, ushering in a period of near-anarchy. As a consequence, critical actors in the revolution fought among themselves in the war’s conclusion. This time, however, aspiring leaders appealed to organized masses to support their leadership. Political activity following the Revolution became more organized and mass-oriented, which was signified by the establishment of the first national political party. The party, which appealed to but did not directly represent core constituents among the organized masses (e.g., labor, agrarian leagues), was reoriented toward these groups and transformed into a vehicle for continued success.

The ability of the hegemonic party to take advantage of and direct large-scale voting in Mexico is well documented, as illustrated by Magaloni (2008), Eisenstadt (2004), and Bruhn (1997). The national legislature, however, is a less well-known institution that is a cornerstone of my explanation for the strength of the Porfiriato. Using biographical information on congressmen and governors provided by Ai Camp (1991), I evaluated some of the central claims in my narrative in chapter 6. I tested whether congressmen
and governors were more likely to be large landowners or materially powerful individuals (military officers, caudillos, or political bosses) during the Porfiriato, as opposed to after his regime, and whether the stability of this period was also associated with an increase in the number of individuals representing intellectual or commercial activities. I found that powerful individuals were more likely to hold office during the Porfiriato, and that their numbers decreased throughout. I also found an increase in the number of individuals associated with academic institutions, as well as a dramatic increase in the affiliations of political officials with labor unions and agrarian groups after the administration of Porfirio Díaz. The results confirm my expectation that the national legislature supported the dictatorship by moderating the interests of powerful local elites, many of whom had contributed to the prior instability.

In chapter 7, I examined whether there is a common path by which institutions have developed. Using concept variables from the Polity IV project to denote varieties of contestation and participation, I demonstrated that the 19th and early 20th centuries involved a considerable number of polities that had an executive designated by elites, and many were characterized by factionalized or nonexistent political participation. The data appear to portray accurate institutional changes as they relate to the political histories of Mexico and other Latin American countries, demonstrating face validity. I also found that there were greater levels of contestation than participation until the last few decades, and that more open forms of political participation were significantly more likely to follow from countries that had more open forms of contestation. Using a relatively novel approach to political science called sequence analysis, I calculated the similarity between the institutional patterns. Clustering the similarity values shows groups of visually similar patterns which comport with the expectations of Dahl (1971). Specifically, I find support for the argument that a general trend involving a transition between limited-access orders and open-access orders characterizes historical political development.

Following from the conclusions derived from process tracing state building in Mexico and the observation that regularized competition and limited participation was a frequent precursor to political parties, chapter 8 quantitatively examined whether it
explained regime type and regime survival. I find that the state of relatively ‘open’
contestation, regardless of the level of institutionalized participation, is significantly
related to party-based authoritarianism and multiethnic party leadership. It also explains
the longevity of authoritarian regime spells, particularly those based on a political party.
The results therefore support the argument that institutionalizing elite consensus is an
important determinant of stable, more complex political institutions.

9.3 Contributions

The purpose of this project was to consider in greater detail the period of
authoritarianism that preceded the Mexican Revolution, and the generation of the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional, for the purpose of understanding why different types of
political institutions may represent different phases in the development of a state. With
regard to my argument that the institutionalization of political competition may precede
that of political participation, and that distinct forms of political organization help
to institutionalize each of these attributes, this thesis accomplishes several important
objectives but does not address others. My research explored the development of the
Mexican state to provide an in-depth analysis of the possible interrelation of interactions
and institutions. Process-tracing attempted to dissect the dilemmas associated with
particular authoritarian institutions in a case that is broadly representative of other cases
in the region. These chapters discussed how the institutionalization of competition, or
contestation, was facilitated by the legislature and its implications for the timing of a
popular political party.

My analysis of the composition of the Mexican legislature between 1884 and 1934
illustrated, in a quantitative fashion, the underlying mechanism that I proposed. It
confirmed the predominance of traits that are associated with elites in the national
congress during the Porfiriato. This supports my argument that the legislature helped to
institutionalize competition among powerful contenders. The results help to augment the
validity of a theory which relates political institutions to different problems associated
with authoritarian governance.

The project also offers to complement existing interpretations of the Mexican Revolution, of which there is an abundant and somewhat heterogenous set of explanations. It would be incredibly short-sighted to presume that the revolution that deposed Porfirio Díaz could be entirely attributed to economic development and to gloss over its disastrous consequences. However, the discussion that I advance herein attempts to integrate the event within a broader explanation of institutional change, rather than to treat the period 1910-1917 as a structural break that prevented its past political life from affecting subsequent activity. The value of not disregarding trends prior to major conflicts is illustrated by the observation of post-war recovery, a trend often referred to as the ‘Phoenix effect’ (Prins and Karakaya 2011, Organski and Kugler 1977). Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003) used the case of Mexico to argue that vertical political integration—a system in which asset holders are integrated into the government—is resilient to political instability, which explains how economies can survive political violence. It is similarly reasonable to assume that the structure of political coalitions formed during the Porfiriato could have survived the Revolution, even if the actors themselves did not.

The expectation that the issue of competition—determining a power-sharing arrangement—precedes that of participation, or the decision to formally integrate a broader proportion of the population, is a question that I attempted to systematically investigate. I examined cross-national trends and provided empirical support for the argument. Demonstrating the relationship between historical ‘levels’ of contestation and important outcomes after 1950 served to add credibility to my argument that institutional choice was related to development and conflict in Mexico. The robustness of the results also signifies the value of thinking about the long-term implications of institutional choice and reinforces the historical institutionalist approach.

At the same time, there are a number of things that the thesis does not do. For one, it does not make any claims regarding changes in the degree of contestation and participation over time. Rather than operationalize the intuitions of Dahl (1971) by focusing on the rights to contest and to participate, I portrayed them as institutional
choices—that is, the institutionalization of a form of contestation and institutions that enhance participation. The implications of extending suffrage or permitting more candidates in an election are left largely untouched. These are, in my opinion, marginal changes associated with the institutions that are already in place. Though they are bound to make a difference in the survival of autocracy and the prospects for democracy and are indeed important, the primary concern of this study was the turn to the institution and not the degree of openness of the institution. To this end, I regard the concept variables from Polity more as distinct forms of contestation and participation rather than levels.

The research presented here does not necessarily yield meaningful predictions about the impacts of ‘contestation’ and ‘participation’ on autocratic survival and democratization. Similarly, it departs from the discussion inherent in the ‘democratic sequencing’ debate over whether modernization is a precondition for democracy. Instead, it explains why the timing of authoritarian institutions may differ in the long-term, and the ways in which authoritarian institutions should differ from their democratic counterparts. One of the major contributions of this thesis, therefore, is to emphasize the importance of considering the prior roles of an institution in order to explain its present functions, and of accounting for previous institutions/regime types in models that aim to predict the viability of present-day regimes. Where one regime failed, the strategic dilemmas that it faced may have generated political institutions that affect the scope of institutional choice in the next regime (Casper 1995).

In line with the concerns of Fukuyama (2011), my expectation about institutional change is not meant to reproduce the thesis by Huntington (1968) regarding “authoritarian modernization.” According to Huntington (1968), authoritarian states establish political order leading to industrialization and economic developments, which is supportive of the emergence of a middle class and institutions favorable to democracy. Criticisms launched against this thesis are that this process “depends on benevolent dictators,” suggests that rule of law precedes democratic openings, and conflicts with normative views of democracy (Fukuyama 2011). The process that I have elaborated on in this project does not require dictators to set aside their personal desires for national development, but argues that
basic levels of economic development are not possible without the contractual agreement between a dictator and oppositional elites should the threat exist. It also avoids the notion of rule of law or normative implications for democracy, focusing instead on strategic dilemmas that foster the institutionalization of specific practices.

