KITSAP COUNTY, WASHINGTON AND THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE:
EXPANDING THE CONCEPT OF THE GUNBELT

A Thesis in
Geography
by
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ABSTRACT

In 1973, the United States Navy announced that Kitsap County, Washington would be the support site for the new Trident submarine. The most expensive ship ever built, the Trident promised to bring 6,000 new jobs and 25,000 more residents to the county. In a still classic study regarding the spatial signature of defense spending, *The Rise of the Gunbelt*, Ann Markusen, *et al.* see post-World War II defense spending as shifting away from the industrial Midwest, especially to the south and west. This formed the Gunbelt. The focus of that study, however, was on production and prime contracts, and not, as would be the case in Kitsap, the maintenance and deployment of these weapons systems. This thesis sees the debate over, preparation for, and possibly emerging local identity of the Trident submarine in Kitsap County as a way to expand the concept of the Gunbelt. An expansion is warranted because while Trident submarines were in production for just over one decade, 10 have been a part of Kitsap County for over three decades, remaining there to this day. Further challenging the Gunbelt thesis is Kitsap’s relationship with the Navy. Kitsap has had a naval presence since 1901. While most residents were grateful for the federal investment in the 1970s, they also saw the challenges, such as tax revenue shortfalls, that came with supporting the Navy. This complicates the binary present in much of the literature relating to military installations, which generally sees public debate forming along pro-military or anti-military stances.

Keywords: Trident, submarine, navy, military, Gunbelt, Kitsap
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Chapter 1: Introduction

After World War II, the United States fundamentally shifted the way in which it prepared and sustained its military. In 1947, the United States shifted linguistically from having a Department of War to a Department of Defense. While war, rightly or wrongly, is considered aberrational, defense is more constant. Corresponding with this shift towards a nominal defense, defense spending increased. This defense spending had a geographic component: the industrial heartland of the Midwest was abandoned in favor of the American South and West. Strategic decisions during World War II transformed the West from a resource colony useful for extraction to a place of extraction and value-added manufacturing.1 Furthermore, the American South was transformed from a place labeled by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as “the nation’s number one economic problem” into a strong part of a national economy.2 Spending post-World War II showed no signs of abandoning this regional favoritism.

This spatial shift in defense spending was profiled in Ann Markusen et al.’s The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of America.3 The work posited that defense production had a spatial signature related to the nation’s shifting defense spending priorities. Post-World War II, the Air Force overtook the Army as the primary service driving defense spending. (An exception to this was the Korean War. A land war, in this conflict the Army drove spending.) The Air Force was much more inclined to contracting and subcontracting than the other two

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branches, which had historically relied on navy yards and arsenals for the production of their materiel. The Air Force-based spending provided the structure for Markusen et al.’s regional profiles (chapters 4-9). For this reason, Washington’s Puget Sound was framed in terms of Seattle. Seattle, in turn, was considered a company city: “the only American city so clearly dependent on one contractor. Boeing dominates Seattle’s economy.”4 Boeing is important, but Puget Sound also boasts a naval base in Everett, a naval air station on Whidbey Island, Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Pierce County, and the Navy Yard and Trident Support Site in Kitsap County. If the emphasis is placed on prime contracts, then a regional focus on Boeing suffices. If the focus is military spending of all kinds, a much more heterogeneous picture of Puget Sound emerges.

Puget Sound is Boeing from a prime contract standpoint, but looking beyond that to defense money more generally, the Gunbelt is much more complex. The thesis takes the view that Markusen et al.’s thesis should be expanded from place of production to also include places of maintenance and deployment (e.g., bases for personnel). These sites also should be considered given the increasing importance of weaponry used by the military decades after their initial production. One such weapon is the Trident submarine, which has a home port at Bangor in Kitsap County, Washington (see fig. 1.1). Originally designed with the intention of firmly re-establishing technological supremacy over the Soviet Union, it has been a part of the county since 1982, and has been impacting the county since its arrival was announced by the Navy in 1973.

Importantly, Kitsap has a long history with the Navy. It has had a Navy Yard since 1901, and in 1975 almost half of its population was employed by the federal government. This contributed to a 1978 report by the New York-based Urban Institute that declared Kitsap County the most federally impacted county in the nation. The thesis’s focus on Kitsap County argues that even in a federally impacted area, the interactions between the military, military personnel, civilian personnel, and lay civilians remains complex and ever-changing. Kitsap’s prior experience with the Navy meant that local residents were well aware of the opportunities as well as the potential pitfalls that came with naval investment. The national and international goals of the submarine are important for grasping the over-arching federal rationale behind the costly Trident. This will be profiled in chapter 2. Equally important, however, is a grasp of the local economic changes (chapter 3) and how the Trident submarine affected and continues to affect local identity (chapter 4). The chapters’ different, but related, foci create a variegated picture of what the installation of the nation’s first Trident base meant to local residents as well as those politicians and policymakers at the national level. This complexity better reflects the different ways in which a decision related to a single military technology can impact a community decades after initial decisions are made.

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5 Kitsap Planning Department, “Kitsap County Data Profile” (n.p., 1976), 14.
A Framework of Military Geographies

While military geography has existed for over a century, it has been conceptualized as geography for use as a military application or for ideological justification of military conquest until the past decade. Starting in the mid-2000s, the work of Rachel Woodward brought cultural aspects of the military into focus alongside its well-studied geopolitical and economic aspects. Woodward sees militarization as becoming increasingly pervasive in twentieth-century America.
In short, “military geographies are everywhere”7 They become a part of both military and civilian spaces and are rooted in everyday spaces and practices, including private spaces.8 Cynthia Enloe took this perspective of military bases becoming part of the more quotidian aspects of a community as she asserted,

Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. A military base, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, can become politically invisible if its ways of doing business and seeing the world insinuate themselves into a community’s schools, consumer tastes, housing patterns, children’s games, adult’s friendships, jobs and gossip.9

In addition to Enloe, Richelle Bernazzoli and Colin Flint have examined these everyday interactions between the military and civilian populations around Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and Jacqueline Tivers looked at these interactions in the context of the United Kingdom.10

The discipline of history has also examined the cultural implications of the United States’ increasing reliance on a military-industrial complex. A groundbreaking synoptic work is Michael Sherry’s *In the Shadow of War: The United States since 1930*. He argued that America’s militarization “reshaped every realm of American life—politics and foreign policy, economics and technology, cultural and social relations. To varying degrees, almost all groups

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8 For an appeal to look at private spaces in the study of the military see Enloe, *infra* at note 7. See also Lorraine Dowler, “Gender Militarization and Sovereignty,” *Geography Compass* 6 (2012): 490-499.

9 Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 66. In architecture, Mark Gillem’s *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire* terms this “spillover” and devotes a chapter to its “socialspatial effects.” In addition to writing about American bases overseas, Gillem (a trained architect and former Air Force officer) has been intimately involved in planning these outposts. His Eugene, Oregon-based firm, The Urban Collaborative, has worked on military bases in Italy, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. See Mark L. Gillem, *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 34-70.

were invested in it and attracted to it….Certainly all were changed by it.”

Marilynn Johnson’s *The Second Gold Rush* (1996) examined cultural transformations at a smaller, metropolitan scale that were caused by the migration of workers from the American South—black and white—to shipyards around Oakland, California. These Southern shipyard workers

provided alternatives to government-sponsored activities as they imported evangelical religion, country music, the blues, and other down-home traditions…. [They] cultivated distinctive subcultures based on racial and regional ties, thus expanding and diversifying the cultural life of East Bay cities.

Seeing militarization through a cultural lens has grounding both inside and outside the discipline of geography.

Geographers and other scholars have also retooled and expanded the concept of the military-industrial complex. Variations have been coined by academics in geography and other disciplines. Geographers have been concerned with describing geography’s role within a military-industrial-academic complex and the location of the complex itself. Historian Roger Lotchin has coined the terms “metropolitan-military complex” and “martial metropolis” in his study of the military industries in California. This aligns with Scott Campbell’s call for a

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complex that is most appropriately dealt with at the metropolitan scale.\(^\text{16}\) (Campbell is one of the co-authors of *The Rise of the Gunbelt.*\) John Morrissey described a “military-strategic studies complex,” which emphasizes the increasing role of think tanks in policy decisions.\(^\text{17}\)

Furthermore, political scientist James Der Derian investigated the military-industrial-media-entertainment network to describe the military’s increasing reliance on networks and virtual warfare.\(^\text{18}\) But, drawing back to Woodward’s assertion that military geographies are everywhere, we should not be surprised that numerous theoretical complexes exist. The challenge is less to prove that a military landscape exists than it is to show how that landscape is expressed and what aspects—both civilian and military—are emphasized over others.

What binds all the concepts of the preceding paragraph is that they literally begin with the military and branch out to include other large and influential institutions. What this thesis will argue, particularly in chapter 3, is that the military and the federal government are complex. Much like Markusen *et al.*, who saw defense spending shifts as tied to internal re-prioritization of certain service branches and weapons systems over others, the federal government (including the military and the Navy) can be broken down and analyzed without adding additional institutions to form a long, compounded verbal string. By examining the internal workings of the Navy and its interactions with Congress and state and local politicians, the development of the support site is clear. Industry drove production, but it was politics at all scales that drove the location of its maintenance.


Chapter Outline

The housing and maintenance of a submarine cannot be completely divorced from the political climate of fear and crisis that drove the weaponry’s production. The next chapter examines the broader national and international narrative being used to justify the Trident submarines’ costly production. The United States feared that it was increasingly under pressure from the Soviets militarily, and the submarine represented the tipping of the strategic balance of the late Cold War back in favor of the United States. In contrast to the support site, the national media played a significant part in driving the Trident’s production—all in the name of strategically matching the Soviet Union. American nuclear supremacy was perceived in popular media as shrinking. From the pages of Reader’s Digest an ominous warning came that the United States was becoming a “second-rate power.” In the binary logic of the Cold War being a second-rate power meant ceding the world to the Soviets. The Trident prevented this from happening. This was fiction; the United States was never threatened by the Soviets, but this geopolitical fact was no match for the emotional public opinion and pessimism that drove a fear-based need for the Trident submarine.

In chapter 3, the Gunbelt thesis is complicated when the local perspectives are considered. Kitsap County’s relationship with the Navy stretches back to 1901 when it was selected as the second Navy Yard on the Pacific coast. Because of this deep, long-standing connection with the Navy, local residents had a much more nuanced view of the investment that accompanied the Trident submarine; a view that could not be distilled into a binary. Unlike the more bracketed view advanced in The Rise of the Gunbelt, Kitsap’s residents knew from personal experience the expenses as well as benefits incurred by more military investment. The Gunbelt thesis focuses more on the civic boosterism associated with luring prime contracts. Vociferous boosterism was involved in planning for Trident’s arrival, too, but it was tempered by
experience. Too often, scholarly work on military installations bifurcates into pro- and anti-military positions. However, the prevailing local political rhetoric in the 1970s showed that local residents understood that preparation for the Trident’s arrival extended well beyond the base itself and into the surrounding community. There are costs associated with this spillover. In the case of the Trident Support Site, the new base was expected to directly employ 6,000 but attract a total of 25,000. This would augment the county’s base population of 101,000. Exacerbating problems was the fact that Kitsap County had limited coffers. Its leading employer was—and remains—the federal government, which meant that sizable amounts of property and sales tax revenue would go unrealized. Although this informed local views, initially the federal government was not inclined to address these problems.

Kitsap residents imbued their views on the Trident submarine. As chapter 4 examines, in the three surrounding communities closest to the support site--Bremerton, Poulsbo, and Keyport (see fig. 1.1)--local heritage sites choose to frame their identities to the outsider qua tourist by embracing its military past in a way that does not include the Trident submarine. A full four decades after the support site was announced and over three decades since the first submarine arrived, the public acknowledgement of the Trident is scarce in comparison to the heritage of World War II or, in the case of Poulsbo, an ethnic Norwegian heritage. Submarines are more generally mentioned in Keyport’s Naval Underwater Museum, but this museum is run by the Navy History and Heritage Command based out of Washington, D.C. Therefore, it is more of an extension of federal politics at a local level than a reflection of local viewpoints. But this museum and a display of the submarine U.S.S. Panche’s sail in Bremerton indicates that a submarine identity may be emerging. Above all, local identity is part of a local narrative and may also be part of the tourism and heritage economy. In both cases, it is constructed, and the
construction is a political process that privileges certain aspects of identity and heritage over others.

Conclusion

Trident’s underlying technology and cost make it worthy of a study unto itself. It is worthy of study in geography because of the way it interacted and changed Kitsap County. But, importantly, Kitsap County also changed the Trident submarine. The local population’s concerns did not alter the project in a technical sense nor did they alleviate Cold War tensions that led to the submarine’s production in the first place, but it gave this global, far-reaching technology—both in the very literal sense of its nuclear payload and the figurative sense—a local component, too.
Chapter 2: Geopolitics, Fear, Reader’s Digest and the Trident Submarine

The cost of the Trident submarine, in 1974 dollars, was initially projected to be $1.2 billion. Later, this was revised upward to $1.9 billion; it would be, when adjusted for inflation, the most expensive ship ever built. In total, eighteen Trident submarines would be produced.\(^1\) This massive investment came in the 1970s, a time when every other major weapons category was being cut.\(^2\) This is illustrated in figure 2.1, a political cartoon in the right-leaning Argus, the Seattle-based news weekly that opposed the ballooning defense budget. The anthropomorphized Trident is on its way “in” juxtaposed with the shrugged, slouching B-1 bomber program, another arm of the American strategic forces (albeit as insinuated by the cartoon a financially neglected one) that is considered on its way “out.” During the Cold War, there was not a steady rise or fall of military expenditures. There were shocks—periods of massive, rapid increase—often perpetuated by a fear or crisis that would play out not only in the official halls of power but also in the popular media. The Trident submarine benefitted from this as the American public sought technological superiority in the form of ocean-launched nuclear missiles. In particular this played out in the pages of Reader’s Digest, where rhetoric devices gave an authoritative timbre to concerns regarding the Soviet Union and united Americans as a collective “we.” This need for a collective superiority is best addressed at the national and international scales and not the scale of Kitsap County. It becomes clear that the national and international concerns driving the Trident’s initial production are fundamentally different from the local concerns Kitsap would

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1. To comply with later arms limitation treaties, four of these submarines would be converted to conventional guided missile submarines. The NATO code for these ships in SSGN as opposed to the Trident’s SSBN designation.
express when the technology would be implemented. Put another way, the prospect of having a submarine as part of a broader strategic arsenal is quite different than having one literally as your neighbor. Yet, with the Gunbelt thesis, the national need and the need to produce are given the overwhelming consideration. This consideration provides only a partial picture of the Trident’s impact. While successive chapters will bring local concerns into focus, a national Cold War context is the foil with which Kitsap’s concerns are contrasted.

Figure 2.1: Political cartoon critical of Trident spending in Argus, 24 March 1978

_Literature Review: An Overview of Popular Geopolitics_

This chapter uses the scholarly lens of critical geopolitics and, more specifically, popular geopolitics to establish how the need for the Trident submarine to be produced was framed in both popular literature and the statements of Washington Senator Henry M. Jackson. The

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3 This trope of being a good partner or a good neighbor appears again and again in the Bremerton Sun. Quotations in the media often hedged criticisms of the overall project with the fact that Kitsap had always been, and would continue to be, a good neighbor.
literature review section addresses the origins of these critical perspectives. Practitioners of critical geopolitics have tended to draw insights away from the official intellectuals of statecraft and the official mechanisms of the state. At its core, however, what makes critical geopolitics critical according to John Agnew is that it sees the “assumptions and schema” that underpin world politics “as socially constructed by particular people in different historical-geographic circumstances and as thereby providing the basis for geopolitical rationales to social and political purposes that are anything but simple reflections of a natural geopolitical order.” Within the framework of critical geopolitics, popular geopolitics offers insight into the power of Reader’s Digest in shaping national opinion. In 1993, Joanne Sharp wrote an article in Political Geography that “essentially began” popular geopolitics. It advocated for “a more equal weighting between an analysis of elite texts and more popular sources of geopolitical information…” To support her claim, Sharp drew on Reader’s Digest as a popular text exemplar; this text also serves as the main source for this chapter’s textual analysis. Not only does the periodical synthesize complex geopolitical issues down to pithy quotations and simple intellectual constructs (e.g., a binary), but it reaches a broad swatch of the populace that contains the “most diverse range of consumer subgroups” of any readership in circulation. Popular geopolitics has grown substantially since this pioneering work. At present, popular geopolitics is

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7 Ibid, 25.
9 Ibid, 495.
considered one of the three\textsuperscript{10} or four\textsuperscript{11} major strands of critical geopolitics. It has expanded to include a range of texts, including print media and cinema; however, there has also been a push to engage with new media, such as blogging, and with established methods in cultural studies, including fan studies.\textsuperscript{12}

Popular geopolitics is also an appropriate lens because the American fear of the Soviet Union as an Other was seeded and reified in the pages of \textit{Reader’s Digest}. As Sharp notes, “More than any other nation, national identity in the United States has been organized around the impetus of the ‘articulation of danger, the specification of difference and the figuration of Otherness.’”\textsuperscript{13} In the Soviet Union, the United States had an Other. In a very Mackinderian sense, the heartland of Europe is at stake in American Cold War discourse, and “the potential Soviet domination of the Eurasian land-mass [is a] persistent [theme] of U.S. security discourse…”\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{The Qualitative Power of Technology}

Endemic to popular geopolitics is the role of emotion. In the context of U.S.-Soviet relations, the pervading emotion is fear. Rachel Pain has written extensively on the geopolitics

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Agnew, “Origins of Critical Geopolitics,” 25.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Coleman, “Intellectuals of Statecraft,” 498.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Joanne P. Sharp, \textit{Condensing the Cold War} xi-xii.
\end{itemize}
of fear. \(^{15}\) This follows the developments in the last 30 years that have expanded from an individualized pathology to something that can be globalized. \(^{16}\) While this idea has been given more legitimacy by the current “War on Terror,” which allows for emotion not only to be globalized but also anthropomorphized into an adversarial combatant, this can be retrojected to the Cold War, when a collective fear of nuclear attack led to personal bomb shelters and community-level civil defense preparations.

