INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ACTORS' RELATIVE INFLUENCE ACROSS THE U.S. FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
Open Access
Author:
Schiff, Eleanor L
Graduate Program:
Political Science
Degree:
Doctor of Philosophy
Document Type:
Dissertation
Date of Defense:
May 31, 2017
Committee Members:
DAVID LOWERY, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor David Lowery, Committee Chair/Co-Chair Suzanna Linn, Committee Member Michael Berkman, Committee Member John Gastil, Outside Member
Keywords:
Congress president bureaucracy principal-agent theory education policy
Abstract:
This dissertation asks a fundamental question common to all bureaucratic institutions: how much relative political influence do political actors have over its inner-workings? Following a review of the literature, an agent-principal model is advanced that uses the bureaucratic agent as the starting point of analysis. Three theoretical mechanisms internal to the bureaucracy itself are hypothesized to impact the influence of political principals. Two empirical chapters specifically test the agent-principal paradigm with the results demonstrating suggestive support for the theory. Consistent with the U.S.’s constitutional design and separation of powers, both empirical chapters find that Congress and the president exert control over the bureaucracy. The concluding chapter discusses overall implications of the findings, the theory, and future research avenues to explore.