My efforts to empirically evaluate institutional trends suffers from an inability to identify patterns involving legislatures and political parties prior to 1946. While I was able to show common patterns in changes related to the form of executive recruitment and political competition, I was unable to show commonalities in the form of political organization. To demonstrate that a legislature can provide a different function than a political party (or that horizontally organized institutions exert different effects from vertically organized institutions), I relied principally on qualitative analysis. Extensions of this inquiry, therefore, would include gathering information on the structure of governments in the 19th and 20th centuries. This analysis would also be substantially supported by a similar analysis of additional cases, a goal to which I aspire in further developing the project.

Additionally, the argument that the structure of political parties supports vertical integration should not be taken to mean that political parties denote greater inclusion of the masses. I do not argue that political parties represent a one-to-one correlation with increased participation or inclusion; rather, I argue that the structure of political parties supports the vertical integration of organized masses. This brings me back to the supporting cases that described in the introduction. For example, the observation of Conservative and Liberal parties in Latin America were parties in name, but they were banners for elite interests. In places like Bolivia and Mexico, those parties never transformed into parties of the masses; in Uruguay, in contrast, the resilience of formerly elite parties is due in part to their innovation.117

Even parties that constitute mass interests do not necessarily represent mass integration. Examples include parties composed of specific actors, such as political dissidents (e.g. the FMLN in El Salvador and the FSLN in Nicaragua). Though the MNR in Bolivia attracted workers, students, and members of different classes, economic
and political problems led to factionalization and the development of more disparate, personalist parties. The strength of the military and personalism can also play a role in determining the impact of a political party as a vehicle for mass incorporation, as evidenced by Argentina. The contrasts that these cases provide does not invalidate the theoretical argument that I present, but highlights variations in the paths of political development that are associated with the strategic dilemma that increased participation represents. More importantly, however, the difference in party success in Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay may be partly explained by the theory that he offered here. Where the ‘general trend’ of coordinated elite interests followed by mass incorporation does not occur, the result may likely be personalized, factionalized party politics. A noteworthy observation is that the more successful cases of Argentina and Uruguay fall into the same cluster of institutional patterns, while Bolivia does not (see Figure 7.12 and Table 9.8 in chapter 7). Thus, if identifying a broad, generalizable pattern of institution building can help to explain successful state building, it may also help to explain failures. To illustrate this, I touch briefly on state building in Turkey, contrasting it with current state building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

9.4 Policy Implications

Outside of Mexico, and Latin America more broadly, my explanation helps to explain progress and pitfalls in the institutionalization of politics elsewhere. A relevant example that incorporates some of the insights here is that of Turkey, which dealt with the concern for constitutional government during the second half of the 19th century. In many ways, institutional developments in Turkey mirror those in Mexico. Turkey is characterized by a “deeply divided” center-periphery cleavage comprising a ‘core’ of minority elites representing bureaucrats, military officers, and secularists (Hazama 2011). At the same time, however, its unique experiences with democracy also provides a useful point of contrast against the Mexican experience (Diamond, Linz, and Eds., 1999).

There is a question of whether the process of institutional change in Turkey was the
product of its integration with Western values, or if it was instead a normal progression. Turkey entered a number of western institutions, for which Atatürk’s administration was associated with a legacy of Europeanism. Because it is an industrialized country within the West’s sphere of influence, Turkey is considered a first world country; it is also one the first among developing countries that established constitutional government (Kili 1992). Kili (1992) argues, however, that “[t]he democratic system which Turkey is practicing is not a copy of the West, but the natural culmination of those processes which were in the making in Turkish society over many decades” (pg. 1062).

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, military officer Kemal Atatürk led a revolution against the proxies of the Allies who occupied the partitioned country. A ‘Period of National Struggle’ occurred between 1919 and 1923; the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923, and the Caliphate was abolished in 1924 (Kili 1992). As first president of the republic, Atatürk embarked on a program of reforms that aimed at developing modern, secular nation-state of Turkey. The reforms expanded public education, extended rights to women, and reduced taxes on the poor. Though a former military officer himself, Atatürk discredited direct military rule and insisted on civilian control, “legitimizing civilian supremacy in government” (Patton 1995, pg. 142).

The 1924 Constitution had instituted a strong parliamentary government. Though essentially democratic, the 1924 instituted a unicameral national legislature that was effectively unchecked (Kili 1992). A primary concern during the Kemalist era was modernization, and the process was characterized by the exercise of political power by a central elite composed of retired military officers and technocrats (Kili 1992, Patton 1995). Thus, Atatürk did not support direct military rule, but he did see the value of a strong core of elites to help guide development. The philosophical thought undergirding Kemalism was similar to that of Positivism in Mexico: “[Atatürk] believed reason and scientific method could create an almost unlimited future of material progress for mankind..., and that if Turkey were to benefit from it, then the Turks too would have to apply rational and scientific methods to every sphere of their national life” (Ward 1942). It supported a division in Turkish politics “between central military and the bureaucratic elites, and
the peripheral forces,...all social forces that do not belong to the military-bureaucratic ruling class” (Ozbudun 2006 pg. 216). According to Ozbudun (2006), this class had a monopoly on power from the mid-nineteenth century until the first free elections in 1950.

In addition to a unicameral legislature, Atatürk founded the Republican People’s Party (RPP) in 1923 “to contest elections and shepherd his reforms through the legislature” (Patton 1995 pg. 142). Between 1930 and 1946, the RPP was the only political party in the country (Patton 1995). A party that primarily represented elite interests, its focus on order kept the periphery in suspicion–opposition parties were suppressed, and the provinces were considered areas of potential discontent (Günes-Ayata 2002, Mardin 1973). “In fact, the builders of the Turkish Republic placed the strengthening of the state first in their priorities, even though it meant the perpetuation of dependence on notables...[T]his option seems to have been derived not so much from what, in retrospect, seem rational considerations, but from the bureaucratic code: the center had to be strengthened–partly against the periphery–before everything else” (Mardin 1973 pg. 183). Thus, even though the Constitution supported democratic principles, the emphasis during the nearly 30-year period of one-party dominance was focused on centralizing and consolidating state power (Patton 1995).

The period following World War II saw a turn to multiparty competition, accompanied by a breakdown in the coalition between classes and relative deprivation experienced by peasants (Kili 1980). Many of the reforms implemented under Atatürk had not penetrated the rural countryside (Patton 1995). “Great economic difficulties, which the nation confronted, particularly in the late 1950s, and the negative impact of these difficulties on the Turkish social structure, constituted another source of restlessness in Turkish society” (Kili 1992 pg. 1064). By the 1950s, an opposition party called the Democrat Party had gained considerable traction by appealing to traditional sectors and encouraging mobilization in the countryside. “The Democrat Party re legitimized Islam and traditional rural values;” moreover, “[t]he blows dealt to the power and the prestige of the bureaucracy between 1950-1957 endeared the Democrat Party to both the notables and the peasants” (Mardin 1973 pg. 185). The victory of the Democratic
Party in 1950 that resulted from mobilizing these peripheral forces, also encouraged the adoption of constitutional review and judicial independence (Özbudun 2006). “In effect the DP finished the revolution that Ataturk had started by accomplishing what Ataturk had not—socioeconomic and political changes that penetrated deep into the countryside” (Patton 1995, pg. 145).