While the submarines provided a technological fix, a question that remains is why reverting to technology in dealing with the Soviet Union was necessary. Julienne Mercille has argued that all three Cold War-era military buildups (before the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Reagan era) were precipitated by a crisis. \(^{17}\) Spending on the Trident submarine bridges the latter two eras; nonetheless, the general feeling parallels those that Mercille mentions. In the 1950s, crisis was established through a combination of NSC-68 \(^{18}\) (written in 1950) and the Gaither Report (published in 1957 with hearings in 1956). The fix was technological: a renewed investment in bombers. In 1956, fear of a diminishing bomber gap led to a defense spending increase of $1.4 billion. \(^{19}\) The Gaither Report, named for the committee that investigated this gap, pushed the investment and “established the geopolitical and geoeconomic rationale for additional arms spending on the very weapons which the gaps contended the US was

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\(^{16}\) Pain, “Globalized fear?” 468.


outcompeted.”\textsuperscript{20} Washington Senator Henry M. Jackson also raised this concern in 1956, the same year as the Gaither Report’s hearings. In a speech regarding America’s strategic forces, he pinpointed the closing gap in both quantity and time to development: “Seven years ago [1949] we had a monopoly of both bombs and planes for delivering them. Today, both monopolies are gone. Furthermore, today we cannot even be confident that we are ahead of Moscow in long-range air power.”\textsuperscript{21} In the case of airplanes, as would become the case with submarines, the technology of delivering a nuclear strike was viewed part-and-parcel with the nuclear weapons themselves. Not only were missiles countable, but submarine technology was some of the most advanced of its age. This resulted in the technology having a power not due to a fear of what it could do to a land target, but instead due to what the nuclear submarine represented in terms of seapower and national technological superiority. The nuclear submarine was by far the most complex piece of military hardware and the possession of one represented a massive national technological superiority that was only surpassed by the ability to put a man in space.\textsuperscript{22}

Similar to the above assessment by Duncan Redmond, Graham Spinardi’s work concerning the transition between Polaris submarine technology and its successor Trident technology emphasizes the qualitative shift such an upgrade provided:

\begin{quote}
...[Q]uantitative additions to arsenals were not the most worrisome feature of this ‘arms race’. Quantitative limits and reductions are relatively easy to negotiate and verify and small numerical imbalances are not of much ‘military’ significance at the high levels in question. More disturbing are qualitative ‘improvements’ in nuclear weapons technology, which are more difficult to curb with arms control and perhaps more threatening to strategic stability.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{20} Mercille, “Mind the Gap,” 62.
\textsuperscript{22} Duncan Redmond, \textit{The Submarine: A Cultural History from the Great War to Nuclear Combat} (London: Taurus Academic Studies, 2010), 172.
\textsuperscript{23} Graham Spinardi, \textit{From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4 (internal footnotes omitted).
With the Soviets allegedly approaching parity with the Polaris submarine the United States felt popular pressure to maintain its advantage militarily. Reinforcing hegemony was not a given; it required constant, strong signaling. Nuclear weapons could readily provide this. The speed of the Soviet technological development—how fast the Other was closing the gap with American nuclear superiority—had fueled the American fears of the 1950s. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the national conversation had shifted to the erosion of this hegemony in its entirety. The Vietnam War was turning quickly into a war perceived by the America public as unwinnable. SALT negotiations were considered by many to be a growing source of weakness for American foreign policy. These negotiations were a quantitative check—to borrow Spinardi’s phrasing—therefore, the need for qualitative supremacy was running high.

In February 1971, Reader’s Digest stoked these fears when they ran the article “Our Strategic-Arms Advantage is Fading Fast.”24 Its subtitle contained a gnawing rhetorical question: “Do we let the United States sink into second class status?”25 Here, like in other Reader’s Digest articles profiled in this chapter, the author was a known and respected figure: Charles Murphy. Murphy wrote for both Time and Life; at the time, he was perhaps best known as the biographer of Winston Churchill. Murphy began his piece using submarines as the first weapons system compared after the actual missiles themselves. The comparison did not favor the United States: “Seven years ago, the Soviet navy possessed no ballistic-missile submarine comparable to the U.S. Polaris….Now, at least 13 of these Y-Class nuclear-bombardment submarines are at sea.”26 Furthermore, if the Soviet trend continued, the American submarine advantage would vanish by

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24 Charles J. V. Murphy, “Our Strategic-Arms Advantage is Fading Fast,” Reader’s Digest, February 1971, 94-98.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid, 90.
1973-1974.27 Luckily for the projection of American hegemony, while the Soviets were catching up to the Polaris submarine the Navy was busy building the Trident. The submarine was wrapped deeply in the SALT negotiations and hegemony. The submarine “disturb[ed] the Russians [sic] by sharpening Moscow’s sense of technological lag, by highlighting America’s striking virtuosity in sea-based strategic weapons.”28 Thus, despite including some numbers into its calculating of supremacy, the net result is a sense of lag. Furthermore, the United States would not only have a numeric advantage, but a “striking virtuosity,” too.

The case for the Trident submarine engaged with tropes of fairness and balance. While these two concepts have similar connotations, in a Cold War context, a fair distribution of nuclear power meant an imbalance that favored the United States. Fairness also dictated that the United States should be able to keep the leads that it held over the Soviets. Jackson was a key proponent of keeping the American advantage. He was a mainstream politician who was considered to be a front-runner to be defense secretary for Richard Nixon despite coming from the opposing political party.29 Despite favoring a resolution between the United States and the Soviet Union, he considered in May 1971 that “an agreement limiting only our defenses while leaving the Soviets free to expand their offenses would be both unnecessary and unwise.”30 By 1972, he felt this type of agreement was occurring. In a 15 August 1972 interview on the Today Show he said,

27 Ibid.
29 Many so-called “Jackson Democrats” would join the Republican Party in the 1980s and form the building blocks of the neoconservative movement. One Jackson aide, Richard Perle, would significantly influence foreign policy in the Reagan and both Bush administrations.
30 “Comment by Senator Henry M. Jackson.” HJM Papers. Accession #3560-006, 8-64.
[I]t’s not just a numerical disadvantage we’re facing here; [the Soviets] have fifty percent more missiles. They get 62 submarines; we get 44. They get 1,618 missiles; we get 1,000. But that throw weight….They have a new one now 50-megatons plus. Our missiles are less than two megatons….They’re—they’re superior in both areas. I want to even it up. Just good old equality. I think we know what that means.  

Here equality is presented as being well understood. The collective “we” all “know what that means.” This common sense rhetoric appears again with the Supplemental Statement. Ironically, this “good old equality” is not enough to assuage the public. Equality may be presented as an end goal, but, as will be seen in the Supplemental Statement, even the mere appearance of parity is disturbing in a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union were advancing militarily. This fear did not start with Trident. In the next section, it is evident that Reader’s Digest had been keeping the public abreast of nuclear missile-launching submarines since the mid-1950s.

**Reader’s Digest Confronts Nuclear Seapower**

Reader’s Digest’s coverage of nuclear seapower and its potential stretches back to the 1950s. In a trio of articles—two from 1956 and one from 1958—readers became familiarized with the concept of nuclear seapower. In 1956, Reader’s Digest had already trained its focus on the Navy. Tellingly, fear was at the forefront. The Nautilus, a predecessor to the Trident, was framed as “the fearsome atomic submarine.” While the Nautilus’s Regulus missiles possessed a 500-mile range—one-eighth that of the Trident—its technology was so impressive that Reader’s Digest proclaimed, “It is now clear that a nuclear submarine is capable of materializing in missile-launching position anywhere in the world, and with greater secrecy than any other

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major weapon.”\textsuperscript{33} The technology was improving at a fast pace. In 1952, the Navy’s Loon missiles fired a mere 100 miles.\textsuperscript{34} But, this was no cause for celebration. In its original italics, the article cautions, “Whatever we can do, others will be able to do.”\textsuperscript{35} Although plural, it is clear the Others mean just one enemy: the Soviet Union. Despite an extensively detailed account of a \textit{Nautilus} training run that culminated in the ability to launch its missiles on both New York and Boston, nuclear submarine were framed as instruments of peace.\textsuperscript{36}

What made the SALT negotiations particularly worrisome was that both the Soviets and the Americans had specific missile counts and throw weights. This inevitably drove politicians and laypeople alike to make comparisons. Fairness and balance were easily derived from these comparisons. Jackson would continue his verbal barbing of the Nixon administration’s SALT position on national television programs and in well-circulated newspaper, such as the \textit{Washington Post}. In a position paper titled simply “On Foreign Policy,” Jackson lambasted the executive branch for its mishandling of détente, a practice that was good in theory but, in his opinion, was poorly executed:

It’s not the concept on détente which is at fault; it’s the way the Nixon and Ford Administrations have mishandled it. Détente has become a one-way street, with a one-way flow of benefits based on unilateral American concessions. The Soviets continue to exploit the atmosphere of détente to seek strategic and political advantage.\textsuperscript{37}

If the aforementioned February 1971 article warned American strategic superiority was fading fast, a July 1971 article responded: U.S. strategic superiority has ended.\textsuperscript{38} On 30 June

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 66.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Francis Vivian Drake, “Guided Missiles: Key to Peace?” \textit{Reader’s Digest}, March 1958, 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Drake and Drake, “Fearsome Atomic Submarine,” 66.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Drake, “Guided Missiles: Key to Peace?”
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Defense Panel Report, “U.S. Strategic Superiority Has Ended,” \textit{Reader’s Digest}, February 1971, 89-93.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
1969, the administration of Richard M. Nixon announced the formation of this 12- to 15-member panel to be led by Gilbert Fitzhugh, the Chairman and CEO of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. The Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird “said he felt it vital that the panel help restore confidence in the Defense Department and its credibility.” Unlike previous public statements regarding the need for American strategic forces, the Defense Panel’s was competing with a questioning, unsure public that had turned against the Vietnam War and defense spending more generally. A 1969 Gallup poll of 1,517 adults found that a majority, 52 percent, felt that the United States spent too much on defense. This is compared to a mere eight percent who felt that the United States spent too little and 31 percent who felt the amount spent was “about right.” Fear of defense overspending was occurring at the same time overall confidence in the military was dropping. By November 1969, 55 percent of Americans would characterize the Vietnam War as a “mistake,” a 20-point increase from when a similar question was asked three years earlier. The Panel in its original mandate was doing work that the public largely supported. However, concerns about SALT and the frightening prospect of parity with the Soviet Union would surface during the Panel’s investigation. This led seven of them to advocate for continued superiority in strategic missile capabilities in a Supplemental Statement.

Before the Supplemental Statement was penned, the Panel set to work in 1969 with approximately four dozen administrative staff based out of Arlington, Virginia and a budget of $500,000. Staying true to their one-year schedule, on 28 July 1970, the Panel submitted their initial findings to the public. They made a total of 113 recommendations, many of which were

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focused on streamlining department organization. Although the *New York Times* characterized these recommendations as “radical,” few made it into policy. The elimination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from military operations in favor of a civilian in this position made national headlines. While the suggestion, along with many of the recommendations, were viewed favorably by Defense Secretary Melvyn Laird it never came to fruition. Instead of civilian oversight, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs received more power to act in emergencies. Although some recommendations were implemented none of these received the popular attention that the Supplemental Statement would.

During the drafting of the initial report, it became apparent that some members of the Panel were unhappy with aspects of military policy. Lewis F. Powell attempted to comment on the SALT negotiations, but some on the committee worried that it “might be considered to be outside our charter…” Gilbert Fitzhugh, who would eventually join the Supplemental Statement, remarked in the opening press conference for the Panel that “our charter is to study the organization of the Department of Defense, and not to make recommendations as to national policies.” This sentiment was also expressed in official correspondence from Secretary Laird. A possible loophole involved the Panel being authorized to consider “[s]uch other matters as the Secretary may submit to it from time to time,” but the Secretary never asked for anything regarding the strategic balance.

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43 Ibid.
47 News Conference Transcript. 30 June 1969, 10. JMF Papers.
This lack of official support turned the statement into a private matter. It was printed at private expense by the Lewis Printing Company for $1,000, and the cost was split by three of the seven authors: John Fluke, Williams Clements, Jr., and Lewis F. Powell.\textsuperscript{49} Preceding the release to the general public, the Supplemental Statement titled “The Shifting Balance of Military Power” was submitted to Secretary Laird on 6 October 1970.\textsuperscript{50}

The report was sent to many senators and influential decision makers, including Al Haig, the Army General who advised the president and Henry Kissinger in his capacity as deputy assistant for National Security Affairs.\textsuperscript{51} It made the rounds in Washington’s official circles and was entered twice in its entirety into the congressional record by Congressmen David E. Satterfield, III and John G. Schmitz, respectively.\textsuperscript{52} The Department of Defense, however, wanted little to do with it. It would finally be released more than five months after its submission on 12 March 1971—a Friday. Powell remarked, “At long last they released it, but in a way that pretty much buried it.”\textsuperscript{53}

The statement would have likely stayed buried, lost amongst the reams of paper that constitute the government and think tank world of the nation’s capital if not for the persistence of Lewis F. Powell and the corporate position of Hobe Lewis. Powell rallied the remaining members who composed the Supplemental Statement and acted as the point man for its private printing. Lewis was editor-in-chief of \textit{Reader’s Digest}. A condensed version of the report ran in

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  \item \textsuperscript{49} Letter. Lewis F. Powell to John Fluke and William P. Clements. 27 November 1970. JMF Papers. The Statement’s probable release was that December. The back cover states that it was “Not Printed At Government Expense” [capitalization in original].
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Letter. Lewis F. Powell to Messrs. Blackie, Champion, Clements, Fluke, Lewis, and McNeil. JMF Papers. This is a complete list of the authors of the Supplemental Statement.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Letter. Lewis F. Powell to Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig. 5 February 1971. JMF Papers.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Letter. T. H. Moorer to John M. Fluke. 1 May 1971. JMF Papers.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Letter. Lewis Powell to John Fluke. 15 March 1971. JMF Papers.
\end{itemize}
the magazine’s July 1971 issue. The magazine was in its 50th year of publication and boasted on its cover: “[o]ver 29 million copies bought monthly in 13 languages.”54 The article gave the Supplemental Statement as broad an audience as possible. Although direct metrics are not available regarding its influence, in the mind of co-author John Fluke it “has certainly impacted favorably a tremendous number of Americans.”55 The article did this whilst deploying several of the rhetorical devices Sharp analyzes in **Condensing the Cold War**, including direct appeals to its audience, use of a binary, common sense logic, and an appeal to experts.

