Barry Ickes, Program Head/Chair Chloe Tergiman, Outside Unit & Field Member Yuhta Ishii, Major Field Member Rohit Lamba, Chair & Dissertation Advisor Miaomiao Dong, Major Field Member Vijay Krishna, Major Field Member
Keywords:
Bargaining Dynamic Games Outside Options Coase Conjecture Asymmetric Information
Abstract:
This dissertation consists of three essays in bargaining with outside options. In the first paper, I study the role of outside options in dynamic bargaining settings with interdependent values. I characterize limit equilibrium outcomes and provide conditions under which better outside options may erode bargaining power. In the second paper, I study bargaining outcomes in a dynamic bargaining game with unobservable outside options. An equilibrium with delay is constructed and limit properties are characterized. In the final chapter, I study a bargaining game in which the player with the outside option must make a costless investment in order to maintain the outside option. I characterize sufficient conditions under which under investment in outside options yields a higher payoff.