Consolidation faced considerable difficulty between the 1960s and 1980s. According to Kili (1992), the practice of parties under the multiparty system demonstrated problems associated with majority rule. A military intervention in 1960 prompted a constituent assembly that was heavily dominated by state elites and represented a return to limited politics (Özbudun 2006). In the subsequent constitution promulgated in 1961, greater rights and freedoms were extended to Turkish citizens (Kili 1980, 1992). Nevertheless, “[t]he capacity of the Turkish political system lagged behind the awakening of the Turkish masses to their own needs,” which contributed to additional instability (Kili 1992, pg. 1067). Such conflict led the military to intervene in 1980, and resulted in a 1982 constitution that restricted many rights, returning to the issue of the viability of the state (Kili 1992). The ANAP (Motherland Party) government that followed is credited with greater integration of the interest of the periphery, and political parties have started working together to amend the Constitution of 1982 in the direction of constitutional democracy and human rights (Kili 1992). In this way, the central government is becoming seen as less closed. “What was once a segmentally compartmentalized periphery characterized by ascriptive attachments is now in an increasing process of articulation with expanding forms of functionally differentiated interests, growing associational groups, and increasing market transactions” (Kili 1992, pg. 1077).

The process of state building in Turkey following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire illustrates a prevailing focus on using elite consensus to initiate the project, and subsequent issues related to integrating regime outsiders. Mardin (1973) argues that the deals and bargains that supported client politics in the Democrat Party stemmed in part from the economic infrastructure constructed under the Republican People’s Party. Its semblance to the process that I described in Mexico is well summarized by Patton (1995):
While Atatürk had established political institutions that purported to represent the nation and popular will and had laid out constitutional principles that were consistent with democratic governance, his reforms principally affected elites and local notables...in the one-party period, the people had not been empowered, nor was political participation genuinely democratic. Under the DP, populist mobilization socialized the masses into the norms of competitive politics and created widespread support for democracy in the form of popular participation in contested elections” (pg. 145)

The goals of establishing constitutional government and promoting stability is an issue affecting a number of countries in the world, and they concern host countries as well as external actors. Though focused on historical institutional developments, there are several implications from the research that this project comprises which may help to add to a number of different discussions about governance in the modern world. The first pertains to the ‘lessons’ that can be drawn from U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya (Betts 2014, Boot 2014, Brennan 2014, Tomsen 2014). As Betts (2014) noted, “[m]ilitary intervention in an unstable country can work if it reinforces the development of a stable political system–but that depends on the aims and actions of that country’s politicians” (pg. 18). A major problem facing the promotion of democracy in unstable areas is that it can empower dominant leaders at the expense of unifying the country (Betts 2014). As an example, the national unity government in Iraq, which was designed to be more inclusive and responsive, suffered factionalization when the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pursued a vendetta against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, prompting boycotts. This event was one of many that exposed the failure to establish government unity between Shiites and Sunnis and to resolve the threat of ‘shadow governents’ resonating with populations in different regions. As a consequence, parliamentary elections set to occur in 2010 “devolved into a divisive legal and political battle that took nine months to resolve” and left behind a lack of trust in the political system (Brennan 2014).

The conclusions drawn from my portrayal of the role of ‘horizontal’ versus ‘vertical’ institutions in the process of statebuilding suggests that external powers encouraging nation building should exert greater effort to the identify local sources of conflict and identifying ways to coordinate the interests of the authorities that represent them.
In other words, contestation should be emphasized not in the liberal sense, in which aggregated interests are given equal opportunity to compete, but should firstly aim at settling the terms of power-sharing among those who would otherwise destabilize them. As scholars and international observers alike have discovered, elections do not guarantee a stable government. In the same light, party politics may not necessarily be an appropriate first recourse in places in which warring factions have not determined the rules of competition. This is alluded to in assessments of reconciliation in Iraq, where “[b]ecause democratization unleashed the social divisions that Saddam Hussein’s brutality had suppressed, it enabled a bitter political conflict to explode and paralyzed the government” (Betts 2014, pg. 19). The importance of actively pursuing coalitional governments based on local authorities is best summarized by an appraisal of difficulties facing Afghan statebuilding, given by Tomsen (2014):

Before the communist era, which began in 1978, Afghanistan enjoyed four decades of stability and slow but steady modernization. The country owed its progress largely to a unique relationship between the central government and traditional tribal structures in the regions. The government in Kabul did not possess a monopoly of power in the country but shared it with moderate tribal groups and clerics in rural areas. The government provided services such as schools, clinics, and roads to the regions, whose tribal elders administered their communities according to ancient codes and customs, maintained security, and participated in parliamentary conclaves in Kabul. The new central government will have to decide whether and how to restore that kind of equilibrium (pg. 53)

Elsewhere, the issue of establishing coordination among critical actors is illustrated by the difficulties that Nepal’s Constituent Assembly faces in trying to pass a new constitution. Former Maoist rebels now participating as the United Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (UCPN-Maoist) accused the ruling coalition of pushing through proposals without consensus, as the deadline for a draft constitution came and went. Disagreements over the new national constitution also resulted in violence and arrests within the Parliament, further hampering attempts to hammer out a consensual document in the murmurs of a decade-long civil war (BBC 2015, Hachhethu 2014, Phuyal 2015).

The possibility that resolving strategic dilemmas might need to occur in a particular order may provide a useful framework for action to actors that aim to promote
post-conflict stability. This is made particularly evident by the fact that both Afghanistan and Iraq fall into a cluster characterized by the least likely transition path, in which there was institutionalized participation before contestation (see Figure 7.12 and Table 9.8 in chapter 7). More fundamentally, however, such considerations deserve greater importance in the design of withdrawal after the conflict. One of the reasons attributed to protracted instability in the Middle East and North Africa at the hands of the United States include failing to prepare for the aftermath of victory (Boot 2014, Brennan 2014). Additionally, the long-term nature of institutional changes that I have highlighted here complement insights from those seeking to provide practical advice to U.S. military involvement in other countries: “Washington must recognize that counterinsurgency and nation building take time” (Booth 2014 pg. 14). Not only may there be steps to the construction of viable states, but it may take much longer than their framers had intended. “[T]he most successful [counterinsurgency campaigns] rely on indigenous, rather than foreign, forces and take some ten to 20 years—longer than even the very patient American public is willing to endure” (Betts 2014, pg. 20).

Another implication beyond the interaction of dominant leaders and local authorities concerns the ways in which popular groups exert change. The value of political parties as an instrument for mass incorporation is based in part on the organization of popular groups (Casper and Taylor 1996). As Chenowith and Stephan (2014) noted, civil resistance succeeds “because it is more likely than armed struggle to attract a larger and more diverse base of participants and impose unsustainable costs on a regime.” Reflections on U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq emphasize the importance of focusing efforts on providing “civilian support” to help develop government and economic affairs, and mobilizing rural populations (Betts 2014, Booth 2014). Thus, in addition to identifying potentially destabilizing authorities and using them to determine the structure of national competition that would prevent violence, it may also be worthwhile to develop organizations that serve as pillars of popular society—labor unions, agrarian groups, community organizations—that can more easily support party-based competition that is robust to ethnic divisions. The ability of the PRI to construct a support base on
such pillars helps to explain its continued electoral success, and the ability to solidify cross-cutting cleavages is an old-cited attribute of successful democracy (Lijphart 1968, 1977; Magaloni 2008b).121

9.5 Conclusions

Spurred by the case of state building in Mexico and broad patterns regarding political institutions in Latin America, this dissertation quickly became an ambitious endeavor to relate strategic dilemmas to authoritarian institutions and demonstrate the plausibility of a general trend in historical political development. There are some considerable limitations with it that must be mentioned. First, despite my attempts to accumulate knowledge on actors and their activities in early Mexico, this study could not attain full awareness of the intents and actions of those present in the construction of the republic, nor do I have complete information on the composition of the Mexican legislature during the 19th and 20th centuries. The cross-national analyses that I used to demonstrate a ‘trend’ in political developments between 1800 and 2010 also apply a very blunt treatment to complex concepts. Moreover, the empirical associations that I show in Chapter 8 are hardly groundbreaking.