Directly addressing the audience gives the readers a shared sense of nationalism and responsibility. Nuclear technology and nuclear arms negotiations are the purview of an elite class—notably military officials, scientist, and diplomats—but the article stresses in its subtitle that “unless we act soon to bolster our eroding strategic-arms advantage, this country will become a vulnerable second-rate power”56 While the **Reader’s Digest** article used “us” and “our,” it also made it clear who comprised “us” and who did not. This use of a binary permeates the publication throughout the Cold War. On one end of the binary is the United States harboring values such freedom and individualism. On the other end is the Soviet Union in a natural (and sometimes unstated) opposition. Although articles before the Cold War would occasionally shed positive light on the Soviet Union, after World War II there was a “representational shift to an extreme image of the Soviet Union as Other and evil…”57 This depiction of evil was the necessary countervailing force to the United States’ good. The binary played a vital role in the “imagining of [danger]…through the Cold War geopolitical model of

54 **Reader’s Digest**, January 1971, Cover. This is not to say that this article made foreign language editions. It is unclear what, if any, other editions the condensed version of the Supplemental Statement was a part of.
57 Sharp, **Condensing the Cold War**, 83.
The condensing of the Supplementary Statement used this binary heavily. This is not surprising given that the document from which the article was condensed was titled “The Shifting Balance of Power.” This implies, at a minimum, a second actor with whom to balance.

By using the model of good and evil, the statement can absolve the United States of most, if not all, responsibility for past nuclear tensions and future nuclear conflicts. The specific reason given for this is that “[t]here is an ever-present risk of disastrous technological surprise in major weaponry where an open society is in competition with a closed communist society.” The communist Soviets are facing the ideologically unnamed, but implicitly better and non-communist, Americans. The United States when participating in these competitions is cast as a guilt-free respondent to crises that “the Soviet Union precipitated or supported…” The individual crisis may change from time to time, but the objective remains “to create disarray within the United States and the free world.” The United States is grouped with the adjective “free” in contrast to the communist Soviets. Finally, this binary has broader implications for the article’s title. If the United States has become a second-rate power, in a binary this means it is in last place.

The rhetorical device of common sense supports the personalized text and comparisons of the binary. It works by “appeal[ing] to the obviousness of its claims; it makes the world seem simple and manageable through a silencing of complexity…” This has been seen previously.

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58 Ibid, xii.
60 Ibid, 92.
61 Ibid.
62 It is grouped along with many other nations. It is unclear the extent to which these other nations have agency and if they are a willing part of this group.
63 Sharp, Condensing the Cold War, 41.
with Jackson’s *Today Show* quotation. This leads to aspects of foreign policy “be[ing] reduced to the well known, the always already understood.”

Common sense logic and binary divisions are self-reinforcing: a simple logic for a simple division of the world. This is not meant, however, to elide the tremendous power and bevy of detail present in the argumentation style. Given the considerable percentage of citizens against wasteful spending and military action more generally, the succinct and powerful re-purposing of the strategic arms debate is vital for popular support. In a separate call-out box, Hanson W. Baldwin, a roving editor for *Reader’s Digest* and a former military editor for the *New York Times*, put the Soviets choice to continue a military build-up in this context: “The Soviets have plainly opted for guns instead of butter.”

A binary is in operation here—the militaristic spending represented by guns opposite the non-military spending represented by butter—and it is supported by a common sense logic. “Plainly,” the Soviets had a choice to invest or not invest in their military and they chose to do so. Another common sense device is the use of the word “only.” By using “only” a common sense duality is established whereby the two options are either to follow or not to follow whatever the “only” option is. This action/non-action logic is used to support continued American investment in strategic missiles. For these weapons “the only viable national strategy is to retain a clearly superior strategic capability.”

In other words, other options, such as détente, do not exist. Bolstering these choices is an appeal to history that “[t]he road to peace has never been through appeasement. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary.”

The use of history to reinforce something that should be taken for granted was often used by *Reader’s Digest*.

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64 Ibid.
66 Ibid, 92.
67 Ibid, 93.
*Digest* to “naturalize the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.” 68 To go against missile superiority would be to go against all recorded history; a stark binary if there ever was one.

The final rhetorical device Sharp employs that will be used to analyze the Supplemental Statement is the appeal to experts. Experts give the statement credibility and weight, but they do so in a way that does not contradict the article’s common sense appeal. Expertise imparted on experts is “deriv[ed] from experience rather than learning.” 69 The Supplemental Statement is given an aura of expertise immediately on the magazine cover. The authors are not listed individually but referred to as the “Defense Panel.” The individual authors are listed in a footnote on the second page of the article. Members are listed as the president, chairman, or board member of various firms. Lewis F. Powell is listed as a “prominent” lawyer, a designation that gives him an additional platitude beyond that of an ordinary lawyer. (He would be a Supreme Court justice only six months after the *Reader Digest* article was published.) Their expertise allows them to write about how they perceived a “tremendous shift in the balance of power…largely unnoticed by the public.” 70 In this way, they are imparting new, previously privileged, knowledge. It appears that the statement and the resulting article affected public sentiment. A high-level naval official wrote to Lewis Powell to congratulate him on his nomination to the Supreme Court. He also thanked Powell for the statement because “[t]he

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68 Sharp, *Condensing the Cold War*, 97.
69 Ibid, 42
70 Defense Panel Report, 89.
passage of time has confirmed the disturbing trends set forth in [it], and it now seems to be producing public awareness of them.”

**Conclusion**

The Navy may have been thankful to the Defense Panel for raising public awareness in such a high profile publication such as *Reader’s Digest*. But, in raising public awareness the question then becomes who constitutes that public. The public in the case of this chapter was national, and, as will be seen in chapter 3, national concerns were not always aligned with local concerns. National concerns drove production: more throw weight, more submarines, greater missile ranges. Even a local voice in the Senate, Jackson, repeatedly called for technological advancement and supremacy. Equally, if not more important than the sentiment expressed in the condensed report was the venue. The Supplemental Statement was not just a national perspective; it was national and popular. This stands in contrast to the national administrative perspective in chapter 3 and a local popular perspective in chapter 4. In addition to being popular, the Supplemental Statement was also largely qualitative. It dealt with the Other in the Soviets. It dealt with fear and notions of fairness and equality. These notions and ideas could remain as such precisely because for most Americans, the concepts were abstract. As the thesis turns to the next two chapters, nuclear seapower, throw weights, and submarines become very real for the residents of Kitsap County. A new submarine did not just balance with the Soviet Other; it also brought people to Kitsap County and carried with it the opportunity to change local identities. The Trident’s cutting edge, expensive technology has to be maintained, and this maintenance is an extension of the Gunbelt. This is not to say that Kitsap residents were not also swept up in the above-mentioned debates and rhetoric; rather, that they knew from past dealings

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with the Navy that a more concrete reality existed. This reality was one of population booms, expanding roads, and local identities—not just numbers bandied about in publications and on morning talk shows. This tension between the rhetorical need for the Trident submarine and its material reality came to blows in the public debates in 1974 over the support site’s environmental impact statements. These documents broadly construed the environmental impact in a way that did not always align with local reality or prior experience with the Navy. It is these statements that become the foci of the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Impact Statements and Assistance Funding:
Local, State, and Federal Governments Respond to Projected Impacts

Introduction
When the *U.S.S. Ohio* sailed through Hood Canal in 1982 it did tip the Cold War balance of power. It would also attract more than 43,000 people to Kitsap County alone, which made for one of the “largest developments occurring in the state since World War II. Impacts [would] be statewide.”¹ A vocal minority of citizens protested the Trident Support Site (herein, “support site” or “base”) as part of the anti-war and anti-nuclear movement; however, most supported the base. The issue, however, was too transformative and complex to fit into a for-or-against binary. Residents knew from over 70 years of experience what the Navy meant in terms of both community opportunities and costs. They held a collective view that was broad and nuanced, especially concerning how the county would handle paying for the necessary infrastructure changes needed to accommodate the influx, initially projected for 25,000. It is generally assumed that congressmen and senators lobby vigorously for federal funds to their districts and states. Voters want their piece of the federal largesse and then return the favor of pork by voting for the politicians that proverbially “brought home the bacon.” Ann Markusen, *et al.* take the position that political influence is less important in attracting federal investment than using congressional pull to protect already existing investments.² This narrative is not wrong; it underlies many of the academic studies attributing federal spending to the growth of the Sunbelt—the American South and West. Furthermore, the State of Washington was considered to be a poster child for political pork. Its two senators—Henry M. Jackson and Warren G.

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²For the assertion of Congressional power as protection see Ann Markusen *et al.*, *Rise of the Gunbelt*, 241.
Magnuson—were well-known for this. Jackson was so influential in securing defense contracts that he earned the moniker of the “Senator from Boeing”; he despised this characterization. Magnuson was influential in securing federal grants that transformed the University of Washington from a flagship state university into a national leader in medical research. Despite this history of pork, when a federally impacted area, such as Kitsap, needed to build the infrastructure around the base without a sizable tax base, what on paper is projected to be a federal economic boom can seem to be an economic burden. In comparison to a private investment, the tax benefit of this public investment is minimal. Kitsap County commissioner Gene Lobe noted: “In counties where employment is provided by private industry, approximately 47% of tax revenues are paid by industry.” But Kitsap’s industry was the Navy, which paid no local taxes. This led Lobe to conclude that “we are in effect cut off at the pockets as far as local government revenues are concerned.”

There is a considerable amount of literature on spillover effects of military installations; the costs and benefits of these installations are not confined to the federal land. Spillover makes the military’s economic and social impacts much broader than the base itself. The debate then becomes how much the federal government is responsible for mitigating the costs required to accommodate this spillover. Tellingly, this is not part of the debate on the strategic navy in chapter 2. Jackson would play a role in these debates regarding spillover, but he would be addressing a different audience than he was during his appearance on national talk shows. In Kitsap County, the debate still turned on “good old-fashioned equality,” mentioned in chapter 2 by Senator Jackson, but this equality was regarding the fairness of cost splitting between federal,

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state, and local government agencies and not between the United States and the fear-laden Soviet Union.

Kitsap’s local consternation concerning how to prepare for the Trident’s arrival is clearly seen in the public debates, political projects, and lawsuits that stemmed from the issuance of a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (herein, “DEIS”) and a Final Environmental Impact Statement (herein, “FEIS”). These statements were mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act a mere three years earlier. While they are presently ubiquitous in federal projects (as of April 2014, at least 20,781 statements have been produced), in the early 1970s, their scope was still a matter of debate as legal precedent was still being shaped. Thus, there was an added layer to the debate. Not only were there concerns over what the federal government would do to help the support site’s surrounding community, there were legitimate concerns that impact statements were not being adequately prepared. Having a debate over projected environmental changes becomes exponentially more difficult when the term environment is in and of itself a matter of debate. Parties on all sides of the litigation were articulating to standards that were far from firm.

**Literature Review: Policy, Power, and the Environment**

The reach of a central power has been considered by geographers, although not to the extent it perhaps should be. The first article to look at this topic considered the reach of a

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4 This count comes from the Northwestern University Transportation Library, which boasts the largest collection of environmental impact statements in the world. Given that these statements are crafted at the direction of individual departments and agencies, an exact count—and, in addition, an exact cost—is difficult to ascertain.

5 Wilbur Zelinsky laments, when speaking of the United States, “Perhaps nowhere else is there stronger visible evidence of the power and universality of the governmental presence. Yet, to date only two scholars have seriously considered this focus on the visible scene anywhere on this earth.” Wilbur Zelinsky, “Asserting Central Authority,” in *The Making of the American Landscape* Michael Conzen ed. 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 389 (internal footnote omitted). The two scholars he cites are Derwert Whittlestley (*infra*) and Davis B. Knight. See Davis B.
central authority to be closely tied to its use of force and projection of security: “Security is one of the most valued products of effective central authority…”6 But, this does not mean that the central authority is necessarily welcome or even preferred to the more local authorities. This appears in recent scholarship regarding immigration. Immigration policy is enforced in some localities and wantonly ignored in others. This creates spaces of exception where federal immigration law is not enforced.7 There has been a push to start to consider the distribution of power as an assemblage. Thus, federal power would not equate to being higher or reified as better, but it would be seen as having a wider reach and the ability to lodge itself in a wider array of situations.8 Assemblage theory has also been viewed as a way to get at materiality in political geography.9 The Trident submarine engaged with a myriad of actors. While this chapter, and the broader thesis, should not be read through the lens of assemblage theory—the blurred distinction between state and federal actors lends to this type of reading. Importantly, federal concerns often displace local concerns when the two are in conflict, but this is not always the case. Local and state actors can bend federal policy through official protests and, more bluntly, lawsuits. The reverse is also true. The federal government, often in the name of a broader national security and invoking rhetoric similar to what has been detailed in chapter 2, can sweep aside local concerns. In the case of the Trident submarine, the latter occurred more often than the former.

When this chapter examines the debate around the draft and final environmental impact statements, it is examining a highly democratic form of governmental power: the public comments on the DEIS. Through these comments it is possible to evaluate a public perspective ranging from government bureaucrats and experts crafting additional impact statements to ordinary citizens hand writing two-sentence missives. The act of public comment permits all levels of skill and expertise to interact with federal officials. Sarah Armstrong’s examination of public comments related to the siting of a prison in rural Scotland sees the documents as insight into public opinion and the power of policy: “It is through the written record that local views were officially visible.”10 She further examines these documents as indicative of the power that public policy documents have to shape local environments. Borrowing on the concept of policy as a form of power, the counter-EIS narratives in Kitsap County is an example of a local countermovement (albeit through official channels) challenging the prevailing federal narrative.

Another theoretical construct that helps in understanding the EIS as a complex expression of federal power is John Dryzek’s concept of administrative rationalism,11 which is extensively employed by Rachel Woodward in her “Military Environments” chapter of Military Geographies.12 Administrative rationalism “define[s] environmental debates and disputes in terms which emphasize conflicts as problems to be solved…where the role of the state rather than the citizen in achieving a solution to a dispute is prioritized, in a social context imagined as hierarchical.”13 When the state is represented by way of the military, this becomes the essence of militarism: “The extension of military influence into civilian political, social and cultural

13 Ibid, 97.
spheres.” The extension of the military in this particular case is not surprising; they were a key actor involved in bringing about the changes at the support site and, more broadly, Kitsap County. However, returning to observations by Enloe and Dowler expressed in the introduction, the Navy extended its way into schools, homes, and other places that would be seen in other contexts as being local or private.

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

The genesis of environmental impact statements begins with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (herein, “NEPA”). NEPA was the groundbreaking piece of federal legislation that mandated environmental impact statements. When the support site’s DEIS was crafted in 1973, it marked the largest military base improvement that needed to go through NEPA’s various requirements. While this makes the support site notable, NEPA requirements were still being debated in federal district and appellate courts throughout the nation. Many local actors, including members of the Washington State Attorney General’s office tasked with defending the EISs compliance with NEPA, were unfamiliar with the law’s requirements regarding environmental impact statements.

NEPA was unanimously passed in the Senate and received on 15 nay votes in the House. If the 1960s were the decade of environmental activism spurred on and popularized by Rachel Carson’s publication of *Silent Spring* in 1962, NEPA was a legislative and policy cap to that activism. Although Jackson’s bill (S. 1075) served as the blueprint for NEPA, there were six other bills in Congress that proposed some kind of environmental councils: two more in the Senate and four in the house. All bill sponsors were Democrats, but there was bipartisan support

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for the measure as seen in the final vote and the approval by President Richard Nixon, a Republican. There were multiple voices from both sides of the aisle. Inspiration came from Lynton Keith Caldwell, a law professor at the University of Indiana, who was the chief architect behind NEPA. His 1963 article “Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy?” became the starting point for policy-minded environmentalists. Writing in 1963, he cautioned that considering environmental problems in comprehensive terms is “not a panacea,” it would “force consideration of the basic value questions involved.” What remained a problem in the debate over the Trident was the answer to these basic value questions, including, but not limited to, what constitutes a good environment. What the nation and the Navy held as valuable—a functioning ballistic missile submarine base—would at times conflict with residents who wanted to maintain the rural character of the county as well as a responsive and adequately funded county and municipal services.

When Washington’s Henry M. Jackson wanted to pen an environmental law, he called on Caldwell to help draft the document. Caldwell recalls that there was little debate over the statement-enforcing provision as Jackson’s bill moved through Congress. In addition, the bill was brief. The brevity and lack of congressional record on statutory intent combined to create a bevy of lawsuits in federal court, including cases that were underway well before the support site’s EIS was drafted. Another reason for this was the fact that NEPA was a policy act. This meant that any enforcement would be meted out in federal court. One of the least debated

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16 Ibid, 138.
17 Ibid, 139.
sections in Congress was Section 102(2)(c), which mandated environmental impact statements. While Caldwell cautions that “environmental impact assessment cannot be understood by reference to Section 102(2)(c) alone,” it is the most legally debated section of NEPA.\textsuperscript{19} As Frederick Anderson’s appendix shows, between 1970 and 1973 dozens of lawsuits were filed in federal court.\textsuperscript{20}

Writing at the time of the initial lawsuits, Frederick Anderson remarked, “NEPA suits by and large have sought the preparation of an adequate impact statement under §102(2)(c).”\textsuperscript{21} The text of the Section states that the Federal Government shall “[i]nclude in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official…” Further complicating matters is the method by which federal government was to go about constructing these reports. Mandated by §102(2)(a), the Federal Government shall “[u]tilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts…”

The law’s text gives broad meaning to what is considered part of the environment and how these effects can be accounted for. Therefore, it expands to include aspects of the environment outside of the term’s general connotation. This results in the environment including sanitation, roads, public health, and many other man-made structures, institutions, and systems. However, as will be seen in an upcoming section, when the Navy needed to draw public

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 278.
sentiment to its side regarding the environment, its meaning would go back to being a narrowly constructed concept with wildlife, flora, fauna, and picturesque landscapes.

