Pragmatism and the Past: Charles Peirce on the Conduction of Memory and History

Open Access
- Author:
- Brunson, Daniel J.
- Graduate Program:
- Philosophy
- Degree:
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Document Type:
- Dissertation
- Date of Defense:
- October 05, 2010
- Committee Members:
- Vincent M Colapietro, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor
Vincent M Colapietro, Committee Chair/Co-Chair
Brady Lee Bowman, Committee Member
Christopher P Long, Committee Member
Jennifer Mensch, Committee Member
William Pencak, Committee Member - Keywords:
- Hume
Reid
Berkeley
testimony
historiography
perception
memory
epistemology
pragmatism
Peirce
Descartes - Abstract:
- My dissertation is entitled Pragmatism and the Past: CS Peirce on the Conduct of Memory and History. I start from the longstanding criticism that pragmatism unduly neglects the past in favor of the future. As a response, I interpret Peirce’s pragmatism and its associated doctrines in light of his accounts of memory, history, and testimony. In particular, I follow Peirce’s own example of a deep engagement with the history of philosophy and related fields. For example, Peirce’s account of memory is linked to the development of a notion of the unconscious, which brings in both his work as an experimental psychologist and his interaction with figures such as Helmholtz, Wundt and James. Although my dissertation is primarily a recovery of Peirce’s philosophy, it is influenced by a variety of contemporary approaches to issues of memory and testimony, including thinkers such as Coady, Danto, Ricouer, and their commentators. Overall, I show that Peirce’s pragmatism calls for a robust notion of the past, rather than denying or reducing it to the future. Moreover, Peirce’s pragmatism offers a promising heuristic for any field of inquiry that concerns the past, and, as Peirce readily considers history a science, stands as a contribution to philosophy of science in general. Finally, Peirce’s account of the role of testimony in inquiry offers the promise of a fruitful contribution to another subject of great interest in contemporary philosophy.