At the same time, however, this research makes an earnest effort to pay attention to the richness of the Latin American experience, in the tradition of Kurtz (2013), Mahoney (2001), and Yashar (1997). It also heeds the recommendations by recent scholars to conduct analyses in political science that are more attentive to the role of time in affecting political outcomes (Grzymala-Busse 2011, Pierson 2004). At a time when others are attempting to ‘rein in’ a plethora of partially valid measures and construct latent measures for continuous dimensions of democracy and autocracy (e.g. Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008; Coppedge et al. 2011; Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2010; Wright, Honaker, and Geddes 2014), this study took a relatively simple and straightforward approach to demonstrating a stepwise claim about the development of political institutions.

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Where does that leave us?

Suggesting that there may have been a historically common institutional pattern in the process of state building, in which institutions first favor the coordination of elite interests and then integrate the masses, has the distasteful undertone of prescribing the prevention of ordinary citizens from affecting political change in unstable societies. As Huntington (1965) argued:

Given our hypotheses about the relation of social mobilization to institutionalization, there are two obvious methods of furthering institutional development. First, anything which slows social mobilization presumably creates conditions more favorable to the preservation and strengthening of institutions. Secondly, strategies can be developed and applied directly to the problem of institution-building (pg. 418).

This is a dangerous and unethical prescription. It is also but one possible conclusion to which the argument that this thesis advances leads. Rather, the deduction that this dissertation supports is that peacekeeping efforts should place greater emphasis on designing specialized institutions to accommodate divergences in elite and mass-based sources of instability.

The research embodied in this thesis serves to highlight that there are different sources of threats to a regime, and that there may be different institutional structures to address them. That is to say, a major take-away from it is that institution-building in the context of unstable elite and mass interactions is to focus on institutionalizing competition to support stability among elites, and to focus on institutionalizing participation to support stability among the masses. Both of these problems have been addressed in the ‘transitology’ literature by scholars such as O’Donnell and Whitehead (1986) and Rustow (1970). However, recognizing that they are distinct issues that may require different institutional forms to resolve is an important implication for post-conflict institutional design. The ‘sequence’ identified in the development of political institutions in my historical sample is due in large part to the organic development of mass organization.
over the period of observation.

In recent contexts in which mobilization has already occurred, such as the surge of protests in the Middle East and North Africa that was dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’, promoting stability need not tamper mass dissatisfaction. Instead, such efforts might concentrate on institutionalizing mass participation in ways that can coexist with elite institutional practices. Accomplishing this in practice is a delicate balance that holds the promise of democracy, but nevertheless has the potential to create weak democracies and sustain authoritarianism (Casper 1995, Casper and Taylor 1996). In the meantime, however, thinking along the lines of divergent regime threats and different institutional solutions may help to explain variations in the structure and performance of non-democratic governments. As I have sought to demonstrate, this framework proves useful for understanding the historical development of political institutions, particularly in Latin America.
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Appendix A

Tables and figures to accompany chapter 2

Figure 9.1: Number of regimes with a support party and legislature, 1946-2010

source: Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
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<th>support party only&lt;sub&gt;_t−1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>legislature only&lt;sub&gt;_t−1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>both&lt;sub&gt;_t−1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
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<td>3.85</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<td>1970-1979</td>
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<td>5.33</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>0.24</td>
<td>99.29</td>
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Table 9.1: transition rates between support parties and legislatures, by decade
Appendix B

Timeline to accompany chapter 4

Table 9.2: Timeline, Mexico (1810-1911)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1810-1821</td>
<td>Mexican War of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td>Independence from Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td>Augustín Iturbide declared himself emperor of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td>Iturbide violently opposed by Guerrero and Santa Anna, abdicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823-1835</td>
<td>First Federal Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>First President Guadalupe Victoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835-1846</td>
<td>Centralist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846-1848</td>
<td>Mexican-American War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846-1863</td>
<td>Second Federal Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>Texas ceded to US in Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>New constitution promulgated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857-1861</td>
<td>Three year “War of Reform” led by Benito Juárez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Beginning of Second Mexican Empire, creation of regency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Napoleon III imposed French “emperor” Maximilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Maximilian ousted by General Porfirio Díaz, Benito Juárez reappointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Benito Juárez reelected; Plan of La Noria issued by Díaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>President Juárez died in office, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada assumed office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Lerdo de Tejada reelected; Plan of Tuxtepec issued by Díaz; Díaz assumed office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Founding of Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM), early group opposition to Díaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Díaz announced he would not seek reelection; Creelman interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Revolt began to block reelection of Díaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Resignation of Díaz, elections; Madero assumed presidency</td>
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</table>
### Appendix C

**Timeline to accompany chapter 5**

Table 9.3: Timeline, Mexico (1913-1946)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Civil war, death of Madero; Victoriano Huerta assumed power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Civil war ends, mainly to Carranza and Obregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Díaz regime excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>New constitution, election of Carranza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Founding of Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Assassination of Zapata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Emergence of the ‘Sonoran dynasty’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assassination of Carranza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Assassination of Francisco Villa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolt by de la Huerta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1928</td>
<td>Plutarcho Calles presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Assassination of Obregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1934</td>
<td>The Maximato, weakening of labor power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Pluto Calles created National Revolutionary Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Constitutional reform, presidential term extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to six years with no reelection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Lazaro Cardenas takes power</td>
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<td>1936</td>
<td>Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM) established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Confederacion Nacional de Campesina (CNC) established,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PNR reorganized and renamed the Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana (PRM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Founding of the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Manuel Camacho takes power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>National Labor Unity Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Aleman takes power, Electoral law of 1946,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRM renamed the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D

Dictionary for creating variables in chapter 6

This section specifies the set of terms that were used to construct indicators of specific attributes of the congressmen and governors based on the information provided by Camp (1991). The fields in which each search term was searched refer to specific categories, which are designated in the book by the same letters and explained on pages xiii-xv (Camp, 1991). Parentheses denote sets of criteria, and (*) indicates that any terms (or letters) may precede or follow from the search term. As an example, take the following search criteria:

(D: “*acienda*” OR H:“*acendado*”)

This indicates that the terms “acienda” or “acendado” were searched for within field H, which pertains to nongovermental positions held by an individual. The use of asterisks before and after each term, as in “*acienda*”, indicates that the search is inclusive of words such as “Hacienda,” “hacienda,” and “haciendas”.

There are four ways in which different sets of search criteria were used:

AND–more than one criterion must be satisfied
OR–at least one criterion must be satisfied
AND NOT–criterion excluded from search
IF NOT, THEN–if criterion is not satisfied, the next criterion searched

The size of the data on congressmen and governors allowed for a careful inspection to determine the appropriate search terms to construct the variables, and in some cases specific terms—including terms with spelling errors—were necessary to account for all of the office holders that met a particular criterion. The names of variables listed in the dictionary correspond to those used in the regression analysis (tables 1-4).