**The EIS Draws Local Protest**

Initial protests and concerns regarding the support site concerned the DEIS. The document was released on 21 March 1974 and took public comment through 31 May 1974. The chief local complaint regarding the DEIS was that while the DEIS thoroughly accounted for the environmental impacts of on-base construction, its corresponding treatment of off-base impacts were paltry. Few off-base impacts were mentioned and no solutions were proposed. This despite the fact that the support site was considered a major investment, and at the time the Department of Defense’s Economic Adjustment Program considered that “[t]his total build-up probably represents the largest single DoD program development of the next few years.”

Opposition to the new base’s DEIS emerged forcefully on 24 April 1974. Residents and people from the broader Puget Sound region packed the bleachers in the gymnasium of Central Kitsap High School in Silverdale, Washington to voice their opinions regarding the Navy’s Draft Environmental Impact Statement, which was released on 21 March. Opposition to the document was fierce and carried over into a second session on 25 April. Notably, Navy officials had initially scheduled the talk-back session to be in a classroom, but the event had to be moved the high school’s gymnasium to accommodate the crowd. Over two days and nine-plus hours of transcribed talks, sentiment regarding the support site was overwhelmingly negative. There were some initial opportunities for questions from the crowd, but the bulk of the hearing was from

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**Notes:**

22 Attachment to “Memo to Mr. Mendiola.” To place this in context, in the 1974 Military Construction Authorization Act, Congress authorized $100 million for construction of the support site in 1975. Only three other bases received more than $30 million: Fort Benning, Georgia, Fort Stewart/Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, and Fort Hood, Texas. None of these bases exceeded $43 million. See Public Law 93-522, §§101 and 201.

individuals and elected officials who registered to speak in advance. This resistance was predicted earlier in the month. On 16 April, the Sun ran a story foretelling an adversarial public meeting. In the lede, county officials are framed as being “‘prepared to go to war with the U.S. Navy’ if the Navy doesn’t provide answers on how Kitsap County is to handle the impact of the Trident base here.”

Gene Lobe, one of three Kitsap County commissioners—the highest-ranking county office—was the first pre-registered person to speak on 24 April. He couched his critique with gratitude for the opportunities the submarine and the support site would bring to the area. “Let me state at the outset,” said Lobe, “that we consider Trident to be both a challenge and an opportunity. We look positively on Trident.”

After this, however, he sparred with the Navy representatives, vociferously attacking the Navy’s DEIS as inadequate and not reflective of the realities and challenges facing the county:

“The main point I want to address tonight, is the fiscal impact which Trident will have on Kitsap County. In plainer language, how much is Trident going to cost the taxpayer?

“Quite frankly we were very disappointed in the Draft EIS in this regard”

This non-treatment of local burdens brought with the influx due to the support site was not addressed in the FEIS, either. In that document, published at the end of July 1974, social impacts were largely seen through the lens of doctor-patient ratios and an inventory of existing facilities. Another key area of impact—roads—were also noted yet not adequately dealt with. This is glaringly obvious in volume 3 of the DEIS. The study detailed impacts of traffic related to the population influx related to 10 and 20 submarines being stationed at the support sites as

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26 Ibid, 38.
27 The 20-submarine scenario would mean that the maximal amount of Trident submarines would be produced, and, furthermore, that they would all be based in Kitsap. In total, 18 were built, four of which were converted to
well as no support site being built. The DEIS noted that Kitsap County was not adequately prepared to handle expected traffic buildup without Trident’s arrival much less with a new support site. The most impacted road would be State Route-3. Administered by the State of Washington, the road was (and still is) the main north-south connection between the support site, Bremerton, Jefferson County to the north, and Pierce County to the south. It is assessed in the DEIS as being inadequate for Trident:

The most used portion of the stretch of road is expected to be 2.26 times capacity. If the Kitsap-SR 3 freeway was to be extended in the two-land configuration that capacity would be exceeded by 22 percent. However, one of the largest complaints against rural road congestion is the inability to cross, enter and left turn.28

What was lacking for the entire transportation study, or any other part of the DEIS for that matter, was any suggestion as to how the county or the state could adapt to deal with this increased traffic. What it did have, however, were cost estimates for an on-base tram system to shuttle workers from commuter lots to their work stations. While this is just one example, it demonstrates the absence of local needs for a document intended for audiences in Washington, D.C.

Lobe’s protestations were apparently well received by the citizens who gathered in Silverdale that evening. Although the transcript only notes “applause” at the end of his speech, the front page of the Bremerton Sun the following day alerted readers to the event. Its prominent, above-the-fold photograph showed two Navy officials in the foreground facing the high school’s packed bleachers. There is a visual binary of us-versus-them; the Navy taking the role of opposition. While in the national publication of Reader’s Digest the Soviet Union was

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28 DEIS, vol. 3, C-73.

conventional guided missile submarines in order to comply with strategic arms treaties. The 18 submarines are split between Kitsap (10 submarines) and Kings Bay, Georgia (eight submarines).
the Other, in the local newspaper that role was played by the Navy. The newspaper ran two stories related to the event on that front page. One summarized the tone of the meeting with this one-sentence paragraph: “After Bremerton Mayor Glenn Jarstad’s praise of the cooperative spirit between this area and the Navy, hardly a kind word was spoken between 9:30 p.m. and nearly midnight.” This was also captured by the headline “Navy Takes Round One On The Chin.” 29

Again, much like the article declaring the local government was prepared to “go to war,” a combative and aggressive rhetoric was employed by the local press. The other article from that day’s Sun was just as critical. It led with a description of Lobe’s comments: “The $550 million Trident base, exclusive of the land on which it would sit, would increase Kitsap County property tax revenues by nearly half—if it were taxable, Kitsap County Commissioner Gene Lobe said in Silverdale Wednesday night.” It also noted Lobe’s assertion that the county did not oppose the base, per se; instead that there were deficiencies in the DEIS. 30

The Sun’s treatment of the impacts statements and the emerging combative discourse regarding them is arguably more important than the verbatim text. The base’s DEIS is a large, thousand-plus-page, five-volume document that very few people, regardless of their stance on the base itself, had time to read. The Sun provided a critical service by synopsizing and serializing the document into readable parts. Between 1 April and 11 April (or, two weeks prior to the public hearing) the Sun covered one aspect of the DEIS each day on its front page. Even when the story was short and did not wrap around to a back page it still received front-page billing. 31 A summary of the topics covered by these articles is listed in Table 3.1.

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31 An interesting side note: many of these stories shared the front page with news of the Watergate scandal.
Table 3.1: Bremerton Sun DEIS coverage, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 April</td>
<td>Social impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>Economic impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April</td>
<td>Traffic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April</td>
<td>Zoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April</td>
<td>Pollution from traffic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April</td>
<td>Concerned About Trident profile*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 April</td>
<td>Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>Impacts on developing areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 April</td>
<td>Wildlife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 April</td>
<td>Utilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>Radiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April</td>
<td>Summary of coverage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not on front page

The Sun’s coverage allows us to infer that residents were relatively well informed about the base, the DEIS, and the breadth of topics the document covered.32

These protests allow for environmental impact statements to be seen through a national and local lens—much like the Trident submarine. Environmental impact statements (all 20,000-plus of them) emerged as part of a national environmental movement. But, when a specific one is crafted for Kitsap and the surrounding communities, tensions emerge. Federally contracted perspectives can try to approximate local perspectives. They can contract out to local contractors who may be more in tune with local moods. However, the criteria that are laid out for the project still emanate from Washington, D.C., not Washington State.

These protests were not just limited to local activists or disgruntled county officials. They were legitimized and elevated the following month when Governor Daniel Evans, a moderate Republican and future Senator, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy expressing the State

32 Admittedly, the Sun’s coverage did omit some topics, such as the geological study.
of Washington’s official rejection of the DEIS and the support site in its then-present form. Evans expressed his concern that the State of Washington did not have the resources to support the “secondary” improvements needed to appropriately accommodate the population increase slated to accompany the base. This was based on the assessment of 19 state-level agencies.\(^{33}\) He asked for the recommendations and reactions of 21 state agencies regarding the DEIS in a memorandum on 5 April 1974, four days after the DEISs release. In a memorandum dated 27 May 1974, Evans’s Director of the state’s Office of Community Development informed him that 19 of the 21 agencies responded. Governor Evans took the memorandum and the agency findings seriously, and the next day he informed the Secretary of the Navy that

> …the State of Washington cannot, at the present time, support the Trident project in view of the inadequate assessment of the secondary impacts and the failure of the Navy or other federal agencies to make any meaningful proposals to alleviate those impacts within this state.\(^ {34}\)

Two of these conclusions are relevant for the chapter at-hand. First, there was “consensus among agencies…that the secondary impacts in the area surrounding the base will be of far greater magnitude than primary on-base impacts.” The DEIS, however, draws on social impact data that the memorandum characterizes as “obsolete,” and, more generally, the support site’s characterization is “superficial.” This was not the most serious deficiency, in the opinion of the state, which was reserved for the “…failure of the DEIS to delineate the extent to which the Navy holds itself accountable for measures to ameliorate secondary impacts or to specify how such mitigating measures will be accomplished.” The example used for this is the extensive planning related to dock modification to allow for the passing of fish. This is set up as a straw man argument. The memorandum contrasts this planning by noting that “…no plan is advanced

\(^{33}\) Documentation of these assessments is available in the FEIS, vol. 5.

\(^{34}\) Letter from Daniel J. Evans to J. William Middendorf. 28 May 1974. WGM, 168-6.
to provide for schools and roads which will be required in the surrounding area.” The state, however, estimated that modifications to upgrading the two state highways that would be most affected by Trident would cost $44 million—almost one-third of the state-borne costs. ³⁵ In terms of schools, the state’s Superintendent of Public Instruction (herein, “SPI”) reported that the DEIS significantly underestimated the number of Trident-related secondary students. The DEIS also considered that there would be a 1600 student housing capacity surplus (i.e., students who could be put into existing facilities). By contrast, the SPI found that there was a then-current deficit of student housing capacity. They also strongly disagreed with the DEISs assertion that costs could be offset by a simple increase in tax revenues, noting “[t]he failure of recent school levies…” SPI indicated that it would need additional facilities at a cost of $35 million.³⁶ Local tax stresses were already approaching their limits. Between 1969 and March 1974, Kitsap raised property taxes 73 percent to cover new school-related costs.³⁷ Schools and roads combined to account for approximately one-third of the estimated $130 million of state costs for which the State of Washington had no funds. Table 3.2 shows the state’s projected budgetary shortfalls, which were included as an attachment to the governor’s letter. Even when tax revenues were considered, the prognosis remained bleak. In terms of a dollar amount, Evans wrote, “State agencies alone have conservatively estimated additional Trident-related costs of $130 million through FY 1983 for which no state funds are budgeted.” When tax revenue income is factored in, the fiscal outcome remained bleak. Of that estimated $130 million shortfall, “[t]he State Department of Revenue has estimated that revenue collection to the state from Trident-related

³⁶ Ibid.
³⁷ Statement of Representative Floyd Hicks, Congressional Record, Vol. 120, 27 March 1974, 8483.
activities would be approximately $30.8 million for the period FY 75 to FY 83.”

Of all the departments shown in Table 3.2, only the Department of Labor and Industries would have their costs offset by a Trident-related revenue increase.

### Table 3.2: Projected State Revenue Shortcomings in U.S. Dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPI</td>
<td>7,700,000</td>
<td>17,700,000</td>
<td>10,100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35,500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highways</td>
<td>44,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSHS</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,400,000</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>19,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>292,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks &amp; Recreation*</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>2,695,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outdoor Recreation*</td>
<td>4,800,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>18,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Library</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor &amp; Industries**</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>2,450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Security</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>65,323,000</td>
<td>28,738,000</td>
<td>21,938,000</td>
<td>12,738,000</td>
<td>128,737,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figures indicated by these agencies may be somewhat duplicative.

**Labor & Industries costs will be offset by the revenue increase to the department.

Additional opposition was provided by the Kitsap County Trident Coordination Office.

The office was formed soon after Kitsap was selected as the support site location, and by the time the DEIS was issued, the office had been in existence for several months. It was funded by

38 Letter Evans to Middendorf.
the county with help from federal money from the Department of Defense’s Office of Economic Adjustment. The position, although new, was filled by John Horsley, a high-ranking Kitsap County government official with experience in Washington, D.C. as an aide to Congressman Floyd Hicks, who represented Kitsap. Horsley would leave the office after two-plus years of service to replace Gene Lobe as a Kitsap County Commissioner. Horsley’s political trajectory speaks to not only his professional acumen but also to the importance of the position within the overall county government structure. Its role as described by Peter Crane, who succeeded Horsley as coordinator, was “to assist and coordinate the planning efforts of various local governments…and to assist such local governments in the obtainment of funding of public projects needed as a consequence of the present and anticipated population influx…”39 The Trident Coordination Office’s opposition followed the same tack as the protests of Lobe and Evans. It “support[ed] location of the Trident Support Facility here on the Kitsap Peninsula” but nonetheless “noted several deficiencies in the draft [EIS], some of them serious.”40 The main deficiencies noted were financial. The coordination office passed a resolution, signed by Gene Lobe, who wrote that the committee, “express[es] its insistence on the responsibility of the Navy and the Federal Government to pay their fair share of the costs which will be required to alleviate Trident impacts.”41 Here, like in chapter 2, the trope of fairness emerges. In this context fairness was between the federal government on one side and the state and county governments on the other. It did not seem to matter that any before-the-fact funding was, based on its novelty, more

than was previously considered “fair.” At issue in this debate was not if the arrival of the Trident would buoy Kitsap economically, but if the economic windfall from the Trident submarines would bring enough revenue to cover the necessary costs. The DEISs conclusion that “Trident will bring about ‘…increased income, improved social services, and a higher standard of living for all residents in the region,’ is directly contradicted by much of the analysis which preceded it in earlier sections of the draft EIS.”  The local governments felt that

[t]he fiscal analysis contained in the Trident Draft EIS fell far short of what we had been led to believe would be provided and far short of what we will accept as adequate. At best it was incomplete. At worst, its effect was to understate the impacts which can be expected. 43

Initial political opposition was so stark that the Trident Task Force, a coalition of local business leaders, was formed to “[o]rganize support for the [Trident] project within the business community and general public of the Puget Sound region.” To do this would require facts and research and not simply rhetoric invoking the looming Soviet threat or a missile gap. The task force listed as their fourth objective to “[r]esearch important issues in depth…in order to arrive at reasoned, logical conclusions regarding proper solutions to such issues.” Thus, there was a need for more in-depth local research in addition to the traditional boosterism and civic promotion generally within the ken of these and similarly positioned civic organizations. The Trident submarine and its support site could be supported, but pro-Trident research emanating from these official channels could not merely extract research done as part of the voluminous DEIS.

Additional research, from a local perspective, needed to be conducted. 44

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43 Ibid, 3.
44 Ibid. Although the document has no date the organizational meeting is listed as July 11 [1974]. Since public opposition precipitating the need for such a task force did not arise until Aril 1974, it is reasonable to put this document in the April to July timeframe. The makes the DEIS, but not the FEIS, available for consideration.
Seattle’s Chamber of Commerce came out in favor of the support site project on 21 May 1974. First, they couched their support in the national security importance of the support site—reinforcing the words of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and Henry Jackson’s 1957 ballistic sea power speech on the Senate floor. Then, the chamber went on to state that

"[t]he addition of this federal activity to Kitsap County represents a significant economic contribution to the entire Puget Sound region, in that it will increase the long range stability of the region’s economic base, and will generate substantial primary and secondary employment opportunities."

They felt that this development would be substantial enough that “[a]ny potentially adverse social or environmental impacts [would be] minimal relative to the benefits involved, and it is anticipated that sufficient federal funding assistance will be made to alleviate the impacts…”45

The chamber based this assumption on the $500 million of total capital investments the base would bring.46 The population bump of 27,000 people would bring an estimated $90 million to the civilian and military payrolls annually. In this case, the opposition as voiced by Lobe, Evans, and others was short-sighted. Furthermore, the chamber declared, “Many citizens feel the population issue has been greatly exaggerated. Population levels in the area have fluctuated widely over the years…”47 A graph released in 1975 by the Kitsap Planning Department shows the ebb and flow nature of the county’s population.