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Field Key</th>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
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<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
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<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hacienda owner
(H:“*owner of*” OR H:“*owned*”) AND (H:“*hacienda*” OR H:“*acendado*”)

Family wealth
(I:“*hacienda*” OR I:“*wealthy*” OR I:“*landowner*”) AND NOT (I:“*administrator of José María Almada’s hacienda*” OR I:“*peasants employed on the Hacienda*” OR I:“*disobeying a landowner*”)

Landed
(H:“*landowner*” OR H:“*plantation*” OR H:“*landholder*” OR H:“*land developer*” OR H:“*land holdings*” OR H:“*hectares of land*”)

Business
(H:“*businessman*” AND H:“*founded*”) OR (H:“*founder*” OR H:“*company*” OR H:“*businesses*” OR H:“*own business*” OR H:“*into business*” OR H:“*own forestry business*”)

Financial
(H:“*stockholder*” OR H:“*banking*” OR H:“*banker*” OR H:“*investor in*” OR H:“*investor with*” OR H:“*shareholder*” OR H:“*shareholder*”)

Caudillo/jefe
(F:“*political boss*” OR K:“*caudillo*”)

Military rank
(J:“*rank*”)

Constitutionalist
(J:“*Constitutionalist*”) AND NOT (K:“*fighting against the Constitutionalist*” OR J:“*fought against the Constitutionalist*” OR J:“*fought the Constitutionalist*” OR K:“*executed by the constitutionalist*”)

Revolution
(C-J:“*joined the revolution*” OR C-H:“*participated in the revolution*” OR C-H:“*fought in the revolution*”)

Party
(E:“*party*”)

Labor
(C-J:“*labor*”) AND NOT (I:“*labor*”)

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Agrarian
(C-J:"*agrarian*") AND NOT (I:"*agrarian*")

Education
(C:"*degree*") AND NOT (C: "*no degree*"); IF NOT, THEN (C:"*certificate*"); IF NOT, THEN (C:"*preparatory*"); IF NOT, THEN (C:"*secondary*"); IF NOT, THEN (C:"*primary*")

Academic
(C:"*dean*" OR C:"*director*" OR C:"*professor*" OR C:"*rector*")

Pro-Diaz
(C-K:"*supported Porfirio Díaz*" OR C-K:"*supporting Porfirio Díaz*" OR C-K:"*supported Díaz*" OR C-K:"*exalted President Porfirio Díaz*" OR C-K:"*supported Porfirio Diaz*" OR C-K:"*supporting Porfirio Diaz*" OR C-K:"*supported Diaz*" OR C-K:"*exalted President Porfirio Diaz*")

Anti-Diaz
(C-K:"*against Porfirio Díaz*" OR C-K:"*antiDíaz*" OR C-K:"*opposed Porfirio Díaz*" OR C-K:"*oppose Porfirio Díaz*" OR C-K:"*against the Porfirio Díaz government*" OR C-K:"*against President Porfirio Díaz*" OR C-K:"*opposed to Porfirio Díaz*" OR C-K:"*against Porfirio Diaz*" OR C-K:"*oppose Porfirio Diaz*" OR C-K:"*against the Porfirio Diaz government*" OR C-K:"*against President Porfirio Diaz*" OR C-K:"*opposed to Porfirio Diaz*")

Deputy
(D:"*federal deputy*" OR D:"*constitutional deputy*") AND NOT (D:"*alternate federal deputy*" OR D:"*alternate constitutional deputy*")

Senator
(D:"*senator*") AND NOT (D:"*alternate senator*")

Governor
(D:"*governor*" OR D:"*governor*")
## Appendix E

### Tables and figures to accompany chapter 6

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<th>$\sigma$</th>
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Table 9.4: Summary statistics of variables
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* gov. = governor; hac. = hacendado; fam. = family wealth; bus. = business; fin. = financial; caud. = caudillo/jefe
  mil. = military rank; const. = constitutionalist; rev. = revolutionary; agr. = agrarian; acad. = academic; educ. = education

Table 9.5: Correlation matrix of variables
Table 9.6: Estimates associated with time variables only

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*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Appendix F

Tables and figures to accompany chapter 7

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Figure 9.2: Levels of contestation and participation, 1800-2013
Figure 9.3: Levels of contestation and participation, 1800-2013
### Table 9.8: Cluster membership by six clusters

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Figure 9.4: Changes in executive recruitment and political participation, 1800-2013

Figure 9.5: Trends in political openness, 1800-2013
Figure 9.6: Levels of contestation and participation, by institutional changes *sorted by start value*

Figure 9.7: Levels of contestation and participation, by institutional changes *grouped by region*
Table 9.7: Cluster membership by number of clusters

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<th>Variable</th>
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<td>205</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>1993</td>
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Table 9.9: Summary statistics associated with Table 7.9

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Appendix G

Tables and figures to accompany chapter 8

Figure 9.8: Distribution of authoritarian regime spells

_Dashed line denotes median; solid line denotes mean_
Figure 9.9: Hazard rate, by regime type

Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014)

Figure 9.10: Hazard rate, by levels of contestation and participation
Figure 9.11: Log-log plot of survival probability

Figure 9.12: Kaplan-Meier and predicted survival plot
Figure 9.13: scaled Schoenfeld residuals associated with *contestation only*

Figure 9.14: scaled Schoenfeld residuals associated with *participation only*
Figure 9.15: scaled Schoenfeld residuals associated with *open*
Notes

1. The River Plate refers to a large estuary between Argentina and Uruguay.

2. These factions were called the Unitarians and Federalists. On the one side, Federalists wanted a federation of independent provinces; on the other side, Unitarians advocated for a more centralized state. These antagonisms also distinguished Buenos Aires from other parts of Argentina. Mostly within Buenos Aires, people favored centralization, free trade, European immigration, modernization, and decreasing the influence of the Church. Outside of Buenos Aires, local interests centered on federalism and limited government (Chen 2007).

3. The two major battles over the reincorporation of Buenos Aires were the Battle of Cepeda (1859) and the Battle of Pavón (1861).

4. As Chen (2007) notes, “[t]he economic interests of the elites, still concentrated in the export cattle industries, were little threatened under Radical Rule” (pg. 107).

5. In 1912 President Saenz Pena established universal, secret, and mandatory male suffrage through the creation of an electoral list. The Saenz Pena Law included only native and naturalized men, thus excluding a significant portion of the population.

6. As Secretariat, Perón skillfully enforced legislation and manipulated unions, stripping Communist and leftist unions of their power (Collier and Collier 1991). As Minister of Labor Perón “reversed longstanding antilabor legislation and actively promoted legislation to improve workers’ lives. Old-age pensions, accident and health insurance, annual paid vacations, factory safety codes, minimum wage and maximum hour legislation—all were expanded and enforced” (Chen 2007, pg. 109). “Labor courts were created, which handled worker grievances; a minimum wage was established; a year-end bonus amounting to one month’s wage was granted; and a new Law of Professional Associations was passed, which ended many of the antilabor provisions of the law put in place during the first months of the military government” (Collier and Collier 1991, pg. 338). With trade unions, he negotiated collective bargaining settlements and Social Security laws in their favor, in exchange for their support (Wynia 1990). The Law of Professional Associations was also passed, which established the Confederación General de Trabajo (General Labor Confederation, CGT) as the voice of all unions to the government (Lovering 2007).

7. The congress consisted of a Senate, Chamber of Tribunes, and Chamber of Censors.

8. From Hudson and Meditz (1990): “Montevideo, where approximately one-fourth of the population lived, expanded and improved its services. Gas services were initiated in 1853, the first bank in 1857, sewage works in 1860, a telegraph in 1866, railroads to the interior in 1869, and running water in 1871. The creation in 1870 of the typographers’ union, the first permanent workers’ organization, was soon followed by the establishment of other unions.”