45 Resolution adopted by the Board of Trustees of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce. 21 May 1974. WGM,168-6.
46 The site’s direct investment would actually be $880 million.
47 Ibid.
The planning department’s goal was to provide citizens and policy makers with relevant data. It acted as a local clearinghouse, gathering data and information “from a variety of sources too numerous to mention.” While the data profile does not add new data, it is important that a local government actor is providing information to local citizens, adding a sense of legitimacy for residents interested in the inputs to the planning process.

Depending on local government actors was not unusual in the debate over the support site as seen in this section. The next section details Section 608 funding: a federal support program that grew from the local Trident Coordination Office.

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48 Kitsap Planning Department, “Kitsap County Data Profile,” 1.
Challenging Federal Funds in Federal Court

Debates were not only held in gymnasiums and local newspaper columns. The EIS was mandated by NEPA and could therefore be challenged in the federal courts. Soon after the DEIS was published, groups began to form to oppose the Navy’s characterization of Kitsap through litigation. One of these groups was Concerned About Trident (CAT), which had a profile in the Bremerton Sun during the newspapers’ serialization of the DEIS. The group was a coalition of citizens and lawyers from Kitsap and the surrounding area, including Seattle. Members were anti-Trident, but some also enjoyed high standing in mainstream, establishment politics. This included a state district judge and John F. Kennedy’s former economic advisor Walter W. Heller, who owned property on Hood Canal. According to CAT’s chairman Irving Clark, a Seattle-based attorney, at the time the DEIS was issued for public review CAT was going to consider “the questions of whether ‘the Navy complied with all the statutes…and whether they have thoroughly considered all the alternatives to the project, including the no-build option.” After a review of the DEIS and FEIS, CAT commenced a suit in the District Court of the District of Columbia, which would end up before the D.C. Circuit Court in 1976 and was decided in 1977.

In Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring), the circuit court found that although “[t]he district court found that the EIS and Navy procedures fully complied with the mandates of NEPA….After a thorough review of the voluminous record in this case, we must agree that the Navy decision making process and the EIS satisfy NEPA in all respects save two.” The first of those two exceptions was the forecasting of environmental impacts merely to 1981—when the Trident was projected to arrive.

50 Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 820.
The circuit court found the Navy “too short-sighted” in this regard.\textsuperscript{51} The second was the need for “further discussion of the alternative systems and the environmental consequences which the Navy considered before choosing the dedicated site alternative.”\textsuperscript{52} In general, however, the EIS requirements of NEPA were followed. This includes not only the environmental requirements of NEPA but also the social and population-related assessments.

Although the adequacy of the Navy’s EISs was upheld in \textit{Concerned About Trident}, the result was far from assured. In another federal case, \textit{National Wildlife Federation v. Adams}, 629 F.2d 587 (9\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 1980), the National Wildlife Federation used NEPA in conjunction with Executive Order 11990\textsuperscript{53} to challenge the adequacy of the FEISs wetlands analysis around expansion of State Route-3.\textsuperscript{54} Legal challenges to the base faced an uphill battle. As a forum that defers to precedent, the lack of precedent in these cases made any hope for substantive change farfetched. A consensus regarding how to determine the adequacy of an EIS still remains up for grabs. As of 2011, there is still a circuit split regarding the extent NEPA predetermination suit can look beyond an EIS or if that view must be mostly focused on the text of the EIS itself.\textsuperscript{55}

The mechanisms for challenging an EIS, which, to reiterate, must be challenged in federal court

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 830. Given that the Trident submarines would not arrive until August 1982 due to delays in construction and testing, these projections were quite short-sighted.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{53} Executive Order 11990 went into effect on 24 May 1977. The order’s scope is complementary to the goals of NEPA and is designed “in furtherance of the National Environmental Policy Act…in order to avoid to the extent possible the long and short term adverse impacts associated with the destruction or modification of wetlands and to avoid direct or indirect support of new construction in wetlands wherever there is a practicable alternative…” “Executive Order 11990—Protection of Wetlands” http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11990.html. Accessed 23 May 2014.

\textsuperscript{54} The same plaintiff had also challenged the construction of a freeway interchange in state court. This was dismissed principally because over 90 percent of the funding came from the federal government and not the state government. See Associated Press, “Court Denies Injunction to Halt Trident Freeway Construction,” \textit{Bremerton Sun}, August 18, 1979.

because NEPA is at its core a policy act, remains murky. This is seen in a supplemental EIS for the Trident Support Site. The Navy was expanding its dredge work in Hood Canal, but this would threaten commercially viable clam beds. It noted that “[t]hese [three] beds are productive, containing 0.77 to 1.56 lb/ft$^2$. Beds are considered to be commercially valuable if they contain clams in concentration greater than 0.5 lb/ft$^2$.”\textsuperscript{56} This did not alter the decision to dredge, and the supplemental EIS determined that “clams and other benthic animals…would thus be lost to excessive sedimentation.”\textsuperscript{57} Thus, in this EIS, losses are noted and chronicled and not, in any way, mitigated.

**The Section 608 Funding Solution**

Economic Adjustment efforts have historically focused on impacts occurring after major realignment decisions were announced. These decisions invariably prompted negative economic impacts in communities and regions. An exception to this general rule was the Army Safeguard ABM Program. This project was unique in that an assistance program was developed in anticipation of impacts created by new DoD activity. Assistance was rendered under Public Law 91-511-Section 610 which permitted the SecDef to authorize the use of DoD funds to augment other federal grants to construct necessary public facilities to accommodate demands generated by new military activities. This ABM impact program was not, however the result of a “progressive” or altruistic philosophy of DoD. It was the upshot of Congressional pressures.\textsuperscript{58}

While local protests and opposition was forming over the DEIS’s perceived deficiencies, political plans were underway to direct federal compensation to Kitsap County. The idea for this federal compensation, however, appears to have emanated from the local Trident Coordination Office. It wrote to Norm Dicks, the future congressman who at the time was a high-ranking aide to Senator Magnuson, about the Safeguard ABM funding, considering it to be “…one of the options we may wish to consider to provide federal funds for some of the impacts Trident may

\textsuperscript{56} Department of the Navy, *Supplement to Final Environmental Impact Statement* 6.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 7.
have on Kitsap County.”59 This funding was new and innovative. Although a similar program was playing out in North Dakota and Montana regarding anti-ballistic missile sites, the support site “was the first time the Office of Economic Adjustment of the Department was asked to participate in the economic adjustment of a growing community, rather than a stable or declining community.” Furthermore, the Trident program was larger than the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile program simply because Kitsap County was considerably larger than Grand Forks, North Dakota, which received the bulk of the Safeguard monies.60

The memorandum and attachments were marked by Dicks and forwarded to Mike Steward, a top aide to Senator Jackson. In the margins of the original memorandum from the Trident, Dicks writes, “MES [Steward] We should take a very hard look at the possible approach.”61 One line in the attached memorandum that Dicks underlined was that the ABM assistance was provided to “…help ease the impact of the ABM…by providing funds for the construction of roads and the expansion of schools, hospitals, parks, etc.”62 These same areas would also be covered in the coming Section 608 Trident funding bill.

The funding tacitly acknowledged the burden as well as the potential benefit of military spending. While the conventional narrative of federal investment being by-and-large an improvement still rang true for a Kitsap naval support community that was struggling to keep the Bangor Ammunition Depot open at the start of the 1970s, Section 608’s “basic philosophy of providing community impact assistance to a growing community contradicts the popular opinion

60 Dicks affidavit.
61 Memorandum. Horsley to Dix. 11 March 1974 (underline in original).
62 Ibid.
that Federal activity has positive impacts on a community.”  While the funding theoretically challenged the mantra of federal funding as an unqualified asset, the specific placement of the funds dramatically altered Kitsap County between Bremerton and Silverdale (see figs. 3.2-3.4).

**Urban Concentration and the Brick and Mortar Report**

Where these Section 608-funded projects made the greatest change was highly concentrated within Kitsap because the county elected to handle growth “via a land use approach known as ‘urban concentration.’” This approach required an all-encompassing perspective regarding what Crane termed “public facilities/amenities.” This included 11 aspects of county and municipal planning: transportation, sewers, water, housing, shopping, communications, electric services, libraries, recreation, fire protection, and education. With this approach, the population influx and Section 608 funded projects were concentrated on the eastern shore of Dyes Inlet, running northwest from East Bremerton to Silverdale, as seen in figures 3.2 to 3.4, which were attachments to the Second Affidavit of Trident Coordinator Peter J. Crane. Section 608 was mostly used on schools and roads. While the biggest road-related investment was the expansion and improvement of State Route-3, which runs on the west side of Dyes Inlet (this inlet is immediately below Silverdale in figs. 3.2-3.4), the construction of most 608-funded projects was on the inlet’s west side. In total, eight new schools were constructed, seven of which were on the East Bremerton-Silverdale axis (see fig. 3.4). This was in response to the projected population increases. At the census tract-level, only two of Kitsap’s 15 census tracts were projected to see a population increase of more than 6,000 people. (In fig 3.2, these are the

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63 Dicks affidavit.
64 Second Affidavit of Peter J. Crane.
65 Ibid.
66 Attachment C to Second Affidavit of Peter J. Crane.
dark shaded tracts.) Not coincidentally, the two tracts where these large increases were occurring act as the respective bookends of the major Section 608 investments in the built environment.
Figure 3.2: Projected Population Increase Related to Trident Support Site.

(This is a reproduction of a reproduction. As such, the data ranges up to 6,000 look the same. However, the numbers inside the tract boundaries also indicate the projected growth. Note that all but one of the tracts expecting more than a 4,000-person increase runs on a northwest-southeast axis through the submarine base and Silverdale. This is also the zone of urban concentration.)
Figure 3.1: Location of Section 608-Related Projects
Figure 3.2: Schools Built for Trident-Related Increases
Underpinning all of the public facilities and amenities improvements is State Route-3. According to Crane, if State Route 3 and the Bucklin Hill bypass were not constructed “the urban concentration will not be [a] success (or at least not as successful)” and “pressures will force the development of the [mostly rural] Clear Creek Valley.”67

Urban concentration was especially important given the base’s close proximity to Silverdale. The large, unincorporated area had resisted pushes for incorporation since the mid-1950s. (It remains unincorporated to this day.) Principally, the reason for this is so that retail outlets in and around the Central Kitsap Mall could avoid having to pay a municipal tax. There was fear that the unplanned and unregulated growth would lead to more strip malls, sprawl, and the general loss of Kitsap’s rural character. The Sun wrote on the DEISs treatment of Silverdale’s sprawl: “a ‘harsh, discordant note.’”68 Although the articles title was “Avoid Stripping—EIS,” the story regarded the visual quality section of the EIS. For this section, the Navy and local officials agreed, feeling that the visual quality could be mostly preserved by “[p]lac[ing] major development adjacent to already existing urban areas.”69 Tellingly, as the growth of existing areas was underway, there was an effort to re-assure residents that urban blight would likely not be accompanying this growth because “[t]he community lacks low-income and oppressed minorities common to slum areas in most eastern industrial cities.”70

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67 Second Affidavit of Peter Crane.
69 Ibid.
70 Ken Olsen, “Crowded City Comes With Trident Base,” Bremerton Sun, February 9, 1977. Race is scarcely mentioned in media reports related to the base except in instances of reference to the rural-to-urban transition or in urban growth-related articles, such as this one.
The Navy’s Counter-Narrative Regarding the Environment

For all the protests that the EISs collectively garnered, there was little public acknowledgement by the Navy that the EISs were deficient or incomplete. The Navy saw itself as fairly and equitably integrating national security and environmental concerns. For the Navy, however, these environmental concerns hinge on the natural environment and not the local concerns over infrastructure discussed above. The rhetoric of balance and fairness is not unique to the support site. As chapter 2 has shown the national security fixation with balancing (or exceeding) the Soviet nuclear threat underwrote the rhetoric surrounding the Trident submarine more generally. In the case of the base’s environmental concerns, balance was again a trope. In a 1978 issue of All Hands, a fleet-wide magazine published by the Arlington, Virginia-based Naval Personnel Office, the base’s construction is characterized as “reflect[ing] a system of checks and balances designed to protect the environment and control the impact of the base upon the community…”71 Furthermore, the Navy self-characterized its efforts as pulling double duty where possible: “In the case of Bangor’s buildings, design combines with eye-pleasing elements with energy-saving materials.”72 The D.C. Circuit Court would partially challenge this, as seen in Concerned About Trident; however, the characterization of the Navy balancing the objectives of national security and environmental protection still played out in a broader discourse: “[T]he balance metaphor is central to military environmental discourses….Accordingly, the balance metaphor understands and presents military training and environmental protection as conceptually equal; like is being balanced with like.”73 When the two objectives come into conflict is when, in general, national security trumps the environment. Even when the ideas are

72 Ibid, 24.
73 Woodward, Military Geographies, 96.
not necessarily in conflict the idea that military activities cause environmental damage is “obscured the military ‘greenwash’” (i.e., the military’s discursive construction of its environmental programs). To acknowledge deficiencies in the impact statements would counter these narratives. Woodward notes that the deployment and articulation of environmental discourses is a rhetorical shift by western militaries away from a “common discursive strategy…the use of silence.” Indeed, the All Hands article can be seen as the beginnings of a green militarization where discourse of and solutions to environmental problems are considered in the military’s purview. The efforts of the EISs, and NEPA more broadly, made the environment and government-environment interactions a matter of public record and a space for democratic participation as well as litigation. But, who controlled the public project still mattered. In the case of the support site, final decision making power rested with the Navy and the federal government. Their version of a good environment would prevail.

**End of Trident Coordination Office**

In November 1979, the Bremerton Sun announced that the Trident Coordination Office was shutting its doors, which allowed for accounting of what federal funding had actually meant for the surrounding area. The story announcing the closure was accompanied by a picture of Trident Coordinator Peter Crane standing on the shoulder of State-Route-3 with a construction truck and the exit sign for “Clear Creek Rd. Naval Submarine Base Bangor.” The placement of this photograph is intentional; the caption concludes by reminding readers that State Route-3 was

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74 Ibid, 102.
75 Ibid, 90.
“a spur of highway constructed with Trident impact funds.” Furthermore, State Route-3 was the lynchpin of the county’s Trident-related development strategy. Fittingly, state roads, the project that attracted the most Section 608 funding, were used to bookmark the end of a brief--yet unprecedented--era. Below this story were two additional articles, both of which were unsigned editorials. The first outlined just how much Section 608 funding was slated to be doled out through the arrival of the first submarines. The figures in this report are summarized in Table 3.3. State roads received almost twice as much Section 608 funding than the second-largest recipient: schools.

Table 3.3: Summary of Federal Funding Related to the Trident Support Site (in millions $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>608</th>
<th>Other Federal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Roads</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Roads</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Roads</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Health</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewer</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libraries</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>70.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>114.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The second *Sun* editorial begged a separate, yet corresponding, question: “Did we get a fair share?” This question is harder to parse; however, the use of the rhetoric of fairness is unsurprising. It emerges as a defining trope when discussing the Trident submarine across scales. At the international scale, Trident submarines exist as the countervailing ballistic force to the menacing, technologically threatening Soviets. In the case of the EISs, the Navy viewed themselves as balancing two separate concerns: that of the environment and that of national security. In the case of Trident funding fairness emerges, too.

Much like the complaints from the gymnasium bleachers at Central Kitsap High School in April 1974, the assessment in November 1979 was a mixture of praise, cautious critique, and gratitude. Steve Landau succinctly wrote, “By most measures, the Trident impact program—the first of its kind in the nation—has been a success.” John Horsley, now in the role of county commissioner, echoed this sentiment, but added the caveat that the funds were not a panacea, “We got the capital funding we went after….In terms of road construction, school construction and some of the utilities, it has performed what we had hoped it would.” However, the funds fell short in regards to operating funds. Although the Section 608 funds were never designed to assist in this area, it nonetheless hurt the county coffers as state law prohibited the county from increasing property taxes by more than six percent per year. The Trident Coordination Office’s “Brick and Mortar Report” touches on this. While the document is celebratory, as detailed earlier in this chapter, there is also an overview of a problem that vexed Kitsap as Section 608 funds drew to a close. Taken from a March 1979 report by the Washington State Employment Security Department, it notes that in 1979, of the county’s top ten largest employers, only the J.