9. An example includes Colombia during the National Front (1958-1974), in which the leaders of the two dominant parties formed an exclusionary power-sharing agreement to end violence between the parties. General Rojas Pinilla, an ex-general who had helped to end the era known as La Violencia and return stability to the country, lost presidential elections through allegedly fraudulent means, prompting the creation of a leftist guerrilla group known as the M-19 (Movimiento de 19 de Abril) (Nielson and Shugart 1999).

10. See also Przeworski (2009a) and Przeworski (2009b).

11. A closely related strand in institutionalism looks at the informal institutions that pervade and shape political interactions, such as social conventions and norms. Examples include Cook, Hardin, and Levi (2007), Helmhke and Steven Levitsky (2006), and Levi (1997).

12. Others, such as Casper (1995), have argued that the church is an important institution in the transition to democracy.

13. For more information, refer to Wilson (2014).

14. For criticisms of the Polity score, see Casper and Tufis (2003), Gleditsch and Ward (1997), and Vreeland (2008).

15. “Although the empirical relationship is robust, the micro-logic of the relationship between authoritarian legislatures and actual expropriation is both theoretically unsatisfying and empirically untested” (Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014, pg. 656).

16. An important theoretical division which the author highlights is between power-sharing or accountability that is horizontal—between the executive and elites—and that which is vertical—between the executive and the popular masses. Though not the first to consider authoritarian institutions as
differing arbiters of horizontal and vertical accountability. [Hanson (2010)] emphasizes the potential role that authoritarian parties and elections may play as satisfying commitment problems involving the public. In contrast, the legislature has the potential to resolve issues of credible commitment between the executive and “regime-insiders,” or elites.

18 See also [Riker (1980)] and [Shepsle (1986)].

19 For more information on historical institutionalism and a comparison of it to other “institutionalisms,” see [Hall and Taylor (1996)].

20 The end of an authoritarian regime is marked by competitive elections won by someone not affiliated with the incumbent, government ouster, or major rule changes.

21 According to the typology created by [Geddes (2003)] and added to by [Wright (2008a)], military regimes refer to autocratic spells in which governance decisions are made by a group of military officers. Monarchies denote power concentrated within a royal family, while party-based regimes are those in which control over executive selection and security is exercised by a ruling party. Regimes that consist of a narrower support group and authority that is vested in an individual dictator are considered personalist regimes.

22 The variables used to differentiate support parties are listed as localorgzns and multietnic in the codebook associated with [Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014)]. Legislatures were differentiated based on legcompetn.

23 Casper and Taylor (1996) argued that there are three transition paths in the establishment of democracy. Where the preferences of defendants of the regime and challengers diverge, and the defendants are not responsive to mass cues, democracy does not occur. If the defender is forced to adopt a facilitating strategy, democracy will both be installed and consolidated. However, where the defender relinquishes power in order to control the process, the prospects for democracy—and viable—are worse [Haggard 1998]. I argue that the motives for creating a minimum ruling coalition, which stem from elite threats, describes a situation similar to the third path.

24 Villanueva (1997) argues that collective bargaining is ‘bilateral’, in the sense that the mass public does not have a seat at the table. As suggested by [Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)] and [Weingast (1997)] and others, however, at the critical moment in which the masses are capable of overcoming problems of collective action, they turn the game of determining political institutions into a ‘trilateral’ one by using their de facto power to change the course of negotiation.

25 If a subset of legislators were all bonded by membership in a valuable extralegislative group, such as a political party, and if the cost of giving up the bond were expected to exceed most realistically imaginable benefits from defection, then legislators’ choices over structure (and hence policy) might therewith be stabilized” (Cox and McCubbins 1994, pgs. 217-218).


27 As Bazant (1991) notes, “[t]he first and principal effect was that the political power formerly exercised by the royal bureaucracy was transferred to the army” (Bazant 1991 pg. 3).

28 The provisional triumvirate was made up of generals Guadalupe Victoria, Nicolas Bravo and Pedro Celestino Negrete (Bazant 1991).

29 Andrews (2011) notes that earlier constitutional projects were also influenced by the British constitutionalism.

30 Victoria was, nevertheless, the only President to complete his full term in the first 30 years after Mexico’s independence (Grayson 2007).

31 The period 1846-1863 is generally referred to as the Second Federal Republic.

32 “The centralists tended to become masons of the Scottish Rite while the federalists...became members of the York Rite” (Bazant 1991, pg. 10).

33 According to Cabrera (1914) no constitutional system can be said to have truly existed in Mexico prior to the 1857 Constitution. Roel (1968) notes that the 1857 Constitution was the first to include the word democratic.

34 According to Clements (2013), “[t]his meant that all of the land that the Roman Catholic Church had acquired over the centuries were to be put up for sale at public auction. The church could keep its church buildings, monasteries, and seminaries, but all of its rural and urban property had to be given up.”

35 According to Bazant (1991), “the liberals were as anti-militaristic as they were anti-clerical” (pg. 36). They also abolished the judicial privileges of the army.

36 As Katz (1991) noted, the large landholders and small business owners were highly suspicious of each other but united in their dislike of the popular sectors that Juaréz mobilized against the French.
The first federal constitution in 1824 established a bicameral legislature, but it was reduced to a unicameral legislature in the 1857 constitution. Juárez’s attempt to reinstate a bicameral legislature was based on the argument that a unicameral congress did not adequately represent regional views. Although Juárez was unsuccessful in convincing Congress to add a senate, his successor Lerdo de Tejada was able to pass legislation in 1874 establishing the Senate (Hamnett 1996). According to Hamnett (1996), Díaz closed the Senate after assuming office in 1876 as a gesture to his popular and radical supporters.

To pacify growing unrest among land-holders, Juárez offered the hacendados (large-estate owners) more local authority; he also expanded state bureaucracy to satisfy “middle-class” interests (Katz 1991).

Local power contests following the 1871 elections were not without price, however. Díaz’s brother Felix was executed during an uprising in Oaxaca, a fate that Porfirio escaped (Falcone 1977). According to Katz (1991), the unrest was due to the failure of Juárez’s administration to adequately redistribute land to peasants who had supported the return of the Liberals. The Mexican Northern frontier continued to elude federal control, and it was at this time that attacks by Apache Indians on Northern landholders were reaching a climax (Katz 1991).

This estimate includes the War of Independence (1810-1821), the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), the War of Reform (1857-1861), and French Intervention (1861-1867).

Constitutional projects include the Elementos Constitucionales of 1811; the Cadiz Constitution of 1812; the Apatzingan Constitution of 1814; the First Constitution of Independent Mexico of 1824; the Siete Leyes of 1836; the Bases Organicas of 1843; the Constitution of 1847; the second Bases Organicas in 1853, and the Constitution of 1857 (Roel 1968).


As an example of alternative ideologies among Porfirián elite, see Dirk Raat (1977) on Antipositivism.

“Federal-state relations have long been assigned a prime role in explaining both the success and the ultimate failure of the Porfirián power structure” (Coerver 1977, pg. 567).

A cacique is an indigenous parallel to the caudillo.

See also Bryan 1976.

Borrowed from Falcone 1977 pg. 638, which is listed as: ABJ. Ms. J. 15-2443. Miguel Castro to Juárez (September 25, 1867).

A cacicazgo refers to the domain of control of a relatively small association of individuals by a leader, or cacique (Friedrich 1965).

Porifirio Díaz’s brother Felix, for example, “sought the governorship for himself almost as soon as he assumed military control of Oaxaca in the Spring of 1867” (Falcone 1977, pg. 635).

The 1883 law is referred to as the Decreto sobre Colonización y Compañías Deslindadoras (Decree on Colonization and Demarcation Companies).

This law refers to the Ley sobre Ocupación y Enajenación de Terrenos Baldíos (Law on the Occupation and Alienation of Barren Lands). The diputados involved in drafting it included Pablo Macedo, Justo Sierra, Rosendo Pineda, Manuel Marimol, Manuel Flores, Ramón Prida, Julian Montiel y Duarte, Francisco Buhles.

“Between 1883 and 1910 they demarcated 59 million hectares and received 20 million hectares, or over 10 percent of the national territory, in compensation” (Assies 2008, pg. 38).

Unfortunately, a lack of adequate data on land ownership in Mexico during time prevents a systematic analysis of trends regarding the haciendas (Alston, Mattiace, and Nonnenmacher 2009; Coatsworth 1978, Katz 1991).

See also Merrill and Miro 1996, who assert that by 1910, only a few hundred families owned over 54 million hectares of land and employed over half of all rural workers in Mexico.

Juárez spent the greater part of his presidency tacking between rival factions in Congress, to sustain a national policy, and in the states, to maintain a federal executive presence. His skill at such political maneuvering ensured a degree of success, but not unchallenged supremacy” (Hamnett 1996 pg. 676).

It is also worthwhile to mention that Congress did regularly meet. During the ordinary sessions of Congress in 1890 and 1897, the Cámara de Diputados (House of Deputies) met 72 and 75 times respectively between September and December (Congreso 1890; 1897). In comparison, the current legislature met 72 times in 2012 and 76 times in 2013 (Legislatura N.d.). The records of congressional debates during this time also show considerable discussion between diputados. “The legislative branches of the federal government had relatively free debates but the range of opinion on crucial political questions was narrow, since most members were in effect Díaz’s appointees” (Goldfrank 1975, pg. 429).

According to Foran 2005 and (Garza 2001), railway tracks grew from 650 km in 1876 to 25,000 by 1910.

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Alec-Tweedie (1906) cites as her source Lucien Jerome, of the British Consul in Mexico City. An alternative estimate is given by Foran (2005), who claims that the Gross Domestic Product rose from 435 million pesos in 1877 to 1,184 in 1910. Beatty (1998) argues that although foreign trade and investment drove lots of growth, it does not fully explain concurrent domestic growth.

According to Katz (1991), population growth was particularly notable in Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Torrejón. Another estimate claims that some of the biggest growth occurred in Veracruz, Puebla, the Federal District, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Guanajuato, and Mexico (Cosío Villegas 1960).

“In 1901 a group of firemen formed the Unión de Fogoneros del Ferrocarril Nacional. In 1903, with the aid of the Unión de Mecánicos, the boilermakers founded the Sociedad de Hermanos de Caldereros Mexicanos, which later changed its name to Unión Internacional de Caldereros” (Parlee 1984, pg. 455).

For reviews of historiography on the Porfiriato, see Bryan (1976) and Benjamin and Ocasio-Meléndez (1984).

As an example, Terrazas granted himself and Creel a state charter for the Banco Minero (Minero Bank) in 1882 and fought laws that would have invalidated it. As well as obtaining a federal charter from the Díaz government in 1888, Terrazas-Creel banks received exemptions as a result of political lobbying.

Information on battles compiled from a variety of sources, including Gonzales (2002) and Kent (N.d.). From Iturriaga (1951):

En efecto, la influencia y la preocupación de aquella clase por los asuntos públicos quedaron patentizadas durante la primera década del siglo actual. Y puede decirse que, si bien es cierto que la demanda de tierras de las masas campesinas fue el motor principal de la Revolución Mexicana, no es menos cierto que las clases medias—que no cabían ya dentro del marco feudal en que el general Díaz mantenía jurídica y políticamente el país—ayudaron activamente tanto a clarificar las demandas de los propios campesinos como a programar las inconformidades de un proletariado urbano, incipiente; todo ello junto con la formulación de las propias aspiraciones de las clases medias, ya que éstas se sentían construidas por la dictadura, a pesar del reconocimiento del general Díaz de que el país de hallaba ya apto para la democracia (pgs. 92-93).

In the nineteenth century federalist liberals had fought conservative centralists for greater regional autonomy, as well as for the new positions which such autonomy might open up. In 1910, this old struggle was to be repeated in a new form, as the diploma elite of the provinces rose against a regime composed of ‘political cadavers’” (Wolf 1969 pg. 24).

Some have argued that post-Revolution regimes did not institutionalize the supposed ideals of the Revolution—“what took place between 1928 and 1946 was the institutionalization of the new political order, populist in appearance and structure but essentially dedicated to the preservation of the power and privileges of the postrevolutionary political elite” (Benjamin1985 pg. 197). Anderson (1974) also argues that the workers who did participate in the Revolution did so out of demands for social justice and not in terms of a “a heightened class consciousness” (pg. 113).

As Weldon (1997) also notes, others explain the authoritarian, centralized political structure of presidencialismo on political culture—the accumulation of personal power in the hands of a caudillo, a quasi-military leader. In contrast to scholars who explain presidencialismo exclusively by either political culture or the 1917 constitutional framework, however, scholars also blend the two arguments (Weldon 1997).

Carranza supported the candidacy of Ignacio Bonillas as his successor to the presidency.

According to Camín and Meyer (1993), the Agua Prieta rebellion led by the Sonorans would be the “last victorious rebellion in the history of contemporary Mexico” (pg. 73).

The Cristero War was an attempted counter-revolution based in western Mexico against the anti-clericalism of the Calles government.

“[t]he growth of industrial enterprise, especially the large cotton mills in the states of Puebla, Tlaxcala and Veracruz, developed a laboring population which was prepared to enter upon a struggle for better housing conditions” (pg. 287).

See also Collier and Collier (1991).

Antonio Hidalgo is a good example of political changes that favored peasants. Considered a nearly illiterate peasant, Hidalgo assumed the governorship of Tlaxcala in 1911 (Buve 1975).

See also Garrido (1982).
Specifically, Francisco R. Serrano, the Secretary of War, and General Arnulfo R. Gomez were against Obregón’s reelection (Camín and Meyer 1993).

As an example, Calles’ use of the PNR “accelerated the disappearance of the Labor Party which had been an appendage of the CROM” (Delarbe and Yanez 1976, pg. 137).

According to Haberman (1921), it was rumored that as Minister of Communication, Public Works, Post and Telegraphs, Ortiz Rubio accepted bribes in exchange for privatizing the railway, securing a source of supply for railroad ties, and facilitating linkages between railways and oil producers. Rodríguez later served as the commander of the Military Zone of the Gulf (Ai Camp 1991).

An alternative hypothesis that has been provided is that Cárdenas did not gain office by incorporating workers and campesinos, but rather by making alliances with caudillos and military leaders whom Calles had marginalized and excluded. Thus, while the incorporation of labor and peasants helped give the government greater leverage for economic intervention, his real power resided in generals, governors, and politicians (Benjamin 1985). All the same, Cárdenas is widely credited with strengthening the party through the incorporation of workers and peasants, giving it greater influence.

According to Patroni (2001), “corporatism in state-labor relations implies a system of social control in which the state facilitates the organization of the labor sector both through the promulgation of legal instruments that guarantee monopoly of representation to certain organizations, and by extending to them the legal, material and political resources that are necessary to sustain their privileged position as labor organizations” (pg. 3).

Nevertheless, “its historical prestige and the aura of the profound transformations it produced continued to lend legitimacy to Mexican governments in the second half of the twentieth century” (Camín and Meyer 1993, pg. 158).