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79 Landau, “Trident Office Ends.”
80 Anon, “Did We Get A Fair Share?”
C. Penney in the Central Kitsap Mall paid any property tax. The report’s findings are reproduced as Table 3.4. Thus, while Section 608 funding was seen as covering the construction-related funds, it did not move the county any closer to resolving the larger problem of its largest employers being exempt from local property taxes. While the broader Trident project re-invigorated the county economically and made Kitsap part of the Navy’s future and not its past, the underlying problems of being a federally impacted county that Gene Lobe noted at the first public comment meeting persisted.

Table 3.4: Kitsap County Employers and Property Taxes Paid, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>Property Taxes Paid ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puget Sound Naval Shipyard</td>
<td>10,606</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering System, Keyport</td>
<td>2,571</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kitsap School District</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kitsap School District</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan American</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremerton School District</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitsap County</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic College</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Supply Center Puget Sound</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. C. Penney Co.</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>57,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Coda: The Counter Example of Seattle_

This chapter ends with an anecdote from Seattle’s bid for a carrier group in the 1980s. The city would eventually lose the bid to Everett, Washington, the long-time Boeing and timber town one hour’s drive north of the city. The circumstances of Seattle’s bid emphasize the unique nature of the Trident base’s construction and funding. The support site’s debate, funding, and political pressures were a result of the timing of naval decisions aligning with powerful local and state actors. Casserly asserts that the protestations of local government officials may have been a political ploy designed to extort federal funding, but the counter-example of Seattle’s experience
with the Navy illustrates that even if this were a ploy, it was far from a given. Local politicians and local power were still important to tailoring federal decisions for local communities.  

On 18 April 1984, a *Seattle Times* political cartoon had a depiction of Seattle mayor Charles Royer standing on a pier holding a larger sign, which read: “WELCOME TO EVERETT!” The tongue-in-cheek humor, implying that the mayor was actively campaigning against his own bid was sent to him by a constituent in support of his anti-base stance. In reality, Royer had supported the base locating in Seattle, but, as he explained in a form letter after the decision was made, Seattle “refused to get into a bidding war with Everett.” This sentiment expressed the changing nature of local-federal relations regarding military bases. Unlike with the support site, the federal government was not looking to subsidize the militarization transition; instead, it was looking for a financial partner that could offer it cheap land and cheap utilities. In a letter from the Department of the Navy’s Shore Activities Planning Branch, potential cities were asked for an “identification of actions which local agencies/entities are willing to take to reduce costs.” The Navy also detailed “suggested areas” that might want to be highlighted, including long-term, low-cost leases; participation in providing utility services; usable structures and recreation facilities; and road upgrades and improvements. The request for a public-private partnership had precedent. New York City won a bid for the *U.S.S. Iowa* using similar tactics. However, Seattle could not use this tactic as it was bound by then-current city law to charge city utilities to all users at a uniform rate, including the Navy.

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81 Casserly, “Confronting the U.S. at Bangor,” endnote 19.
82 Charles Royer Papers. RG 5224-02. Box 27. Folder 26. Seattle Municipal Archives, Seattle, WA.
84 Letter from Captain J.C. Doebler, USN to Charles Royer. 9 September 1983. CRP, 23-19.
85 Ibid.
Spellman may have extolled the Trident base as an example of cooperation, but when the Navy returned to Puget Sound just as the Trident Base was completed the nature of the relationship had changed. The Navy, and by extension federal government, had changed its tone from assisting in communities to being assisted.

Between the installation of the Trident Support Site and the bidding for the carrier group, Washington’s senatorial clout had diminished tremendously. The days of having a tandem of two of the most respected and longest-serving senators were over. In 1980, Magnuson lost his seat to Washington Attorney General Slade Gorton as part of the larger political sea change that saw congressional power swing to the Republicans and Ronald Reagan enter the White House. Three years later, Jackson would die while in office. This coupled with Seattle’s comparatively more diverse tax roll was likely why the tone of the exchanges between local, state, and federal actors changed.

**Conclusion**

Temporally, this chapter has focused on the events of the 1970s before the arrival of the Trident submarines. As a result, there emerged a tension pitting those who knew Kitsap County versus those who saw it as a place that, as chapter 2 articulated, would put Soviet targets in range of nuclear missiles soon after leaving port. When the *U.S.S. Ohio* came through Hood Canal on 12 August 1982 the speculation of what changes the submarine might bring about was replaced by the reality of changes actually brought about. Initial estimates of population increases had been revised upward throughout the preparation stages, and, by the 1980 census, Kitsap boasted a population of 147,152, almost 9,000 more than had been projected in 1974.  

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87 For initial, local estimates see Chart. 1974. “Kitsap County Population Growth.” Poulsbo City Clerk Files. Washington State Archives-Puget Sound Branch, Bellevue, WA. For the actual population in 1980, see United
The *U.S.S. Ohio* was met with a mixture of civic pride and direct protest. Given that in the preceding decade, hundreds of protestors had been arrested, such actions were not surprising. The *Sun* ran a special 25-page section titled “Trident Today” on 13 August 1982. While many of the pages were taken up with advertisements where everything and everyone from politicians to Arby’s to J. C. Penney welcomed the ship and its crews, there were also articles detailing the submarine, the importance of its nuclear capabilities, and the modern nature of the base itself. In the base-related article, the lede and title framed the base’s “humble start” by quoting the opening sentence of the DEIS: “The project under construction in this environmental impact statement is known as the Trident Support Site located at the Bangor Annex in the Naval Torpedo Station, Keyport; Bangor, Washington.”

However, as this chapter has shown that simple opening line belied the document’s gravity and the power of its federal vision. Although this vision would be challenged through federal court cases—and even slightly altered—the end result of a nuclear navy in Puget Sound was never in serious doubt. What was in doubt was local support. Even as polls showed most Kitsap residents in favor of the submarines, they still saw these impressive machines as more than geopolitical chess pieces. These machines promised an economic future that would bring men and women to the area. The Cold War narrative of fear of and safety from the Soviets was evoked in local discussions, but, more importantly, the submarines were also seen in terms of schools, roads, and other infrastructure. This is something that the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel did not (and could not) foresee. Arguably, when Henry Jackson took the Senate floor in 1957 to advocate for a ballistic submarine, he also could not foresee this. However, when base planning began in 1973, local interests and impacts could not

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be avoided. Throughout the debate on the support site, the Navy is described as a “partner” or a “neighbor,” but the question then becomes what kind of a partner or neighbor would they be? Furthermore, how would this partnership become part of a local identity? The question of the Navy and local identity is addressed in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: The Navy and Tourism in Present-Day Kitsap

Introduction

The previous two chapters regarding the fear-induced national need for Trident and the give-and-take related to planning for the Trident’s arrival have two arcs: one temporal and the other thematic. Temporally, the chapters progress from anticipating the building of the Trident to preparing for the reality of the Trident’s arrival and the corresponding arrival of military personnel, civilian contractors, and laypeople attracted to the base. This chapter looks towards the lingering effects of Trident: how it continues to be a part of Kitsap. Thematically, this chapter is a return to the popular. Whereas chapter 3 focused on how official channels, monies, and programs carved up the landscape with, among other things, improved highways and schools, local residents continue to be engaged in a dynamic articulation of place and local identity. But, as will be seen, this is also a highly political process.

Some of the county’s local identity plays into a heritage complex and Ashworth and Tunbridge’s concept of the touristic-historic city; however, not all of the county’s local identity is presented for tourism. After the literature review, this chapter tells the story of the military landscapes that imbue Kitsap. Three communities are the foci for this chapter: Bremerton, Poulsbo, and Keyport. Poulsbo is the closest incorporated community to the base; its population was projected to double as a result of the Trident’s arrival. In actuality, the population grew by more than 160 percent between 1970 and 1990, and there was a 46 percent increase just from 1970 to 1980.¹ The second community is Bremerton, the entrepot to the county via ferry and the largest city. Compared to Poulsbo, its population increase was fairly modest eight percent

between 1970 and 1990. 2 Yet, as the commercial hub of the county, it benefitted from the county-wide boom.

The Trident is very much a part of present-day Kitsap; 10 submarines remain based here each with two rotating crews. Despite the Trident’s impact, as detailed in chapter 3, it is absent from the main constructions of local identity. This chapter reads the local landscapes in detail and posits that the nation’s first home base for the Trident does not elect to identify with it due to its clandestine nature and the entrenched position of far more public sites of local culture. This omission is a political act—albeit a different kind of politics than the one of political speeches, legislation, and court cases profiled in chapter 3. A vital part of a Gunbelt city is “vigorous boosterism,”3 and a key part of this is a courting process of military decision makers with “dubious claims regarding beauty, accessibility, and facilities.”4 This is true for Kitsap’s selection as a Navy Yard in 1890, but the effusive praise was from a naval observer regarding the area’s natural harbor and not part of a larger local campaign for capital investment.5 Despite the idea that a skilled labor force may have been a draw for Gunbelt towns, Markusen, et al. found that “[l]abor pools have been built with ease around new emerging gunbelt cities…. [P]eople follow jobs.”6 Unlike in Johnson’s study of Oakland, no comparative cultural migration happened with the Trident submarine.

2 Ibid.
3 Markusen et al., Rise of the Gunbelt, 239.
5 The report read, “It is doubtful if an equal area of clear water of moderate depth and an entrance of but a quarter mile could be found in this country or elsewhere…. [N]o place in the Northwest possesses the advantages of Port Orchard.” From “A Report of the Commission to Select a Site for Drydock on the Pacific Coast,” December 23, 1890. Quoted in William Harry Freeman, “An Analysis of Military Land Use Policy and Practice in the Pacific Northwest” (doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1974), 315.
6 Ibid, 240.
Boosterism is a roundabout way of getting on the subject of identity—to be a booster is to project a certain place as inherently better and therefore worth investing in; this is much the same logic that imbues heritage and local identity. In Kitsap, heritage and local identity were already firmly in place when support site construction began. The arrival of Trident did little to change these preexisting notions of place. Politics is involved in the crafting of local identity from whose stories get told to the funding and resolutions passed to get public funds to tell these stories. But, there is little drive from the county to add the Trident prominently to the local narratives. Much like the initial process of placing the Trident submarine in Bangor, the process of making submarines part of the local identity is occurring at a federal naval museum in Keyport. Thus, the drive for making the submarine part of Kitsap’s identity is exogenous, not endogenous.

**Literature Review**

Two distinct, yet complementary, literatures inform this chapter: tourism and local identity. Some of this literature was previously discussed in chapter 1, but it bears repeating because of this key theme: federal policy plays out in local places differently. Chapter 3 problematizes the concept of a single federal government by focusing on the many federal actors involved, but a single federal action can play out in various ways throughout a country. John Agnew detailed this in Italy, a country where sectionalism and local identities that are seamlessly transformed into political positions. In a collection of essays alongside cultural geographers, he noted that “[d]ifferent places have different relationships to the national state….These differences affect the nature of local political cultures as local life adjusts to external
challenges.” On the one hand, Kitsap adjusted to the challenges of Trident by, *inter alia*, lobbying for before-the-fact Trident-related funding. But, on the other hand, this was through official channels. Local life adjusted differently than was dictated through policy and administrative paperwork. While Trident may have been a catalytic change regarding the county’s population and the economy, the touristic-heritage industry had already carved out an economic niche. For Bremerton, the Navy was the key tourism attraction, but it was the Navy of World War II, not the Cold War. Importantly, the tourism landscapes are grafted over an established military landscapes, which are detailed in the next section.

Kitsap County’s tourism economy is built on a combination of military tourism, heritage tourism, and the outdoors, which relies on the county’s easy access to the Olympic Peninsula, Hood Canal, and Puget Sound. This chapter focuses on military tourism and heritage tourism, the two types founds at the chapter’s three sites. Ashworth and Tunbridge address this in *The Touristic-Historic City*. Originally published in 1990, *The Touristic-Historic City* was part of a larger resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s of tourism studies by geographers. Despite the fact that there has been an “over-representation of geographers in tourism studies” and that many related geographic sub-disciplines, including preservation and heritage, have long been subjects of study for geographers, tourism geography continues to “occupy a liminal position in the discipline.”

Considered a “composite concept,” the touristic-historic concept recognizes that “[h]istory has

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become heritage, heritage has become an urban resource, and this resource supplies a major ‘history/heritage industry,’ which shapes not merely the form but the function and purpose of the ‘commodified’ city.”¹² To lay out their argument, Ashworth and Tunbridge first discuss the concepts of the “historic city” and the “tourist city” in separate chapters. Then they devote a chapter to their neologistic concept. There are a range of tourist-historic cities from small- and medium-sized towns to complete re-visions of major metropolitan areas, such as Baltimore’s Inner Harbor. Woodward’s assertion that military geographies are everywhere is paralleled by Ashworth and Tunbridge’s claim that “all cities have history and culture.”¹³

¹² Ibid, 2.
¹³ Ibid, 65.
The Touristic-Historic City devotes considerable attention to the role of the waterfront and port redevelopment as touchstones for tourism. The schema used to illustrate the touristic-historic city is modified in the case of ports. Ashworth and Tunbridge’s modified waterfront schematic is seen above in figure 4.1. A point made, which will be returned to in the succeeding section on the U.S.S. Turner Joy, is the importance of a ship in the water to the narrative of
maritime places. A ship in the water connects the narrative being described on-shore (e.g., in parks, tourism shops, and hotels) with the maritime experience more broadly. On the shore, there can be maritime kitsch, which serves to tie both tourist and locals materially to the activities of the surrounding waters, but “[s]hips of all sorts provide catalysts for waterfront revitalization…” The practice of waterfront redevelopment is a product of post-industrialism, urban regeneration, and gentrification. In order for a port to be reused as a tourist attraction, it has to have ceased or significantly reduced its role as a port; thus, there is ample space to redevelop docklands into commercial and tourist uses. This has led David Ley to state that waterfront redevelopment is “wholly a product of our era.” Andrew Hurley considers this a modern phenomenon, too, but one that is also imbued with history: “[N]o component of the urban landscape has been subject to more explicit historical interpretation in the service of redevelopment goals over the past fifty years.” The development goals, however, do not stop at the water’s edge, but they extend to the surrounding area, which Hurley terms “alternative waterfront development strategies.”

These alternative development strategies are on display in Bremerton. The town employs the “ship in water” concept using a very specific type of ship to anchor its maritime heritage—a

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19 Ibid, 22.
naval ship. This embrace of the military is common in Kitsap, and it will be shown in the next section. But, the involvement of the military also opens Kitsap’s framing to be seen as military geographies following in the tradition of Rachel Woodward’s definition: “the continual preparations which states make in order to be able to wage war and engage in military operations shape wider economic, social, environmental, and cultural geographies, and produce their own ordering of space.”

One of these processes is the repurposing and repackaging of older bases. This transforms them from functional, military sites into heritage sites ready to be consumed as part of the broader heritage-tourism complex.

What the preceding works do not directly address is the idea that tourist sites can be both heritage sites as well as fully functioning sites in the military-industrial complex; however, they do acknowledge that this is possible. Ashworth and Tunbridge see this in places such as Norfolk, Virginia, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Portsmouth, United Kingdom, but they focus largely on places such as Bermuda, where the Royal Navy is a distant memory and not a current economic driver. In Norfolk, Virginia, tourism is rarely discussed in scholarly literature; however, Norfolk and the larger Tidewater area has three decommissioned naval ships that are used as “ship in water” tourism attractions. The famed Civil War-era *U.S.S. Monitor* is in Newport News, and two other ships are located in Norfolk and Portsmouth, respectively. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam is located eight miles west of Honolulu, the state’s most populated city. It has over 13,000 active duty naval personnel and over 5,000 active duty air force personnel.

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personnel. Beside the fully functioning joint base are World War II memorials: the *U.S.S. Arizona* memorial and the *U.S.S. Missouri*. Thus, there is a tourism industry comingling with a military one. The *Missouri*, famed as the location where World War II officially ended, was originally housed in Bremerton, Washington. It was re-located to Pearl Harbor after its re-deployment in Operation Desert Storm and symbolically brackets American involvement in World War II when co-located with the *U.S.S. Arizona* memorial. The *Arizona* was a casualty of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, which was part of a broader Japanese campaign that started American involvement in World War II. Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez considers Pearl Harbor to show how “tourism and militarism’s *mutual* work produces the possibilities for American historical and contemporary dominance in the [Asia-Pacific] region.” However, Gonzalez’s work is more of a critique of tourism and militarism’s continuing reinforcement of a masculine colonial and neocolonial domination of feminized native populations by white soldiers, sailors, and tourists.