Additional examples include the 1958 strike by railroad workers, to which President Lopez Mateos responded by repressing leaders of the national railway union (Gonzalez 2008, Handelman 1976, Magaloni 2008). When Gustavo Diaz Ordaz took office in 1964, he forcefully confronted strikes by medical doctors (Gonzalez 2008). He also presided over the repression and execution of hundreds of student demonstrators in 1968, in an event which came to be known as the “Tlatelolco Massacre” (Grayson 2007, Gonzalez 2008, Collier and Collier 1991, Magaloni 2008b). On June 10, 1971, the day of the Corpus Christi festival, a group of elite Mexican army soldiers known as los Halcones (the Hawks) confronted and killed student demonstrators.

A commonly used conceptual framework for understanding power comes from French and Raven (1959), who distinguished between five forms of social power: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert. An individual who possesses the power to reward or coerce others to act in accordance with his interests is capable of providing positive or negative inducements, respectively, to achieve an outcome. The other forms of social power identified by French and Raven (1959) are derived from the perception that another person has the right to prescribe an action (legitimate), shares the similar goals based on a shared identity (referent), or has special knowledge about the costs and benefits of an action (expert). I argue that the latter three can be thought of as internalized perceptions that follow from initial interactions involving violence and compensation—“carrots” and “sticks”—when there is imperfect information about a leader’s capacity to lead, or to achieve socially desirable outcomes.

Díaz’s first administration was 1876-1880. For the 1880 elections, President Díaz offered in his place Manuel Gonzalez Flores as his hand-picked successor. In the 1884 elections, Díaz ran once again for president and won.

As Ai Camp (1991) notes, “the disadvantage of the positional approach as the basic criterion for selection is that some leaders, intellectual, religious, guerrilla, or otherwise, who may have had an impact on the period do not qualify under this criterion” (pg. xvii).

Ai Camp (1991) excluded an individual from the sample if information was missing for three or more categories.

My use of the male is due to the fact that all office holders in my sample were male.

Although biographical data cover the period 1884-1934, individuals in the sample may have held political positions prior to 1884, which are also listed.

Since democracy may involve more dimensions...and since (in my view) no large system in the world is fully democratized, I prefer to call real world systems that are closest to the upper right corner [substantially popularized and liberalized] polyarchies” (Dahl 1971, pg. 8).

For the sake of transparency, I refer to the variable names as they are used in the codebook.

For more information, refer to Addendum A in Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2014).
According to Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2014), ‘multiple identity’ refers to systems in which “[t]here are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level–parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected–but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests.” In sectarian systems, in contrast, “[p]olitical demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups” (pg. 26).

Statutory law 130 gave legal recognition to political organizations that obtained sizeable support, either through memberships or signatures (Moreno 2005).

For a brief summary of each of these cases, refer to Wilson (2014).

Herein, ‘states’ refers to discrete values.

‘Open’ contestation is determined as either designational, transitional, or competitive recruitment, while ‘open’ political participation refers to restricted, guided liberalization, or institutional participation.

Percentages based on the same information are shown in the Appendix.

As an example of the use of Sequence Analysis in the hard sciences, see Liu, Neuwald, and Lawrence (1999).

For information on the calculation of these metrics, see Gabadinho et al. (2011).

For more information on edits used in Optimal Matching (insertions, deletions, and substitutions), see Gabadinho et al. (2011).

A table showing the exact number of countries in each cluster is provided in the Appendix (Table 9.7).

The United States is coded as having factional political participation between the years 1854 and 1864, a period corresponding to the implementation of Kansas-Nebraska Act through the end of the American Civil War.

Gleditsch (2002) imputed missing data by drawing on alternative sources, through substitution based on reversed trade flows, balancing between-country records of exports and imports, and linear interpolation within and extrapolation beyond available time-series (Teorell and Rothstein 2011).

The authors defined an autocratic regime as a continuous period of rule involving the same support structure, which reflects a similar set of defacto rules. To be coded as authoritarian, the executive must have achieved power through undemocratic means, the government must have limited competition through changing the formal or informal rules, or the military must have prevented a significant portion of the citizenry from participating in elections. The end of an authoritarian regime is marked by competitive elections won by someone not affiliated with the incumbent, government ouster, or major rule changes.

According to the typology created by Geddes (2003), military regimes refer to autocratic spells in which governance decisions are made by a group of military officers. Party-based regimes are those in which control over executive selection and security is exercised by a ruling party, while regimes that consist of a narrower support group and authority that is vested in an individual dictator are considered personalist regimes. Wright (2008a) also included monarchies, which denote power concentrated within a royal family. The updated data provided by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) denote nonautocracies as well, which I separated into democracies and other regimes. ‘Other’ regime types coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) include foreign-occupied, non-independent, provisional, and warlord states.

I use the terms ‘contestation’ and ‘competition’ interchangeably.

Grouping together all forms of executive recruitment that are associated with ascription includes executives based on dual titles, such as ascription-designation and ascription-election. These are arguably rare.

The measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization comes from Fearon (2003). It ranges from 0 to 1, reflecting the probability that two randomly selected members of the population would belong to the same ethnic group. For more information, refer to Teorell and Rothstein (2011).

Tests of the proportional hazards assumption were conducted on the results of a Cox proportional hazards models containing the covariates shown in Table 8.3.

‘Castling the king’ is an optional move in chess that involves interchanging one of a player’s rooks with his king. The king is moved two squares toward the rook, and the rook is placed on the square the king passed to assume its final position.

I thus avoid any speculation about whether there is a “normal sequence” of political development in which a set of civil rights are necessarily conferred prior to the extension of subsequent political and social rights (Armony and Schamis 2005).

Grzymala-Busse (2002) provides a detailed analysis of party transformation among countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union.
118 Quote borrowed from Kili (1992).

119 Populism, which was defined by the RPP to mean that the people of Turkey were to be considered as an undifferentiated community held together by a harmony of interests whose integrity and privileges transcended those of the individual...sanctioned the suppression of political dissent. Hence, neither Kemalist reforms nor Kemalist institutions like the party-state had produced a democratic political culture in Turkey” (Patton 1995, pg. 144).

120 See Mardin (1973), pg. 185.

121 For criticisms of Lijphart (1968) and Lijphart (1977), see Schendelen (1989).
VITA
MATTHEW CHARLES WILSON

EDUCATION
Ph.D., Pennsylvania State University, August 2015.
Dissertation: “Castling the King: Institutional Sequencing and Regime Change.”
Advisor: Gretchen Casper
Committee: Joseph Wright, James Piazza, Melissa Hardy
M.A., Pennsylvania State University, 2011.
Thesis: “A Discreet Critique of Discrete Regime Type Data.”
B.S., Clemson University, 2009, Summa cum Laude, Honors in Global Politics
Honors thesis: “Determinants of Household Migration from an Ethnic Perspective.”

PUBLICATIONS
Journal Articles
2014 “A Discreet Critique of Discrete Regime Type Data.”
Comparative Political Studies, 47(5): 689-714.
2013 “Dictatorships and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Regime Type on Terrorism.”
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Book Chapters
2014 “Governance Built Step-by-Step: Analyzing Sequences to Explain Democratization.”

Book Reviews
2012 Jeffrey Haynes, ed., Routledge Handbook of Democratization
2012 Jay Ulfelder, Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation: A Game Theoretic Approach

Invited Talks and Conferences
2014 University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom, December.
2013 Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (CIDE), Mexico City, Mexico, October.
2012 Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Norway, June.
2012 Conference on Sequence Analysis, University of Lausanne, Switzerland, June.