**The Military Landscape around Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor**

In any major city in Kitsap County there are banners fixed to lightposts displaying a blue star. Commemorating local residents serving in the armed forces and the National Guard, the banners carry the name and home town of a service member as well as the banner’s individual or corporate sponsor. There are also several gold stars in memory of those killed in service. The program is modeled after a similar program in Temple City, California. The blue star and gold

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star service flags have been used to signal those in service or those killed since World War I. There are strict regulations as to who may display them. Per United States Code:

A service flag approved by the Secretary of Defense may be displayed in a window of the place of residence of individuals who are members of the immediate family of an individual serving in the Armed Forces of the United States during any period of war or hostilities in which the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged.\(^{24}\)

(The service banner program has since expanded to include other products such as car window decals. United States Code covers only service flags and lapel pins.\(^{25}\) The statute makes the service flag a personal or familial object. By extension, the public display of service banners expands the familial concept to the broader community. In addition, the banners mark the public spaces as supportive of the broader military including, but not limited to, the Navy.

Support for the military on lampposts in populated areas of Kitsap extends to the roads below. A marked difference between the banners and the street names is that while the banners celebrate the entire armed forces, the street names are decidedly part of the Navy. This is particularly the case around the Trident Support Site (presently named Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor) and Bremerton’s Navy Yard (presently named Naval Base-Kitsap-Bremerton). On the support site Luoto Road, which boasts a base-specific exit from State Route-3, turns into Trident Boulevard. Other on-base roads carry submarine-specific language, including, most ominously, Trigger Avenue. This street is the main north-south road on-base, and it continues off-base as well. There is a slight irony here. The support site in meant to be part of the broader nuclear deterrent; thus, the nuclear arsenal is present but never used. Trigger Avenue, an oft-used road by both those on and off the base, is named for something that, ideally, is never touched. The


\(^{25}\) 36 U.S.C. §901(c).
road naming scheme drops off quickly outside of the base—the first major street east of State Route-3 is Viking Way, a nod to the Scandinavian heritage of nearby Poulsbo.

By contrast, Bremerton is on a modified Philadelphia street plan: the streets parallel to the shoreline are numbered. The numbering starts at the first street outside of those on Navy Yard property, or when the shoreline becomes accessible to the general public. Where First Street would be, however, is instead named for Alfred T. Mahan, the famed naval theorist who was the original recommender of the area for a Navy Yard in 1890. In the downtown is the Admiral Theater, restored with the largesse of the Seattle-based Gates foundation. There are other prominent landmarks here, too: the Masonic Temple, a VFW Hall, and the headquarters of the Kitsap Sun, the successor to the Bremerton Sun. There is also the Norm Dicks County Government Center, a new steel-and-glass structure named after the long-serving congressman who, in the previous chapter, was Magnuson’s top aide during the start of the Trident Support Site.

Bremerton has many of the markers that confer its municipal county-level authority similar, although at a different scale, to those markers described by Whittlesey and Zelinsky. This is despite the fact that the much smaller Port Orchard, which is the county seat and faces Bremerton from the opposite side of Sinclair Inlet. Coming into the downtown area from State Route-3, one sees ships in the process of being disassembled. It is clear what the Navy Yard does, and as will be seen in the coming sections, its work is part of a broader touristic-historic narrative. The workers, and their work, is showcased and celebrated. Bangor is separated from the public by a six-foot fence topped with barbed wire. The fence was so scalable that stories of protestors storming the base ran photographs of protestors scaling the fence with store-bought ladders. The low fences remain. By comparison, Bremerton’s fencework is much more
formidable. The key distinction for the purposes of this chapter is what is behind the fences. At the Trident Support Site, there are rows of trees. The submarines remain hidden. In Bremerton, the fences are tall but one can still look through the bars and see an installation at work ranging from trucks and forklifts moving materials to billboards reminding workers of workplace safety requirements.

Banners, street names, and fences combine to form a part of Kitsap’s military landscape. Returning to Woodward’s conclusion that “military geographies are everywhere,” the question becomes how the county expresses its military geographies through the built environment and the landscape. Methodologically, geography has borrowed from the work of Clifford Geertz, who advocates for thick description. In conveying the importance of a place or a landscape employing thick description “diagnose[s] much about the cultures at large in which they are situated and esteemed. It is not the uniqueness of these places which is at issue, but their specificity.” The emphasis of specificity over uniqueness is important for military places as key elements of a landscape are produced and reproduced to meet exacting military requirements, which, in turn, gives bases a cookie cutter character. Base architect and planner Mark Gillem remarks, “Thousands of pages of rules govern planning and architectural practices on America’s outposts….These lines lead to familiar landscapes in unfamiliar lands.” Gillem’s outlook is tailored toward the United States’ bases in foreign countries, but the policy-based uniformity makes for the predictability in the landscape. Kitsap’s combination of these common elements makes it unique.

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27 Gillem, America Town, 122.
Military Geographies at Three Sites

The next section examines three such places: Bremerton, Poulsbo, and Keyport. Bremerton is the most populous city in Kitsap County, and its celebration of the past accomplishments of its residents and skilled labor follows many of the conventions described by Ashworth and Tunbridge regarding a touristic-historic place. Poulsbo, the closest incorporated community to the support site, also has a touristic-historic angle, but in a way that celebrates its Norwegian heritage. Extending the illustrative street names to Poulsbo, most streets in the downtown carry a Norwegian name: King Olaf Vei, and Queen Sonja Vei are on landfill added in the 1970s when the town’s three jetties were removed. Jensen, Moe, and Iverson extend from downtown. South of the downtown Front Street bends inland and Fjord Drive becomes the closest road to Liberty Bay, the main physical showcase of the town. A former working waterfront, the bay now hosts recreational boats. Poulsbo’s propinquity to Bangor means that this town could have easily embraced the submarine aesthetic in the immediate vicinity. Many of the new residents since the 1970s arrived as a result of the Trident submarine or the spillover economic effects, but it has chosen to more fully embrace an ethnic heritage instead of a military one. This is best illustrated by the main road to the east of State Route-3. To State Route-3’s west is the Trident Support Site, to its right is Viking Way, which takes travelers to downtown Poulsbo. Lastly, there is Keyport, a small, unincorporated community also in close physical proximity to the support site. With Keyport, there is an attempt include submarines—although not specifically ballistic submarines—into a heritage. However, this effort is not a local one; rather, it is the effort of a federal museum. There is little local effort into making the submarine a marquee part of the public landscape.

The three Kitsap communities profiled in this chapter are all spatially proximate to the zone of urban concentration detailed in chapter 3. All saw their populations increase and their
social and physical infrastructures upgraded. When the Trident submarine and the support site are discussed in terms of the broader cultural and economic impacts of a naval presence, it is reasonable and logical to group Bremerton, Poulsbo, and Keyport together. Yet, they cannot be grouped together in all instances. These three communities showcasing their preexisting, historically engrained resources and trumpeting them in the crowded tourism market: Bremerton’s century-old Navy Yard, Poulsbo’s original Norwegian settlement, Keyport’s naval torpedo station. None of these communities were starting with a blank slate; rather, they were reframing their existing historical assets. This is an ongoing process, and the submarine exhibit under construction at the Naval Undersea Museum is an appropriate testament to this.

Submarines may be in the process of being transformed into heritage in Kitsap County three decades after the U.S.S. Ohio sailed into Hood Canal. The Soviet presence that necessitated the technologically advanced submarine that rivaled a spaceship has passed, and the final Trident submarine rolled off the line at Vickers Shipyard in Barrow, England in 1999. Perhaps enough time has passed to start to transform the submarine from a geopolitical chess piece and an economic booster into an historical object. Notably, this is not happening in Bremerton or Poulsbo; their respective heritage narratives remain strong sans a submarine. The exhibit is being placed in Keyport to supplement an existing, if federally framed, heritage.

**Bremerton**

Bremerton, the largest city in Kitsap County, is best known as a naval support site, which it has been since 1901. Outside the main entrance is a park that wraps around to a pleasure boat marina, restaurants, and the *U.S.S. Turner Joy*. It has water fountains, statues, and plaques detailing the history of Bremerton, the base, and those who work on it. Towards the south side of the park, there is a two-story, blue Navy Yard warehouse with two lines of yellow text. (Not
coincidentally, this is also the color scheme of the U.S. Navy.) The top line reads “Puget Sound Naval Ship Yard.” The bottom line reads “Building on a Proud Tradition” (fig. 4.2). Its military landscape pivots on how it showcases to the public its proud tradition with a security guard and a fence separating the work of the shipyard with the public—be they tourist or local. This is answered, in part, by Memorial Park. The park is located adjacent to the naval shipyard (see fig. 4.6). This park focuses more on a narrative with four important nodes: the founding of the Navy Yard, World War I, World War II, and the present-day. In this respect, the park \(^{28}\) and museum perform a vital function by bringing the Navy Yard’s work out from behind the security guard and the fence to the public who support this operation with their tax dollars. The shipyard is not hidden or secret and the public can infer what the naval yard does (e.g., it takes warships and turns them into these skeletal, mothballed structures), but the park and museum allow for a more expansive narrative to be woven to this effect.

Artisanally twisted sheets of metal at least twelve-feet high frame historic markers (see the right side of fig. 4.5). They signal a start to the park. In the left half of figure 4.5, there is a fountain and a stream giving the park an artificial shoreline even though a real shoreline is visible immediately past the park. Progress is signaled by the ambitions and dreams and visions of great men; trajectories are shaped by great events. Although heritage and history can be presented as highly variegated and complex \(^{29}\) there is still a tendency to lean towards a narrative of major events and people. This approach may be reductionist, but it is also reflective of the ebb and flow of defense employment, which spiked in times of war and slowed or subsided in

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\(^{28}\) Technically, these are two parks, but since they abut one another, herein I will refer to them as “the park.”

times of relative peace. As for people, the founding of the Navy Yard is credited on plaques as well as the marker near the Navy Yard gate to Lieutenant Ambrose B. Wyckoff, first commander of the Puget Sound Navy Yard (fig 4.7). Inside the museum, the Navy Yard’s early development is credited to “Wyckoff’s vision.” A board on the museum reads, in part,

[d]uring his survey of upper Puget Sound; Wyckoff noted its deep harbors, mild climate, and abundant natural resources. He became convinced the Puget Sound area was the ideal location for a new naval shipyard. Steadfast in his vision, Wyckoff spent the next 14 years making it a reality.

Here, there is a narrative of one man being able to mold history. In most other respects, however, the displays are focused on the working men and women who performed and continue to perform the work for the U.S. Navy. The act of working is prized and placed in the exalted terms of battle. Battle Es, an honor bestowed to civilian production facilities are still proudly displayed. The ceremonious act served to link the war worker to the war fighter and, by extension, the war itself.30 These Battle Es further blur the line between civilian support and wartime service with the displaying of the submarine *U.S.S. Parche’s* (SSN-683) sail. The *Parche* holds the distinction of being the most decorated ship in United States history. The litany of awards form columns on the sail, and the display centers Memorial Park as it is roughly equidistant from the entrance to the naval museum and the entrance to the naval shipyard. The *Parche* display indicates as growing interest in including submarines in Bremerton and, much like the *U.S.S. Turner Joy*, a growing interest in the post-World War II navy.

The Battle Es are not the only example of one image with multiple meanings, interpretations, and heritages. The visual narrative of the civilian *qua* war fighter extends back to World War I with an image of an integrated, all-female riveting crew adorning a tall piece of

metal marking the Navy Yard’s involvement in the conflict (fig. 4.3). This is an oft-used image, and a bus stop on the edge of downtown also conveys a similar image, which is likely part of a school-based public art program (fig. 4.4). In addition, the image has been used by Quintard Taylor to illustrate the integration effects of the war economy on race relations. The focus on the everyday war worker forges a popular, relatable connection with the war efforts that is impossible to convey with the singular, grand narrative relating to Wyckoff’s vision.

The majority of the park and the museum focuses on World War II. The large-scale employment of the factory draws even more of the public into the fold as workers have their stories re-told beside those of soldiers and sailors. In addition to the previously mentioned Battle Es and war decorations, a large stone tablet indicates the war record of the joiner shop. It contains simple tally marks and arithmetic, but by doing so it simply lays out the shop (and overall Navy Yard’s) involvement quantitatively. As seen in figure 4.8, there were 363 repairs and 50 new ships constructed between 1941 and 1945. The shop’s effort (part of the larger efforts of the entire ship yard) is another example of connecting the mechanical work of the yard to the broader war. World War II is figured prominently in the park.

World War II also figures prominently in the museum. Although exhibits range from the planning of the yard in the late nineteenth century through an interactive display on the modern-day carrier the U.S.S. John C. Stennis (CVN-74), the pervading motif is World War II. There are photographs of long production lines of skilled worker skillfully working with machinery and

31 Taylor has also written on the overall importance of war contracting on the black community through World War II. See Quintard Taylor, The Forging of a Black Community: Seattle’s Central District from 1870 through the Civil Rights Era (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1994).
32 Interestingly, there is little mention of Alfred T. Mahan, the widely known fin-du-siècle naval strategist who first suggested Kitsap County as a naval base.
33 Notably, the war record injects the fact that Japan unconditionally on 2 September 1945.
metal works. There is also a large, wooden chain standing in for its iron counterpart—each link is over one foot long. The narrative message is not only that the Navy Yard supported the fight; rather, these workers were also part of it. These workers won decorations from the Navy; decoration that were now on public display. The line between war and war support was, therefore, quite blurred.

What is opaquely hidden in this display is the modern-day navy. There are two exceptions to this: the interactive *John C. Stennis* display where visitors can hear recordings of radio chatter from the aircraft’s various deckhands, and large, chromic discs near the entrance to the Navy Yard. On these discs (fig. 4.9) men and women continue to operate precise machines. In contrast to earlier photographs, the modern-day, non-uniform dress code stands out.

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Figure 4.2: Warehouse Facing Memorial Park in Bremerton
Figure 4.3: Rivet passing Team from World War I

Figure 4.4: A school art project likely based on the photograph in figure 4.3 adorns a bus stop.

Figure 4.5: Memorial Park facing north. In the map (fig. 4.6), this is denoted at marker 14.
Figure 4.6: A street display showing the location of tourism attractions in Bremerton. The Naval History Museum is the gray figure to the right of marker 1. Memorial park is marker 14.
Figure 4.7: The plaque to Wyckoff's vision. The bars in the background are part of the Navy Yard’s fence.

Figure 4.8: World War II "record" of the yard's joiner shop.
Figure 4.9: Artwork featuring present-day workers.
The U.S.S. Turner Joy

Connecting Bremerton’s shore heritage to the actual water is the U.S.S. Turner Joy (DDG-951), the “ship in water” heritage element. It arrived in Bremerton in 1991. One gets to the Turner Joy by passing along a revitalized shoreline hosting a marina for pleasure boats. Unlike the museum or the park, there is an admission charge\(^{34}\) to go aboard; self-guided audio tours are available at an additional cost. This is likely due to upkeep costs, which would also explain the requirement to enter and exit through the gift shop stuffed cheek-to-jowl with kitsch and curios of all military persuasion. No focus or care is given to crafting this commercial display. When on the ship, there is little to mark it as special or unique from any other destroyer. The lone unique feature appears to be a six-by-six foot replica of the North Vietnamese prison cell. Faux bamboo bars house a dummy, and in the background is the POW/MIA flag. While the sentiment is admirable, it is a visual anachronism. A terrestrial, enemy holding cell is housed in the lower level of a nautical vessel. Yet here, like with the Panche, there is an attempt to bring other conflicts into the heritage and identity conversations.

\(^{34}\) Twelve dollars per adult as of August 2013.
A cornerstone of this chapter’s argument is that identity and heritage are political. What is displayed and what is cropped out of the collective memory turns on what the local public—and often what the local public elite—wish to show. The Turner Joy arrived in Bremerton as the result of a lost political battle in the 1990s between Bremerton and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The Turner Joy was not Bremerton’s first “heritage” ship; that was the U.S.S. Missouri. The Missouri is steeped in historical significance. It is the last of the Iowa-class battleships and, more importantly, its famed surrender deck is the spot where the Japanese surrendered on 2 September 1945 thereby ending World War II. From 1955 to 1984, Bremerton was home to the then-retired battleship. The reason it is not part of Bremerton’s local identity at present has to do with Bremerton losing a bidding war for the ship in the 1990s. When the Missouri was re-retired following Operation Desert Storm in 1995, Bremerton was put in a bind. The Secretary of the Navy is authorized by 10 U.S.C. 7306 to transfer retired naval ships to non-profit organizations. Despite the fact that Bremerton was the temporary home to the Missouri following the ship’s re-retirement, the city nonetheless was forced to make a bid to the Navy to keep a ship it had already re-opened for public, touristic purposes on 20 May 1995—Armed Forces Day. Competition for the Missouri was fierce. Bremerton would go up against four other groups representing three other, more populous localities: San Francisco, California with two bids and Long Beach, California and Honolulu, Hawaii with one bid each.

The selection process that followed was fraught with controversy. After an initial round of bids on the financial and technical aspects of the bid, the Navy added addition criteria of “historic significance” and “public benefits to the Navy.” Bidders were notified of the additional criteria in letters dated 5 June 1996, and they were given a deadline of 21 June 1996—less than three weeks. What was not disclosed was that the two additional criteria would carry a 75-
percent weight; the financial and technical aspects carried the remaining 25 percent. In addition, the criterion of “public benefits to the Navy” was vague and drew disparate responses. The Navy admitted that this situation was not ideal, and that although the additional criteria were impartially applied, “…the Navy did not do a good job in communicating its additional criteria to the applicant….As a result, to varying degrees, the evaluation team found all applicants lacking in information when measured against the added criteria.”

This controversy would spur a report “recommending changes to the Navy’s donation procedures,” but the change would not affect the Missouri’s relocation to Honolulu. Thus, despite lobbying at the local and federal levels, the ship anchoring the shore heritage displays was gone.

Poulsbo, Washington: Tourism through Norwegian heritage

Not all Kitsap municipalities, however, put the military on center display. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Poulsbo began re-branding itself in order to prominently display its Norwegian heritage. Again, like in the battle for the U.S.S. Missouri, this was a case of local elites lobbying for funds and passing resolutions. As in Ashworth and Tunbridge’s touristic-historic city, the political process dictates what aspects of a community get funding for preservation and what aspects do not. Like other resource-based economies in the Olympic Peninsula and coastal western Washington, Poulsbo was looking to avoid economic stagnation. The town finished second in a statewide redesign competition carried out in conjunction with the Century 21 Expo in Seattle. By the time the Trident base was under construction, Poulsbo was doing brisk tourism business because of its Norwegian heritage and reconstructing its working

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36 Ibid.
waterfront into a park. Its presentation of its Norwegian roots provides insight into the re-selling of ethnicity as a brand and the conflation between past heritage and present-day identities.

Figure 4.11: Page 1 of the 1929 Sanborn insurance map of Poulsbo, Washington.

This heritage presentation, however, is grounded in a real, historic presence. The Norwegian presence has been in Poulsbo since the first days of settlement. The 1900 census, the
first complete records available since the founding of both the town and the State of Washington, show an overwhelming number of immigrants and first-generation Americans from Norway. Sweden was also well-represented. Most residents of Dog Fish Bay Precinct, which appears to have included Kitsap, were either farmers, farm laborers, or loggers. The final class of workers resided in boarding homes. Only three men listed their profession as fisherman. By 1929, the Sanborn map indicates that Front Street and the three piers that connect the downtown to Liberty Bay are not heavily used for fishing but may serve as a delivery point for supplies. There are two feed warehouses and one grocer’s warehouse. By contrast, only one pier holds a structure of “net storage.” Front Street seems more concerned with automobiles; tire, gas, and oil dealers line the streets. What is evident, even in 1929, is the Norwegian influence on the town. One block from Front Street, Bjarmland Avenue shows that the Norwegian influence on street names significantly predates the re-discovery of marketable heritage in the mid-1960s. While fishing was not an economic driver, timber experience was married with maritime knowledge in the production of small boats. Over 750 small craft were constructed at the Young’s Block building on Front Street. A major activity for the local historical society at-present is the restoration of some of these 16-foot crafts. As of 2014, two such boats have been restored.

Heritage is not just about local identity; it is also an economic driver, especially in a small town like Poulsbo. But, Poulsbo is far from unique. There is an emphasis on Danish heritage in Solvang, California and Elk Horn, Iowa; an emphasis on Dutch heritage in Pella, Iowa and Holland, Michigan; an emphasis on Swedish heritage in Lindsborg, Kansas; and an emphasis on

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37 The Washington Territory’s portion of the 1890 census was lost in a 1921 fire.
38 This inference is based on the presence of a few merchants, clergyman, and an orphanage that is present on the third sheet of the 1929 Sanborn map.
Swiss heritage in New Glarus, Wisconsin. In Washington, Leavenworth brands its attributes as “Bavarian charm and Northwest hospitality.” This list is far from complete, but it gives a general sense of the rediscovery of ethnic heritage—notably, European ethnic heritage—in small towns across the United States.

Poulsbo’s streetscape carries the Norwegian heritage by way of the town seal—a Viking longboat—which is affixed to all major signs. Public parking lots are not labeled as parking or the customary “P” emblem; they are called King Olaf’s parking. The Norwegian heritage put a unique stamp on the town, which is not found elsewhere in Puget Sound. The onion-domed former city hall has become a shopping center with a more modern government building, but the Sons of Norway hall and the Poulsbo First Lutheran Church indicative of a continued interest in heritage by locals. On the main street, the Viking theme plays out at a bakery and several bars.

A critique leveled against this rediscovery of heritage is that it is overtly commercial—a rediscovery borne of the post-industrial turn to tourism as part of the broader service economy. Steven M. Schnell writes on the mid-century rediscovery of Swedish heritage in Lindsborg, Kansas, which billed itself as “Little Sweden, U.S.A.” This town had a “fairly standard Midwestern business district” in 1930 and was referred to as a “Gopher Prairie town,” invoking the bland, undistinguished, replicated nature of the town in Sinclair Lewis’s Main Street. In the 1960s and 1970s this changes, and traditions are discovered and rediscovered: “[Lindsborgians] had begun to revive vanished Swedish customs and traditions and even to

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42 Ibid, 12.
introduce them in areas of life where they had never been practiced.”\textsuperscript{43} The parallels between Lindsbourg and Poulsbo are evident. Both small towns felt compelled to rediscover their heritage in order to carve out a niche in the post-industrial tourism economy.

There is a political angle, as well as an economic one, behind Poulsbo’s re-branding that can be traced back to its participation in and winnings from the Century 21 design competition in 1962. This may be, per census records, a historically well-grounded effort, but it is one the local government promoted. This extended not only to the distilled ethnic heritage and Viking longboat on the city crest; it also extends to Poulsbo’s morphology. In 1972, one decade after the town won the Century 21 design competition and just one year before the Navy announced Bangor as the future Trident Support Site, Poulsbo began the process of tearing out its old dockworks to lay infill for a public park and pleasure boat marina. Importantly, Poulsbo’s City Council agreed to the park in principal but “the City of Poulsbo [was] without sufficient funds to complete the project.” A resolution passed by the council authorized the mayor to pursue state-level funds for the project.\textsuperscript{44} The filled park now hosts recreational boats and a statue commemorating King Olaf’s visit. A newer addition to the park is a cartoonish depiction of a Viking to go alongside the traditional statue. Since 1968, the town has hosted a Viking Fest, which includes a road race and other shore activities. The claims of Norwegian ties are not only bolstered by the initial census records but by an official state visit from the King of Norway in 1975. The king’s arrival prompted the Poulsbo City Council to adopt an emergency resolution


so that proper funds could be disbursed in preparation.\textsuperscript{45} The dignitary’s visit coincided with that year’s Viking Fest.

The political angle of Poulsbo’s Norwegian heritage is evident in these resolutions and state visits. The city may not have had funds initially to complete these projects, but they were considered important enough to warrant political maneuverings. The rediscovery and marketing of Poulsbo’s Norwegian heritage came a mere five years before the equally transformative announcement of the coming Trident submarine, but the city’s elites were already politically and financially invested in a non-military identity. While heritage and the re-embrace of an ethnic identity re-shaped Poulsbo’s presentation to outsiders and its tourism draw, Trident increased the local population significantly.\textsuperscript{46} It follows that this must be Trident-related, but the people who settled due to the submarine have yet to imbue any of their landscape with a military presence—save, possibly, the Viking longship.

\textbf{Keyport: A Federal Presence and an Emerging Submarine Narrative}

One place that does seem to be embracing submarines is Keyport; this signals a possible emerging Trident-related heritage. Importantly, however, this embrace comes from a federally funded museum. It does not have the local investment and, correspondingly, the military is absent from public space. Today, the civilian side of Keyport remains a crossroads with a church, a restaurant, and a small office of BAE Systems, the British defense giant that is one of the largest defense firms in the world. Keyport boasts a museum, which, unlike the other museums and other attractions profiled in this chapter, is run by the federal government. The Naval Undersea Museum opened to the public in 1995 and is overseen by the Naval History and

\textsuperscript{46} For specifics, see footnote 178.
Heritage Command. Based out of Washington, D.C., the command manages 42 sites nationwide at 13 distinct geographical locations. Of these 42 sites, 10 are museums. The command’s influence and governance also extends to naval shipwrecks that have been congressionally designated as heritage sites. Currently, an exhibit on submarine technology is under construction, and it will feature a simulator of the submarine *U.S.S. Greenling* (SSN 617). The *Greenling* is an attack submarine designed as the countervailing force to ballistic submarines, such as those based out of the support site. Other exhibits display naval technology relating to diving and torpedoes. If spillover is a hallmark of base communities, per Gillem, Keyport provides an antithesis. Its naval heritage is contained by the federal government and out of public space.

There are many reasons why this could be the case. Operating within the motif of this chapter, it does not have the local political pull nor does it have the public-private partnerships that Bremerton or Poulsbo have. But, Keyport is also dealing with a technology that has been purposefully hidden. It was not designed to be celebrated; it was not designed to be located period. Thus, this chapter circles back to the military landscapes at the beginning of this chapter: the gated, but visible, Navy Yard versus the invisible support site. Trident, and by extension submarines, impacted the county but not in a way that has been celebrated. What Keyport does signal, is the possible beginning of an identity that may spill over into a public space from a federal one. This is explored in the chapter’s conclusion.

**Conclusion**

The Naval Undersea Museum and the sail of the *U.S.S. Panche* (see fig. 4.10) may be the start of Kitsap bringing submarines into its local identity and tourism offering. These and the *U.S.S. Turner Joy* signal the acceptance of post-World War II displays as part of its identity.
Why the nuclear submarine is still not a vibrant part of this identity is unknown. Perhaps as an ongoing piece of the active navy, the Trident is seen as still part of the everyday lived reality. The clandestine, stealthy nature of the Trident makes public displays of present-day work (see fig. 4.10) unwarranted and perhaps even unwise from a security standpoint. The workers at Bangor buoyed Kitsap’s population and economy at a time when it was needed; identity, however, cannot be altered by the injection of new people. To reiterate from Markusen et al., “[P]eople follow jobs”;^47 they did not follow identities. And while efforts were made to adapt infrastructure and the, broadly conceived, environment, identity did not have to be ready for the arrival of Trident. In terms of the national *pathos*, there was a need for Trident (see chapter 2). Local identity did not have any kind of similar time table. With Keyport’s Naval Undersea Museum and the *U.S.S. Panche*, this may be changing as the passage of time means that more artifacts fall under the broad umbrella of heritage.

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Chapter 5: Conclusion

Threading the preceding four chapters together was a single, important technology: the Trident submarine. Currently still in service, the 14 remaining ballistic submarines (four were converted to conventional guided missile submarines) are not scheduled to be replaced until 2027.\(^1\) Twelve ships are slated to replace the remaining 14; however, budgetary concerns put this in jeopardy.\(^2\) This is exactly 50 years since the first Trident submarine, the *U.S.S. Ohio*, was completed in New London, Connecticut. While this was an impressive piece of naval engineering, the longevity of the submarine hints at the temporal shortsightedness of the Gunbelt thesis proffered by Markusen, *et al.* Weaponry has longer research and development times than in previous eras, but deployment time should also factor into the Gunbelt’s conception. This would allow it to deal with spillover effects—be they economic or cultural—that imbue public spaces and affect the everyday lives of the surrounding communities regardless of whether or not they are directly involved in the maintenance of the weapons system. The prevailing assumption is that military investment is always desired. Pro-base and anti-base sentiments exist, but in a community such as Kitsap County, where there is a long and constant history of a federal presence, the reaction of the community to increased federal investment is more nuanced.

When the Trident submarine was in the development, research, and production stages—the main stages of concern for Markusen *et al.*’s well-established Gunbelt thesis—fear of the Soviet Union and the need to compete technologically and militarily with the communist Other

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drove the process. In those stages, the Trident submarine, or any weapons system, is an idea or a scale model or a prototype. When the Trident submarine arrives in Kitsap it is a reality. This reality draws in economic funding and infrastructure as the people who are directly employed to service the Trident submarine also need roads for their cars, schools for their children, houses to live in, and many other resources.

The national or international concerns expressed in chapter 2 are what provided the necessary context for production. But, then there is a follow-up question at a different scale: What does the Trident submarine mean to Kitsap? This question could be answered multiple ways. Chapter 3 and 4 attempted to provide answers; the former in terms of federally backed infrastructure investment, the later in terms of locally inscribed tourism and heritage. Even within these chapters multiple, dynamic meanings emerged. In chapter 3, the very questions of what constituted an environment and a significant impact were matters for debate. Dynamism was also evident at the local level, as some towns publicly identified with the navy, and the military more broadly, more than others. Chapter 4 concludes that this is still an ongoing process that may or may not result in the Trident submarine eventually becoming part of the local identity or the marketable touristic landscape. In Bremerton and Keyport, there is evidence of an emerging appreciation of submarines and the post-World War II navy more generally, but not enough time has passed to reach a definitive conclusion as to whether or not the submarine will enjoy the vaunted identity and tourism status afforded to Bremerton’s surface ships and World War II-era production and repair shops. Poulsbo stands in stark contrasts to both Bremerton and Keyport. Despite the fact that the town is flourishing precisely because of the Trident-related population increase, Poulsbo has traded on its Norwegian heritage since the late 1960s and seems comfortable identifying with and trading on its ethnic, non-military past.
The subject of this thesis was chosen to highlight a single, paradigm-shifting event. It was not a story of the Navy arriving; rather, it was the story of the Navy staying and a place in danger of becoming part of the Navy’s past instead becoming part of the Navy’s future. Even in places where the navy is part of many people’s everyday lives, the nature of this relationship changes. Elected officials may have had the visibility and cachet to press for funding and other policy changes, but the demand came because of local concerns expressed by residents.

The Gunbelt thesis was a product of its time, and it could be used to explain Midwestern deindustrialization and project possible fallout from the demise of the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the role of the Other was left vacant and the need for a robust defense was put into question. Post-9/11 foreign and domestic policies have filled this lacuna by resurrecting the Other and making the concept stateless, spectral, and even more fraught with fear in the popular imagination. The two decades since the Gunbelt has also seen a renaissance in geography’s study of militarization and securitization. In an academic sense, military geographies are being seen and analyzed everywhere, from public commemorative displays to the most private and intimate of spaces. These social and culture turns can be used to expand the concept of the Gunbelt. The Trident submarine is one example, albeit a very significant and costly one, where this expansion can take place. It is hoped that the preceding thesis made a compelling, if preliminary, case for the Gunbelt’s expansion as a concept and the corresponding geographic expansion that would result from this. In Puget Sound, Boeing remains a key economic player despite the nominal move of its headquarters to Chicago in 2001. But, as the focus on Kitsap has conveyed, to say that the Gunbelt’s presence in Puget Sound is just Boeing is a myopic and limiting construction of what the Gunbelt could, and should, be.
The Trident submarine’s interaction with Kitsap is part of a broader, more complicated view of defense spending in Puget Sound that extends beyond Boeing. However, more work should also be done in this geographic area. To be clear, this thesis asks for an expansion of, not a negation of, the Gunbelt thesis. A much broader concept of militarization has gained acceptance in geography in the past two decades, and it can be applied to historical subjects. A similar thesis could have been done in many of The Rise of the Gunbelt’s case studies. Kitsap was attractive given the unprecedented nature of both the submarine and the federal funding that accompanied it. There are many other places where this type of work can be done. The United States has a military presence in every state and every continent, except Antarctica. This global reach places the call for an expanded Gunbelt outside the skills of any one scholar. This gets further complicated when militarization takes a non-U.S. perspective. In the Pacific Northwest, Canada also has a naval presence: its Pacific naval base is located just outside of Victoria. The blurring of military-civilian lines and the incorporation of a military ethos into the everyday, private lives of Canadians has been explored by Deborah Cowen.\(^3\) Chapter 3 previously alluded to Tivers’ United Kingdom-based work. Woodward grounds her studies in the United Kingdom, too. Perhaps then, the challenge is to expand beyond the traditional geographical foci of Anglo-American geography.

For future work, I propose extending not only the geographic area of my study from one county to a broader region, but also extending this time frame of my study. This thesis was centered on the need for and implementation of a single technology. A longer time period would afford me the opportunity to look across the long Twentieth century. Starting in the 1890s and

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continuing to the present-day, such a study can track the coming and going of multiple technologies and the geopolitical circumstances that preface or result from their implementation.
References


